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Begin New Search Topic Foreign Policy Political Geography United States of America Content Type Journal Article Journal Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies Publication Year within 10 Years

1. The Russo-U.S. National Identity Gap and the Indo-Pacific in 2021

Author:
Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The start of the Biden administration demonstrated how far Russo-U.S. relations had sunk. On the heels of the massive cyber-hacking of U.S. government files, attributed to Russia, hearings for Biden’s appointees showcased harsh accusations. These were compounded by the arrest of Aleksey Navalny on his return to Moscow from convalescence in Germany after a near fatal poisoning in Russia, arousing severe rebukes in the U.S. Meanwhile, Russian officials and news sources attacked Biden personally as senile or a figurehead, a flawed U.S. system of democracy as a farce and dysfunctional, and U.S. plotting through Navalny as aimed at taking down Putin. Mutual accusations intensified in mid-March 2021 when Biden responded to a query whether he considered Putin a killer by saying, “I do,” which reverberated in sharp retorts by Putin and from many in Russia. In late April, as Russia massed troops on Ukraine’s border, Biden placed new sanctions on Russia, and Russian language grew even more threatening, relations had sunk even further. If there was no direct focus on the Indo-Pacific in such vitriolic exchanges, that can be seen elsewhere, especially in a further tilt toward China in a reputed “strategic triangle.” The Indo-Pacific is where relations between Moscow and Washington have the most potential, spared of the quandaries of NATO expansion and Soviet nostalgia over a sphere of influence or Middle East intrigues leading to shifting alliances. Many in Washington thought that a win-win scenario could be achieved if Moscow accepted integration into a dynamic region, a balance of power welcoming Beijing’s rise but preventing it from domination, the denuclearization and stabilization of Pyongyang, and breakthroughs in bilateral relations with Tokyo and Seoul. All of these objectives appeared consistent with Russian aspirations in the early 1990s, but they were thwarted by the national identity that was being reconstructed in the following quarter century, especially under Vladimir Putin from the mid-2000s. Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific proved to be a casualty of Russian thinking toward the United States, most of all, but also toward China, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and India. The Russo-U.S. identity gap has widened further in 2021. As Dmitry Medvedev wrote on January 16, the relations of Moscow and Beijing with the new U.S. administration are likely to remain extremely cold after years in which the trajectory of relations between Washington and Moscow had already been heading steadfastly downhill. Russo-U.S. bilateral relations and conflicting agendas in Europe and the Middle East draw avid interest, but the Indo-Pacific appears to be an inconsequential factor in their sharp rivalry. Nor do their differences in this region appear to have much significance for the development of the area, where China casts a broad shadow and U.S. alliances and partnerships are being renewed. To argue to the contrary leads one down several possible pathways: 1) this is the one promising arena for rebuilding relations; 2) Russia has a special role to play, distinct from China’s, due to its ties to India, North Korea, or ASEAN; 3) continued strengthening of Sino-Russian ties adds an element of concern for U.S. policies in the Indo-Pacific; or 4) Russia’s animus toward the U.S. may find an unexpected outlet in this region. Whichever pathway is explored, it is important to grasp how Russians perceive this region and its various sub-regions, while keeping in mind the context of the broader clash of national identities severely affecting the Russo-U.S. relationship. In this chapter, I offer an overview of the Russo-U.S. identity gap, turn to Russian thinking about the Biden administration, review Russian national identity, focus on aspects of Sino-Russian ties and their identity gap, subsequently shift to how Russians have viewed other parts of Asia of late, and conclude with an assessment of the prospects for Russo-U.S. relations in the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Culture, Domestic Politics, and Identity
Political Geography:
Russia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

2. The Sino–U.S. National Identity Gap and Bilateral Relations

Author:
Danielle Cohen
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The national identity gap between China and the United States has become increasingly apparent. Under Xi Jinping, China has sought to reclaim its historical greatness and proclaimed itself to be a responsible great power that offers a credible alternative to Western values, while also promoting increasingly authoritarian policies at home, complete with extensive repression in Xinjiang and renewed state control of the economy. Assertions of U.S. national identity were somewhat muted under Donald Trump, confused by the battle between those who supported the administration’s “America First” policy, its transactional approach to foreign affairs, and its deemphasis on human rights and democracy promotion in U.S. foreign policy, and those who worried about the global repercussions of an isolationist, nativist policy. For a time, the United States seemed more preoccupied with its trade war with China than with claims that the United States should act as the global protector of human rights and democracy. The COVID-19 pandemic further complicated already tense Sino–U.S. relations and called both countries’ national identities into question. While China had, as of spring 2021, succeeded in keeping its COVID-19 outbreak remarkably small, the damage caused by its initial suppression of medical reports, along with successful virus mitigation in a number of non-authoritarian states, called into question its claim to be a responsible world power on the basis of its pandemic performance. Meanwhile, the Trump administration failed to protect U.S. citizens from catastrophic death tolls and prevented the United States from taking a leading role in resolving this global crisis. In January 2021, the Biden administration took office with a focus on swiftly ending the pandemic, while also reasserting the traditional U.S. global leadership role. When combined with its assessment of U.S. power after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and of U.S. domestic social and political instability evident throughout 2020-2021, the pandemic has strengthened China’s perceptions of the United States as a country in decline, and of China as a “risen” great power that should now play a major role in shaping the global order. At the same time, although U.S. policy towards China remains firm despite the presidential transition, the underlying rationale has shifted from the “America First” approach of the Trump administration to the democratic values-infused approach of the Biden administration. As the world struggles to move beyond the pandemic, the national identities of China and the United States are increasingly defined in opposition to each other and seem likely to drive an ever more challenging bilateral relationship in the coming years.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Culture, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

3. The COVID-19 Pandemic and Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific: A View from the United States

Author:
Jacques deLisle
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic poses significant geopolitical challenges and presents opportunities for the United States in the Indo-Pacific. The Trump administration bungled the crisis, damaging the U.S.’s standing as a paragon of competence in public health, and functional governance more generally. The international face of the U.S. response deepened preexisting concerns—especially significant in the Indo-Pacific—that the U.S. had retreated from its post-Second World War and post-Cold War role of providing international public goods and leadership and supporting international institutions. Opportunities for the U.S. amid the crisis and in its aftermath stem primarily from shortcomings or unappealing features in China’s handling of the epidemic, and stumbles in China’s self-presentation as a provider of foreign assistance and international cooperation, and from U.S. policies—many of them embraced by the Biden administration—that could correct missteps and ameliorate trends that have diminished U.S. standing (especially during Donald Trump’s presidency). For the U.S. to reap potential gains, it also must adapt its policies to the implications of some Indo-Pacific states’ comparatively successful responses to the pandemic, and the pandemic-spotlighted nature of contemporary international problems.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
United States of America and Indo-Pacific

4. The Pandemic as a Geopolitical Gamechanger in the Indo-Pacific: The View from China

Author:
Yun Sun
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
How has the COVID-19 pandemic reshaped or influenced China’s geopolitical outlook and its grand strategy for the years to come? This is a question that will determine China’s relationship with the United States, the Indo-Pacific region, and the rest of the world. In the Chinese strategic community, the pandemic has been regarded as a “watershed” event that has reshaped the structure of the international system and the power equilibrium. Its importance is elevated to the same status as the end of World War II, which determined the bipolar international system between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War which began thirty years of U.S. hegemony in a unipolar world. Although China began as a sheer loser in the pandemic given its culpability in the origin of COVID and its early poor management of the domestic spread of the disease, Beijing believes that it has eventually emerged as a pure winner in the pandemic: the relative gain China has made vis-à-vis the U.S.’s bigger losses in disease control, national power, economic growth, global leadership, and credibility has strengthened Chinese confidence that the tide is turning in China’s favor. The “effectiveness” of the Chinese political system, as manifested in its domestic disease control, has reinforced China’s ideological conviction of its superiority. As China uses COVID diplomacy to demonstrate the superiority and desirability of its political system, the pandemic is perceived as an opportunity for it to shape the new international order and promote China’s desired “Community of Common Destiny.” Challenges remain, as the U.S. revamps its alliance system under the Biden administration and as regional powers and Western countries grow increasingly concerned and anxious about China’s growing confidence and capabilities. However, for China, the pandemic has been a great opportunity, and China has emerged from it as a pure winner. It is an interesting question as to how the pandemic has changed the nature and the dynamics of the great power competition between the U.S. and China. Most would agree that the pandemic exacerbated, accelerated, and aggravated the deterioration of relations that the U.S. and China had already been experiencing before 2020. However, the differences lie in the degree, intensity, velocity, and extensiveness of the damage. Without the pandemic, the downward slope U.S. and China had already been on would not have come to a state of “freefall” in 2020. And that “freefall” period has long-lasting and significant implications for their bilateral relations in the post-COVID world. The damaged trust, confidence, and credibility, and the deeply entrenched sense of hostility, or even antagonism, have made any effort to repair the relations extremely difficult, if not completely impossible. And this reality will affect the regional dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region for the many years and decades to come.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

5. China’s Economic Rise amid Renewed Great Power Competition, America’s Strategic Choices

Author:
Charles W. Boustany Jr.
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
American ideals coupled with the commercial self-interest of American business and industry drove the policy of engagement, and even after the 1989 massacre of student protesters at Tiananmen Square, sustained momentum for China’s accession into the WTO. Despite China’s known unfair trade practices, it was thought that problems would eventually disappear as China adopted rules and norms as conditions of its accession to the WTO while deepening its integration into the global trading system. Yet, despite this strategy of engagement, China has not implemented expected substantive structural reforms consistent with the spirit, if not the letter, of its WTO obligations.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, and Economics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

6. The Case of United States Views of Its Ties with China

Author:
Scott W. Harold
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
U.S. views of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have been hardening for at least two decades, from George W. Bush characterizing China in the 2000 presidential campaign and the first months of his presidency as a “strategic competitor,” to the Obama administration’s pursuit of a “pivot” to the Asia–Pacific in response to China’s growing assertiveness, to the Trump administration describing China’s rise as signaling the “return of an era of great power competition.” Does this trend reflect changes in U.S. self-conception and national identity? Evolving assessments of threat in light of Chinese behavior and what these imply about the regime’s intentions? A reaction to shifts in the overall balance of power between the two countries, perhaps a reflection of a declining superpower facing a rising challenge, “tragically” destined to participate in a “contest for supremacy in Asia” that will ineluctably result in a “Thucydides trap” or war of hegemonic transition? Or is it instead an inevitable clash between a liberal, democratic, rule of law capitalist hegemon and a resilient authoritarian challenger that is a communist dictatorship increasingly reliant on aggressive nationalism since the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre and evolving rapidly towards national socialism or fascism? While each of these perspectives provides some purchase on the recent developments in U.S. – China relations as seen from Washington, this chapter focuses on the role of national identity, arguing that identity is by no means the sole or best explanation, but that it is an important factor that should not be overlooked or underestimated.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

7. Putin’s Strategic Framework for Northeast Asia

Author:
Dmitri V. Trenin
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This paper discusses the strategic framework for Russia’s policies toward Northeast Asia, placing it in the context of Moscow’s geopolitical repositioning after the Ukraine crisis and the ensuing confrontation with the United States, and the alienation from Europe. After 2014, the Ukraine crisis put an end to Russia’s quarter-century-long attempt to integrate with the West and become part of a Greater Europe and the Euro-Atlantic community. At the same time and in the same place (Ukraine), Russia’s attempt to build a power center in the former Soviet space came to an end. Ukraine was not the cause of either failure, but it was the trigger of both. The conclusion was clear. Russia was not fit for integration into something that was bigger than Russia, and Russia was no longer capable of integrating former borderlands. Two-plus decades after the break-up of the former Soviet Union, Russia stood alone—but also free. Such was the end of a grand illusion linked to the West, and also the end of three centuries of empire-building.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, Geopolitics, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and United States of America

8. Donald Trump’s Geopolitical Framework for Northeast Asia: Something Borrowed, Something New

Author:
Mark Tokola
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Does the forty-fifth president of the United States, Donald J. Trump, have a foreign policy, not least of all inclusive of the vital Northeast Asian region? The question is not flippant. Policy is usually thought of as a set of principles that guide action towards a desired outcome. Trump may, as he professes, act from instinct – reactively and transactionally rather than from an intent to implement an established policy. In the eyes of some of his supporters, this would be a virtue. They elected him expressly for the purpose of breaking with a traditional Washington policy machinery that they did not believe was serving their interests. However, Trump and his administration do assert and describe a distinct foreign policy. They even have a name for it, “principled realism.” Moreover, when Trump was running for the presidency in 2016, he announced his intention to “develop a new foreign policy direction for our country, one that replaces randomness with purpose, ideology with strategy, and chaos with peace.” He stated, “It’s time to shake the rust off America’s foreign policy.”
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

9. The U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy and Its Implications for U.S.-ASEAN Economic Governance Architecture

Author:
Kaewkamol Karen Pitakdumrongkit
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
During his visit to Asia in November 2017, President Donald Trump announced his vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” as the U.S. approach to the region. The Department of State unveiled in detail the economic elements of the Indo-Pacific strategy in April 2018. These economic policies were reiterated by Vice President Mike Pence at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) CEO Summit in Papua New Guinea in November 2018. For instance, Pence maintained that Washington plans to “make bilateral trade agreements with any Indo-Pacific nation that wants to be our partner and that will abide by the principles of fair and reciprocal trade,” promote private sector investment, and assist regional states on sustainable infrastructure development. On December 31, Trump signed into law the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) passed by the U.S. Congress earlier that month. ARIA further advances the strategy by mandating the executive branch to “develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific region.” Moreover, the text authorizes $1.5 billion to “the Department of State, United States Agency for International Development [USAID], and, as appropriate, the Department of Defense . . . for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023, which shall be used” to achieve several objectives including ensuring “the regulatory environments for trade, infrastructure, and investment in partner countries are transparent, open, and free of corruption.” Against this backdrop, this chapter examines the effects of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy on the future of U.S.-ASEAN economic governance architecture. “Strategy” refers to “the collection of plans and policies that comprise the state’s deliberate effort to harness political, military, diplomatic, and economic tools together to advance that state’s national interest.” Such a study is warranted for a few reasons. First, the jury is still out on the degree to which this strategy would align or clash with different approaches and policies supported by Southeast Asian governments. Clashes of ideas and policies can result in not only failed implementation of the U.S. strategy but also competing economic initiatives which could undermine the future of U.S.-ASEAN trade and investment ties. Therefore, this research is aimed at: 1) assessing how the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy would interact with Southeast Asian nations’ policies to shape the future development of regional economic architectures, and 2) forging policy recommendations for the U.S. and ASEAN governments on how they could jointly pursue regional economic institution-building. The questions I explore include: 1) What are the economic components of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy? 2) How will this strategy and Southeast Asian countries’ economic agendas/policies interact to shape the future advancement of regional economic architecture? and 3) What should American and ASEAN governments do to foster cooperation and lessen conflict among their different policies regarding economic regionalism? The chapter is organized as follows. The next part discusses the economic components of the Indo-Pacific strategy under the Trump administration. The second section examines the interactions between this strategy and the economic agendas of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to highlight the areas of complementarities and clashes. The last section provides policy recommendations for American and Southeast Asian governments to augment synergies and ameliorate clashes among their policies.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Governance, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

10. The Trump Economic Impact on East Asia after Two Years: The Case of South Korea

Author:
Yoon Yeo-joon
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The U.S.-South Korea relationship has traditionally been characterized as a security alliance, meeting the interests of both countries for a stable Korean Peninsula. Economically, Korea was a major recipient of U.S. development assistance after the Korean War. The U.S. also provided non-reciprocal preferential trade treatment, which played an important role in Korea’s economic development. After Korea’s unprecedented economic development, the economic relationship between the two countries progressed from mere donor-recipient relations. The U.S.-Korea economic partnership culminated in the Korea-U.S. free trade agreement (KORUS FTA), which came into effect in 2012. During the past 70 years, the U.S. has become the second most important export destination and the third most important importer for Korea. Korea has also risen to be the sixth largest trading partner for the U.S. During these years, Korea has also benefited from common values shared with the U.S., such as democracy, rule of law, and an open and free market economy. Two years into the Trump administration, the U.S.-Korea economic relationship is facing another turning point. Trump is a game changer, trying to alter the global trading system and its relation to China. Korea has been only partially affected by his grand scheme so far. However, Trump specifically blamed the KORUS FTA as a major contributing factor to the U.S.’ huge trade deficit and domestic job losses in manufacturing. As a result, the KORUS FTA was amended. Various protectionist measures, such as Section 201 tariffs on washing machines and solar panels as well as Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum, could have a substantial impact on Korea. Rising protectionism in the U.S. is a grave concern for Korea considering the significance of the U.S. to the Korean economy. This chapter explores U.S.-Korea economic relations two years into the Trump administration—too short a time to make definitive statements such as whether the relationship has deteriorated or not. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economic relations between Korea and the U.S., focusing on trade and investment. Section 3 covers the KORUS FTA renegotiations, which were recently settled. It includes what was decided and the implications for the Korean economy. Section 4 summarizes the protectionist measures that the Trump administration has imposed and how these measures would impact Korea, adding a simple empirical analysis that investigates whether the U.S. trade balance with Korea improved over the two years. Section 5 concludes the chapter.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

11. The Trump Impact on East Asia After Two Years

Author:
Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Trade ties between the United States and many East Asian countries have faced a high degree of uncertainty since Donald Trump took office in early 2017. The world is now accustomed to an atmosphere of sanctions, tariffs, ultimatums, and negotiations under pressure with little left off the table. The centerpiece in this drama is, of course, Sino-U.S. relations. Much is written on that, and the saga of tense talks, occasional breakdowns, and upbeat statements continued as we were proceeding with our analyses of the East Asian region. Instead of trying to unravel where that might end, we concentrate on countries in the region neighboring China. We begin with the Trump economic impact on South Korea, turn then to Japan, switch next to Southeast Asia, and conclude with North Korea. In the first three cases, we identify various similarities as well as some differences, and with North Korea, burdened with “maximum pressure,” we find an outlier. South Korea has already cut a trade deal, Japan is now beginning negotiations for an agreement with the U.S., and the states of Southeast Asia, after Trump’s pullout from TPP and Japan’s leadership in keeping the momentum alive, are striving to hold onto multilateralism. Trump’s thinking is steeped in narrow notions of manufacturing trade deficits subsumed under the slogan “America First,” as well as updated alarm about unfair practices to coerce or steal intellectual property rights. He has rallied Americans with considerable international support behind the need to curb China’s predatory trade practices, while alienating virtually the entire world, including U.S. allies, with overcharged claims of “national security” in imposing tariffs to control imports of selected products, starting with steel and aluminum but threatening to make the sale of foreign-made cars and trucks the ultimate target for reducing the U.S. trade deficit. Concern prevails over what further damage Trump may do to the trade environment in East Asia. In Seoul, despite relief that what was most feared when Trump railed against the KORUS FTA did not come to pass, one hears warnings that Trump may extend barriers already imposed on washing machines and solar panels to automobiles—a large part of exports to the U.S. Just on the precipice of bilateral talks demanded by the U.S., Japan also nervously awaits pressure against its even more massive automobile exports. For Southeast Asian states, the prospect of bilateral negotiations with the U.S .is frightening as well, since it is understood that smaller economies have little leverage in such negotiations. The spillover for all of these countries from hefty U.S. tariffs on China is also feared, since they are deeply integrated into production chains.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, and Trade
Political Geography:
East Asia, North America, and United States of America

12. Chinese Sharp Power and U.S. Values Diplomacy: How Do They Intersect?

Author:
Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
An intensifying backlash against Xi Jinping’s makeover of China and Donald Trump’s makeover of the United States has muddied thinking about the national identity struggle recently building between the world’s top two powers. What was heralded as the “China Dream,” benefitting from earlier touting of “harmonious” themes, became tarnished as the “China nightmare” of stooping to any means to steal secrets and undermine other states. The long-admired “beacon on the hill” had become sullied as the valueless and selfish “America First” unable to champion democracy or even truth, which was dismissed as “fake news.” The clash in national identities between the two dominant powers on opposite sides of the Pacific is now taking an idiosyncratic form, which challenges us to separate the essence of the struggle likely to be unavoidable for decades ahead from its specific manifestations under the exceptional circumstances of today. Whereas Trump is seen as sui generis, an anomaly that is unlikely to put U.S. values diplomacy at long-run risk, Xi Jinping’s shift from soft power to sharp power appears more sustainable even if there is reason to assume that another effort will be made to raise the profile of Chinese soft power at some point. If 2017 was the year of mounting obsession with Russian sharp power, 2018 proved to be the year of increasing attention to Chinese sharp power. As the focus expanded from Russia to China, a similar set of questions was being asked: 1) how was sharp power manifested? 2) what are the comparisons between Chinese and Russian sharp power? and 3) what was the United States, cognizant of the experiences of other targets of sharp power, doing in response? The suggested answers have pointed not only to developments in Sino-U.S. relations, but also to some wider implications for the Indo-Pacific region of an ever-deepening values confrontation. As many anticipate a prolonged struggle ahead between the United States and China, steeped in different and clashing national identities, the prospects for Chinese usage of sharp power and of U.S. effectiveness in the advance of values diplomacy should be on people’s minds, but there has been a shift of attention as Trump refused to acknowledge the blatant use of Russian sharp power on the minds of many Americans, let alone to make Chinese sharp power his concern. In the absence of such concern, others have raised alarm about China’s sharp power and warned that Trump’s indifference to advancing U.S. values diplomacy is resulting in a dangerous vacuum.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

13. Japan's Strategy to Keep the North Koreans and Chinese Down, the Americans in, and the Russians Neutral

Author:
James D. J. Brown
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The Japanese government makes no secret of its intensifying security concerns. The Ministry of Defense’s most recent annual white paper includes the assessment that, “The security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, with various challenges and destabilizing factors becoming more tangible and acute.” The report is also explicit about the source of these challenges. The most immediate danger is identified as North Korea, whose “military development such as its nuclear and missile development constitute unprecedented, serious and imminent threats to the security of Japan.” Second on the list is China, which is singled out for the non-transparent strengthening of its armed forces, as well as the increase in its military activities in the vicinity of Japan. Lastly, the white paper notes that “Russia has been modernizing its forces including its nuclear capability not only in the Europe region but in the periphery of Japan,” and that close attention needs to be paid to these developments. The country faces not only the individual security challenges posed by North Korea, China, and Russia, but also the danger of increased cooperation between these three nuclear-armed neighbors. What is more, at just the time when Tokyo needs reliable partners, it finds itself dealing with a South Korean government that it considers chronically untrustworthy and a U.S. administration that often seems less like a loyal friend and more like an increasingly expensive supplier of commercial security services. Having identified the nature of this problem, the remainder of this essay focuses on explaining Japan’s strategy for addressing it. It does so by adapting Lord Ismay’s famous description of the fundamental goal of NATO as being to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”13 Correspondingly, Japan’s current strategy can be characterized as aiming to keep the North Koreans and Chinese down, the Americans in, and the Russians neutral. After outlining the details of each part of this strategy, the essay will identify the main challenges to overcome in its implementation.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and National Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, North Korea, and United States of America

14. Advancing the Regional Trade Order in East Asia with a Less Engaged United States

Author:
KEI
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
In the aftermath of Donald Trump’s election and immediate pullout from the TPP, a scramble ensued over how to proceed with constructing a regional trade order centered on East Asia. For China this brought closer scrutiny of its pursuit of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In the case of Japan, questions followed about what to do with the residue of TPP. Others, notably countries in Southeast Asia, were left contemplating the balance between eastern exclusive regionalism and the western presence in regionalism. In the background were efforts in South Asia aimed at advancing economic integration with East Asia. A kind of free-for-all was in progress without the moorings that had been lost after the paradigm of competition between a U.S.-led TPP and a China hub-and-spokes BRI no longer was guiding the strategic calculations of Asian countries. Then, in March 2018 came Trump’s disruptive tariffs, threatening to set a trade war in motion. Four chapters explore the challenge of advancing a regional trade order in East Asia in the new circumstances of 2017-18. Tu Xinquan in Chapter 10 questions whether BRI is a path toward regionalism, delving deeply into the Chinese strategy for BRI. T.J. Pempel follows in Chapter 11 by exploring Japan’s thinking about TPP and the process of refocusing on TPP- 11 following the U.S. withdrawal. Chapter 12 by Sanchita Basu Das offers a hopeful ASEAN perspective on economic regionalism. Finally, in Chapter 13 Pradumna Bickram Rana traces thinking about re-energizing economic integration between South Asia and East Asia. With no finality to the RCEP talks and the recently concluded TPP-11 pact still taking shape and Trump’s “America First” trade policy casting a dark shadow, we aim to capture signs of a new trade order at a time of flux.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Trade, Regional Economy, and TPP
Political Geography:
East Asia, Asia, and United States of America

15. A U.S. Perspective on the Impact of Sanctions

Author:
James Walsh
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Despite a crowded news agenda, North Korea has managed to draw the attention of both political leaders and the public at large. Missile tests, an assassination employing VX nerve agent, and preparations for a nuclear test have drawn strong reaction from Washington to Kuala Lumpur. Each new controversy sends policymakers scrambling for a response and, more often than not, that response has been a call for new and tougher sanctions. And not surprisingly, each new call for sanctions resurrects the old question: do sanctions on North Korea have any impact?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

16. A Chinese Perspective on the Impact of Sanctions

Author:
Cheng Xiaohe
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Since the Korean War, North Korea (the DPRK) has endured sanctions imposed by the United States and other western countries, but the sanctions began to acquire a dramatic impact only in 2006 when North Korean ballistic missile blasts invited a punitive reaction from the UN Security Council. In addition to sanctions imposed by individual countries, for the first time, international organizations, notably the Security Council, passed punitive resolutions in an effort to rein in North Korea’s missile and nuclear development. In order to supervise implementation of the sanctions, the Security Council set up a committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 in 2006 (the sanctions committee), which now comprises all 15 members and makes its decisions by consensus. To North Korea’s dismay, as it continues to fight against western countries’ economic sanctions and military embargo, it now has to bear the brunt of sanctions from its traditional allies, China and Russia. Even so, it has been defying international pressure and pressing ahead with its missile and nuclear weapons programs. Despite tougher sanctions, North Korea is poised to possess missiles with nuclear warheads that could hit South Korea, Japan, and the United States. This paper explores the effectiveness of the sanctions, asking whether the North’s steady progress on nuclear and missile weapons demonstrates their failure.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, and Economy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

17. A View from the United States on Sino-U.S. Relations

Author:
Joel Wuthnow
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
During the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, the candidates reached a bipartisan consensus on one issue: how to deal with North Korea. Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump both called for China to do more to convince Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear program once and for all. Candidate Trump said that China has “absolute control” over North Korea and promised to do whatever it takes to convince Beijing to use that leverage, including imposing penalties on Chinese firms. As president, however, Trump will have to navigate the reality of China’s extreme hesitance to use the only type of pressure likely to divert North Korea’s nuclear ambitions—the threat of regime-endangering punishment. If and how China should continue to fit into U.S. strategy for dealing with North Korea will thus be a key issue facing Trump and his advisors.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, Elections, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

18. Intro | Establishing Triangular Talks Among Washington, Beijing, and Seoul

Author:
Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Of five alternative approaches to addressing the North Korean threat to stability in East Asia and beyond, this section is concerned with the possibility of just one—a diplomatic approach via Three-Way Talks among China, South Korea, and the United States. We single out this approach as the golden mean for reconciling the conflicting interests among the parties best positioned to reshape the calculus of Pyongyang. It represents the path to compromise. Among the alternatives, there is the Chinese appeal for a dual-track approach through Six-Party Talks, aimed at a peace treaty on terms attractive to North Korea and greatly transformative to the security architecture in Northeast Asia. This could hardly be called a compromise, since Seoul and Washington regard this as a win for Pyongyang and evidence that Beijing actually has been siding with Pyongyang. Another alternative is Strategic Patience, which is a misnomer for the policy of the Obama administration, but, in any case, refers mainly to reliance on increased deterrence as pressure is ratcheted up. In fact, Obama was seeking a pathway to three-way talks, giving China time to shift in that direction bolstered by new sanctions, while in 2016 also moving closer to a fourth approach: Unilateral Sanctions targeted at the Chinese firms assisting North Korea. A fifth option is Alliance Triangularity to force change in Pyongyang.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Sanctions, Instability, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America