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Begin New Search Topic Science and Technology Political Geography China Content Type Policy Brief Publication Year within 5 Years

1. Network and Text Analysis on Digital Trade Agreements

Author:
Kyu Yub Lee, Cheon-Kee Lee, Won Seok Choi, Jyun-Hyun Eom, and Unjung Whang
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
We use the Trade Agreements Provisions on Electronic Commerce and Data and their corresponding texts to undertake network and text analysis on trade agreements with digital trade chapters to identify which countries are important in the network and how similar or different their texts of digital trade chapters are. centrality values reflect which countries are influential in the network, while values of similarity assess the level of similarity between the texts of digital trade chapters concluded by these countries. Centrality and similarity are complementary in assessing the relative positions of countries in the network, where the number of linkages between countries is significant in centrality and the quality of digital trade chapters is critical in similarity. We interpret this to mean that a country with a high degree of centrality is likely to be a rule-promoter in the network, whereas a country with a high degree of similarity is likely to be a rule-maker. The brief highlights three key findings from network and text analysis of digital trade agreements: (1) The U.S. has been the best rule-maker but not the best rule-promoter, whereas Singapore has been the best rule-promoter but not the best rule-maker. (2) China is a rule-maker, but to a weaker extent than the U.S., and Korea is a rule-promoter, although it is less active than Singapore. (3) Japan and Australia have served as both rule-makers and rule-promoters. Identification of countries’ relative positions in the network of digital trade agreements would be useful at the start of talks on digital trade policy.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Treaties and Agreements, Digital Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
Japan, China, South Korea, Australia, and United States of America

2. China’s subsea-cable power in the Middle East and North Africa

Author:
Dale Aluf
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
In a new Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative issue brief, “China’s subsea-cable power in the Middle East and North Africa,” Aluf analyzes China’s campaign to make countries in the region more dependent on Chinese networks, while reducing its own dependence on foreign cables. For a country that seeks to alter the internet’s physical form and influence digital behavior while exerting supreme control over information flows, China’s growing presence in the Middle East and North Africa’s cable industry is significant because Beijing has the power to shape the route of global internet traffic by determining when, where, and how to build cables.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Politics, Science and Technology, Partnerships, and Innovation
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Asia, and North Africa

3. Beyond launch: Harnessing allied space capabilities for exploration purposes

Author:
Tiffany Vora
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The “United States Space Priorities Framework,” released in December 2021, confirmed the White House’s commitment to American leadership in space.1 Space activities deliver immense benefits to humankind. For example, satellite imaging alone is crucial for improvements in daily life such as weather monitoring as well as for grand challenges like the fight against climate change. Such breakthrough discoveries in space pave the way for innovation and new economies on Earth. Exploration is at the cutting edge of this process: it expands humankind’s knowledge of the universe, transforming the unknown into the supremely challenging, expensive, risky, and promising. US allies and partners accelerate this transformation via scientific and technical achievements as well as processes, relationships, and a shared vision for space exploration. By integrating these allied capabilities, the United States and its allies and partners set the stage for safe and prosperous space geopolitics and economy in the decades to come. However, harnessing the capabilities of US allies and partners for space exploration is complex, requiring the balance of relatively short-term progress with far-horizon strategy. Space exploration has changed since the US-Soviet space race of the 1960s. In today’s rapidly evolving technological and geopolitical environment, it is unclear whether the processes, relationships, and vision that previously enabled allied cooperation in space, epitomized by the International Space Station (ISS), will keep pace. Here, China is viewed as the preeminent competitor for exploration goals and capabilities—as well as the major competitor for long-term leadership in space.2 This development drives fears of space militarization and weaponization, prompting protectionist legislation, investment screening, and industrial policies that can disrupt collaboration among the United States and its key allies and partners.3 Further complication stems from the rise of commercial space, with opportunities and challenges due to the decentralization, democratization, and demonetization of technologies for robotic and crewed space exploration. This paper serves as a primer for current US space exploration goals and capabilities that will be critical to achieving them. It highlights arenas where US allies and partners are strongly positioned to jointly accelerate space exploration while also benefitting life on Earth. This paper concludes with recommended actions—gleaned from interviews with international experts in space exploration—for the US government as well as allied and partner governments to increase the number and impact of global stakeholders in space exploration, to remove friction in collaboration, and to guide the future of space toward democratic values.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, Science and Technology, European Union, Partnerships, and Space
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

4. Seeking to undermine democracy and partnerships: How the CCP is influencing the Pacific islands information environment

Author:
Blake Johnson and Joshua Dunne
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is conducting coordinated information operations in Pacific island countries (PICs). Those operations are designed to influence political elites, public discourse and political sentiment regarding existing partnerships with Western democracies. Our research shows how the CCP frequently seeks to capitalise on regional events, announcements and engagements to push its own narratives, many of which are aimed at undermining some of the region’s key partnerships. This report examines three significant events and developments: the establishment of AUKUS in 2021 the CCP’s recent efforts to sign a region-wide security agreement the 2022 Pacific Islands Forum held in Fiji. This research, including these three case studies, shows how the CCP uses tailored, reactive messaging in response to regional events and analyses the effectiveness of that messaging in shifting public discourse online. This report also highlights a series of information channels used by the CCP to push narratives in support of the party’s regional objectives in the Pacific. Those information channels include Chinese state media, CCP publications and statements in local media, and publications by local journalists connected to CCP-linked groups.1
Topic:
Science and Technology, Partnerships, Democracy, Social Media, Disinformation, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Pacific

5. China's response to the US tech war: The closing of detours

Author:
Yang Jiang
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
In the US-China rivalry, no battle is currently more fierce than the one over technology, with both countries ramping up efforts to pursue global technological leadership. The tech war has intensified under President Joe Biden, with the US’s strangling of China’s technological bottleneck getting tighter and tighter. The US’s stated aims are protecting its national security and foreign policy interests and preventing sensitive technologies with military applications from being acquired by China. Some analysts point to Beijing’s Made in China 2025 as the trigger of the tech war because that is China’s plan to upgrade manufacturing and seek the top positions in global value chains. The US is pursuing a strategy to outcompete and outmanoeuvre China, as is stated in the Biden administration’s National Security Strategy in October 2022: “this decade will be decisive, in setting the terms of our [the US’s] competition with the PRC”. Especially in the sector of semiconductors or chips, where the West controls China’s access to the most advanced technology, US restrictions and its ability to bring its allies into line have been destructive to China’s development. On 21 May 2023, Beijing’s ban of American chipmaker Micron from critical information infrastructure in China signals a first direct retaliation from Beijing. China has also realised that some of its hitherto measures—turning to alternative sources of import, utilising policy loopholes, and sufficing with lower-level technology—are just detours. They are not long-term solutions; nor can they be the foundation of China’s national security. The US restrictions have forced China to adopt new measures to accelerate domestic innovation with more focus on basic research and market forces. How the tech war will play out has important implications for Western countries and global supply chains. This policy brief will focus on China’s responses to the US-waged tech war, specifically: What have been China’s domestic measures to respond to the tech restrictions from the US, and what is China’s potential for technological breakthrough? What have been China’s international responses, and what are China’s options for retaliation?
Topic:
Science and Technology, Sanctions, Strategic Competition, Rivalry, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

6. Who Leads China's 5G Technology Ecosystem? A Network Analysis of China's Cooperation on Association Standards

Author:
Won Seok Choi
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
This study suggests who is leading the ecosystem of China's 5G industry through analysis of the association standard network. Our study finds that the Chinese government think tank is in the most important position in the related network. Our study also suggests that it is important to monitor association standards in China and strengthen the standard cooperation of companies, scholars, and institutes in the Korean ICT industry.
Topic:
Government, Science and Technology, Think Tanks, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Korea

7. When the State Becomes the Only Buyer: Monopsony in China’s Public Procurement of Medical Technology

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, and Anna Guildea
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
China’s centralised state procurement policies are moving the Chinese market of medical technologies in a monopsonistic direction. A monopsony means that a single buyer exerts strong power to move the market to its favour by gradually cutting prices and setting terms for producers that are extortionary. It is equivalent to a monopoly – with the only difference being that in a monopsony, it is the single buyer that acts in a market-predatory manner. Ultimately, a monopsonistic market empowers the buyer to capture most of the financial rewards from a contract. Competition gets undermined because a vibrant market also requires competition between buyers and, over time, fewer firms will be able to supply the procured goods at terms that are set by the single buyer. This shift towards monopsony does not happen overnight, it is a process that builds on a number of steps that tilts the balance of power in favour of the buyer. First, there is a concentration of buyers, sometimes down to a single buyer – such as the state. This concentration of buyers acts to extract value from sellers by creating pressure to reduce and converge prices. Buyers in monopsonistic conditions may also add other objectives to their agenda, using their monopsonistic position to abuse the market. For example, political objectives may be in place, which can include discrimination against foreign companies or corruption. Finally, there is a consolidation of the market, with fewer suppliers overall, and a focus on price rather than innovation. Several characteristics of a market could be indicative of a monopsony. One of these indicators is the price. In the case of the Chinese market for medical technology, price reductions have been sustained across medical devices, with price cuts exceeding 90 percent in some medical products. When the buyer’s primary focus is to reduce prices, the risk is that low-quality products will drive out high-quality products. Another indicator is price convergence: the idea that one price should apply to the whole market. Price convergence can be observed as the distance between the average and maximum price reduction offered by companies. The small differences seen in the Chinese procurement of medical technologies for these two indicators indicates that prices are converging downwards. Forcing a convergence of prices breaks with natural market behaviour and overall leads to a market with fewer participants. In a monopsony, the buyer tends to capture the dominant part of the market value of the product, which squeezes the margins of sellers. Over time, this leads to fewer competitors as only a few companies can survive under such conditions. These dynamics have real consequences: the number of winning companies in the procurement of medical technology per one million people in China is substantially lower than in the EU. In addition to a reduced reliance on multiple suppliers, the Chinese centralised state procurement reinforces China’s industrial policy to support Chinese firms growing their domestic market shares to the detriment of non-Chinese companies. These are the consequences of a market that is increasingly taking a monopsonistic form. Public procurement does not have to follow the Chinese recipe of centralised state procurement. There is a substantial body of evidence, research, and studies that recommend specific procurement policies that tackle the monopsonistic tendencies embedded in public procurement markets. These recommendations emphasize the importance of competition without lowering the number of firms in the market, underlining the need for a long-term view on how the market delivers continuous innovation. The danger for China is that monopsony will collapse the future market by making it less attractive for companies to innovate and compete. Chinese centralised state procurement and the move towards monopsony will not go unnoticed. These policies clearly breach basic principles and norms of international exchange, and how governments should behave to avoid a distortion of competition. First, Chinese centralised state procurement favours the Chinese medical technology industry to the detriment of non-Chinese companies. Second, given the low prices achieved in Chinese centralised state procurements, there is a risk that firm’s margins are severely cut, putting a lid on global spending on R&D. The EU and the US should coordinate their policies to counter the monopsonistic tendencies of the Chinese market of medical technologies. Their markets for medical technologies are significantly larger than the Chinese market and Chinese companies rely on the US and the European market to maintain their growth. The EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) offers a setting to take these discussions forward and agree on policies to counter Chinese market distortions.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Health Care Policy, Public Procurement, and Monopsony
Political Geography:
China and Asia

8. The U.S.-China Battle for Semiconductor Supremacy and Reshaping of Global Supply Chain

Author:
Hyung-gon Jeong
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
The realization of digital transformation (DX) and the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) has led to the development of new technologies in areas such as AI, big data, metaverse, autonomous vehicles, digital currency, and blockchain technology. While these sectors are expected to continue to grow, major countries including the United States and China are fiercely competing to secure a global supply chain for the semiconductor industry. Built on free trade, the global division of production in the semiconductor industry has driven corporate innovation and technology development. However, the trend of technological nationalism and countries’ efforts to build a value chain within their territory are expected to hurt the global semiconductor industry. The ever-deepening hegemony competition between the U.S. and China in the semiconductor industry could have a profound impact not only on the Korean economy but also on a restructuring of the global semiconductor supply chain. This study analyzes the supply chain structure and risks of the Korean semiconductor industry, along with U.S. and Chinese policies to foster the semiconductor industry, going on to explore corresponding countermeasures.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Supply Chains, Semiconductors, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

9. South Korea should prepare for its exposure to US-China technology tensions

Author:
Mary Lovely and Abigail Dahlman
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
The stated goal of the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) is to create standards that enhance and elevate regional trade and investment flows, but it is clearly aimed at reducing the role of China in global supply chains. As China is Korea’s largest trading partner, US policy discouraging Chinese participation in supply chains has immediate detrimental implications for Korean manufacturers. The United States is the second-most important destination for Korean exports. Given the values of these triangular trade flows, Lovely and Dahlman assess South Korea’s exposure to US demands to remove or reduce Chinese participation in the manufacture of exports destined for the US market. The reliance of the proposed framework on certain standards will likely reduce Chinese participation in IPEF trade networks. Korea may benefit from this trend, but IPEF could also increase production costs for Korean companies, especially in the electronics sector, a problem that would worsen if China retaliates against these companies. To reduce these risks, Korea might find it prudent to reduce its reliance on intermediate goods from China for products it produces for export to the United States. The Korean government should also seek to better understand its exposure to US–China trade tensions and diversify its trade relations. Korean firms should start preparing for supply chain disruptions, perhaps by making investments at home. Korea could also help other IPEF members reduce supply chain disruptions while addressing security concerns over China.
Topic:
Economics, Science and Technology, Supply Chains, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

10. The Scowcroft Center’s project on twenty-first-century diplomacy

Author:
Jeffrey Cimmino and Amanda J. Rothschild
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
How should US diplomacy adapt for the twenty-first century? The practice of diplomacy has changed drastically over the past several decades, with the return of great power rivalry, the emergence of the new technologies of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR), and the rise of other important developments. Yet, while scholars and strategists have devoted enormous attention to how these new developments affect other domains, such as the future of warfare, they have devoted scant attention to the changing nature of diplomacy. If we believe, however, that diplomacy is a—if not the—most important tool of American statecraft, then twenty-first-century diplomacy deserves the same level of sustained attention. This paper will seek to characterize the changing nature of diplomacy with the objective of helping US and allied diplomats more effectively practice strategy and statecraft. This issue brief considers two key questions. How is the context of twenty-first-century diplomacy different from that of the past? How can US diplomacy begin to adapt for the twenty-first century? In answering the first question, this issue brief will focus on the most salient change in the international balance of power—the rise of China—in addition to the current technological revolution. After outlining how these changes have affected the context in which the United States conducts diplomacy, this issue brief will suggest several proposals to adapt US diplomacy to the twenty-first century. These suggestions will address both how changes in the global context—especially technology—have affected the conduct of US diplomacy and how US diplomacy can best respond to China’s rise and the 4IR.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Organization, Politics, Science and Technology, and Innovation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

11. China’s surveillance ecosystem and the global spread of its tools

Author:
Bulelani Jili
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
This paper seeks to offer insights into how China’s domestic surveillance market and cyber capability ecosystem operate, especially given the limited number of systematic studies that have analyzed its industry objectives. For the Chinese government, investment in surveillance technologies advances both its ambitions of becoming a global technology leader as well as its means of domestic social control. These developments also foster further collaboration between state security actors and private tech firms. Accordingly, the tech firms that support state cyber capabilities range from small cyber research start-ups to leading global tech enterprises. The state promotes surveillance technology and practices abroad through diplomatic exchanges, law enforcement cooperation, and training programs. These efforts encourage the dissemination of surveillance devices, but also support the government’s goals concerning international norm-making in multilateral and regional institutions. The proliferation of Chinese surveillance technology and cyber tools and the associated linkages between both state and private Chinese entities with those in other states, especially in the Global South, is a valuable component of Chinese state efforts to expand and strengthen their political and economic influence worldwide. Although individual governments purchasing Chinese digital tools have their local ambitions in mind, Beijing’s export and promotion of domestic surveillance technologies shape the adoption of these tools in the Global South. As such, investigating how Chinese actors leverage demand factors for their own aims, does not undercut the ability of other countries to detect and determine outcomes. Rather it demonstrates an interplay between Chinese state strategy and local political environments. This paper specifically focuses on key features in China’s surveillance ecosystem, while the companion to this report will focus on the key ‘pull factors’ from African countries and their significance for US interests.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Surveillance, and Public-Private Partnership
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Global Focus

12. How the Chinese government is financing its way to becoming a techno-superpower

Author:
Ngor Luong
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
On October 7, the Biden administration announced a new rule to control exports of advanced-computing semiconductor chips to China. As the United States works to cut off technology and capital flows to China, Beijing’s desire to achieve technological self-sufficiency is greater than ever. In fact, during the 20th Party Congress in the following week, Xi Jinping further pledged self-reliance in technology to gain a competitive edge in the tech competition with the United States. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China has sought technology-focused securitization to build an innovation system that supports its broader economic, societal, and geostrategic goals. In response to the economic impact ranging from the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic to the US-China trade and technology war, the Chinese Politburo unveiled the new “dual circulation” strategy at a Central Financial and Economic Commission meeting in 2020. At its core, dual circulation aims to reduce China’s vulnerability to external shocks, and to increase the country’s self-reliance to better guard against global volatility. The Chinese government works to improve China’s innovation-building capacity by attracting foreign capital and technology know-how in order to maximize their benefits while retaining overall control of the system. Beijing is committed to becoming a state-led and self-sufficient techno-superpower. In doing so, the Chinese government is consolidating its influence in both the domestic market and overseas markets where Chinese firms are active, while simultaneously mobilizing public, private, and public-private investment vehicles to support these tech ambitions. A number of its financial mechanisms have already spanned decades, but others have emerged recently. The decade-long mechanisms have yielded mixed results, while the successes of the new ones remain to be seen. It can thus be expected that the Chinese government will continue to further assert itself in all aspects of the innovation system by providing financial support and political guidance for critical and strategic industries. Within this context, this paper examines the various forms of financing vehicles that involve a range of diverse actors to support China’s whole-of-nation approach in an effort to achieve self-reliance in technology. To conclude, this paper assesses the mechanisms’ successes and shortcomings as well as areas to monitor going forward.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Economy, Business, and Innovation
Political Geography:
China and Asia

13. How Does China’s Industrial Policy Support Specific Sectors?

Author:
Barry Naughton and Tai Ming Cheung
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
The brief summarizes discussions and findings from the workshop on China’s Industrial Policy: Sectors and Resources, which was hosted by the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) with support from the UC San Diego 21st Century China Center, on September 30–October 2, 2022. Held in La Jolla, California on the UC San Diego campus, the workshop examined Chinese industrial policies in the sectors in which China hopes to make the biggest technological leaps, including high-performance computing, artificial intelligence, electric vehicles, solar, robots, aerospace, and biotech. Participants from leading universities, think tanks, and industry, along with U.S. government representatives, shared their research and observations along China’s industrial policy life cycle, from formulation to implementation.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, Science and Technology, and Innovation
Political Geography:
China and Indo-Pacific

14. China and the U.S. Compete for Global Techno-Security Dominance

Author:
Tai Ming Cheung
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
In the struggle for global geostrategic and geoeconomic supremacy between the United States and China, the technosecurity sphere where economics, technological innovation, and national security meet has become a principal battleground. Two contrasting models are pitted against each other: China’s state-led top-down approach and the United States’ market-driven bottom-up system. Which of them will ultimately prevail will depend on how capable, robust, and adept they are in meeting the challenge of rapid and disruptive change? This brief examines the underpinnings of U.S.-China great power technosecurity competition and assesses what the countries’ different approaches imply for future techno-security rivalry.
Topic:
Security, Industrial Policy, Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

15. China’s Use of U.S. Satellite Communications Technology in the South China Sea

Author:
Zachary Haver
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In recent years, the maritime law enforcement (MLE) forces of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have dominated the contested waters of the South China Sea (AMTI, December 4, 2020). While the exponential growth and increasing assertiveness of the China Coast Guard (CCG) have captured headlines, the evolving role of technology in China’s MLE operations has received less attention. New communications infrastructure and monitoring systems, for example, help Chinese MLE forces monitor and control contested maritime space in the South China Sea (CMSI, January 2021). These investments align with China’s broader pursuit of information superiority in the South China Sea, which involves building up electronic intelligence, counter-stealth radar, and other capabilities (JHU APL, July 2020).
Topic:
Science and Technology, Communications, Armed Forces, and Satellite
Political Geography:
China, Asia, United States of America, and South China Sea

16. Tracking the Digital Component of the BRI in Central Asia, Part One: Exporting “Safe Cities” to Uzbekistan

Author:
Sergey Sukhankin
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Following the 2013 announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) at a speech given by People’s Republic of China President Xi Jinping during visit to Kazakhstan, Central Asia has been a key regional priority and an indispensable element for the success of the BRI as a whole (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 7, 2013). Over the years, the BRI—nebulously defined from the start—has come to be associated with a variety of policy and investment programs. A previous series of articles has covered security-related developments associated with the BRI aimed at maintaining stability and protecting economic investments across the region (China Brief July 15; October 19; August 12).China has also begun to expand its export of digital infrastructure and surveillance technology under the umbrella of the BRI. The digitalization strategy—ostensibly aimed at promoting the international integration of technology with infrastructure and finance as well as spreading digital innovation abroad—is often referred to as the Digital Silk Road (DSR, 数字丝绸之路, shuzi sichou zhi lu). The high-level emphasis on promoting the DSR has only grown under the COVID-19 pandemic (CGTN, June 10, 2020). Across Central Asia, the DSR has been primarily represented by efforts to export China’s Smart/Safe City programs, which allow governments to collect, store, process and analyze vast amounts of personal information. The promotion of the so-called “informatization” of society (信息化, xinxi hua) and data commodification are yet more driving forces behind China’s DSR ambitions in Central Asia.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Surveillance, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
China, Central Asia, Asia, and Uzbekistan

17. Buying Silence: The Price of Internet Censorship in China

Author:
Ryan Fedasiuk
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On Monday, November 12, 2018, the recently-appointed director of China’s Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission (CAC) Zhuang Rongwen (庄荣文) summoned senior executives from WeChat and Sina Weibo for a “discussion” (Central CAC, November 16, 2018). While there is no transcript of the meeting available to the public, one thing is certain: It did not go well. For months, Zhuang had been telegraphing his discontent with the state of censorship in China—and specifically, the role that social media giants had played in undermining it (New America, September 24, 2018). His official statement about the meeting, which was uploaded to the CAC’s website a few days later, accused China’s largest internet companies of “breeding chaos in the media” and “endangering social stability and the interests of the masses.” Under his watch, he vowed that the Central CAC would “strictly investigate and deal with the enterprises that lack responsibility and have serious problems” (Central CAC, November 20, 2018). Rarely do Party officials offer such scathing public admonitions.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Internet, Surveillance, and Censorship
Political Geography:
China and Asia

18. Is the European Union’s investment agreement with China underrated?

Author:
Uri Dadush and André Sapir
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The European Union is very open to foreign direct investment. By comparison, despite considerable liberalisation in the past two decades, foreign investors in China’s markets still face significant restrictions, especially in services sectors. Given this imbalance, the EU has long sought to improve the situation for its companies operating or wanting to operate in China. After eight years of negotiations, the EU and China concluded in December 2020 a bilateral Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI). The text awaiting ratification aims to give foreign investors greater market access, enforceable via state-to-state dispute settlement. It does not yet, however, cover investor protection (such as against expropriation). Meanwhile, investor protection is covered by bilateral investment treaties between EU countries and China, which remain in force. The CAI has been met in some quarters with scepticism on economic and geopolitical grounds. The main criticism is that it provides little new market access in China, and that this small economic gain for the EU comes at the price of breaking ranks with its main political ally, the United States. Our assessment, which focuses on the economic implications, is different. It is true the CAI provides only modest new market access in China, but this is because China has already made progress in recent years in liberalising its foreign investment regulations unilaterally. The CAI binds this progress under an international treaty, marking an improvement for EU firms insofar as their market access rights can be effectively enforced. Most important, the CAI includes new rules on subsidies, state-owned enterprises, technology transfer and transparency, which will improve effective market access for EU firms operating in China. These bilateral new rules could also pave the way for reform of the multilateral rules under the World Trade Organisation, with the aim of better integrating China into the international trading and investment system – a goal shared by the EU, the United States and other like-minded countries. From an economic viewpoint therefore, the CAI is an important agreement, and one worth having. However, its ratification by the European Parliament is unlikely while China continues to apply sanctions against some members of the European Parliament and other critics of China’s human rights record.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Investment, and Liberalization
Political Geography:
China and Europe

19. Eyes on the Prize: Australia, China, and the Antarctic Treaty System

Author:
Claire Young
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Australia’s interests in Antarctica are better served by the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) than anything we could negotiate today. We should redouble our commitment to its ideals of science-driven, rules-based management — and counter the narrative of ATS ‘failure’. China is pushing the boundaries of ATS practice by exploiting fisheries and tourism, and probably seeking access to Western technologies in Antarctica. And in the future, Beijing could lead a coalition of states seeking mineral riches that only China is likely to be capable of retrieving. Australia should watch China’s activities closely, but react cautiously. We should be wary of false analogies with the Arctic and not overreact to marginal military developments. We should shield the ATS from Australia–China tension and US–China competition.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Treaties and Agreements, Natural Resources, Tourism, Geopolitics, Fishing, and Coalition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Australia, and Arctic

20. To Beat China On Tech In Emerging Markets, Learn From It: Competing with China on 5G and future technologies

Author:
Luke Patey
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Recommendations: The US, South Korea, Japan, and the EU can pool resources to level the playing field with China and offer new finance options for developing countries seeking to upgrade their communications and technology infrastructure. The US should look to the India and Vietnam model and help other nations develop domestic capacities that lower dependencies on Huawei and other foreign tech providers over time. Open RAN is no silver bullet to compete with China. Its potential will only be fully realized in the mid and long run, after high integration costs, security gaps, and other problems are worked out.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Development, Politics, Science and Technology, Power Politics, Economy, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America