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Begin New Search Content Type Policy Brief Publication Year within 10 Years Publication Year within 5 Years Publication Year within 25 Years

3401. Working in Export Manufacturing: A Blessing or a Curse?

Author:
Francesco Amodio and Andreas Menzel
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institute for the Study of International Development, McGill University
Abstract:
In popular opinion, manufacturing in developing countries is often associated with low wages, dangerous working conditions, lax regulation, and worker exploitation. Research has shown that factories producing for export or based on FDI pay wages equivalent to other sectors, have higher labour standards, and employ large numbers of female workers. However, there are reported adverse effects on well-being, and consequences for young workers. While skepticism remains on buyers’ ability and interest in improving labour standards, there is some evidence of improvement through safety councils and more skilled management. Fears of consequences for competitiveness have been largely unfounded.
Topic:
Labor Issues, Global Markets, Economic Growth, Exports, and Manufacturing
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3402. The Poison Pill: EU defence on US terms?

Author:
Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
It took two letters. One, sent to Brussels on 1 May 2019 by two US undersecretaries, accused the EU of damaging transatlantic cooperation and hindering US access to Europe’s defence market through the rules it plans to set for the participation of third states in the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). The other, sent to Washington on 16 May 2019 by senior EU officials of equal standing, refuted these claims by showing the objective and transparent way in which the EU had established the EDF and PESCO. Unlike the letter from Washington, which was laced with robust language and questionable accusations, the EU response argued that, even with the introduction of the two initiatives, the European defence market would remain more open than that of the US. The EU institutions also stated that by creating the EDF and PESCO, the Union was showing its collective determination to reduce European capability duplication and enhance interoperability, while also ensuring the competitiveness of Europe’s defence industry. In essence, the EU pointed out that its security and defence initiatives are designed to contribute to transatlantic burden sharing – something the US has been requesting from European allies for some time. While the US welcomes that the Fund allows for the participation of third states, it objects to the fact that recipients and subcontractors supported by the EDF will not be permitted to transfer sensitive information and/or Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) outside of the EU.1 Additionally, the US fears that the unanimity principle governing PESCO could ensure that any future US participation in the initiative could be vetoed by a single EU member state. At the core of Washington’s fears is the idea that EDF and PESCO could lock US firms out of the European market. However, the EU has made it clear that the EDF and PESCO will not alter EU defence procurement rules, lead to EU-owned defence capabilities, affect bilateral defence agreements between the US and individual member states and/or harm NATO defence planning targets and processes. Furthermore, given the US’ own long-standing and legitimate protection of its core defence industrial interests, there is a certain irony to its accusations of the EU because the Union has equally legitimate security interests. Following the exchange of letters between the partners, a number of questions have surfaced. First, despite a sustained campaign of influencing the EU to adopt favourable conditions for the US,2 why has Washington raised tensions with the Union now? Second, given that €13 billion has been earmarked under the EDF, and its own defence budget stood at $650 billion in 2018, why is the US so concerned? With a view to answering these questions, this Brief begins with an analysis of US government data that shows the asymmetry between US and EU defence markets. It then moves on to a discussion about a web of regulations and laws which effectively provides the US government with the discretionary power to control its defence market and technologies. The Brief ends with some reflections on why the US has decided to formally raise objections about the EDF and PESCO now and the deeper reasons underlying American concerns.
Topic:
European Union, Transatlantic Relations, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

3403. Russia in the Western Balkans: Tactical wins, strategic setbacks

Author:
Stanislav Secrieru
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Over the last few years, news about Russia’s conduct in the Western Balkans has resembled dispatches coming from the trenches of political and economic warfare: Moscow has slashed gas supplies, banned imports of agro-food products, conducted coordinated disinformation campaigns, nurtured nationalist organisations, deployed Cossack paramilitary groups, tested cyber defences and allegedly even tried to overthrow legitimate governments. This flurry of disruptive operations caught Europe by surprise and generated debate: does this resurgence herald Russia’s return to the region and if so, what is driving the comeback? What does Moscow want to achieve? What is the Russian modus operandi in the region? Is it confined only to coercion, as the headlines suggest, or is there a softer side to Russia’s power? Finally, looking retrospectively, did Russia’s approach bear fruit? This Brief addresses this set of questions in greater detail, with two key findings. First, Russia’s policy in the region is executed by a network of Russian state and non-state actors who are blurring the traditional lines between the public and private domains. This allows the Kremlin to tap into the resources of informal institutions and hide behind a fog of deniability. Second, Russia has raised the cost of Western Balkan integration in the EU and NATO by exploiting the region’s political and economic vulnerabilities. That said, although Moscow was able to slow down the process, it has hitherto failed to alter the region’s steady drift towards Western institutions, at least for now.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Balkans

3404. Stress Tests: An insight into crisis scenarios, simulations and exercises

Author:
Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Until the arrival of General Norman Schwarzkopf to United States Central Command (CENTCOM) in November 1988, American war planners assumed that the US’ biggest threat in the Middle East would come from a Soviet invasion of Iran. The Soviet Union had been a net exporter of oil until the late 1960s, but in order to meet its own growing industrial and energy demands Moscow looked increasingly to the Middle East and countries such as Iran to bolster its oil reserves. Based on his own reading, however, Schwarzkopf turned this planning assumption on its head and with CENTCOM he worked on a wargame based on an intra-regional conflict between Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia rather than a Soviet invasion. Apart from the precise details about potential US fatalities (Schwarzkopf and his team believed the US would suffer more casualties than it actually did), the general and his wargamers were right: Iraq eventually invaded and annexed Kuwait in August 1990 and Operation Desert Storm was over before the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. Schwarzkopf’s wargame had been prophetic in preparing the US military for war with Iraq. Of course, the history of wargaming and scenario planning does not always mirror the success achieved by Schwarzkopf. Companies such as Shell that are famed for their in-house scenario planning departments do have notable periods of success, but the company’s ‘futures branch’ was nearly shut down three times in almost 50 years of scenario planning at the firm because Shell’s leaders saw little value in its work. In some cases, sound scenario planning and the assessments they lead to are not taken seriously enough: for example, vulnerability assessments of the Fukushima nuclear plant showed that there was a risk from natural disasters such as tsunamis but the consequences of these assessments were downplayed. Most of the time, however, crisis scenario planning unfortunately emerges in the wake of a major crisis such as the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the US or the global financial crisis of 2007.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, European Union, Crisis Management, Hybrid Threats, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Europe and Global Focus

3405. Three Scenarios for Sudan: From non-violent revolution to democratic reform?

Author:
Katariina Mustasilta
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
On 11 April, Sudan’s long-standing head of state, President al-Bashir, was removed from office by his military generals following a large-scale non-violent uprising against the regime. Four months later, on 17 August, the Transitional Military Council (TMC) and the opposition coalition Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) signed a power-sharing agreement establishing a three-year transitional regime set up to steer the country towards democratic elections. The agreement forged in August was underpinned by the same dynamics that led to the overthrow of the regime in April: determined non-violent resistance demanding a transition to civilian-led rule. These events in Sudan demonstrate the potential of strategic non-violence in bringing about societal change, even in the face of violent repression. Indeed, research has found that non-violent resistance, defined as ‘the application of unarmed civilian power using non-violent methods such as protests, strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations, without using or threatening physical harm against the opponent’, is not only increasingly frequent but also more effective in achieving its goals than violent rebellion. Moreover, recent studies show that non-violent resistance creates better foundations for building democratic institutions than armed or elite-led transitions. In the light of these research findings, there is genuine potential for democratic transition in Sudan.
Topic:
War, Social Movement, Reform, Conflict, Protests, and Revolution
Political Geography:
Africa and Sudan

3406. Resetting Ethiopia: Will the state heal or fail?

Author:
Giovanni Faleg
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
While democratic reforms should in principle promote peace and stability, to what extent can they also exacerbate political violence? Although the academic debate is controversial with regard to this question,1 Ethiopia provides a good test case to look at conflict prevention from the perspective of a country that recently experienced a peaceful transfer of power, followed by fast-paced reformism, and can as a result either stabilise or fall back into conflict. Since the appointment of Abiy Ahmed Ali as prime minister in April 2018, Ethiopia has undergone a profound transformation. These changes are the result of the peaceful stepping down of Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn in January 2018 in response to severe societal turmoil. In an attempt to mitigate conflict and avoid extreme fragility, the new leadership sought to accelerate its progress towards democratisation, expanded political freedoms, introduced market liberalisation and developed a new approach to foreign policy, which led, inter alia, to the peace deal between Ethiopia and Eritrea. These transformations, however, have not occurred without turbulence. Insecurity and ethnic tensions have been worsening, leading to an unprecedented crisis of internally displaced persons (IDPs). The new foreign policy course paved the way for trade opportunities, but also new border tensions. A coup launched by Brigadier General Asaminew Tsige on 22 June 2019 attempted to seize power in Amhara’s regional capital Bahir Dar. The attempt failed, but the coup resulted in the assassination of the Chief of Staff of the Ethiopian Defense Forces General Seare Mekonnen and revealed to the world the country’s precarious political situation. This Conflict Series Brief analyses the drivers and prospects of the ongoing democratic transition in Ethiopia. It argues that while the implementation of reforms launched by the current leadership has the potential to deliver progress on democracy and growth, the outcome of the transition depends on a set of factors (domestic, economic and external), which in turn delineate three possible avenues: spiralling instability and relapse into conflict, gradual stabilisation and democratisation, or a mix of democratisation and turmoil. The conclusion outlines the possible contribution of the international community to reinforce the resilience of the Ethiopian state and its capacity to heal by bridging gaps in the current government’s ambitious reform agenda.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, War, Reform, Geopolitics, Fragile States, Economy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa, Ethiopia, and Sub-Saharan Africa

3407. Libya's Conflict: A very short introduction

Author:
Wolfgang Pusztai
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Eight years after the revolution, Libya is in the middle of a civil war. For more than four years, international conflict resolution efforts have centred on the UN-sponsored Libya Political Agreement (LPA) process, unfortunately without achieving any breakthrough. In fact, the situation has even deteriorated since the onset of Marshal Haftar’s attack on Tripoli on 4 April 2019. An unstable Libya has wide-ranging impacts: as a safe haven for terrorists, it endangers its north African neighbours, as well as the wider Sahara region. But terrorists originating from or trained in Libya are also a threat to Europe, also through the radicalisation of the Libyan expatriate community (such as the Manchester Arena bombing in 2017). Furthermore, it is one of the most important transit countries for migrants on their way to Europe. Through its vast oil wealth, Libya is also of significant economic relevance for its neighbours and several European countries. This Conflict Series Brief focuses on the driving factors of conflict dynamics in Libya and on the shortcomings of the LPA in addressing them. It shows how the approach ignored key political actors and realities on the ground from the outset, thereby limiting its impact.
Topic:
Civil War, Migration, Oil, War, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Libya and North Africa

3408. The EU as a Maritime Security Provider

Author:
Eva Pejsova
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Maritime security is one of the fundamental strategic interests of the European Union. Then HR/VP Federica Mogherini reiterated this fact at the conclusion of the informal meeting of EU defence ministers in Helsinki at the end of August 2019, adding that there was a ‘growing demand for an EU role as a maritime security provider not only in our region, but also further away’ – especially in Asia and the Indian Ocean. As a global trading power, the EU is vitally dependent on free, open and safe maritime shipping: 90% of its external and 40% of its internal trade is seaborne. The value of goods transported by sea is 1.8 times higher than that of goods transported by air and almost three times higher than that of goods transported overland.1 In 2018 alone, the value of trade between the EU and Asia, home to its main economic partners, reached €1.4 trillion, with 50% of it transiting through the Indian Ocean. As a result, the EU has a vested interest in a secure maritime domain and it is only natural that it should contribute to its preservation, especially in waters connecting it to its main economic partners in Asia. It is also natural that Asian countries want to see Europe becoming more proactively involved in addressing the many maritime security challenges – both traditional and non-traditional – in the Indo-Pacific, especially given its aspiration to play a greater security role in the region. The question is: can the EU perform such a role? How realistic is its ambition to become a maritime security provider in the region and how might it go about accomplishing this? The purpose of this Brief is to look into why, where and how Europe could contribute to improving the maritime security environment in the Indo-Pacific. A closer look at the current situation and the multitude of maritime security challenges facing littoral states in the region reveals several niches that the EU could fill. Analysing the Union’s key attributes and achievements in the maritime security field, the Brief identifies features and capacities that can effectively add value to regional security and stability.
Topic:
Security, Governance, European Union, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Europe and Indo-Pacific

3409. Darkening Horizons: Global Violent Deaths Scenarios, 2018–30

Author:
Gergely Hideg and Anna Alvazzi del Frate
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
The year 2017 saw the second highest annual rate of global violent deaths in the period 2004–17, according to this Briefing Paper from the Small Arms Survey. In 2017, 589,000 people—including 96,000 women and girls—lost their lives due to lethal violence. This corresponds to a rate of 7.80 violent deaths per 100,000 population, the second highest since 2004. The same figure for 2016 was 560,000 people, or 7.56 deaths per 100,000 population. The data for 2017 compared to 2016 was also the third-largest annual change during the period 2004–17. Overall, the proportion of female victims of lethal violence remained stable at 16%. This increase in the number of global violent deaths is primarily due to a rise in homicides, ie: non-conflict deaths. ‘In 2017, some 403,000 people were victims of intentional homicides, compared to 106,000 who were killed as a result of war or other conflicts,’ noted Gergely Hideg, co-author of the Small Arms Survey Briefing Paper Darkening Horizons: Global Violent Deaths Scenarios, 2018—30.
Topic:
Weapons, Sustainable Development Goals, Violence, and Death
Political Geography:
South America, Central America, and Global Focus

3410. War Crimes and Punishment: The Terrain Compound Attack and Military Accountability in South Sudan, 2016–18

Author:
Flora McCrone
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
On 11 July 2016, government forces stormed Terrain, a residential compound in Juba, South Sudan. Systematic violence, looting, and vandalism ensued—including one fatality, multiple incidents of rape and torture, as well as destroyed property. War Crimes and Punishment: The Terrain compound attack and military accountability in South Sudan, 2016–18, a Briefing Paper from the Small Arms Survey’s Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan (HSBA) project, examines both the attack and the subsequent special court martial that followed from May 2017 to September 2018. Despite the SPLA’s sub-par record of providing justice for victims of war crimes, the paper finds that when certain individuals and their interests align, accountability can be achieved through formal justice mechanisms.
Topic:
War Crimes, Conflict, Accountability, and Justice
Political Geography:
Africa, Sudan, and South Sudan