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32. Framing the Partition Plan for Palestine
- Author:
- Lorenzo Kamel
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Cairo Review of Global Affairs
- Institution:
- School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
- Abstract:
- Many different opinions abound concerning Resolution 181, but one fact cannot be denied or overlooked: it was not a solution born out of the “free and sovereign” world states of the time
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Governance, Conflict, Peace, and State Building
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, and Palestine
33. Bringing Russia Back in From the Cold
- Author:
- Nikolas Gvosdev and Damjan. Krnjevic Miskovic
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Baku Dialogues
- Institution:
- ADA University
- Abstract:
- Our reasoning is straightforward: for better or worse, Ukraine will never be as important to the West as it is to Russia—and this would be true even if Ukraine was the only item on their respective stra- tegic agendas. But this last is very far from being the case today—cer- tainly for the United States, whose leadership of the West has again been reaffirmed thanks to the conflict over Ukraine. To main- tain and perhaps even strengthen that leadership against China—a country that Biden defines as being in “competition [with the United States] to win the twenty-first cen- tury”—America stands to benefit greatly from bringing Russia back in from the cold.
- Topic:
- Military Strategy, Leadership, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, North America, and United States of America
34. The CSTO Intervention in Kazakhstan Implication for Regional and World Order
- Author:
- Filppo Costa Buranelli
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Baku Dialogues
- Institution:
- ADA University
- Abstract:
- In the first two weeks of 2022, Kazakhstan was ravaged by an unprecedented scale of protests, violence, and repression. While it is still very much difficult to know what exactly caused the clashes, what seems to be the case is that it involved the meeting of two different and separated dynamics. The first was peaceful protest, which originated in the west of the country because of the doubling of LPG prices alongside the solidarity expressed with the protesters in other parts of the country, i.e., in the north as well as in the east and the south. The second was the presence of violent bandits, criminals, and hooligans that in less than perfect coordination set ablaze Almaty, Taraz, Shymkent, and other centers in the south, which led to the bloodiest clashes in the history of independent Kazakhstan. In a series of rapid escalations, which even those inside the Central Asian nation are still struggling to understand, the initially peaceful marches descended into violence. On 5 January 2022, the Kazakhstani authorities, fearing for the collapse of the constitutional order and for the state to spiral into country‑wide bloodshed, decided to request the intervention of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to protect sensitive and strategic infrastructural objectives such as power grids and airports so to allow to the internal security forces to repress and quell the violence. On 6 January 2022, the CSTO Collective Security Council issued a statement indicating its decision to “send the CSTO Collective Peacekeeping Forces to the Republic of Kazakhstan for a limited period of time to stabilize and normalize the situation in that country.” The same day, these forces began to arrive in Kazakhstan. On 19 January 2022, the CSTO Secretary General informed the CSTO Collective Security Council that all contingents of its Collective Peacekeeping Forces have been withdrawn from the territory of Kazakhstan. Much ink has been spilled in writing about why these events took place, what caused them, who was behind them, and who or what favored them. Most of what has appeared in print has not been particularly coherent or accurate. The truth is that too little is known at the moment: much time will need to pass for scholars to gain a clear understanding of what exactly happened within the Kazakhstani security and elite apparatus so that these violent dynamics could be unleashed.
- Topic:
- Conflict, Protests, Violence, and Intervention
- Political Geography:
- Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and Asia
35. Prospects for Pax Caucasia? The 3+3 Regional Cooperation Initiative
- Author:
- Vasif Huseynov
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Baku Dialogues
- Institution:
- ADA University
- Abstract:
- The 3+3 format for regional cooperation is an initiative that was first proposed by the leaders of Turkey and Azerbaijan in the aftermath of the Second Karabakh War, building somewhat on an idea that originated in Iran during the war itself. This grouping covers the three countries of the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) plus the three most important countries neighboring this region (Russia, Turkey, and Iran). Thus in December 2020, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced the initiative at a joint press conference with his Azerbaijani counterpart, President Ilham Aliyev, during his visit to Baku in which he reviewed the military parade marking Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia in the aforementioned war—a war that heralded the fundamental transformation of regional geopolitical and geo‑economic realities. On this occasion, Erdoğan called 3+3 a win‑win initiative for all actors in the region. Given its obvious potential to promote peace and security in the South Caucasus and facilitate the normalization of relations between former belligerents, some local experts believe that the 3+3 initiative could be instrumental for the emergence of Pax Caucasia. Four of the six countries immediately reacted positively to the initiative, with Armenia and Georgia expressing some reservation. While Armenia initially sounded skeptical, the government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan eventually confirmed its participation in this format. For now, the only country that retains distance from the Pax Caucasia process is Georgia which, due to its ongoing territorial dispute with Russia, refuses to participate in this platform and proposes an alternative 3+2 format (the countries of the South Caucasus + the EU and the United States). Tbilisi has called its counterproposal the “Peaceful Neighborhood Initiative” but has taken no concrete action to set it in motion. Neither Aliyev nor Pashinyan have yet to publicly comment on the 3+2 format. Others have also remained silent. Hence, the likelihood it can prevail over the 3+3 framework in geopolitical substance is low, given that it excludes major active regional players like Russia and Turkey and substitutes them with two Western actors that are evidently less engaged in the region. The advent of the present phase of the conflict over Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, has also not increased the prospects of the Georgian idea being adopted, either.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Caucasus, Middle East, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia
36. Repatriating Azerbaijani IDPs Policy Priorities and Recommendations
- Author:
- Fariz Ismailzade
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Baku Dialogues
- Institution:
- ADA University
- Abstract:
- The conflict over Karabakh between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which started in 1988 and resulted in the occupation of some 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized territories, produced a massive humanitarian catastrophe in the region. Around 350,000 ethnicAzerbaijanis were driven from their homes in the Republic of Armenia in 1988‑1989, becoming refugees in the Republic of Azerbaijan. At the same time, the armed conflict in and around the former Nagorno‑Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) resulted in the ethnic cleansing of an additional 650,000 ethnicAzerbaijanis from their homes in 1992‑1993. By some estimates, back in 1993 Azerbaijan was one of the largest refugee‑ and IDPhosting countries in the world, given that 1 out of every 7 of the country’s Azerbaijani population fell into one of those two categories. In addition to that, Azerbaijan also hosted large numbers of Chechen, Afghan, and Meskheti Turks. Azerbaijani refugees and IDPs mostly came from towns and villages outside the former NKAO part of the Karabakh region. Forcibly driven from their homes, they first settled in temporary tent camps, railway wagons, university dormitories, public buildings, and old sanatoriums. After being ethnically cleansed, their houses in Karabakh were looted and destroyed by Armenian occupational forces. Towns like Fuzuli, Jabrayil, Agdam, Gubadly, and Zangelan were entirely raised to the ground. During the last 30 years, refugees and IDPs received significant humanitarian assistance from various foreign donors, a plethora of national charity organizations, and, of course, the Azerbaijani government. The latter had even launched a housing program for them with the funds accrued by the State Oil Fund, the country’s sovereign wealth fund, which enabled many families to move from tent camps into purpose‑built single‑family home developments that oftentimes included land plots for agricultural activities. When Ilham Aliyev first ran for president in 2003, he had promised to eliminate the need for all tent camps in the country—a promise that he fulfilled in 2007 thanks to the priority allocation of resources from increasing oil revenues. Nevertheless, large number of refugees and IDPs continued to live in temporary housing in Baku and other urban centers that sometimes had significant safety issues and subpar sanitation facilities. Despite the fact that refugees and IDPs receive many welfare benefits from the government of Azerbaijan (e.g., free education, free utilities, monthly remuneration for food and other social payments), their living standards remain suboptimal, and the rate of poverty, health risks, and other social problems among the refugee and IDP community remains higher than the country’s average. At the same time, serious concerns remain regarding the employability and religious education of young people belonging to refugee and IDP communities, with many analysts fearing that this part of the population can be more susceptible to recruitment by foreign radical sects and similar such groups.
- Topic:
- Ethnic Cleansing, Conflict, Humanitarian Crisis, and Repatriation
- Political Geography:
- Central Asia, Asia, and Azerbaijan
37. Armenia Adapts to New Postwar Realities
- Author:
- Richard Giragosian
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Baku Dialogues
- Institution:
- ADA University
- Abstract:
- To many observers, Armenia’s non‑violent change of government in 2018 represented an unusual victory of “people power.” In what became heralded as Armenia’s “Velvet Revolution,” Armenian opposition leader Nikol Pashinyan surprised many with the relative ease with which he displaced an entrenched elite and emerged as the new Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia. After an important free and fair election in December 2018 cemented Pashinyan as Armenia’s new leader, the country ushered in a new period of democracy and reform. Endowed with a rare degree of legitimacy bolstered by popular support, the new democratically‑elected government promised a critical reassessment of a number of critical issues, ranging from Armenian relations with Russia to its policy regarding the conflict over Karabakh. Yet despite these important gains in democratic change and advances in reform, the Armenian leadership faced a looming challenge that was largely obscured by a legacy of arrogance and complacency. With a focus overwhelmingly devoted to domestic reform priorities, the Pashinyan government seemed increasingly ill‑prepared for the inescapable geopolitical and foreign policy demands that loomed large over Armenia. And through much of the period between mid‑2018 and early 2020, Armenia embarked on a foreign policy course characterized more by overconfidence than any realistic reassessment, marked by sporadic mistakes and missteps in its approach toward Russia but also Azerbaijan. Although somewhat explainable by a combination of inexperience and simplistic idealism, Armenia greatly overvalued the advantages of democracy and reform while also overstating its strategic significance. Against that backdrop, such diplomatic overconfidence only exacerbated a mounting crisis over Karabakh, as tensions increased and vulnerability intensified.
- Topic:
- Conflict, Violence, Peace, and Nonviolence
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Armenia
38. Armenian-Azerbaijani Relations in the Wake of the Second Karabakh War
- Author:
- Agil Rustamzade and Anar Valiyev
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Baku Dialogues
- Institution:
- ADA University
- Abstract:
- The Second Karabakh War was more than a war between two belligerents; essentially, it represented a war between two strategic paradigms: one belonging to the twenty‑first century and the other a relic of twentieth‑century military thinking. Azerbaijan’s achievement of air supremacy with the help of drones was not only one of the crucial factors that decided the outcome of that particular war; it will almost certainly contribute to the further development of the military art in armed conflicts of various scopes across various theaters in the time ahead. At the same time, referring to this war as a “drone war” does not reflect reality. In this, as in much else, impressionable journalists got it wrong: this could be a proper designation only if the drones had fought also on the ground instead of soldiers. Certainly, the use of drones was decisive; but the laurels of victory in this war do not belong solely to this contingent of the Azerbaijani military: the mobile groups of special forces were also decisive. Each played a critical part in the country’s military achievement. We begin with an examination of the area of hostilities and the respective dispositions of the parties to the conflict before getting into a discussion about some relevant aspects of Operation Iron Fist—the official designation used by Azerbaijan for the Second Karabakh War. We conclude with remarks of a more geopolitical nature.
- Topic:
- War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
- Political Geography:
- Asia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan
39. Enlargement of the European Union: Lessons from the Western Balkans
- Author:
- Tefta Kelmendi
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
- Institution:
- Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
- Abstract:
- Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine created a new momentum for the European Union to review its political and security strategy for the neighborhood. Its enlargement policy – which has become yet another divisive issue in Europe over the past years – is now forced back into the EU’s foreign policy priorities. With Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova officially requesting membership in the EU, deciding how to go about it has become an even greater challenge. Over the past 20 years, we have evidenced a failure of the EU to show results in the Western Balkans – both in terms of driving democratic reforms and the rule of law, as well as in delivering on its promises in the accession process. The war in Ukraine might be the EU’s last chance to reinvigorate its enlargement policy and reposition itself geopolitically in eastern and southeastern Europe.
- Topic:
- Security, Military Strategy, European Union, Military Intervention, Conflict, and Integration
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Balkans
40. War, Peace, and (in)Justice in the Nuclear Age
- Author:
- Ulrich Kűhn
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
- Institution:
- Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
- Abstract:
- Russia’s war against Ukraine has created a watershed moment for Europe. The coming weeks and months will decide what kind of peace and security order will shape the old continent. The prominence of nuclear weapons will likely increase in the years ahead. Mutual deterrence between NATO and Russia will be the military component to what may soon turn out to be a new Cold War dividing Europe. While this is already bad news news, Ukraine’s fate has again exposed the system of nuclear deterrence as highly unjust and precarious. The consequences of that sorry state of affairs might soon create additional injustices on a global scale. A realistic view must come to the conclusion that we do not have the time to fight another Cold War
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine