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Begin New Search Political Geography China Content Type Policy Brief Publishing Institution Bruegel Publication Year within 10 Years

1. Can Chinese growth defy gravity?

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Chinese growth, astounding since the beginning of the reform era, has slowed in the last decade. We offer a baseline estimate (based on the current trend) of China’s medium-term growth rate, which we project to fall to 2.4 percent by 2035. Several factors create uncertainty around this baseline. China’s rapid aging is already incorporated into our long-term growth scenario, but its impact on growth will depend on how China’s remaining urbanisation process spreads over time, how the shrinking labour supply affects labour productivity and whether the decline in total factor productivity growth, reflecting the lack of reform during the last decade and possibly the rising role of the state, can be reversed. Investment in China, for decades the largest factor in China’s growth, is expected to contribute less to growth given the increasingly low return on assets, particularly on state-led investment. The rapid piling up of public debt is also becoming a heavy burden for the Chinese economy. Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic may have left significant scarring effects, such as structurally high youth unemployment and low investment confidence. On the upside for China, the rise in human capital and research and development expenditure may support innovation and growth, but the magnitude of this effect is uncertain, because it is unclear if higher innovation will translate into higher total factor productivity, and because of the United States’s push to contain China technologically.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, European Union, Economic Growth, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

2. Will China’s new financial regulatory reform be enough to meet the challenges?

Author:
Martin Chorzempa and Nicolas Veron
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Effective financial supervision plays a crucial role in maintaining financial stability and a healthy financial system. China’s leadership has made financial risk a core priority, and in reforms approved in March 2023, it reassigned regulatory responsibilities, creating a new supervisory body that will take over some responsibilities from the central bank, the banking and insurance regulator, and the securities regulator. The aim is that a change to the financial supervisory architecture (who does what in financial supervision) will make China’s system more effective and stable. In this policy brief, we argue that this incremental reform will not solve the core issues China faces in financial supervisory effectiveness. We provide an overview of China’s large and complex financial system, including its largely state-owned banks (some of which are the largest in the world by assets), securities markets and other financial intermediaries. Traditional divisions between different types of activities and institutions have been blurred by the rise of large financial conglomerates, risk-transfer techniques and internet-based finance. Reforms in 2018 to China’s supervisory architecture did not eliminate perceived shortcomings, including failures to effectively regulate financial conglomerates, fintech and regional banks. We then survey global benchmarks against which China’s financial supervisory architecture can be compared, including the United States and European Union. China’s supervisory system is already more streamlined, at least on paper, than either of these most comparable global counterparts. Like them, China’s system does not correspond exactly to any of the three textbook archetypes of supervision: sectoral, twin-peaks or integrated supervision. Ultimately, the effectiveness of China’s financial supervisory architecture suffers from excessive state intervention in the financial system through other channels, including through the unique and pervasive influence of the communist party, which hampers supervisory independence and makes it difficult to establish accountability for regulatory failures. While the recently announced reform may improve coordination across supervisory bodies, coordination within the new quasi-integrated supervisor, across central departments, and between them and local branches, will remain a challenge.
Topic:
Reform, Regulation, Finance, and Financial Stability
Political Geography:
China and Asia

3. Lessons for Europe from China’s quest for semiconductor self-reliance

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Pauline Weil
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Semiconductors are a critical input to production of information and communication technology and many other goods. The major economies want to be able to produce chips at home to avoid excessive dependence on supply chains in an increasingly unpredictable world, where trade is being compromised because of national security concerns. China was first in terms of timing and scale of funding to support its its semiconductor industry. Since 2015, China has spent $150 billion upgrading its semiconductor industry. Success, however, has been limited. China’s massive industrial policy effort has been most successful in increasing capacity for assembly of chips, though that is also the least value-added part of the semiconductor supply chain. Progress on chip design and fabrication in China remain underwhelming. The United States has also started implementing its $50 billion package to support the production of chips. The European Union, meanwhile, has not yet fully finalised its main semiconductor initiative, the European Chips Act. China’s experience offers a number of lessons. First, chip fabrication requires massive fixed asset investment and, therefore, large subsidies, but with no guarantee of success. Second, one reason for the underwhelming results of China’s semiconductor policy is US containment, through export controls and other measures. In this respect, the EU should find it easier than China to upgrade its chips industry but, given the costs, focusing on the highest-end part of the supply chain would be the best approach. Assembly and production of lower-end semiconductors already face overcapacity, given the financial resources already invested by China.
Topic:
International Relations, European Union, Economy, Trade Policy, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China and Europe

4. How difficult is China’s business environment for European and American companies?

Author:
Uri Dadush and Pauline Weil
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Despite tensions over China’s discriminatory business practices, China’s trade continues to thrive, and the country has taken over from the United States as the first destination for foreign investment. American and European businesses continue to be engaged in China’s large and growing market, even amid a trade war between China and the United States. Drawing on surveys of companies and international comparisons, we show that – contrary to the prevailing narrative – China’s business practices have improved significantly in recent years. China’s business environment is today generally more favourable than that in other large countries at similar levels of development and, in some though certainly not all aspects, is in line with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development average. Differences over geopolitics and human rights must be addressed, but it is clear that trade and investment agreements conditioned on accelerated reforms in China would yield substantial dividends. The benefits of such deals would accrue not only to foreign investors in China and exporters to China, but also to consumers and importers in the European Union and, especially, in the US, where punitive tariffs on China remain in effect. Critical aspects in the negotiations would include better access for American and European investors to China’s market for services and improved enforcement of rules and regulations in China. As in many middle-income countries, uneven enforcement of the law (rather than the law itself) remains a critical problem in China.
Topic:
Development, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Business, and Investment
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

5. Is the European Union’s investment agreement with China underrated?

Author:
Uri Dadush and André Sapir
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The European Union is very open to foreign direct investment. By comparison, despite considerable liberalisation in the past two decades, foreign investors in China’s markets still face significant restrictions, especially in services sectors. Given this imbalance, the EU has long sought to improve the situation for its companies operating or wanting to operate in China. After eight years of negotiations, the EU and China concluded in December 2020 a bilateral Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI). The text awaiting ratification aims to give foreign investors greater market access, enforceable via state-to-state dispute settlement. It does not yet, however, cover investor protection (such as against expropriation). Meanwhile, investor protection is covered by bilateral investment treaties between EU countries and China, which remain in force. The CAI has been met in some quarters with scepticism on economic and geopolitical grounds. The main criticism is that it provides little new market access in China, and that this small economic gain for the EU comes at the price of breaking ranks with its main political ally, the United States. Our assessment, which focuses on the economic implications, is different. It is true the CAI provides only modest new market access in China, but this is because China has already made progress in recent years in liberalising its foreign investment regulations unilaterally. The CAI binds this progress under an international treaty, marking an improvement for EU firms insofar as their market access rights can be effectively enforced. Most important, the CAI includes new rules on subsidies, state-owned enterprises, technology transfer and transparency, which will improve effective market access for EU firms operating in China. These bilateral new rules could also pave the way for reform of the multilateral rules under the World Trade Organisation, with the aim of better integrating China into the international trading and investment system – a goal shared by the EU, the United States and other like-minded countries. From an economic viewpoint therefore, the CAI is an important agreement, and one worth having. However, its ratification by the European Parliament is unlikely while China continues to apply sanctions against some members of the European Parliament and other critics of China’s human rights record.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Investment, and Liberalization
Political Geography:
China and Europe

6. China’s state-owned enterprises and competitive neutrality

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
As China’s economic weight continues to grow, so does the global impact of its companies. Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) produce a large share of Chinese goods and services. Given their importance both in China and increasingly globally, it should be measured whether SOEs introduce distortions into markets and how significant those distortions are. Foreign governments negotiating trade or investment deals with China need this information so they can better measure how far China is from offering a level playing field to foreign companies on its domestic market. In this context, competitive neutrality is an important working concept that can be used to asses how far a market is from being a competitive environment. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development defines a framework of competitive neutrality as one in which public and private companies face the same set of rules, and no contact with the state gives competitive advantage to any market participant. Quantifying the concept is difficult, but we provide a preliminary measure of the lack of competitive neutrality in relation to Chinese SOEs. In particular, we focus on debt and tax neutrality and compare the situation for Chinese state-owned and private firms on aggregate and sectoral levels. Our results support the view that China’s competitive environment is generally poor. The advantageous position of SOEs in China is true for most economic sectors, though to a variable extent, with the automotive sector one of the furthest away from competitive neutrality. A working measure of competitive neutrality applied in China could help improve the level playing field for foreign companies in China. It could also be applied globally given the very large size and global footprint of Chinese SOEs. The concept could even be introduced in a potential reform of the World Trade Organisation.
Topic:
Business, Trade, Neutrality, and State-Owned Enterprises
Political Geography:
China and Asia

7. A new direction for the European Union’s half-hearted semiconductor strategy

Author:
Niclas Poitiers and Pauline Weil
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
A basic component in electronic devices, semiconductors are essential to the production of many products, from smartphones to cars. Securing reliable supplies of semiconductors to safeguard the production lines of a range of industries has thus become an important policy goal, especially in the context of an increasingly confrontational international environment in which high-technology leadership is also associated with military power and geopolitical reach. The semiconductor sector is highly concentrated, capital- and R&D-intensive, and particularly exposed to bottlenecks and political risks. High-end chip fabrication is centred in Asia, dominated by the duopoly of Taiwan’s TSMC and South Korea’s Samsung. In other parts of the supply chain, companies in the United States and Europe hold relative monopolies that have been leveraged for trade sanctions. The United States has taken steps to block the supply of chips and components to emerging tech giants in China, and to contain China’s ambitions of building its own cutting-edge chip production capacities. Heavy United states and Chinese investment poses a challenge to the European Union, which in response has set the goal of increasing European production beyond domestic demand. To increase its presence in this strategic and thriving sector, the EU needs a more targeted strategy that builds on its existing strengths while accommodating its relatively low domestic needs. Instead of investing public funds in a subsidy war over fabrication capacity, the EU should focus on inputs and chip design. However, no economy can hope to fully achieve independence in the sector and ensuring sustainable supply through diplomatic means should therefore also be a priority. Lastly, Europe’s small role in global semiconductor production is symptomatic of shortcomings in the European environment for high-tech innovation. These shortcomings should be addressed.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Economy, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

8. Deglobalisation in the context of United States-China decoupling

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Junyun Tan
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
After decades of increasing globalisation on every front, from trade – pushed further by the growing role of value chains – to technology, movement of people and investment, there now seems to be a turn towards slower globalisation if not deglobalisation, at least in some areas. Deglobalisation is not a new concept but rather a megatrend which has been seen before, for example right before the First World War. Signs of deglobalisation, measured by decelerating trade and investment, and smaller global value chains, started to appear already in 2008. But this trend seems to have accelerated because of the United States’ push to contain China in the context of the strategic competition between the two. Such containment is apparent not only in bilateral trade and investment flows but also in technology. COVID-19 has been a second very important factor contributing to deglobalisation. The most obvious impact has been in movement of people. However, the trend towards deglobalisation is much less evident for finance, with the exception of foreign direct investment, though increasing attempts by the US and China to decouple particular types of financial flows are emerging, including the delisting of Chinese companies from US stock exchanges and the imposition of sanctions for transactions with certain Chinese companies and individuals. Overall, it is too early to confirm the depth and the sustainability of the current wave of deglobalisation, but an increasing number of signals suggest a trend of deglobalisation is underway.
Topic:
Globalization, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Investment, Trade Policy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

9. The European Union-Russia-China energy triangle

Author:
Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
We argue that energy relations between the EU and Russia and between China and Russia influence each other. We analyse their interactions in terms of four areas: oil and gas trading, electricity exchanges, energy technology exports and energy investments. We discuss five key hypotheses that describe the likely developments in these four areas in the next decade and their potential impact on Europe: 1. There is no direct competition between the EU and China for Russian oil and gas 2. China and the EU both have an interest in curbing excessive Russian energy rents 3. The EU, Russia and China compete on the global energy technology market, but specialise in different technologies 4. Intercontinental electricity exchange is unlikely 5. Russia seems more worried about Chinese energy investments with strategic/political goals, than about EU investments We find no evidence of a negative spillover for the EU from the developing Russia-China energy relationship. But, eventually, if these risks – and in particular the risk of structural financial disintermediation – do materialise, central banks would have various instruments to counter them.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Oil, and Europe Union
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Europe