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1. The Impacts of the Russo-Ukranian War on Latin America in the Age of Strategic Competition

Author:
Guido Torres
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
As we enter the second year of the Russo-Ukranian war, it is prudent that the foreign policy community examine the impacts of the conflict on other regions, including Latin America. Despite the distance between Latin America and Ukraine, the conflict has disrupted the region and exacerbated the negative impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. COVID-19 disproportionately affected Latin America’s fragile socioeconomic, fiscal, and political situation. For example, Brazil, a major regional economic powerhouse, was one of the worst-struck countries in the region, and the pandemic significantly impacted its economy. The country’s GDP contracted by 4.1% in 2020, and unemployment reached a record high of 14.1% in the first quarter of 2021. The pandemic also impacted Brazil’s fiscal situation, with the country’s debt reaching 90% of GDP. Brazil’s downturn is not an isolated incident, albeit a microcosm of the region. In addition, the instability allowed authoritarian regimes to further consolidate control in places like Nicaragua, Venezuela, and El Salvador. For instance, leaders like El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele capitalized on the chaos of the pandemic and a desperate citizenry to strengthen his power. Furthering the impacts on domestic politics, the confluence of the pandemic and war in Ukraine disrupted global supply chains, agriculture production, and energy resources. Moreover, as tensions between the West and nations such as Russia and China continue to grow, globalization is becoming increasingly divided. This will likely lead to further political turmoil and socioeconomic disparity in Latin America, which has already been compounded by the war and the lackluster COVID-19 recovery efforts. With these repercussions still lingering, a lack of economic and trade development, an intensifying energy crisis, and rampant inflation prevailing in 2023, the region’s outlook remains bleak.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Conflict, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Latin America

2. European Mercenaries: Will Congo use Wagner in its conflict with Rwanda?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Tensions broke out between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda in January 2023 after an exchange of accusations of non-compliance with their peace agreement signed in the Angolan capital Luanda in November 2022. The development came after Kinshasa announced that it uses private military firms to counter growing security threats. Kigali regarded this move as a declaration of war.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Conflict, Wagner Group, and Private Military Companies (PMCs)
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Rwanda

3. A Dead-End War: Russian Failure and Ukrainian Destruction

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
With all parties still clinging to their demands, there is no end in sight to the war: Russia wants to cement its control over four Ukrainian provinces, win recognition of its sovereignty over Crimea, and secure guarantees for Ukrainian neutrality. Ukraine wants a definitive end to hostilities, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory (including Crimea), and negotiations on its strategic future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Conflict, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

4. Leveraging Islam and Internal Conflict: Strategies and Consequences in Russia’s War Against Ukraine

Author:
Miriam Katherine Heß
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Assessment of the president of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov; the inner-Chechen conflict; and Chechen fighters on both sides in Russia’s war against Ukraine reveals how internal conflicts become crucial for international structures and how transnational dynamics – such as foreign fighter flows – pose challenges to the interplay of national and international law. By anticipating the effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine beyond the Zeitenwende in Germany and Europe, policy-makers will increase readiness and preparedness for the ongoing but also post-war period.
Topic:
Islam, Conflict, Foreign Fighters, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Central Asia

5. Economic sanctions against Russia: How effective? How durable?

Author:
Jeffrey J. Schott
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
Economic sanctions by Western democracies against Russia have not stopped the war and attacks on Ukrainian civilians. Together with continued economic and military support for Ukraine, however, sanctions are blocking Russian president Vladimir Putin from achieving his territorial objectives. Sanctions have contributed to a sharp compression of Russian imports; forced Russia’s military and industry to source from more costly and inefficient suppliers at home and abroad; and slowly begun to squeeze Russian government finances. The G7 countries must sustain and augment their efforts, including by confiscating frozen reserves of the Central Bank of Russia to help fund Ukraine’s reconstruction. G7 policymakers need to derive lessons from the current crisis about the utility of sanctions in conflicts between major powers. Maintaining coherent and coordinated sanctions against large and powerful target countries is critical for the effectiveness and durability of the policy. Deploying sanctions against such rivals also requires a long-term commitment to the implementation and enforcement of the trade and finance restrictions. Sanctions impose costs on both the target country and those imposing the sanctions, so Western policymakers need to offset those costs via domestic support or tax relief to sustain political support over time for sanctions in big power conflicts.
Topic:
Sanctions, Economy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

6. Russia after the Wagner mutiny: Yevgeny Prigozhin and the Kremlin’s gamble with the monopoly on violence

Author:
Jussi Lassila and Margarita Zavadskaya
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Vladimir Putin’s system is built on risk-averse loyalty and needs informal actors who can compensate for the inefficiency of official actors and partially satisfy the regime’s ambitious geopolitical visions. In Prigozhin’s mutiny, the same factors that had protected the regime’s integrity and deepening autocracy turned out to be vulnerabilities. The elimination of Prigozhin does not resolve this structural weakness but only shifts the problem elsewhere. Private military company (PMC) Wagner operated in Ukraine as an autonomous unit of the Russian army with more discretion on the ground and certain organizational advantages. However, PMCs should not be seen as private armies, but as extensions of the bureaucratic army or attempts to produce “pockets of efficiency”. The decentralization of armed groups weakens their ability to act against the political leadership. At the same time, this can be a ticking time bomb that critically weakens the state’s monopoly on violence.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Conflict, Wagner Group, Russia-Ukraine War, and Yevgeny Prigozhin
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

7. North Africa Can Reduce Europe's Dependence on Russian Gas by Transporting Wasted Gas Through Existing Infrastructure

Author:
Mark Davis, Perrine Toledano, and Thomas Schorr
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
North Africa can reduce Europe's dependence on Russian gas by transporting wasted gas through existing infrastructure.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Oil, Military Strategy, Natural Resources, Gas, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

8. Russia, Ukraine and international Law

Author:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Russian actions in Ukraine since 2014, and the tensions to which they have led, obscure the legal aspects of these attacks thereby opening the way to propaganda and approximations. To contribute to a better understanding of what is at stake, this contribution is limited to the legal aspects of an otherwise eminently political issue. This in fact heralds a spectacular break in the international order and a violation of commitments and treaties signed by a member of the Security Council of the United Nations that have not been witnessed since the Second World War[1].For a long time, Russian diplomacy was attached to the strict and formal respect of the rules of international law, sometimes "clinging" to them in a bid to resist the demands made by the different populations. Even during the succession of the USSR, this constant was respected. However, the actions in Crimea and Donbass since 2014 have marked the abandonment of this formalism, while the Kremlin's diplomacy is promoting the need to conclude new treaties with the United States and European states so that Russia can endorse its claims.
Topic:
International Law, Conflict, Norms, Annexation, and Disputes
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

9. Has Europe’s hour come?

Author:
Antoine Cibirski
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
“Europe’s hour has come”, said a Luxembourg minister in 1991 at the beginning of the Yugoslav wars. The context seemed favourable: an initially peripheral crisis, a relative lack of interest on the part of Russia, a green light from the United States which was even encouraging invention by the Western European Union (WEU), the majority of whose activities were taken over by the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and later by the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). America's 'pet project' at the time was not yet Asia, but rather the management of the decay of the Soviet world, without much interest in the Western Balkans. In response, some Europeans 'held back' and feared an unfavourable division of tasks: 'noble' collective defence missions reserved for NATO and peacekeeping missions, considered 'subordinate', for Europe. Strategic prescience! Four years later, we had witnessed the bombing of civilians, the siege of Sarajevo, broken ceasefires, failed mediations and Srebreniça. We had experienced the humiliations inflicted on a UN force (UNPROFOR) that had a timid mandate and overly restrictive rules of engagement. The British and French were in the field this time round, but not the Germans. The Dayton Peace Agreement, which only France calls "the Dayton-Paris agreement" (a formal concession by Bill Clinton to Jacques Chirac) was largely a Pax Americana. In the American camp, Richard Holbrooke had pulled the strings and decided everything, by ruthlessly relegating the European leaders, including Carl Bildt, Jacques Blot and Pauline Neville-Jones[1].
Topic:
European Union, Conflict, and Integration
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

10. The Threat of New Wars in the Caucasus: A Good Case for U.S. Restraint

Author:
Anatol Lieven and Artin DerSimonian
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The decline of Russian power due to military defeats in Ukraine risks leading to increased violence and instability in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The effects of this can already be seen in the flare–up of fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenia, inadequately checked by Russian peacekeepers. This shift in power creates a temptation for Washington to increase its involvement in the region in an effort to end Russian influence there. This temptation should be resisted. The United States has no vital national interest in this region — certainly not ones that are worth the risk of new wars. The conflicts in the southern Caucasus are deeply intractable, and have roots that long predate the Soviet collapse and indeed the Soviet Union itself. They were not created by Russia, and cannot be solved by the United States. Increased support for Georgia risks empowering a new attempt by Georgia to retake its lost territories by force, leading to another war with Russia, the outcome of which would be uncertain and highly dangerous. Increased support for Azerbaijan threatens Armenia and would create a fierce backlash in the Armenian–American community. Instead, the United States should continue to play a helpful but limited diplomatic role, aimed not at solving these disputes but at reducing tensions and preventing new eruptions of violence.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, and Instability
Political Geography:
Russia, Caucasus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, United States of America, and Nagorno-Karabakh

11. Russia’s Ill-Fated Invasion of Ukraine: Lessons in Modern Warfare

Author:
Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Russia has failed to achieve most of its objectives in Ukraine because of poor military planning, significant logistical problems, low combat readiness, and other deficiencies, which undermined Russian military effectiveness. These and other challenges—including Ukrainian military efforts and Western aid—severely impacted Russian air, ground, cyber, and maritime operations. Russia’s failures will force the Russian military to fundamentally rethink its training practices, organizational structure, culture, logistics, recruitment and retention policies, and planning efforts. Nevertheless, Russia is still attempting a de facto annexation of parts of eastern and southern Ukraine that it controls.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

12. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Western Military Assistance

Author:
Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The tenth Brief in the “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series concerns the Western military assistance to Ukraine. Tony Lawrence, the Head of the Defence Policy and Strategy Programme at the ICDS, examines donor dilemmas, and how the Western military assistance has changed the course of the war. He highlights the steps made by Western Allies even before the 24th of February, and their considerations regarding “offensive” and long-range weapons, as well as Russia’s efforts to discourage donors. He concludes that most weapons can be used for both offence and defence, and therefore the Allies earlier argued about self-imposed restrictions. He states that the offensive-defensive dilemma was largely resolved when the war shifted to the east. Donor dilemmas include fear of escalation, the apparently limited capacity of manufacturers to produce replacements, and ensuring that Ukraine is provided with what it needs. Lawrence concludes that the West’s military assistance, far from being historically unprecedented, has been uneven and broadly cautious. Ukraine’s victories are Ukraine’s alone, but they could not have been achieved without Western assistance. The outcome of the war will depend to a large extent on Western supply of weapons and equipment to Ukraine, as Russia’s military strength degrades.
Topic:
Conflict, Foreign Assistance, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

13. EU Defense After Ukraine: A New Capabilities Agenda

Author:
Tony Lawrence and Louis Pernotte
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has had profound impact on European and transatlantic security organisations. NATO has taken steps to strengthen its own deterrence and defence posture but, recognising the risk that the war may become or be portrayed as a NATO-Russia conflict, has carefully avoided a direct institutional response. The EU Member States have, by contrast, acted collectively against Russia, notably in implementing robust EU-wide sanctions and in using EU instruments to finance the delivery of lethal weapons to Ukraine. Through these actions, the EU has gone some way towards strengthening its geopolitical posture as envisaged in its most recent strategy document, the Strategic Compass. In this short series of briefs, we examine some aspects of the EU’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The second considers the EU’s longer-term efforts to enhance European military capabilities through initiatives adopted and proposed in the light of the war.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, European Union, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

14. Russia’s Losing Hand in Ukraine

Author:
Seth G. Jones, Philip G. Wasieleswki, and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The United States and its partners and allies should be prepared to conduct a sustained diplomatic, economic, military, and humanitarian campaign that supports Ukraine and raises the financial and military costs for Moscow of meddling in Ukraine—both now and in the future. Russia has several weaknesses that can be exploited, and Ukrainian nationalism and Western resolve could present formidable, long-term problems for Moscow.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

15. How Russia Fights

Author:
Nicolò Fasola
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Until this year’s renewed aggression on Ukraine, over-reliance on catchy labels such as “hy- brid war” has led many observers and deci- sion-makers to under-appreciate (if not disregard com- pletely) one undeniable fact: that over the last 20 years, the Kremlin has achieved its key strategic goals mainly through kinetic military means. Notwithstanding a weak tactical performance, Rus- sia won the 2008 “August war” against Georgia in only five days and successfully imposed its own regional set- tlement. In 2014, the annexation of Crimea, while sup- ported by the promotion of favourable socio-political conditions, was carried out and secured militarily; even more so in the Donbas campaign, where Russian propa- ganda suffered from serious limitations. Finally, the role of the Russian military in Syria beginning in 2015 was evident, albeit frequently reduced solely to the use of the Aerospace Forces. Notably, and besides obvious differences linked with the specifics of each theatre, the military interventions that Russia has conducted since 2008 display a consistent modus operandi. An analysis of these experiences can help illuminate what Russia is doing today and might do in the future, thus enabling NATO to fine-tune its posture on the Eastern flank. This Policy Brief draws on an expanded research project regarding Russia’s approach to war, as well as on a wealth of Russian-language military essays and commentary – deliberately highlighting the way the Russian military thinks of and practises war on its own terms.
Topic:
War, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

16. The war in Ukraine and the future of Russia-China relations

Author:
Marcin Kaczmarski
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The China-US rivalry, observed since late 2017, has pushed Moscow and Beijing closer togeth- er, but it has not transformed their relation- ship. One reason is the persistent cautiousness of both states, another is Moscow’s lack of capabilities to offer genuine support to China in such areas as the econo- my, trade or technology. The official rhetoric, boasting about the relationship being “better than an alliance”, in reality hides real obstacles to a more substantial co- operation. The first “post-pandemic” in-person meeting be- tween Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping on 4 February 2022 seemed to have opened the new era in Sino-Rus- sian relations. The joint communication was unusually ideologised, with both states claiming their democratic traditions. China offered support for Russia’s “legiti- mate security concerns” in Europe and opposed fur- ther NATO enlargement. Russia reciprocated by sup- porting China in Asia. The slogans of the relationship having “no limits” or no “red lines” dominated the post-summit narratives. Russia’s war against Ukraine has pushed the Si- no-Russian relationship into uncharted waters. Mos- cow’s failure to secure a quick victory has put Beijing in an uncomfortable position. The future direction of Sino-Russian cooperation will depend heavily on the length of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the ultimate decision of Beijing as to what extent (if at all) to prop up Russia economically. Regardless of whether Beijing decides to assist Mos- cow in bypassing Western sanctions, the unravelling of the Sino-Russian relationship is highly implausible. We can expect either China’s explicit economic support for Russia or the maintenance of close political ties without economic support. In the first scenario, Russia’s dependence on China would increase dramat- ically, diminishing Moscow’s room for manoeuvre in foreign policy and ultimately turning Russia into Chi- na’s asset in the latter’s global rivalry with the US. In the second scenario, Russia would remain an autono- mous actor, pursuing close political cooperation and normative anti-Western convergence with China, but increasingly isolated and weakened economically. It is only domestic political change in Russia, the end of Vladimir Putin’s personal rule in particular, that would provide Moscow with an opportunity to reassess the relationship with China.
Topic:
International Cooperation, War, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

17. Russia’s “total confrontation” on the Eastern flank

Author:
Marc Ozawa
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
For the second time in less than a year, Russian troops have gathered on Ukraine’s border in alarming numbers raising concerns of a possible invasion. In the meantime, Russia is posing conditions that are unacceptable to the West. Unless NATO, allies and Partners respond appropriately, the chain of events that Russia has initiated could inadvertently trigger a conventional war between Ukraine and Russia. If this were to happen, there is the real risk that some allies could be drawn into the conflict. This underscores the need for the Alliance, in tandem with the EU, national governments, and the private sector, to deepen coop- eration and respond in a timely, unified and coordi- nated fashion. At the same time, it is more important than ever that NATO, allies, and Partners understand Russia’s intentions. This raises the need for a return to regular and sustained dialogue with Russia. The right response for NATO will depend on changing circum- stances – namely Russia’s actions, the progress of di- plomacy, and the Alliance’s collective will to support Ukraine.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

18. Avoiding the Dangers of a Protracted Conflict in Ukraine

Author:
Anatol Lieven, Sarang Shidore, and Marcus Stanley
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
A protracted conflict in Ukraine looks increasingly plausible. Russia continues to launch attacks on military and civilian targets, and the United States and its partners are increasing shipments of arms to the Zelensky government. Washington is reportedly making plans to support long-term guerrilla warfare against Russian forces, should Kyiv fall. The current path toward a protracted war in Ukraine is highly undesirable and is laden with grave risks to the interests of the United States, Ukraine, and the international community. Such risks include: • a high cost in Ukrainian lives and suffering and the destruction of Ukraine — its infrastructure, institutions, and social fabric; • radicalization of Ukrainian society and a consequent civil war; • escalation to a great-power war, potentially involving nuclear weapons and pitting NATO against Russia, thereby threatening U.S. national security; • a weakening of NATO’s cohesion; • a prolonged global recession that strikes the U.S. as hard as it will any other nation. The United States and its allies should avoid these destructive outcomes by prioritizing support for the Ukrainian government to achieve a diplomatic settlement. Such a settlement will result in a more secure outcome for Ukraine, the United States, the European allies, and the rest of the world. While the details of such a settlement lie beyond this brief’s scope, the progress of Ukrainian–Russian talks indicates that a settlement providing for meaningful sovereignty and independence for Ukraine is possible. Avoiding a protracted conflict also implies that the United States should not adopt maximalist objectives, such as regime change in Moscow or the complete and decisive defeat of Russia. It should instead deploy sanctions to build up Ukraine’s negotiating leverage.
Topic:
NATO, Conflict, Escalation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

19. How to Maintain International Unity on Ukraine (Part II)

Author:
Sarah Cliffe, Hanny Megally, Karina Gerlach, Faiza Shaheen, and Leah Zamore
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:
This piece is the second part to our analysis published in early April on what it would take to maintain international unity on Ukraine. In the first analysis, we noted the large number of countries that abstained from or voted against the resolution suspending Russia’s membership in the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council, including nine out of the ten most populous countries in the world.
Topic:
United Nations, Conflict, Multilateralism, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

20. The next war: How Russian hybrid aggression could threaten Moldova

Author:
Dumitru Minzarari
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia could target Moldova by embarking on a limited-scope but overt military invasion; or by pursuing more covert hybrid aggression scenarios. The three most plausible Russian aggression scenarios are: a military action launched from Transnistria; a local, elite-focused rebellion similar to Russia’s exploits in Donbas in 2014, likely centring on the Moldovan region of Gagauzia; and popular unrest stoked by Russia and containing violent elements. The EU and Moldova underestimate the risk of one or more of these happening. The EU’s preferred “resilience” approach to hybrid threats lacks an active component that can effectively respond to, and repel, Russian aggression. Moldova should draw on Western support to implement an “active resilience” policy to better confront and undermine Russian actions. The EU should set up a CSDP mission in Moldova comprising both civilian and military components that helps the Moldovan authorities plan and conduct security threat assessments and protect against military and hybrid risks.
Topic:
European Union, Conflict, Resilience, Hybrid Threats, and Invasion
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Moldova

21. Survive and thrive: A European plan to support Ukraine in the long war against Russia

Author:
Piotr Buras, Marie Dumoulin, Gustav Gressel, and Jeremy Shapiro
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine is likely to last many years, even if the violence may subside at times. To sustain Ukraine during this conflict, Europeans should draw up a four-part ‘long-war plan’. This plan would comprise military assistance to Ukraine in the form of a ‘security compact’; security assurances that respond to scenarios of Russian escalation; economic support, giving Ukraine access to the EU’s single market; and help to secure Ukraine’s energy supply. Besides its practical impact, this plan will signal Europeans’ commitment to assisting Ukraine, showing Kyiv, Moscow, and the wider global community that the EU is in it for the long haul. The long-war plan will also provide clarity to anxious publics in member states. Together, these proposals would protect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and help create the long-term conditions for a resolution to the war – if and when a more constructive attitude emerges in the Kremlin.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Conflict, Military, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

22. Pugwash note on the situation in Ukraine

Author:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:
We note with great concern the worsening situation in the ongoing conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The annexation of areas currently controlled by Russian military will exacerbate tensions as Ukraine seems determined to recover the occupied regions and is supported by several NATO countries. The situation is quite complex as armed hostilities continue unabated, and opposing security perceptions by the parties involved do not appear easily reconcilable. Despite the fact that prospects for a ceasefire look dim under this current situation, a ceasefire is a necessary step towards stopping this dangerous conflict which, while it is heavily affecting Ukraine, is also a very destabilizing element that threatens international security.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Global Security, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

23. Pugwash Statement on the War in Ukraine

Author:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine is a very dangerous war inside Europe. It is the first significant Russian military intervention in Europe in more than 50 years.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

24. Russian Crisis Behavior, Nagorno-Karabakh and Turkey?

Author:
Richard Giragosian, David G. Lewis, and Graeme P. Herd
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:
On September 27, 2020, Azerbaijan initiated a war to retake the disputed Armenian-populated enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven districts of Azerbaijan held by Armenian forces.1 The forty-four-day war resulted in a resounding defeat for the Armenian forces and only halted with the acceptance of a Russian-imposed agreement for a cessation of hostilities on November 9-10, 2020. Although the war was initially expected to unfold as a war of attrition with an eventual stalemate based on the advantages of terrain of the Armenian defenders, reality differed in terms of duration, intensity, and outcome.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

25. EU and Russia: From a Partnership to a Rivalry

Author:
Jelena Jurisic
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
At the beginning of the 20th century Halford Mackinder was the first to write about a possibility of integrating Europe and Russia in his famous essay “Geographical Pivot of History.” The latter, on his map of natural crossroads of power, constituted the biggest portion of the “Pivot Area”, later dubbed “the Heartland”, while the former constituted the western part of the “Inner or Marginal Crescent.” Mckinder perceived that an alliance of Europe, as homeland of progress, and Russia, which throughout history influenced Europe by the vastness of its territory, could form the biggest center of power that would span between two oceans and dominate the world. A version of this continental connection was presented some 20 years later by Karl Haushofer who in the alliance of Germany, the Soviet Union and Japan saw a geopolitical force which could crush the domination of the Anglo-Saxon civilization. The next to grasp to the ideal of “Greater Europe” in the fifties was Charles de Gaulle who made a statement about a “Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.” With the political rapprochement of France and West Germany with the Warsaw Pact led by the USSR he wanted to distance the two for NATO and the dominance of the United States. In the late eighties is was Mikhail Gorbachev who spoke about The “Common European Home” as an ultimate goal of the process of integration, be it in the west as well as in the east of the old continent, in order to end their military and political confrontation through integration. Notwithstanding, with his appeasing foreign policy and wrong steps he achieved the opposite. With the disappearance of ideological chains between Russia and the West the idea of “Greater Europe’’ also ceased to exist. Moscow embarked on the process of democratization, and with it of rapprochement with the US and the EU, and in 1994 the EU–Russia partnership and cooperation agreement was signed. Four years later Boris Yeltsin hosted an informal summit with Helmut Kohl and Jacques Chirac, which resulted in creation of Paris-Berlin- Moscow axis. This axis lasted for just a few minutes as during the press conference the Russian president stated that Russia cannot become a member of the EU and NATO. Pale facial expirations of his guest indicated clearly their thoughts on this statement. Europe did not take seriously the wakened successor of the USSR.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Hegemony, European Union, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

26. Current State of Ukraine’s Play within the Geopolitical Map of Europe

Author:
Iuliia Osmolovska
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
The beginning on November has been rich on worrysome developments in Eastern Europe and around Ukraine in particular. With reports of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) of continued and evergrowingnumberofceasefireviolationson the frontline in Donetsk and Lugansk regions - climbing to more than 750 daily on 12th and 13th November - satellite data on suspicious build-up of Russian forces near the Ukrainian border and respective US warning its EU allies of Russia’s potential invasion in Ukraine, migrant crisis on Polish-Belarussian border leading to aggressive land and aerial border patrol checks by joint Belarus and Russia military forces - the whole security landscape of Eastern Europe becomes ever more shaky and troublesome. Spiced up with undeclared energy war in Europe and Troyan Horse of Nord Stream 2, muscle stretching in the Black Sea, still-to-be-defined political configuration and policies of the new German government, turbulent presidential run-up France, everything leads to ideal mulled waters for perfect fishing. At first glance, all the mentioned presents rather gloomy picture of unfavorable setting, in which Ukraine has to operate nowadays. Russia seemingly has a tactical upper hand it its confrontation with the West and enjoys this advantage. Yet, this could be true, if we ignore some fundamental systemic changes. They are firmly shaping irreversibility of Ukraine’s pro- Western orientation and ever further steady integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures, thus leaving tiny fading prospect for potential return of Ukraine into Russian orbit of influence. Recent poll data demonstrate that 62% of Ukrainians support the country’s integration into the EU, while 58% support Ukraine’s membership in NATO. The number of Ukrainians, who see better guarantees in Ukraine’s membership in NATO has risen to 55% in 2020 (compared to 26% for neutral status and 5% for a military union with Russia and other CIS countries).
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

27. In Russia's Hands: Nagorno-Karabakh after the ceasefire agreement

Author:
András Rácz
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Nearly five months have passed since the 9 November 2020 ceasefire that ended the second Nagorno-Karabakh war. The conflict broke out as a culmination of tensions that had been mounting for years, and had already resulted in two smaller flare-ups (one in April 2016 and another in July 2020). The war took a heavy toll on the lives of Azerbaijani and Armenian civilians, as well as claiming the lives of altogether more than 5,000 fighting personnel, and resulted in the displacement of approximately 70,000 Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh. This Brief analyses to what extent the ceasefire agreement has provided the ground for a lasting, stable and sustainable settlement. While the overall stability of a post-conflict situation may depend on a range of factors, this analysis focuses on three main variables that could affect the resilience of the post-war status quo in the medium and long run. The first and second of these – the stability of the present post-war territorial configuration and the uncertain future legal status of the parts of Nagorno-Karabakh that continue to be administered by the separatist de facto authorities – constitute underlying, inherent weaknesses of the ceasefire agreement. The third and probably most important factor is the Russian peacekeeping contingent deployed to Azerbaijan in order to maintain the ceasefire, because it brings in Russia’s political will as an independent variable that could fundamentally shape the overall settlement process. The deployment of Russian troops into Azerbaijan deserves special attention, because there is a theoretical possibility that it may lead to a new ‘freezing’ of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution process, instead of politically settling the conflict itself. The core problem is that should Moscow decide to keep its troops on Azeri soil even after their original five-year mandate expires, it is unlikely that Azerbaijan could prevent such a scenario. The Brief is structured as follows: in the first section, the weaknesses of the ceasefire agreement are analysed, while in the following section the role and potential future outcomes of the Russian peacekeeping mission are examined. The concluding section offers a forward-looking perspective on the post-war status quo.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, War, Peacekeeping, Conflict, and Ceasefire
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Nagorno-Karabakh

28. Appeasement and Autonomy: Armenian-Russian relations from revolution to war

Author:
Narek Sukiasyan
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Armenia’s foreign policy and its role in the post-Soviet space are often characterised as ‘pro-Russian’. While such a description is partially true, it is overly simplistic. This Brief analysis the main trends and evolutions in Armenia’s Russia policy after the 2018 Velvet Revolution: how the changes have influenced Russia’s approach towards Armenia, how these dynamics affect Armenia’s autonomy and what the consequences of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war are for Armenia’s regional security and alliances. After the revolution and up until the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, no substantial strategic changes were made to Armenian foreign policy. The leadership has avoided framing its external affairs in geopolitical ‘pro or against’ terms, promoting a ‘pro-Armenian’ policy that aims to maintain good relations in all directions and prioritises sovereignty as a foreign policy principle. Instead, the revolutionary ambitions of the new leadership have been directed towards domestic issues such as fighting corruption, reforming the judiciary and law enforcement bodies, improving the business environment and addressing social issues.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economy, Conflict, Regional Integration, Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, and Appeasement
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Armenia

29. Russia's Redefined View on Strategic Stability: A Security Dilemma in Northern Europe?

Author:
Jyri Lavikainen
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Te concept of strategic stability has traditionally been associated with a stable nuclear relationship between leading nuclear powers, the US and USSR/Russia. Teir last commonly agreed defnition of the concept in 1990 formed the basis of the START negotiations, defning strategic stability as a nuclear relationship, where neither side has an incentive to attempt a disarming strike. In 2016, Russia and China suggested replacing the concept of strategic stability with ‘global strategic stability’ by arguing that the conventional defnition of strategic stability as a military category concerning only nuclear weapons was outdated.1 Instead, they seek to redefne strategic stability as a concept con- cerning the state of great-power relations, with both political and military categories, the military category being the focus of analysis in this paper.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Conflict, Strategic Stability, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

30. Three decades of Russian Policy in the European Part of the Post-Soviet Space: Swimming Against the Current

Author:
Arkady Moshes and Ryhor Nizhnikau
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The successful pursuit of Russia’s great-power status and its recognition by the West imply the preservation of pre-eminent positions, above all in the European part of the post-Soviet space. Since Vladimir Putin’s rise to power, the Kremlin has been making a consistent effort to reverse the earlier trend towards the weakening of Russia’s regional stance. One of the implications of this policy was the shift of the Russian-Western competition in the “common neighbourhood” towards an open stand-off after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russian regional policy has run counter to structural changes that could not be counter-balanced through activism, whether enticing or coercive. As a result, 30 years since the dissolution of the USSR, Russia’s regional influence as well as its attraction as a societal role model and a security provider are continuing to erode. Russia has regional clout, which is nonetheless hardly growing over time. More and more often, Moscow is encountering difficulties in achieving its goals. While post-Soviet states resist Russia’s assertiveness, non-Western players pose new challenges to its posture.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Post-Soviet Space
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Post-Soviet Europe

31. Waves of ambition: Russia’s military build-up in Crimea and the Black Sea

Author:
Gustav Gressel
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s capacity to carry out large-scale military operations against Black Sea states allows it to coerce and extort them. Reducing the predictability of such operations is the first step towards deterring them, because Moscow carefully weighs their risks. Western countries should increase their militaries’ interoperability with Black Sea states’ armed forces and improve the infrastructure they use to deploy reinforcements in the region. This would allow them to react to Russian military escalation in kind and thereby increase the risks for Moscow. With Ukraine and Georgia engaged in land wars against Russia, the vulnerabilities of Ukrainian and Georgian airspace and territorial waters have received relatively little attention. Western states could begin to address these vulnerabilities by establishing an international naval presence in the Black Sea. This would counter Russia’s attempts to deny other nations free use of the sea, and could help mitigate long-standing rivalries between allied states in the region. These efforts to enhance Black Sea states’ security will depend on improvements in other areas, particularly the security of government communications, counter-intelligence, the rule of law, and the fight against corruption.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Military Affairs, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, Crimea, and Black Sea

32. TINA for Putin – Or is there an alternative?

Author:
Marc Franco
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
EU Relations with Russia hit the news headlines this week. The visit of EU High Representative Josep Borrell, launched in a constructive spirit, ended up in a diplomatic catastrophe. The Navalny saga and the recent weekly demonstrations all over Russia have been commented on at length in the Western press. What is going on in Russia? How to interpret the recent surge of aggressiveness of theRussianauthorities? Aretheprotestsjusta small hiccup in a stable Putin regime, or is something more going on? To be clear, this is neither the end nor, probably, the beginning of theendofaregime.Buttheeventsarefarfrom insignificant. In this article I look at the ongoing events from three angles: what is the Putin regime up to? What is behind the recent wave of protests? And what are the implications for the EU’s relations with Russia?
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, European Union, Conflict, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

33. The EU and Russia: A New Foreign Policy for the “Carcass”?

Author:
Marc Franco
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Without any irony: the decision of High Representative (HR) Borrell to go to Moscow in early February was courageous and correct. The discussion on EU-Russia relations at the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) of 22 February and the conclusions of that meeting were a success. But that does not mean that the EU should not drastically improve its foreign policy game.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

34. Ceasefire or Escalation in Libya?

Author:
Ben Fishman
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
After the fall of Sirte, Erdogan and Putin’s desired ceasefire can only be achieved with Washington’s support. Over the past week, regional and European actors have increased their diplomatic activity around Libya in response to intensifying violence in the nine-month-old civil war. On January 8, less than a week after the Turkish parliament approved sending forces to support the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA), President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian leader Vladimir Putin met in Istanbul and called for a Libya ceasefire to begin on January 12. Whether or not Moscow and Ankara manage to pause the violence temporarily, their growing influence in Libya represents an epic failure of Western attempts to resolve the conflict diplomatically. The longer-term effort to jumpstart Libya’s political transition requires a wider international effort at peace and reconciliation—something Russia and Turkey can support but not lead. Putin and Erdogan seemed to acknowledge that fact at their summit, endorsing a long-planned multilateral conference in Berlin aimed at recommitting all relevant actors to support an end to hostilities and respect the UN Security Council’s mandatory but widely ignored arms embargo. Even assuming Putin is serious and withdraws Russian mercenaries from the frontlines, a full, lasting ceasefire cannot transpire until the other actors who support Gen. Khalifa Haftar’s so-called Libyan National Army (LNA) agree to withdraw their equipment and personnel for a fixed period while negotiations are launched—especially the United Arab Emirates, which provides the LNA with critical air superiority. At the same time, Turkey would have to take commensurate de-escalatory steps of its own. The United States is the only actor that holds enough weight with all the foreign parties to bring about an authentic ceasefire. Despite being consumed with crises in Iran and Iraq, Washington should expend the diplomatic effort required to pursue durable stability in Libya before the country slips further toward endemic chaos.
Topic:
Diplomacy, United Nations, Conflict, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Middle East, Libya, North Africa, and United States of America

35. Idlib and Its Environs: Narrowing Prospects for a Rebel Holdout

Author:
Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
During the war years in Syria, the northwest, specifically Idlib, has become a site of heavy internal displacement. Observers on the ground recognize the green buses traveling to Idlib carrying migrants who have refused reconciliation agreements with the Damascus regime. Since around 2014, a range of jihadist, Islamist, and Salafi actors have wielded control in the area, the most recent being the al-Qaeda offshoot Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which has ruled—ineffectively and brutally—through its so-called Syrian Salvation Government. But the group's reign is unlikely to last long if current trends persist. The regime's recent move against the town of Maarat al-Numan suggests plans for a broader takeover in the northwest, aided by Russian firepower and other allies such as Iran. In this Policy Note filled with local insights, jihadism expert Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi presents the current scene in and around Idlib province, the last Syrian outpost still run by independent rebels. Absent an intervention by Turkey, the Assad regime will likely prevail in a campaign that quashes the insurgency at a high humanitarian cost.
Topic:
Al Qaeda, Displacement, Military Intervention, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, and Idlib

36. Making the Most of the Berlin Conference on Libya

Author:
Ben Fishman and Charles Thépaut
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
If the latest conference is to succeed, the principal actors stoking the civil war must endorse a genuine ceasefire and a return to Libyan internal dialogue. On January 19, international leaders will convene in Berlin to discuss a way out of the nine-month civil war between the so-called “Libyan National Army” led by Gen. Khalifa Haftar and the internationally recognized Government of National Accord led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj. The Germans led several months of preparatory efforts at the request of UN envoy Ghassan Salame, but had been reluctant to choose a specific date until they were assured that the event stood a reasonable chance of producing practical steps to improve the situation on the ground and jumpstart the UN’s stalled negotiation efforts between the LNA and GNA. Chancellor Angela Merkel finally took that step after several key developments unfolded earlier this month, including a January 8 ceasefire proposal by Russian president Vladimir Putin and Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Putin’s subsequent failed attempt to have each side sign a more permanent ceasefire agreement in Moscow on January 13 (the GNA signed but Haftar balked, though most of the fighting has paused for the moment). Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has been averse to engage on Libya during his tenure, but he is expected to attend the Berlin conference alongside National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien. Accordingly, the event gives the United States a chance to play a much-needed role on several fronts: namely, pressuring the foreign actors who have perpetuated the war and violated the arms embargo; working with Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia to codify a ceasefire at the UN Security Council; and backing Salame’s efforts to reinvigorate the Libyan national dialogue, which Haftar preempted by attacking Tripoli last April despite European support to Salame. Since 2011, Libya has struggled to establish a legitimate transitional government despite three national elections and the creation of at least four legislative bodies. Challenges to the 2014 election results eventually led to rival governments in the east and west, and the division solidified when Haftar started the first civil war with support from his allies Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. That war halted in 2015, but several years’ worth of domestic and international efforts failed to bring Sarraj and Haftar to an enduring resolution.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Civil War, United Nations, Conflict, Negotiation, and Conference
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Middle East, Libya, Germany, North Africa, United Arab Emirates, Berlin, and United States of America

37. Idlib: The New Strategic Nucleus of the Battle over Syria

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
After Turkey’s unsuccessful ultimatum set for the Syrian regime and its Russian ally to commit to the Sochi Agreement, Ankara has targeted the Assad regime and its allies’ locations along the de-escalation zone by launching Operation Spring Shield. Russia has capitalized on Turkey’s anger by offering an agreement establishing new facts on ground during a Turkish-Russian summit on March 5th.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Armed Forces, Geopolitics, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, United States of America, and Idlib

38. An Advance Line of Defense: Moscow’s Objectives in Libya

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
Moscow is escalating its undisclosed intervention in Libya to set up an advanced line of defence in the Mediterranean but the chances of its success are uncertain due to the nature of the NATO’s potential countermeasures and the political legitimacy that Russia’s Libyan partners will gain.
Topic:
NATO, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Libya, and North Africa

39. 2020 Country Brief: Russia

Author:
Third Way
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
Under Vladimir Putin, Russia is our adversary. The goals of Vladimir Putin are simple and dangerous: 1) reassert Russian global “great power” status; 2) have supremacy over the territory of the former Soviet Union; and 3) create a sphere of influence in the international system to achieve dominance. To do so, the Kremlin seeks to weaken America and its allies by sowing domestic discord, discrediting the institutions of democracy, and destroying US alliances and partnerships. Under Donald Trump, they are winning.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Power
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

40. From Bad To Worse? The Impact(s) of Covid-19 On Conflict Dynamics

Author:
Katariina Mustasilta
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
In December 2019, when the novel strain of coronavirus first hit the headlines, 12 countries in the world were experiencing organised violence on an extensive scale, with more than 100 incidents of violence and attacks against civilians recorded in that month. To most of these countries, the virus seemed a distant threat at the time. Yet, a few months and over 7 million recorded Covid-19 cases later, it has evolved from a distant threat to a stark reality. The global crisis – which has unleashed an emergency in the world’s public health, political, and economic systems simultaneously – has subjected even the most stable societies to unprecedented disruption. In conflict-affected countries, i.e. countries with ongoing conflicts or a high risk of relapse into conflict, and countries emerging from conflicts, the pandemic has added another layer on top of often multiple existing layers of crisis. Against the backdrop of expert warnings over the particular vulnerabilities of conflict-affected countries to Covid-19, this Brief analyses key emerging dynamics and repercussions in conflict-affected countries in general, and in five countries in particular: Colombia, Libya, Sudan, Ukraine and Yemen. The focus here is especially on conflicts and countries previously covered by our Conflict Series, so as to build on already accumulated analysis. The Brief identifies three main ways in which the global crisis impacts conflict-affected countries. First, the pandemic itself risks exacerbating inequalities and further burdening already vulnerable groups within conflict-affected societies. Second, local and external conflict parties are quick to capitalise on various opportunities arising from the policy responses to the crisis which also complicate peace and crisis management efforts. Third, the economic fallout puts severe strain on already weak state institutions and undermines governance outcomes (thus increasing the risk of conflict). Of these three dimensions, the policy responses and distraction created by the pandemic have thus far had the most significant repercussions for conflict dynamics, unfortunately often for the worse. The global scale of the crisis and its continuing evolution complicate efforts to seize momentum for peace and set the pandemic apart from previous catastrophic/disruptive events, such as the tsunami in 2004, that in some cases led to a positive shift in local conflict dynamics. The Brief is structured as follows: the main text analyses the emerging trends catalysed by the pandemic crisis in conflict-affected contexts, while the case study boxes discuss the unfolding processes in specific countries. The last section discusses the policy options for preventing further escalatory repercussions.
Topic:
War, Inequality, Conflict, Crisis Management, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, Asia, South America, North Africa, North America, and Africa

41. Devil in the Detail: Local versus regional approaches to peace in Donbas

Author:
Karen Madoian
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Following the Euromaidan protests and the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Ukraine has witnessed continued violence in the east of the country, with approximately 13,000 people killed, including more than 3,300 civilians, and as many as 30,000 wounded. After a period of stalled negotiations, 2019 brought new momentum to the peace process: Ukraine’s new president, Volodymyr Zelensky, and his political party ‘Servant of the People’ won an unprecedented majority in the 2019 elections, gaining full control over the executive and legislative branches of power with more than 70% of all votes cast across the country. One of the instrumental factors for President Zelensky’s victory was his promise to end the war in Donbas. To this end, he agreed to revive negotiations in the Normandy Format (between France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine) and reactivated direct communication channels with the Kremlin. The president’s message regarding reconciliation with the separatist, Russia-backed ‘People’s Republics’ of Donetsk and Luhansk appears to resonate with the majority of Ukrainians: more than 50% of citizens believe that Kyiv should negotiate a peace deal with separatist leaders and more than 70% support the Ukrainian president’s engagement in direct dialogue with Russia.
Topic:
Civil Society, Regional Cooperation, War, Conflict, and Decentralization
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

42. Biden’s World? Views from the United States, China, Russia, and the European Union

Author:
Alexey Gromyko and Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic prevented the annual joint seminars that since a few years the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations organise in Moscow and Brussels. But the coronavirus cannot interrupt academic exchange; a dialogue that is more than ever necessary in a world of increasing tensions between the great powers. We continue our collaboration through this joint publication, therefore, for which we have invited prominent scholars from Russia and the European Union as well as China and the United States to share their analysis of the impact of Joe Biden’s victory in the US presidential elections on international politics.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

43. DONBAS PEACE TALKS 2.0: Russia’s Objectives and Ukraine’s Limits

Author:
Cristina Gherasimov and András Rácz
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
On October 1, 2019, President Volodymyr Zelenskiy agreed to meet Russia’s conditions for holding peace talks already this autumn. Moscow’s readiness to play, however, should not be mistaken for willingness to solve the conflict. So far, the Kremlin has not made any concessions in Eastern Ukraine that would be irreversible; consequently, it seems to only be testing Zelenskiy’s limits. Both Zelenskiy and the EU need to be cautious not to reward easy-to-reverse steps with major, strategic benefits.
Topic:
Diplomacy, European Union, Conflict, Negotiation, and Peace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

44. National Security in the Age of Hybrid War

Author:
Ilhami B. Değirmencioğlu
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Global Political Trends Center (GPoT)
Abstract:
During the course of the past 10 years, the security environment has become more complex due to the blurring of the lines of warfare. Therefore, the ‘gray zone’ between peace and war expanded and became a battlefield of non-conventional warfare such as counterinsurgency, terrorism, cyber-attacks, etc. (Mansoor, 2012: 1). The failed and fragile states in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia, as well as non-recognized de facto states in the Caucasus played catalytic role in the expansion of the non-conventional warfare. Moreover, Great Powers inclined to use increasingly the non-conventional warfare in the proxy and delegated wars waged by them. In the recent years, the non-state actors used innovative and complicated tactics against legal authorities in many countries. The prevalence of the new complex threats transformed the classic war concept into a concept called ‘new wars.’ Due to the combined use of the conventional and non-conventional warfare, many scholars and politicians started to call the new model of war as ‘hybrid war.’
Topic:
National Security, Conflict, Peace, and Hybrid Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Global Focus, and United States of America

45. Arab League Summit Report

Author:
Omar Sheira and Muhammed Ammash
Publication Date:
04-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Global Political Trends Center (GPoT)
Abstract:
The 26th Arab League Summit, held in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, came amidst a series of divisive crises in the Middle East and North African region: in Yemen, a Saudi Arabian-led coalition initiated a campaign of airstrikes to counter the advance of the Houthi rebellion; in Libya, a multiparty civil war continues between rival governments and Islamist-oriented groups; in Syria, the civil war enters its fifth year, prolonging the conflict and adding more parties; and in Iraq, the government leads an offensive against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), to regain territory which was seized by the group in the Summer of 2014. Meanwhile, Iran also has an alleged role in the crises in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria, which was referenced during the Summit. In addition to these issues, the agenda of the Arab League Summit also aimed to monitor the implementation of past recommendations, express support for Palestine and Somalia, and discuss ways to combat extremist groups.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Palestine, and Arab Countries

46. What do the Crimean Tatars face in Crimea?

Author:
Alexander Osipov
Publication Date:
04-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for Minority Issues
Abstract:
The Issue Brief concerns further developments which the Crimean Tatars may experience after the Russian annexation of Crimea. The Crimean Tatars are the second largest minority in the Crimean peninsula, and they are represented by politically active movements with far-reaching claims concerning the status of Crimean Tatars and territorial self-determination. Within less than one month these people as well as their homeland have been transferred to another country with different political and legal systems and potentially a less friendly social environment. Since the contours of the future legal and institutional framework for the accommodation of Crimean Tatars are not fully clear, one can project the major organizational setups and patterns of Russian ethno-politics onto Crimea and tentatively assess their applicability. We can conclude that in a formal sense the Russian rule does not promise the Crimean Tatars much more than they already had in Ukraine, but puts them at risk of a strict police control and pressure. Such arrangements as territorial and non-territorial autonomy, power-sharing, 'rehabilitation' of the Crimean Tatars as victims of the past repressions may take place but they would have limited practical sense. Cultural programmes and recruitment of Crimean Tatars to the regional administration are unlikely to be legally guaranteed and will be fully dependent on the discretion of Russian and Crimean authorities.
Topic:
Culture, Minorities, Ethnicity, Conflict, and Identity
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Crimea

47. What next for Moldova's Minorities after Crimea?

Author:
Federica Prina
Publication Date:
07-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for Minority Issues
Abstract:
This Issue Brief examines the possible consequences of Russia's annexation of Crimea on Moldova and its national minorities. It further reflects on the factors that hinder greater integration of persons belonging to minorities, and the expression of minority identity in Moldova/Transnistria. The Issue Brief argues there are two indirect consequences of the annexation of Crimea by Russia. First, the annexation deepens the polarization between the pro-Russia and pro-EU camps in Moldova, which manifests itself in multiple ruptures within Moldovan society. Second, such a polarization furthers a tendency to marginalize (non-Russian) minorities, which implies a reduction of the spaces for the articulation of minority concerns and the expression of minority identity.
Topic:
Minorities, Ethnicity, Discrimination, Conflict, and Identity
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Moldova, and Crimea

48. A Resolvable Frozen Conflict? Designing a Settlement for Transnistria

Author:
Stefan Wolff
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for Minority Issues
Abstract:
The conflict over Transnistria is a territorial dispute in which one of the conflict parties (Transnistria) seeks independence while the other (Moldova) aims to restore its full sovereignty and territorial integrity. For close to two decades, the situation has been stagnant: a ceasefire agreement signed in 1992 in Moscow between the Russian and Moldovan presidents at the time—Yeltsin and Snegur—established a trilateral peacekeeping mission (Russia, Moldova, Transnistria) and a buffer zone along the Dniestr/Nistru River. Protected by these arrangements and an additional Russian military presence, Transnistria has developed into a de-facto state of its own, albeit without international recognition and heavily dependent on Russia.
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, Minorities, Ethnicity, Conflict, Settlements, Independence, and Identity
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Moldova, and Transnistria

49. The Georgia-Russia Crisis and the Responsibility to Protect

Author:
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:
08-2008
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:
This policy brief addresses the Georgia-Russia crisis within the Responsibility to Protect framework. Highlighting that the protection of civilian populations in South Ossetia and elsewhere in the region remains an urgent concern.
Topic:
International Law, Conflict, Civilians, and Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Georgia, and South Ossetia

50. Reciprocity or the Higher Ground? The Treatment of Ethnic Russians in Georgia After the "Spy Scandal" of 2006

Author:
David Szakonyi
Publication Date:
02-2008
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for Minority Issues
Abstract:
Upon comparison of the treatment of one another‟s ethnic community following the spy scandal,‟ clear differences emerge between Russia‟s and Georgia‟s approaches to the issue. In contrast to the full-fledged targeting and expulsion of both legal and illegal residents on the part of Russia, Georgian officials, media outlets, and citizens responded admirably to the tenuous situation, with few reported incidents of discrimination. However, anti-Russian sentiments, at least at the elite political level, are still very much present among Georgian society, and the consequences of the agitated, negative rhetoric towards Russia by several Georgian leaders could lead to an environment of increased animosity towards Russian speakers. Without specific steps taken by the Georgian government, media outlets, and society as a whole to reduce anti-Russian sentiment, there is a danger of further incensed political relations negatively affecting interpersonal relations between the ethnic Russian minority and the Georgian majority.
Topic:
Intelligence, Minorities, Ethnicity, Discrimination, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Georgia

51. Armenian Minority in Georgia: Defusing Interethnic Tension

Author:
Natalie Sabanadze
Publication Date:
07-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for Minority Issues
Abstract:
July 2000 was the deadline for the withdrawal of two Russian military bases in Vaziani (near Tbilisi) and in Gudauta (Abkhazia). The agreement on Russian military withdrawal was reached at the 1999 OSCE summit in Istanbul, according to which the first two bases would be withdrawn by July 1 of the current year, to be followed by the two remaining bases in Javakheti (Southern Georgia) and Batumi (Western Georgia) in the near future. Russia did not meet the deadline on the Gudauta base, which has become the main source of renewed Georgian-Russian political confrontation over the past few days. However, as the talks on withdrawal intensified, the issue of the Javakheti base also came to the fore. Javakheti is the southernmost region of Georgia where the local population is predominantly Armenian. Similar to Abkhazia, the situation in Javakheti is very sensitive and could be exacerbated by the Russian military withdrawal which is strongly opposed by the local Armenian population. This at first sight benign case of base closure is thus likely to involve broader issues of regional political alliances, competing national interests, minority policies and a potential risk of yet another ethnopolitical confrontation in the region. Among the most common descriptions of Javakheti found in both journalistic and scholarly literature is that of a "potential zone of conflict", "area waiting to explode" and in the more radical accounts 'the second Nagorno-Karabakh'. Despite many contrary predictions, Javakheti managed to maintain peaceful interethnic relations and to survive in peace and relative stability. However, in order to maintain the fragile peace and cooperation much has to be done in terms of minority protection and power-sharing structures within Georgia. What follows is a brief discussion of the Armenian minority in Georgia in the context of ongoing regional geopolitical changes, interests and vulnerabilities of the states involved. In addition, Javakheti here is regarded as a zone of ethnopolitical tension which requires serious efforts, and well-developed preventive measures to avoid its deterioration into a zone of conflict.
Topic:
Minorities, Ethnicity, Conflict, and Protected People
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Georgia