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Begin New Search Topic Science and Technology Political Geography Asia Content Type Policy Brief Publication Year within 10 Years Publication Year within 5 Years Publication Year within 3 Years

1. Developing ODA Evaluation Methodology for Technical Cooperation

Author:
Eunsuk Lee and Hyemin Yoon
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
As the volume of Korea's official development assistance (ODA) expands, the demand for systematic management of evaluations and improvement of their usefulness is increasing. This study focuses on developing evaluation methodology for technical cooperation (TC) which is an important part of Korea’s ODA. Based on the case studies of six multilateral organizations and four bilateral development agencies, we draw lessons for Korean ODA agencies in terms of selection criteria, types, and methodological aspects of evaluation of technical cooperation and propose a four-step project management and evaluation mechanism for TC activities.
Topic:
Development, Economics, Science and Technology, and Management
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

2. China’s subsea-cable power in the Middle East and North Africa

Author:
Dale Aluf
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
In a new Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative issue brief, “China’s subsea-cable power in the Middle East and North Africa,” Aluf analyzes China’s campaign to make countries in the region more dependent on Chinese networks, while reducing its own dependence on foreign cables. For a country that seeks to alter the internet’s physical form and influence digital behavior while exerting supreme control over information flows, China’s growing presence in the Middle East and North Africa’s cable industry is significant because Beijing has the power to shape the route of global internet traffic by determining when, where, and how to build cables.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Politics, Science and Technology, Partnerships, and Innovation
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Asia, and North Africa

3. Beyond launch: Harnessing allied space capabilities for exploration purposes

Author:
Tiffany Vora
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The “United States Space Priorities Framework,” released in December 2021, confirmed the White House’s commitment to American leadership in space.1 Space activities deliver immense benefits to humankind. For example, satellite imaging alone is crucial for improvements in daily life such as weather monitoring as well as for grand challenges like the fight against climate change. Such breakthrough discoveries in space pave the way for innovation and new economies on Earth. Exploration is at the cutting edge of this process: it expands humankind’s knowledge of the universe, transforming the unknown into the supremely challenging, expensive, risky, and promising. US allies and partners accelerate this transformation via scientific and technical achievements as well as processes, relationships, and a shared vision for space exploration. By integrating these allied capabilities, the United States and its allies and partners set the stage for safe and prosperous space geopolitics and economy in the decades to come. However, harnessing the capabilities of US allies and partners for space exploration is complex, requiring the balance of relatively short-term progress with far-horizon strategy. Space exploration has changed since the US-Soviet space race of the 1960s. In today’s rapidly evolving technological and geopolitical environment, it is unclear whether the processes, relationships, and vision that previously enabled allied cooperation in space, epitomized by the International Space Station (ISS), will keep pace. Here, China is viewed as the preeminent competitor for exploration goals and capabilities—as well as the major competitor for long-term leadership in space.2 This development drives fears of space militarization and weaponization, prompting protectionist legislation, investment screening, and industrial policies that can disrupt collaboration among the United States and its key allies and partners.3 Further complication stems from the rise of commercial space, with opportunities and challenges due to the decentralization, democratization, and demonetization of technologies for robotic and crewed space exploration. This paper serves as a primer for current US space exploration goals and capabilities that will be critical to achieving them. It highlights arenas where US allies and partners are strongly positioned to jointly accelerate space exploration while also benefitting life on Earth. This paper concludes with recommended actions—gleaned from interviews with international experts in space exploration—for the US government as well as allied and partner governments to increase the number and impact of global stakeholders in space exploration, to remove friction in collaboration, and to guide the future of space toward democratic values.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, Science and Technology, European Union, Partnerships, and Space
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

4. Seeking to undermine democracy and partnerships: How the CCP is influencing the Pacific islands information environment

Author:
Blake Johnson and Joshua Dunne
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is conducting coordinated information operations in Pacific island countries (PICs). Those operations are designed to influence political elites, public discourse and political sentiment regarding existing partnerships with Western democracies. Our research shows how the CCP frequently seeks to capitalise on regional events, announcements and engagements to push its own narratives, many of which are aimed at undermining some of the region’s key partnerships. This report examines three significant events and developments: the establishment of AUKUS in 2021 the CCP’s recent efforts to sign a region-wide security agreement the 2022 Pacific Islands Forum held in Fiji. This research, including these three case studies, shows how the CCP uses tailored, reactive messaging in response to regional events and analyses the effectiveness of that messaging in shifting public discourse online. This report also highlights a series of information channels used by the CCP to push narratives in support of the party’s regional objectives in the Pacific. Those information channels include Chinese state media, CCP publications and statements in local media, and publications by local journalists connected to CCP-linked groups.1
Topic:
Science and Technology, Partnerships, Democracy, Social Media, Disinformation, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Pacific

5. China's response to the US tech war: The closing of detours

Author:
Yang Jiang
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
In the US-China rivalry, no battle is currently more fierce than the one over technology, with both countries ramping up efforts to pursue global technological leadership. The tech war has intensified under President Joe Biden, with the US’s strangling of China’s technological bottleneck getting tighter and tighter. The US’s stated aims are protecting its national security and foreign policy interests and preventing sensitive technologies with military applications from being acquired by China. Some analysts point to Beijing’s Made in China 2025 as the trigger of the tech war because that is China’s plan to upgrade manufacturing and seek the top positions in global value chains. The US is pursuing a strategy to outcompete and outmanoeuvre China, as is stated in the Biden administration’s National Security Strategy in October 2022: “this decade will be decisive, in setting the terms of our [the US’s] competition with the PRC”. Especially in the sector of semiconductors or chips, where the West controls China’s access to the most advanced technology, US restrictions and its ability to bring its allies into line have been destructive to China’s development. On 21 May 2023, Beijing’s ban of American chipmaker Micron from critical information infrastructure in China signals a first direct retaliation from Beijing. China has also realised that some of its hitherto measures—turning to alternative sources of import, utilising policy loopholes, and sufficing with lower-level technology—are just detours. They are not long-term solutions; nor can they be the foundation of China’s national security. The US restrictions have forced China to adopt new measures to accelerate domestic innovation with more focus on basic research and market forces. How the tech war will play out has important implications for Western countries and global supply chains. This policy brief will focus on China’s responses to the US-waged tech war, specifically: What have been China’s domestic measures to respond to the tech restrictions from the US, and what is China’s potential for technological breakthrough? What have been China’s international responses, and what are China’s options for retaliation?
Topic:
Science and Technology, Sanctions, Strategic Competition, Rivalry, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

6. Evaluating Public Support for Chinese Vendors in Europe’s 5G Infrastructure

Author:
Tim Rühlig and Richard Q. Turcsányi
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Germany is considering banning equipment made by Chinese companies like tech giant Huawei – in its 5G mobile infrastructure. A revised 2021 IT Security Act failed to reduce China’s 59 percent market share. A representative opinion poll, shows only 30.8 percent of Germans want 5G cooperation with China. Across 11 European countries, skepticism is equal, with only 31.8 percent approval – though this varies greatly from country to country.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Infrastructure, European Union, and 5G
Political Geography:
Europe and Asia

7. A More Strategic Approach to Foreign Direct Investment Policy

Author:
Markus Jaeger
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Cross-border investment and trade give rise to both economic gains and economic vulnerabilities. As geopolitical competition is intensifying, governments increasingly resort to restricting cross-border investment and trade. Policies are informed by a desire to limit security risks and secure technological advantages rather than pursue efficiency gains.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Foreign Direct Investment, Strategic Competition, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and Americas

8. Who Leads China's 5G Technology Ecosystem? A Network Analysis of China's Cooperation on Association Standards

Author:
Won Seok Choi
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
This study suggests who is leading the ecosystem of China's 5G industry through analysis of the association standard network. Our study finds that the Chinese government think tank is in the most important position in the related network. Our study also suggests that it is important to monitor association standards in China and strengthen the standard cooperation of companies, scholars, and institutes in the Korean ICT industry.
Topic:
Government, Science and Technology, Think Tanks, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Korea

9. When the State Becomes the Only Buyer: Monopsony in China’s Public Procurement of Medical Technology

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, and Anna Guildea
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
China’s centralised state procurement policies are moving the Chinese market of medical technologies in a monopsonistic direction. A monopsony means that a single buyer exerts strong power to move the market to its favour by gradually cutting prices and setting terms for producers that are extortionary. It is equivalent to a monopoly – with the only difference being that in a monopsony, it is the single buyer that acts in a market-predatory manner. Ultimately, a monopsonistic market empowers the buyer to capture most of the financial rewards from a contract. Competition gets undermined because a vibrant market also requires competition between buyers and, over time, fewer firms will be able to supply the procured goods at terms that are set by the single buyer. This shift towards monopsony does not happen overnight, it is a process that builds on a number of steps that tilts the balance of power in favour of the buyer. First, there is a concentration of buyers, sometimes down to a single buyer – such as the state. This concentration of buyers acts to extract value from sellers by creating pressure to reduce and converge prices. Buyers in monopsonistic conditions may also add other objectives to their agenda, using their monopsonistic position to abuse the market. For example, political objectives may be in place, which can include discrimination against foreign companies or corruption. Finally, there is a consolidation of the market, with fewer suppliers overall, and a focus on price rather than innovation. Several characteristics of a market could be indicative of a monopsony. One of these indicators is the price. In the case of the Chinese market for medical technology, price reductions have been sustained across medical devices, with price cuts exceeding 90 percent in some medical products. When the buyer’s primary focus is to reduce prices, the risk is that low-quality products will drive out high-quality products. Another indicator is price convergence: the idea that one price should apply to the whole market. Price convergence can be observed as the distance between the average and maximum price reduction offered by companies. The small differences seen in the Chinese procurement of medical technologies for these two indicators indicates that prices are converging downwards. Forcing a convergence of prices breaks with natural market behaviour and overall leads to a market with fewer participants. In a monopsony, the buyer tends to capture the dominant part of the market value of the product, which squeezes the margins of sellers. Over time, this leads to fewer competitors as only a few companies can survive under such conditions. These dynamics have real consequences: the number of winning companies in the procurement of medical technology per one million people in China is substantially lower than in the EU. In addition to a reduced reliance on multiple suppliers, the Chinese centralised state procurement reinforces China’s industrial policy to support Chinese firms growing their domestic market shares to the detriment of non-Chinese companies. These are the consequences of a market that is increasingly taking a monopsonistic form. Public procurement does not have to follow the Chinese recipe of centralised state procurement. There is a substantial body of evidence, research, and studies that recommend specific procurement policies that tackle the monopsonistic tendencies embedded in public procurement markets. These recommendations emphasize the importance of competition without lowering the number of firms in the market, underlining the need for a long-term view on how the market delivers continuous innovation. The danger for China is that monopsony will collapse the future market by making it less attractive for companies to innovate and compete. Chinese centralised state procurement and the move towards monopsony will not go unnoticed. These policies clearly breach basic principles and norms of international exchange, and how governments should behave to avoid a distortion of competition. First, Chinese centralised state procurement favours the Chinese medical technology industry to the detriment of non-Chinese companies. Second, given the low prices achieved in Chinese centralised state procurements, there is a risk that firm’s margins are severely cut, putting a lid on global spending on R&D. The EU and the US should coordinate their policies to counter the monopsonistic tendencies of the Chinese market of medical technologies. Their markets for medical technologies are significantly larger than the Chinese market and Chinese companies rely on the US and the European market to maintain their growth. The EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) offers a setting to take these discussions forward and agree on policies to counter Chinese market distortions.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Health Care Policy, Public Procurement, and Monopsony
Political Geography:
China and Asia

10. North Korean Cryptocurrency Operations: An Alternative Revenue Stream

Author:
Heeu Millie Kim, June Lee, and Rachel Paik
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
As cryptocurrency has risen to prominence within the past decade, its widespread use has like- wise created great potential for exploitation by malicious actors. With a cyber arsenal capable of reaching cryptocurrency platforms and users, North Korea has increasingly targeted virtual assets as a source of revenue for its regime. In its 2021 final report, the United Nations Panel of Experts estimated that North Korea stole approximately $316.4 million in virtual assets between January 2019 and November 2020. The decentralized nature of the cryptocurrency market is well-suited for a heavily-sanctioned and financially-isolated state like North Korea, especially given tighter trade restrictions and border closures during the COVID-19 pandemic. The ease of obscuring ownership of virtual assets and the lack of regulatory oversight make cryptocurrency all the more attractive for North Korea. Although North Korean cyber operations have been widely publicized, the purpose of this report is to focus on three ways North Korea obtains cryptocurrencies, specifically cryptomining, cryptojacking, and fraudulent initial coin offerings (ICOs). Given observed trends and changes in the cryptocurrency environment—namely, the rise of decentralized finance (DeFi) and over-the-counter brokers—this paper finds that North Korea’s crypto operations are consistent with its national objectives and likely to continue. Second, North Korea’s cryptocurrency operations offer an attractive and transferable model for other financially-isolated states and non-state actors. Finally, governments should work with law enforcement agencies, multilateral institutions, and non-traditional actors to mitigate the national security threat from North Korea’s cryptocurrency activities.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Finance, Cryptocurrencies, and Virtual Assets
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

11. Estimating Japan’s Return on Investment from an Ambitious Program to Incentivize New Antibiotics

Author:
Rachel Silverman and Adrian Towse
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
Anti-microbial drugs form the backbone of modern medicine. Yet their lifespan is naturally limited; over time, use of these drugs selects for mutations that survive exposure those same drugs, driving “anti-microbial resistance,” or AMR. Already, drug-resistant infections kill an estimated 23,210 Japanese citizens every year. In the absence of sufficient research and development (R&D) investment for new antimicrobials, deaths from drug-resistant infections could increase dramatically in the coming decade. To address this growing crisis and solve market failures that prevent the development of new antibiotics, the government of Japan is considering a new program that would provide minimum guaranteed revenue to the successful developers of new antibiotics. In this note, we present the results of a modelling exercise to estimate the likely return on investment (ROI) from such a program, assuming it is paired with complementary and proportionate efforts from Japan’s G7 partners. The results are necessarily imprecise due to several uncertain parameters, but nevertheless provide evidence of a very high expected ROI that is robust to different inputs and assumptions.
Topic:
Health, Science and Technology, Health Care Policy, and Medicine
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

12. Governing the Global Commons: Challenges and Opportunities for US-Japan Cooperation

Author:
Kristi Govella, John Bradford, Kyoko Hatakeyama, Saadia M. Pekkanen, Setsuko Aoki, James Lewis, and Motohiro Tsuchiya
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The global commons—domains beyond the sovereign jurisdiction of any single state but to which all states have access—are essential to the stability and prosperity of the international order. In addition to the high seas, outer space, the atmosphere, and Antarctica, which are defined as global commons by international law, analysts have also suggested that other domains such as cyberspace may also qualify as potential commons. These domains provide essential public goods such as trade routes, transportation and communication networks, fish stocks, satellite imagery, global positioning, and e-commerce infrastructure that benefit countries around the world. To successfully manage the resources of the global commons and ensure open access to their spaces, effective governance structures must exist to accommodate and integrate the interests and responsibilities of state and non-state actors. Consequently, states have tried to come to agreements in each domain about how to enable broad access, avoid conflict, and enable cooperation. Over time, these discussions have resulted in the creation for each domain of a “regime,” a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge (see Box 1). These regimes can take shape in the form of international law, national law, local regulations, private standards, and institutional bodies. They differ dramatically in maturity and complexity: the governance regime of the oceans has developed over the course of centuries, while the rules and norms of cyberspace have only had a few decades to coalesce. However, all these regimes attempt to solve similar dilemmas surrounding shared access and resources.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Democracy, Economy, Trade, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
East Asia, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

13. The U.S.-China Battle for Semiconductor Supremacy and Reshaping of Global Supply Chain

Author:
Hyung-gon Jeong
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
The realization of digital transformation (DX) and the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) has led to the development of new technologies in areas such as AI, big data, metaverse, autonomous vehicles, digital currency, and blockchain technology. While these sectors are expected to continue to grow, major countries including the United States and China are fiercely competing to secure a global supply chain for the semiconductor industry. Built on free trade, the global division of production in the semiconductor industry has driven corporate innovation and technology development. However, the trend of technological nationalism and countries’ efforts to build a value chain within their territory are expected to hurt the global semiconductor industry. The ever-deepening hegemony competition between the U.S. and China in the semiconductor industry could have a profound impact not only on the Korean economy but also on a restructuring of the global semiconductor supply chain. This study analyzes the supply chain structure and risks of the Korean semiconductor industry, along with U.S. and Chinese policies to foster the semiconductor industry, going on to explore corresponding countermeasures.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Supply Chains, Semiconductors, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

14. South Korea should prepare for its exposure to US-China technology tensions

Author:
Mary Lovely and Abigail Dahlman
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
The stated goal of the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) is to create standards that enhance and elevate regional trade and investment flows, but it is clearly aimed at reducing the role of China in global supply chains. As China is Korea’s largest trading partner, US policy discouraging Chinese participation in supply chains has immediate detrimental implications for Korean manufacturers. The United States is the second-most important destination for Korean exports. Given the values of these triangular trade flows, Lovely and Dahlman assess South Korea’s exposure to US demands to remove or reduce Chinese participation in the manufacture of exports destined for the US market. The reliance of the proposed framework on certain standards will likely reduce Chinese participation in IPEF trade networks. Korea may benefit from this trend, but IPEF could also increase production costs for Korean companies, especially in the electronics sector, a problem that would worsen if China retaliates against these companies. To reduce these risks, Korea might find it prudent to reduce its reliance on intermediate goods from China for products it produces for export to the United States. The Korean government should also seek to better understand its exposure to US–China trade tensions and diversify its trade relations. Korean firms should start preparing for supply chain disruptions, perhaps by making investments at home. Korea could also help other IPEF members reduce supply chain disruptions while addressing security concerns over China.
Topic:
Economics, Science and Technology, Supply Chains, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

15. The Scowcroft Center’s project on twenty-first-century diplomacy

Author:
Jeffrey Cimmino and Amanda J. Rothschild
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
How should US diplomacy adapt for the twenty-first century? The practice of diplomacy has changed drastically over the past several decades, with the return of great power rivalry, the emergence of the new technologies of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR), and the rise of other important developments. Yet, while scholars and strategists have devoted enormous attention to how these new developments affect other domains, such as the future of warfare, they have devoted scant attention to the changing nature of diplomacy. If we believe, however, that diplomacy is a—if not the—most important tool of American statecraft, then twenty-first-century diplomacy deserves the same level of sustained attention. This paper will seek to characterize the changing nature of diplomacy with the objective of helping US and allied diplomats more effectively practice strategy and statecraft. This issue brief considers two key questions. How is the context of twenty-first-century diplomacy different from that of the past? How can US diplomacy begin to adapt for the twenty-first century? In answering the first question, this issue brief will focus on the most salient change in the international balance of power—the rise of China—in addition to the current technological revolution. After outlining how these changes have affected the context in which the United States conducts diplomacy, this issue brief will suggest several proposals to adapt US diplomacy to the twenty-first century. These suggestions will address both how changes in the global context—especially technology—have affected the conduct of US diplomacy and how US diplomacy can best respond to China’s rise and the 4IR.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Organization, Politics, Science and Technology, and Innovation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

16. China’s surveillance ecosystem and the global spread of its tools

Author:
Bulelani Jili
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
This paper seeks to offer insights into how China’s domestic surveillance market and cyber capability ecosystem operate, especially given the limited number of systematic studies that have analyzed its industry objectives. For the Chinese government, investment in surveillance technologies advances both its ambitions of becoming a global technology leader as well as its means of domestic social control. These developments also foster further collaboration between state security actors and private tech firms. Accordingly, the tech firms that support state cyber capabilities range from small cyber research start-ups to leading global tech enterprises. The state promotes surveillance technology and practices abroad through diplomatic exchanges, law enforcement cooperation, and training programs. These efforts encourage the dissemination of surveillance devices, but also support the government’s goals concerning international norm-making in multilateral and regional institutions. The proliferation of Chinese surveillance technology and cyber tools and the associated linkages between both state and private Chinese entities with those in other states, especially in the Global South, is a valuable component of Chinese state efforts to expand and strengthen their political and economic influence worldwide. Although individual governments purchasing Chinese digital tools have their local ambitions in mind, Beijing’s export and promotion of domestic surveillance technologies shape the adoption of these tools in the Global South. As such, investigating how Chinese actors leverage demand factors for their own aims, does not undercut the ability of other countries to detect and determine outcomes. Rather it demonstrates an interplay between Chinese state strategy and local political environments. This paper specifically focuses on key features in China’s surveillance ecosystem, while the companion to this report will focus on the key ‘pull factors’ from African countries and their significance for US interests.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Surveillance, and Public-Private Partnership
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Global Focus

17. How the Chinese government is financing its way to becoming a techno-superpower

Author:
Ngor Luong
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
On October 7, the Biden administration announced a new rule to control exports of advanced-computing semiconductor chips to China. As the United States works to cut off technology and capital flows to China, Beijing’s desire to achieve technological self-sufficiency is greater than ever. In fact, during the 20th Party Congress in the following week, Xi Jinping further pledged self-reliance in technology to gain a competitive edge in the tech competition with the United States. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China has sought technology-focused securitization to build an innovation system that supports its broader economic, societal, and geostrategic goals. In response to the economic impact ranging from the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic to the US-China trade and technology war, the Chinese Politburo unveiled the new “dual circulation” strategy at a Central Financial and Economic Commission meeting in 2020. At its core, dual circulation aims to reduce China’s vulnerability to external shocks, and to increase the country’s self-reliance to better guard against global volatility. The Chinese government works to improve China’s innovation-building capacity by attracting foreign capital and technology know-how in order to maximize their benefits while retaining overall control of the system. Beijing is committed to becoming a state-led and self-sufficient techno-superpower. In doing so, the Chinese government is consolidating its influence in both the domestic market and overseas markets where Chinese firms are active, while simultaneously mobilizing public, private, and public-private investment vehicles to support these tech ambitions. A number of its financial mechanisms have already spanned decades, but others have emerged recently. The decade-long mechanisms have yielded mixed results, while the successes of the new ones remain to be seen. It can thus be expected that the Chinese government will continue to further assert itself in all aspects of the innovation system by providing financial support and political guidance for critical and strategic industries. Within this context, this paper examines the various forms of financing vehicles that involve a range of diverse actors to support China’s whole-of-nation approach in an effort to achieve self-reliance in technology. To conclude, this paper assesses the mechanisms’ successes and shortcomings as well as areas to monitor going forward.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Economy, Business, and Innovation
Political Geography:
China and Asia

18. A next-generation agenda for US-ROK-Japan cooperation

Author:
Lauren Gilbert
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Trilateral cooperation among the United States, Japan, and South Korea has proved challenging over the years, owing largely to historical tensions. As a result, this project has sought perspectives from next-generation leaders of the three countries to define areas where targeted, flexible, and informal cooperative arrangements can provide clear mutual benefit to all. This issue brief calls for enhanced cooperation with likeminded allies and partners in order to counter shared challenges and advance mutual interests across the areas of security and defense, science and technology, and global public goods. Taken together, several essential themes emerge. Future cooperation should center on tackling shared challenges including addressing an increasingly belligerent China through proactive yet constructive methods. In the security and defense sector, the three countries should prepare for Chinese economic reprisals by forming a united front. With regard to S&T, to protect against authoritarian threats, including those presented by China’s increasing technological prowess, the three countries should utilize multilateral frameworks, like IPEF, as tools to ensure the safety and security of scientific research and data. For public goods, the trilateral partnership can diversify away from Chinese supply chains by ally-shoring and information-sharing with trusted allies. Given the historically fraught relationship between South Korea and Japan, the United States can act as a mediator to facilitate cooperation in areas of high benefit and low sensitivity. In security and defense, the trilateral partnership should address less-sensitive, shared security challenges, which include but are not limited to maritime incursions, crisis contingency planning, and cybersecurity. S&T can explore these new frontiers and safeguard free and fair principles for digital connectivity and data governance. Although public goods are less subject to domestic political pushback, the trilateral group’s actions are more likely to succeed if they are small, yet meaningful, such as implementing the democratic building blocks. Lastly, trilateral cooperation requires both top-down institutionalization and bottom-up support from the general populace. With respect to defense and security, trilateral summits at the head-of-state level must be coupled with gaining public support. For S&T, the private sector can help advance collaboration, while the public sector helps each country remain in the bounds of domestic feasibility to prevent regional conflict. With global public goods, long-lasting trilateral progress requires coupling high-level government dialogues with civil society engagements.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Science and Technology, Innovation, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

19. China and the U.S. Compete for Global Techno-Security Dominance

Author:
Tai Ming Cheung
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
In the struggle for global geostrategic and geoeconomic supremacy between the United States and China, the technosecurity sphere where economics, technological innovation, and national security meet has become a principal battleground. Two contrasting models are pitted against each other: China’s state-led top-down approach and the United States’ market-driven bottom-up system. Which of them will ultimately prevail will depend on how capable, robust, and adept they are in meeting the challenge of rapid and disruptive change? This brief examines the underpinnings of U.S.-China great power technosecurity competition and assesses what the countries’ different approaches imply for future techno-security rivalry.
Topic:
Security, Industrial Policy, Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

20. China’s Use of U.S. Satellite Communications Technology in the South China Sea

Author:
Zachary Haver
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In recent years, the maritime law enforcement (MLE) forces of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have dominated the contested waters of the South China Sea (AMTI, December 4, 2020). While the exponential growth and increasing assertiveness of the China Coast Guard (CCG) have captured headlines, the evolving role of technology in China’s MLE operations has received less attention. New communications infrastructure and monitoring systems, for example, help Chinese MLE forces monitor and control contested maritime space in the South China Sea (CMSI, January 2021). These investments align with China’s broader pursuit of information superiority in the South China Sea, which involves building up electronic intelligence, counter-stealth radar, and other capabilities (JHU APL, July 2020).
Topic:
Science and Technology, Communications, Armed Forces, and Satellite
Political Geography:
China, Asia, United States of America, and South China Sea