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1. The Rise and Fall of Military Strategic Communications at National Defence 2015-2021: A Cautionary Tale for Canada and NATO, and a Roadmap for Reform

Author:
Brett Boudreau
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
On November 2, 2020, the Ottawa Citizen ran the front-page headline “Canadian Military Wants to Establish New Organization to Use Propaganda and Other Techniques to Influence Canadians.” This seemed an unbelievable story, and one initially denied by a spokesperson for the minister of National Defence. Just three days later, though, then-chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) Gen. Jonathan Vance shuttered the group in question, terminating an initiative more than five years in the making that called into question the Department of National Defence’s (DND) commitment to objective and appropriate public communication, at a time when truth decay, misinformation and disinformation have gained much traction around the world and in Canada. In June 2021, the day Parliament adjourned for the summer, DND acknowledged to select media that acting CDS Lt.-Gen. Wayne Eyre and then-deputy minister Jody Thomas had determined the initiative was “incompatible” with government communications policy and the vision, mission and principles of DND Public Affairs. In a surprising self-indictment, the leaders also admitted a lack of “institution-wide strategic level direction and guidance,” to build information-related capabilities that were “governed by appropriate authorities and oversight.” Deliberate influence campaigns by malign state, non-state and increasingly by domestic actors to disturb, disrupt and create disorder in democratic societies have become widespread and commonplace. The volume of vitriol is increasing. This is fast eroding citizen faith, trust and confidence in government and public institutions and may be the greatest contemporary threat liberal democracies face – arresting this trend and then restoring trust, the ultimate challenge. National Defence’s entire program – to be successful on operations; secure sufficient funding; recruit, train and retain; effect culture change; reconstitute the force post-pandemic and procure the equipment needed to contest, confront and defeat adversaries – will largely depend on whether the institution can modernize its approach to strategic communications to manoeuvre more agilely and to better effect in a complex, frenetic and hostile information environment.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Communications, Reform, Propaganda, and Military
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

2. Arctic Perils: Emerging Threats in the Arctic Maritime Environment

Author:
Adam Lajeunesse
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
When Russian tanks crossed the Ukrainian border in February 2022, the Western world’s perception of great-power conflict changed overnight. Formerly a competitor, Russia had unambiguously transformed itself into an enemy – one sitting perilously close to Canada, on the far side of the Arctic Ocean. The premiers of the three northern territories declared this a “wake-up call”1 while security experts called for Canada to “rethink its entire understanding of Arctic security.”2 Minister of National Defence Anita Anand responded in June 2022, with a pledge to update NORAD systems against that crystallizing threat of Russian missiles and bombers using the North as an avenue of attack. The expanded invasion of Ukraine (from a war Russia began in 2014) certainly brought the conventional threats to Canada through the Arctic into stark relief. These are the hypersonic weapons and advanced capabilities that NORAD has been monitoring and planning to deter or defeat for years, and to which the Canadian and American governments are now paying closer attention.3 What has received less attention in recent years are threats to the Arctic itself, and specifically those in the maritime environment. In his framing of the Arctic security dynamic, Whitney Lackenbauer defines those threats as “those that emanate from outside of the region [which] affect the region itself.”4 This category extends to a wide array of emerging, non-military threats – from state and quasi-state actors to private adventurers and environmental dangers tied to the region’s increasingly busy waterways. While the dramatic new (or renewed) state-based military threats – like submarines, bombers and cruise missiles – have made headlines, it is the threats to those quasi-state-based fishery operations, surveillance and dual-use marine scientific research expeditions that will probably develop into persistent challenges requiring constant attention and regular management. These threats are often more opaque and harder to define, sometimes difficult to tie directly to an adversary government, yet still indirectly linked to state actors with malign intent. This is not to say that the emerging military threats from Russia, and even China, in the Arctic can be ignored, but rather that these should be considered continental or even global challenges, rather than Arctic-specific dangers requiring a greater military presence and response capability in the region.5 The nature of the emerging military threats points to a growing need for surveillance and detection and, when necessary, interdiction by assets based further south. Responding to real or perceived adversarial threats with a greater allied combat capability in the Arctic itself would represent an overinvestment and misunderstanding of these emerging threats. While the emerging security dynamic demands new platforms and capabilities, these will be most effective when geared to the constabulary end of the defence spectrum. Deterrence and defence will also mean more than new ships and technologies; it will require a consistent presence, improved situational awareness and the ability to scale our national and international response to a wide range of both obvious and nebulous threats. This paper is an overview of that evolving threat environment and how Canada might respond.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Maritime, Deterrence, Strategic Competition, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:
Canada, North America, and Arctic

3. Milestones in Canadian Gender and Trade Policy

Author:
Judit Fabian
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
The progressive/inclusive turn in Canada’s trade policy has attracted significant attention since the advent of the Trudeau government. This is particularly true of its gender component. It is, however, only the most recent stage in a developmental arc that began with the negotiations for NAFTA in the early 1990s. “Trade and gender” is therefore not new, but is the continuation of a three decades-long developmental process that Canada has often led. The paper shows this by defining and describing the milestones of Canada’s role in incorporating gender in trade agreements since the 1990s, and how gender is incorporated in Canada’s trade policy at present.
Topic:
Government, Trade Policy, and Gender
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

4. Use it or Lose it: Corporate Over-Planning in the Air Force

Author:
Ross Fetterly
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
The Canadian government allocates funds to departments through the annual federal budgetary process. With a Department of National Defence (DND) budget in the fiscal year 2019-20 of close to $22 billion,2 and expenditures spread out across a broad range of very different and distinct activities, expending the full allocation can be a significant challenge. While federal departments are permitted some carry-forward of eligible lapsing funds from one fiscal year to the next, in fiscal year 2018-19 the amount designated was up to five per cent of the operating budgets in their Main Estimates.3 With the federal government projecting significant budgetary deficits in the coming years, restricting or eliminating carry-forward of funding may be limited or eliminated to reduce deficits. Past practice within the department has been for the Investment Resource Management Committee (IRMC), chaired by the deputy minister, to decide on funding allocations of the carry-forward, based on departmental corporate priorities. While from an institutional perspective that aligns funding with optimal funding requirements, the consequence to organizations such as the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) is that only a limited amount of lapsed funding may be allocated the following fiscal year. Thus, the air force has a significant incentive regarding its budget: to “use it or lose it”.4 RCAF corporate over-planning (COP) is a principal in-year strategy to maximize the use of allocated financial resources. Yet, at the operational and tactical level, the concept and application of in-year over-planning is not sufficiently understood. This paper will frame over-planning within the context of the RCAF and then recommend strategies to integrate over-planning into the air force culture. Corporate over-planning is essentially a means toward an end; specifically, that of maximizing output given by defined resource allocation. The paper will first consider defence planning approaches and budget allocations, and then consider the strategic environment within which the organization operates. The third section will emphasize the need for change in how the RCAF manages financial resources, followed by a section on adapting to change. The fifth section will review the concept of over-planning. That will be followed by a discussion of RCAF institutional corporate over-planning. The seventh section will consider budgeting as communication and how this supports maintenance of a common operating picture within the RCAF on over-planning. The final section will focus on RCAF corporate over-planning by discussing the structural unexpended rate, applying an absorption rate in operations and maintenance activities, and planning investment opportunities.
Topic:
Government, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Budget
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

5. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau: A Foreign Policy Assessment 2015-2019

Author:
Colin Robertson
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
An internationalist and a progressive, Justin Trudeau consistently boosts diversity, social justice, environmentalism and reconciliation with Indigenous peoples. A gifted retail politician, Trudeau prefers campaigning and contact with voters to the hurly-burly of the House of Commons. He possesses an empathy and emotional intelligence most people found lacking in his famous father, Pierre Trudeau. But are these attributes and causes out of sync with our turbulent times? Mr. Trudeau is learning firsthand what British prime minister Harold MacMillan warned U.S. president John F. Kennedy what was most likely to blow governments off-course: “Events, dear boy, events.” As Trudeau begins a second term as prime minister, the going is tougher. The Teflon is gone. He leads a minority government with new strains on national unity. Parliament, including his experiment in Senate reform, is going to require more of his time. Canada’s premiers will also need attention if he is to achieve progress on his domestic agenda. Does he have the patience and temperament for compromise and the art of the possible? The global operating system is increasingly malign, with both the rules-based international order and freer trade breaking down. Managing relations with Donald Trump and Xi Jinping is difficult. Canadian farmers and business are suffering - collateral damage in the Sino-U.S. disputes. In what was supposed to be a celebration of “Canada is back”, there is doubt that Canada will win a seat on the UN Security Council in June 2020. Losing would be traumatic for his government and their sense of Canada’s place in the world. It would also be a rude shock for Canadians’ self-image of themselves internationally.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Government, Politics, and Justin Trudeau
Political Geography:
Canada, North America, and United States of America

6. Financing Capital Assets: The Missing Link in Defence Procurement

Author:
Vern Kakoschke
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Defence procurement in Canada has had some well-known challenges in recent years. Many commentators have suggested possible strategies for fixing the defence procurement system. The identified problems include overspending on defence programs, unnecessary and undue delays in re-equipping Canada’s fleet of aircraft, ships and ground transport, and defence budgets that remain unspent. The problems also include procuring authorities experiencing a shortfall in manpower and expertise, the inability to execute on defence procurements, unjustified sole-sourcing without a proper competition, political interference in selection issues, and the list goes on. The proposed solutions often address process-related matters: establish a single agency responsible for defence procurement or perhaps a cabinet secretariat to manage the involvement of three of four government departments who are often not on the same page. To date, not much has been written or discussed in public policy forums on a critical question: How should the necessary capital assets be financed? At one extreme, Canada could simply write a cheque and pay for them up front, thereby placing the assets on Canada’s balance sheet. At the other extreme, Canada could drop the financing obligation into the laps of private-sector bidders and let them worry about the most efficient way of raising the necessary capital. A middle-ground solution could involve a public-private partnership (P3) structure, a model which seeks to balance the interests of the public and private sectors in a manner that leads to a better solution for all parties. Any public policy discussion often begins with first principles. What is the government’s policy objective? It is to procure the best available equipment, with the most benefit to the Canadian economy or local interest groups and at the lowest possible cost. All three goals must be balanced in a manner that is politically acceptable, meets budget constraints and withstands public scrutiny. In major procurements, capital can be the largest single cost of a defence procurement.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Government, Armed Forces, Finance, and Public Policy
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

7. Complex Project Delivery Capability Matters

Author:
Ian Mack
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Canada’s experience with the Phoenix pay system is not just a pay problem. It points to wider problems in Canada’s management of complex major projects. Learning from Phoenix is important for the Government of Canada as a whole and the Department of National Defence specifically, the latter arguably responsible for the largest portfolio of complex projects – both for weapon systems platform and information technology initiatives. Fortunately, it appears that the Liberal government has taken notice. In the most recent Mandate Letters to Ministers, the Treasury Board President has been directed to ‘improve project management capabilities so that all major projects in government are led by a certified professional with at least five years of experience’. Additionally, the new position of Minister of Digital Government was tasked to ‘lead work to create a centre of expertise that brings together the necessary skills to effectively implement major transformation projects across government, including technical, procurement and legal expertise’ (and to lead in the replacement of the replacement pay system). This paper attempts to shed some light on the matter of pursuing complex projects and the enormity of the task at hand. I say “enormity” because complex projects are difficult to deliver at all (let alone on time and budget), as in evidence by the number that continue to fail in the private and public sectors, regardless of the complex project capabilities of those responsible for delivering them.
Topic:
Government, Budget, and Public Policy
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

8. Canada’s Campaign for a Seat on the United Nations Security Council: The Historical Context

Author:
Adam Chapnick
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
On Feb. 11, 2016, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau briefed the Ottawa press corps after a meeting with the United Nations (UN) secretary-general, Ban Ki-moon. Having pledged during the 2015 election campaign to re-engage with the UN, he noted that doing so would include “looking towards a bid for the Security Council.” Perhaps this comment should not have surprised. The Conservative government’s failure to win a Security Council (UNSC) seat in 2010 had been a subject of Liberal ridicule for years. Yet, council membership was not included among the Liberals’ 167 campaign promises, nor was it mentioned specifically in then-Foreign Affairs minister Stéphane Dion’s mandate letter. One month later, Trudeau met with Ban again, this time in New York. Afterwards, with Dion looking on, Trudeau announced that Canada would be joining the 2020 Western European and Others Group (WEOG) election for one of two non-permanent seats on the Security Council in 2021-2022. The move was unprecedented. It marked the first time that a Canadian prime minister, and not the Foreign Affairs minister or a member of the foreign service, had publicly declared Canada’s initial interest in a council seat. It was also the first time that Canada had deliberately entered an already contested election: Ireland, Norway and San Marino would be its opponents for two WEOG seats. This brief history of Canadian interest in Security Council membership will suggest that attempting to return to the UNSC was the right decision, made at the wrong time, and for the wrong reasons.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Government, Politics, History, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:
Canada, United Nations, and North America

9. Canada and the European Union: A New Transatlantic Alliance

Author:
Robert Hage
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Jean Monnet’s early Canadian experiences are seen as the basis for his inspiration to unite Europe. Successive Canadian governments have tried to ensure lasting links with the European Union. Both sides have now achieved this against the background of President Trump’s rejection of multilateralism and the world-wide pandemic.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Alliance, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, Canada, and North America

10. Knocking NATO: Strategic and institutional challenges risk the future of Europe’s seven-decade cold peace

Author:
Anessa L. Kimball
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Despite providing European stability through collective defence and crisis management in an exclusive club, NATO faces persistent challenges from strategic insecurities complicated by recent institutional uncertainties. The club’s structure permits several goods-producing schemes, depending on how individual contributions combine, the qualities associated with a good’s publicness (i.e., its possible substitutes or how it excludes benefits from non-members) and partner differences in capacity and willingness. NATO faces challenges from Russia ranging from cybersecurity and media manipulation to overt and covert military pressures. Recent deployments sink costs and tie hands, reassuring commitment credibility, and are essential given the uncertainty generated from U.S. President Donald Trump’s ambiguous commitment to Article 5, compounded with the effects of Brexit on alliance politics and burden-sharing. Given the conjunction of strategic insecurities and institutional uncertainties, it is convenient to knock NATO, but rational institutionalist theory (RIT) is optimistic. RIT argues that the club’s design permits strategic adaptation to new contexts and insecurities, but partners must signal commitment credibly to prevent uncertainties about cohesion. RIT favoured enlargement to shift burdens, and data confirm that the Americans, British and Germans shifted burdens to others, including Canada. Moreover, any alternative to NATO is costly for less-endowed partners facing direct defence pressures. Canada’s role as a broker of compromise and its willingness to make its commitments credible places it in future missions, regardless. Canadian leadership in reassuring and socializing new partners in Operation Reassurance offers an opportunity to retain its objective and subjective position as a key partner.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe, Canada, and North America

11. Does Canada Need a Foreign Policy Review

Author:
Randolph Mank
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Canada’s contemporary foreign policy has been shaped by deep integration with, and dependence on, the United States, offset by multilateral support for a rules-based international order. The Trump administration’s confrontational nationalism, combined with other global events and trends, has now disrupted Canada’s position and assumptions. This raises the question of whether or not it’s time for a Canadian foreign policy review. While the Trudeau government deserves credit for several initiatives, a series of discontinuities in Canada’s domestic and foreign policies suggests that our interests could be better served. The Canadian government has two main options: it can follow its current path of adjusting its policies in an ad hoc fashion, while waiting out the Trump administration and hoping for more favourable successors, or it can attempt to set Canada on a new path, in which case a foreign policy review would be warranted. The review option would only be useful if everything were on the table, including what to do about bilateral relations with the U.S., the future of our multilateral commitments, and domestic policies on such critical global issues as energy and the environment. The ultimate goal should be to advance Canada’s national interests through better aligned domestic and foreign policies.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Energy Policy, Environment, and Government
Political Geography:
Canada, North America, and United States of America

12. Bringing Chaos to Order: Donald Trump and his Band of National Security Advisors

Author:
Eugene Lang
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Two hundred and forty days. That is the average length of tenure – eight months – of the national security advisor to the U.S. president during the past two-and-a-half years. With the resignation or firing (depending on who you listen to) of John Bolton, Donald Trump is now on to his fifth assistant to the president for national security affairs, the official title of the job. It is an historic anomaly of epic proportions. Since the position was created during the Eisenhower administration in the early 1950s, on average national security advisors have served 32 months, exactly four times the average shelf life of Trump’s advisors (and Trump is only just over halfway through his first term of office).1 Revolving doors are of course a hallmark of the Trump administration, but does this one really matter?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Government, National Security, Politics, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Canada, North America, and United States of America

13. Defence Procurement Canada: Opportunities and Constraints

Author:
Jeff Collins
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Substantive defence issues rarely make national political campaign platforms. However, in the 2019 federal election, reforming the defence procurement bureaucracy to overcome delays became a highlight for not one but two of the country’s main political parties. To “ensure that priority projects are progressing on time and on budget”, the Conservatives called for the creation of a defence procurement secretariat within the Privy Council Office, akin to a model used by the Robert Borden government in the First World War. The winning Liberal party went further and promised to create a separate defence procurement agency, called Defence Procurement Canada (DPC). As of this writing, details remain sparse, but as with the Conservatives, the ostensible purpose of such a reform is to ensure that “Canada’s biggest and most complex defence procurement projects are delivered on time and with greater transparency …” Considering that the government’s own defence white paper, 2017’s Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE) found that 70 per cent of all defence procurement projects were not delivered on time, the existing bureaucratic process warrants a serious look. In fact, a substantial shake-up of the Canadian defence procurement bureaucracy has not taken place since the last separate procurement organization, the Department of Defence Production (DDP), was abolished in 1969. Arguments for altering the bureaucratic architecture of Canadian defence procurement have ebbed and flowed since the mid-2000s, when the first of successive governments began acquisition plans for replacing decades-old fleets of equipment, including CF-18 jets, Protecteur-class auxiliary oiler replenishment ships, Halifax-class frigates and Iroquois-class destroyers. With much publicized delays in these and other major Crown projects (MCPs), reform advocates have drawn attention to Canada’s multi-departmental procurement process as a source of frustration. Unique among allies, Canada relies principally upon three departments – National Defence (DND), Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC) and Innovation, Science and Economic Development (ISED) – for acquiring MCPs. Other countries typically rely on one of three approaches to acquiring material for their armed forces: procurement by individual armed services (United States); centralized government organizations (United Kingdom) or independent civilian corporations (Sweden). Although it is not clear whether the Liberal proposal is a new department (akin to the DDP), a Crown corporation or an agency under the DND’s auspices, any restructuring of the defence procurement system will not be easy. No matter what shape it takes, any new organization must deal with rearranging a complex set of institutional realities based on decades’ worth of statutes, policy frameworks and human resources allocations. Political realties still apply, too. Any new organization must contend with Canadian procurement politics, including the impact of new governments, differing priorities, regionalism and purchasing patterns.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Politics, Military Affairs, Weapons, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

14. Funding Defence for the Age of Accelerations

Author:
Ross Fetterly
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
At a time when even large, high-tech Silicon Valley corporations that operate as market disruptors are challenged to keep up with the pace of change, national Western governments need to ensure that defence funding is responsive to persistent, dramatic and non-linear shifts in the international strategic environment. The United States is experiencing a “deepening crisis of credibility in global affairs”,2 largely resulting from an America-first posture, rather than a multilateral approach with traditional allies. Some nations now view the U.S. as “undermining the international order”,3 and reliance on the U.S. as the leading democratic nation is less certain. Indeed, periods of great economic change “driven chiefly by economic and technological developments, which then impact on social structures, political systems, military power, and the position of individual states”,4 create a dynamic that shifts power, influence and trade among nations. Further, nations that can “develop, produce, and deploy technology the most effectively”5 can gain a comparative advantage in the current security environment, where the rate of technological change is accelerating. However, with adversaries advancing their military technology in increasingly shorter cycles, market dominance by Western defence firms has only fleeting or transitory advantage. The revolution in military technology has been a constant topic for analysts, but the changing military and defence department skill sets required in the future security environment are equally important, with the cyber-realm and space being two prominent examples.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Government, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

15. The Future of Foreign Military Training

Author:
Mike Jeffery
Publication Date:
03-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
This paper examines the nature of foreign military training, Canada’s history in the provision of military training assistance, including its training mission in Afghanistan, evaluates the success of these commitments and assesses the future of such missions. It concludes that, as a professional force, the Canadian Forces has excelled at providing foreign military training. However, the effectiveness of such assistance is limited by the nation’s lack of a strategic focus and the consequent short term provision of training. The process of developing a professional military capable of defending the nation and supporting the government is a long one, and only through consistent and trusted mentoring can nations like Canada expect to achieve the influence essential for success. The paper suggests that foreign military training is a very effective diplomatic tool and should form a key component of Canada’s long term focus for international development.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Development, Diplomacy, Governance, and Armed Forces
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

16. The Future of Drones in Canada: Perspectives from a Former RCAF Fighter Pilot

Author:
DF Holman
Publication Date:
08-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
What are the prospects for implementation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in the Canadian military? Holman explores many aspects of how UAVs operate, their strengths and shortcomings. Examining them in the context of the overall systems that enable their capabilities, he looks at communications vulnerabilities, degrees of automation and autonomy, categories of UAV, rotary versus fixed wing applications, legal and airspace management constraints, and the potential roles in which UAVs might offer an immediate advantage. He concludes that surveillance is a very likely application, particularly in Canada’s far north. He is less sanguine about armed UAV roles, particularly when it comes to air combat. Improved reliability, a matured regulatory framework, and a more stable customer base are the critical elements for future system development.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Weapons, and Drones
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

17. The Digital Diplomacy Revolution: Why is Canada Lagging Behind?

Author:
Roland Paris
Publication Date:
06-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
The practice of international diplomacy is undergoing a revolution. As activists, private and public organizations, political leaders and mass publics embrace Twitter, Facebook and other forms of social media, foreign ministries have come under increasing pressure to update their operating methods. Many countries, including the US and Britain, are now encouraging their diplomats to use social media as a regular part of their job – not simply as a virtual “listening post” to monitor political discussions, nor merely as a megaphone for broadcasting press releases, but as a forum for participating directly in these discussions. Foreign ministries that fail to adapt to the social media revolution will lose influence over time: they will forgo opportunities to shape public discussions that are increasingly channeled through social media, to correct errors of fact or interpretation in real-time, and to build networks of interlocutors and followers. Canada is lagging far behind the US and Britain in digital diplomacy. Aside from a few recent experiments, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) has largely sat on the sidelines of this revolution. DFAIT operates few social media channels and these channels tend to have few followers, compared to our two closest allies. Further, the Conservative government’s centralized control of public communications makes it virtually impossible for Canadian diplomats to engage in real-time substantive exchanges, which is the currency of the medium. Unless DFAIT joins its American and British counterparts in embracing new channels and methods of diplomacy, Canada’s voice will progressively fade in international affairs.
Topic:
Security, Governance, Cybersecurity, and Digital Diplomacy
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

18. The Case for RAIPON

Author:
Ron Wallace
Publication Date:
02-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Canada is about to enter an entirely new phase of heightened diplomatic responsibilities in the circumpolar Arctic. This comes at a time when international attention to polar aboriginal, economic, strategic, SAR and environmental concerns approach new heights. Additionally, the deadline of December 2013 is fast approaching for Canada’s anticipated first submission under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) for claims to subsea lands that extend beyond the existing 200 nm limits delineated by the current Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ) in the Arctic1. For Canada, these represent material social, economic, diplomatic and strategic interests. They also constitute an opportunity for Canada to exert tangible international leadership in the Arctic – a region that many Canadians consider to be a vital component of our national identity. Significantly, Prime Minister Harper has deftly selected an Inuk to lead Canada’s Chairmanship of the Arctic Council at a time when these, and other, international issues are assuming increasing importance throughout the Circumpolar Arctic. This paper touches on current affairs that may affect Canadian and US relations with Russia and is meant to place in perspective recent events that affect our circumpolar trading neighbours, including the fate of indigenous peoples of the Russian North. Under the renewed leadership of President Vladimir Putin, Russia has embarked on a determined course of heightened nationalism designed, among other things, to control “foreign influences” in Russia, especially those targeted NGOs and other agencies such as RAIPON (the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and Far East) that have received external funding from the West. Such policies have material consequences for Russia’s civil and political institutions – including their indigenous peoples throughout Arctic Russia. Without understanding the events that have overtaken Russia since the rise of the Putin regime, the significance of the recent international uproar surrounding RAIPON might well be lost. Canada, with its increasingly high-profile participation on the Arctic Council, may have a unique opportunity to work with other international agencies, and through diplomatic channels, to prevent a further deterioration of the Russian-Western dialogue by seeking to elevate and inform future discussions about the circumpolar region. Recent events in Russia may force reconsideration by the West of Russia’s developing political and international strategic intentions, many of which involve the circumpolar Arctic region. In short, Canada has an opportunity to advocate for the meaningful participation of Russia’s indigenous peoples in the Arctic Council. Responsible Canadian leadership and advocacy in the Arctic Council could further elevate its work and also enhance Canada’s position at a time when the Arctic – and its peoples – has become a growing focus of international attention.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Canada, North America, and Arctic

19. Is NATO Still Necessary for Canada?

Author:
J. L. Granatstein
Publication Date:
03-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been the most successful military alliance of the modern era. Set up in 1949 to counter the Soviet Union, NATO won the Cold War some four decades later without firing a shot. Perhaps it might have been better if NATO had wound itself up at the end of the Cold War. The alliance instead sought a new role and found it out of area. It conducted operations in Former Yugoslavia, war against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, and later still an air campaign that brought down Gaddafi in Libya. None of these operations were notable successes. In 2011, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated that NATO faced “the real possibility [of] a dim, if not dismal future....The military capabilities simply aren’t there." The transatlantic alliance, Gates said, must confront fundamental strategic questions about its future. All this makes a hard look at NATO essential. The European nations can readily handle the defence of their territory, and it is time to ask if NATO is the best way for us to contribute to Western defence, to ask which nations can and will act to protect democratic values? The "Anglosphere" states all fought in Afghanistan. So too did France and Denmark. And in Asia, there are other friendly states. There is no talk of a military alliance yet but there is the possibility of coalitions of the willing. Instead of pledging fealty to NATO's hollow shell, it is time for Canadians to produce a strategy for the next twenty years. Any such review will give primacy to Canada’s alliance with the United States. But one question must be asked and answered: does NATO any longer serve our political and military needs?
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, Canada, North America, and United States of America

20. How Should Canada's Parliament Decide Military Deployments? Lessons from the United Kingdom

Author:
Philippe Lagassé
Publication Date:
12-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Since 2006, Canada’s House of Commons has been asked to vote on military deployments. These votes have allowed Members of Parliament to express their views on the operations of the Canadian Forces, while serving to democratize the executive ’ s power to send armed forces overseas. However, this practice of consulting the Commons does not impose any binding legal or political constraints on the executive ’ s prerogative to deploy the military. The legal and constitutional authority to send forces abroad still rests with the prime minister and Cabinet. The practice of consulting MPs when deploying the military remains a courtesy, rather than an obligation. In contrast, the British House of Commons has been granted politica l control of the executive ’ s military deployment prerogative through a constitutional convention. The effect of this convention was recently shown in the vote involving British military strikes against Syria. Unlike in Canada, the British government is pol itically bound to consult and adhere to the views of MPs before considering military deployments overseas. This paper examines whether Canada should follow the British example, granting member s of Parliament control over the executive ’ s power to deploy the armed forces by means of a constitutional convention. It concludes that Canada ’ s existing practice has many advantages, and that Canadian parliamentarians should be mindful of the risks and costs involved in adopting a constitutional convention to control the executive ’ s military deployment prerogative.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Parliament, and Military
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Canada, and North America

21. Exigencies of Future Deployments: What Canada must Exact from its Military Partners

Author:
Hugh Segal and Jessica McLean
Publication Date:
06-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
An increase in global threats, failing states, and crisis prone regions around the world, coupled with shrinking defence budgets in the US, as well as budget cuts in Canada’s most loyal joint deployment partners – France, the UK, and The Netherlands – indicates there will be no less of a demand for Canadian deployable capacity over the next few years. In this context, understanding the ‘political’ requirements for various kinds of deployments is important and a key planning area for defence policy makers as well as military and strategic practitioners. To better understand the future of Canadian military deployments it is first necessary to examine the historical context of our post-war NATO and UN deployments as well as Prime Minister Harper’s 2006 commitment that required all significant military deployments to have parliamentary approval. Each deployment since WW II has been unique. The command structures, intelligence-sharing, mission design and assigned areas of responsibility for Canada, whether under the UN or NATO, have varied by the deployment itself and the nature of the mission. This requires our political and command requirements to adapt to the mission at hand. But whether or not Canada will participate in future deployments relies on not just being able to answer the question of “why”, but also “why us”. Reticence on the part of NATO allies will continue to be a problem in the future and so Canada must be capable to ensure it only takes part in “coalition of the willing” deployments to ensure realistic burden sharing. The pivot towards the Pacific will also require fresh and deeper intelligence cooperation with Australia, other Commonwealth partners in the region and enhanced interoperable capacity with our American allies.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Troop Deployment, and Military
Political Geography:
Europe, Canada, North America, and United States of America

22. Diplomacy, Globalization and Heteropolarity: The Challenge of Adaptation

Author:
Daryl Copeland
Publication Date:
08-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Globalization is the defining historical process of our times, conditioning, if not determining, outcomes across vast swathes of human activity. At the same time, a heteropolar world is emerging, one in which various and competing sources of power and influence are based more on difference than on similarity. In the face of these transformative forces, diplomacy is struggling to evolve. To date, none of the key elements of the diplomatic ecosystem – the foreign ministry, the Foreign Service, or the diplomatic business model – have adapted well, or quickly enough. If diplomacy is to achieve its full potential as a non-violent approach to the management of international relations and global issues through political communications, then radical reform will be required. These observations are particularly apt in Canada, where diplomatic performance has in recent years been troubled. The foreign ministry (formerly DFAIT), still struggling to absorb the deep cuts contained in the federal budget of March 2012, finds itself in the midst of a complicated merger with the aid agency (formerly CIDA). This unanticipated amalgamation has resulted in significant uncertainty and dislocation in both organizations, and is reminiscent of the disastrous split, and then re-integration, of the foreign and trade ministries 2004-06. Canadian public and digital diplomacy, widely considered to represent the leading edge of diplomatic practice, have been wound down as a result of the imposition of centralized control over all communications. The Foreign Service, for its part, remains locked in a protracted and acrimonious labour dispute over pay equity. Rotating strikes and working to rule have taken a toll on business and tourist arrivals, foreign student enrolment and high-level visits. In short, Canada’s diplomatic ecosystem is in a perilous state, and Canadian interests are suffering. In the age of globalization and heteropolarity, this won’t do.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Globalization, Politics, Multipolarity, and Adaptation
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

23. Canadian Defence Commitments: Overview and Status of Selected Acquistions and Initatives

Author:
Elinor Sloan
Publication Date:
12-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
For years, successive Canadian governments have been overpromising and under-delivering on defence procurement. Timetables have slipped even as repair and maintenance costs for aging equipment have soared, while elaborate rules have obscured the acquisition process in a bureaucratic fog. This paper assembles information from a wide range of official sources and cuts through the confusion. It surveys 15 Canadian defence acquisitions and initiatives, each anticipated to cost more than $100 million, to account for the delays. Final replacements for the ancient Sea King helicopters are no closer to arriving — after almost 30 years — because the DND failed to recognize that it asked for technology that is still in development. The Joint Support Ship project is years behind schedule because, as originally conceived, it sought to integrate so many capabilities that it was unbuildable. The Integrated Soldier System Project is almost as far behind because Ottawa’s procurement rules are so complex and niggling that no bidder could fulfill every single one. Canada faces evolving threats, but efforts to equip the Canadian Forces to meet them have been marked by a long litany of failures — failures of communication, of organization and of vision. This paper sets out the military procurement process, and concisely explains the most egregious flaws, making it essential reading for anyone interested in the future of Canada’s military.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Procurement, and Military
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

24. Canada and International Organizations: Time for a Review

Author:
Ferry de Kerckhove
Publication Date:
07-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
It is a common refrain that Canada’s international standing has been falling over the last few years. Yet, in international economic forums, Canada’s economic stability and continued progress is lauded by all. The more limited multilateral fiber of the present government points to a form of renunciation of Canada’s traditional approach to international politics. The government prefers intergovernmental groupings where sovereignty is unfettered and major players’ consensus is the rule. It has called in stronger terms for accountability, value for money, and results based-management in return for its financial contribution to multilateral organizations. A question arises as to the amount of leeway Canada is prepared to give today to international organizations as actors on the international stage. For the Government, multilateralism can be one of the foundations of global governance provided it produces consensus based programs of action. Yet, for all its bemoaning of the United Nations, the present Government, as much as its predecessors, has always ascribed considerable value to the functional multilateral organizations to which Canada belongs and pays over half a billion dollars to in assessed contributions. In the face of a somewhat dichotomous approach, there is a need for a broad review of international organizations we belong to, starting with their objectives and mandates and then running through the way they perform their roles and deliver their contributions. Such a review would very likely rekindle our government’s faith in multilateralism and shape what has been referred to as Canada’s “dignity agenda”.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Organization, Multilateralism, UN Security Council, and International Institutions
Political Geography:
Canada, Israel, and North America

25. Should Brazil be “Special” for Canada?

Author:
Jean Daudelin
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
After years of mutual neglect and sometimes outright tension, Canada’s relations with Brazil are smoother than ever. As Brazil emerges as a relatively powerful and influential global player, shouldn’t Canada try to build that increasingly fluid relationship into a strategic partnership, making Brasilia a key prong of its global policy? Looking at Brazil’s place in the world, and at the ways in which its foreign policy meshes – or not – with Canada’s, this paper argues that such an option has little appeal and in fact few chances of success. Brazil’s rise has its limits, and the country’s global reach and power remain heavily constrained. Beyond the Americas, and even within, Brazil’s power is very soft and could hardly be harnessed effectively by Canada. Moreover, the two country’s international agendas do not overlap much. In global governance circles, Brazil’s global star is on the rise just as Canada’s is in decline. On democracy and human rights, Canada is much more willing to put sovereignty between brackets, and in the face of nuclear proliferation, Brazil is much more critical of the asymmetry of the global regime and the advantage this gives to established powers. Crucially, Canada largely embraces globalization and sees Asia’s rise primarily as an opportunity, whereas Brazilians feel more threatened by it. In that context keeping things running smoothly, without dreams of “grandeur,” is the most that should be sought: normal is great, special would be too much.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Globalization, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Canada, Brazil, South America, and North America

26. Defence After the Recession

Author:
David Perry
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
With unfortunate timing, the Harper government released a well-intended plan pledging “predictable, long-term funding”1 for the Department of National Defence (DND), mere months before the collapse of Lehman Brothers signalled the onset of a global recession. The Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) built on the defence budgetary renaissance begun under Paul Martin’s tenure as Prime Minister and promised the Canadian Forces the resources to project leadership abroad over the next twenty years. Economic circumstances quickly intervened, however, and in 2011 the government launched a Strategic and Operating Review (SOR) to reign in government programs. As a result, defence spending has peaked in 2011/2012 and will decline for the next three years. For DND, this fiscal retrenchment presents a significant problem. Although defence funding increased 54 percent nominally between 2003/2004 and 2010/2011, the CFDS was never adequately funded. While its capital investment plan was long rumored to be insufficient, the Report on Transformation 2011, led by Lieutenant General Andrew Leslie, acknowledged this openly.2 As a result, DND faces a perfect fiscal storm as its already inadequate funding is battered by deficit fighting measures and the results of the departmental Strategic Review announced in Budget 2011, which both take effect April 1, 2012.3 This combination of factors means the CFDS is likely no longer viable, at least in its original twenty year timeframe. Although a lack of detail makes the full impact of Budgets 2011 and 2012 difficult to discern, enough information is available to provide a preliminary assessment of the probable impact on the Canadian military.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Budget, Military, and Recession
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

27. The Panda Bear Readies to Meet the Polar Bear: China Debates and Formulates Foreign Policy Towards Arctic Affairs and Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty

Author:
David Curtis Wright
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
The rise of China to international prominence by virtually every measure conceivable is the single most important international and geopolitical fact of the early twenty-first century. The insatiable Chinese colossus combs the earth in search of energy to fuel its economic juggernaut; its trade networks now bestride the globe; and its investors now hold the single largest proportion of United States foreign debt in the form of US Treasury securities. China now has many very astute and acutely observant geostrategic thinkers, and several of them have begun lately to focus their attention squarely on Canada. Why? Because of two things: the tremendous untapped wealth and the currently still largely unused Northwest Passage in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago (CAA). The Canadian Arctic has what China wants: natural resources and the possibility of a major new shipping route. China knows that Canadian control over these resources makes Canada a major international player, a country with natural resource wealth and geostrategic advantage befitting its sheer geographical size, but out of proportion with its relatively small population. Over the past decade or so China has been paying increased attention to the Arctic and Arctic affairs and since 2004, China has had a permanent land-based presence in the Arctic, specifically in the Svalbard Archipelago, or Spitsbergen (well inside the Arctic Ocean in the Barents Sea). This is where it maintains its Arctic Yellow River Station (Huang He zhan), a facility for oceanic and climatological research. China became the eighth state to establish research facilities there. There are currently energetic discussions and debates in China about the Arctic as the country formulates official foreign policy regarding the region. While it is certainly not an Arctic state, China nonetheless feels entitled to a voice in Arctic affairs and does not want wealthy and powerful northern states to grow even more so at the expense of the wider world’s access to Arctic resources and navigation routes.2 While it seems unlikely that China has any ambitions of becoming an armed belligerent in a future war over the Arctic, or of making serious territorial claims in the region, it can be expected that China will become more assertive and opinionated in its commentary on Arctic affairs, especially as they pertain to extended continental shelf territorial claims currently being prepared by Arctic states – Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States. Canada needs to be aware that in the course of these discussions and debates, some Chinese scholars are carefully examining Canada's claims of historical sovereignty over the Arctic in general and the Northwest Passage in particular. Although it appears at present that Beijing does not want to affirm the accuracy or appropriateness of Canada's historical claims, Canada should be aware that the small number of scholars in China who consider these claims in detail seem largely to end up sympathetic with, and supportive of, them. Even so, the Chinese government itself does not seem ready to affirm Canadian Arctic sovereignty. Canada needs to be on its guard against Chinese attempts to water down Canada’s Arctic sovereignty and should strengthen cooperation with democratic Arctic states for the security and stability of the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Canada, Asia, North America, and Arctic

28. Lessons Learned? What Canada Should Learn from Afghanistan

Author:
David J. Bercuson, J. L. Granatstein, and Nancy Pearson Mackie
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Lessons Learned? What Canada Should Learn from Afghanistan Canada fought for a decade in Afghanistan, its troops sustaining casualties and inflicting them. The war became progressively more unpopular at home, even while Canadian troops, well trained and well equipped, scored successes in the field. But what were the lessons of the war for Canada’s leaders? Did we secure more influence with our Alliance friends? Were there factors that made battlefield success more difficult to achieve? Were there flaws in the government’s organizational structure? In the goals it sought? Canada first went to Afghanistan in December 2001, dispatching some forty members of its secret Joint Task Force 2 to operate against al Qaeda. Early in 2002, the 3rd Battalion of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry began serving in Kandahar Province with a United States Army division and after six months returned home. In July and August, 2003, the Canadian Forces began to return to Afghanistan in force with some 2000 troops, becoming the largest troop contributor to the Kabul Multinational Brigade under the stillnascent International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), operating in the Afghan capital while the United States’ Operation Enduring Freedom had operational control in the rest of Afghanistan. The Canadian role there would last for over two years, and it included key leadership positions in ISAF Headquarters. In late 2003-04 policymakers in Ottawa began to consider a transfer of Canadian troops as part of ISAF’s expansion out of Kabul to cover all of Afghanistan with either civilian- or military-run Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The PRTs would be accompanied by NATO troops tasked to secure them and to train the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). In general, ISAF’s PRT mission aimed to improve the lot of rural Afghans and thus to build closer relations between the people and the Hamid Karzai government in Kabul. Another component of the effort to improve Afghan governance was the SAT-A, the Canadian-provided Strategic Advisory Team—Afghanistan that from 2005 to 2008 placed Canadians in key advisory roles with Afghan government ministries. For a variety of reasons, including advice from the Canadian diplomatic, aid, and military leadership in Kabul, the Departments of National Defence and Foreign Affairs and International Trade in Ottawa believed that Canada ought to establish a Battle Group and PRT presence in Kandahar, beginning in 2006, in order to play a more central, more visible role in Afghan reconstruction. There were some dissenters and the two lead departments jockeyed for control over the Afghan file – and where DND, providing the boots on the ground, including the vast majority of those in the PRT, naturally enough assumed that there should be no contest. But there was general agreement that, with this deployment, Canada would raise its profile in the international community and among its NATO partners (especially the United States) and signal an end to the “human security agenda” period of the Chrétien government. For the Army leadership as well, the Kandahar commitment provided the opportunity to strike squarely at the mythology of peacekeeping. Nonetheless, the desire to help Afghanistan and to achieve political and status gains may have overridden the fact that the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan was wide open and the Taliban insurgency was beginning to grow in Kandahar and Helmand provinces by late 2005. This was largely ignored until Canada took its first casualty in the new campaign on January 15, 2006 – even before the Canadian area of operations moved south - when diplomat Glyn Berry, who was to run the Canadian PRT from Camp Nathan Smith in a northern suburb of Kandahar City, died in a suicide bomb attack. In total, some 157 Canadian servicemen and women have been killed in Afghanistan, along with an undeclared, but large, number of soldiers wounded.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Conflict, and Military
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, Canada, and North America

29. Foreign Policy in the Election

Author:
Derek H. Burney
Publication Date:
04-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Foreign policy rarely plays a major role in Canadian elections and, CDFAI Senior Research Fellow, Derek Burney contends 2011 will be no exception. Differences about the purchase of new fighter aircraft to replace the aging CF-18 Hornets will surface during the campaign. The Liberals have adopted a preference for “butter” instead of “guns” and should there be a change of government, defence equipment purchases could be curtailed more generally. While other differences are evident, e.g. on Middle East issues and Climate Change, the two major parties are essentially on the same page on the key issues of war and peace – Afghanistan and now Libya. The new bilateral initiative for a security perimeter with the US has attracted little opposition to date, primarily because it is a process not a result, yielding little to attack or defend. Uncertainties about the global economy may simply reinforce public concerns about Canada’s economic prospects. The Conservatives have delivered on what they said they would do: strengthening the military to give more capacity for a global role, engaging constructively with the US and enhancing relations in our hemisphere, notably with a substantial contribution to Haiti. The Liberal alternative seems more rhetorical than prescriptive, citing grievances with the Conservative record along with nostalgic calls for a return to Pearsonian emphasis on peace-keeping and multilateralism. Regardless of who wins, and excepting the possibility of different commitments to defence, the main lines of Canadian foreign policy are unlikely to change significantly.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Elections, Weapons, and Military
Political Geography:
Middle East, Canada, and North America

30. Budget 2011 – Restraining Growth in Defence Spending?

Author:
Brian MacDonald
Publication Date:
08-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
The Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) was tabled on June 19, 2008. Among its promises was “A Military with Stable, Predictable Funding,” which was to be delivered through a twenty year “new long term funding framework for the Defence Department,” which had not been the practice of previous White Papers and Policy Statements. The framework included the promise of an increase in the annual inflation adjustment from 1.5% to 2%, plus a “Real Growth” adjustment of 0.6% annually for a total of 2.6%. The CFDS also forecast an increase in the total defence budget “from approximately $18 billion in 2008-09, to over $30 billion in 2027-28. In total, the Government planned to invest close to $490 billion in defence over this period.” In addition, the Government committed to fund separately the incremental costs of any expeditionary deployments such as that in Afghanistan. The CFDS also promised “A Military with the Right Equipment and Training.” The first new equipment tranche would include the already purchased four C-17 strategic airlifters, plus maritime helicopters, plus “17 new CH47F Chinook helicopters, three replenishment ships, 2,300 trucks, up to 100 Leopard 2 tanks and 6-8 Arctic/Offshore patrol ships.” Further down the road the second tranche would add “15 ships to replace existing destroyers and frigates, 10 to 12 maritime patrol aircraft, 17 fixed wing search and rescue aircraft, 65 next generation fighter aircraft, and a fleet of land combat vehicles and systems.” The CFDS also proposed to increase the Regular Force strength to 70,000 and the Reserves to 30,000. The CFDS planned to allocate the total budget to the following categories: Personnel – 51%, Equipment – 12%, Infrastructure – 8%, and Readiness – 29%. Over the 20 year period personnel expenses would amount to $250 billion; the first tranche of equipment purchases would account for $15 billion of capital; the second tranche of major fleet acquisitions would account for $20 billion; Infrastructure would account for $40 billion and Readiness would account for $140 billion.
Topic:
Budget, Defense Spending, and Military
Political Geography:
Canada and North America