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Begin New Search Topic NATO Political Geography Russia Content Type Policy Brief Publishing Institution German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS) Publication Year within 10 Years

1. NATO and Societal Resilience: All Hands on Deck in an Age of War

Author:
Edward Hunter Christie and Kristine Berzina
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Prior to 2022, NATO and the European Union were already moving toward more comprehensive approaches to resilience. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine heightens the need for such work, with a sharper focus on scenarios of armed attack. In view of decisions taken at NATO’s recent Madrid summit and the evolution of EU legislation, all alliance members will benefit from close liaison work and reciprocal briefings between relevant NATO and European Commission officials as well as through the NATO Resilience Committee and the European Critical Entities Resilience Group. Three new functions should be added to the NATO baseline requirements: payment systems, psychological defense, and continuity of data and infrastructure software. The forthcoming membership of Finland and Sweden will provide NATO with particularly valuable national best practices, notably in terms of coherence, robustness, quality of cooperation across government and society, and engagement with the population.
Topic:
NATO, Resilience, Society, Russia-Ukraine War, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

2. NATO and Russia after the Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Liana Fix and Steven Keil
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the culmination of its increasingly militarized foreign policy centered around a small cast of decision-makers primarily in the military and security services close to the president. Its approach is aggressive, risk-tolerant, and deeply revisionist, spanning domains and leaning heavily on brutal tactics to achieve victory. NATO is now forced to return to its original mission—to defend Europe against an aggressive and highly militarized Russian foreign policy. NATO-Russia relations relatively normalized in the immediate post-Cold War context, resulting in waning European investments in defense capabilities. NATO only began reversing this trajectory in 2014, when Russia first invaded Ukraine, and must now significantly speed up its efforts. Key priorities include transitioning from forward deterrence to forward defense, augmenting NATO’s capabilities in Europe and creating a greater role for Europe, strengthening regional partnerships, reestablishing risk-reduction mechanisms to manage a potential escalation between NATO and Russia, and considering long-term stabilization scenarios.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Russia-Ukraine War, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

3. NATO’s Role in Global Cyber Security

Author:
Merle Maigre
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Malicious cyber activity has increased substantially over the past years, ranging from ransomware and espionage to politically motivated cyberattacks and sophisticated malware used in the war in Ukraine. NATO allies must remain on high alert. The changed nature of military conflict changes the defensive mission of NATO, which faces capable opponents in cyberspace and raises the question of how to create accountability when a hostile state fails to observe globally agreed norms. The set of action for NATO for the next five years evolves around how to impose costs and how to deny benefits against malicious actors in cyberspace.
Topic:
NATO, Cybersecurity, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Global Focus

4. The ASD European Policy Blueprint For Countering Authoritarian Interference in Democracies

Author:
Kristine Berzina, Naďa Kovalčíková, David Salvo, and Etienne Soula
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
In recent years, European democracy has been shaken by internal and external events. European nations and institutions are confronting numerous challenges like migration, nationalist extremism, and discontent with the political status quo. They also face challenges from a revanchist Russia that seeks to reestablish influence it lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union and to weaken democracy across the continent, and from a rising China that aims to export its model of authoritarianism across the globe. The European Union and NATO have expanded their membership, bringing more European citizens into the Euro-Atlantic community, and yet a polarized European society remains ever more susceptible to interference from foreign authoritarian regimes’ attempts to undermine Europe’s stability, unity, and prosperity. The overall security threat to Europe has evolved. Europe’s adversaries are less likely to use conventional military power to fight today’s geopolitical battles and more likely to employ asymmetric tools to compensate for conventional military weaknesses—cyberattacks, information operations, malign financial influence, the subversion of political and social organizations, and strategic economic coercion. Regimes like Vladimir Putin’s Russia amplify divisive narratives to undermine public trust in democracy using a combination of state-controlled media outlets, government-sponsored online trolls masquerading as European citizens, and a network of sympathetic social media agitators. Authoritarian actors bring money into Europe licitly and illicitly to corrupt European leaders and peddle their influence in European politics and society. They use state assets as leverage to create economic dependencies that further authoritarian interests in Europe and advance their corroding influence across the continent. Finally, these regimes disrupt democracies’ ability to govern and function by conducting cyberattacks against government institutions, businesses, and media. Elections are a prime target of authoritarian attacks on democracy. The Russian government has interfered in elections and referendums in several European nations, and initial assessments of the May 2019 European Parliament elections revealed that Russian disinformation campaigns “covered a broad range of topics” to attack the EU, amplify localized polarizing content to influence public opinion, and attempt to suppress voter turnout. 1 But undermining elections is not the only goal. Authoritarian incursions into the daily lives of Europeans have increased since the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014, and they will grow by an order of magnitude as technologies evolve and more actors adopt these tools. By using these tools to exploit existing cleavages in democratic societies and vulnerabilities in democratic governments, authoritarian regimes are trying to weaken and distract Europe and its transatlantic partners in the United States and Canada from their regional and global responsibilities, and to diminish confidence in democracy as a viable form of government.
Topic:
NATO, Authoritarianism, European Union, Democracy, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

5. Russia’s Efforts to Destabilize Bosnia and Herzegovina

Author:
David Salvo and Stephanie De Leon
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
More than 20 years have passed since the United States brokered the Dayton Peace Accords to end the conflict that ravaged Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) after the collapse of Yugoslavia. The peace agreement ended the war, but the country remains bedeviled by old demons, particularly nationalist political leaders who capitalize on and fuel ethnic tensions between Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs. That ethnic tensions persist may not be all that surprising, but addressing the problem requires the recognition that the Russian government is exploiting and exacerbating them. The Kremlin’s strategic objective in the Western Balkans is to block aspiring nations from joining the EU and NATO. Most well known is Moscow’s attempt to organize a coup in Montenegro. Although their efforts ultimately failed to overthrow the pro-NATO government or block the country’s eventual accession into the Alliance, the Kremlin sent a message that it is willing to undermine legitimate governments and the rights of the Balkan peoples to choose their own destiny. To stymie BiH’s Western integration, Russia is destabilizing the country through a number of means: using local media to disseminate pro-Kremlin narratives; training a Bosnian Serb paramilitary unit; acquiring ownership in strategic industries; and, supporting politiciansand groups loyal to Moscow and hostile to the EU and NATO.
Topic:
NATO, European Union, and Destabilization
Political Geography:
Russia, Eastern Europe, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

6. NATO and Asymmetric Threats: A Blueprint for Defense and Deterrence

Author:
Brittany Beaulieu and David Salvo
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Russia is increasingly turning its asymmetric arsenal on NATO allies to attack the credibility of the Alliance, undermine democratic institutions across member states, and disrupt NATO cohesion on a variety of policy and security issues. Despite falling below the threshold of conventional warfare, asymmetric threats are designed to weaken the security of the Alliance and individual allies, as well as destabilize allied governments and societies. NATO has taken some measures to address hybrid threats; however, NATO needs a more comprehensive strategy to counter the growing threat that asymmetric interference poses. The NATO Brussels Summit taking place July 11 and 12 presents an important opportunity on this front. To better position itself to tackle these challenges, the Alliance should: (1) elevate discussion of hybrid threats in the North Atlantic Council (NAC), permit allies to invoke Article 4 when confronted with hybrid threats to share information and request assistance through hybrid response teams, and internally clarify thresholds for coordinated response in times of hybrid crises; (2) work with NATO allies and with the EU to ensure the optimal utilization of resources and expertise in combating asymmetric threats; (3) develop stronger public-private partnerships to address asymmetric threats outside the purview of the Alliance; (4) invest in resources to improve resilience in individual member states, as mandated by Article 3; and (5) issue a declaratory statement that hybrid, asymmetric tactics pose a serious threat to the Alliance and that allies will respond appropriately.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia