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Begin New Search Topic NATO Political Geography Europe Content Type Journal Article Journal Warsaw East European Review (WEER)

1. The Modern Interfaces of Intermarium and the Fight against Destiny

Author:
Adrian Popa and Cristian Barna
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
Russia’s recent buildup of A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) forces in Crimea and Kaliningrad, coupled with its increasingly confronting rhetoric in the Black and Baltic Seas, pose a serious challenge for the NATO’s Eastern flank countries. While the mare sui generis status of the Black Sea might be altered under the expected inauguration of Canal Istanbul in 2023 as it would probably require the revision of the Montreux Convention, the mare liberum status of the Baltic Sea might also be questioned as Russia contests NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in this region. Facing this challenging geostrategic context, Pilsudski’s ideas of Intermarium seem to have revived within the Central and Eastern European countries under modern interfaces such as the Bucharest Nine and the Three Seas Initiative. This paper proposes a comparative analysis between the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea in terms of their newly-emerged geostrategic context, discusses the feasibility of the recent endeavours to promote cooperation within the Central and Eastern European countries and not ultimately, highlights the utility of a regional military alliance in support of NATO.
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, International Security, International Affairs, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Asia, Crimea, Baltic Sea, and Baltic States

2. Georgia’s Road to NATO: Everything but Membership?

Author:
Marion Kipiani
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
The ongoing crisis in Ukraine continues to jolt the architectural plans of Euro-Atlantic security developed over the past 25 years. Predictions of a “new Cold War,” and anxiety over Russia’s ambitions in its neighborhood, have led to calls for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to step up efforts to ensure security on the European continent and protect its newer members in close geographic proximity to the Russian Federation. After more than two decades, during which NATO was transforming into a military alliance fo- cused on out-of-area missions, the collective defense at the heart of the 1949 Washington Treaty has suddenly appeared to regain its relevance. Since the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the escalation of military conflict in Ukraine’s Donbas region a year ago, NATO has demonstrated its commitment to the security of its Eastern European member states through reassurance measures that have included increased air and maritime patrols, as well as the rotation of ground forces. There are however countries partnering with NATO – but not covered by its collective defense protective umbrella – which fall into a gray zone of influence between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic allies. These countries, including Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine itself, are particularly concerned by Russia’s strategic objective of keeping a sphere of i
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Georgia, and North America

3. Shaking the Foundation: the Trump Administration and NATO’s East

Author:
Metthew Bryza
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
Ultimately though, my very last remarks are ultimately optimistic, because President Trump lacks geopolitical vision, lacks historical insight or, really even, frankly – I don’t mean to be disrespectful, but – curiosity about history. Everything is about the deal. One and one, the individuals, the people – that’s why he had nobody in a room which is what Putin wanted, besides Rex Tillerson and the interpreter when they met. And so, what’s inevitably going to happen is he will start up with a grand bargain, where something hap- pens in Ukraine mostly cut over the heads of the Ukrainians. But thank goodness with Am- bassador Volker there, I know he’s no fool and will fight against that, but probably though there will be an agreement which I know that the Trump administration, from my own contacts within, has been cooking up, hoping for, for a longtime, whereby President Putin gets what he needs. He gets an excuse to exit Donbass, because that’s a failed operation, the uprising that he expected never happened, Russian troops are dying, it’s an economic albatross around the neck of Russia. But he can’t just leave, he can’t just pull out Russian troops, because that would really hurt him domestically, politically. So, okay, he says: “We’ve reentered the geopolitical stage, we’re at the center of it with President Trump”. Putin will say “We’ll pull out of Donbass, we’re never leaving Crimea”, That will be the deal I think. Donbass – if the Ukrainian government offers autonomy – will have a sort of a frozen political conflict, troops gone, heavy weapons pulled back on the Russian side, Crimea still what it is – anschlussed by Russia. And then the other area where there will be coopera- tion is in Syria. And we’ve already seen in Southeastern Syria there is a modest cease-fire that seems to be holding – that’s great, may it work, however it also provides U.S. bless- ing for Russian troops to base deeper in the Middle East, and that has never happened before. But leave that aside, maybe it will bring peace. Eventually that cooperation in Syria will collapse. Russia has no history of successfully establishing peace and rebuilding economies and complex cultures. It used brutality in the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, to build the Soviet Union, but it doesn’t have the finesse to rebuild something on the scale of Syria. And so, Trump is going to be disappointed with President Putin. President Putin will inevitably overplay Russia’s hand, and finally at that point my last remark – if the EU and NATO have maintained their cohesion, remain strong, maintain the geopolitical vision of President Duda and Secretary of State Szczerski, then we have a chance to take these positive developments and push away the lack of clarity, the dalliance with Putin and the security services on the part of team Trump, and finally wake up – just as Obama woke up, just as President Bush woke up and realized he that he hadn’t see Putin’s soul, and then maybe we can rebuild. So, the key to all this is that you all are doing exactly what you’ve said, Mr. Secretary of State – taking the strategic reins in your own hands, pursuing initia- tives like the Three Seas, changing the geopolitical facts on the ground so that when the U.S. does finally wake up – we know which way to move. Thank you very much!
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

4. NATO’s 2018 Brussels Summit: A View from the United States

Author:
Matthew Rhodes
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
NATO leaders billed their last full formal summit two years ago in Warsaw as a “break- through summit.” Speaking at a parallel experts forum, Polish President Andrzej Duda named the event the second most important in his country’s post-communist history, be- hind only NATO accession itself. In addition to the headline decision for Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) in the Baltic region, the Alliance adopted special declarations on strength- ening “resilience” and strategic partnership with the European Union. In contrast, the next leaders’ meeting in two weeks in Brussels is expected to be less about conceptual innovation than practical steps to implement existing commitments. At preceding ministerials and other occasions, the Alliance’s leading member, the United States, has pushed for further focus on mobility, stability, and burden-sharing in particu- lar. Nonetheless, recent tensions in other aspects of transatlantic relations have injected a measure of drama and raised the stakes for the summit’s success.1
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

5. Shaking the Foundation: the Trump Administration and NATO’s East

Author:
Metthew Bryza
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
This is a very powerful place for me to be, here at the University of Warsaw, I am totally Polish by background, 100 percent. I was looking in front of my hotel today, at the monu- ment to the victims of Soviet repression and the deportations, it is very powerful. I looked at all the towns that victims came from, and I thought about my grandmother’s region – Sambor, She was only from a small village, but you know, it made me think that had she, like so many other Poles, not taken a very difficult decision at that time I probably would not exist, would not be here speaking before you, and the changes that this country has gone through, would have never have happened. Fundamentally, my talk, is going to end up being optimistic, but it’s going to start pessimistic, because the title is, U.S. relations with NATO’s East under Trump: Shaking the foundation. But before that I just want to build on some other things that were said already and thank all the excellencies who are here, the ambassadors, the other members of the diplomatic and academic communities. Professor Micgiel referred to my new life outside of diplomacy. I have a joint venture with a Finnish company, Lamor Corporation, which is the world’s largest oil spill response company. I am on their global board – a fantastic en- vironmental technologies company, and it’s really fun to be involved in entrepreneurial en- deavor, even if it’s scary, because, well, all my meager savings are on the line and I have to succeed. So, it’s very nice to be back here and have a chance to think and stretch my mind in the way I did in my previous career, to be here with you in a place that my grandparents may have never been able to enter. So it’s a very powerful moment for me, thank you. And also to be an opening speaker, together with Secretary of State Szczerski and with my favorite boss of all time, Ambassador Daniel Fried closing the conference. Dan taught me so much about this part of the world, which I’ll get to in a moment, enabled me and my dear friend Kurt Volker, who is now the new special representative for Ukraine, to make it, to move through the State Department system, when there were all sorts of bureaucratic obstacles, If you go back and google us, you will see we were attacked by The Washington Post, when we were brought to the State Department from the White House in 2005. There is a position in the State Department called DAS – Deputy Assistant Secretary. That’s the first level at which things get serious, where you actually can have an impact on policy. And, we were called the baby DASes, because we were brought over at younger age than normal, thanks to Secretary Rice and Ambassador Fried, and Dan suffered because of that, inside the bureaucracy, a lot of people disliked him because he enabled Ambassador Volker and me, and then another ambassador, Mark Pekala, a Polish American guy as well who became ambassador to Latvia. I remember, Mark at that time was 50, and he said: “Boy, only in the State Department and in Washington could a 50-year-old guy be criticized for being a baby”. So, it’s great to be outside Washington, it really is. I live in Istan- bul now, by the way.
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, North America, and United States of America

6. Defending the Free World

Author:
Daniel Fried
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
ne week ago President Trump spoke at Plac Krasińskich and gave the best foreign policy address of his presidency. He spoke of a community of nations, an alliance of coun- tries united by values, among those values the rule of law, freedom of expression, freedom of speech. He spoke of a strong alliance of free nations. He spoke a strong Europe. He then mentioned that Russia is acting in Ukraine and other ways, as a destabilizing factor in the world. And therefore reaffirmed America’s Article 5 commitment to Poland and to all the other NATO members. As I said, I think this was the best foreign policy speech of President Trump’s new presidency. He reaffirmed in essence America’s commitment to the free world. The free world is sometimes termed the liberal world order but I really don’t like the phrase “the liberal world order,” because there are many people who don’t describe themselves as liberals, who belong in it, not outside it. I prefer “the free world”. And in re- committing the United States to the free world, President Trump was following a centu- ries-old tradition in the West. In Europe, the notion of a just international order, rooted in transnational values, is at least as old as Erasmus. Emmanuel Kant elaborated the theory of perpetual peace between states committed to the rule of law and republican values. As my country, as America, emerged as a world power at the end of the 19th century, we developed our own American Grand Strategy, our version of the free world. We thought of ourselves as distinct from the European empires and spheres of influence of the time. In contrast, America sought an open, rules-based world, more just and simultaneously more profitable for ourselves and for others, because we Americans recognize that our interests, our prosperity and our security are tied to the prosperity and security of other nations. We believe that the advanced democracies of the world should set the global agenda along the lines of this vision. An objective, ambitious, but also generous vision, because we un- derstand America’s national interests in broad, not narrow terms. In his memoirs, Kurier z Warszawy, Jan Nowak-Jeziorański writes of astonishment at American humanitarian as- sistance to Poland in 1920 and wondered what sort of nation helped others and asked nothing for itself. But America understood that as we helped others, we in fact advanced our own interests, because America could not do good business with poor countries. We wanted to make the world a better place so we could all get rich. That was our American ambition and confidence. My nation developed the outlines of this grand strategy starting in 1900, but my country failed to apply it in the 1930s when Europe needed us most.
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, United States of America, and North America

7. Round Table I – Regional Security

Author:
Matthew Rhodes
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
I will try to talk about a little bit about what NATO in particular as a core part of this community has been doing to respond. A starting point is to recognize that this confer- ence is taking place at almost exactly the one year anniversary of NATO’s summit here in Warsaw. I had an opportunity to participate during this summit at the parallel Warsaw Summit Experts Forum that was organized by NATO together with the Polish Institute of International Affairs here in Warsaw. While the adults were meeting in the Warsaw National Stadium about 300 other professors and experts such as myself were meeting in a circus tent across the parking lot. Sometimes this felt a little bit silly but it was very interesting to hear firsthand from many of the people attending the main summit and one of the open- ing speakers there was President Duda. One thing that stuck with me was his remark that for him this summit was the second most important thing that had happened for Poland since the end of the Cold War and the only thing that topped it was Poland’s entry to NATO itself, so for him this was really a big deal. What I will try to do in my time is to talk a little bit about why the Warsaw Summit was so important for President Duda and other leaders of the alliance, and try to reflect on where we are a year after that summit and what remains to be done for NATO to respond to the Russian threat especially of hybrid warfare.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe, Poland, and North America

8. Turkey and East Central Europe: Idealism, Pragmatism, Misperception or Clash of Interests?

Author:
Konrad Zasztowt
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
urkey is focused on Russia in its policy vis-à-vis the Black Sea region, Cauca- sus, Ukraine, Balkan countries as well as, at least to some extent, Central European countries, including Poland. This priority has its impact on Ankara’s relationship with Eastern and Central European countries, which remain in the shadow of Turkish policy towards Russia. However that negative impact is not powerful enough to spoil Turkey’s cooperation with Eastern and Central European countries. It certainly limits the scope of such partnerships or alliances. Turkey contin- ues to cooperate with the region’s countries, but often rejects their Euro-Atlanticism. In Turkish perception the EU’s enlargement in Central Europe was unjust (as Turkey has been applying much longer for the EU’s membership without any significant progress, whereas post-commu- nist countries were accepted relatively quickly). NATO enlargement in the East in Turkey’s view was always a ‘risky adventure’. At the same time, from Ankara’s point of view the Middle East is strategically more important than Turkish northern neighbourhood. Moreover, Turkey wants to be an equal interlocutor in dialogue with Russia, the U.S. and the EU, whereas it often conceives post-communist and post-Soviet countries merely as a zone of influence for the Kremlin and Washington or their battleground in Cold War 2.0.
Topic:
NATO, Cold War, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Poland, North America, and United States of America