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  • Author: Mike Fejes
  • Publication Date: 02-2021
  • Content Type: Journal Article
  • Journal: Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
  • Institution: Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
  • Abstract: Over the past twenty years, domestic military operations in Canada have seen a dramatic increase in the employment of the Primary Reserve (PRes) alongside the Regular Force. This raises an important question regarding how, in an evolving environment, the PRes can be successfully employed in future aid to the civil power roles? This paper argues that the current organization and terms of service for the PRes are not properly structured and mandated to support any large-scale and sustained aid to the civil power operation - and that this forces Canadians to accept risk when it comes to domestic national security. Theoretically, Canadians have relied for decades on what Sokolsky and Leuprecht have defined as an easy rider approach; where the government contributes just enough resources to ensure that the Canadian public respects and values the military effort. As demands increase, future domestic operations may now have to adapt to a new approach where the criteria for success becomes crisis resolution rather than crisis contribution. By examining the current roles and framework under which the PRes operates, the legal obligations that are currently in force, and the proposal that the PRes assume primary responsibility for domestic response operations, this paper concludes that assigning new roles and responsibilities to the PRes without additional legal obligations will not set the conditions for success should a large scale or lengthy call out be required.
  • Topic: Military Strategy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Conflict, Risk
  • Political Geography: Canada, North America
  • Author: P. Whitney Lackenbauer
  • Publication Date: 02-2021
  • Content Type: Journal Article
  • Journal: Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
  • Institution: Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
  • Abstract: Any conceptual framework for Canadian policy had to recognize the interdependent nature of North American security, whereby the United States’ safety was dependent on Canadian territory and airspace. In its classic incarnation, the concept of defence against help thus represents a trilateral equation, consisting of an external threat (or threatening context), a smaller state (the security of which is inextricably linked to the perceived security of a larger neighbour), and the neighbouring larger power itself. The equation incorporates how the threat relates to the larger state, and how the smaller state plays (or does not play) an intermediary role in the threat relationship between the threatening context and the larger state. Canada’s alignment to the United States did not detract from the value of the concept to its decision-making; it bolstered it. A smaller state can invoke the strategy of defence against help in two ways: unilaterally (with or without coordination with the larger state), or conjointly with the larger state. Does defence against help continue to represent a workable, basic decision-making strategy for Canada to ensure continental defence in the 21st century? Building upon observations that I initially drew in a 2000 working paper, I maintain that the concept no longer represents an attractive or viable justification for core Canadian strategic decision-making. Rather than conceptualizing United States continental defence priorities as a threat to Canada’s sovereignty (as it is conventionally defined in military and diplomatic circles) owing to potential territorial encroachment to protect the American heartland, cost-benefit analysis of Canadian options should focus on the benefits that Canada derives from its bilateral and binational defence partnership. Instead (and in contrast to some recent commentators), I suggest that the driving strategic consideration since the late 1980s has been less about defence against help than about the need for Canada to contribute meaningfully to bilateral defence in order to stay in the game and secure a piece of the action.
  • Topic: Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Regionalism
  • Political Geography: Canada, North America, United States of America
  • Author: Livia Peres Milani
  • Publication Date: 01-2021
  • Content Type: Journal Article
  • Journal: Contexto Internacional
  • Institution: Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
  • Abstract: Academic literature on US Foreign Policy to South America usually states its lack of atten- tion to the region in the post 9/11 period. I aim to problematize this assertion through an analysis of US regional security policy. Therefore, I consider data referring to military and economic assistance, arms transfers, and the SOUTHCOM position towards its area of responsibility, as well as official documents and diplomatic cables. I conclude that, although the region was not a priority, a waning in US actions or a moment of neglect in its policy towards it was likewise not observed. From a historical perspective, the area was never the main focus of attention, but there is a specialized bu- reaucracy that works on the region to maintain US hegemony. Therefore, the investigation indicates that Latin American assertiveness during the 2000s was caused primarily by the conjunction of the ascension of leftist governments and quest for autonomy, as well as by Chinese and Russian involve- ment in Latin America, but not by US neglect. The article is divided into six sections, including the introduction and final remarks. Following the introduction, I analyse the academic literature regarding USA-Latin American relations in the second section, the US assistance in the third, the SOUTHCOM postures in the fourth, and the strategies deployed by the USA regarding great powers and arms transfers in the fifth. Finally, I present the final remarks.
  • Topic: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Counter-terrorism
  • Political Geography: Latin America, North America, United States of America
  • Author: James Franklin Jeffrey
  • Publication Date: 03-2021
  • Content Type: Journal Article
  • Journal: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
  • Institution: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
  • Abstract: In his foreign policy, President Trump followed new approaches and shaped the international stage in ways that will be hard for the Biden administration to reverse. These approaches, nowhere more apparent than in the Middle East, include, first, focus on near peer competition, in the Middle East, that included containing Russia, Iran, and Islamic violent extremists such as al-Qaida and particularly Daesh or ISIS. The second is reliance upon partners and allies. The Trump administration succeeded by its standards using the above approaches: Iran’s regional advance was contested and to some degree constrained, Teheran is under far greater economic pressure and faced with a regional coalition encouraged by the Abraham Accords. The administration had moved most of the region beyond the endless Palestinian issue as the lodestone of regional diplomacy, destroyed the ISIS territorial state, and with help from Turkey contained Russian advances. With the exception of the Iranian nuclear file, this looks like success. The issue now is whether the Biden administration can build on this success or revert to Obama
  • Topic: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Leadership, Transition
  • Political Geography: North America, United States of America
  • Author: Assal Rad
  • Publication Date: 03-2021
  • Content Type: Journal Article
  • Journal: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
  • Institution: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
  • Abstract: The attacks on 11 September 2001 not only shaped the focus of US foreign policy over the last two decades, but also de!ned how a generation of Americans understood the gravity of these policies by bringing the cost and tragedy of con"ict home. For many young Americans, it was the !rst time they became aware of the extent of US interventionism and how it impacts the way other nations and peoples view the United States. But events over the last year in the United States have brought the attitude of US foreign policy—which has long been driven by the idea that problems can be solved exclusively through militarism and force—much closer to home. Images of police violently confronting Black Lives Matter protestors and an insurrection at the Capitol were often likened to images of war zones abroad, the very wars started by the United States.
  • Topic: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Peace
  • Political Geography: Iran, Middle East, North America, United States of America
  • Author: Ibrahim Karatas
  • Publication Date: 03-2021
  • Content Type: Journal Article
  • Journal: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
  • Institution: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
  • Abstract: When the United States was hit by al-Qaida's terrorist attack on 11 September 2001 (hereafter 9/11 attacks), not only Americans but the whole world was shocked: The world’s only superpower was attacked at home and had lost more than three thousand people. To take revenge for the attack as well as to prevent new ones, the Bush administration decided to invade both Afghanistan and Iraq, which they claimed were sheltering and supporting al-Qaida. Afghanistan was invaded on 7 October 2001 because the US wanted (1) to eliminate Osama bin Laden (the mastermind of 9/11) and al-Qaida; (2) to remove the Taliban group from power and bring stability to Afghanistan by creating a democratic and peaceful state.[1] The US Army subsequently invaded Iraq in 2003, claiming that Saddam Hussain was supporting terrorism and producing chemical weapons. There were also allegations that the Hussain regime was behind the 9/11 attacks, but it was never proven. The US eventually removed both Taliban and Saddam Hussain from power and captured Hussain, who was later judged and executed by the new Iraqi government on 30 December 2006. US special forces killed Laden on 2 May 2011. As of today, the US has killed its two archenemies and changed regimes allegedly supporting terrorism in both Afghanistan and Iraq, yet could not bring stability. What is more, the remaining US troops are preparing to leave the two countries. Neither Afghanistan nor Iraq is in better condition than the pre-invasion era as both states have failed, lack a strong authority, and cannot !ght terrorism. In Afghanistan, the Taliban was the enemy to be removed, however the US’s recent agreement with the organization has paved the way for re-control of the country by the group. On the other hand, Iraq has become a land of widespread terrorism, and the country is more divided than before, not mentioning Iranian in"uence on Baghdad. Based on the current situation, my arguments are that (1) the US is about to make the same mistake it did in Vietnam, and (2) Afghanistan and Iraq might again become the hub of terrorist organizations as well as regional rivalries. Although I do not approve of the US invasions, as Afghanistan and Iraq saw the worse with its invasion, these countries will face the worst with the US’s withdrawal.
  • Topic: Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, War on Terror, Foreign Interference
  • Political Geography: Afghanistan, Middle East, North America, United States of America
  • Author: Augusto C. Dall'Agnol, Marco Cepik
  • Publication Date: 05-2021
  • Content Type: Journal Article
  • Journal: Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
  • Institution: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
  • Abstract: This article explains changes in strategic stability through a path dependence framework, discussing its antecedent conditions, increasing returns, cleavages, critical junctures, reactive sequences, and legacy. We identify the leading causes of its formation, reproduction, modification, and, eventually, its end. Such an analysis is relevant as far as we observe significant changes in cornerstone’s aspects of strategic stability after the abrogation of the ABM Treaty and the INF Treaty. We argue that strategic stability as an institution passes through radical modifications produced by reactive sequences breaking the causal loop that allowed its reproduction since its formation.
  • Topic: Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, INF Treaty
  • Political Geography: North America, United States of America
  • Author: David Hutchins
  • Publication Date: 09-2020
  • Content Type: Journal Article
  • Journal: The Ambassador's Review
  • Institution: Council of American Ambassadors
  • Abstract: It should come as no surprise to those in the United States that China has some ambitious goals for the coming decades, but perhaps what is less known by Americans is what China seeks to achieve and the rate at which the country is determined to achieve it. China’s economic achievements and its increasing presence on the global stage are shifting the balance of power in this current era of great power competition. While China’s ascension seems all but certain, what remains to be seen is how the United States will respond to meet this challenge. To understand how the U.S. could weather the storm, one must first understand China’s ambitions.
  • Topic: Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Leadership, Conflict
  • Political Geography: China, Asia, North America, United States of America
  • Author: Steven Pifer
  • Publication Date: 09-2020
  • Content Type: Journal Article
  • Journal: The Ambassador's Review
  • Institution: Council of American Ambassadors
  • Abstract: The Biden presidency that begins in January will adopt some very different directions from its predecessor in foreign policy. One such area is arms control, particularly nuclear arms control with Russia—the one country capable of physically destroying America. President-elect Biden understands that arms control can contribute to U.S. security, something that President Donald Trump never seemed to fully appreciate. Biden will agree to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the sole remaining agreement limiting U.S. and Russian nuclear forces. His administration should aim to go beyond that and negotiate further nuclear arms cuts. That will not prove to be easy. Doing so, however, could produce arrangements that would enhance U.S. security and reduce nuclear risks.
  • Topic: Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Denuclearization
  • Political Geography: North America, United States of America
  • Author: Thomas Graham
  • Publication Date: 09-2020
  • Content Type: Journal Article
  • Journal: The Ambassador's Review
  • Institution: Council of American Ambassadors
  • Abstract: During the depths of the 45-year-long Cold War in the early years, neither side believed it had an understanding of what the other side was doing. Both sides feared a sudden bolt from the blue in which nuclear weapons would lay waste to their societies. The threat was indeed beyond rational description. One U.S. B-52 bomber in those days carried more explosive power than all the bombs dropped by all the sides in World War II. The Soviet Union deployed an intercontinental ballistic missile with a 25-kiloton warhead that could strike the United States with only a few minutes of advanced warning, perhaps 20 minutes. One way of thinking about the explosive capability of just one megaton is to contemplate a freight train loaded with dynamite stretching from New York to California. Just one Soviet missile had 25 times this capability, and the Soviet Union had hundreds of such weapons. The bombs on the U.S. strategic bombers were of the same destructive force. And the U.S. ultimately built a missile force that had a destructive capability that was at least three or four times greater than the Soviet force. The two nations were like two strong men fighting each other to the death in a pitch-black room with long knives. The principal difference was that one of the men would eventually win and emerge victorious from the darkroom; yet in nuclear war, there would be no winners, only losers—and both contestants would be effectively destroyed.
  • Topic: Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, United States , Denuclearization
  • Political Geography: North America, United States of America