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Begin New Search Topic Foreign Policy Political Geography Iran Content Type Policy Brief

1. De-escalation Efforts: What Tehran wants from a prisoner swap deal with Washington?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
US National Security Council Spokesperson Adrienne Waston, in a statement on August 10, 2023, affirmed that Iran has released from prison five Americans who were detained and has placed them on house arrest. US citizens Siamak Namazi, Morad Tahbaz, Emad Shargi, and two others were released from Tehran’s notorious Evin prison to house arrest. The US official described their release as “an encouraging step” and stressed that Washigton will continue efforts to bring them “all back home in the United States.”
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

2. A Bid to Contain Pressure: What are the motives behind Iranian President's East Africa tour?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi went on a trip to Africa from July 11 to 13, 2023, during which he visited Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe on invitations from the leaders of the three countries, President William Ruto, Yoweri Museveni and President Emmerson Mnangagwa, respectively. Raisi led a high-level delegation including First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber, Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, Health Minister Behrouz Aghaei, and Minister of Agriculture Seyyed Javad Sadati Nejad, and several other high-ranking officials and businessmen.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Partnerships, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Uganda, Kenya, Iran, Middle East, Zimbabwe, and East Africa

3. The Israeli ThreatL What is driving the renewed escalation between Iran and Azerbaijan?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The Ministry of Interior, Security Agency, and Prosecutor General’s Office of Azerbaijan announced in a joint statement on Tuesday, May 16, 2023, that nine individuals were arrested on charges of planning to overthrow the government by force, assassinate prominent figures and senior Azerbaijani officials. The statement indicated that they had connections to Iranian intelligence agencies, and that the cell was composed of a person named Ruhollah Akhoundzadeh and his son Mursal, along with seven others working under his supervision. On his part, the spokesperson for the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nasser Kanaani, rejected the accusations in a statement on May 18, denying any official or unofficial relationship between these individuals and Iran. He affirmed that imprisoning individuals on the pretext of their connection to Iran is unacceptable.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, and Escalation
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Azerbaijan

4. Encircling Damascus: Iran’s Foreign Minister Visits Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Iranian Foreign Minister, Hossein Amirabdollahian, has made a surprise visit to Ankara, Beirut, and Damascus, reflecting his country’s increased engagement in the region. His trip to Ankara replaced a postponed trip to Moscow, where he was set to meet with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Syrian War, Engagement, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Lebanon, and Syria

5. Bankrupting Iran’s Empire of Terror

Author:
Nate Sibley
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Hamas’s surprise attack on Israel has left thousands of innocent people dead, set the stage for a bloody and protracted conflict in Gaza, and precipitated a crisis that threatens to engulf the Middle East in a devastating new conflict. To prevent further escalation, the United States needs to act swiftly to intensify economic pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran and dismantle its terrorist financing networks. Though Iran has denied any involvement, Hamas could not have planned an operation of this scale without critical support from its chief state sponsor. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has devoted enormous resources to building up proxy terrorist organizations in order to encircle Israel. According to a 2020 US government estimate, the IRGC provides as much as $700 million to Lebanese Hezbollah and $100 million to Hamas and other Palestinian groups each year. So far, this strategy appears to be working. Hezbollah, the IRGC’s most powerful terrorist partner, is poised to attack from the north, while other Iranian proxies threaten Israel from within Syria and elsewhere. Israel’s newly cordial relations with its Arab neighbors—including its nascent détente with Saudi Arabia—hang precariously in the balance. President Joe Biden’s immediate response to the attacks rightly focused on delivering Israel the political backing and military assistance that it urgently needs. But as the overseer of the global financial system, the United States can also deploy its unique capabilities to constrict the Islamic Republic’s revenues and shut down its global terrorist financing networks. Whether the United States succeeds in doing so will shape events far beyond the Middle East. This conflict is not just another flare-up in a long-troubled region. It reflects an ongoing global realignment wherein powerful adversaries test American strength and resolve with growing coordination and assertiveness. As Russia wages war in Ukraine and Beijing watches carefully, the stakes call for nothing less than a major US endeavor to bankrupt the Islamic Republic’s empire of terror once and for all.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Corruption, Terrorism, and Hamas
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

6. The System Is Blinking Red over Iran

Author:
Jonathan Schachter
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In his testimony to the 9/11 Commission, then-CIA Director George Tenet described the harrowing intelligence picture that had emerged in the summer of 2001. “The system was blinking red,” he famously recalled. What followed, of course, was the well-documented, multi-agency failure to prevent an avoidable disaster that changed the course of history. The system is blinking red again, and the American response appears frighteningly familiar. Earlier this month, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that its inspectors in Iran had discovered uranium particles enriched to about 84 percent purity. Most reports have noted that this is just shy of the 90 percent level generally considered to be “weapons grade.” Others correctly point out that uranium enriched to around 80 percent fueled the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. Almost no one mentions that Iran has no civilian need to enrich uranium in the first place. During the nearly four years leading up to the IAEA’s finding, Iran has engaged in increasingly grave violations of its international nuclear obligations, only some of which derive from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran still refuses to cooperate with at least three separate IAEA investigations of undeclared nuclear materials, activities, and sites, in violation of its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. With Iran’s long history of nuclear lawbreaking, the discovery of undeclared, highly enriched uranium is unsurprising. Iran does not have a peaceful uranium enrichment program. Uranium enrichment remains part and parcel of the regime’s effort to develop and maintain the ability to produce and deliver nuclear weapons on demand. Rather than dismantling Iran’s illegally built military enrichment program, the JCPOA decriminalized it. Even if the US had not withdrawn from the JCPOA in 2018, the deal’s limited and temporary terms explicitly permit Iran to expand its enrichment capability and capacity and increase its stockpile of enriched uranium, legally and without limitation, by the end of this decade. In a February 24 interview with CBS News, the current CIA director, William Burns, downplayed the danger. He reaffirmed that “we don’t believe that the Supreme Leader in Iran has yet made a decision to resume the weaponization program that we judge that they suspended or stopped at the end of 2003.” The materials Israeli intelligence spirited out of a Tehran warehouse (the “Atomic Archive”) in 2018, which Israel shared with the United States, raise disturbing questions about the assessment Burns presented and its persistence. The archive materials showed that the regime did not stop or suspend its weaponization program in 2003, but, in the Iranians’ own words, modified it. What had been a crash program geared toward testing a nuclear device on a short timeline became a dispersed, long-term effort—part clandestine, part under the cover of civilian research—to develop and maintain capabilities relevant to the production of nuclear weapons. The program went from sprint to marathon, though both have a nuclear weapons finish line. More broadly, the archive showed that the Iranian nuclear weapons program was more advanced and comprehensive than previously understood. Israel and the United States became aware of how much so 15 years after the fact and only thanks to one of the most stunning intelligence coups in modern history. Despite this long lag and the long odds of repeating such an intelligence feat, Burns seems to believe that we will know in near-real time if and when Iran’s leader decides to switch the program back to an even shorter nuclear sprint. This belief seems to reflect, as the saying goes, the triumph of hope over experience. Perhaps this too is unsurprising. The JCPOA was always built on little more than hope. The largely unspoken logic behind the agreement was that an engaged, wealthier Iran would lose interest in nuclear weapons before the deal’s restrictions expired. Iran quickly proved the optimists wrong. In the years immediately after striking the deal, Tehran increased defense spending by more than 30 percent; offered substantially more support to terrorist groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis; and intensified its aggression across the region. Iran continues to develop missiles and, as Burns pointed out, the associated ability to deliver a nuclear warhead. Now Iran is using the same uranium enrichment infrastructure guaranteed by the JCPOA to violate its terms. The Biden administration’s policy toward Iran reflects a clear and consistent preference for diplomacy over the use of force, and understandably so. But the White House treats the two as contradictory, rather than complementary. For over two years, the administration has demonstrated its reticence to use, or even credibly threaten to use, force against Iran. Manifestly undeterred, Iran has continued and accelerated its drive toward the nuclear threshold. Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine and Iran’s provision of weapons to Russia mean that even if the IAEA Board of Governors were to refer Iran’s nuclear crimes to the United Nations Security Council, Russia surely would veto any punitive measure toward the Islamic Republic. In other words, America’s soft-handed approach and global events are making a diplomatic solution less likely. If Washington continues on its current path, the world almost certainly will face a nuclear-armed Iran, a war to prevent that eventuality, or both. It is not too late to act. First, the United States can press its European partners to activate the JCPOA’s snap-back mechanism, which is not subject to a Russian (or Chinese) veto. Doing so would reimpose international sanctions and the UN arms embargo on Iran that the deal lifted in 2020. It also would prevent the planned lifting of the UN missile embargo on Iran in October of this year. Second, the president, his administration, and Congress can make clear that the United States and its allies can and will use force to prevent Iran from violating its nuclear obligations. The United States would not be moving its red lines, but rather enforcing them. Doing so would send a powerful message to Iranian leaders that they have already crossed America’s red lines and need to back down. Such a threat might not be effective. But without a credible American commitment to use force, no diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear problem is possible. This moment could be America’s last chance to change course on Iran. If it does not, one wonders what Director Burns and his colleagues in the administration might say in their future testimony about why they failed to act when the system was blinking red on their watch.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

7. An Heir and a Spare? How Yemen’s “Southern Hezbollah” Could Change Iran’s Deterrent Calculus

Author:
Michael Knights
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Since October 27, the Houthis have launched three medium-range ballistic missiles at Israel, a first since Saddam Hussein fired Scud missiles into the country in 1991. The Yemen-based jihadists have also launched at least eight salvos of cruise missiles and long-range explosive drones focused on the southern port of Eilat. Moreover, they have attacked U.S. assets directly during the Hamas-Israel war, shooting down one MQ-9 Reaper drone and routing numerous missiles near Navy vessels. If Iran continues to develop the group’s capabilities, the Houthis may provide the broader “axis of resistance” with a potent new chess piece. In this timely Policy Note, Michael Knights assesses the rising Houthi threat and explains how the United States and its allies can respond more assertively and effectively. A revamped policy would recognize the intimate alliance between the Houthis and Iran—which has never been a “marriage of convenience,” as some analysts have imagined—and seek to counter the group’s aggression with the goal of securing U.S. interests and providing a better future for the Yemeni people.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Energy Policy, Deterrence, and Houthis
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Yemen, Palestine, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

8. The Regent of Allah: Ali Khamenei's Political Evolution in Iran

Author:
Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
During his lengthy tenure as Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei has shown a knack for consolidating power by creating layers of bureaucracy in military, economic, and religious affairs. In turn, he has liberally purged officials who have hinted at disloyalty to him, the Islamic Republic, or its governing doctrine, velayat-e faqih (rule of the jurisprudent). But Khamenei does not lack for personal complexity. As a younger man, he dressed casually, flaunted his love of literature, and composed poetry. And as a leader, he has often demonstrated flexibility—coined as “heroic flexibility” in the case of the 2015 nuclear deal—at times of national risk or strained social cohesion. He has likewise blessed the rise of relatively moderate presidents such as Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani when he thought their leadership would reinforce national stability. In this wide-ranging study, former Qom theologian Mehdi Khalaji details Khamenei’s political ascent, from his role as an influential cleric in Mashhad to his presidency under Ruhollah Khomeini and his surprising appointment as Supreme Leader. Whoever succeeds him, the author makes plain, will inherit an infrastructure designed to preserve Iran’s authoritarian system and suppress rumblings of internal dissent.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Political Islam, and Ali Khamenei
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

9. Is Iran Looking to Inspire Shia Homegrown Violent Extremist Attacks?

Author:
Moustafa Ayad and Matthew Levitt
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
An October 2018 report by the National Counterterrorism Center defined Shia homegrown violent extremists as “individuals who are inspired or influenced by state actors such as Iran, foreign terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, or Shia militant groups but who do not belong to these groups and are not directed by them.” At the time, the prospect of such Shia violence was largely theoretical, and officials could identify no tangible threats on American soil. But the January 2020 targeted killing of Iranian Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani changed the picture, and U.S. officials could now point to a “catalyzing event,” as envisioned in the NCTC brief. Last year’s attack against writer Salman Rushdie and another at a Las Vegas hotel exemplified how Iran-inspired individuals were motivated to act. In this Policy Note, experts Moustafa Ayad and Matthew Levitt explore lone-offender Shia violence largely through the lens of social media. Closer tracking of online networks, they argue, could illuminate this flourishing virtual activity and how it might lead to real-world harm.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, and Shia
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

10. Iran’s Nuclear Endgame Warrants a Change in U.S. Strategy

Author:
Michael Singh
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Recently, inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency discovered that Iran had enriched uranium to a level just shy of what is generally considered weapons grade. Like many findings before it, this revelation underscores the need for a new U.S. and European policy toward Iran. The two most important and immediate steps in that process are clear by this point: Washington and its partners need to move on from any remaining plans they might have to resurrect the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), namely by activating that accord’s “snapback” mechanism; and governments must heighten their efforts to deter Iran through credible threats of military force.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

11. Striking Back: Iran and the Rise of Asymmetric Drone Warfare in the Middle East

Author:
Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr.
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Iranian drone strikes, as exemplified by the September 2019 attack against Saudi Aramco facilities, have jolted Middle East leaders and revealed Tehran’s long-range precision strike capabilities. The regime’s large and growing drone force, which can be used for reconnaissance or strike missions, now poses an existential threat to the Gulf states and a direct threat to Israel, as does its formidable missile force. Moreover, Iranian drones transferred to Russia have had a significant impact on Moscow’s war against Ukraine. In the bigger picture, advances in drone technology have produced an inflection point in aerial warfare—comparable to the introduction of manned flight more than a century ago—that has ended the guarantee of U.S. air superiority over its forces and bases. Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. explores the contours and consequences of Iran’s drone activities in this timely Policy Note. To counter the Islamic Republic, the former CENTCOM commander recommends an approach centered on clearer U.S. communication about its goals for the region, tighter collaboration with partners and allies, and enhanced efforts to counter Iran’s drone fleet, along with its ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Drones, Military, and Asymmetric Warfare
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

12. Holding the Hard-line: What is behind Iran’s seizure of Greek ships in Arabian Gulf?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
On May 27, Iran seized two Greek tankers, named “Prudent Warrior” and “Delta Poseidon”, in the Arabian Gulf. Forces from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) descended on the tankers and ordered them to sail to Bandar Abbas port. Onboard the tankers were 49 crew members. Greece described the operation as ‘piracy’. The seizure seems to be a reprisal for Greece’s role earlier in the month assisting the US impounding a Russian-flagged tanker transporting Iranian oil and carrying 19 crew.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Maritime, and Shipping
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Greece

13. Korea's Economic Presence in Iran under Trump and Its Prospects during the Biden Presidency

Author:
Shirzad Azad
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
On July 14, 2015, when Iran and the 5+1 group (the United States, Russia, China, France, Britain, and Germany) ultimately agreed over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Republic of Korea (ROK) was practically one of the top three trade partners of the Persian Gulf country. In early May 2016 and only a few months after the nuclear deal was carried through, the then Korean President, Park Geun-hye, made an official visit to Iran where the two countries vowed to ratchet up their economic relations from roughly $6 billion to more than $18 billion in the years to come. Accompanied by “the largest business delegation in the history of Korean presidential trips,” Park’s high-profile trip to Iran persuaded many interested experts and observers to believe that the East Asian country was really determined to shore up its economic weight in Iran by drawing certain policies relevant to the long-term presence of Korean businesses in the Middle Eastern country (Choi 2016). Despite all those upbeat expectations about the ROK’s future economic and technological role in Iran, however, various data and statistics coming out indicate that over the past several years nearly all well-known Korean brands and products have increasingly lost their market share in the Mideast country to brands and goods supplied by other competitors. As a matter of fact, in the late 1990s and early 2000s the East Asian nation emerged as one of the Persian Gulf country’s top trading partners in the world, outstripping a number of Tehran’s traditional trading partners from the West. And while Korea managed to even expand its economic presence in Iran in the heydays of sundry international sanctions levied against the Middle Eastern country over its contentious nuclear program a couple of years before the JCPOA was eventually agreed in 2015, the ROK has been doing relatively poor in Iran during the past years (Azad 2018). Such lackadaisical performance, epitomized by abandoning the long-established pattern of significant trade in energy with Iran, has critically influenced a sharp decline in the total volume of two-way commerce between the two countries. While the plummeting share of Korean brands and goods in Iranian markets had indubitably something to do with certain policies pursued by the Moon Jae-in-led Korean government, however, the main culprit turned out to be the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the nuclear deal in May 2018. The crippling sanctions which Washington under Trump subsequently imposed on Iran played a pivotal role in reshaping the scope and size of Korean commercial connections to the Persian Gulf country, though some unprecedented diplomatic and political troubles involving Seoul and Tehran during the past years have also had a lot to do with those punitive economic and financial measures targeting the Iranians. How did then the Koreans respond to those unique circumstances rendered largely by Trump’s approach toward the Persian Gulf country? What are going to be the prospects of a Biden administration’s policy shift for Korea’s economic performance in Iran? This study seeks to shed some light on Trump’s Iran policy with regard to Korea, its repercussions for the East Asian nation’s economic relationship with the Middle Eastern country, and potential solutions to chip away at those impediments under a Democrat administration in Washington led by Joe Biden.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Donald Trump, JCPOA, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Iran, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

14. Sanctions Against Russia: Five Lessons from the Case of Iran

Author:
Stefan Meister and David Ramin Jalilvand
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has led to the most comprehensive economic sanctions imposed on a country of this size since the end of the Second World War. Yet sanctions are only an effective tool of foreign and security policy if they are embedded in a sustainable political strategy that considers the cost-benefit analysis for both sides. Looking at the sanctions against Iran can be helpful when it comes to learning lessons about how to deal with Russia.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Eurasia, and Ukraine

15. Scoring Iraq’s New Government: Metrics for Preserving U.S. Interests

Author:
Michael Knights
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The protracted post-election process has been a step backward for Iraqi democracy, so Washington will need to closely monitor the new leadership’s actions and hold Baghdad to measurable benchmarks. Iraq’s stalled government formation process finally lurched forward on October 17, with new president Abdul Latif Rashid taking office more than a year after the 2021 election. Incoming prime minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani will now try to ratify his cabinet during a parliamentary session on October 22. If he succeeds as expected, Baghdad will finally close perhaps its most troubled electoral cycle yet—a chapter in which a clear popular vote nearly failed to produce a peaceful transition of power, and the losing factions spurred the biggest winner to abandon parliament through corrupt judicial rulings. Under these sad circumstances, the U.S. government and its partners need to quietly but insistently push for early, inclusive elections to restore legitimacy to the democratic process. Simultaneously, all of Iraq’s friends must watch the new government like a hawk to ensure that militias and corrupt politicians do not attempt to purge technocrats, conduct witch hunts against Western-leaning officials, cover up past graft, or initiate a new wave of “asset-stripping” via state institutions. After many false alarms, the survival of Iraq’s close relationship with the West is truly at stake right now, and only firm expectation-setting can ensure that the partnership continues.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Government, Terrorism, Reform, Democracy, and Military
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

16. A Stabilizing Factor: Oman’s Quiet Influence amid Mounting Uncertainty in the Gulf

Author:
Jeonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Based on its sound reputation as a conflict mediator and talks facilitator, Oman is well-positioned to tone down flaring rivalries in the Gulf and prevent tensions from spiraling out of control. After a timid thawing of tensions, the Gulf region is witnessing a renewed phase of uncertainty. Despite being a skillful master at navigating turbulent waters, Oman is eyeing the revamping of tensions in its immediate neighborhood with growing apprehension. The failed attempts to review the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the revamping of Iran’s outward-looking incendiary rhetoric as well as localized military retaliations amid recent mass protests, and the failure to extend the U.N.-brokered ceasefire in Yemen do not bode well for the region’s precarious stability. Muscat has a vested interest in preventing at-sea incidents from escalating and harsh infighting among rival Yemeni factions from reaching alarming proportions, especially given its coasts looking out on the Strait of Hormuz and much of its southwestern frontier bordering Yemen.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Energy Policy, and Political stability
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Oman, and Gulf Nations

17. Toward an Inclusive Security Arrangement in the Persian Gulf

Author:
Trita Parsi
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
• Abandon dominance. For many of the United States’ security partners, even a dysfunctional Pax Americana is preferable to the compromises that a security architecture would inevitably entail. The preconditions for creating a successful security architecture can emerge only if the United States begins a military withdrawal from the Persian Gulf and credibly signals it no longer seeks to sustain hegemony. • Encourage regional dialogue, but let the region lead. The incoming Biden administration’s hint that it will seek an inclusive security dialogue in the Persian Gulf is a welcome first step toward shifting the burden of security to the regional states themselves. For such an effort to be successful, the United States should play a supporting role while urging regional states to take the lead. • Include other major powers. The regional dialogue should include the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and major Asian powers with a strong interest in stability in the Persian Gulf. Including them can help dilute Washington’s and Beijing’s roles while protecting the region from inter–Asian rivalries in the future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, United Nations, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Military Affairs, and Grand Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, and Persian Gulf

18. Moscow's Central Role: Have the Rules of Engagement Changed in Syria after the recent Israeli Strikes?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
On July 19, 22 and 25, Israel carried out three strikes in less than one week using surface-to-air missiles against Syria. These strikes are considered the first of their kind executed by the new Israeli "Bennett-Lapid" government. Although this type of strikes is not novel, the Russian reaction to it was different this time. The Russian Ministry of Defense engaged in the scene for the first time, sending indirect messages to Israel. This made analysts refer to a possible shift in the rules of engagement in Syria. The understandings between Moscow and Tel Aviv were based on Moscow turning a blind eye to Israeli fighters launching airstrikes in Syria against Iranian targets, in return for Israel not targeting Syrian regime forces or Russian forces, which provide direct support to the Syrian army against the armed opposition. The Russian position reflected a clear desire to weaken the Iranian military presence in Syria, particularly with the escalation of rivalry between Moscow and Tehran over economic and military influence there.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Economy
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

19. Curtailing Tehran: Breaking down the validation of Israeli conjectures if Damascus is constraining Iranian military activities

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The Israeli ‘Walla’ news website published a report that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has reorganized the deployment of military forces in Syria, and has restricted the movement of Iranian forces internally in order to prevent internal frictions and achieve peace and stability. Walla deems the change in Damascus’s stance towards Iran to be in response to the political, economic and military pressures implored on the former. The website has also indicated that the Iranian presence in Syria has also weakened for other reasons, including the continuous Israeli and US pressures on Iranian presence there. While there were no sources confirming such notions, considering the policies of regional and international powers’ concerning the Syrian crisis, there might be some truth to this notion, pushing Damascus to embrace such tactics.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Political stability, and Peace
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

20. The Battle of Time: Why is Washington showing little interest in Iran's presidential elections?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The Biden administration has been keen on sending several messages implying that it shows little interest in the results of the Iran presidential elections due to take place on June 18. Washington believes that the identity of Iran's next president will not change the decision-making trends in Tehran or the potential course of the relations between Iran and the US over the next phase. On March 11, Robert Malley, the US envoy to Iran, said that “Iran's elections in June are not a factor in the Biden administration’s decision-making for how to proceed with nuclear talks” adding that “the pace will be determined by how far we can get consistent with defending U.S. national security interests”. He continued saying, “we won’t rush or slow things because of the Iranian elections”. This reflects several indicators relevant to the new strategy adopted by the Biden administration in dealing with Iran during the current phase, which can be addressed as follows:
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Elections, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Iran and Washington