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Begin New Search Topic Military Strategy Political Geography North America Content Type Policy Brief Publication Year within 25 Years

1. The Collapse of One China

Author:
Ivan Kanapathy
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
As the One China policy accommodation unravels and China’s military attains a credible capability to mount a cross-strait invasion, the United States and its allies should stop hedging and adopt enhanced measures to deter Beijing.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Hegemony, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

2. Resetting NATO’s Defense and Deterrence: The Sword and the Shield Redux

Author:
Sean Monaghan
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
There is a saying: “If you want a new idea, read an old book.” For the authors of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) new strategic concept looking for a new approach to its core task of defense and deterrence, the best “old books” to consult might be the seven strategic concepts NATO has published since 1949. The first four of these were classified and made public in 1997.1 Since 1991, three concepts have been published openly, the latest in 2010. This paper examines NATO’s first seven strategic concepts to chart the progress of the alliance’s approach to defense and deterrence. The main purpose of doing so is to give today’s leaders and planners a better understanding of their forebearers’ efforts, to learn their lessons, and avoid their mistakes. The analysis also reveals three broad insights that can be applied today: plan against Russia’s maximum intentions; revitalize the sword and the shield; and modernize the sword and the shield.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

3. Keeping the U.S. Military Engine Edge: Budget and Contract Trends

Author:
Gregory Sanders and Nicholas Velazquez
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Military aircraft engine technology is a qualitative edge for the United States, one enabled by a world-leading industrial base. However, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) faces critical decisions regarding the future of engine investments and the industrial base of the F-35. This platform dominates present U.S. tactical aircraft purchases and faces a growing engine modernization imperative. The following questions help inform key debates: How does the DOD prioritize investments in engines compared to other systems? Where is investment targeted? And how can competition best be fostered? Recent years have shown a spike in the purchase of products for military engines amid a decline in research and development (R&D) spending relative to the early 2000s. Military engine R&D is now largely dependent on the Air Force, as the Navy has taken a step back to focus funding on other service priorities. Finally, competition for military engine contract spending has been on the decline as the F-35, with its single-engine option, dominates the procurement landscape. The future of the military engine industrial base will be shaped by the DOD’s choice between spending more up front to introduce competition into the fifth-generation fighter fleet or waiting until the end of this decade as the first sixth-generation fighter is expected to enter production.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

4. US global security partnerships in the Biden era: Twilight or regeneration?

Author:
Eoin Micheál McNamara
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Guarantee-based alliances underpinned US grand strategy during the Cold War, but policies designed for the War on Drugs (WOD) after the 1990s, the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in the 2000s, and counter-piracy operations in the 2010s have led US policymakers to increasingly rely on ad hoc security partnerships. Looser partnerships facilitate cooperation that is quick to reform and redistribute, benefiting the US when reacting to urgent risks. When the necessity for cooperation diminishes, partnerships allow for prompt “exit options”. Guided by a narrowing set of strategic priorities under President Biden, the US partnership network is undergoing some downsizing. As part of a wider effort to challenge the US-led international order, Russia and China seek to reduce US opportunities to renew security partnerships. Ever closer US and NATO partnerships with Finland and Sweden have bucked an otherwise weakening global trend in recent years. Russia’s escalated aggression in Ukraine has caused Finland and Sweden to seek policy change from partnership-based security policies to NATO membership and stronger deterrence.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

5. NATO and the South after Ukraine

Author:
Pierre Morcos
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine will have a pervasive impact on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is set to adopt a new strategic concept at the upcoming Madrid summit in June 2022. There is little doubt that adapting the alliance’s deterrence and defense posture in Eastern Europe will be a strategic priority on the road to Madrid. However, the alliance should not neglect other challenges and priorities, including preserving stability in its southern neighborhood. Spanning from North Africa and the Sahel to the Balkans and the Middle East, NATO’s “South” remains fraught with growing vulnerabilities—and is not impervious to the broader strategic competition with Russia and China. Rather than transforming NATO into a unidirectional entity, the future strategic concept offers the alliance an opportunity to reimagine its approach toward the South.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, North America, and Global South

6. Space Threat Assessment 2022

Author:
Todd Harrison, Kaitlyn Johnson, Makena Young, Nicholas Wood, and Alyssa Goessler
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Welcome to the fifth edition of Space Threat Assessment by the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Over the past five years, this assessment has used open-source information to track the developments of counterspace weapons that threaten U.S. national security interests in space. The United States has relied heavily on its space infrastructure since the first satellites were launched to track and monitor nuclear missile launches during the Cold War. Over the past six decades, the United States has grown more reliant on the information, situational awareness, and connectivity provided by military, civil, and commercial space systems. It should be no surprise that these assets are a target for adversaries attempting to gain asymmetric military advantage. The Space Threat Assessment is critical to understanding the changing nature of the space domain and monitoring trends in space and counterspace weapons.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Governance, and Space
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

7. Rethinking NATO engagement in the Western Balkans

Author:
Ismet Fatih Cancar
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Recently NATO Secretary General Jens Stolten- berg recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) as a possible frontier for Russian activities fol- lowing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.1 These activities, best illustrated by the threat from the Russian ambas- sador to Sarajevo of a Ukrainian scenario should BiH seek NATO membership, raises an important question: why is BiH of particular importance to the Euro-At- lantic Alliance? First, the Western Balkans is unfinished business for NATO and for countries in the region that have recognized NATO integration as a strategic goal. Second, other actors, primarily Russia and China, have established interests that compete with NATO’s en- gagement in the Western Balkans. Third, the interests of these external actors undermine Euro-Atlantic se- curity on the eastern flank. As a result, there are bene- fits for NATO in increasing cooperation with BiH and the Western Balkans in order to prevent the possible return of conflict to the region.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Balkans, and North America

8. Protecting NATO’s security community

Author:
Alexandra Gheciu
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Following Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine, numerous Western policy-makers and analysts have interpreted the Alliance’s cohesiveness and prompt response as evidence of its value in protecting the transatlantic community of liberal-democracy. NA- TO’s Allies, the argument goes, have clearly demon- strated their shared determination to protect allied ter- ritory and core liberal-democratic values, re-affirming the Alliance’s unshaken commitment to the principle of collective defence. But can this momentum be sus- tained? While the Ukraine crisis has triggered initial prac- tices of unity, it has also highlighted – and rendered more complex – difficult questions, tensions and nor- mative dilemmas for NATO. This policy brief exam- ines some of the key challenges that NATO is likely to face in protecting the transatlantic security commu- nity in the unstable, post-February 2022 environment. What is particularly important to understand is that some of those challenges concern key norms and val- ues around which NATO defines itself. There are no simple answers to the political questions facing the security community – but there are steps that can be taken to put the Allies in a stronger position to ad- dress them.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

9. Is Russia a threat in emerging and disruptive technologies?

Author:
Katarzyna Zysk
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
jor stakeholders, including the United States, China, and Russia, is of paramount impor- tance to the transatlantic community. The Russian authorities, including Vladimir Putin, perceive gaining or losing ground in this rapidly advancing technolog- ical competition in existential terms: either a nation will successfully ride the wave, or it will be crushed by it. Emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs), and their mutual convergence, are increasingly regarded as sources of strategic and operational advantages in fu- ture warfare. They create a new set of conditions and potentially consequential defence applications that may increase Russia’s – and other key actors’ – military ad- vantage over competitors. Accordingly, EDTs may al- ter the trajectory and character of future warfare and human involvement in it. Stakes seem high for both national and international security, with a likely impact on deterrence, arms control, and strategic stability, as well as the distribution of power in the international system, along with Russia’s share of it. One of the key objectives during Putin’s presiden- cy has been to rebuild the country’s military capacity. A large-scale modernization programme launched in 2008 has focused on strengthening the nuclear arse- nal and reducing the conventional inferiority that took hold in the military organization during its post-Cold War decay. The Russian authorities have been con- cerned, however, that it would take too long to catch up with the West’s military development. Conversely, EDTs promised a rapid, non-linear way to close the capability gap. As a result, Russia has been systemati- cally expanding its pursuit of cutting-edge military and dual-use technologies. This Policy Brief explores Russia’s technological eco- system with examples of the major programmes and strategies that have been prioritized to pursue excel- lence in EDTs. It examines constraints that affect EDT development, including the impact of the invasion of Ukraine, and considers what possible implications Rus- sian EDT development may entail for NATO.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and North America

10. Cool Change Ahead? NATO's Strategic Concept and the High North

Author:
Elizabeth Buchanan
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine not only revived NATO unity, it also bolstered the case for NATO’s enduring mission of deterrence and defence. In the High North, NATO’s mission objectives are precariously balanced. For the Alliance, the High North is an enduring component of Cold War history, as well as a flank in terms of NATO’s 360-degree security thinking. Of course, the High North is also a strategic frontier for renewed NATO-Russia competition. This Policy Brief examines NATO’s High North challenges and considers strate- gic priorities for the Alliance’s forthcoming Strategic Concept.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and North America

11. The Dos and Don'ts of Strategy Making

Author:
Marina Henke
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The Strategic Concept is NATO’s most import- ant document after the Washington Treaty. It identifies the foundational elements of the Al- liance: it defines NATO’s strategic goals, the key risks and threats the Alliance faces, and designs a strategy of how to overcome those challenges. Since its in- ception, NATO has adopted six Strategic Concepts. The latest one was published in 2010. Given the ex- traordinary events of the last decade if not months, including Russian aggression in Ukraine and China’s increasingly assertive posturing in the Asia Pacific, a new NATO Strategic Concept is urgently needed and will be presented at the 2022 Madrid Summit. In this context, it is worth asking: how do we design good strategy? What are the main building blocks of strat- egy? How can NATO most efficiently integrate the variety of tools at its disposal into a coherent, cohe- sive whole? Practitioners and academics have over the years identified best practices in strategy design along with some common mistakes.1 This Policy Brief sum- marizes their most important findings.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Strategic Stability, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

12. Lessons from NATO’s intervention in Afghanistan

Author:
Benjamin Zyla and Laura Grant
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
AFter US troops began withdrawing from Afghanistan on 1 May 2021, the Taliban launched an offensive to take back control of the country. By August, the militants had retaken con- trol of most (administrative) districts and President Ashraf Ghani and other key officials fled the country. NATO Allies rushed to close nearly all of the military and civilian infrastructure they had built since 2001, and hastily set up air bridges to evacuate their citizens and personnel from Kabul. Most of this was done by the member states while NATO as an organization mainly stood on the fringes. Critics have focused on these events to call for an evaluation of this hasty and uncoordinated withdraw- al, and of the entire Afghan intervention more gener- ally. Among others the NATO Parliamentary Assem- bly called upon member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance not only to “conduct a thorough, clear-eyed, and comprehensive assessment of the Alliance’s 20-year engagement in Afghanistan”, but also demanded to incorporate these lessons into “NATO’s New Strategic Concept”.1 This Policy Brief aims to contribute to the lessons learned analysis that will be central to discussions at the NATO Summit this coming June in Spain. We of- fer eight findings and recommendations, based on a four-year long study of the effectiveness of the Af- ghan intervention.2
Topic:
NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Europe, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

13. The rise of China and NATO’s new Strategic Concept

Author:
Markus Kaim and Angela Stanzel
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
China’s rise is shaking up international power relations and is calling into question Western ideas of regional and global order. NATO, too, is confronted with the necessity of dealing with the challenges posed by China. This has been reflected in various NATO statements since 2019. According to Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, “China does not share our values” and “uses modern technology, so- cial media [and] facial recognition, to monitor, to do surveillance of their own population in a way we have never seen before”. “All of this makes it important for NATO to strengthen our policy when it comes to China”, he added.1 NATO Allies only paid attention to the significance of the People’s Republic on their security policy com- paratively late. For a long time, the dominant view was that the Alliance and Beijing were pursuing a num- ber of common interests, e.g. in the areas of crisis management, counter-piracy and in the countering of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.2 Only China’s rise on the international scene and the resulting rivalry with the US in recent years have led to Beijing’s foreign policy to appear on the Alliance’s agenda.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and North America

14. NATO and human security

Author:
Mary Kaldor
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The August 2021 Afghan debacle offers NATO a moment for serious reflection about its role in the world. Some are drawing the conclusion that NATO should not engage in out-of-area opera- tions in the future and should instead focus on its core function of defending Euro-Atlantic territory from at- tack by foreign states, while dealing with the terrorist threat through long distance strikes using drones. But NATO members should draw a different conclusion, namely that in this globalised interconnected world, no one is safe from the complex combination of dangers that include war and violence, climate disasters, forced migration, pandemics or extreme poverty. It is no lon- ger possible, if it ever was, to insulate one part of the world from what happens elsewhere. What is needed is not retrenchment but rethinking and redirecting of NATO’s role. In this Policy Brief, I put forward the idea of a global strategy based on human security. Human security is understood as the security of individuals and the com- munities in which they live, in the context of multiple economic, environmental, health and physical threats, as opposed to the security of states and borders from the threat of foreign attack. Human security offers an alternative way to address “forever wars” whether we are talking about conflicts in different parts of the world, the so-called war on terror, or the geo-political competition with Russia and China. Human security implies that the security of Afghans or Chinese is just as important as the security of Americans or Europe- ans.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

15. Pugwash note on present dangers

Author:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:
The present global situation is very dangerous. Not since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis have we had such a dangerous environment. But while the Cuban missile crisis lasted 13 days, the present situation has continued for over 100 days since February 2022.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

16. Counterterrorism from the Sky? How to Think Over the Horizon about Drones

Author:
Erol Yayboke and Christopher Reid
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
August 31, 2021, marked the end of the United States’ two-decade military presence in Afghanistan. It also marked the end of U.S. military and intelligence eyes and ears on the ground in a place known to be a safe haven for violent extremist groups. In Afghanistan and other areas where the United States lacks a persistent, physical presence, the Biden administration announced a pivot to “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism operations (OTH- CT) that rely heavily on stand-off assets, such as overhead satellite technology and airpower, in the absence of eyes and ears. While the use of drones—or “remotely piloted aircraft” (RPAs)—to target potential terrorist threats seems to be a cost-effective approach from a military perspective, their use has come under increasing pressure from Capitol Hill, human rights and humanitarian organizations, and others for their effects on civilian populations. Military action almost always carries risk of collateral damage, but the disproportionate civilian impact associated with RPAs is not only troubling from rights and humanitarian perspectives, but it also calls into question the strategic, longer-term rationale of using them for counterterrorism purposes in the first place. Congressional leaders sent a letter to the president on January 20, 2022, about the ongoing OTH-CT strategy review. In it, they point out that “while the intent of U.S. counterterrorism policy may be to target terrorism suspects who threaten U.S. national security, in too many instances, U.S. drone strikes have instead led to unintended and deadly consequences—killing civilians and increasing anger towards the United States.” They, therefore, call on the administration to “review and overhaul U.S. counterterrorism policy to center human rights and the protection of civilians, align with U.S. and international law, prioritize non-lethal tools to address conflict and fragility, and only use force when it is lawful and as a last resort.” Reconciling the risks and implications of RPA strikes is necessary for genuinely implementing President Biden’s calls for a “targeted, precise strategy that goes after terror.” In doing so, the administration also needs to address concerns over civilian casualties alongside meaningful and justifiable military utilization of RPAs. Using RPAs against those who pose an imminent threat to the United States or its allies and partners is sometimes necessary and appropriate, especially in scenarios that are high-risk for crewed aircraft or ground forces. So why wouldn’t the United States use RPAs more broadly at low risk to blood and treasure? Why put soldiers in danger when we can extensively monitor threats and eventually address them from a remotely piloted aircraft high above? The answers are at once simple (e.g., impact on civilians) and complicated (e.g., limited military alternatives), exposing a gulf in understanding and approach to RPA utilization between the advocacy community (and some congressional leaders) and military and intelligence planners. This CSIS brief explores the challenge ahead for the Biden administration. It starts with a contextualization of the OTH-CT strategy review, followed by assessments of the short- and longer-term risks associated with RPA utilization and how to think about risk itself. Offering evidence and framing throughout, the brief ends by detailing two sets of recommendations
Topic:
Defense Policy, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Counter-terrorism, and Drones
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

17. Unknown Knowns How the Bush Administration Traded Failure for Success in Iraq

Author:
David Cortright, George A. Lopez, and Alistair Millar
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Fourth Freedom Forum
Abstract:
This is the story of a road not taken, how the United States discarded a proven system of United Nations weapons inspections and multilateral sanctions and opted for an unnecessary war in Iraq. The saga of what happened twenty years ago may seem like ancient history to some, but many negative consequences are still evident. From the imposition of sanctions on Iraq in 1990 until the calamitous invasion in 2003, our research team produced a steady stream of reports and publications documenting the most significant policy failure by the United States since the Vietnam War.1 With the twentieth anniversary of the invasion approaching, it is time for a fresh look at those events to assess the strategic and ethical implications of the decisions made then and their relevance for today. George W. Bush was gripped by a messianic zeal to overthrow Saddam Hussein by force.2 The president and his advisers were determined to implement a policy of armed regime change regardless of all evidence, logic, or reason.3 The White House concocted a false narrative of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a dictator with supposed links to al-Qaida.4 Bush ignored the unequivocal conclusion of the U.S. intelligence community that Iraq had nothing to do with either 9/11 or al-Qaida.5 The result of the administration’s campaign of deception was a costly war of choice that ended in “strategic defeat,” to cite the conclusion of the U.S. Army history of the war.6 Many studies have examined what went wrong in Iraq,7 but few have looked at the alternative security approaches that were available at the time. We examine those alternatives here to document that the war was unnecessary and to highlight the policy advantages of multilateral nonmilitary security strategies.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Multilateralism, Iraq War, and George W. Bush
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

18. What role for NATO in the Sahel?

Author:
Chloe Berger
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Since the collapse of the Libyan regime in 2011, the Sahel region has gradually gained significance within the NATO environment. The chaos in Lib- ya has accelerated the interconnection of North African and Sahelian dynamics, creating a complex environment with serious implications for both the stability of North Africa and the Mediterranean Basin. The Sahel region suffers from a paradoxical situation. In view of the multiple national (Sahel armed forces), regional (African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)) and internation- al actors (United Nations, European Union, and also non-African states) present on the ground, the situation is often dubbed a “security traffic jam”. Some NATO Allies who have traditionally wielded influence in this region, have also invested in regional stabilization and development efforts for a long time. For the first time at the June 2021 NATO Summit, Al- lies have explicitly voiced their concerns over the “dete- riorating situation in the Sahel region”.1 As the “newest addition” in this already “crowded” environment, and at a time of review of its Strategic Concept, the Alli- ance must demonstrate its added value; identify “niche” areas where it can complement and strengthen existing efforts; while considering the Sahelian countries’ aspira- tions and specific needs.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, North America, and Sahel

19. Biden’s nuclear posture review: what's in it for NATO?

Author:
Andrea Chiampan
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The Biden administration has formally start- ed a review of the US nuclear weapons poli- cy known as Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The NPR is a public policy document that each US administration has published since 1994 during the first months in office and that is scheduled to be released in 2022. NPRs are important public statements: they set out the administration’s views on the role of nuclear weapons in US grand strategy. NPRs are also crucial signalling documents. They provide insight into an administration’s understanding of the prevailing geo- political environment – including perceived risks and threats – and convey US intentions to allies and adver- saries alike. Given NATO’s significant reliance on US extended deterrence, the elements of continuity and change that the new NPR will propose will inevitably have direct effects on NATO’s defence posture.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

20. The future of NATO

Author:
Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO’s reflection process (NATO 2030), as well as the decision to revisit the Alliance’s Strategic Concept in 2022 pose two sets of questions: the first pertains to the organization’s adap- tation to tomorrow’s security environment; the second is on whether there is agreement inside the Alliance on the kind of organization to be built, and what its prin- ciples and methods should look like. This Policy Brief examines these two levels of ques- tions to identify five possible directions in which the Alliance might move: continuity; refocusing on collec- tive defence; morphing into a security organization; standing up to China; and marginalization.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

21. Future warfare, future skills, future professional military education

Author:
Andrea Gilli
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Created in 1951 by Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower to endow NATO Allies’ officers with a forum for strategic education and politico-military re- flection, this year the NATO Defense College is cele- brating its 70th anniversary. In a world of rapid change and growing uncertainty, the best way to honor the past is to prepare for the future. This Policy Brief contributes to this goal by looking at the future of Professional Military Education (PME). Based on the recent Con- ference of Commandants,1 the discussion is divided into three parts: what the future of warfare is, what skills future warfighters will need to possess, and how professional military education will have to change ac- cordingly.
Topic:
NATO, Education, War, Military Strategy, Leadership, and Professionalism
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

22. The US in NATO: adapting the Alliance to new strategic priorities

Author:
Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer and Martin Quencez
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
At the June 2021 NATO Summit, Allies agreed that “[we] will engage China with a view to de- fending the security interests of the Alliance”, as “China’s stated ambitions and assertive behaviour present systemic challenges to the rules-based inter- national order and to areas relevant to Alliance securi- ty”. For Washington, it was a win to have NATO, the cornerstone of the United States’ network of alliances, acknowledge the challenge posed by China and expand the Alliance’s predominantly transatlantic focus. During his visit to Europe in Spring 2021, President Biden signalled that “America was back” with a clear vision for NATO and that he was seeking European partners’ support. The US President’s recommitment to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is premised on the expectation that NATO address the country’s current and future strategic concerns, in a security and geopolitical environment that has dramatically changed these last twenty years. China, technological competi- tion, climate change, and hybrid threats and their desta- bilizing effects on NATO member states’ political co- hesion, are now at the core of the US strategic agenda. These priorities redefine NATO’s purpose. In this con- text, NATO’s new Strategic Concept, to be presented in 2022, aims at addressing these very changes, espe- cially as the Alliance enters the post-Afghanistan era. The US objectives vis-à-vis NATO are threefold. In the short term, the Biden administration seeks to re- engage with NATO as part of a larger effort to work with Allies around the world. US public opinion is clearly supportive of the Alliance across political affiliations, despite the politicization of the debate under the Trump administration. In the longer term, NATO will remain relevant to the US, only if it contributes to the strategic competition against China. This can take different forms and re- quire moving beyond two decades of out-of-area oper- ations to tackle challenges of a broad nature, especially in the cyber and techno- logical realms. Finally, the US aims to continue work on struc- tural issues within the Alliance, such as bur- den-sharing and political cohesion, whilst devel- oping a new partnership agenda that better fits its priorities. To sum up, NATO will remain a “global alliance” shaped by the US global strategic priorities, and will continue to strengthen its engagement with “global partners” as the increasingly complex security environment requires transregional approaches.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

23. European allies and the forthcoming NATO strategic concept

Author:
Barbara Kunz
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The forthcoming NATO Strategic Concept will primarily serve the purpose of adapting the definition of the Alliance’s core tasks to 21st century realities. This includes an updated threat analysis, as well as a widening of priorities to include matters and domains such as cybersecurity and soci- etal resilience. It will, in many ways, also reflect the considerable changes European security underwent since the publication of its preceding Strategic Con- cept in 2010. It will therefore be the first post-Crimea Strategic Concept, and mark the end of a cooperative security approach to Russia. The new text will also be the first post-Trump administration document, one elaborated after a period of profound doubts over US commitment to the Alliance. Finally, the new Strate- gic Concept will be adopted after years of sometimes heated debates on European security, particularly on the notion of European strategic autonomy. While a consensus on this concept and its implications for the Atlantic Alliance has thus far proved elusive, it seems clear that Europeans increasingly understand the need for a stronger, and in many ways more independent Europe. To some, recent events in Afghanistan may also have been a wake-up call. In reality, however, most of these developments are structural in nature, and have persisted for some time.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

24. Military Competition With China: Harder Than the Cold War?

Author:
Oriana Skylar Mastro
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:
Dr. Oriana Skylar Mastro begins her paper by emphasizing that U.S. national defense strategy has characterized the US-China relationship as one of great power competition (GPC). Both the US and China have existing relationships in the Indo-Pacific region and are undergoing efforts to foster new relationships there as well. China’s efforts, however, conflict with US military efforts to promote peace, strategy, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific, making them much harder to achieve. Mastro argues that it will be difficult to deter China’s efforts — perhaps even more difficult than it was to deter the Soviet Union’s efforts during the Cold War. She cites the geography of the Asia-Pacific (compared to that of Central Europe), the US’s ongoing struggle to establish a credible deterrent, China’s range of options for nonlethal but effective uses of force, and the lack of US willingness to grant China a parallel sphere of influence to that in which the Soviet Union was allowed to control as evidence to support her claim. Thus, Mastro recommends that the US must avoid relying on the same Cold War tools and competition strategies in its competition with China, despite their success in the past. Instead, the US needs to combat the threat posed by China through 1) convincing China that the costs of using force outweigh the benefits and 2) forging a counterbalancing coalition of allies and partners that are confident that the US will not only protect them from a military attack but other costly behaviors (e.g., economic coercion, diplomatic isolation) that China may leverage against them as well.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

25. 2020 Country Brief: Afghanistan

Author:
Third Way
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
After 19 years of war in Afghanistan and a peace agreement signed with the Taliban, it’s time for the United States to withdraw. Although the United States has slowly reduced troops in Afghanistan, the Trump Administration has left the remaining troops vulnerable to the Taliban and to Putin’s Russia, which is paying bounties to Afghans for murdering American soldiers.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Political stability, Military Intervention, Peace, and State Building
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, Europe, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

26. 2020 Country Brief: Iran

Author:
Third Way
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
A nuclear-armed Iran is an unacceptable threat to America and our allies. But because of Donald Trump, we are closer to—not farther from—this nightmare scenario. Donald Trump chose a bellicose, chaotic, go-it-alone strategy toward Iran. He blew up the Iran Deal, the international agreement that froze Iran’s nuclear weapons program, because it was negotiated by Barack Obama. When he blew it up, our European allies were shocked—and for the first time ever, they sided with Iran to preserve the deal over the Trump Administration. And that’s what just happened again at the United Nations in August of this year. Now it will be more difficult to stop Iran’s malign activity in the future. President Obama brought international pressure to bear to force Iran into a difficult choice: they could have an economy or nuclear weapons, but not both. Iran chose an economy, and in doing so, accepted restrictions on its nuclear program and submitted to international inspections. In return, the United States, our European allies, Russia, and China began to resume economic activity with Iran. After freezing Iran’s nuclear program, the United States could have begun dealing with Iran’s other malign activity. Unfortunately, against the advice of his senior national security advisors and allies, President Trump unilaterally withdrew from the Iran Deal. Then he threatened our negotiating partners with sanctions for attempting to salvage the deal. And when that didn’t work, in January, he ordered a unilateral strike to kill one of Iran’s senior military leaders, Qasem Soleimani, risking outright war. Despite all this, he signaled he was open to negotiations with Iran but has not indicated what a successful agreement would include. Trump’s chaotic, bellicose strategy has yielded no positive results. Future policymakers will need to rebuild the coalition to deal with Iran and develop a long-term strategy to get Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions, end its support for terrorists, and become a responsible global player.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

27. From one master of survival to another: a tardigrade’s plea for NATO2030

Author:
Tania Latici
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
A microscopic creature whose size reaches that of a grain of rice at the utmost could teach NATO more survival lessons than one would think. The tardigrade has survived all five mass extinctions and is over 500 million years old. Like NATO, the tardigrade survived the nuclear challenge and even outer space. It is hard to find a more resilient animal from which NATO can draw inspiration for its ability to adapt to and withstand the most extreme conditions. To remain relevant and powerful in a dynamic threat landscape NATO needs to do what it has always been doing: adapt. Yet by 2030 NATO not only needs to adapt. Just like the tardigrade, it needs to hyper adapt. Four areas are key: redefining defence and deterrence; agreeing on the math; internal renewal; and rebuilding public support. Money, politics and nostalgia are not enough to keep the Alliance alive. It is time to get creative.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

28. For a New NATO-EU Bargain

Author:
Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
NATO and the European Union (EU) are both engaged in a continuous cycle of adaptation, witness in 2021 the NATO 2030 process on the NATO side, and the Strategic Compass on the EU side. These two exercises aim to look forward to how both institutions can better respond to ever-changing risks and threats. One key dimension in this debate is the optimal division of tasks between NATO and the EU, so that what they do together and in a coordinated manner is bigger than what they do separately or in a disorderly way. The issue of NATO-EU cooperation is obviously not new and has been at the heart of the development of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) since the late 1990s. This ties into at least three levels of debate that pertain to: the relationship and complementarity between the two organizations; the issue of what European states do within NATO; and the broader transatlantic bond. This said, twenty years of debates and inter- institutional cooperation have fallen short of clarifying what the two institutions must do in relation to each other. Most importantly, the NATO-EU conundrum is hampered by a series of never-met objectives and pledges, as well as by frictions on issues such as duplication, overlap, European strategic autonomy and burden-sharing. Against this background, this paper takes stock of these unmet objectives and offers a broad picture of what a division of tasks between NATO and the EU could possibly look like. The analysis is intentionally bold and puts forward a number of proposals that are undeniably contentious. It nonetheless draws on an observation of long-term and more recent trends, and aims at feeding the debate about the future of the two main European security institutions and the way they can interlock better.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

29. Breaking the Law of Opposite Effects: Europe’s Strategic Autonomy and the Revived Transatlantic Partnership

Author:
Iulian Romanyshyn
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The post-Cold War transatlantic relations have been marked by something akin to the law of opposite effects. When the relationship is vibrant, Europe’s defence cooperation stagnates. When the relationship is in trouble, Europeans pull themselves together to advance their security and defence interests. During the Clinton presidency, Europeans comfortably outsourced military crisis management in the Balkans to Washington. In contrast, a major transatlantic rift over the Iraq war during the Bush administration triggered the adoption of the European Security Strategy and a bulk of EU military operations under the banner of the European Security and Defence Policy. EU-US relations were back on an even keel during the Obama era, the time when Europeans haphazardly reduced their defence budgets and lost a great share of their military capabilities. Enter Donald Trump. During the deepest crisis of confidence among transatlantic allies in decades, Europeans re-energized their defence integration with a set of new initiatives, such as permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF). It is therefore somewhat logical and far from unexpected that when Joe Biden emerged as the winner of the 2020 US presidential elections, there is yet again a heightened risk that Europeans would fall back into a lazy, self-defeating mindset of dependency on the US military shield. Breaking this pattern of reverse effects and avoiding European complacency is crucial for a healthy transatlantic partnership, but it requires concerted efforts on both sides of the Atlantic.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

30. Toward a meaningful metric: replacing NATO’s 2% defence spending target

Author:
Leonard August Schuette
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The confluence of Joe Biden’s election to the White House, the likely ramifications of the pandemic for defence budgets, and unfolding EU and NATO strategic reflection processes offers a window of opportunity to replace NATO’s flawed 2% defence spending target. Europeans should credibly propose an output- oriented metric to reconstitute the transatlantic bargain on burden-sharing.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

31. EU and NATO Strategy: A Compass, a Concept, and a Concordat

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
A concordat is an agreement between the church authorities and the state that regulates the activities of the former on the territory of the latter. Since both European Defence and the Transatlantic Alliance are churches with their zealous high priests and devoted believers, the term seems apt enough for the EU-NATO package deal that I propose in this paper. The coincidence that in 2021-2022 the EU is drafting a Strategic Compass and NATO a new Strategic Concept should be put to use to mend the schism between them. Can a miracle be worked?
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

32. How the Strategic Compass can Incubate a European Prototype for Burden Sharing

Author:
Tania Latici
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Much ink has been spilled calling upon Europeans to do more for their defence in the context of the transatlantic relationship. “Everybody talks about the weather but nobody does anything about it”: it used to be a fitting expression for this conundrum – no more. The Strategic Compass process is an opportunity not only to decide what umbrellas to buy but when, how, and where to use them to protect against rain, hail, snow and even sunburn. There is a dissonance, however, between the political rhetoric about a complex and unpredictable security environment requiring a 360° defence and deterrence and the practice of measuring defence and deterrence. There is also a dissonance between advocates for a clear focus on NATO’s core business of territorial defence or for a more comprehensive Alliance contribution to security. This brief makes an argument firmly in favour of the latter with a focus on Europe’s contribution. It argues that the Strategic Compass process can be an incubator for a credible European prototype for burden sharing.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

33. America’s “Forever War” and the End of the Washington-led Unipolar World

Author:
Darren Spinck
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
America’s retreat from Afghanistan culminated in the country falling back into control of the Taliban, the very group that provided safe- haven for al-Qaeda prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks. America suffered immeasurable pain and costs from this jihadist attack on US soil, made possible by intelligence failures, evolved for the “Global War on Terror.” Twenty years later, Washington still has not learned from pre-9/11 mistakes. Prior to America’s complete withdrawal from Afghanistan, US intelligence was unable to convince the White House of the Afghan government’s fragility and the Taliban’s intentions. Radical Islamists in Afghanistan capitalized on policymaking which did not recognize the emerging Islamist threat towards America. Al-Qaeda’s September 11 tactical victory begat a series of foreign policy blunders in Afghanistan as strategies missteps again, celebrating another victory over America when the Taliban flag rose over the Afghan presidential palace on September 11, 2021.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Leadership, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

34. Deterrence by Detection: Using Surveillance to pre-Empt Opportunistic Aggression

Author:
Thomas G. Mahnken and Grace B. Kim
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
On NATO’s entire Eastern and South-Eastern flank, the Allies face a major, pressing and subtle challenge. Using sub-conventional grey zone tactics, Moscow has repeatedly tried, and at times succeeded, in expanding its influence, eroding international norms, undermining the rules-based in- ternational order, and shifting the balance of power in its favour. Preventing Russia from launching such op- portunistic acts of aggression is particularly import- ant because its armed forces are developing the ability to attack quickly – under the cover of increasingly capable defences – countries on their periphery in a clear effort to impose a fait accompli.1 NATO countries are at a particular disadvantage in this type of compe- tition. Their force structures consist of expensive and technologically complex information-gathering platforms, such as satellites and manned aircraft, which due to their high costs are also scarce and employed with reluctance by states who generally hesitate to put them in harm’s way. Additionally, the prohibitively high cost of these platforms deters some countries from investing in these types of capabilities. As debates within NATO about cash, capabilities and contributions continue to hold the stage, highlighting Allies’ needs for different types of capabilities – less expensive, more resilient, and relatively more disposable – is important.2 Equal- ly critical is the need for Allies to develop new concepts of operations as well as new organi-zations to employ them effectively. The solution may not involve fielding exotic new capabilities so much as employing existing ones in innovative ways. It will also benefit greatly from approaches that allow Allies and partners to participate fully. If we do not adapt, we risk being surprised by potentially catastrophic events in a future conflict.
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Surveillance
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, Eastern Europe, North America, and Southern Europe

35. Operation Althea and the Virtues of the Berlin Plus Agreement

Author:
Olivier Rittimann
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
What is commonly known as the “Ber- lin Plus” arrangements, signed in March 2003, provides for the European Union (EU) to draw upon NATO’s assets and capabilities for operations in which the Alliance would not be militarily involved. Following lengthy delays incurred by the Cyprus question, it was only as of 2003 that the agreement was successfully implemented with the transfer of operations from NATO to the EU in both the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2003) and then in Bosnia-Herzegovina (2004). The Berlin Plus agreement guarantees EU access to NATO planning capabilities, which contribute to EU- led military operations through the identification of command options, procedures for release and recall of NATO assets and capabilities, and the exchange of classified intelligence under reciprocal security protection rules. At the end of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia (1999), the EU had no defence staff fit to plan nor conduct an operation, and it is only fifteen years ago that member states established national Operation Headquarters (OHQ), which nations make available for EU operations, as was done in 2006 in the Demo- cratic Republic of Congo and in 2007 in Chad. At the end of the 1990s, the Berlin Plus proposal made em- inent sense: it prevented any duplication (by the EU) of assets and fostered the emergence of a European operational culture. But is the Arrangement still fit for purpose almost 20 years later?
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

36. NATO's Eastern Flank: Retooling the US-Baltic Security Link

Author:
Andris Banka
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
In recent years NATO has markedly increased its presence in the Baltic states. Relatively “light”, yet highly diverse multinational forces have been placed across the Alliance’s frontline with an underly- ing objective: to deter Russia. In this effort, the United States has served as a critical ballast. The Pentagon has directed sophisticated military exercises and rotated US service members throughout the region. These mea- sures, however, often did not align with US President Donald Trump’s spoken words nor written tweets. This obvious dichotomy disoriented Allied governments and shook bedrock assumptions about US security commitments. As political power changes hands in Washington, this lends an opportunity for a retooling of the transatlantic partnership. Domestically, incoming US President Joe Biden ran on the platform “Build Back Better”. In the spirit of that slogan, this Policy Brief lays out policy cor- rectives that both sides of the Atlantic could pursue to strengthen the US-Baltic security link.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

37. Central European Security: History and Geography Matter

Author:
Marcin Zaborowski
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The post-Cold War enlargements have changed the Alliance, its geopolitics and the definition of its purpose, which is no longer limited to deterring against threats to Allies’ territory. Enlarge- ments have also redefined the security and defence policies of the new member states, by transforming their armed forces, civil military relationships and im- pacting their defence industries. The states that joined NATO since 1989 are usually categorized as Central Europe or Central and East- ern Europe. Within this Central European realm of new member states, one can distinguish between the North-East, the Centre, the South-East, and the West- ern Balkans. All states in these groupings were com- munist prior to the end of the Cold War. Today, with the Cold War fast becoming a faded memory, Central Europeans tend to define their security needs with in- creasing divergence, with major repercussions on their defence policies, in spite of their belonging to the same Alliance. This Policy Brief maps out Central Europe by identifying groups of states in the region and looking at defence policy divergences. It focuses on a number of indicators, such as defence spending, acquisition of defence equipment and attitudes towards hosting for- eign NATO troops on their soil.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Post Cold War
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

38. The Strategic Argument for a Political NATO

Author:
Heather A Conley
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The 1949 Washington Treaty is a remarkably brief document consisting of a preamble and 14 articles. The Treaty describes only the po- litical commitments and obligations of the signato- ries. It does not articulate a requirement for NATO members to spend a certain amount of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense nor does it specify the military capabilities that a NATO member must possess to defend the Alliance. From 1949 to the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO was the singular locus of geopolitical discus- sion between North America and Europe. These were not easy discussions, yet the Alliance weathered strident policy and geopolitical policy differences. NATO also endured its members temporarily ceasing to be democracies due to military coups or concern about Communist influence on NATO governments. With a political body standing on the shoulders of a credible military deterrence, Allies were able to deploy creative problem-solving skills to bridge political dif- ferences, such as the policy innovation of deterrence and détente, while pursuing other, quieter methods, such as the temporary suspension of sharing sensitive intelligence from compromised NATO governments. Unfortunately, NATO’s centrality as a political forum greatly diminished after the Cold War as the Alliance reduced its political consultations in a less demanding geopolitical environment. Despite occa- sional interruptions of intense political discussion re- lated to conflict in the Balkans and the September 11th attacks, US retrenchment, combined with Europe’s inward focus, minimized NATO as a political forum. NATO was increasingly consumed by tactical decisions on out-of-area operations and transatlantic policy divisions over the Iraq War which fueled both Europe’s desire for greater autonomy and America’s questioning of the military utility of its Allies. NATO leaders substituted tactical – albeit important – military decisions regard- ing troop contributions, placement, and caveats as a substitute for political discussion. This political drift has now become so great that NATO members have begun to withhold support for the defensive planning of other Allies and new disputes between NATO members have the potential to escalate.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Grand Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

39. The Global Dimensions of NATO's Future Posture

Author:
Michael Clarke
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO has always been an important player in global politics. It is in the nature of the Alli- ance that its essential military missions were always carefully defined and its geographical boundar- ies strictly set by the collective defence commitments among its members. Nevertheless, NATO’s role as a politico-military institution among the great powers of the Cold War ensured it would always be global- ly significant. It could not have been otherwise. This remains as much the case – though now in different ways – as we consider the international environment taking shape for the 2030s. In this new environment the unavoidable global responsibilities of being a regional military alliance can be summarised in three ways; looking at NATO’s role in helping western powers defend their wider interests in the multi-polar world; helping meet the pseudo-ideological challenges posed by the rise of autocracies; and contributing to issues of the “global commons”.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

40. Jihadi Radicalization: Between the Local and the Global

Author:
Olivier Roy
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Any counter-terrorist policy should be shaped according to the nature of the threat. For an alliance like NATO, it is particularly import- ant to distinguish the fundamental characteristics of global movements from local terrorist entities. Whilst global jihadi propaganda and Islamist ideology still represent a significant danger, in many instances, it is the local dynamics that prevail. Complex NATO operations – designed to prevent, stabilize or rebuild – must be framed and designed accordingly.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Globalization, Regional Cooperation, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Radicalization, Local, and Jihad
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

41. Net Assessment: "Competition Is For Losers"

Author:
Andrea Gilli
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Under the guidance of the Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, in 2020 NATO embarked on a reflection process aimed at equipping the Alliance for the challenges of 2030.1 Composed of several parts, actors and phases, the process ul- timately aims to make NATO more relevant in the years ahead when technological disruption, climate change, competition among Great Powers and vio- lent non-state actors will pose new and major threats. Ideas, proposals, and recommendations are coming in from within and from outside the Alliance. Inter- estingly, among the recommendations, several voices have called for NATO to expand its net assessment capabilities.2 For most observers, even in the security and defence world, net assessment is an esoteric word. While many may have heard of Andrew Marshall and the US Department of Defense’s Office of Net As- sessment, most would probably struggle to define the term. This Policy Brief provides a short introduction to the topic: what is net assessment, how and why has it emerged, how reliable is it and how could NATO use it?
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

42. NATO, Strategy, and Net Assessment

Author:
Niccolo Petrelli
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
In late 2020, analysts recommended for the first time the establishment within NATO of a net assessment (NA) capability to deal with an in- creasingly complex strategic environment.1 The same recommendation was reiterated in the NATO 2030 report to address the problem of “strategic simultane- ity”: i.e. the emergence of multiple, simultaneous and interconnected threats. According to the Reflection Group appointed by the Secretary General, “NATO should consider creating a new net assessment office [...] with the mission of examining NATO’s strate- gic environment on the basis of agreed threats and challenges across the whole spectrum of military and non-military tools. [...] A net assessment function [...] would bring a systematic methodology distinct from horizon scanning. It would exist to analyse the organisation’s strengths and options [...]”.2 The term NA was first coined in the US during the early 1970s by national security official Andrew W. Marshall to refer to a constellation of concepts and techniques for evaluating relative power. In West- ern usage, however, and for some decades now, it has been employed in a broader sense to denote the function of combining the appreciation of one’s own strength against that of one’s opponents in interna- tional affairs at the highest level.
Topic:
NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Grand Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

43. Global NATO: What Future for the Alliance's Out-of-area Efforts?

Author:
Antoine Got
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
While modest in scope, the efforts briefly discussed above illustrate a desire not to rescind NATO’s role in the promotion of international – as opposed to strictly regional – stability. Notwithstanding this, there is room for improvement. Above all, the non-kinetic nature of these initiatives signals that NATO is still hesitant to reattempt ambitious crisis-management endeavours involving large-scale troop deployments or combat operations abroad. This is coherent with previous policy, of course, considering that responsibility for security provision should remain regionally – if not locally – owned. This hesitancy is likely to endure as a consequence of the withdrawal from Afghanistan. As a result, the threshold for orchestrating military operations abroad will likely remain high. At the same time, NATO should not entirely forgo such endeavours. For while international support for SSR and capability-building are certainly vital to deliver long-term resilience, stability and the rule of law, these activities are not panaceas. Pre-crisis activities, including early preparation and prevention, are crucial in helping to reduce the known risks that can lead to or aggravate a crisis or conflict. But to conceive of prevention activities as alternatives to emergency response and management would be misguided. Crises are an unpredictable and unavoidable part of contemporary international relations, and an over- reliance on prevention activities can obfuscate the wider set of non- Article 5 instruments at NATO’s disposal to defend allied interests and protect foreign populations against violence. NATO can apply this holistic array of tools for the best possible outcome before, during and after conflict. NATO should also recognise that support for out-of-area crisis management does not necessarily require large-scale, high-risk and expensive foreign troop deployments, and that a middle ground exits between this and the political costs of inaction. With the ongoing sense of anti-interventionism in the West and the hybridisation of warfare, NATO can achieve considerable gains with low-cost, low-footprint forms of military intervention that rely on remote airpower, special operations, and the force-multiplying potential of local partners, which NATO can arm, train, and support logistically to fight against common enemies. Remote warfare and “over-the-horizon” counter-terrorism combined with local capacity-building can provide a middle ground between the costs of inaction and those of over-reaction, while constructively re-establishing the primacy of NATO as an international security provider.24 Most importantly, the alliance should not restrict the scope of its out- of-area activities because of fear that more engagement could lead to the organisation being unwillingly dragged into an Afghanistan-type conflict. NATO has drawn several lessons from this experience and is unlikely to repeat the mistakes of the past. To remain a prominent crisis- management actor, it must continue its efforts to engage proactively with the world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

44. Exploring India's Strategic Futures

Author:
Arzan Tarapore
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:
The method of major/minor trends developed in this report suggests that the roots of apparently surprising future behavior can be found in a close reading of a target state’s history. Using this method, the report outlines three unlikely but plausible alternative futures of India as a strategic actor. The first scenario envisions India as a Hindu-nationalist revisionist power hostile to Pakistan but accommodating of China; in the second, it is a militarily risk-acceptant state that provokes dangerous crises with China; and in the third scenario, India is a staunch competitor to China that achieves some success through partnerships with other U.S. rivals like Russia and Iran. These scenarios are designed not to predict the future but to sensitize U.S. policymakers to possible strategic disruptions. They also serve to highlight risks and tensions in current policy.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Nationalism, Religion, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, India, Asia, North America, and United States of America

45. 2020 Country Brief: Saudi Arabia and its role in Yemen

Author:
Third Way
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been a close security and economic partner of the United States for most of the Kingdom’s history. But the United States cannot ignore Saudi Arabia’s gruesome acts and abuses, nor allow them to be swept under the rug. The two countries have critical differences on a number of key issues, including those related to terrorism, human rights, and regional security threats. Two particular actions taken by Saudi Arabia have caused Congress to revisit the US-Saudi relationship: Saudi-led military operations in Yemen that have killed thousands of innocent civilians and left millions on the brink of starvation; and The 2018 brutal murder of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi—a Saudi citizen and US resident—carried out by the Saudi government in Istanbul, Turkey. In the face of Saudi Arabia’s dangerous and destabilizing behavior, President Trump has doubled down on his support for the Kingdom and defied bipartisan congressional opposition to continue to sell arms to the Saudi government. Instead of permitting President Trump to allow autocrats and dictators to operate with impunity and commit acts of unimaginable horror, Congress must reassert its foreign policy decision-making power, impose targeted consequences on the Kingdom for its actions, and withdraw support for Saudi-led military operations in Yemen.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Human Rights Violations
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, North America, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

46. 2020 Thematic Brief: Preventing and Countering Terrorism

Author:
Third Way
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
The Trump Administration’s stated strategies to prevent and counter terrorism have largely continued the approach of the Obama Administration. However, this approach is at odds with the president’s own rhetoric and actions, which make us less safe in the long term. President Trump has verbally attacked and abandoned key allies and partners in the fight against terrorism, including the Kurds in Syria, while embracing counterproductive policies that will make it easier for terrorists to rebuild. At the same time, President Trump has largely ignored the far-right extremism that has spiked under his presidency. Even worse, he has retweeted statements that come from people associated with hate groups. Right-wing extremists, and in particular white supremacists, have caused more deaths than international terrorists in recent years.1They feel they have an ally in President Trump because he has largely refused to condemn them. During the recent protests for racial justice, he completely ignored the threat of right-wing extremists accused of killing Americans and plotting attacks against the military, while at the same time he was inflating other extremist threats.23And he blamed both sides in Charlottesville. To be clear, one side was neo-Nazis and other white supremacists. The United States needs a smart and tough approach to terrorism and extremism that includes: Prioritizing the threat of domestic extremism and dedicating resources to prevent and counter it, including by providing support to organizations working on these issues, cutting off financial flows, evaluating whether further designations of foreign right-wing organizations are warranted, and addressing extremism in the US military;4 Preventing the spread of all forms of violent extremism by addressing the root causes globally and reducing the effectiveness of recruitment efforts; Protecting the American homeland by preventing terrorist attacks and disrupting terrorist networks in the United States; and Eliminating terrorist safe havens abroad and building up the capacity of partner nations to fight terrorism on their own turf.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Terrorism, Military Strategy, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

47. Biden’s World? Views from the United States, China, Russia, and the European Union

Author:
Alexey Gromyko and Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic prevented the annual joint seminars that since a few years the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations organise in Moscow and Brussels. But the coronavirus cannot interrupt academic exchange; a dialogue that is more than ever necessary in a world of increasing tensions between the great powers. We continue our collaboration through this joint publication, therefore, for which we have invited prominent scholars from Russia and the European Union as well as China and the United States to share their analysis of the impact of Joe Biden’s victory in the US presidential elections on international politics.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

48. "NATO 2030. United for a new Era.": A Digest

Author:
Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
On 25 November 2020 the independent Reflection Group, established by the NATO Secretary Gen- eral following the December 2019 London Lead- ers meeting, released its report titled “NATO 2030: United for a New Era”.1 Composed of ten leading personalities,2 the Group was mandated to look at NATO’s current and future role and suggest recommendations on how to rein- force Alliance unity, political consultation between Allies, and NATO’s political role. The initiative came implicitly as a response to the French President’s statement about NATO being “brain dead”, made in the context of the October 2019 US withdrawal from northern Syria and the subsequent Turkish operation there, both apparently carried out without consultation within NATO. The Report is divided into three parts, looking in se- quence at: the vision and main findings; the security and political environment; and recommendations.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

49. NATO and 5G: what strategic lessons?

Author:
Andrea Gilli
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Thanks to their higher speed, larger data volume, lower latency, and capacity to sustain very high density connections (including machine-to-machine communications), 5G networks are set to unleash a major economic revolution, potentially adding trillions of dollars to the global economy (at least according to recent forecasts). From smart cities to Artificial Intelligence (AI); telemedicine to driverless cars; virtual reality to the Internet of Things (IoT); Industry 4.0 to all manner of applications that will comprise this new ecosystem, 5G ushers in enormous opportunities. 5G communications still require significant investments, both for research and development of key technologies, and for building the supporting infrastructure. Moreover, the next generation of telecommunications raises several important questions about the political economy of spectrum allocation and standard definition, their military applications, the role of Chinese companies and the attendant cybersecurity risks. These are all relevant topics for NATO from which the Alliance can draw some strategic lessons.
Topic:
NATO, Military Strategy, Data, 5G, and Internet of Things
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and Global Focus

50. Avoiding an Epic Mistake: The Case for Continuing the U.S. Mission in Sinai

Author:
Assaf Orion and Denis Thompson
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
For almost four decades, the Multinational Force & Observers has protected Israel-Egypt peace and anchored stability in the Sinai Peninsula, but a new Pentagon initiative could end the American contribution by late next year. Defense Secretary Mark Esper has indicated that all military endeavors must now fall within a National Defense Strategy focused on Great Power competition. Look closer, though, and America’s MFO role does just that. Both Russia and China have recently sought deeper involvement in Egypt’s development, nuclear energy, arms acquisition, and broader economy, so staying in Sinai means staying relevant. This timely Policy Note is authored by two decorated military officers, Assaf Orion, a brigadier general in the Israel Defense Forces, and Denis Thompson, a Canadian Army major general who led the MFO from 2014 to 2017. They contend that the grand-strategic benefits of the force—now populated by 1,156 troops from thirteen nations—easily justify its low cost. An American exit would likely unravel the entire MFO, putting Israel-Egypt peace and regional stability at needless risk.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
North Africa, North America, Egypt, Sinai Peninsula, and United States of America