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Begin New Search Topic Foreign Policy Political Geography North Korea Content Type Journal Article Publication Year within 10 Years

1. Dominating the Superpower: A Bounded Rationality Approach to Nuclear Proliferation and Inhibition in the U.S. / North Korea Dyad

Author:
Sercan Canbolat and Stephen Benedict Dyson
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
Why was the United States, despite its overwhelming superiority in power, unable to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons? Why did North Korea persist in its nuclear pursuit in the face of U.S. opposition? In this article, we represent nuclear proliferation and counter-proliferation as situations of subjective strategic interaction between states. We measure preferences over strategies and outcomes using operational codes of the leaders of each country, derived via linguistic analysis. Our results indicate that neither the U.S. nor North Korea accurately understood the other side’s preference ordering, and that their operational codes interacted in such a way as to produce an outcome favorable to North Korea – the weaker party - and unfavorable to the U.S. – the stronger. The wider contribution is to show that (mis)perceptions of the goals and resolve of the opponent play a crucial role in the success or failure of strong states to compel weak states and vice versa.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Politics, Leadership, and Perception
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

2. Sanctions Run Amok – The Undermining of U.S. Power

Author:
Keith A. Preble
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Well into its second year, the Biden administration has continued to grapple with persistent foreign policy challenges while new ones have emerged: North Korea has not curtailed its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs; negotiations with Iran on resuscitating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) remain stalled; and a Russian troop buildup near Ukraine may signal a potential invasion and full-scale conflict. In confronting these and other challenges, the United States continues to use economic sanctions as a mean of punishing, signaling, and coercing rivals into changing their foreign policy behaviors. As a tool of American economic power, policymakers often see sanctions as “Goldilocks” instruments that are “just right,” albeit ones that require time and patience to facilitate policy change.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, and Economy
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

3. China’s Role in Inter-Korean Relations

Author:
Gordon G. Chang
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
China has great power over both Koreas, but its influence looks to be at its peak. There are many reasons for this, but the most important is that the two Koreas are moving closer together and in the process shutting out outsiders. Moreover, the U.S., as it seeks to disarm North Korea, is pursuing policies undercutting Beijing’s role on the peninsula. And to make matters worse, China is beginning to limit its own effectiveness.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

4. The North Korean Détente: Peace Prospects on the Korean Peninsula

Author:
Jonathan Lim
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
This paper conceptualizes the emerging détente within inter-Korean relations as evidence of tangible transformations within North Korea’s domestic and foreign policy, establishing how this phenomenon represents a unique and conclusive opportunity for peace and engagement. It contextualizes the inter-Korean and Singapore summits as foundations for the détente, before expanding upon the nature of the détente through the contrasting objectives of North and South Korea, and the transitional nature of domestic affairs in North Korea. The article establishes the bona fide nature of North Korea’s détente, as revealed by a direct connection between North Korea’s international diplomatic gestures vis-av-vis transitional domestic circumstances; involving incremental economic modernization and political liberalization under a shift in focus within Kim Jong-un’s Byungjin Line policy. This analysis departs from and orthodox Western interpretation of inter-Korean relations, providing a holistic analysis of inter-Korean affairs and North Korean domestic politics.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Singapore

5. North Korea’s Sharp Power and the Divide Over Korean Identities

Author:
Aram Hur
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This chapter examines the nature and motivations of North Korea’s sharp power toward South Korea. Unlike China or Russia, to secure long-term survival, North Korea ultimately needs cooperation from the rival democracy it seeks to undermine. I argue that this produces a particular North Korean brand of “Trojan horse” sharp power: the hijacking of South Korea’s value diplomacy apparatus to disseminate a dual narrative. Externally, North Korea aims to project soft power hand in hand with South Korea to the international community, while internally, it exploits South Korea’s nationalist divisions to its desired ends. I illustrate this strategy through in-depth case studies of North Korea’s most significant sharp efforts in 2018. The analysis contests a simplistic understanding of sharp power and shines a different light on the regime’s recent diplomatic efforts.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Diplomacy
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

6. Japan's Strategy to Keep the North Koreans and Chinese Down, the Americans in, and the Russians Neutral

Author:
James D. J. Brown
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The Japanese government makes no secret of its intensifying security concerns. The Ministry of Defense’s most recent annual white paper includes the assessment that, “The security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, with various challenges and destabilizing factors becoming more tangible and acute.” The report is also explicit about the source of these challenges. The most immediate danger is identified as North Korea, whose “military development such as its nuclear and missile development constitute unprecedented, serious and imminent threats to the security of Japan.” Second on the list is China, which is singled out for the non-transparent strengthening of its armed forces, as well as the increase in its military activities in the vicinity of Japan. Lastly, the white paper notes that “Russia has been modernizing its forces including its nuclear capability not only in the Europe region but in the periphery of Japan,” and that close attention needs to be paid to these developments. The country faces not only the individual security challenges posed by North Korea, China, and Russia, but also the danger of increased cooperation between these three nuclear-armed neighbors. What is more, at just the time when Tokyo needs reliable partners, it finds itself dealing with a South Korean government that it considers chronically untrustworthy and a U.S. administration that often seems less like a loyal friend and more like an increasingly expensive supplier of commercial security services. Having identified the nature of this problem, the remainder of this essay focuses on explaining Japan’s strategy for addressing it. It does so by adapting Lord Ismay’s famous description of the fundamental goal of NATO as being to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”13 Correspondingly, Japan’s current strategy can be characterized as aiming to keep the North Koreans and Chinese down, the Americans in, and the Russians neutral. After outlining the details of each part of this strategy, the essay will identify the main challenges to overcome in its implementation.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and National Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, North Korea, and United States of America

7. The North Korean Factor in the Sino-Russian Alliance

Author:
Stephen Blank
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The Kim-Putin summit in April 2019 and the abortive Trump-Kim summit in February 2019 compel us to review Korean issues from the regional security standpoint, rather than primarily as a proliferation question. Despite apparent failure of the Trump-Kim summit, the search for denuclearization and peace in Korea will continue. North Korea is obviously resuming discussions with Russia and China to decide their future course of action, inasmuch as Kim went to Vladivostok. The summit with Putin in April only reinforced those considerations, as it is clear from the subsequent press conference that Kim asked Putin to transmit his views to Washington and that Putin agreed to do so. Likewise, Washington must rethink its approach. Instead of emphasizing denuclearization, Washington would likely benefit from viewing Korean issues primarily as regional security questions. Certainly, Russia and China do so. Therefore, rethinking Russo-Chinese ties to North Korea offers valuable insights in the quest for a lasting Korean peace, especially as Russia and China have become allies.5 The argument of a Sino-Russian alliance is admittedly a minority view among scholars, but the mounting evidence of their alliance is apparent not only in regard to Korea—as the other chapters in this collection show—but in larger military-political affairs as well.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea

8. Sino-Russian Relations, South Korea, and North Korea

Author:
Robert Sutter
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This examination of the relations among these four governments assesses the ever-closer China-Russia relationship featuring stronger strategic alignment against the United States and its interests in many parts of the world, including the Korean Peninsula. It also considers how the Sino-Russian relationship reacted to the major changes in the Korean Peninsula brought on by the string of remarkable developments on the peninsula since 2017. Those developments include: the Donald Trump administration’s heavy pressure against North Korean nuclear weapons development in 2017; North Korea’s abrupt shift away from confrontation and toward negotiations with the U.S. and South Korea in early 2018; the subsequent dramatic shift toward top-level U.S.-North Korea negotiations to ease tensions and improve relations seen in Trump’s meetings with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in June 2018 and February 2019; and active, related North Korean summitry with South Korea and China. In this period, China and Russia in relations with South Korea and North Korea repeatedly worked together to offset U.S. pressures and undermine U.S. influence. Developments over the past two years have seen China emerge as a critically important player with a major role in all aspects of negotiations involving the crisis caused by North Korea’s rapid development and repeated testing of nuclear weapons and related development and testing of ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead as far as the continental U.S. By contrast, Russia’s role and influence have declined in importance. The failed revival of the Six-Party Talks, in which Russia and Japan played a direct role along with North and South Korea, China, and the U.S. in dealing with the North Korean nuclear weapons crisis, and the current regional dynamic focused on only the four latter powers means that Moscow and Tokyo have been marginalized by recent developments. Such an outcome challenges the Russian government of President Vladimir Putin and its drive to play a prominent role as a leading world power on issues important to Russian interests. Demonstrating new prominence, Putin hosted visiting Kim during a brief summit long sought by Russia in Vladivostok on April 25. The Russian leader said North Korea’s security concerns would be better met with international guarantees involving Russia and China rather than bilateral North Korean agreements with the U.S. Up until this point, Russia had been playing second fiddle to Beijing, repeatedly siding with China in matters regarding the Korean Peninsula. China, for its part, seemed comfortable with close cooperative relations with Russia as it deals with Korean matters. Whatever differences the two may have over Korean issues have been difficult to discern amid their collaboration and cooperation, which focus on weakening the American position in Korea and Northeast Asia.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

9. The China-Russia-North Korea Triangle After Kim Jong-un's Turn to Diplomacy

Author:
Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The triangle of Beijing-Moscow-Pyongyang has great significance for the geopolitics of not only Northeast Asia, but the globe. It played a critical role in the 1950 launching of the Korean War, when the Cold War took shape. It became the subject of much speculation in the 2000s, when the Six-Party Talks offered hope that the post-Cold War framework could become one of trust based on shared interests in peace and stability and joint prosperity focused on Northeast Asia. Today, it is again worthy of close attention, as diplomacy has intensified in an atmosphere of increasing polarization. Various alternatives for the future of this triangle have recently been suggested. The options offered for the emerging China-Russia-North Korea triangle include the following. One, a North Korean defection centered on a deal with the United States and an understanding with South Korea allowing for gradual inter-Korean integration with economics in the forefront. Two, a Chinese sphere of influence, which Russia is too weak to resist and North Korea prefers to the danger of regime change through Korean integration and U.S. demands for openness and human rights. Three, a balanced triangular alliance, where North Korea resumes playing off its allies in Beijing and Moscow without having to take the side of either, but this time without a serious split between the two great powers. Four, maximum autonomy of Pyongyang carving space among the five states most concerned with its destiny, leaving this triangle with no more significance than the triangle with the U.S. and South Korea. Fast-moving, diplomatic developments in 2018-2019 provide some evidence for assessing these alternative outcomes.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Economy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea

10. Chinese Views of Korean History in the Cold War Era

Author:
Jin Linbo
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This chapter draws a rough sketch of the evolution of Chinese views on Korean history in the Cold War era in three parts. The first focuses on the formulation of Chinese views of the Korean War in 1950 and the mainstream assessment of the war after Sino-South Korean diplomatic normalization in 1992. The second focuses on China’s attitudes and policies toward the two Koreas in the Cold War years. The third deals with the changes and limits of perceptions on Korean history after diplomatic normalization and their impact on bilateral relations between Beijing and Seoul. For centuries many Chinese have firmly believed that the relationship between China and the Korean Peninsula is like that between lips and teeth, they are not only close to but also dependent upon each other. If the lips are gone, the teeth will be cold. From the middle of nineteenth century, the geopolitical proximity and interdependence between the two have become the determining factors in formulating Chinese perceptions towards Korea. Since then the national security concerns symbolized by the sense of lips and teeth had been frequently stressed by some Chinese intellectuals and officials when both China and Korea were exposed to the growing imperialist expansion and geopolitical competition in East Asia. In order to maintain the traditional tributary relationship between China and Korea, China fought the first Sino-Japanese War in 1894-95. Although it was miserably defeated, and Korea was consequently annexed to the Japanese empire in 1910, the Chinese sense of lips and teeth remained undiminished. Rather, it was further strengthened among ordinary Chinese when the Cold War began and especially when the Korean War broke out in 1950. After the end of World War II, China faced a new situation on the peninsula. Korea was liberated from Japanese rule but soon divided into the Soviet backed socialist North Korea, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and the U.S. backed capitalist South Korea, the Republic of Korea (ROK). As a newly established socialist country, China naturally allied itself with the Soviet Union and viewed the DPRK as a close friend while regarding the United States and ROK as hated foes. The intensified Cold War confrontation between the two camps and two Koreas triggered the outbreak of the Korean War. In order to safeguard its own political, ideological, and security interests, China quickly got involved in the war by sending the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (CPVA) to fight together with its DPRK friend against their common enemies. The war ended with a cease-fire armistice and created a friend and foe Cold War framework, which the new China was compelled to face even beyond the Cold War era. Under these circumstances, the majority of Chinese held the view that it was the capitalist enemy rather than the socialist friend who started the Korean War with a view to overthrowing not only the socialist government in Pyongyang but also the similar one in Beijing. Therefore, it was against this background that China’s attitudes and policies toward the two Koreas in the post-Korean War era were doomed to be ideologydriven and DPRK sympathetic.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cold War, History, and Public Opinion
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and North Korea

11. The Candlelight Mandate & Moon Jae-in’s Inter-Korean Dilemma

Author:
John Delury
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The question of the proper relationship between domestic sentiment and foreign policy is a vexed one. Historically, statesmen and strategists have tended to distrust or disparage the role of the demos in the elite enterprise of foreign affairs. In the immortal words of the then vice president Richard Nixon: “If we indulge in the kind of thinking which assumes that foreign policy decisions should be made on the basis of public opinion polls we might as well decide now to surrender our position of world leadership to the communists.” Yet from even the most condescending foreign policy establishment perch, it is hard to dispute the significance of securing public support for key foreign policy moves. Nixon as president was fully aware of this, carefully stage-managing his most dramatic maneuver, the visit to China in February 1972, in a way that would maximize support back home. And of course, Nixon’s loss of public trust over the Watergate scandal brought about the abrupt end of his influence on everything, including foreign affairs. Nixon’s impeachment, after years of public opposition to the war in Vietnam, strengthened the view in the United States that unsupervised elites were in fact the worst possible stewards of the instruments of national power, and that popular, democratic checks were critical ingredients in wise and prudent foreign policy. Once the public is accorded a decisive role in foreign affairs deliberation, we have to grapple with the problem of determining what “the public” thinks in the first place. Who represents “the public”? How can we assert “it” thinks one way or another? What do we mean by expressions such as “the public seems to have changed its mind”? French theorist Pierre Bourdieu, for example, challenged the validity of statistical representations of “public opinion” based on polling data. Bourdieu argues that public opinion so constructed is an “artefact” of the pollsters, rather than a reflection of an actual thing in the world. Polling data creates a false sense of certainty about public preferences—the illusion of a static and knowable thing, “the public,” where one does not exist. Despite the epistemological limitations and political biases embedded in the art of polling, public sentiment must be brought into the equation of foreign policy analysis. Particularly in a South Korean context, given the highly participatory nature of political culture, it would be foolish to adopt an elitist premise that the public factor can be ignored. South Korean president Moon Jae-in, for one, emphasizes the critical importance of democratic legitimacy and public input in all aspects of governance, including foreign policy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Governance, and Public Opinion
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

12. Salvaging the Sunshine Policy

Author:
David Straub
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Shortly before his election as South Korea’s president in May 2017, candidate Moon Jaein issued his most detailed North Korea policy statement. As president, he declared, he would “inherit” the engagement-based, inducements-oriented Sunshine Policy approach of Korea’s only other progressive presidents, Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) and Roh Moohyun (2003-2008)1. Moon judged the North Korea policies of his immediate predecessors a failure; Presidents Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013) and Park Geun-hye (2013-2017), both conservatives, had disagreed with key aspects of the Sunshine Policy and suspended the major inter-Korean projects undertaken by Kim and Roh. Moon’s emphasis on incentives to Pyongyang contrasted with United Nations Security Council resolutions adopted during the preceding decade; far from offering inducements, the UNSC had imposed increasingly stringent sanctions on the regime in response to its accelerating pursuit of a full-fledged nuclear weapons capability. Moon also struck quite a different tone than the new Trump administration in Washington, which had only recently concluded a North Korea policy review and characterized its approach as one of “maximum pressure and engagement. This chapter assesses Moon’s North Korea policy, its implementation during his initial year in office, and its prospects under difficult circumstances. It begins by reviewing the Sunshine Policy concept, its practice by previous progressive governments, and the significantly different approach of South Korea’s succeeding conservative administrations. It then argues that Moon and many progressives continue to believe in the basic Sunshine Policy approach, even though, unlike when the policy was first formulated, North Korea now already has a limited nuclear weapons capability and may soon be able to credibly threaten the United States homeland with nuclear attack. It reviews how Moon, as president, has attempted to salvage the policy and how North Korea and other concerned countries have responded. The chapter concludes by considering the prospects for Moon’s North Korea policy and offering recommendations to modify it to maximize the interests of both the ROK and the international community as a whole.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Elections, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

13. North Korea’s Military Strategy, 2018

Author:
Chun In-bum
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
As the focus shifted from North Korea’s military advances in 2017 to its diplomatic offensive in 2018, we should not lose sight of the strategic thinking behind gaining the maximum time to develop the capacity to extend its military threat. At present North Korea needs time to perfect its nuclear strike capability. It has been very successful in developing missile capabilities, but it needs additional time to achieve its goals. Starting with high-level North-South talks on March 5, 2018, the DPRK has just gained what it needs most: time. Whenever the first talks begin with the United States and the DPRK, there should be no surprise if the DPRK comes with an improved capability to threaten the alliance. Thus, for an extended period in 2018, as diplomacy proceeds, we should expect a subdued North Korean approach: not flaunting its nuclear weapons and missiles, while striving to boost capabilities for the struggle ahead. In the seven years since Kim Jong-un officially inherited the leadership of the DPRK, his stated policy has been byungjin ( 병진, 竝進), the pursuit of both economic and military development. In conjunction with purges and efforts to eliminate rivals, byungjin may, in part, derive from Kim’s efforts at the outset of his tenure to consolidate political power. Through it, Kim displayed moderate economic flexibility, thereby gaining favor with the North Korean people through facilitating an improvement in living standards. It is tempting to see byungjin as a sign of the regime’s weakness, or as an indication of moderation, either of which would prompt the eventual collapse of the Kim regime. Correspondingly, one might see it as a reflection of Kim’s immaturity, inexperience, and lack of political and strategic acumen. These viewpoints reflect mirror imaging more than a sophisticated understanding of North Korea. Byungjin may be more of a political device and a strategic communications element of a grand strategy, as opposed to the regime’s strategy. It may be a significant instrument in the regime’s effort to maintain elite cohesion and focus the energies of the North Korean people toward productive pursuits that likewise add to the regime’s legitimacy and staying power. It by no means suggests any diminishing of the priority of making advances in nuclear and missile development in order to pose a more serious threat. Since taking power, Kim’s regime has fired close to one hundred missiles of wide variety and range compared to thirty-one for his father and grandfather combined. He has also conducted four nuclear tests, boasting of a thermal nuclear capability. During his 2018 New Year’s address, Kim Jong-un proclaimed that the DPRK had perfected its nuclear and intercontinental missile capabilities, supporting North Korea’s constitutional claim to be a nuclear power. Despite an upsurge in diplomacy after this address, we should keep our eyes on its military advances.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

14. North Korea’s Diplomatic Strategy, 2018

Author:
Mark Tokola
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
With an outbreak of diplomacy under way for the Korean Peninsula, a review of North Korea’s approach to negotiations is timely. A summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and South Korean President Moon Jae-in was held on April 27. President Trump has accepted an invitation to meet with Kim Jong-un.1 The secretive nature of the North Korean state makes it difficult to assess how it will engage with and what it expects to gain from talks with the international community—not just with the United States and South Korea, but with China, Japan, Russia, the EU, and others. However, its past behavior, official statements, the testimony of defectors, and the expert opinion of North Korea watchers can provide helpful insights. This chapter presents a brief history of talks and agreements with North Korea prior to the inauguration of Trump, followed by an overview of North Korea’s diplomatic outreach in 2018 to date. It then presents indicators as to what North Korean diplomacy may look like through the rest of the year based on assessments of its stated and implicit objectives—ends it would wish to attain in any event, either through diplomacy or by coercion. I conclude with a list of key upcoming dates and scenarios describing how North Korean diplomacy may play out for the remainder of 2018. North Korea’s recent diplomatic moves mark an abrupt policy change. During 2017, it carried out in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions three test flights of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); conducted its fifth and sixth underground nuclear tests, the latter being the most powerful to date and almost certainly thermonuclear; threatened an “unimaginable attack” against the United States;2 and officially announced that it would “never give up its nuclear weapons.”3 If North Korea is indeed now willing to negotiate denuclearization with the United States and South Korea, its diplomacy can at least be described as agile.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

15. A U.S. Perspective on the Impact of Sanctions

Author:
James Walsh
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Despite a crowded news agenda, North Korea has managed to draw the attention of both political leaders and the public at large. Missile tests, an assassination employing VX nerve agent, and preparations for a nuclear test have drawn strong reaction from Washington to Kuala Lumpur. Each new controversy sends policymakers scrambling for a response and, more often than not, that response has been a call for new and tougher sanctions. And not surprisingly, each new call for sanctions resurrects the old question: do sanctions on North Korea have any impact?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

16. A Chinese Perspective on the Impact of Sanctions

Author:
Cheng Xiaohe
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Since the Korean War, North Korea (the DPRK) has endured sanctions imposed by the United States and other western countries, but the sanctions began to acquire a dramatic impact only in 2006 when North Korean ballistic missile blasts invited a punitive reaction from the UN Security Council. In addition to sanctions imposed by individual countries, for the first time, international organizations, notably the Security Council, passed punitive resolutions in an effort to rein in North Korea’s missile and nuclear development. In order to supervise implementation of the sanctions, the Security Council set up a committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 in 2006 (the sanctions committee), which now comprises all 15 members and makes its decisions by consensus. To North Korea’s dismay, as it continues to fight against western countries’ economic sanctions and military embargo, it now has to bear the brunt of sanctions from its traditional allies, China and Russia. Even so, it has been defying international pressure and pressing ahead with its missile and nuclear weapons programs. Despite tougher sanctions, North Korea is poised to possess missiles with nuclear warheads that could hit South Korea, Japan, and the United States. This paper explores the effectiveness of the sanctions, asking whether the North’s steady progress on nuclear and missile weapons demonstrates their failure.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, and Economy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

17. The Impact of Chinese National Identity on Sino-South Korean Relations

Author:
See-Won Byun
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
How do Chinese national identity narratives affect Sino-South Korean relations? The Koguryo history war more than a decade ago was a turning point in bilateral relations since diplomatic normalization in 1992, generating enduring competition over representations of history.1 In 2010, China’s commemoration of its entry into the Korean War raised early warnings in South Korea over Beijing’s hostile foreign policy orientation under Xi Jinping. Contrary to such expectations, however, the earliest summit agreements between presidents Xi Jinping and Park Geun-hye after both took office in 2013 were on history cooperation as common victims of Japanese colonialism. Most notably in 2015, Park’s participation in Beijing’s 70th anniversary celebrations of the end of World War II consolidated joint claims of what was called the best period in bilateral relations.2 This chapter assesses the impact of Chinese national identity on China-Republic of Korea (ROK) relations under the Xi and Park administrations since 2013. It examines Chinese constructions of national identity and their implications for the security, economic, and cultural dimensions of the Sino-South Korean relationship. Rather than promoting partnership, competing identities across these dimensions reinforce enduring differences over the region’s political, economic, and cultural order. These differences surfaced most saliently in 2016, following an initial period of engagement that corresponds with the downward trend in China-Japan relations since 2012. Managing them requires the very trust-building that both Beijing and Seoul have prioritized since 2013.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Identity
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and North Korea

18. A View from the United States on Sino-U.S. Relations

Author:
Joel Wuthnow
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
During the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, the candidates reached a bipartisan consensus on one issue: how to deal with North Korea. Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump both called for China to do more to convince Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear program once and for all. Candidate Trump said that China has “absolute control” over North Korea and promised to do whatever it takes to convince Beijing to use that leverage, including imposing penalties on Chinese firms. As president, however, Trump will have to navigate the reality of China’s extreme hesitance to use the only type of pressure likely to divert North Korea’s nuclear ambitions—the threat of regime-endangering punishment. If and how China should continue to fit into U.S. strategy for dealing with North Korea will thus be a key issue facing Trump and his advisors.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, Elections, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

19. Intro | Establishing Triangular Talks Among Washington, Beijing, and Seoul

Author:
Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Of five alternative approaches to addressing the North Korean threat to stability in East Asia and beyond, this section is concerned with the possibility of just one—a diplomatic approach via Three-Way Talks among China, South Korea, and the United States. We single out this approach as the golden mean for reconciling the conflicting interests among the parties best positioned to reshape the calculus of Pyongyang. It represents the path to compromise. Among the alternatives, there is the Chinese appeal for a dual-track approach through Six-Party Talks, aimed at a peace treaty on terms attractive to North Korea and greatly transformative to the security architecture in Northeast Asia. This could hardly be called a compromise, since Seoul and Washington regard this as a win for Pyongyang and evidence that Beijing actually has been siding with Pyongyang. Another alternative is Strategic Patience, which is a misnomer for the policy of the Obama administration, but, in any case, refers mainly to reliance on increased deterrence as pressure is ratcheted up. In fact, Obama was seeking a pathway to three-way talks, giving China time to shift in that direction bolstered by new sanctions, while in 2016 also moving closer to a fourth approach: Unilateral Sanctions targeted at the Chinese firms assisting North Korea. A fifth option is Alliance Triangularity to force change in Pyongyang.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Sanctions, Instability, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

20. Thomas H. Henriksen. America and the Rogue States. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In America and the Rogue States, Thomas Henriksen lays out the relationships that exist, and have existed, between America and the states that made up George W. Bush's 'Axis of Evil.' Henriksen outlines the history of the interactions between the United States and North Korea, pre-invasion Iraq, and Iran, and through this draws out a number of themes. He also shows that the ways the relationships have played out are highly situational and there is no one-size-fits-all solution. In the last chapter, Henriksen explores American relationships with a number of states that were either once considered rogue or could become rogue, like Libya, Syria, and Cuba, referring to them as either “lesser rogues” or “troublesome states.” These states have remained “a puzzle for US foreign policy” (1) and are characterized by three things: autocratic governance, sponsorship of terrorism, and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). There is no clear definition provided by Henriksen for what can be considered a rogue state, making it difficult to judge what other states, if any, could be considered rogue. Henriksen seems to arbitrarily decide who is rogue and who is not: Cuba is a rogue state, while Myanmar is merely troublesome. Instead of synthesizing a clear definition of the term, something that could then be applied to other states in order to judge their 'rogueness,' Henriksen uses the Bush administration's criteria (the term itself was coined by President Bill Clinton in a 1994 speech in Brussels), which was outlined in the National Security Strategy of 2002 (NSS-2002). These were “brutality toward their own people; contempt for international law; determination to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD); advanced military technology; sponsorship of terrorism; rejection of human rights values; and hatred for the United States and 'everything it stands for'”. The use of the NSS-2002 definition allows for the 'Axis of Evil' to fit neatly into the term, which constitutes a problem of tautology, at least for the Bush administration. Further compounding this was that, according to Henriksen at least, the administration was set on going to war in Iraq prior to assuming office. This creates a situation in which it is hard to determine whether the idea of rogue states was created to justify this desire, or it informed the desire prior to the administration taking office.
Topic:
Foreign Policy and Terrorism
Political Geography:
United States, America, North Korea, and Libya