Search

Begin New Search Political Geography Japan Content Type Journal Article

41. The Clash of Japan’s FOIP and China’s BRI?

Author:
Daisuke Akimoto
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:
Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:
Since the late 2010s, the concept of the “Indo-Pacific” has been becoming increasingly significant in the international political arena. In August 2016, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe proposed a policy of “Free and Open Indo- Pacific” (FOIP) as Japan’s new diplomatic vision at the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) VI held in Kenya. The FOIP strategy was supported by the Donald Trump administration followed by the renaming of the United States Indo-Pacific Command. However, China has viewed the FOIP as a containment strategy against the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The FOIP vision is unclear for general observers, and it might cause a security dilemma with the Chinese BRI. Is it possible for the FOIP vision to coexist with China’s BRI, or are these two strategic visions destined to clash with each other? In an attempt to answer these questions, the article aims to provide multiple perspectives of the FOIP concept by applying international relations (IR) theory. This article warns that the FOIP and the BRI are likely to bring about diplomatic tension that could be escalated into a military skirmish over the territorial dispute. In order to avoid the possible military clash, it finally seeks to explore possible future pathways of the peaceful coexistence of the two visions in the Indo-Pacific region.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Japan, China, and Asia

42. The image of Chinese and Japanese Theatre in selected popular and artistic press printed in Poland in 1930s

Author:
Katarzyna Michalewicz
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
Journalists who described Oriental theatres usually based their narrative on personal experience. Both specialist, mass and popular press paid particular attention to elements that distinguished Japanese and Chinese theatre from their European counterpart. The length of performance, innovative technical solutions, different acting style were the elements that received most attention. Nonetheless, sometimes it was impossible to explain the origins of those differences. Furthermore, the above-mentioned differences usually spoke against Chinese theatre. It was criticized for different music, moveable stage scenery, exaggerated acting that was hard to understand. Such attitude was the result of lack of understanding of Chinese opera’s conventions. On the other hand, press eagerly commended the richness of Chinese actors’ costumes and ,,shadow puppet theatre”. Moreover, Polish press also stressed that both classical and modern Chinese theatre enjoyed immense popularity among Chinese people. Polish press went easy on theatrical art in Japan depicting differences that were in many cases the same as in Chinese theatre as something neutral, even positive as it gave the play magical touch. Sometimes it was emphasized that Japanese theatre could become a source of inspiration for its European counterpart. It was praised for masks, costumes, moveable stage scenery and music. It is interesting that in the last two instances Chinese theatre was looked down on. Polish press also spoke favourably of puppet theatre and ,,Takarazuka” performances. On the other hand, magazines’ opinions on acting varied.
Topic:
History, Arts, Media, and Theater
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, Asia, and Poland

43. The Pandemic and its Impact on the South Korea-Japan Identity Clash

Author:
Scott Snyder
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The global pandemic caused by the onset of the novel coronavirus known as COVID-19 has tested governance at both the national and international levels by challenging the capacity of nations to provide effective public health solutions to protect their citizenry. The pandemic has deepened preexisting international rivalries while also creating diplomatic opportunities to promote international cooperation and public diplomacy. Rather than serving as a turning point for a new era in international relations, the pandemic and the global response appear primarily to have accelerated preexisting trends. In Northeast Asia, the pandemic has accelerated deepening rivalry between the United States and China, reinforced political paralysis between Japan and South Korea, primarily by providing a pretext for privileging domestic concerns and constituencies at the expense of international relations, and has generated heightened new foreign policy challenges resulting from deepening identity-based major power rivalries. This chapter reviews the deepening of identity-based challenges facing Japan-South Korea relations prior to 2020, examines the conditions generated by leadership responses in both countries to the pandemic, identifies missed opportunities for pandemic-related cooperation between the two countries, and addresses challenges and opportunities facing the Japan-South Korea relationship in the context of anticipated recovery from the pandemic as well as the shifting geopolitical environment as tensions mount between China and the United States.
Topic:
Culture, Domestic Politics, COVID-19, and Identity
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

44. The Pandemic as a Geopolitical Game Changer in the Indo-Pacific: The View from Japan

Author:
Glen S. Fukushima
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The coronavirus pandemic that struck in late 2019 has affected the world profoundly, and Japan is no exception. But the direct impact on Japan has been relatively small considering the number of cases of infections and deaths relative to the size of Japan’s population, particularly considering its elderly population and high density. For instance, among the G7 countries, Japan has had the fewest cases of infections (4,690 per million population as of May 2, 2021) compared to 32,276 in Canada, 40,620 in Germany, 64,804 in the United Kingdom, 66,828 in Italy, 86,283 in France, and 99,652 in the United States. Similarly, among the G7 countries, Japan has had by far the fewest number of deaths (81 per million population as of May 2, 2021) compared to 638 in Canada, 996 in Germany, 1,601 in France, 1,776 in the United States, 1,870 in the United Kingdom, and 2,004 in Italy. This chapter argues that although the direct disruptions to Japan resulting from the pandemic have been less than to the other G7 countries, the effect of the pandemic on other nations with strong geopolitical importance to Japan—in particular, the United States and China—coupled with changes in Japan’s domestic political and economic environment have accelerated changes in geopolitical posture and direction that were already in progress in Japan. The fundamental geopolitical challenge facing Japan is how to ensure its military security, political independence, and economic prosperity in the face of a less reliable and less predictable United States and a more powerful and more assertive China. For Japan, the ideal resolution of this challenge is to maintain positive and constructive relations with both countries, while recognizing the reality that even as economic ties with China—whether in trade, investment, finance, tourism, or the exchange of people—are growing relative to ties with the United States, political and security ties (and the sharing of common values) with the United States remain the centerpiece of Japan’s foreign policy. Given this context, it is only natural that Japan would seek to diversify and strengthen its relationships with other countries, regions, economic arrangements, and international organizations and institutions. This diversification, which could be seen since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, has gained momentum in recent years, and the pandemic has served only to accelerate it. The analysis proceeds through the examination of the following: 1) pandemic chronology; 2) Japan’s domestic politics; 3) relations with the United States; 4) relations with China; 5) Japan’s diversification strategy; and 6) conclusions.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Geopolitics, and Economy
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

45. The Big Squeeze: Japanese Supply Chains and Great Power Competition

Author:
Mireya Solis
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Japan led, and was transformed, by the global supply chain revolution. Facing growing protectionism in industrialized markets and reeling from sharp yen appreciation in the aftermath of the 1985 Plaza Accord, Japanese firms responded with a drastic increase in their overseas investment activities. In so doing, many of these companies spearheaded the movement towards the fragmentation of production across national boundaries that sought efficiency gains by pooling the competitive advantages of different locations. Japan’s experience with the first supply chain revolution was transformative. It altered its export-led model with important implications for its foreign policy. Japanese investments in the United States helped abate trade frictions; integrated production was at the heart of the project to rebuild relations with China, and Japan’s lead as foreign investor in Southeast Asia has been a pillar of its blueprint for regional integration. The strains in the rules-based international trade order, however, have raised questions about the ability of global supply chains to continue to operate effectively. The U.S.-China geopolitical rivalry has manifested in a damaging trade war, and moves to restrict tech flows are creating decoupling pressures. The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated these trends with lockdowns that disrupt supply chains while export protectionism and calls to renationalize production are on the rise. The intensified risk environment could lead to a second supply chain revolution with a greater emphasis on redundancy and diversification and bifurcation of productive chains. How will Japan respond to the challenges to international production, a central engine of its economic prosperity, and with what consequences for its relations with major powers? To provide greater clarity on this overarching question, this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the central role of Japanese firms in the emergence and deepening of regional production networks. Although Japan’s overall share of intra-regional trade has decreased in the 21st century—in tandem with China’s rise as regional hub- Japanese firms have retained their central role in GVCs (Global Value Chains) through their advanced manufacturing capabilities. Section 2 offers a glimpse of past and recent supply chain shocks—China’s embargo of rare earth metals, the Great East Japan Earthquake in Tohoku, and the Japan-Korea export control dispute—to illustrate both sources of vulnerability and resilience of Japanese GVCs. Section 3 assesses the systemic shift brought about by revived great power competition, and identifies some early adjustment responses from Japanese firms to a new normal of heightened geopolitical tension.
Topic:
Economics, Strategic Competition, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
Japan, China, and Asia

46. Buddhism and the Question of Relationality in International Relations

Author:
Kosuke Shimizu
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
Relationality seems to have attracted a broader audience in international relations (IR) in the last decade. Unlike other approaches of the relational turn that concentrate more on analyzing or stabilizing the international order, the Buddhist theory of IR is mainly concerned with the political practice of the liberation and healing of people. In this article, I will illustrate how Mahāyāna Buddhist teachings can contribute to IR by using case studies. The cases to investigate include the Okinawa base issue, Denmark’s ‘light in the darkness’, and South Korea-Japan diplomatic relations.
Topic:
Religion, Ethics, International Relations Theory, and Buddhism
Political Geography:
Japan, Europe, Asia, South Korea, and Denmark

47. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Political Warfare and Propaganda

Author:
James J. F. Forest, Daniel De Wit, Kyleanne Hunter, Emma Jouenne, Glen Segell, Lev Topor, Alexander Tabachnik, Donald M. Bishop, Phil Zeman, Michael Cserkits, and Anthony Patrick
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
The digital age has greatly expanded the terrain and opportunities for a range of foreign influence efforts. A growing number of countries have invested significantly in their capabilities to disseminate online propaganda and disinformation worldwide, while simultaneously establishing information dominance at home. Each of the contributions to this issue addresses the central theme of influencing perceptions and behavior. First, Daniel de Wit draws lessons from a historical analysis of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), America’s intelligence and special operations organization in World War II. In addition to its efforts to collect intelligence on the Axis powers and to arm and train resistance groups behind enemy lines, the OSS also served as America’s primary psychological warfare agency, using a variety of “black propaganda” methods to sow dissension and confusion in enemy ranks.82 As noted earlier, psychological warfare plays a significant role in the conduct of today’s military operations, so de Wit’s research offers important historical lessons for contemporary campaign planners. Next, Kyleanne Hunter and Emma Jouenne examine the uniquely troubling effects of spreading misogynistic views online. Their analysis of three diverse case studies—the U.S. military, the incel movement, and ISIS— reveals how unchecked online misogyny can result in physical behavior that can threaten human and national security. Glen Segell then explores how perceptions about cybersecurity operations can have positive or negative impacts on civil-military relations, drawing on a case study of the Israeli experience. Lev Topor and Alexander Tabachnik follow with a study of how Russia uses the strategies and tactics of digital influence warfare against other countries, while continually seeking to strengthen its information dominance over Russian citizens. And Donald M. Bishop reveals how other countries do this as well, including China, North Korea, Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela. Each is engaged in these same kinds of efforts to control the information that circulates within their respective societies, while using various forms of propaganda against other countries to strengthen their influence and national power. Phil Zeman’s contribution to this issue looks at how China and Russia are trying to fracture American and Western societies through information, disinformation, economic coercion, and the creation of economic dependencies— in many cases capitalizing on specific attributes and vulnerabilities of a target nation to achieve their strategic objectives. Through these efforts, he concludes, China and Russia hope to prevent the will or ability of American or Western states to respond to an aggressive act. Next, Michael Cserkits explains how a society’s perceptions about armed forces can be influenced by cinematic productions and anime, drawing on a case study comparison of Japan and the United States. And finally, Anthony Patrick examines how social media penetration and internet connectivity could impact the likelihood that parties within a conventional intrastate conflict will enter negotiations. As a collection, these articles make a significant contribution to the scholarly research literature on political warfare and propaganda. The authors shed light on the need for research-based strategies and policies that can improve our ability to identify, defend against, and mitigate the consequences of influence efforts. However, when reflecting on the compound security threats described at the beginning of this introduction—involving both cyberattacks and influence attacks—a startling contrast is revealed: we have committed serious resources toward cybersecurity but not toward addressing the influence issues examined in this issue. We routinely install firewalls and other security measures around our computer network systems, track potential intrusion attempts, test and report network vulnerabilities, hold training seminars for new employees, and take many other measures to try and mitigate cybersecurity threats. In contrast, there are no firewalls or intrusion detection efforts defending us against digital influence attacks of either foreign or domestic origin. Government sanctions and social media deplatforming efforts respond to influence attackers once they have been identified as such, but these efforts take place after attacks have already occurred, sometimes over the course of several years. The articles of this issue reflect an array of efforts to influence the perceptions, emotions, and behavior of human beings at both individual and societal levels. In the absence of comprehensive strategies to more effectively defend against these efforts, the United States risks losing much more than military advantage; we are placing at risk the perceived legitimacy of our systems and institutions of governance, as well as our economic security, our ability to resolve social disagreements peacefully, and much more.83 Further, many other nations are also facing the challenges of defending against foreign influence efforts. As such, the transnational nature of influence opportunities and capabilities in the digital age may require a multinational, coordinated response. In the years ahead, further research will be needed to uncover strategies for responding to the threat of digital influence warfare with greater sophistication and success.
Topic:
Security, National Security, Politics, Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Women, Radicalization, Cybersecurity, Internet, History, World War II, Propaganda, Deterrence, Disinformation, Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Digital Policy, Psychological Warfare, and Misogyny
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Israel, Global Focus, and United States of America

48. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Special Issue on Strategic Culture

Author:
Ali Parchami, Ofer Fridman, Neil Munro, W. A. Rivera, Evan Kerrane, Matthew Brummer, Eitan Oren, Katie C. Finlinson, Mark Briskey, Ben Connable, Benjamin Potter, Emilee Matheson, Jeffrey Taylor, and Dr. Jose de Arimateia da Cruz
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
An ironic feature of U.S. strategic culture is a rather distinctive disinterest in the study of our own or others’ strategic cultures. The U.S. security institutions find themselves energized about cultural study during irregular conflicts in which the cost of cultural ignorance is made plain, but they persist in under developing the ability to apply that same cultural acumen to great power conflict and key relationships with allies. During the last 100 years of fighting, U.S. defense institutions have repeated a pattern of investing in cultural study during short bursts of counterinsurgency fighting and then abandoning it along with its lessons learned at the termination of conflict. As a consequence, U.S. planning efforts—including those now being designed for future great power conflict—suffer from an unnecessarily narrow optic and fail to account for the full range of perspectives and plausible courses of action considered by an adversary. America’s allies know it and are frustrated by it. More importantly, U.S. adversaries know it and plan to exploit it. The study of strategic culture accounts for the ways in which the culture of a group, whether it be the constructed culture of a nascent terrorist organization or the enduring culture of a nation, impacts thinking and decision making regarding defensive and offensive approaches to security. Within a complex state like Russia or China, one must account for sweeping national narratives that cultivate collective mentalities and impact decision making but must also include the internal cultures of key organizations within the nation’s security community. These organizations often develop distinctive identities, values, perceptions, and habits of practice that can be consequential in moments when the organization’s leaders wield instruments of state power. In the first section of this special edition of the Journal of Advanced Military Studies (JAMS) on strategic culture, Drs. Ali Parchami, Ofer Fridman, Neil Munro, W. A. Rivera, and Major Evan Kerrane provide strategic culture profiles on key U.S. adversaries: Iran, Russia, and China. Their work reflects the complexity involved in identifying and analyzing the narratives and drivers that compete for dominance across these three strategic culture landscapes. Acquainting ourselves with the multivariate and often-contested internal constructs that produce the behavior of our adversaries helps expand our own thinking about the range of possible and plausible competitive strategies we are likely to see from them. The second section of this issue highlights the utility of understanding not only U.S. adversaries but also American allies and partners. Drs. Matthew Brummer and Eitan Oren examine the effort by Japan’s military leaders to shift their own strategic culture through an influence campaign aimed at altering domestic perceptions concerning the appropriate role for the military and thereby expanding its ability to more actively cooperate with the United States in maintaining peace and stability in Asia. Whether they are successful has direct implications for U.S. alliance constructs in the Pacific and the action that might be reasonably expected from Japan should U.S. conflict with China become kinetic. Katie C. Finlinson offers analysis that benefits U.S. deterrence and nonproliferation efforts. She employs a two-tiered research approach— leveraging both strategic culture and analysis of national role conception—as a useful framework for assessing the propensity of the United Arab Emirates to consider weaponizing civilian nuclear knowledge and infrastructure. Finlinson offers an approach repeatable for other potential over-the-horizon states and demonstrates the interplay between a state’s strategic culture and powerful exogenous factors—like security assurances from the United States and potential nuclear acquisition by Iran—in determining outcomes. Finally, Dr. Mark Briskey offers a look at the aspects of Pakistan’s strategic culture that exist as an outgrowth of its army’s most formative historic experiences and have resulted in deeply entrenched perceptions of self, of key adversaries, and perceptions of the past that must be understood by Western partners seeking Pakistan’s cooperation and partnership in the region. Our third section offers a close look at the ways in which cultural analysis can illuminate policy options on particularly difficult problem sets. One of these is assessing will to fight on the part of both allies and adversaries. Dr. Ben Connable recommends a diagnostic tool developed and trialed by the Rand Corporation that demonstrates promise in advancing the ability of defense institutions to anticipate will to fight in kinetic conflicts but also will to act in consequential ways by great powers engaged in strategic competition. Benjamin Potter, Emilee Matheson, and Jeffrey Taylor follow with applications of the Cultural Topography Framework, an approach to cultural data assessment and application that benefits from the insights supplied by the sort of comprehensive strategic culture profiles offered in section one of this issue and translates these into actionable intelligence against discrete problem sets. Their work, respectively, illuminates policy options for containing a potentially escalatory situation in Transnistria, decreasing violence and looting through a more effective reintegration strategy for former members of the Lord’s Resistance Army in Central Africa, and reexamining the value of technological advances in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, which may be having a deleterious impact on its deterrence strategy. The special issue concludes with a review essay by Dr. José de Arimatéia da Cruz, which offers readers critical analysis of three volumes of strategic culture scholarship. The articles collected for the special issue demonstrate a range of ways in which the study of strategic culture delivers critical insights to policy planners and strategists. Understanding other great powers on their own terms—the identities they seek to establish or defend, the values that inform their policies, the norms of strategic competition or warfighting that they deem acceptable and effective, and the worldview they espouse (whether an accurate fit with objective realities or not)—prepares policy makers to craft plans and strategies in ways that are tailored for maximum advantage vis-à-vis a particular adversary. Given the steady shutdown of cultural inquiry labs and training facilities across the U.S. defense and security community, it is worth issuing a stern reminder that the advantage of knowing one’s enemy is far more consequential when engaged in great power conflict than in the irregular conflicts in which U.S. institutions have learned its worth. This issue of JAMS is provided as a resource to both reinforce that point and supply a wealth of initial material in advancing it.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, War, History, Power Politics, Realism, Strategic Competition, Resistance, Identity, and Strategic Culture
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, Japan, Iran, Middle East, India, United Arab Emirates, and United States of America

49. Japan on the Borderlines: Is Japan Still a Civilian Power?

Author:
Bahadir Pehlivanturk
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
The New Security Legislation (NSL) passed through the Japanese Diet in 2015 has created concerns among the public and some parts of the academia about whether Japan’s potentially unhindered actions will destabilize the region. By adopting a civilian power ontology within the neoliberal framework, this study analyzes the 2015 NSL and its implications through three hallmark civilian power credentials: internationalization; the scope of the use of force; and the autonomy of security policy. The analysis and empirical evidence suggest that even after allowing for collective self-defense through the 2015 constitutional reinterpretation and the ensuing expanded scope for international security activity, Japan can still be narrowly considered a civilian power.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, and Legislation
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

50. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Naval Integration and the Future of Naval Warfare

Author:
Michael Flynn, Andrew Rhodes, Michael F. Manning, Scott Erdelatz, Michael Kohler, John T. Kuehn, B. A. Friedman, Steven A. Yeadon, Matthew C. Ludlow, Terje Bruøygard, and Jørn Qviller
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
In 2019, the 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps released his planning guidance that laid out the strategic focus and future direction of the Marine Corps. General David H. Berger’s intent for the following four years concurred with the analysis of the previous Commandant and the necessary alignment of the Corps with the National Defense Strategy for the future needs of the Fleet by focusing on five areas: force design, warfighting, education and training, core values, and command and leadership. General Berger cogently noted that the coming decade will be characterized by conflict, crisis, and rapid change—just as every decade preceding it. And despite our best efforts, history demonstrates that we will fail to accurately predict every conflict; will be surprised by an unforeseen crisis; and may be late to fully grasp the implications of rapid change around us. Berger’s primary concern is that the Marine Corps is not fully prepared— equipped, trained, or organized—to support the naval force. To that end, force design became the priority for Marine Corps efforts to fulfill its role for the Fleet as prescribed by the U.S. Congress. The level of change required to integrate the Corps of the future with the naval forces of today would not happen overnight and certainly not without a great deal of growing pains to ensure the Corps is equipped and prepared for the future security environment. When Force Design 2030 was released in March 2020, the Marine Corps was prepared to make the force-wide changes necessary to partner with the Navy and serve as the country’s naval expeditionary force. Our current force design, optimized for large-scale amphibious forcible entry and sustained operations ashore, has persisted unchanged in its essential inspiration since the 1950s. It has changed in details of equipment and doctrine as technology has advanced toward greater range and lethality of weapon systems. In light of unrelenting increases in the range, accuracy, and lethality of modern weapons; the rise of revisionist powers with the technical acumen and economic heft to integrate those weapons and other technologies for direct or indirect confrontation with the U.S.; and the persistence of rogue regimes possessing enough of those attributes to threaten United States interests, I am convinced that the defining attributes of our current force design are no longer what the nation requires of the Marine Corps. Berger’s plan pointed to specific areas of change required to make force design a reality: the size, capacity, and capability of the Corps. In an austere fiscal environment, the Marines must assess their current capabilities to achieve a smaller footprint with broader reach—do more with less. As the reality of COVID-19 and the 2020 U.S. presidential election have so poignantly reminded us all, these tasks cannot and should not rest on any single shoulder and any response should be well considered and intended to benefit the greater good. This issue of the Journal of Advanced Military Studies (JAMS) will address elements of the Commandant’s Planning Guidance, particularly the concept of naval integration and what it means for the Services, especially the Marine Corps. Our authors look to the past for relevant examples of military successes and failures of integration, but they also discuss how future warfare will play out based on these concepts. The authors explore the topic from a variety of perspectives, including those for and against, and they offer analyses of past and current attempts and what naval integration may mean for the future of the Corps. The following articles present the capabilities that will be required to shift from a traditional power projection model to a persistent forward presence and how the Marine Corps can exploit its positional advantage while defending critical regions. Our first author, Dr. Matthew J. Flynn, presents a historical approach to the topic in his article “The Unity of the Operational Art: Napoleon and Naval Integration.” Flynn’s research calls for greater coordination between the sea and land domains to improve U.S. national security. His article draws parallels between Napoleon Bonaparte’s defeat and the importance of naval integration for military success: “Napoleon’s fate reveals a great deal about naval integration and how it explains France’s defeat and, most importantly, that there is but one operational art—not one for land and one for sea.” Our second author, Andrew Rhodes, also relies on a historical example with his discussion of the salient lessons that can be learned from the Sino-Japanese War. Rhodes encourages professional military educators and planners who are developing future operational concepts to look beyond simply retelling history and consider how the legacy of this conflict might shape Chinese operational choices. He reinforces From the Editors 9 Vol. 11, No. 2 the concept that military history is not simply a resource for answering concerns about future conflict, but it encourages us to ask better questions about the role of the sea Services and how they can handle uncertainty when preparing for the future. Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Manning’s “Sea Control: Feasible, Acceptable, Suitable, or Simply Imperative” offers a historical review of early twentieth century Japanese naval battles as a framework to model possible future contests for control of the maritime domain. Manning believes that control of the maritime domain is a prerequisite for assured access and sets the condition for successful Joint operations. Manning believes that “nations not only have to compete with their enemy’s major air and naval capabilities but must also defend against land-based airpower; missiles; torpedoes; short-range, antisurface warfare assets; and coastal mines.” Colonel Scott Erdelatz (Ret) and his team of coauthors focused on an old approach for a new era of naval integration that acknowledges the long-term threat posed by China but also considers how much of what we know as the Marine Corps should be retained to fulfill other missions. Erdelatz et al. also analyze how radical integration might incur significant risk for the Marine Corps if long-term force structure decisions are based on still-evolving concepts and unproven technologies. Major Michael Kohler’s article, “The Joint Force Maritime Component Command and the Marine Corps: Integrate to Win the Black Sea Fight,” discusses how most current Marine and Navy integration takes place at the Service-chief level and primarily focuses on the Pacific. Kohler, however, believes that naval integration is also an important component of a successful defense against Russian expansion in the Black Sea region. Dr. John T. Kuehn shifts the focus to carriers and amphibious operations with his article “Carriers and Amphibs: Shibboleths of Sea Power.” Dr. Kuehn argues that aircraft carriers and Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) with an embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit represent shibboleths of seapower that conflate a deeper understanding of where the U.S. Fleet belongs now and where it needs to go in the future to face the challenges of the twenty-first century. Major B. A. Friedman’s article, “First to Fight: Advanced Force Operations and the Future of the Marine Corps,” then circles back to the traditional Marine Corps stance as always first to fight and the need for advanced force operations in the Corps of the future. Steven A. Yeadon’s article, “The Problems Facing United States Marine Corps Amphibious Assault,” rounds out the current perspective with a review of issues the Marine Corps has faced with amphibious assaults. Yeadon offers actionable information on current limitations and vulnerabilities of U.S. amphibious forces to chart a way forward for a robust forcible entry capability from the sea. The discussion closes with two articles looking to the future of naval in- 10 From the Editors Journal of Advanced Military Studies tegration and the Marine Corps. Major Matthew C. Ludlow’s article, “Losing the Initiative in the First Island Chain: How Organizational Inefficiencies Can Yield Mismatched Arsenals,” presents what may be considered a losing proposition of initiatives in China’s First Island Chain; however, strategic gaps in capabilities have emerged that could dramatically impact the ability to execute an island-defense strategy. The final article by Lieutenant Colonels Terje Bruøygard and Jørn Qviller, “Marine Corps Force Design 2030 and Implications for Allies and Partners: Case Norway,” offers a larger discussion of Force Design 2030 and its future implications for American allies with a case study on Norway. The authors encourage the Department of Defense to consider greater interoperability between and among Services and allies, including increased communication with allies on changes happening at the Service and national level of the U.S. armed forces. The remainder of the journal rounds out with a review essay and a selection of book reviews that continues our focus on naval integration, but it also highlights continuing challenges in national security and international relations. The coming year will be busy for the JAMS editors as we work to provide journal issues on a diverse range of topics relevant to the study of militaries and defense.
Topic:
Defense Policy, War, History, Military Strategy, Power Politics, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, Navy, Oceans and Seas, and Seapower
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Europe, Norway, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Black Sea