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Begin New Search Topic Federal Reserve Content Type Policy Brief Publication Year within 10 Years Publication Year within 3 Years

1. The case for a cautiously optimistic outlook for US inflation

Author:
David Reifschneider and David Wilcox
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
The Federal Reserve and most other analysts failed to anticipate the surge in inflation in 2021. Considerable debate now surrounds the question of whether the Fed is too sanguine in anticipating that too-high inflation will mostly take care of itself over the next few years, even as the unemployment rate remains low and monetary policy remains accommodative. This Policy Brief concludes that although the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) was too optimistic in the projections it issued in December 2021, the broad contour of its baseline inflation outlook for 2022 and beyond remains sensible. The authors find the 2021 surge in inflation resulted mainly from COVID-19-related sectoral developments rather than the classic situation of aggregate demand outstripping the overall economy's long-run productive potential. The statistical analysis in this Policy Brief was conducted before Russia invaded Ukraine. As a result of the war, the inflation situation will probably get worse before it gets better, and could do so in dramatic manner if Russian energy exports are banned altogether. Nonetheless, if the key considerations identified in this Policy Brief remain in place, and if monetary policymakers respond to evolving circumstances in a sensible manner, the inflation picture should look considerably better in the next one to three years.
Topic:
Federal Reserve, Economy, and Inflation
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

2. An analysis of central bank decision-making

Author:
Maria Demertzis, Catarina Martina, and Nicola Viegi
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The process by which central banks take decisions has evolved over the years, with a tendency towards independence and decisions taken by committees rather than individuals. Monetary policy committees can be set up formally in different ways, traditionally falling into one of two categories: individualistic or collegial. Individualistic committees reach decisions by voting and publish the votes of each of their members, while in collegial committees, decisions are typically reached collectively. The European Central Bank is an example of the latter, while the Bank of England follows an individualistic approach. Focusing on decision-making, a relevant question is whether the formal set-up in practice leads to different ways of deliberating and reaching monetary policy decisions. We look at decisions taken by the Bank of England, the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank over more than 20 years to evaluate how different the decision-making process is in these three central banks. The results indicate that, irrespective of the committee type, their approach to consensus building when they take decisions is similar. The three central banks seem to value reaching decisions by unanimity, both on interest rates – the prime monetary policy instrument by definition – and on asset purchases. Decisions to tighten monetary policy are more often taken unanimously than decisions to ease monetary policy. When maintaining policy unchanged, decisions are usually backed by most committee members.
Topic:
Federal Reserve, Finance, Central Bank, European Central Bank, Decision-Making, and Bank of England
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Global Focus, and United States of America

3. Another reason to raise the Fed's inflation target: An employment and output boom

Author:
David Reifschneider and David Wilcox
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
In 2012, the Federal Reserve formally adopted an inflation target and set it at 2 percent, in line with the level chosen by many other central banks. In hindsight, this setting left policymakers with too little room to cut interest rates when they want to fight recessions. Many researchers have noted that if central banks raised their inflation targets—either individually or in concert—they could do a better job in the long run of keeping inflation near its target and the workforce fully employed. Reifschneider and Wilcox highlight an additional and less-noted consequence of raising the inflation target modestly: The economy could enjoy a temporary but substantial boom in employment and output as it adjusted to the increase in the target. Critical to generating this favorable outcome would be decisive action by monetary policymakers to ensure that the higher inflation target is achieved in a reasonably timely manner. In light of substantial transition benefits, as well as the long-run improvement in economic performance, the authors recommend that the Federal Reserve raise its inflation target to 3 percent as part of its next framework review.
Topic:
Federal Reserve, Employment, Economy, and Inflation
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America