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Begin New Search Topic Foreign Policy Political Geography Iran Content Type Policy Brief Publication Year within 5 Years

1. De-escalation Efforts: What Tehran wants from a prisoner swap deal with Washington?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
US National Security Council Spokesperson Adrienne Waston, in a statement on August 10, 2023, affirmed that Iran has released from prison five Americans who were detained and has placed them on house arrest. US citizens Siamak Namazi, Morad Tahbaz, Emad Shargi, and two others were released from Tehran’s notorious Evin prison to house arrest. The US official described their release as “an encouraging step” and stressed that Washigton will continue efforts to bring them “all back home in the United States.”
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

2. A Bid to Contain Pressure: What are the motives behind Iranian President's East Africa tour?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi went on a trip to Africa from July 11 to 13, 2023, during which he visited Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe on invitations from the leaders of the three countries, President William Ruto, Yoweri Museveni and President Emmerson Mnangagwa, respectively. Raisi led a high-level delegation including First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber, Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, Health Minister Behrouz Aghaei, and Minister of Agriculture Seyyed Javad Sadati Nejad, and several other high-ranking officials and businessmen.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Partnerships, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Uganda, Kenya, Iran, Middle East, Zimbabwe, and East Africa

3. The Israeli ThreatL What is driving the renewed escalation between Iran and Azerbaijan?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The Ministry of Interior, Security Agency, and Prosecutor General’s Office of Azerbaijan announced in a joint statement on Tuesday, May 16, 2023, that nine individuals were arrested on charges of planning to overthrow the government by force, assassinate prominent figures and senior Azerbaijani officials. The statement indicated that they had connections to Iranian intelligence agencies, and that the cell was composed of a person named Ruhollah Akhoundzadeh and his son Mursal, along with seven others working under his supervision. On his part, the spokesperson for the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nasser Kanaani, rejected the accusations in a statement on May 18, denying any official or unofficial relationship between these individuals and Iran. He affirmed that imprisoning individuals on the pretext of their connection to Iran is unacceptable.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, and Escalation
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Azerbaijan

4. Encircling Damascus: Iran’s Foreign Minister Visits Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Iranian Foreign Minister, Hossein Amirabdollahian, has made a surprise visit to Ankara, Beirut, and Damascus, reflecting his country’s increased engagement in the region. His trip to Ankara replaced a postponed trip to Moscow, where he was set to meet with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Syrian War, Engagement, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Lebanon, and Syria

5. Bankrupting Iran’s Empire of Terror

Author:
Nate Sibley
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Hamas’s surprise attack on Israel has left thousands of innocent people dead, set the stage for a bloody and protracted conflict in Gaza, and precipitated a crisis that threatens to engulf the Middle East in a devastating new conflict. To prevent further escalation, the United States needs to act swiftly to intensify economic pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran and dismantle its terrorist financing networks. Though Iran has denied any involvement, Hamas could not have planned an operation of this scale without critical support from its chief state sponsor. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has devoted enormous resources to building up proxy terrorist organizations in order to encircle Israel. According to a 2020 US government estimate, the IRGC provides as much as $700 million to Lebanese Hezbollah and $100 million to Hamas and other Palestinian groups each year. So far, this strategy appears to be working. Hezbollah, the IRGC’s most powerful terrorist partner, is poised to attack from the north, while other Iranian proxies threaten Israel from within Syria and elsewhere. Israel’s newly cordial relations with its Arab neighbors—including its nascent détente with Saudi Arabia—hang precariously in the balance. President Joe Biden’s immediate response to the attacks rightly focused on delivering Israel the political backing and military assistance that it urgently needs. But as the overseer of the global financial system, the United States can also deploy its unique capabilities to constrict the Islamic Republic’s revenues and shut down its global terrorist financing networks. Whether the United States succeeds in doing so will shape events far beyond the Middle East. This conflict is not just another flare-up in a long-troubled region. It reflects an ongoing global realignment wherein powerful adversaries test American strength and resolve with growing coordination and assertiveness. As Russia wages war in Ukraine and Beijing watches carefully, the stakes call for nothing less than a major US endeavor to bankrupt the Islamic Republic’s empire of terror once and for all.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Corruption, Terrorism, and Hamas
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

6. The System Is Blinking Red over Iran

Author:
Jonathan Schachter
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In his testimony to the 9/11 Commission, then-CIA Director George Tenet described the harrowing intelligence picture that had emerged in the summer of 2001. “The system was blinking red,” he famously recalled. What followed, of course, was the well-documented, multi-agency failure to prevent an avoidable disaster that changed the course of history. The system is blinking red again, and the American response appears frighteningly familiar. Earlier this month, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that its inspectors in Iran had discovered uranium particles enriched to about 84 percent purity. Most reports have noted that this is just shy of the 90 percent level generally considered to be “weapons grade.” Others correctly point out that uranium enriched to around 80 percent fueled the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. Almost no one mentions that Iran has no civilian need to enrich uranium in the first place. During the nearly four years leading up to the IAEA’s finding, Iran has engaged in increasingly grave violations of its international nuclear obligations, only some of which derive from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran still refuses to cooperate with at least three separate IAEA investigations of undeclared nuclear materials, activities, and sites, in violation of its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. With Iran’s long history of nuclear lawbreaking, the discovery of undeclared, highly enriched uranium is unsurprising. Iran does not have a peaceful uranium enrichment program. Uranium enrichment remains part and parcel of the regime’s effort to develop and maintain the ability to produce and deliver nuclear weapons on demand. Rather than dismantling Iran’s illegally built military enrichment program, the JCPOA decriminalized it. Even if the US had not withdrawn from the JCPOA in 2018, the deal’s limited and temporary terms explicitly permit Iran to expand its enrichment capability and capacity and increase its stockpile of enriched uranium, legally and without limitation, by the end of this decade. In a February 24 interview with CBS News, the current CIA director, William Burns, downplayed the danger. He reaffirmed that “we don’t believe that the Supreme Leader in Iran has yet made a decision to resume the weaponization program that we judge that they suspended or stopped at the end of 2003.” The materials Israeli intelligence spirited out of a Tehran warehouse (the “Atomic Archive”) in 2018, which Israel shared with the United States, raise disturbing questions about the assessment Burns presented and its persistence. The archive materials showed that the regime did not stop or suspend its weaponization program in 2003, but, in the Iranians’ own words, modified it. What had been a crash program geared toward testing a nuclear device on a short timeline became a dispersed, long-term effort—part clandestine, part under the cover of civilian research—to develop and maintain capabilities relevant to the production of nuclear weapons. The program went from sprint to marathon, though both have a nuclear weapons finish line. More broadly, the archive showed that the Iranian nuclear weapons program was more advanced and comprehensive than previously understood. Israel and the United States became aware of how much so 15 years after the fact and only thanks to one of the most stunning intelligence coups in modern history. Despite this long lag and the long odds of repeating such an intelligence feat, Burns seems to believe that we will know in near-real time if and when Iran’s leader decides to switch the program back to an even shorter nuclear sprint. This belief seems to reflect, as the saying goes, the triumph of hope over experience. Perhaps this too is unsurprising. The JCPOA was always built on little more than hope. The largely unspoken logic behind the agreement was that an engaged, wealthier Iran would lose interest in nuclear weapons before the deal’s restrictions expired. Iran quickly proved the optimists wrong. In the years immediately after striking the deal, Tehran increased defense spending by more than 30 percent; offered substantially more support to terrorist groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis; and intensified its aggression across the region. Iran continues to develop missiles and, as Burns pointed out, the associated ability to deliver a nuclear warhead. Now Iran is using the same uranium enrichment infrastructure guaranteed by the JCPOA to violate its terms. The Biden administration’s policy toward Iran reflects a clear and consistent preference for diplomacy over the use of force, and understandably so. But the White House treats the two as contradictory, rather than complementary. For over two years, the administration has demonstrated its reticence to use, or even credibly threaten to use, force against Iran. Manifestly undeterred, Iran has continued and accelerated its drive toward the nuclear threshold. Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine and Iran’s provision of weapons to Russia mean that even if the IAEA Board of Governors were to refer Iran’s nuclear crimes to the United Nations Security Council, Russia surely would veto any punitive measure toward the Islamic Republic. In other words, America’s soft-handed approach and global events are making a diplomatic solution less likely. If Washington continues on its current path, the world almost certainly will face a nuclear-armed Iran, a war to prevent that eventuality, or both. It is not too late to act. First, the United States can press its European partners to activate the JCPOA’s snap-back mechanism, which is not subject to a Russian (or Chinese) veto. Doing so would reimpose international sanctions and the UN arms embargo on Iran that the deal lifted in 2020. It also would prevent the planned lifting of the UN missile embargo on Iran in October of this year. Second, the president, his administration, and Congress can make clear that the United States and its allies can and will use force to prevent Iran from violating its nuclear obligations. The United States would not be moving its red lines, but rather enforcing them. Doing so would send a powerful message to Iranian leaders that they have already crossed America’s red lines and need to back down. Such a threat might not be effective. But without a credible American commitment to use force, no diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear problem is possible. This moment could be America’s last chance to change course on Iran. If it does not, one wonders what Director Burns and his colleagues in the administration might say in their future testimony about why they failed to act when the system was blinking red on their watch.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

7. An Heir and a Spare? How Yemen’s “Southern Hezbollah” Could Change Iran’s Deterrent Calculus

Author:
Michael Knights
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Since October 27, the Houthis have launched three medium-range ballistic missiles at Israel, a first since Saddam Hussein fired Scud missiles into the country in 1991. The Yemen-based jihadists have also launched at least eight salvos of cruise missiles and long-range explosive drones focused on the southern port of Eilat. Moreover, they have attacked U.S. assets directly during the Hamas-Israel war, shooting down one MQ-9 Reaper drone and routing numerous missiles near Navy vessels. If Iran continues to develop the group’s capabilities, the Houthis may provide the broader “axis of resistance” with a potent new chess piece. In this timely Policy Note, Michael Knights assesses the rising Houthi threat and explains how the United States and its allies can respond more assertively and effectively. A revamped policy would recognize the intimate alliance between the Houthis and Iran—which has never been a “marriage of convenience,” as some analysts have imagined—and seek to counter the group’s aggression with the goal of securing U.S. interests and providing a better future for the Yemeni people.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Energy Policy, Deterrence, and Houthis
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Yemen, Palestine, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

8. The Regent of Allah: Ali Khamenei's Political Evolution in Iran

Author:
Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
During his lengthy tenure as Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei has shown a knack for consolidating power by creating layers of bureaucracy in military, economic, and religious affairs. In turn, he has liberally purged officials who have hinted at disloyalty to him, the Islamic Republic, or its governing doctrine, velayat-e faqih (rule of the jurisprudent). But Khamenei does not lack for personal complexity. As a younger man, he dressed casually, flaunted his love of literature, and composed poetry. And as a leader, he has often demonstrated flexibility—coined as “heroic flexibility” in the case of the 2015 nuclear deal—at times of national risk or strained social cohesion. He has likewise blessed the rise of relatively moderate presidents such as Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani when he thought their leadership would reinforce national stability. In this wide-ranging study, former Qom theologian Mehdi Khalaji details Khamenei’s political ascent, from his role as an influential cleric in Mashhad to his presidency under Ruhollah Khomeini and his surprising appointment as Supreme Leader. Whoever succeeds him, the author makes plain, will inherit an infrastructure designed to preserve Iran’s authoritarian system and suppress rumblings of internal dissent.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Political Islam, and Ali Khamenei
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

9. Is Iran Looking to Inspire Shia Homegrown Violent Extremist Attacks?

Author:
Moustafa Ayad and Matthew Levitt
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
An October 2018 report by the National Counterterrorism Center defined Shia homegrown violent extremists as “individuals who are inspired or influenced by state actors such as Iran, foreign terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, or Shia militant groups but who do not belong to these groups and are not directed by them.” At the time, the prospect of such Shia violence was largely theoretical, and officials could identify no tangible threats on American soil. But the January 2020 targeted killing of Iranian Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani changed the picture, and U.S. officials could now point to a “catalyzing event,” as envisioned in the NCTC brief. Last year’s attack against writer Salman Rushdie and another at a Las Vegas hotel exemplified how Iran-inspired individuals were motivated to act. In this Policy Note, experts Moustafa Ayad and Matthew Levitt explore lone-offender Shia violence largely through the lens of social media. Closer tracking of online networks, they argue, could illuminate this flourishing virtual activity and how it might lead to real-world harm.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, and Shia
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

10. Iran’s Nuclear Endgame Warrants a Change in U.S. Strategy

Author:
Michael Singh
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Recently, inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency discovered that Iran had enriched uranium to a level just shy of what is generally considered weapons grade. Like many findings before it, this revelation underscores the need for a new U.S. and European policy toward Iran. The two most important and immediate steps in that process are clear by this point: Washington and its partners need to move on from any remaining plans they might have to resurrect the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), namely by activating that accord’s “snapback” mechanism; and governments must heighten their efforts to deter Iran through credible threats of military force.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

11. Striking Back: Iran and the Rise of Asymmetric Drone Warfare in the Middle East

Author:
Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr.
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Iranian drone strikes, as exemplified by the September 2019 attack against Saudi Aramco facilities, have jolted Middle East leaders and revealed Tehran’s long-range precision strike capabilities. The regime’s large and growing drone force, which can be used for reconnaissance or strike missions, now poses an existential threat to the Gulf states and a direct threat to Israel, as does its formidable missile force. Moreover, Iranian drones transferred to Russia have had a significant impact on Moscow’s war against Ukraine. In the bigger picture, advances in drone technology have produced an inflection point in aerial warfare—comparable to the introduction of manned flight more than a century ago—that has ended the guarantee of U.S. air superiority over its forces and bases. Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. explores the contours and consequences of Iran’s drone activities in this timely Policy Note. To counter the Islamic Republic, the former CENTCOM commander recommends an approach centered on clearer U.S. communication about its goals for the region, tighter collaboration with partners and allies, and enhanced efforts to counter Iran’s drone fleet, along with its ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Drones, Military, and Asymmetric Warfare
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

12. Holding the Hard-line: What is behind Iran’s seizure of Greek ships in Arabian Gulf?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
On May 27, Iran seized two Greek tankers, named “Prudent Warrior” and “Delta Poseidon”, in the Arabian Gulf. Forces from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) descended on the tankers and ordered them to sail to Bandar Abbas port. Onboard the tankers were 49 crew members. Greece described the operation as ‘piracy’. The seizure seems to be a reprisal for Greece’s role earlier in the month assisting the US impounding a Russian-flagged tanker transporting Iranian oil and carrying 19 crew.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Maritime, and Shipping
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Greece

13. Korea's Economic Presence in Iran under Trump and Its Prospects during the Biden Presidency

Author:
Shirzad Azad
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
On July 14, 2015, when Iran and the 5+1 group (the United States, Russia, China, France, Britain, and Germany) ultimately agreed over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Republic of Korea (ROK) was practically one of the top three trade partners of the Persian Gulf country. In early May 2016 and only a few months after the nuclear deal was carried through, the then Korean President, Park Geun-hye, made an official visit to Iran where the two countries vowed to ratchet up their economic relations from roughly $6 billion to more than $18 billion in the years to come. Accompanied by “the largest business delegation in the history of Korean presidential trips,” Park’s high-profile trip to Iran persuaded many interested experts and observers to believe that the East Asian country was really determined to shore up its economic weight in Iran by drawing certain policies relevant to the long-term presence of Korean businesses in the Middle Eastern country (Choi 2016). Despite all those upbeat expectations about the ROK’s future economic and technological role in Iran, however, various data and statistics coming out indicate that over the past several years nearly all well-known Korean brands and products have increasingly lost their market share in the Mideast country to brands and goods supplied by other competitors. As a matter of fact, in the late 1990s and early 2000s the East Asian nation emerged as one of the Persian Gulf country’s top trading partners in the world, outstripping a number of Tehran’s traditional trading partners from the West. And while Korea managed to even expand its economic presence in Iran in the heydays of sundry international sanctions levied against the Middle Eastern country over its contentious nuclear program a couple of years before the JCPOA was eventually agreed in 2015, the ROK has been doing relatively poor in Iran during the past years (Azad 2018). Such lackadaisical performance, epitomized by abandoning the long-established pattern of significant trade in energy with Iran, has critically influenced a sharp decline in the total volume of two-way commerce between the two countries. While the plummeting share of Korean brands and goods in Iranian markets had indubitably something to do with certain policies pursued by the Moon Jae-in-led Korean government, however, the main culprit turned out to be the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the nuclear deal in May 2018. The crippling sanctions which Washington under Trump subsequently imposed on Iran played a pivotal role in reshaping the scope and size of Korean commercial connections to the Persian Gulf country, though some unprecedented diplomatic and political troubles involving Seoul and Tehran during the past years have also had a lot to do with those punitive economic and financial measures targeting the Iranians. How did then the Koreans respond to those unique circumstances rendered largely by Trump’s approach toward the Persian Gulf country? What are going to be the prospects of a Biden administration’s policy shift for Korea’s economic performance in Iran? This study seeks to shed some light on Trump’s Iran policy with regard to Korea, its repercussions for the East Asian nation’s economic relationship with the Middle Eastern country, and potential solutions to chip away at those impediments under a Democrat administration in Washington led by Joe Biden.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Donald Trump, JCPOA, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Iran, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

14. Sanctions Against Russia: Five Lessons from the Case of Iran

Author:
Stefan Meister and David Ramin Jalilvand
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has led to the most comprehensive economic sanctions imposed on a country of this size since the end of the Second World War. Yet sanctions are only an effective tool of foreign and security policy if they are embedded in a sustainable political strategy that considers the cost-benefit analysis for both sides. Looking at the sanctions against Iran can be helpful when it comes to learning lessons about how to deal with Russia.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Eurasia, and Ukraine

15. Scoring Iraq’s New Government: Metrics for Preserving U.S. Interests

Author:
Michael Knights
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The protracted post-election process has been a step backward for Iraqi democracy, so Washington will need to closely monitor the new leadership’s actions and hold Baghdad to measurable benchmarks. Iraq’s stalled government formation process finally lurched forward on October 17, with new president Abdul Latif Rashid taking office more than a year after the 2021 election. Incoming prime minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani will now try to ratify his cabinet during a parliamentary session on October 22. If he succeeds as expected, Baghdad will finally close perhaps its most troubled electoral cycle yet—a chapter in which a clear popular vote nearly failed to produce a peaceful transition of power, and the losing factions spurred the biggest winner to abandon parliament through corrupt judicial rulings. Under these sad circumstances, the U.S. government and its partners need to quietly but insistently push for early, inclusive elections to restore legitimacy to the democratic process. Simultaneously, all of Iraq’s friends must watch the new government like a hawk to ensure that militias and corrupt politicians do not attempt to purge technocrats, conduct witch hunts against Western-leaning officials, cover up past graft, or initiate a new wave of “asset-stripping” via state institutions. After many false alarms, the survival of Iraq’s close relationship with the West is truly at stake right now, and only firm expectation-setting can ensure that the partnership continues.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Government, Terrorism, Reform, Democracy, and Military
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

16. A Stabilizing Factor: Oman’s Quiet Influence amid Mounting Uncertainty in the Gulf

Author:
Jeonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Based on its sound reputation as a conflict mediator and talks facilitator, Oman is well-positioned to tone down flaring rivalries in the Gulf and prevent tensions from spiraling out of control. After a timid thawing of tensions, the Gulf region is witnessing a renewed phase of uncertainty. Despite being a skillful master at navigating turbulent waters, Oman is eyeing the revamping of tensions in its immediate neighborhood with growing apprehension. The failed attempts to review the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the revamping of Iran’s outward-looking incendiary rhetoric as well as localized military retaliations amid recent mass protests, and the failure to extend the U.N.-brokered ceasefire in Yemen do not bode well for the region’s precarious stability. Muscat has a vested interest in preventing at-sea incidents from escalating and harsh infighting among rival Yemeni factions from reaching alarming proportions, especially given its coasts looking out on the Strait of Hormuz and much of its southwestern frontier bordering Yemen.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Energy Policy, and Political stability
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Oman, and Gulf Nations

17. Toward an Inclusive Security Arrangement in the Persian Gulf

Author:
Trita Parsi
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
• Abandon dominance. For many of the United States’ security partners, even a dysfunctional Pax Americana is preferable to the compromises that a security architecture would inevitably entail. The preconditions for creating a successful security architecture can emerge only if the United States begins a military withdrawal from the Persian Gulf and credibly signals it no longer seeks to sustain hegemony. • Encourage regional dialogue, but let the region lead. The incoming Biden administration’s hint that it will seek an inclusive security dialogue in the Persian Gulf is a welcome first step toward shifting the burden of security to the regional states themselves. For such an effort to be successful, the United States should play a supporting role while urging regional states to take the lead. • Include other major powers. The regional dialogue should include the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and major Asian powers with a strong interest in stability in the Persian Gulf. Including them can help dilute Washington’s and Beijing’s roles while protecting the region from inter–Asian rivalries in the future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, United Nations, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Military Affairs, and Grand Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, and Persian Gulf

18. Moscow's Central Role: Have the Rules of Engagement Changed in Syria after the recent Israeli Strikes?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
On July 19, 22 and 25, Israel carried out three strikes in less than one week using surface-to-air missiles against Syria. These strikes are considered the first of their kind executed by the new Israeli "Bennett-Lapid" government. Although this type of strikes is not novel, the Russian reaction to it was different this time. The Russian Ministry of Defense engaged in the scene for the first time, sending indirect messages to Israel. This made analysts refer to a possible shift in the rules of engagement in Syria. The understandings between Moscow and Tel Aviv were based on Moscow turning a blind eye to Israeli fighters launching airstrikes in Syria against Iranian targets, in return for Israel not targeting Syrian regime forces or Russian forces, which provide direct support to the Syrian army against the armed opposition. The Russian position reflected a clear desire to weaken the Iranian military presence in Syria, particularly with the escalation of rivalry between Moscow and Tehran over economic and military influence there.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Economy
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

19. Curtailing Tehran: Breaking down the validation of Israeli conjectures if Damascus is constraining Iranian military activities

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The Israeli ‘Walla’ news website published a report that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has reorganized the deployment of military forces in Syria, and has restricted the movement of Iranian forces internally in order to prevent internal frictions and achieve peace and stability. Walla deems the change in Damascus’s stance towards Iran to be in response to the political, economic and military pressures implored on the former. The website has also indicated that the Iranian presence in Syria has also weakened for other reasons, including the continuous Israeli and US pressures on Iranian presence there. While there were no sources confirming such notions, considering the policies of regional and international powers’ concerning the Syrian crisis, there might be some truth to this notion, pushing Damascus to embrace such tactics.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Political stability, and Peace
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

20. The Battle of Time: Why is Washington showing little interest in Iran's presidential elections?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The Biden administration has been keen on sending several messages implying that it shows little interest in the results of the Iran presidential elections due to take place on June 18. Washington believes that the identity of Iran's next president will not change the decision-making trends in Tehran or the potential course of the relations between Iran and the US over the next phase. On March 11, Robert Malley, the US envoy to Iran, said that “Iran's elections in June are not a factor in the Biden administration’s decision-making for how to proceed with nuclear talks” adding that “the pace will be determined by how far we can get consistent with defending U.S. national security interests”. He continued saying, “we won’t rush or slow things because of the Iranian elections”. This reflects several indicators relevant to the new strategy adopted by the Biden administration in dealing with Iran during the current phase, which can be addressed as follows:
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Elections, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Iran and Washington

21. The Coming Iran Nuclear Talks: Openings and Obstacles

Author:
Dennis Ross
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
A reimagined approach to Iran nuclear talks could extend the country’s breakout time, preserve U.S. negotiating leverage, and strengthen American alliances in Europe and across the Middle East. In the first in a series of TRANSITION 2021 memos examining policy challenges across the Middle East, esteemed diplomat and policymaker Dennis Ross provides an innovative approach to reengaging Iran in nuclear diplomacy. His ideas have the potential to extend Iran’s breakout time, preserve U.S. negotiating leverage, and strengthen U.S. alliances in Europe and across the Middle East. Ross explains: “If regime change is not a realistic or advisable goal, the objective must be one of changing the Islamic Republic’s behavior. While this would be difficult, history shows that the regime will make tactical adjustments with strategic consequences when it considers the price of its policies to be too high.” In the coming weeks, TRANSITION 2021 memos by Washington Institute experts will address the broad array of issues facing the Biden-Harris administration in the Middle East. These range from thematic issues, such as the region’s strategic position in the context of Great Power competition and how to most effectively elevate human rights and democracy in Middle East policy, to more discrete topics, from Arab-Israel peace diplomacy to Red Sea security to challenges and opportunities in northwest Africa. Taken as a whole, this series of memos will present a comprehensive approach for advancing U.S. interests in security and peace in this vital but volatile region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Power, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, North America, and United States of America

22. Potential Cooperation: Iranian Possible Cooperation with Taliban to Curb Threats

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The situation in Afghanistan, after the Taliban took over the country, is the second key issue that the new Iranian president, Ebrahim Raisi’s, foreign policy agenda, after reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Taliban, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iran, South Asia, and Middle East

23. Mutual Concessions: Did al-Kadhimi’s visit to Tehran achieve its objectives?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
On September 12, 2021, Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, led a high-profile government delegation on an official one-day visit to Tehran that came upon invitation from Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi. Besides Raisi, al-Kadhimi also met Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, and other senior officials.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Domestic Politics, and Energy
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

24. Greece and Israeli-Turkish relations

Author:
George Tzogopoulos
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
This essay by Dr. George Tzogopoulos, focuses on the multidimensional nature of Greek-Israeli relations. The understanding of the depth of these relations can explain why the two countries – along with Cyprus – are interested in coming closer. On the other hand, the effort of Israel and Turkey to normalize bilateral ties – already under way since 2016 – is a logical development that deserves attention. However, it is not related to the future evolution of Greek-Israeli collaboration. The evolution of Greek-Israeli relations in the last decade and trilateral Greece-Israel-Cyprus summits outline the common interest of the three countries to enrich their cooperation. Israel and Turkey have started since 2016 to normalize their relations. This is an ongoing process that has evolved in a period during which Greece, Israel and Cyprus charted a joint course in the Eastern Mediterranean. Israel and Turkey are expected to find a modus vivendi by agreeing on some issues and disagreeing on others. A potential Turkish-Israeli collaboration against Iran in Syria might pave the way for new synergies between Israel and Turkey. This is a highly controversial and complicated matter that entails risks for Ankara.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Greece, and Syria

25. Centering Iraq Policy on Human Rights and Fair Elections Michael Knights

Author:
Michael Knights
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The surest way to counter Iran’s malign influence is to proactively focus on human rights issues that the new prime minister can actually affect, such as organizing free elections and preventing further violence against protestors. On February 1, a plurality of Iraqi parliamentary factions gave President Barham Salih the go-ahead to nominate Mohammed Tawfiq Allawi as the new prime minister-designate. The mild-mannered Shia Islamist nominee will now attempt to form and ratify his cabinet in the next thirty days. As he does so, political blocs will probably rally behind him while limiting his mandate to organizing early elections next year, having struggled through a long and fractious process to replace resigned prime minister Adil Abdulmahdi. For the first time since the dramatic events of the past two months, Iraqis and U.S. policymakers alike can catch their breath and consider their medium-term options.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Elections, Domestic Politics, and Protests
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

26. Establishing a Response Ratio for Iranian and Proxy Attacks

Author:
Michael Knights
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Enhancing deterrence and protecting Americans in Iraq and Syria requires a more formalized system for rationing out retaliatory strikes at the proper intensity, time, and place. When U.S. airstrikes targeted Kataib Hezbollah militia personnel and senior Iranian military figures on December 29 and January 3, they were releasing long-pent-up retaliation for a range of provocations by Iraqi militias. Yet while these powerful blows may have injected some caution into enemy calculations, such deterrence is likely to be a wasting asset. The most proximal trigger for the strikes—the killing of an American civilian contractor during Kataib Hezbollah’s December 27 rocket attack on the K-1 base in Kirkuk—was just one in a series of increasingly risky militia operations against U.S. facilities. Only good fortune has prevented more Americans from dying in attacks conducted since then, including January 8 (when Iranian ballistic missiles struck the U.S. portion of al-Asad Air Base, causing more than a hundred nonlethal traumatic brain injuries), January 26 (mortar strike on the dining hall at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad), January 31 (rockets fired at the U.S. site at Qayyarah West), February 10 (explosive device thrown at a U.S. logistical convoy south of Baghdad), and February 13 (rocket attack on U.S. site at Kirkuk). The United States has seemingly communicated to Tehran that it will strike Iraqi militias and Iranian targets if any Americans are killed, but this redline has opened up a dangerous gray zone in which Iran and its proxies are emboldened to continue their nonlethal attacks. Besides the fact that such high-risk attacks are destined to result in more American deaths at some point, they will also produce many more injuries if permitted to continue, as seen in the January 8 strike. More broadly, they will limit U.S. freedom of movement in Iraq and Syria, undermining the point of being there in the first place. This situation is unacceptable—the United States needs a way to deter such behavior even when attacks fall short of killing Americans. When faced with similar challenges in past decades, the U.S. military established reckoning systems that matched the punishment to the crime, with useful levels of predictability, proportionality, and accountability.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Assassination, and No-Fly Zones
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

27. New Khamenei Speech Underlines the Importance of Popular Support for the Regime

Author:
Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Instead of focusing on Iran's missile retaliation or future threats, the Supreme Leader used his latest speech to extoll the virtues of public unity behind the regime’s revolutionary goals. On January 8, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei delivered his first public speech since the U.S. assassination of Qasem Soleimani and the subsequent Iranian missile strike on Iraqi bases housing American forces. As part of an address that touched on regional solidarity against the United States and other notable subjects, he spent considerable time claiming that Soleimani symbolized the Iranian people’s continued commitment to the revolution. In doing so, he indicated that popular support for the regime remains a crucial objective for Iran’s leaders, perhaps more so than issuing or acting on further military threats.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Domestic Politics, Qassem Soleimani, and Assassination
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

28. The Coronavirus in Iran (Part 2): Regime Culpability and Resiliency

Author:
Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Even as their lack of transparency worsens the public health crisis, the Supreme Leader and other officials have systematically gutted any civil society elements capable of organizing substantial opposition to such policies. Iran’s ongoing coronavirus epidemic has left the people with less reason than ever to trust the information and directives issued by their leaders. Part 1 of this PolicyWatch discussed the clergy’s role in aggravating this problem, but the state’s mistakes and deceptions have been legion as well. They include scandalous discrepancies between official reports after a period of denial that the virus had entered the country; a health system that was unprepared to deal with such a disease promptly and properly; and official resistance to implementing internationally recommended precautionary measures, such as canceling flights from China and quarantining the center of the outbreak. These decisions have sown widespread confusion about facts and fictions related to the virus, the most effective medically proven ways to control it, and the degree to which it is spreading throughout the country. As a result, an already restive population has become increasingly panicked about the future and angry at the state. Yet can the coronavirus actually bring down the regime? The harsh reality is that the state has left little space for opposition to organize around health issues, or any issues for that matter. Instead, it has sought to confuse the people and redirect their anger toward external enemies, even as its own policies contribute to the crisis.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Civil Society, Health, Public Health, and Coronavirus
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

29. The Coronavirus in Iran (Part 1): Clerical Factors

Author:
Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The clergy’s ambitions for global Shia revolution made the city of Qom uniquely vulnerable to the disease, and their resistance to modern medical science weakened the state’s ability to combat its spread. On February 19, two days before the Iranian government officially announced the arrival of coronavirus, an infected businessman who had recently returned from China to Qom passed away. The location and timing of his death illustrate how the Shia holy city and the religious leaders and institutions who call it home have played an outsize role in the disease’s disproportionately rapid spread inside Iran compared to other countries. How did this situation come to pass, and what does it say about the current state of the clerical establishment, its relationship with the regime, and its alienation from large swaths of Iranian society? (Part 2 of this PolicyWatch discusses the regime's role in the outbreak and its resiliency to such crises.)
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Health, Religion, Shia, and Coronavirus
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, Global Focus, and United States of America

30. Who Is Esmail Qaani, the New Chief Commander of Iran’s Qods Force?

Author:
Ali Alfoneh
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Given the IRGC’s recent restructuring, the Qods Force will likely see more continuity than change under Qaani, though his bureaucratic background is a far cry from Soleimani’s brand of charismatic, risky leadership. On January 3, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Brig. Gen. Esmail Qaani as chief commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force, just hours after his predecessor, Qasem Soleimani, was killed by a U.S. drone strike. The new commander’s background and military activities are not nearly as well known as Soleimani’s, so taking a closer look at them can help determine whether and how the IRGC’s main extraterritorial branch might change under his leadership.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Qassem Soleimani, and Assassination
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

31. Reading Trump in Tehran

Author:
Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
A week after Donald Trump was elected president in November 2016, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei played coy, remarking, “I have no judgment on the American election...[Both parties have been] naughty toward us.” Of course, his true reaction was far more complex. On one hand, he saw in the president-elect—who had spoken much of disentangling U.S. forces from the Middle East—a prospect of decreased military pressure on his country. On the other, he heard Trump’s raw vitriol directed at Iran’s leadership and the nuclear deal crafted by President Obama. The eventual U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA demonstrated that the new president could back up his talk with punishing action. In this close analysis of statements by Khamenei and other Iranian leaders, former seminarian Mehdi Khalaji lays out the regime’s current views on President Trump and the United States. He shows that even after the American assassination of Qods Force chief Qasem Soleimani, Iranian leaders could be open to negotiating with Washington if they believe the regime’s existence depends on it.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Elections, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

32. The Iraqi and Kurdish Regional Government’s Sinjar Agreement: Consequences for U.S., Turkish, and Iranian Influence and Rebel Rivalries

Author:
Rami Jameel
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On October 9, the Iraqi government headed by Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi and the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) signed the “Sinjar Agreement” to normalize the situation in the war-torn district of Sinjar in northern Iraq. The agreement stated that only Iraqi federal forces should operate in Sinjar and all other armed groups must leave the town. It also gave the KRG a say on establishing a new local government, including appointing a new mayor, and planning and running reconstruction efforts in Sinjar, including related budgetary matters (Rudaw, October 10).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Terrorism, Non State Actors, Kurds, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, and United States of America

33. The Nagorno-Karabakh war: A new balance of power in the southern Caucasus

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
Despite the ambiguity around the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh, the war produced clear winners – Azerbaijan and Turkey – and losers – Armenia, France, the United States and Iran.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, War, Power Politics, Geopolitics, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Iran, Turkey, Caucasus, France, Armenia, Azerbaijan, United States of America, and Nagorno-Karabakh

34. Iran's Evolving Approach to Asymmetric Naval Warfare: Strategy and Capabilities in the Persian Gulf

Author:
Farzin Nadimi
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
In an April 22 tweet, President Trump spoke of instructing the U.S. Navy to destroy any Iranian gunboats that "harass our ships at sea." Aside from whether it departed from existing U.S. rules of engagement, the statement highlighted a persistent reality: the military threat posed by Iranian forces in the Persian Gulf. Months before the coronavirus pandemic seized the world's attention, these forces were already reasserting themselves through bold actions against U.S., Saudi, and wider Gulf interests. In this impressively detailed Policy Focus -- an updated version of his 2008 volume -- military expert Farzin Nadimi offers historical context and specifics on Iran's naval activities in the Gulf. The study, which includes maps, tables, and other graphics, covers everything from submarines to sea mines, while also distinguishing between the roles of the revolutionary navy (IRGCN) and the conventional one (IRIN). Most important, it offers a sober take on Iran's capabilities and intentions during a perilously unstable time.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, and Navy
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Persian Gulf, and United States of America

35. Israel and the UAE on Iran: Shared Foe, Different Perspectives

Author:
Danny Citrinowicz
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Given past developments, the UAE’s and Israel’s recent announcement of normalization in exchange for shelving annexation plans should come as no great surprise, even if the timing was unexpected. There remains, however, frequently understated differences between one aspect of this relationship often assumed to be a common denominator: Jerusalem’s and Abu Dhabi’s perspectives on Iran. Understanding and accommodating these differences will be critical issue for a lasting relationship between the two countries, with the Israeli government in particular needing to acknowledge the differences as well as similarities between the two sides. It is no secret that Israel and the UAE see Iran as a common enemy; both countries have worked together covertly for years to prevent Iranian hegemony in the Gulf and Middle East at large. Since the beginning of their unofficial relationship several decades ago, the two countries have improved their intelligence-sharing and military relations, strengthened their diplomatic ties behind the scenes, and worked to improve their readiness for Iranian threats across the board. President Trump’s recent decisions to withdraw troops from parts of the Middle East region and the world at large have further catalyzed development of Israel-UAE relations in anticipation of weakened direct support from the United States.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Gulf Nations
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and United Arab Emirates

36. Iran-South Korea Humanitarian Trade Requires U.S. Assurances

Author:
Katherine Bauer and Kevin Mathieson
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Tehran is pressing Seoul regarding the billions in Iranian oil revenues held by South Korean banks, creating an opportunity to expand the U.S. humanitarian trade mechanism. On July 21, South Korea’s Foreign Ministry summoned the Iranian ambassador to lodge a complaint over Tehran’s heightened rhetoric regarding access to funds frozen in South Korea. The week before, Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson had accused Seoul of having a “master-servant relationship” with Washington, while the governor of the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) had previously threatened legal action to access the funds, which Tehran says it plans to use for humanitarian purchases. Although the U.S. government authorized use of the funds for such purposes in February, South Korean banks appear hesitant to move forward without additional U.S. assurances—a reluctance compounded by the $86 million fine that U.S. regulators levied on the Industrial Bank of Korea (IBK) in April for failing to identify large-scale Iranian money laundering. With COVID-19 cases on the rise again in the Islamic Republic, Washington should work with Seoul to ensure that trade for medicine, equipment, and other humanitarian items moves forward—albeit with strict oversight.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Government, and Trade
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

37. With COVID-19, Iran’s Dependence on China Grows

Author:
Kevjin Lim
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Beijing has steadily become Tehran’s economic ventilator, diplomatic prop, and military enabler, and the Iranians need this backstop now more than ever. When the coronavirus spun out of control in Wuhan this January, Iran ignored the example of many other countries and continued to maintain direct flights and open borders with China. Even after President Hassan Rouhani’s government suspended all such flights on January 31, Mahan Air—a company affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—kept flying between Tehran and four first-tier Chinese cities, leading many to allege that the airline was instrumental in introducing or at least exacerbating Iran’s raging epidemic. Whatever the truth behind these allegations, Mahan’s policy is symptomatic of a larger geopolitical reality: Tehran has become profoundly, disproportionately, and perhaps irretrievably dependent on Beijing, despite its own revolutionary opposition to reliance on foreign powers. Where diplomatic and economic sanctions have fallen short, the pandemic has succeeded in isolating the Islamic Republic like never before, compelling it to keep its borders to China open. COVID-19 has also dispelled the notion that Iran’s heavily-sanctioned “resistance economy” still suffices to keep the country solvent. The government has conceded that staying afloat would be impossible if it curtailed cross-border trade, shut down industries, and quarantined entire cities. The crisis is so severe that Iran’s Central Bank has for the first time in decades requested billions of U.S. dollars in assistance from the IMF. Indeed, according to Deputy Health Minister Reza Malekzadeh, whenever his colleagues questioned why China flights continue, bilateral economic relations were among the reasons given. Two days after the government’s ban on such flights, Chinese ambassador Chang Hua tweeted that Mahan CEO Hamid Arabnejad wanted to continue cooperating with Beijing. Neither man specified exactly what this meant, but the implied message to Tehran was clear given China’s resentment of travel bans. Meanwhile, the Iranian Students News Agency, Tabnak, and other domestic media criticized Mahan for prioritizing profit margins over public health.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, Geopolitics, Economy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

38. Renewing transatlantic strategy on Iran

Author:
Ellie Geranmayeh, Barbara Slavin, and Sahil Shah
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The election of former Vice President Joe Biden in the United States presents the prospect of major changes in US foreign policy, especially toward Iran. These changes cannot begin to be implemented until after Inauguration Day in January of the new year, while an urgent need exists for other players to bridge the gap. None are better suited to this task than the US’s closest allies in Europe which have already played a significant role in the negotiations that led to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Britain, France and Germany – the E-3 – and the European Union have also worked tirelessly to keep the JCPOA alive in the face of the unilateral US withdrawal from the agreement in 2018, the imposition of draconian sanctions by the Trump administration and escalating tensions in the Middle East. A new report by Ellie Geranmayeh, Barbara Slavin, and Sahil Shah presents a series of recommendations for the E-3 and the EU to preserve the JCPOA, promote regional peace and development and boost people-to-people contacts with Iran in concert with the new US administration. Taken together, these steps would amount to a renewed transatlantic diplomatic agenda through which the United States and European allies can stabilize the nuclear file and then build on the resulting diplomatic momentum to address other concerns with Iran.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

39. Prospects for European and U.S. Policy toward Iran

Author:
Ariane Tabatabai and Edgar P. Tam
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
President Donald Trump’s views on Iran have centered on dismantling the landmark nuclear deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was agreed in 2015. He made it clear early on that he believed he could negotiate a better deal with Iran that would not compromise the interests of the United States as much and that would also address far more issues of concern to its partners in the Middle East. However, to date the Trump administration has not come any closer to achieving this goal. Instead, the United States and Iran have come close to war. Although European countries share objectives on Iran with the United States—for instance, limiting Iran’s ballistic-missile activities and seeking its return to compliance with its nuclear commitments under the JCPOA—they disagree strongly with President Trump’s approach to achieving these. His approach has made Washington the proverbial bull in a china shop for U.S allies in Europe, forcing them to put on hold long-desired objectives such as expanding economic ties with Iran and bringing it closer into a community of responsible stakeholders. Therefore, the result of the U.S. presidential election will have a significant impact on Europe’s relations with the United States when it comes to dealing with Iran. There are several ways in which a Trump reelection could affect Europe’s calculations. A second Trump administration that maintains a hard-line policy toward Iran would lead Europe to double down on encouraging Iran to negotiate by offering incentives as a demonstration of its good faith to Washington. Alternatively, no longer having to think about his reelection, Trump may pursue a less hard-line approach to secure negotiations, thus solidifying his presidential legacy. Germany and France in particular might seek additional leverage to temper and perhaps even counter Trump’s hard-line Iran policy to limit what they view as the damage caused by his administration. For its part, the United Kingdom may align more with the United States, causing a rupture in European unity. However, a “hybrid” scenario is most likely, in which Europe would continue its attempts to be perceived as independent while seeking a greater role in leading a quiet international effort to get Iran back in compliance with the JCPOA and at the negotiating table. If Joe Biden becomes president, he would return the United States to the JCPOA if Iran returned to compliance—which Europe also wants—while trying to negotiate additional commitments from Tehran on other areas of concern, such as missile testing and U.S. hostages. If this plan is complicated by the Trump administration’s pursuit of a unilateral sanctions snapback before it leaves office, however, a Biden administration may find itself facing a scenario in which there is no JCPOA to rejoin. This could be further complicated by a withdrawal by Iran from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which it has threatened to do. Even if there is a change in U.S. administration, European countries would still have to overcome differences among themselves on many aspects of Iran policy. A post-Brexit Europe may see the United Kingdom more aligned with U.S. objectives than European ones and acting more as an occasional “+1” to a remaining E2 of France and Germany. European countries also disagree on how to approach Iran’s malign activities, such as terrorism—with Germany having outlawed all of Hezbollah’s activities while the United Kingdom, France, and other European countries distinguish between the organization’s ostensibly political arm and its militant wing. These intra-European divisions, despite the European Union trying to establish a united front, make it easier for Iran’s propaganda efforts to sow division among European countries and in the transatlantic relationship.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Elections, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, and United States of America

40. What Is Iran Up To in Deir al-Zour?

Author:
Oula A. Alrifai
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Tehran and its proxies have been exerting hard and soft power in northeast Syria, combining military consolidation with economic, social, and religious outreach in order to cement their long-term influence. On September 30, Syria and Iraq reopened their main border crossing between al-Bukamal and al-Qaim, which had been formally closed for five years. The circumstances surrounding the event were telling—the ceremony was delayed by a couple weeks because of unclaimed foreign airstrikes on Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps targets in east Syria following the Iranian attack against Saudi oil facilities earlier that month. What exactly have the IRGC and its local proxies been doing in Deir al-Zour province? And what does this activity tell us about Iran’s wider plans there?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Education, Military Strategy, Geopolitics, Conflict, and Soft Power
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

41. Don't Write Off Iraq

Author:
Bilal Wahab and Barbara A. Leaf
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Even as Baghdad works to rein in militias that invite outside attacks, Washington needs to be patient with the country’s contradictions in the near term and give space for it to exert sovereignty in the long term. As President Trump met with Iraqi president Barham Salih today on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, they were no doubt buoyed by their governments’ mutual conclusion that the recent attack on Saudi oil facilities in Abqaiq did not originate from Iraq. Initial concerns about that possibility were well founded—a previous attack on a major Saudi pipeline was carried out from Iraqi territory this May, and multiple Iraqi militia facilities have been struck since June, reportedly by Israel. Each of these developments was linked to Shia “special groups” with known ties to Iran. On July 1, Iraqi prime minister Adil Abdulmahdi ordered these and other militias to fold themselves under state authority, but so far he has been unable to impose order on them. The government has also failed to prevent them from threatening neighboring countries at Iran’s presumed behest—an especially dangerous lapse given that Iraqi authorities cannot protect the territory these militias hold from external retaliation. To keep other countries from turning Iraq into a proxy battleground, Baghdad needs to rein in the unruliest militias. This is a tall order because Tehran has spent fifteen years building them into a parallel force of its own. Given the willingness these “special groups” have shown when asked to attack U.S. troops, fight on the Assad regime’s behalf in Syria, or secure other Iranian interests, they risk implicating Iraq in Tehran’s regional confrontations with the United States, Saudi Arabia, and/or Israel.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Non State Actors, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

42. Iran’s New Budget Is Tight, But Not Tight Enough

Author:
Patrick Clawson
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Rouhani has taken a remarkably austere fiscal approach ahead of the looming parliamentary election, but the country’s economic situation is still not sustainable over the long run. On December 8, following established procedures, President Hassan Rouhani visited parliament to present his budget for the Iranian year 2020/21, which begins in March. Notwithstanding the government’s rosy rhetoric, his spending proposals show the tough times the Islamic Republic is facing.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Oil, Sanctions, Budget, Elections, and Economy
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

43. Meeting the challenge of secondary sanctions

Author:
Ellie Geranmayeh and Manuel Lafont Rapnouil
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Secondary sanctions have become a critical challenge for Europe, due to the Trump administration’s maximalist policy on Iran and its aggressive economic statecraft. Europe’s vulnerabilities mostly result from asymmetric interdependence with the US economy, due to the size of US markets and the global role of the US dollar. In future, states will likely weaponise economic interdependence with the EU to target countries that are more important to the European economy than Iran, such as China and Russia. European countries should demonstrate that, despite their economic interdependence with the US, they control EU foreign policy. The EU and its member states should strengthen their sanctions policy, begin to build up their deterrence and resilience against secondary sanctions, and prepare to adopt asymmetric countermeasures against any country that harms European interests through secondary sanctions. They should also attempt to bolster the global role of the euro and lead a robust international dialogue on the role of sanctions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, European Union, Economy, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Iran, North America, and United States of America