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10951. Commentary on "A Modest Proposal for a Basic Agreement on Peaceful Cross-Strait Development"

Author:
Christopher R. Hughes
Publication Date:
01-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Abstract:
This critique assesses Prof. Chang Ya-chung's draft basic agreement for cross-Strait relations by arguing that it overstates changes in Beijing's Taiwan policy, which is based on a strategy that has not seen substantial change since it was devised in the early 1990s to prevent the island's democratization leading to the exercise of self-determination. By over-estimating Taiwan's political, diplomatic, military, and economic vulnerability the proposal unnecessarily narrows down Taibei's options to the point where it has to accept Beijing's one-China principle. This merely closes off other options that Taiwan can just as readily pursue, such as continuing to develop cross-Strait relations through ad hoc solutions to practical problems or seeking more imaginative ways to create a durable modus vivendi with international support. Even more problematic is that a political framework for stability based on the principles of Chinese nationalism is unlikely to be acceptable for Taiwan's liberal- democratic politics and could thus amount to an unnecessary risk that would lead to a less durable cross-Strait status quo than that which has been maintained over the last two decades.
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Beijing

10952. Commentary on "A Modest Proposal for a Basic Agreement on Peaceful Cross-Strait Development"

Author:
Jean-Pierre Cabestan
Publication Date:
01-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Abstract:
The main question that Chang Ya-chung's Modest Proposal triggers is whether a political and security agreement can realistically be reached today. The twelve agreements signed by Beijing and Taibei since 2008 should be saluted as conducive to constructing détente, non- military confidence-building measures and de facto government-to- government relations across the Strait. However, in the foreseeable future, is it realistic to ask for more? Actually, a temporary or long-term political agreement between Taibei and Beijing will not be reached if the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) refuse to formally recognize each other's separate existence and sovereignty in one way or another, at least tacitly, and if they do not agree to address security issues squarely with the assistance of the USA. Finally, no meaningful agreement can be re ached either if the PRC Chinese and certain segments of the Kuomin tang (KMT) (Guomindang) fail to recognize Taiwan's specific history or realize that the Taiwanese have been developing a distinct identity since 1949 and even more so since the island's democratization took place in the late 1980s.
Political Geography:
United States, China, Taiwan, and Beijing

10953. Signs of Change? An Analysis of Taiwan's December 2009 Local Elections

Author:
Stefan Braig
Publication Date:
01-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Abstract:
Under special circumstances created by a government decision to partly merge and upgrade six counties and county-level cities to special municipality status, local elections took place on December 5, 2009 in areas covering less than half of Taiwan's population. The results are generally seen as an important, though small, victory for the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The ruling Kuomintang (KMT) (Guomindang), however, has remained in a stable position, while the DPP still has a long way to go towards a comeback.
Political Geography:
Taiwan

10954. From the Editor

Author:
Rashid I. Khalidi
Publication Date:
03-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Palestine Studies
Institution:
Institute for Palestine Studies
Abstract:
Since ISRAEL' S winter 2008–2009 offensive against the Gaza Strip, it has seemed that we are living through a period of après-Gaza. Whether it was because of the brutality of that offensive with its lopsided 100-to-1 casualty ratio, the unusually critical media treatment of Israel that eventually emerged, a greater international awareness of the pernicious nature of the Israeli-Egyptian blockade of the Strip, or the ongoing impact of the Goldstone report, echoes of what happened then in Gaza have lingered on. It is of course too early to make a definitive judgment of the impact of the war on Gaza, but at least in the short term, it appears to have been a turning point.
Political Geography:
Israel and Egypt

10955. "The Most Moral Army in the World"?: The New "Ethical Code" of the Israeli Military and the War on Gaza

Author:
Muhammad Ali Khalidi
Publication Date:
03-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Palestine Studies
Institution:
Institute for Palestine Studies
Abstract:
This article examines the content of and justification for a new "ethical code" designed for the Israeli army to take into account the "fight against terror." It argues that the code contains two innovations: it includes acts aimed exclusively at military targets in its definition of "terrorism," and it contains a principle of distinction that prioritizes the lives of citizen combatants over those of noncitizen noncombatants, contrary to centuries of theorizing about the morality of war as well as international humanitarian law. The article suggests that the principle of distinction played a direct role in Israel's offensive in Gaza in winter 2008-2009, as demonstrated by a preponderance of testimony indicating that Israeli military commanders explicitly instructed soldiers to give priority to their own lives over those of Palestinian noncombatants.
Political Geography:
Israel

10956. The Polarization of the Palestinian Political Field

Author:
Jamil Hilal
Publication Date:
03-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Palestine Studies
Institution:
Institute for Palestine Studies
Abstract:
Arguing that the polarization of the Palestinian political field did not start with Hamas's takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007, the author analyzes the factors that have eroded the cohesiveness and vitality of the Palestinian polity, namely, the paralysis of Palestinian political institutions, territorial and social fragmentation, and egregious outside interference. In this context, and in the absence of an internal Palestinian debate about the objectives of holding elections under occupation, the author shows that the timing and circumstances of the 2006 legislative elections were bound to precipitate the current state of disarray. Finally, he considers the way forward, highlighting the potential of public pressure in promoting national reconciliation. NO ONE WOULD QUESTION today the utter disarray of the Palestinian political field [i], where two separate entities governed by bitterly rival factions are ensconced in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, one under Israeli occupation, the other under a suffocating Israeli siege. Each of the two governments, one primarily secular (controlled by Fatah), the other “Islamist” (controlled by Hamas), has its own security forces and, to the extent possible, bans the activities of members of the rival faction within “its” territory (if it does not arrest or imprison them). Both political “entities” are heavily dependent on external funding (from different donors) and are allied to different regional powers overtly or covertly opposed to one another. As time passes, the two entities grow further and further apart, threatening a repetition in some form of the Pakistan-Bangladesh experience. This state of polarization did not begin in June 2007 when Hamas installed itself as the dominant political, military, and administrative power in the Gaza Strip while Fatah took steps to tighten its control over the West Bank. Rather, these events deepened trends long in the making, enfeebling still further a political field that had been battered since the early 1990s by many changes and events, regional and international. The present essay [ii] seeks to highlight the factors underlying the precariousness and vulnerability of the Palestinian polity and its consequent polarization, the paralysis of its national institutions, and egregious foreign interference. Similar situations have been noted in other regional states subject to invasion and war (Lebanon, Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan, and the Sudan, among others), but the disarray is perhaps more visible in Palestine for reasons relating to its history, its specific regional and international context, and its ongoing subjection to settler-colonialism and territorial fragmentation. THE MAKING OF THE PALESTINIAN POLITICAL FIELD The Palestinian political field differs from most others in that it includes Palestinian communities with differing socioeconomic, state, and civil society structures, not only in historic Palestine (the 1967 occupied territories and Israel) but also in the diaspora (al-shatat) created by the 1948 Nakba. It was also formed outside the national territory, not by a state but by a national liberation movement that arose in the Palestinian shatat. From the outset, then, lacking a sovereign state, the Palestinian political field has been subject to powerful outside influences and pressures. Its leading institution, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), was founded at the initiative of the Arab states in 1964 and was initially under their control. It was only after the 1967 war, when the PLO was democratically taken over by Palestinian resistance organizations led by Fatah, that it became a popular mass movement and, several years later, the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.” For the next twenty-some years, the PLO and its constituent organizations conducted their political, military, and other activities from bases in countries bordering Israel and later from Tunisia. While this situation made it vulnerable to the machinations of various regional powers seeking to determine the political and economic shape of the Middle East, the fact that the pressures were conflicting helped the PLO maintain to a tangible degree its hegemony over a relatively autonomous Palestinian political field throughout the 1970s and 1980s. PLO hegemony over the Palestinian political field began to be challenged in the late 1980s with the emergence in the occupied territories of political Islam, whose main embodiment, Hamas, had been established at the start of the first intifada in 1987, and the smaller Islamic Jihad several years earlier. Both these organizations were indigenous, having grown out of local branches of the Muslim Brotherhood, and their prominence in the first intifada showed them to be a force to be reckoned with. However, it was not until the 1993 signing of the Oslo accords, which laid out the stages that were supposed to lead to full peace with Israel by the end of the decade, that the magnitude of the challenge posed by political Islam became fully apparent. Under the Oslo accords, the PLO leadership returned from its long exile to the Palestinian territories, thus moving the center of gravity of Palestinian politics to the “inside” for the first time since 1948. There it established the Palestinian Authority (PA), a self-governing body whose powers were sharply limited by the Israeli occupier but which was understood as the first step on the road to statehood. The accords were fiercely opposed by political Islam, as well as by a number of secular PLO factions, most importantly the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). With a growing following, and already endowed with a high degree of discipline and organization, political Islam and especially Hamas found in opposition to Oslo a powerful cause around which to mobilize.
Political Geography:
Palestine and Gaza

10957. The Palestinian Economy and Future Prospects: Interview with Mohammad Mustafa, Head of the Palestine Investment Fund

Author:
Salim Tamari, Khalid Farraj, and Nasr Abdul Karim
Publication Date:
03-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Palestine Studies
Institution:
Institute for Palestine Studies
Abstract:
Dr. Mohammad Mustafa is chairman and CEO of the Palestine Investment Fund (PIF) and an economic adviser to Palestinian Authority President Mahmud Abbas. PIF, the leading investor in Palestine, is a publicly limited company fully owned by the people of Palestine. It was established in 2003 with the transfer of assets managed by the Palestinian Authority. Financially and administratively autonomous, it is governed by an independent board of directors and a general assembly representing civil society, nongovernmental organizations, academia, and the public and private sectors. In pursuit of its mandate—which is to strengthen the local economy through investments that foster sustainable economic development while maintaining and increasing existing national reserves—PIF owns direct majority and minority stakes in companies and follows a business model based on public-private partnerships. Currently, PIF has approximately $800 million in assets under management and is leading a $4 billion investment program aimed at stimulating economic growth and creating over 100,000 new job opportunities within the next five years. The interview was conducted in Amman, Jordan, in mid-December 2009 by Nasr Abdul Karim, former dean of economics at An-Najah University, Nablus, and by Salim Tamari and Khalid Farraj, respectively director and associate director of the Institute for Palestine Studies, Ramallah. Abdul Karim: We wanted to start by asking about the current state of the Palestinian economy, particularly after the 2007 split [between Fatah and Hamas]. There have been reports of significant improvement in the gross domestic product (GDP). Is the improvement due to government action or to Israeli steps to facilitate trade and economic development after Netanyahu's call for “economic peace”? Mustafa: There's been a marked improvement in the Palestinian economy in the West Bank in the last three years. Obviously, it hasn't reached where we want it to be. The Israeli occupation and its harsh and arbitrary policies negatively impact its performance and make it heavily dependent on the Israeli economy. Despite our recent efforts to decrease trade with Israel, it still constitutes 90 percent of total Palestinian trade. The result is an economy with only limited self-reliance and high donor dependency. And even though it is stable at present, it's still below its 1967 and 1999 levels. Let me go into some detail with regard to the current economic indicators. According to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund [IMF], the growth rate for the first half of 2009 was about 5 percent. Without Israeli restrictions, it would have been higher, perhaps as much as 12 percent. There is no question that the very considerable international support received by the [Palestinian] Authority—which amounted to $1.7 billion in 2008 and a bit less in 2009—played a large part in realizing this growth, but a significant part also resulted from the political stability and improved security in the West Bank, and from institutional, legal, and economic reforms. These two factors—international support and the improved situation on the ground—led to the recovery, albeit partial, of the private sector. One factor that had very adverse effects on the economy this year—especially on small investors whose ventures depend on Israel—was the difference in the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar against the Israeli shekel. The world economic downturn also had an impact on inflation, which decreased by 2 percent in 2009 relative to 2008 thanks to a drop in the price of certain commodities, specifically oil and some foodstuffs. It could decline further in 2010. Finally, unemployment remains extremely high, reaching 26 percent overall—40 percent in Gaza, 18 percent in the West Bank. These figures do not even include disguised unemployment. For the West Bank, however, we expect to see the rate begin to fall soon. We still have a long way to go, of course, before we reach our goal of an independent, sustainable economy, but this requires not only continuing the program of reform but also removing Israeli restrictions. Farraj: You mentioned unemployment in Gaza. What about the economic situation there? Mustafa: Gaza's economy is in a catastrophic state as a result of Israel's embargo and the absence of Palestinian legitimacy. The economy has been totally destroyed, particularly the private sector. The organized destruction of the economy in the past two years has completely done away with the economic wealth it took decades to build. Some enterprises established in the 1920s and 1930s have now been destroyed and cannot be rebuilt without huge effort. At present, Gaza's economy is based on three sources: (1) the salaries paid by the Authority to nearly 60,000 employees, which support about a million people; (2) the salaries and donor aid paid by the government in Gaza to its employees and members of its security forces; and (3) informal trade—in other words, the tunnels. I think Israel's ongoing embargo and policy of collective punishment of the entire Gaza population is utterly disgraceful. Even a partial reconstruction of Gaza has not been allowed to take place. The Sharm al-Shaykh donor conference [held on 2 March 2009] raised $4 billion, which was allocated for reconstruction, yet to this day there is no mechanism for getting even a fraction of these funds into Gaza. Furthermore, the Israeli embargo prevents materials, such as cement, steel, and wood, needed to restore destroyed homes and buildings from entering. Certainly Gaza's economy was already bad before the blockade, but with the ongoing embargo and the catastrophic destruction of the Israeli invasion it continues to get worse. In my view, the Palestinian economy will never be strong until the two halves of the nation are reunited, national reconciliation is achieved, and Palestinian legality in Gaza is restored.
Political Geography:
Palestine and Gaza

10958. Remembering Hasib Sabbagh (1920-2010)

Author:
Walid Khalidi
Publication Date:
03-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Palestine Studies
Institution:
Institute for Palestine Studies
Abstract:
Hasib Sabbagh, who died on 12 January 2010 after a long illness, was arguably the preeminent Palestinian entrepreneur in the business and contracting fields in the post-1948 period. Born to an old and distinguished Greek Catholic family of Safad in Eastern Galilee, Sabbagh established the Consolidated Contractors Company (CCC) in 1945 in Haifa with several partners after graduating in engineering from the American University of Beirut. Under his dynamic leadership and with the cooperation of his life-long partner, Said Khoury, the CCC (which Sabbagh reconstituted in Lebanon after the fall of Palestine) evolved from a modest local enterprise into the giant global multinational corporation that it is today. Using the CCC as his base, he began as of the early 1970s to devote his great energy to the service of Palestine, not only through his philanthropic ventures promoting social and educational causes, but also through his behind-the-scenes political mediation and reconciliation efforts. The following reminiscences trace the unusual partnership and friendship between the author, whose orientation was largely academic, and Sabbagh, whose approach reflected his big-business milieu. The two met in 1972 around the time when Sabbagh was embarking on his public service phase. They became fast friends and remained so until Sabbagh's death, joined by their common dedication to Palestine. The memoir includes Sabbagh's own account of his departure from Palestine in 1948 and sheds light on some relatively little known activities of the Palestinian business and academic elite in the post-1967 period. I met Hasib Sabbagh for the first time in 1972 in Beirut, but his name had been familiar to me since the late 1930s when he was a student at the Government Arab College in Jerusalem, whose principal was my father. The principal's residence was just behind the main college building, and I heard his name mentioned while eavesdropping on a faculty meeting held in my father's study. The fact that Hasib was a pupil at the Arab College already says a lot about him. The college was the apex of the Arab, male, public (in the American sense) educational system. Admission to it was based exclusively on merit and the most stringent entrance qualifications. Although a board­ing institution, its fees were nominal. Entrants were at the top of their class at the mid-high school level, where the college classes began. Its recruitment network encompassed the entire country, generating the stiffest competition among applicants and tapping the best Arab talent, rural and urban, irrespective of social or financial status. The faculty, graduates of the best British universities, were mostly Arab, and the curriculum was a bal­anced synthesis of the humanities and the sciences as well as of Arab Islamic culture and the Western classical heritage, both Greek and Latin being taught. . . . Had Palestine not fallen in 1948, the college would have become its national university. In most ways, the Arab College was unique in the Arab world, and possibly in the third world. Its graduates constitute to this day an elite with their own esprit de corps. Between the 1930s and 1972, when our very different paths finally converged, the watershed year in Hasib's life and mine—as for all Palestinians—was, of course, 1948. The events of that year have remained a permanent item on our agenda as, day after day and over the years, Hasib and I “tired the sun with talking and sent it down the sky.” Coaxing his memory, the following is what I have pieced together from Hasib's reminiscences of how he left Haifa, his adopted city, which in his mind was second only to the true capital of Palestine, his hometown Safad. Hasib's Tale When the final Jewish onslaught came on 23 April, Arab morale broke down and there started a panicky flight from the city by land and sea. The British forces escorted convoy after convoy out of town, encouraging the evacuation of Haifa. We lived in the Abbas quarter, and close by was the house of George Mu`ammar, a business partner and an active member of Haifa's National Committee. Mu`ammar was distraught by the flight of Haifa's residents, and I can still see him standing on his balcony, ha­ranguing the crowds surging by below, pleading with them not to leave. When I saw this I ran up to him and shouted: “What on earth are you doing? Leave these people alone! Can't you see that if they stay and get killed, you will be blamed?” He persisted, but I pulled him down and made him stop. I myself had decided to go to Safad, my hometown, which was in the middle of Arab territory and strongly held by us. But with the fighting in eastern and western Galilee at the time, the easiest way to reach Safad was from the north, through south Lebanon, which meant I had first to go to Beirut. Our company had lorries in Haifa, and I invited anybody who wanted to travel to Beirut to climb on board. Soon the lorries were crammed to capacity, and the British escorted us to the Lebanese frontier. We ar­rived in Beirut on the afternoon of 23 April. There I met Captain Emile Jumay`an, who was with the Transjordanian Arab Legion and an old fam­ily friend. I told him I had just come from Haifa, which had fallen, and he asked me what I intended to do. I said I was going to Safad after seeing my brother Habib and my sister Suad, who had just come [to Beirut] from there. He told me not to go, although he was on his way there himself on a mission involving the garrison under the command of the Arab League's military committee based in Damascus. When my brother Habib, who had been sent by the Safad National Committee to get arms and ammunition, heard what Jumay`an had said, he decided to stay behind in Beirut. But my sister Suad, who had come to Beirut on behalf of the Red Crescent to take back medicines and bandages, insisted on completing her mission regardless. After two weeks in Beirut, I set off for Safad myself. But when I reached the border on 9 May, masses of people were coming from the direction of Safad, among them my brother Munir and my sister Suad, who was disheveled, barefooted, and with torn clothing. Safad had fallen, so we returned to Beirut, and, as I contemplated our situation, I decided that what the family most urgently needed was money. We had plenty in Barclays Bank in Haifa, so I made up my mind to return there, and set off by sea from Tyre. The journey was stormy and the boat was packed, with everybody vomiting over everybody else. The boat docked in the harbor near the government hospital on 10 May, five days before the end of the British Mandate. Arriving in the city we saw both British and Haganah forces. The Haganah troops looked at our identity cards and, the Mandate still being in force, allowed us in. I made my way to our house in Abbas. Shops were closed, the streets were empty, and Haganah troops were all over. Our house had not been touched. Soon after my arrival, I went to call on Mu`ammar, who was delighted to see me. He chided me for leav­ing and tried to convince me to stay: “If you stay behind, you and I can do a lot of business together.” I said I had come only to withdraw money from the bank.
Political Geography:
Palestine, Jerusalem, and Lebanon

10959. Trip Notes on a Return to Israel and the West Bank: Reflections on U.S. Peacemaking, the Security Mission, and What Should be Done

Author:
Col. (USA Ret.) Philip J. Dermer
Publication Date:
03-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Palestine Studies
Institution:
Institute for Palestine Studies
Abstract:
The following document, previously unpublished, was written in March 2010 by a recentlyretired (June 2009) U.S. Army colonel with thirty years experience in the Middle East, including tours of duty and advisory roles (in both military/security and civilian domains) from North Africa to the Persian Gulf. The subject of the informal report is the author's first two trips as a "civilian" to Israel and the West Bank, where he had served two tours of duty, most recently as U.S. military attaché in Tel Aviv during Israel's 2005 unilateral disengagement from Gaza and the formation of the U.S. Security Coordinator's (USSC) mission to reform Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces. Written as an internal document for military colleagues and government circles, the report has been circulating widely-as did the author's earlier briefings on travel or missions in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and especially Iraq-among White House senior staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency, CENTCOM (U.S. Central Command), EUCOM (U.S. European Command), and the USSC team. The document's focus is the state of the "peace process" and the current situation in the West Bank, with particular attention to the PA security forces and the changes on the ground since the author's last tour there ended in mid-2007. But the real interest of the paper lies in the message directed at its intended audience of military and government policy officials-that is, its frank assessment of the deficiencies of the U.S. peace effort and the wider U.S. policy-making system in the Israel-Palestine arena, with particular emphasis on the disconnect between the situation on the ground and the process led by Washington. The critique has special resonance in light of the emerging new thinking in the administration fueled by the military high command's unhappiness (expressed by CENTCOM commander General David Petraeus and Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Admiral Michael Mullen) with the State Department's handling of Middle East diplomacy, especially with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, on the grounds that diplomatic failures are having a negative impact on U.S. operations elsewhere in the region. For most JPS readers, the report has additional interest as an insider's view of the U.S. security presence in the Israel-Palestine arena. It also reflects a military approach that is often referenced but largely absent in public discourse and academic writings. The author, in addition to his tours of duty and peacekeeping missions in various Middle Eastern countries, has served as advisor to two U.S. special Middle East envoys, the U.S. negotiating team with Syria, General Petraeus, Lieutenant General Keith Dayton, Vice President Dick Cheney, and, more generally, to CENTCOM, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, among others. In retirement, he has worked with CENTCOM as a key primary subject matter expert in the development of analyses and solutions for its area of responsibility, leads predeployment briefings for army units heading to Iraq, and travels frequently to Iraq and elsewhere in the region as an independent consultant. He is currently in Afghanistan with the CENTCOM commander's Afghanistan-Pakistan Center of Excellence. The report, made available to JPS, is being published with the author's permission.
Political Geography:
Middle East and Israel

10960. Sand: The Invention of the Jewish People

Author:
Adam Sutcliffe
Publication Date:
03-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Palestine Studies
Institution:
Institute for Palestine Studies
Abstract:
The Invention of the Jewish People, by Shlomo Sand (translated from the Hebrew by Yael Lotan). London and New York: Verso, 2009. xi + 313 pages. Index to p. 334. $34.95 cloth. Adam Sutcliffe, senior lecturer in European history at King's College London, is the author of Judaism and Enlightenment (Cambridge University Press, 2003).
Topic:
History
Political Geography:
New York, Europe, and London