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Begin New Search Topic Cybersecurity Content Type Policy Brief Publishing Institution Atlantic Council Publication Year within 10 Years Publication Year within 5 Years Publication Year within 3 Years

1. What do we know about cyber operations during militarized crises?

Author:
Michael Fischerkeller
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The Department of Defense (DoD) will soon kick off the drafting of its cyber strategy and cyber posture review to align US cyber capabilities and operating concepts with the foreign policy objectives of the Joseph Biden-Kamala Harris administration. Given that the administration describes China as the “pacing threat,” debates over the best use of cyber operations and campaigns will likely be framed by US-China interaction in day-to-day competition, and by a potential militarized crisis and war over the status of Taiwan. This essay focuses on how cyber operations employed during militarized crises are likely to impact escalation management. Policymakers may be attracted to the idea that cyber operations could serve as de-escalatory offramps in a crisis. Such expectations should be tempered, if not completely set aside, for two reasons. First, there is no experience with cyber operations employed during a militarized crisis between two nuclear-armed peers. Absent direct experience, all one can rely on is academic research. Yet, secondly, deductive and empirical academic research provides no basis for confidence that cyber operations are either de-escalatory or non-escalatory in the context of militarized crises.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cybersecurity, Crisis Management, and Militarization
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

2. Hackers, Hoodies, and Helmets: Technology and the changing face of Russian private military contractors

Author:
Emma Schroeder, Gavin Wilde, Justin Sherman, and Trey Herr
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The first time Russia invaded Ukraine in the twenty-first century, the Wagner Group was born. The now widely profiled private military company (PMC) played an important role in exercising Russian national power over the Crimea and portions of the Donbas—while giving Moscow a semblance of plausible deniability. In the near decade since, the Russian PMC sector has grown considerably, and is active in more than a dozen countries around the world. PMCs are paramilitary organizations established and run as private companies—though they often operate in contract with one or more states. They are profit-motivated, expeditionary groups that make a business of the conduct of war.1 PMCs are in no way a uniquely Russian phenomenon, yet the expanding footprint of Russian PMCs and their links to state interests call for a particularly Russian-focused analysis of the industry. The growth of these firms and their direct links to the Kremlin’s oligarch network as well as Moscow’s foreign media, industrial, and cyber activities present a challenge to the United States and its allies as they seek to counter Russian malicious activities abroad. As signals intelligence and offensive cyber capabilities, drones and counter-drone systems, and encrypted communications become more accessible, these technologies will prove ever more decisive to both battlefield outcomes and statecraft. More exhaustive research on these issues is necessary. The ongoing conflict resulting from Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in this young century seems likely to shape the conduct of Russian foreign policy and security behavior for years to come—and these firms will play a part. The activities of these PMCs include high-intensity combat operations, as evidenced in Syria in 2018 and Ukraine in 2022, and a mix of population control, escort and close protection, and local direct-action activities, as seen in Libya, Mali, and elsewhere.2 Given the sourcing and dependence of Russian PMCs on Russian military service personnel and no small influence of Russian doctrine, the questions to reasonably ask include: How do changes in the Russian conduct of war and adoption of new technologies influence these PMCs? Moreover, how might these technological changes influence the role these PMCs play in Russian strategic goals and activity abroad?
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Innovation, Wagner Group, Russia-Ukraine War, and Private Military Companies (PMCs)
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, Middle East, and Africa

3. Behind the rise of ransomware

Author:
John Sakellariadis
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
This issue brief investigates the drivers of the ransomware surge that menaced the United States in the summer of 2021, explains why these attacks remain a persistent threat today, and offers recommendations for mitigating the problem in the future. The 2021 surge in ransomware activity stems from a change in how criminals launch ransomware attacks. Between 2016 and 2019, cybercriminals shifted away from automated ransomware campaigns that emphasized scale to targeted extortion operations against organizations and established businesses. This adaptation made ransomware more disruptive and more profitable, eventually attracting the attention of well-organized cybercrime gangs. The intensification of the ransomware epidemic from that point until the attack on Colonial Pipeline resulted from the growing adoption of this new extortion model among criminals. Though the US government has devoted more attention to ransomware over the ensuing months, ransomware remains a significant and long-term threat to the US economy. Three factors drive the persistence of the problem: the presence of a vast pool of security-poor organizations, the availability of a poorly regulated monetization pipeline in the form of cryptocurrency, and criminals’ ability to evade law enforcement by exploiting jurisdictional boundaries. Mitigating just one of these conditions, let alone all three, will demand years of sustained effort. Because the US government cannot eliminate ransomware overnight, it must begin planning how to manage the problem over the long term. To do so, it should start by investing in new efforts to improve the defenses of small- to medium-sized entities. The ease of compromising these organizations has been key to fueling the appetite for ransomware attacks. Yet, many of these organizations lack the personnel, incentives, and contracting power to secure their own networks. Moreover, the US government should require all US-based organizations to report ransomware payments to the government and publish quarterly reports with anonymized versions of the data. Comprehensive payment transparency offers the best way to measure success against ransomware over the long term. It will ensure that success against targeted ransomware is judged in terms of the overall volume of ransomware payments, not just the absence of attacks on high-risk or high-profile entities.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Ransomware
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

4. China’s surveillance ecosystem and the global spread of its tools

Author:
Bulelani Jili
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
This paper seeks to offer insights into how China’s domestic surveillance market and cyber capability ecosystem operate, especially given the limited number of systematic studies that have analyzed its industry objectives. For the Chinese government, investment in surveillance technologies advances both its ambitions of becoming a global technology leader as well as its means of domestic social control. These developments also foster further collaboration between state security actors and private tech firms. Accordingly, the tech firms that support state cyber capabilities range from small cyber research start-ups to leading global tech enterprises. The state promotes surveillance technology and practices abroad through diplomatic exchanges, law enforcement cooperation, and training programs. These efforts encourage the dissemination of surveillance devices, but also support the government’s goals concerning international norm-making in multilateral and regional institutions. The proliferation of Chinese surveillance technology and cyber tools and the associated linkages between both state and private Chinese entities with those in other states, especially in the Global South, is a valuable component of Chinese state efforts to expand and strengthen their political and economic influence worldwide. Although individual governments purchasing Chinese digital tools have their local ambitions in mind, Beijing’s export and promotion of domestic surveillance technologies shape the adoption of these tools in the Global South. As such, investigating how Chinese actors leverage demand factors for their own aims, does not undercut the ability of other countries to detect and determine outcomes. Rather it demonstrates an interplay between Chinese state strategy and local political environments. This paper specifically focuses on key features in China’s surveillance ecosystem, while the companion to this report will focus on the key ‘pull factors’ from African countries and their significance for US interests.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Surveillance, and Public-Private Partnership
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Global Focus

5. Trusted connectivity: A framework for a free, open, and connected world

Author:
Kaush Arha
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Global affairs are increasingly shaped by three important and overlapping trends: 1) the unprecedented and growing demand for trillions of dollars’ worth of global digital and physical infrastructure; 2) the ideological battle between democracy and autocracy for the best path forward to achieve peace and prosperity; and 3) the world’s response to changing climate. As democracies address the global demand for a free, open, and connected world while ensuring that local and global emissions targets are met, they need an organizing framework: the concept of “trusted connectivity.” Democratic governments and institutions function with intricate checks and balances to ensure public trust. Unchallenged aggregation of power is antithetical to democracies and instinctively distrusted by their citizens. While holding unimaginable promise, today’s advancements in digital and physical infrastructure also embody new opportunities for malign actors in general, and authoritarian governments in particular, to accumulate and wield this power. Malign influence or control over data, communications, trade routes, energy, and transportation, all of which becomes possible when countries accept infrastructure investments from authoritarian states, could open potential vectors for coercion, disruption, or attack in times of crisis or conflict. In order to deny malign actors this influence over other countries’ infrastructure, democracies need to work together to ensure that the benefits and terms for the host country in building a bridge, port, rail, road, or telecommunications network are equitable and transparent, thereby leading to greater trust and security in addition to economic prosperity. US President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., rallied the world’s leading democracies behind this cause at the Group of Seven (G7) summit in June 2021 in Cornwall, England. The G7 nations, comprising the world’s leading free economies and free societies, proclaimed that, as they aim to meet global infrastructure demand, among other goals, their efforts will be guided by shared democratic values. For China, the standard-bearer of an alternate, illiberal model, infrastructure investment serves a different purpose: to increase China’s global economic leverage for its political gain. To prevail in this competition, advance their values, and develop much-needed digital and physical infrastructure, the world’s leading democracies should adopt the principle of trusted connectivity.
Topic:
National Security, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, and Connectivity
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America