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1. Seeking to undermine democracy and partnerships: How the CCP is influencing the Pacific islands information environment

Author:
Blake Johnson and Joshua Dunne
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is conducting coordinated information operations in Pacific island countries (PICs). Those operations are designed to influence political elites, public discourse and political sentiment regarding existing partnerships with Western democracies. Our research shows how the CCP frequently seeks to capitalise on regional events, announcements and engagements to push its own narratives, many of which are aimed at undermining some of the region’s key partnerships. This report examines three significant events and developments: the establishment of AUKUS in 2021 the CCP’s recent efforts to sign a region-wide security agreement the 2022 Pacific Islands Forum held in Fiji. This research, including these three case studies, shows how the CCP uses tailored, reactive messaging in response to regional events and analyses the effectiveness of that messaging in shifting public discourse online. This report also highlights a series of information channels used by the CCP to push narratives in support of the party’s regional objectives in the Pacific. Those information channels include Chinese state media, CCP publications and statements in local media, and publications by local journalists connected to CCP-linked groups.1
Topic:
Science and Technology, Partnerships, Democracy, Social Media, Disinformation, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Pacific

2. Updating Estimates of Methane Emissions: The Case of China

Author:
Zichong Chen and Daniel Jacob
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
The Harvard Initiative to Reduce Global Methane Emissions released its first publication in May 2023: a research brief titled “Updating Estimates of Methane Emissions: The Case of China.” The Initiative is one of five interdisciplinary research clusters funded by the Salata Institute for Climate and Sustainability at Harvard University. The Harvard Project on Climate Agreements collaborates in the implementation of the Initiative. The brief summarizes research by Professor Daniel Jacob and postdoctoral fellow Zichong Chen, atmospheric scientists at Harvard University, with their colleagues. Jacob and Chen use high-resolution data from the TROPOspheric Monitoring Instrument (TROPOMI), onboard a satellite launched in 2017, to estimate national and sectoral methane emissions more accurately than has been possible in the past. They draw upon atmospheric transport models to invert the satellite observations of methane concentrations, using advanced statistical methods, and infer emissions quantities and locations from the observed atmospheric concentrations. This method has yielded generally higher estimates of emissions than in previous reports, including in the case of China. Future methane-initiative briefs will address similar research the authors and their colleagues are conducting in the United States, Latin America, North Africa, and other countries and regions. An accurate picture of aggregate and sector-level methane emissions is important to better target mitigation policies. It is hoped that the results of the research described here and in subsequent briefs will advance national efforts and international collaboration aimed at reducing methane emissions. The Harvard Initiative to Reduce Global Methane Emissions seeks meaningful and sustained progress in global methane-emissions reductions through research and effective engagement with policymakers in government and key stakeholders in business, nongovernmental organizations, and international institutions. Reduced methane emissions can significantly reduce, in the near term, the magnitude of climate change and its associated impacts. The Initiative’s objectives span the full range of disciplines and topics associated with this challenge. Among its objectives are to build on scientific research on measurement and attribution of emissions; understand legal, regulatory, and political opportunities and constraints to methane-emissions reductions in the United States; design policies that might best contribute to methane emissions reduction; work effectively through existing international venues, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; and define roles that business and international and multilateral organizations can play in this effort.
Topic:
Climate Change, Methane, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
China and Asia

3. Outsiders Wanting In: Asian States and Arctic Governance

Author:
Calvin Heng and Eyck Freymann
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
The strategic interests of Asian countries in the Arctic continue to grow despite the disruptions of the COVID-19 pandemic and the geopolitical fallout of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. China and India have their eye on Russia’s Arctic energy resources, and China is further seeking to leverage Russian weakness to expand its operational presence in the Arctic Ocean. Japan, South Korea, and Singapore are less prominent in Arctic regional institutions, yet they have distinctive interests in Arctic science, governance, and resources and are resuming dialogue about Arctic matters amongst themselves. This policy brief reviews the key differences in how Asian states are approaching the Arctic through a survey of their strategic documents, public statements, and diplomatic and commercial activities.
Topic:
Governance, Multilateral Relations, Strategic Interests, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Japan, China, India, Asia, South Korea, Singapore, and Arctic

4. China's response to the US tech war: The closing of detours

Author:
Yang Jiang
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
In the US-China rivalry, no battle is currently more fierce than the one over technology, with both countries ramping up efforts to pursue global technological leadership. The tech war has intensified under President Joe Biden, with the US’s strangling of China’s technological bottleneck getting tighter and tighter. The US’s stated aims are protecting its national security and foreign policy interests and preventing sensitive technologies with military applications from being acquired by China. Some analysts point to Beijing’s Made in China 2025 as the trigger of the tech war because that is China’s plan to upgrade manufacturing and seek the top positions in global value chains. The US is pursuing a strategy to outcompete and outmanoeuvre China, as is stated in the Biden administration’s National Security Strategy in October 2022: “this decade will be decisive, in setting the terms of our [the US’s] competition with the PRC”. Especially in the sector of semiconductors or chips, where the West controls China’s access to the most advanced technology, US restrictions and its ability to bring its allies into line have been destructive to China’s development. On 21 May 2023, Beijing’s ban of American chipmaker Micron from critical information infrastructure in China signals a first direct retaliation from Beijing. China has also realised that some of its hitherto measures—turning to alternative sources of import, utilising policy loopholes, and sufficing with lower-level technology—are just detours. They are not long-term solutions; nor can they be the foundation of China’s national security. The US restrictions have forced China to adopt new measures to accelerate domestic innovation with more focus on basic research and market forces. How the tech war will play out has important implications for Western countries and global supply chains. This policy brief will focus on China’s responses to the US-waged tech war, specifically: What have been China’s domestic measures to respond to the tech restrictions from the US, and what is China’s potential for technological breakthrough? What have been China’s international responses, and what are China’s options for retaliation?
Topic:
Science and Technology, Sanctions, Strategic Competition, Rivalry, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

5. Second Meeting in Beijing: China-Facilitated Iran-Saudi diplomatic reconciliation efforts amid US apprehensions

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
On April 6, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian and his Saudi Arabian counterpart, Faisal bin Farhan Al-Saud, signed a joint statement in Beijing announcing the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries, which follows a tripartite agreement signed under China's auspices on March 10.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Reconciliation, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, Asia, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

6. Intertwined Interest: What’s behind China-Ivory Coast strengthened relations?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The diplomatic relation between China and Ivory Coast spans over more than four decades. Both sides have strengthened their relations in recent years as China looks to cement its presence in Africa.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Investment, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Ivory Coast

7. China “De-risking”: A Long Way from Political Statements to Corporate Action

Author:
Ole Spillner and Guntram Wolff
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Major Western leaders have been calling for “de-risking” from China, rather than “decoupling.” But what exactly de-risking means and how it differs from decoupling, remains unclear. It is ultimately firms, not governments, driving trade and investment relations. But firms cannot account for unidentified risks by themselves. National security risks are for governments to define. Complex supply chain externalities might entail risks to production that are also difficult for firms to account for. Furthermore, firms may bet that governments will rescue them if a worst-case scenario happens, effectively socializing risks. In the EU, Germany is particularly exposed to China risk in terms of security, macroeconomic, and political exposure.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Macroeconomics, Supply Chains, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

8. Evaluating Public Support for Chinese Vendors in Europe’s 5G Infrastructure

Author:
Tim Rühlig and Richard Q. Turcsányi
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Germany is considering banning equipment made by Chinese companies like tech giant Huawei – in its 5G mobile infrastructure. A revised 2021 IT Security Act failed to reduce China’s 59 percent market share. A representative opinion poll, shows only 30.8 percent of Germans want 5G cooperation with China. Across 11 European countries, skepticism is equal, with only 31.8 percent approval – though this varies greatly from country to country.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Infrastructure, European Union, and 5G
Political Geography:
Europe and Asia

9. A More Strategic Approach to Foreign Direct Investment Policy

Author:
Markus Jaeger
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Cross-border investment and trade give rise to both economic gains and economic vulnerabilities. As geopolitical competition is intensifying, governments increasingly resort to restricting cross-border investment and trade. Policies are informed by a desire to limit security risks and secure technological advantages rather than pursue efficiency gains.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Foreign Direct Investment, Strategic Competition, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and Americas

10. Will China's impending overhaul of its financial regulatory system make a difference?

Author:
Martin Chorzempa and Nicolas Véron
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
China's reshuffle of its financial supervisory architecture announced in March, like previous changes, appears incremental rather than radical. It will not, however, resolve the main challenge hobbling China’s financial system, which is not linked to specific choices of supervisory architecture but rather to the unfinished transition from a state-directed to a market-based financial system and the way the Chinese Communist Party's pervasive role creates obstacles to good corporate governance of individual financial firms and to the independence of supervisory authorities. Too often, political authorities and sometimes the supervisors themselves intervene directly in financial firms’ decisions to allocate capital and credit, occasionally resulting in failures of risk control and risk management. The authors argue that Chinese reformers should aim at a clearer and more rigorous division of responsibilities, in which financial firms manage financial opportunities and risks, and supervisors are exclusively focused on their respective public policy mandates.
Topic:
Economics, Regulation, Finance, and Corporate Governance
Political Geography:
China and Asia

11. China’s subsea-cable power in the Middle East and North Africa

Author:
Dale Aluf
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
In a new Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative issue brief, “China’s subsea-cable power in the Middle East and North Africa,” Aluf analyzes China’s campaign to make countries in the region more dependent on Chinese networks, while reducing its own dependence on foreign cables. For a country that seeks to alter the internet’s physical form and influence digital behavior while exerting supreme control over information flows, China’s growing presence in the Middle East and North Africa’s cable industry is significant because Beijing has the power to shape the route of global internet traffic by determining when, where, and how to build cables.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Politics, Science and Technology, Partnerships, and Innovation
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Asia, and North Africa

12. Beyond launch: Harnessing allied space capabilities for exploration purposes

Author:
Tiffany Vora
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The “United States Space Priorities Framework,” released in December 2021, confirmed the White House’s commitment to American leadership in space.1 Space activities deliver immense benefits to humankind. For example, satellite imaging alone is crucial for improvements in daily life such as weather monitoring as well as for grand challenges like the fight against climate change. Such breakthrough discoveries in space pave the way for innovation and new economies on Earth. Exploration is at the cutting edge of this process: it expands humankind’s knowledge of the universe, transforming the unknown into the supremely challenging, expensive, risky, and promising. US allies and partners accelerate this transformation via scientific and technical achievements as well as processes, relationships, and a shared vision for space exploration. By integrating these allied capabilities, the United States and its allies and partners set the stage for safe and prosperous space geopolitics and economy in the decades to come. However, harnessing the capabilities of US allies and partners for space exploration is complex, requiring the balance of relatively short-term progress with far-horizon strategy. Space exploration has changed since the US-Soviet space race of the 1960s. In today’s rapidly evolving technological and geopolitical environment, it is unclear whether the processes, relationships, and vision that previously enabled allied cooperation in space, epitomized by the International Space Station (ISS), will keep pace. Here, China is viewed as the preeminent competitor for exploration goals and capabilities—as well as the major competitor for long-term leadership in space.2 This development drives fears of space militarization and weaponization, prompting protectionist legislation, investment screening, and industrial policies that can disrupt collaboration among the United States and its key allies and partners.3 Further complication stems from the rise of commercial space, with opportunities and challenges due to the decentralization, democratization, and demonetization of technologies for robotic and crewed space exploration. This paper serves as a primer for current US space exploration goals and capabilities that will be critical to achieving them. It highlights arenas where US allies and partners are strongly positioned to jointly accelerate space exploration while also benefitting life on Earth. This paper concludes with recommended actions—gleaned from interviews with international experts in space exploration—for the US government as well as allied and partner governments to increase the number and impact of global stakeholders in space exploration, to remove friction in collaboration, and to guide the future of space toward democratic values.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, Science and Technology, European Union, Partnerships, and Space
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

13. China in Sub-Saharan Africa: Reaching far beyond natural resources

Author:
Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou and Naomi Aladekoba
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
This work empirically examines China’s growing footprint in Sub-Saharan Africa’s investment, trade, cultural, and security landscape over the past two decades. It highlights China’s increasing appetite for Sub-Saharan Africa’s natural resources and growing young labor force—identifying the region’s consumer market as an important destination for Chinese goods and services over the next few decades. The analysis identifies more than 600 Chinese investments and construction contracts in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), valued at over $303 billion, signed between 2006 and 2020. Four sectors attract 87 percent of China’s investment and construction in the region: energy at 34 percent; transport, 29 precent; metals, 13 percent; and real estate, 11 percent. This is very similar to the Middle East and North Africa Region, where the energy sector attracts close to 50 percent of China’s investment, followed by transport, 19 percent; real estate, 15 percent; and metals, 6 percent. In terms of trade, this work shows that between 2001 and 2020, China’s merchandise trade with the region increased by a whopping 1,864 percent—surpassing SSA’s trade with both the United States and the European Union. In other words, from 2001 to 2020, China’s share in total merchandise trade in SSA rose from 4 percent to 25.6 percent, while during the same period, the shares of the United States and the EU in SSA’s total trade declined by 10 percentage points and 8 percentage points, respectively. The report also takes a look at China’s arms trade with the region. Twenty-two percent of SSA’s arms imports are sourced from China, making China the region’s second-largest supplier of arms and military equipment, with Russia in the lead (24 percent). Finally, the report highlights the fact that the size of Chinese migrants in Africa is estimated at one to two million, with around one million permanently residing in the region. The largest numbers are in Ghana, South Africa, Madagascar, Zambia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.This work is the first in a series of empirical analyses that will be conducted on China’s presence in developing economies and low-income countries.
Topic:
Natural Resources, Economy, Business, Economic Growth, Macroeconomics, Trade, and Inclusion
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa

14. Can Chinese growth defy gravity?

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Chinese growth, astounding since the beginning of the reform era, has slowed in the last decade. We offer a baseline estimate (based on the current trend) of China’s medium-term growth rate, which we project to fall to 2.4 percent by 2035. Several factors create uncertainty around this baseline. China’s rapid aging is already incorporated into our long-term growth scenario, but its impact on growth will depend on how China’s remaining urbanisation process spreads over time, how the shrinking labour supply affects labour productivity and whether the decline in total factor productivity growth, reflecting the lack of reform during the last decade and possibly the rising role of the state, can be reversed. Investment in China, for decades the largest factor in China’s growth, is expected to contribute less to growth given the increasingly low return on assets, particularly on state-led investment. The rapid piling up of public debt is also becoming a heavy burden for the Chinese economy. Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic may have left significant scarring effects, such as structurally high youth unemployment and low investment confidence. On the upside for China, the rise in human capital and research and development expenditure may support innovation and growth, but the magnitude of this effect is uncertain, because it is unclear if higher innovation will translate into higher total factor productivity, and because of the United States’s push to contain China technologically.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, European Union, Economic Growth, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

15. Will China’s new financial regulatory reform be enough to meet the challenges?

Author:
Martin Chorzempa and Nicolas Veron
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Effective financial supervision plays a crucial role in maintaining financial stability and a healthy financial system. China’s leadership has made financial risk a core priority, and in reforms approved in March 2023, it reassigned regulatory responsibilities, creating a new supervisory body that will take over some responsibilities from the central bank, the banking and insurance regulator, and the securities regulator. The aim is that a change to the financial supervisory architecture (who does what in financial supervision) will make China’s system more effective and stable. In this policy brief, we argue that this incremental reform will not solve the core issues China faces in financial supervisory effectiveness. We provide an overview of China’s large and complex financial system, including its largely state-owned banks (some of which are the largest in the world by assets), securities markets and other financial intermediaries. Traditional divisions between different types of activities and institutions have been blurred by the rise of large financial conglomerates, risk-transfer techniques and internet-based finance. Reforms in 2018 to China’s supervisory architecture did not eliminate perceived shortcomings, including failures to effectively regulate financial conglomerates, fintech and regional banks. We then survey global benchmarks against which China’s financial supervisory architecture can be compared, including the United States and European Union. China’s supervisory system is already more streamlined, at least on paper, than either of these most comparable global counterparts. Like them, China’s system does not correspond exactly to any of the three textbook archetypes of supervision: sectoral, twin-peaks or integrated supervision. Ultimately, the effectiveness of China’s financial supervisory architecture suffers from excessive state intervention in the financial system through other channels, including through the unique and pervasive influence of the communist party, which hampers supervisory independence and makes it difficult to establish accountability for regulatory failures. While the recently announced reform may improve coordination across supervisory bodies, coordination within the new quasi-integrated supervisor, across central departments, and between them and local branches, will remain a challenge.
Topic:
Reform, Regulation, Finance, and Financial Stability
Political Geography:
China and Asia

16. Course Correction: Charting a More Effective Approach to U.S.-China Trade

Author:
Clark Packard and Scott Lincicome
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Over the past several years the U.S.-China economic relationship has soured and become subordinated to broader concerns about national security and geopolitics. After a decades‐​long reform agenda in China that lifted hundreds of millions out of grinding poverty, Chinese president Xi Jinping has increasingly turned inward—reembracing Maoist socialism and heavy‐​handed central planning. Washington’s response to these worrisome developments has been reflexively hawkish economically, scattershot, and woefully inadequate for the economic challenge that China presents.
Topic:
National Security, Bilateral Relations, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

17. Why Democracies Implement Better Climate Actions: Case Study of India, the Philippines, and Japan

Author:
Niranjan Sahoo and Jisoo Park
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Asia is the most populous and one of the most climate-vulnerable regions in the world. Long coastline, vast low lying areas comprising many small island nations make it highly susceptible to climate change such as rising sea level and extreme weather events like floods, landslides. For many critics, democracies' response to climate change is much impeded due to their slow decision-making process and short-termism governed by electoral compulsions. Some analysts go as far as to claim that authoritarianism is needed to tackle the crisis more effectively. However, close examination of different governance structure's climate actions strongly supports that democracies are inherently better at handling climate crisis compared to authoritarian regimes. This article explores the multifaceted impact of climate change to democracy and delves into the case studies of India, the Philippines, and Japan to identify strengths as well as areas of improvement that democracies should consider to establish meaningful climate actions.
Topic:
Climate Change, Authoritarianism, Democracy, and Accountability
Political Geography:
Japan, India, Asia, and Philippines

18. Competition Versus Exclusion in U.S.–China Relations: A Choice Between Stability and Conflict

Author:
Jake Werner
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The Biden administration’s China policy is pulling in two different directions, but the tension is not widely recognized because every antagonistic measure aimed at China is filed under the heading of competition. As a result, Washington’s debate on China loses the crucial distinction between “competition” — a kind of connection with the potential to be carried on in healthy ways — and “exclusion,” an attempt to sever connection that necessarily leads to conflict if the domain is significant. Biden’s exclusion policies focus on cutting China out of the principal growth sectors in the global economy and the most lucrative and strategically important markets. Administration officials think their approach is sensible and moderate compared to more extreme voices in Washington calling for exclusion in all realms. Even so, the Biden approach is highly destabilizing because both countries consider the targeted areas vital to the future of global authority and economic prosperity, and because the attempt to trap China in a position of permanent subordination represents a serious threat to the legitimacy of China’s leaders. Healthy competition requires a shared stake in the future. In earlier periods, despite sharp tensions and mutual suspicions suffusing the relationship, U.S.–China ties were stabilized first by the joint project of containing Soviet power and then by a shared commitment to market–led globalization. Now that leaders on both sides are disenchanted with key facets of globalization, the two countries are caught in an escalatory cycle of exclusion and retaliation that risks hardening zero–sum pressures in the global system into a permanent structure of hostility. In such a scenario, each country would organize its own society and international partners to undermine the other, dramatically increasing the likelihood of violent conflict. The warning signs are already clear on both sides, as each increasingly interprets every action on the other side as part of a conspiracy to achieve domination. Notwithstanding widespread complacency about the risks of conflict after a tentative diplomatic opening in recent months, the rise of securitized thinking in both countries is steadily building institutional and ideological momentum for confrontation that can only be broken by a new and inclusive direction for the relationship.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Political stability, Conflict, Strategic Competition, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

19. Common Good Diplomacy: A Framework for Stable U.S.–China Relations

Author:
Jake Werner
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
One curious feature of the emerging U.S.–China conflict is that each side claims to be defending the existing international order against the threat the other poses to it. Hidden beneath this seemingly irreconcilable dispute is a crucial truth: both the United States and China are status quo powers, sharing a deep interest in a stable global security environment and an open global economy. At the same time, both countries are pursuing urgently needed reforms to a global system increasingly defined by zero–sum pressures. Yet both are prone to exclusionary impulses that threaten to ruin the possibility of a shared reform agenda and instead throw the world into conflict. Working with China to revitalize the international order would not only prevent such a conflict, it would also establish the conditions for healthy forms of both competition and cooperation in the U.S.–China relationship. But how can U.S. leaders pursue such a project without simply giving a pass to China’s sometimes undesirable behavior? The focus should be diplomacy to frame an inclusive global system, focusing on actions that would reduce zero–sum constraints. In the three key realms of global authority and security, the global economy, and climate change, China is currently engaged in counterproductive moves that exacerbate existing tensions but is also pursuing promising reforms that could expand the scope for positive–sum outcomes. Rather than seeking to counter every Chinese initiative, U.S. leaders should carefully distinguish between beneficial and damaging outcomes, affirming and building on China’s constructive proposals and managing differences through negotiation rather than polemics and confrontation. Some potentially fruitful areas for cooperation include joint action to limit climate change, development in the Global South, revising the global guidelines for economic statecraft, and reforming international institutions to create a more open and inclusive world order. Pursuing cooperative efforts in such areas would both create direct benefits and improve U.S. credibility as a responsible leader of the world order rather than simply a rival of China. It would also open space to pursue competition within a rules–based order rather than risk a slide into destructive zero–sum conflict.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Political stability, and International Order
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

20. A post-Western global order in the making? Foreign policy goals of India, Turkey, Brazil and South Africa

Author:
Sinikukka Saari, Toni Alaranta, Bart Gaens, Katariina Mustasilta, and Lauri Tahtinen
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
India, Turkey, Brazil and South Africa are striving for a more multipolar, post-Western world order in which they would not be seen merely as auxiliary powers to the bigger players, but as independent great powers. For them, a key foreign policy goal is to transform global governance institutions. They all call for a permanent seat for their country on the UN Security Council. To achieve that, the states need backing from more than the Western states – and this logically strengthens the multi-aligned logic of their foreign policies. India, Turkey, Brazil and South Africa see Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine and the Western countermeasures from their own perspective. They describe Russia’s invasion as a violation of international law, but see the war primarily as a Western concern, not theirs. Although these states are critical towards the West, they are not anti-Western and they all value multilateral institutions; their foreign policy goals and features offer opportunities for the EU to engage with them, but that needs to happen on a more equal footing than what has traditionally been the case.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, UN Security Council, Multipolarity, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Africa, Turkey, India, Asia, Brazil, and Latin America

21. Russia and Kazakhstan in the global nuclear sector: From uranium mining to energy diplomacy

Author:
Marco Siddi and Kristiina Silvan
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Amidst heightened geopolitical competition and low-carbon energy transformations, several states, notably China and countries in the Global South, have decided to invest in nuclear power, seeing it as a secure and low-emission alternative to fossil fuels. Kazakhstan is the world’s largest producer and exporter of unenriched uranium. It has been a reliable supplier to the West for decades, but its nuclear sector is closely linked to Russia’s, which has caused some concern in the European Union and the United States. Russia is a major player in the field thanks to its global exports of enriched uranium and nuclear technology. Its state nuclear company Rosatom has a large portfolio of international customers and numerous projects, mainly outside the West. Russia’s nuclear sector has become an important aspect of its energy diplomacy. While the nuclear sector has not been sanctioned, geopolitical tensions and instability in uranium-producing countries have increased security of supply risks for the West, which relies heavily on imports of both uranium and nuclear fuel.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Mining, Post-Soviet Space, Nuclear Energy, and Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Kazakhstan, and Asia

22. The changing dynamics of the G7, G20 and BRICS: Informal multilateral cooperation is increasingly important in an era of strategic competition

Author:
Juha Jokela and Alana Saul
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Increasing strategic competition among major powers has had a negative effect on the efficacy of formal multilateral cooperation. This has also been reflected in informal forums such as the G7, G20 and BRICS. Yet some new dynamics have emerged. Since Russia was excluded from the G8 in 2014, the G7 has become a key forum for Western cooperation. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has further geared the group towards a stronghold of Western economies and democracies. The BRICS group has continued to meet at leaders’ level, and has consolidated its position. Despite variation in its members’ interests, the group aims to balance the G7, and its importance for China and Russia has been elevated. Currently, the G20 constitutes a forum in which strategic competition can potentially be managed. Along with the G7 and BRICS countries, other powers play an increasingly notable role. The dynamics of the group also displays an increasing “Southernization” of informal multilateral cooperation.
Topic:
European Union, Democracy, Multilateralism, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

23. Chinese Military-Civil Fusion: Sino-Italian Research Cooperation

Author:
N. Lill
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The Chinese government exploits foreign academic infrastructure and talent to build a world-class military. Although cooperation with China offers alluring investments, it risks research objectives being mandated by or from China and may result in unintended knowledge transfer in critical areas. Considering the extent of Chinese military-civil fusion, any collaboration—with military and non-military institutions alike—is likely to boost Chinese military capabilities. Utilising academic exchanges to further military ambitions is a coordinated and broad long-term strategy that has benefited from the West’s limited knowledge of Chinese institutions and their links to the military. To repurpose a quote by Nelson Mandela, “Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world.” And for now, that weapon is handed out without deep consideration or proper regulation.
Topic:
Education, International Cooperation, Research, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Italy

24. Empowering Ukraine Prepares Us for China

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
China is America’s number one adversary due to Beijing’s willingness and capability to undermine US security, freedom, and prosperity. One pressing way China could strike a blow against US interests would be to violently force Taiwan to unify with mainland China. Doing so would immediately cause a global recession and rupture the US alliance architecture in the Pacific. It would also clear the way for China to contest US interests in the global commons far beyond the region. Some policymakers who are rightly concerned about the threat China poses to Taiwan argue that the United States should stop aiding Ukraine and instead divert attention, support, and weapons to Taiwan. While proponents of this argument are right to convey a sense of urgency and focus on some points that are true, their position overlooks key facts that make its simplistic zero-sum formulation unrealistic and self-defeating. For example, their argument does not sufficiently grapple with the connection between the China and Russia threats to US interests and allies, the responses of allies and how their perspectives affect outcomes, and the way the US budgetary and weapons delivery systems function.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Spending, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, and Asia

25. Winning in Ukraine Is Critically Important for Deterring a War in Taiwan

Author:
John P. Walters
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Below are remarks by Hudson President and CEO John P. Walters during a debate over whether winning in Ukraine is important for deterring a war in Taiwan. To view the debate, click here. I support the judgment of the commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), Admiral John Aquilino, who was recently asked by Senator Roger Wicker, “There’s some people who feel our support for Ukraine is taking away from our capability and credibility in the Indo-Pacific. . . . What do you say?” Adm. Aquilino replied, “Senator I do not . . . I believe we have to do both to maintain the peace.” Why is Adm. Aquilino correct in linking the defense of Taiwan and deterrence of Communist Chinese aggression to our support for Ukraine? First, US victory in Ukraine is essential for generating support for Taiwan at home. Winning in Ukraine will help generate the domestic resolve to fight for Taiwan. If we pull back from Ukraine, however, the US will strengthen those isolationists who pit baby formula against defense spending. Success creates a slipstream of confidence, which the country is currently lacking after our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. A victory in Ukraine can restore confidence in our ability to win wars—at home and abroad.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

26. The Chinese Communist Party’s Campaign on University Campuses

Author:
Ellen Bork
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s influence activities at American universities have received considerable scrutiny from the US government, Congress, and media over the past several years. Many of them operate under the auspices of its united front, a loose network of entities for which there is no American equivalent.1 The united front is a Leninist concept the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) adopted from the Soviet Union in the earliest phase of the party’s development. United front activities “control, mobilize, and otherwise make use of individuals outside the party to achieve its objectives . . . domestically and internationally.”2 In recent years, General Secretary Xi Jinping has reinvigorated the united front, drawn it more tightly under his control, and directed it to serve an ambitious agenda to project Chinese power globally and undermine liberal democratic norms. China’s influence activities are part of the country’s subnational united front agenda, which targets not only universities but also state and local governments, private businesses, and civic organizations, in line with Mao Zedong’s directive to “target local entities in order to weaken the national core.” Some of China’s united front efforts, including Confucius Institutes and Chinese Student and Scholar Associations, have experienced declines and exposure. This is not as significant as it might seem. The CCP has a record of responding to united front failures by regrouping and doubling down. US intelligence agencies have warned that China is intensifying influence efforts at the subnational level. Several factors complicate America’s ability to respond effectively to China’s united front activities at American universities. Under America’s federal system, states, cities, and educational and civic institutions have no responsibility for and little experience in defending against national security threats. For much of its relationship with the PRC, the US minimized the fundamental differences between the US democratic and Chinese communist political systems. American leaders encouraged not only trade and investment but also participation in activities that served the PRC’s political, ideological, and other agendas. Furthermore, Washington largely accepted the CCP’s conflation of itself with China and the Chinese people, enabling it to cast its critics—including those in the US and elsewhere in the West—as “anti-China,” xenophobic, or racist. The Trump administration began countering united front activities, including by educating the American public, state and local officials, and university administrators about the threat they pose. Despite the bipartisan consensus on China that has emerged in recent years, the Biden administration has not maintained the same priority on countering united front efforts.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Education, National Security, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

27. The Jeju 4.3 Attacks Were Not a Democracy Movement

Author:
Tara O
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
On April 3, 1948, on the Korean island of Jeju, communist guerrillas went on a rampage, killing police officers, election workers, and others; setting houses on fire; and terrorizing villagers, all to discourage them from voting in the upcoming May 10 elections that would establish the Republic of Korea (ROK). The insurgency—referred to as Jeju 4.3—triggered a government counterinsurgency, forcing the communists into the mountains where they would continue their guerrilla operations for nine more years. In March 2023, the Democratic Party of Korea (Deobureo Minju Party) introduced a bill mandating that citizens refer to the insurgency only as a “democracy struggle,” with punishments of up to five years in prison. But historical documents, eyewitness testimony, and statements from the perpetrators show that the incident was a campaign of irregular and unconventional warfare, a prelude to the communist military invasion of South Korea in June 1950, and part of the larger Korean War.
Topic:
History, Counterinsurgency, Democracy, and Korean War
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

28. Nuclear energy and proliferation in Turkey’s Asian Politics

Author:
Eliza Gheorghe
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
The share of nuclear power in Asia’s electricity generating capacity has grown significantly over the last two decades. China is one of the dominant players in Asia, developing a robust nuclear power program. In the Middle East, Iran and the United Arab Emirates have introduced nuclear power into the region, with Turkey planning to follow in their footsteps in 2023. The adoption of nuclear power spurs concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear latency. Some countries use their civilian nuclear programs to develop a robust infrastructure that allows them to acquire nuclear weapons in a relatively short period of time. Such dynamics are likely to have a destabilizing effect on international affairs in the Middle East and Asia. The current international situation makes it unlikely that the nuclear non-proliferation regime will become stronger in the near future. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated the need for a new generation of negative security assurances and collective defense that protects countries from nuclear blackmail.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Politics, Electricity, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Asia

29. Is Realism Policy Relevant? Evidence from Ukraine and Taiwan

Author:
Nikolaos Lampas
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Criticism of realism is based on a largely superficial understanding of the paradigm. Critics treat realism as a one-dimensional approach. Realism is a paradigm that encompasses different and sometimes mutually contradictory approaches. Realist scholars strongly opposed U.S. military interventions, such as Iraq, which have proved disastrous. Offensive realism’s rationale is unconvincing in the case of Ukraine. However, the international community’s response falls well within the realist paradigm. Deterrence remains a vital policy recommendation of realism, as evidenced by the U.S. response to the Taiwan debacle.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Intervention, and Realism
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, and Asia

30. Japan’s Carbon Neutrality and Green Growth Strategy

Author:
Gyu-Pan Kim
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
Japan is mobilizing all its policy capabilities for energy transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy and hydrogen energy from the perspective of realizing carbon neutrality by 2050. Among them, the overseas development and return of hydrogen energy to Japan and the domestic green hydrogen development are making great progress since the announcement of the basic hydrogen strategy in December 2017. Japan promotes the green growth strategy (December 2020) as a national strategy to achieve the 2030 GHG reduction target of 46% (compared to 2013) (NDC) and to realize ‘carbon neutrality by 2050’. Japan's green growth strategy sets 14 areas as key development industries, including offshore wind power, hydrogen, nuclear power, automobiles and batteries, semiconductors, and information & technology. It also presents action plans in the key 14 areas such as R&D, demonstration projects, introduction expansion, and self-reliance/commercialization according to the growth stage of each area. In this WEB, we would like to explore which part of Japan's energy transition policy and green growth strategy the Korean government will refer to in order to achieve the task of realizing carbon neutrality by 2050, and cooperate with Japanese government.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economic Growth, Fossil Fuels, Carbon Emissions, Hydrogen, Energy, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

31. Korea's Official Development Assistance to the Philippine Education Sector: Observations and Inputs

Author:
Inero Ancho
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
Advocating inclusive and equitable quality education (SGD 4: Quality Education) is central to sustainable development efforts anchored on collaboration and partnership that enable the policy-to-impact synergy. Agencies and institutions in various levels need to align motivations as they work towards realizing education for sustainable development (ESD). As education fuels sustainable development, school access and completion need to be prioritized, as wealth inequality and gender gap are eliminated. Human capital investment involves the provision of relevant and responsive education systems and training. These mechanisms enable an individual to be productive and contribute to positive outcomes, improved standard of living, and potential gains. As a core element to growth and poverty reduction, human capital suggests implementing significant and concrete progress in core education indices. Further, sustained economic growth, increased productivity value, and favorable social returns are manifested outcomes at the macro level. This paper looks at the ODA from Korea to the Philippines in the context of education. The discussion will be anchored on the Philippine Development Plan and AmBisyon Natin 2040 as roadmaps reflecting the aspirations of every Filipino of having a strongly rooted, comfortable, and secured life.1 Observations and inputs will be offered to ensure effective ODA and provide focus and ways forward towards access to and quality of education, along with programs and projects that contribute into any meaningful development of the Philippine economy.
Topic:
Development, Education, Economy, Human Capital, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and Philippines

32. ASEAN's medium- to long-term trade strategies and the direction of RoK-ASEAN cooperation

Author:
Sungil Kwak, Seungjin Cho, Jaewan Cheong, Jaeho Lee, Mingeum Shin, Nayoun Park, and So Eun Kim
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
In recent years, the U.S.-China hegemony competition has intensified, dividing the world into two blocs. ASEAN has long culti-vated its position on the international stage by maintaining a certain distance between the United States and China. In that sense, ASEAN is the best partner for Korea to ef-fectively respond to the divided world. Therefore, this study seeks the directions of cooperation with ASEAN in supply chain, digital trade, climate change response, and health and development cooperation in line with changes in the international order.
Topic:
Climate Change, Development, Economics, International Cooperation, Trade, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

33. Developing ODA Evaluation Methodology for Technical Cooperation

Author:
Eunsuk Lee and Hyemin Yoon
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
As the volume of Korea's official development assistance (ODA) expands, the demand for systematic management of evaluations and improvement of their usefulness is increasing. This study focuses on developing evaluation methodology for technical cooperation (TC) which is an important part of Korea’s ODA. Based on the case studies of six multilateral organizations and four bilateral development agencies, we draw lessons for Korean ODA agencies in terms of selection criteria, types, and methodological aspects of evaluation of technical cooperation and propose a four-step project management and evaluation mechanism for TC activities.
Topic:
Development, Economics, Science and Technology, and Management
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

34. International Humanitarian Assistance and Multilateral Cooperation in North Korea

Author:
Jangho Choi and Yoojeong Choi
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
The economic situation in North Korea is worsening. If an economic crisis occurs in North Korea, the first thing that will be pursued is humanitarian aid from the international community. North Korea's problems should not spread beyond North Korea, and above all, the international community should help ensure that the residents of North Korea can live at a minimum level of respect as human beings. This article aims to examine international humanitarian aid to North Korea and multilateral cooperation. We will examine how international humanitarian aid to North Korea has been carried out so far, what North Korea's position is on international support, and what the achievements of multilateral cooperation have been.
Topic:
Economics, Humanitarian Aid, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

35. Does Institutional Quality Matter to Korean Outward FDI? A Gravity Model Analysis

Author:
Muhammad Akhtaruzzaman
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
According to Korea’s Ministry of Knowledge Economy (currently the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy), foreign investment has now become one of the major economic pillars driving the Korean economy over the past 15 years (Tang 2022). The Korean economy started to open up to rest of the world following the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and was the biggest FDI policy reformer among 40 developed and emerging economies over the period from 1997 to 2010 (Nicolas et al. 2013). Over the last decade, Korea’s outward FDI grew much faster than inward FDI (See Figure 1) and Korea is now a net capital exporter to the world. In 2021, Korea’s outward FDI flows totaled $76.64 billion and a total of 2323 Korean enterprises invested in overseas countries (Korea EXIM Bank 2022). Due to this increased amount of outward FDI, a large number of studies (Kim and Rhee 2009; Park and Jung 2020) investigated what determines Korea’s outward FDI (OFDI). Institutional quality is found to be a major determinant in FDI literature in general. It suggests that political risk (lack of/poor institutional quality) not only deters FDI inflows to host countries but also can lead FDI to countries with higher risks and to ‘pollution heaven’ which might have an adverse impact on long term growth and development in both host and home countries. There are strong empirical evidences in literature that lack of institutional quality or good governance is associated with lower FDI inflows. An extensive literature (Alfaro et al. 2008; Ali et al. 2010; Akhtaruzzaman et al. 2017; Bénassy‐Quéré et al. 2007) investigated FDI response to various types of institutional quality in FDI host countries. Over the last 20 years data evidenced that Korea’s OFDI flowed to developing countries with a sustained large gap existing in institutional quality between host countries and Korea (See, Fig 2 top panel); however; those countries had been offering a higher degree of capital account openness. A sharp increase in capital account openness since the early 2000s coincides with sharp increase in Korea’s OFDI to those host countries. For example, Peru was the least open economy and started to initiate measures to open capital account since the mid-90s and early 2000s. The degree of openness in Peru is now similar to that of developed countries. On the other hand, Peru is one of the least progressed countries in terms of institutional quality over the same period of time. This slow or no progress in institutional quality is a common pattern of institutional improvement for a large sample of host countries of Korea’s OFDI (see, Figure 2). However, those developing countries including Peru are regular destinations of a substantial amount of Korea’s OFDI. Does this suggest that institutional quality of host country does not matter to Korean investors, or is there a 3rd factor mitigating the impact of institutional quality on Korea’s OFDI? Few studies on Korea’s OFDI considered institutional quality of host country as a control variable instead of main determinant of FDI (Park and Jung 2020). However, existing studies do not explain why Korea’s OFDI flowed to countries with a large gap in institutional quality between Korea and host countries. This research fills the gap in the literature of Korea’s OFDI. The findings of this research suggest that high degree of capital account openness (a factor that ensures profit repatriation of investors) weakened the negative impact of poor institutional quality in host countries on Korea’s OFDI. The remaining of this paper is organised as follows. Section II reviews relevant literature of FDI and identifies major determinants for Korea’s OFDI from existing studies; Section III discusses research method and empirical issues; Section IV presents the research findings; Section V concludes the research, points to the research limitations, and provides policy recommendations.
Topic:
Economics, Foreign Direct Investment, Institutions, and Knowledge Economy
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

36. Analysis of India's New and Renewable Energy Market and Policies and Implications for Korea-India Cooperation

Author:
Hyoungmin Han
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
The importance of new and renewable en-ergy has been drawing attention since the Paris Climate Agreement was adopted in 2015. In response to the Paris Climate Agreement, the Korean government declared carbon neutrality by 2050 and announced policy plans to create a low-carbon ecosystem in 2020. However, the domestic new and re-newable energy market is limited, making it difficult to mass-produce power generation devices. In addition, the international community's transition to a low-carbon ecosys-tem is rapidly taking place. To achieve 2050 carbon neutrality, it is necessary to secure Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) through various overseas cooperation pro-jects. Thus, it is believed that energy cooperation with developing countries is needed to expand domestic markets and to achieve overseas NDC reduction targets. Considering India's recent market expansion and active policy in the area of renewable energy, India can be a good partner for Korea in the renewable sector. To have a clear understanding of India’s renewable energy market, we conduct the analysis on India’s renewable energy market and policy, which we will explore in this article.
Topic:
Climate Change, Treaties and Agreements, Renewable Energy, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, Asia, and South Korea

37. China's Green Transition Policies and Its Implications for Korea

Author:
Won Seok Choi
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
In China, carbon emissions from the energy and heat producing sector account for 53.4% of total emissions, with industry (28.6%) and transportation (8.9%) being the main carbon emission sectors. Therefore, various green transition policies in energy, industry and transportation are being pursued in Chinese cities. In Chinese cities, the promotion of rooftop-distributed photovoltaic power generation, among renewable energy sources, is evaluated to be capable of intensive development, reducing power peak load, and inducing residents to consume green energy. Policies are being implemented in urban industries to reduce pollution and carbon emissions, increase energy use efficiency, improve resource use levels, and improve green manufacturing systems. In the transportation sector, China's policies to reduce emissions, expand the supply of new energy vehicles, and strengthen green transportation technology are representative. Consequently, this study summarizes the policy implications, areas of Korea-China cooperation, and risk factors of China's green transition promotion plan for its Chinese cities.
Topic:
Transportation, Industry, Carbon Emissions, Energy, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Korea

38. Strategies of Multinational Companies Entering China in the Era of U.S.-China Competition and Implications for Korea

Author:
Sang Baek Hyun, Ji Young Moon, Min-suk Park, Jonghyuk Oh, and Yunmi Oh
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
With the integration of resources and markets around the world sparked by the trend of globalization, multinational companies have continued to grow at a rapid pace. In particular, global manufacturers have maintained their competitiveness by distributing resources more efficiently while establishing a global value chain with China as their main production hub. However, measures taken by the U.S. to block China’s access to technology and supply chains in some high-tech industries have prompted discussions on reorganization of the global supply chain, placing these multinational companies in an uncertain situation concerning their operations in China. At a time when competition between the U.S. and China is intensifying, it is necessary to look at the response strategies of global companies that have entered China and seek effective countermeasures for Korean companies.
Topic:
Economics, Multinational Corporations, Manufacturing, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

39. Structural Transformation and the Global Production Value Chain: Potential Impact of the Cambodia-Republic of Korea FTA on Cambodia

Author:
Shandre Mugan Thangavelu and Vutha Hing
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
This policy brief examines the structural transformation of the Cambodian economy based on the impact of the CKFTA in terms of trade, output growth, and employment. It summarises the key results of the CKFTA study that examined the impact of the CKFTA on the Cambodian economy – specifically quantitative (structural gravity model estimation and simulation) and qualitative trade policy evaluation in terms of exports, output, and structural transformation of the economy in the global and regional value chains. The policy brief also highlights the key benefits of the CKFTA to the Cambodian economy.
Topic:
Economy, Economic Growth, Investment, Trade, and Value Chains
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and Cambodia

40. Playing the Long Game in the South China Sea

Author:
Andrew Mantong
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
In the South China Sea (SCS), as indeed the wider Indo-Pacific, the EU is facing a deepening strategic rivalry between China and the US. In the SCS, China has been able to create physical realities in defiance of international law by constructing artificial islands in the attempt to sustain its claims to the disputed Spratly and Paracel archipelagos as well as expand its military projection deep into international waters. The US is still the predominant security player in the Indo-Pacific, but its military presence has an increasingly hard time shoring up American power in the SCS. The security dilemma between the great powers is threatening rules-based multilateralism, which runs deep in the veins of the EU and to a great extent defines its international posture.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, International Law, European Union, Multilateralism, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, Indo-Pacific, and South China Sea