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1. NATO's New Ambitions for Space

Author:
Béatrice Hainaut
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Ahead of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, a devastating cyber attack targets Ukrainian army communications, exposing Western dependence and vulnerability to space technologies, and calling NATO's defensive posture into question. The longevity of the organization, which celebrates its 75th anniversary in 2024, is partly due to its ability to adapt to the international context. The war in Ukraine has undoubtedly strengthened its legitimacy and attractiveness. The massive use of space applications in Ukraine raises the question of the role of the Atlantic Alliance in providing space data and services to its member states: it does not have its own space capabilities, but its deterrence posture includes space. By equipping itself with a solid documentary corpus, space-focused centers, and access to national capabilities, the Alliance seeks to implement its vision of space as a theater of operations. This theater of operations aims at the integration and interoperability of the space assets of the various member states. For now, these are primarily American capabilities. NATO's space ambition then poses to the states the question of mobilizing financial and human resources. Moreover, deeper cooperation between NATO and the EU could presumably allow for the pooling of efforts.
Topic:
NATO, Science and Technology, European Union, Cybersecurity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and Space

2. Russia’s Influence and Disinformation Campaign in Armenia

Author:
David A. Grigorian
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Often-overlooked developments in Armenia show how Western policy makers are failing to recognize and counteract the growing sophistication of Russia’s propaganda machine. There is much the West can do. Intelligence authorities can start sharing more information about Russia’s influence operations. We need media that can report with more knowledge from the region. Working more closely with the pro-Western opposition, Brussels and Washington, D.C. can help shape an agenda that is not just offering better conditions for Armenia but also leads to more credibility in a Western-oriented agenda. Finally, it is important for the West to acknowledge their own blunders over the settlements between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which led to continued ethnic cleansing.
Topic:
Propaganda, Disinformation, and Foreign Influence
Political Geography:
Russia and Armenia

3. Ukraine’s path to European Union membership and its long-term implications

Author:
Zsolt Darvas, Marek Dabrowski, Heather Grabbe, Luca Léry, André Sapir, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Whether and when Ukraine accedes to the European Union will depend greatly on how and when its war with Russia ends and post-war reconstruction starts, and how the EU handles issues of governance, security, migration, trade, investment, the energy transition, decarbonisation and the EU budget. The enlargement process is likely to overlap with post-war reconstruction, increasing the EU's influence in fostering Ukraine’s institutional development. Ukrainian leaders will have strong incentives to comply with the accession criteria, which the EU should use astutely to create a better-functioning economy and public institutions, especially by reducing opportunities for corruption. This will require clearer standards for rule-of-law and fundamental values, including effective tools to ensure continued compliance after accession. That is also the most effective way to ensure a positive impact of future enlargements on EU governance. The EU will also need to develop assistance programmes to help the Ukrainian government manage post-war external and internal security challenges, including the large number of weapons in circulation, and to encourage Ukrainian refugees to return to the country when possible, as they will be needed for the reconstruction effort. If the current EU budget rules were applied and there were no transitional arrangements – which is unlikely – we calculate the total annual cost of Ukraine's integration into the EU budget at 0.13 per cent of EU GDP, which would hardly change net recipient/payer positions of current EU members. Some of this funding would come back to the EU via EU companies participating in EU-funded projects in Ukraine. Ukraine’s entry into the EU would benefit EU GDP via trade, migration and foreign direct investment, boosting employment, production and tax revenues in the EU. The history of EU enlargement shows that the strongest motivation for difficult reforms is a credible and predictable accession process based on rewarding reforms. Both Ukraine and the EU would benefit from progressive integration of the country into EU policies, alongside the formal accession negotiations. That would show the Ukrainian public the tangible benefits of moving towards EU standards, while also bringing Ukraine into areas such as energy cooperation and decarbonisation.
Topic:
European Union, Regional Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

4. Freerider or Strategic Balancer? Austria vis-à-vis NATO and Russia. US – perspective on Austrian neutrality politics

Author:
Jason C. Moyer and Patrick Kornegay
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 highlighted the fragility of peace and security in Europe. The resurgence of war in Europe prompted a reassessment of the security postures of traditionally neutral countries. Norms on military spending and assistance have been shattered, leading to Finland and Sweden reversing decades of military non-alignment to join NATO. Even Switzerland is eyeing a strategic overhaul and is considering joint exercises with NATO (Revill, 2022). Despite Sweden and Finland’s decision to join NATO Austria remains committed to neutrality. The public debate on Austria’s strategic culture has remained largely the same and policymakers in Vienna have not changed their stance on NATO. Russia’s war in Ukraine has underscored Austria’s need to reevaluate its policy of neutrality and strategic approach vis-a-vis NATO and Russia.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Neutrality, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Austria, and United States of America

5. Energy as a weapon - decoding blackmail tactics in Europe

Author:
Veronika Slakaityte and Izabela Surwillo
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
‘Energy blackmail’ became a buzzword following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the subsequent energy crisis, but the phenomenon is not new. Energy blackmail has been employed by states to leverage their strategic energy resources for decades. In Europe, the weaponisation of energy predates Vladimir Putin’s time in Kremlin. Despite EU efforts to diversify its energy supply, the threat of energy blackmail persists, posing challenges not only to traditional energy dependencies but also to the increasingly digitalised energy sector.
Topic:
European Union, Energy, Russia-Ukraine War, and Natural Gas
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

6. The war in Ukraine poses unprecedented threats to aid workers

Author:
Jethro Norman
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
An interstate war in Europe presents new security challenges for humanitarians. Along the 960km Ukraine-Russia frontline, humanitarian infrastructure has been hit by shelling, missiles and drone strikes, and aid delivery disrupted by electronic warfare. Supporting specialised training and removing outdated bureaucratic burdens are some of the ways in which donors and policymakers can help humanitarian organisations adapt to this new context.
Topic:
Security, Humanitarian Aid, Conflict, Peace, Russia-Ukraine War, and Aid Workers
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

7. Humanitarian principles are under fire in Ukraine

Author:
Jethro Norman
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Ukraine presents a unique challenge for many international humanitarian organisations. Operating in a context of heightened geo-political and donor interest, and in close proximity to military actors, amateur volunteer groups and Ukrainian civil society are testing the core principles of neutrality and impartiality that once underpinned humanitarian work.
Topic:
Security, Civil Society, Humanitarian Aid, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

8. The Gaza War: Military Quagmire, Political Labyrinth

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
As the Israeli conflict in Gaza marks its third month, Israel has been unable to achieve military decisiveness. The resolution of the hostage issue and the administration of the Strip remain uncertain. Russia and Iran have taken advantage of the situation to strengthen their positions, leading to an expansion in the circle of those opposing Israel.
Topic:
Hamas, Armed Conflict, Hostage Crisis, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

9. Tit for tat: A turn in the Russian-Ukrainian war

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
Ukrainian forces are expanding their incursion into Russia's Kursk Oblast, a surprise not seen since World War II. The Russian response has been traditional and disorganised. If Russia fails to repel the advance, Ukraine could regain control over the conflict and set new negotiation terms.
Topic:
Security, Armed Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Incursion
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

10. Inside the ICBM Lobby: Special Interests or the Public Interest?

Author:
William D. Hartung
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The nuclear weapons lobby is one of the most powerful forces in the military industrial complex. 1 The lobby’s current priority is advocating for the $315 billion Sentinel program to build a new Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). The program has faced controversy over both its utility and its cost, including a cost increase of a whopping 81 percent since 2020. The key champions of the Sentinel program are the Senators from Montana, North Dakota, Utah and Wyoming — states that are home to major ICBM bases or host major work on the Sentinel program. The group — known as the Senate ICBM Coalition — stresses the Sentinel’s purported role in strengthening nuclear deterrence as well as its creation of jobs in the states they represent. However, other members of Congress and ex–defense officials have raised urgent concerns about the Sentinel program, questioning the deterrence rationale that undergirds it and raising the alarm over the risk of accidental nuclear usage. Despite claims about Sentinel’s economic benefits, it remains unclear how many jobs the program will actually create. Weapons contractors — led by the Sentinel’s prime contractor, Northrop Grumman — play a central role in the ICBM lobby. Since 2018, members of the strategic forces subcommittees of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees have received $3.8 million from the 11 major Sentinel contractors. In total, ICBM contractors have donated $87 million to members of Congress in the last four election cycles alone. Contractors’ influence efforts are aided by the fact that senior government officials and members of Congress often secure jobs in the arms industry when they leave government; this provides them the opportunity to lobby former colleagues. In all, the 11 ICBM contractors have spent $226 million on lobbying in the past four election cycles. They currently employ 275 lobbyists, the vast majority of whom have passed through the revolving door from influential positions in government. The Sentinel program should be scrutinized as part of a larger reassessment of U.S. nuclear policy. The 2023 report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States endorses the program and calls for a comprehensive nuclear weapons build-up, including the possible placement of multiple nuclear warheads on ICBMs — a highly aggressive strategic posture that has not been in place since the Cold War. A high number of Commission members have ties to the nuclear weapons industry, including its co–chair Jon Kyl, who was once a lobbyist for Sentinel prime contractor Northrop Grumman. Congress must weigh the dubious benefits of the Commission’s proposals against the significant risks and costs its recommendations would entail if carried out.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Grand Strategy, Military-Industrial Complex, Militarism, and Sentinel Program
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and United States of America

11. Right-Sizing the Russian Threat to Europe

Author:
George Beebe, Mark Episkopos, and Anatol Lieven
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Western leaders, including U.S. President Joe Biden, have frequently framed the invasion of Ukraine as the first step in a Russian plan of broader European conquest. However, a close examination of Russian intent and military capabilities shows this view is dangerously mistaken. Russia likely has neither the capability nor the intent to launch a war of aggression against NATO members — but the ongoing brinkmanship between Russia and the West still poses serious risks of military escalation that can only be defused by supplementing military deterrence with a diplomatic effort to address tensions. An analysis of Russian security thinking demonstrates that Putin’s stated views align with long-standing Russian fears about Western encroachment, given Russia’s lack of natural barriers to invasion. As Putin has come to view NATO as increasingly hostile to Russia, aggressive Russian action in defense of its claimed “sphere of influence” has become a factor in European security. However, contrary to many Western analyses, this does not mean that Russia views future wars of aggression against NATO member states as in its security interest. This does not imply naivete about the danger of Russian aggression, as reflected most recently in its illegal invasion of Ukraine. But it highlights the fundamental differences between Russia’s perceptions of Ukraine, which it has long regarded as both critical to its national security and integral to its history and culture, and its views of NATO countries, where the cost-benefit balance of aggression for Russia would be very different. Understanding Russian incentives also requires assessing Russia’s actual military capabilities compared to NATO. As frequently reiterated by NATO leadership, such an assessment shows that Russia is at a decisive conventional military disadvantage against the NATO alliance. While Russia would do damage in a conventional war with NATO, it would almost certainly suffer a devastating defeat in such a conflict absent nuclear escalation. NATO has a greater than three-to-one advantage over Russia in active-duty ground forces. NATO also has even greater advantages in the air and at sea. The alliance has a ten-to-one lead in military aircraft and a large qualitative edge as well, raising the probability of total air superiority. At sea, NATO would likely have the capacity to impose a naval blockade on Russian shipping, whose costs would dwarf current economic sanctions. While Russia has clear military superiority over individual NATO states, especially in the Baltics, it is extremely unlikely it could exercise this advantage without triggering a broader war with the entire NATO alliance. However, NATO’s powerful military deterrent alone cannot create stability in Europe. Paradoxically, an excessive reliance on military deterrence is likely to increase instability by inducing Russia to rely increasingly on its nuclear force as its primary basis for deterrence. Unlike conventional forces, Russia and NATO possess roughly the same amount of nuclear weapons. Washington must work to defuse this increasingly unstable dynamic by restoring diplomatic lines of communication between Russia and the West.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, NATO, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

12. Rethinking the U.S.–Belarus Relationship

Author:
Mark Episkopos
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Belarus is commonly seen as a Russian outpost on NATO’s eastern flank, with its president, Aleksandr Lukashenko, cast as a categorical opponent of Western interests. This narrative became ascendant in the West after Russia’s full–scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. However, a fuller examination of Belarusian foreign policy under President Lukashenko reveals a more nuanced picture of a country that, despite its historic ties to Russia, has consistently demonstrated a willingness to engage with the West. Lukashenko has sought to pursue what he calls a “multi–vector foreign policy,” straddling the great powers to best safeguard Belarus’s national sovereignty and its interests. This multi–pronged approach has shifted decidedly in recent years, however, with Lukashenko drifting into the Russian camp, as evidenced by Minsk providing logistical support and safe passage to Russian troops in its war on Ukraine, and allowing Russian tactical nuclear weapons on Belarussian soil. But these policies did not occur in a vacuum. They were, rather, a direct result of American efforts to isolate Belarus through a maximum pressure campaign which began in the aftermath of the 2020 re–election of Lukashenko. Western policies aimed at isolating Minsk have had the counterproductive effect of pushing Lukashenko closer to Moscow and Beijing, in an effort to counteract what he sees as a Western program of driving regime change in Belarus. Western governments, particularly Washington, should recognize that maximum pressure will backfire by pushing Belarus closer to Moscow. An alternative strategy based on resetting relations with Belarus and enabling the return of Lukashenko’s multi–vector foreign policy holds the promise of preventing the further integration of Belarus and Russia and possibly even reversing some of Putin’s moves to pull Belarus into the Russian orbit. To execute this strategy, the United States should: Explicitly disavow regime change and the training of anti–Lukashenko dissidents as U.S. policy goals in direct talks with Belarussian officials, conditioned on Belarussian assurance that it will not use its territory as a staging ground for attacks on NATO Establish a piecemeal approach for sanctions relief with Belarus as progress is made toward resetting relations Pursue bilateral cooperation with Belarus, including the resumption of energy trade, American investment, and other cultural arrangements. Pursuing the soft reset prescribed in this paper will not be easy, but the alternatives would leave the United States in a weaker strategic position by needlessly heightening Minsk’s dependence on its Russian neighbor. Steps toward reaching a new understanding with Belarus can instead bolster eastern European stability and enhance NATO’s eastern deterrent posture.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, National Security, Bilateral Relations, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eastern Europe, Belarus, and United States of America

13. Ukraine, Gaza, and the International Order

Author:
Faisal Devji
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The ongoing crises in Ukraine and Gaza show the urgent need for a new internationalism that comes to grips with the increasing independence of middle and smaller powers around the world. Such a vision must reject the effort to re-impose a failed framework of unilateral U.S. primacy, or an effort to shoehorn multiplying regionally specific conflicts into an obsolete model of “great power competition” that recalls the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. In both Ukraine and the Middle East, the United States has been unable to impose its will either militarily or diplomatically. Smaller nations have successfully defied American–backed military force. Even more concerning, a significant share of the global community has failed to follow the U.S. diplomatic lead and support the U.S. interpretation of international norms. But opposition to the United States has not been supported by a superpower peer competitor to the United States, along the lines of a Cold War model. The current emerging world order is instead characterized by “regionalization,” a situation where middle and even small powers around the world feel free to circumvent or even defy U.S. interpretations of global norms based on more local interests and regional security concerns. The stage was set for the current situation by the U.S. attempt to assert unilateral power during the War on Terror in ways that appeared to give the United States alone a de facto exemption from global norms and institutions. These actions reduced the legitimacy of the post–World War Two international order that the United States had helped to create, and led many in the international community to seek alternatives to a system that seemed to grant the United States almost arbitrary power to define the rules. The U.S. foreign policy establishment must come to grips with the newly deglobalized and regionalized world order. A failure to do so poses a grave threat to U.S. power and influence, as relationships with key emerging powers such as India, or even traditional U.S. allies in Europe and Asia are not immune from the kind of de–globalizing and regionalizing forces seen in Ukraine and the Middle East.
Topic:
Cold War, International Law, National Security, Hegemony, Grand Strategy, Armed Conflict, International Order, Russia-Ukraine War, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Israel, Eastern Europe, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America

14. Nuclear arms control policies and safety in artificial intelligence: Transferable lessons or false equivalence?

Author:
Eoin Micheál McNamara
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Multiple nuclear arms control treaties have collapsed in recent years, but analogies associated with them have returned as possible inspiration to manage risks stemming from artificial intelligence (AI) advancement. Some welcome nuclear arms control analogies as an important aid to understanding strategic competition in AI, while others see them as an irrelevant distraction, weakening the focus on new frameworks to manage AI’s unique and unprecedented aspects. The focus of this debate is sometimes too narrow or overly selective when a wider examination of arms control geopolitics can identify both irrelevant and valuable parallels to assist global security governance for AI. Great power leaders frequently equate AI advancement with arms racing, reasoning that powers lagging behind will soon see their great power status weakened. This logic serves to intensify competition, risking a spiral into more unsafe AI practices. The global norm institutionalization that established nuclear taboos can also stigmatize unethical AI practices. Emphasizing reciprocal risk reduction offers pragmatic starting points for great power management of AI safety. This research is part of the Reignite Multilateralism via Technology (REMIT) project, funded by the European Union’s Horizon Europe research and innovation programme under Grant Agreement No. 101094228.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Cybersecurity, Economic Policy, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and United States of America

15. China as the second nuclear peer of the United States: Implications for deterrence in Europe

Author:
Jyri Lavikainen
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
China’s nuclear build-up will make it a nuclear peer adversary of the United States in the 2030s. The US will have to deter both Russia and China, as well as other regional adversaries, with forces geared to engage in one major war at a time. If two major wars occur either simultaneously or sequentially, US military capability will be put under great stress. In the event of a second war, the US may find itself in a situation of conventional military inferiority, which it might have to compensate for with greater reliance on nuclear weapons. Since the US remains the ultimate guarantor of European security, its deterrence challenges elsewhere affect European security as well. Thus, even the possibility of war in the Indo-Pacific is a European security issue. European NATO allies can help mitigate the two-peer problem by permanently taking on a greater share of the burden of Europe’s conventional defence. At the same time, the effectiveness of NATO’s nuclear capability must be enhanced. A strategic defeat for Russia in the war in Ukraine would postpone Russia’s ability to pose a military threat to Europe. Ukraine’s NATO membership would further serve to reduce the threat of another major war in Europe.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

16. Russia’s presidential election: Signalling repression and demobilizing opposition

Author:
Margarita Zavadskaya
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Autocrats such as Vladimir Putin use elections strategically to demonstrate their capability to secure the necessary votes. This primarily benefits the regime’s inner circle and rent-seeking elites who rely on Putin’s presidency for their wealth. Although a notable proportion of the Russian population regards the election and Putin’s leadership as legitimate, their support for Russia’s military actions in Ukraine is waning. Only a slim majority backs the continuation of the conflict. Despite the oppressive political environment, opposition initiatives such as “Noon against Putin” manifest ongoing resistance. These actions were reflected in vote tallies abroad, where support for Putin was dramatically lower than in Russia. The post-election period is likely to see the persistence of Russia’s current domestic and foreign policies, with the potential for increased societal and economic tensions. The declining support for the war could further complicate the regime’s efforts to maintain a unified front. This could potentially impact Russia’s global standing and internal stability.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Elections, Democracy, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

17. Russia’s wartime ideology: Radicalization, rent-seeking and securing the dictator

Author:
Jussi Lassila
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Anti-Western propaganda and the indoctrination of citizens, especially young people, have gradually intensified since the early days of Putin’s rule. However, their radicalization during the war is indicative of the regime’s need for manipulative control rather than reflective of broad support for the regime’s worldview. The most significant shift in the Kremlin’s wartime propaganda has been its codification in school education since the summer of 2022. This timing reveals more about the regime’s need to justify the war and its consequences than it does about any consistent long-term strategy. Key actors behind the ideological codification are opportunistically exploiting the current context. Meanwhile, ideological radicals face little opposition, as most citizens show limited interest in their activities. Despite the regime’s indoctrination practices, the indifference of society suggests that the conditions for a strong anti-Western consensus after Putin will be weak. Such a consensus can only emerge if the future regime, like the current one, is able to maintain satisfactory material conditions and a tolerable daily life alongside its ideological views, whatever they may be.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Radicalization, Democracy, Ideology, Post-Soviet Space, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

18. No End in Sight? The West, China, and the Russo-Ukrainian War

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The West supports Ukraine as a non-belligerent. China purports to be neutral, but the West increasingly sees it as a non-belligerent on the side of Russia. In a way, the West’s and China’s approaches are not dissimilar: doing enough for “their” side to stop it from losing the war, but otherwise sitting it out in the hope that the other side will somehow give up. That can hardly be called a strategy. Both the West and China will have to review their strategies if they want to preserve their interests. Will this inevitably increase tensions between them?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Russia-Ukraine War, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Asia-Pacific

19. Procurement by Proxy: How Sahelian Juntas Acquire Equipment from Ousted Security Partners

Author:
Nina Wilén
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
During the past two years military juntas in Mali and Niger have ousted three multilateral security missions in addition to French, and more recently American, forces deployed to fight jihadists in the two countries. Although being preceded by deteriorating relations, the decisions to kick out the international partners have been announced abruptly and the departures have been rushed as juntas have increased pressure for the missions to leave. After making the decision to oust the missions, the juntas have also mounted new obstacles for the missions and their departures, either taking, or forcing the missions to leave a large amount of equipment and material behind. This article argues that this is a deliberate strategy by the military juntas in Mali and Niger to acquire new equipment and material for their security forces, in some cases to be used with new security partners, such as Russia.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Russia, Mali, Sahel, and Niger

20. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Mobilisation in Wartime

Author:
Andriy Stavytskyy
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
As Russia’s war in Ukraine enters its third year, we launch a new series of briefs on various aspects of the conflict. Many of the authors of these briefs are based in Ukraine. The war shows little sign of ending. Ukraine is fighting for its survival and is determined to drive Russia from its territory, while Russia continues to hope that it can mobilise sufficient resources to outlast the west’s support for Ukraine. Although there have been important developments at the tactical level—for example, in the increased use of drones by both sides, in Ukraine’s successes in diminishing Russia’s naval power and in its ability to strike targets inside Russia—there has been little movement on the front lines for many months. Both sides have been forced to adjust, operationally and strategically, to the prospects of a drawn-out conflict. In the first brief of the series, Andriy Stavytskyy examines Ukraine’s need to mobilise, prepare and train half a million men to relieve those who have fought since the start of the full-scale war. This will not only challenge the military but will also have profound economic effects.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Economy, Mobilization, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine