Content Type: Journal Article / Political Geography: Asia / Publication Year: within 10 Years and within 25 Years / Topic: Bilateral Relations

1. The Clash at Tawang: Tensions Rise on the China-India Border

Author:: Amrita Jash
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On December 9, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Indian army clashed at Yangtse along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Tawang Sector in Arunachal Pradesh resulting in injuries on both sides. Following the incident, the local Indian commander held a flag meeting with his Chinese counterpart on December 11 in order to restore peace. The clash at Tawang marked the first major skirmish between the two armies in the eastern sector since the Galwan Valley clash in the western sector in Eastern Ladakh on June 15, 2020 (China Brief, July 15, 2020).
Topic:: Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:: China, India, and Asia

2. The Return of Shuttle Diplomacy

Author:: Ji-Young Lee and Andy Lim
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: In March 2023, Japan and South Korea had a long-awaited breakthrough in their bilateral relations, which many viewed as being at the lowest point since the 1965 normalization. On March 16, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio held a summit in Tokyo and agreed to resume “shuttle diplomacy,” a crucial mechanism of bilateral cooperation that had been halted for about a decade. Behind the positive developments was President Yoon’s political decision on the issue of compensating wartime forced laborers. The two leaders took steps to bring ties back to the level that existed prior to actions in 2018 and 2019, which precipitated the downward spiral in their relationship. Japan decided to lift the export controls it placed on its neighbor following the South Korean Supreme Court ruling on forced labor in 2018. South Korea withdrew its complaint with the World Trade Organization on Japan’s export controls. Less than a week after the summit, Seoul officially fully restored the information sharing agreement (GSOMIA) that it had with Tokyo. They also resumed high-level bilateral foreign and security dialogues to discuss ways to navigate the changing international environment together as partners. The big question now is whether this trend of restoring and expanding bilateral cooperation would continue throughout and beyond the Yoon presidency. In South Korea, critics argue that his handling of the forced labor issue is not a lasting solution to historical issues with Japan. The breakthrough was not a product of any major change in South Korean public sentiment toward Japan’s past wrongdoings. Nor was it a product of changes in the Japanese position on outstanding bilateral historical and territorial issues. Both the Japanese and South Korean governments, however, feel the urgent need to cooperate for their own national security, and for economic reasons. Whether the advances in the first four months of 2023 will be short-lived or the start of a new partnership and reconciliation will likely depend on how much understanding they both show in seeing things from the other’s perspective and how willing they will be in accommodating the other’s political needs.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and South Korea

3. Deepening Suspicions and Limited Diplomacy

Author:: Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: China and South Korea began 2023 with the temporary imposition of tit-for-tat restrictions by both governments on travel to the other country after China lifted its zero-COVID policy. Although the restrictions proved temporary, they pointed to the reality of a sustained downward spiral in China-South Korea relations accompanied by increasingly strident public objections in Chinese media to the Yoon Suk Yeol administration’s steps to redouble South Korean alignment with the United States regarding Indo-Pacific strategy, supply chain resiliency, and shared values. South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Park Jin’s congratulatory call to newly appointed Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Qin Gang on Jan. 9 was one of the few positive senior-level interaction between the two countries in early 2023; by the end of April, the main diplomatic interactions between China and South Korea had devolved into a dueling exchange of private demarches and public assertions that the other side had committed a “diplomatic gaffe.” As Yoon took steps to strengthen South Korean ties with NATO, stabilize relations with Japan, and upgrade efforts with the US to deter North Korea from continued nuclear development, Chinese criticisms of South Korea became increasingly ominous. They culminated in a stern Chinese diplomatic response to Yoon’s interview with Reuters on April 19 in which he characterized a possible cross-strait conflict between mainland China and Taiwan as a global security issue. Meanwhile, the 75th founding anniversary of North Korea’s Korean People’s Army (KPA) in February and China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) confirming Xi Jinping’s third term as president in March drove symbolic exchanges of support between Chinese party-state and military leaders and their North Korean counterparts. The continued lack of a unified UN response to North Korean missile provocations renewed calls for Chinese “responsibility” and “influence” and Beijing’s reassertions of Pyongyang’s own “insecurity.” The arrival of Chinese Ambassador to North Korea Wang Yajun in Pyongyang, delayed for two years following his appointment due to pandemic-related quarantines, may presage a broader opening for China-North Korea humanitarian exchanges alongside concerns about North Korea’s ongoing military development.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

4. North Cranks up Nukes—and Slams Down the Phone

Author:: Aidan Foster-Carter
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The first four months of 2023 brought no progress or respite in inter-Korean relations. Pyongyang sent no further drones into Southern airspace as it had in December, but continued to rattle Seoul with tests of advance weaponry and ever more lurid nuclear rhetoric. South Korea hardened its language and stance, with a restored emphasis on human rights in the North—now officially defined as an enemy once more. ROK President Yoon Suk Yeol also found enemies within: leftists who made contact with the DPRK in third countries were no longer ignored but prosecuted. More ominously, so were four top officials who served the previous president, Moon Jae-in, over how they handled two difficult inter-Korean incidents in 2019-20. Elsewhere, Seoul complained in vain about Pyongyang’s abuse of its assets in two defunct joint ventures: stealing some, destroying others. Soon after, the North stopped answering the phone. It is hard to see how North-South relations will improve, but all too easy to imagine them getting even worse.
Topic:: International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

5. Confrontation Muted, Tensions Growing

Author:: David J. Keegan and Kyle Churchman
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: As 2023 began, cross-Strait confrontation was muted. Travel began returning to pre-COVID levels across the Strait and between the mainland and Taiwan’s offshore islands. At China’s annual National People’s Congress, outgoing Premier Li Keqiang and reanointed President Xi Jinping eschewed inflammatory rhetoric about reunification with Taiwan. Taiwan and the US kept Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s transit of the US low-key. Tsai met House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California, deflecting the speaker’s expressed interest in visiting Taiwan and avoiding the destabilizing Chinese military exercises around Taiwan that followed Speaker Pelosi’s visit last August. Despite this calm, seeds of confrontation proliferated. China cut a communications cable to Taiwan’s offshore islands and announced a coast guard drill to inspect commercial shipping in the Taiwan Strait, both interpreted as practice for gray-zone coercion. China persuaded Honduras to sever its longstanding diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Taiwan increased its military budget and expanded training with US forces. Former Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou visited China and met Chinese officials, endorsing the 1992 Consensus and signaling that the upcoming election campaign for Taiwan’s president will again offer two very different visions of Taiwan’s future relationship with mainland China.
Topic:: International Relations, Bilateral Relations, Coercion, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

6. China Strengthens Regional Leadership Countering US Challenges

Author:: Robert G. Sutter and Chin-Hao Huang
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Southeast Asia featured prominently in Beijing’s increasingly strong international efforts to portray China as a source of strategic stability and economic growth with comprehensive global governance plans supportive of interests of developing countries and opposing the United States. These efforts intensified after the landmark 20th Party Congress in October and the 14th National People’s Congress in March. They were reinforced as Xi Jinping emerged from COVID restrictions and preoccupation with domestic matters to engage actively in summitry with leaders of Vietnam, Laos, the Philippines, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Singapore. China’s economic importance for regional countries grew as did its dominance over the contested South China Sea. Its show of force against Taiwan in April had little discernible impact on China-Southeast Asia relations, while notable US advances in military cooperation with the Philippines warranted Chinese warnings that escalated during the reporting period.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Leadership, Economic Growth, Strategic Stability, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Southeast Asia

7. US-Korea Relations: Nuclear New Year

Author:: Mason Richey
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: South Korean president Yoon Suk-yeol has tried to make a priority of transforming the traditional US-South Korea military alliance into a “global, comprehensive strategic alliance” with increasing ambitions beyond hard security issues on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia in general. Yoon and his foreign policy team get an “A” for vision and effort—joining the NATO Asia-Pacific Four (AP4) and releasing an Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2022 are evidence. But, like Michael Corleone trying to go legit in The Godfather III, every time they make progress getting out, they get pulled back into the Peninsula. To wit, during the first trimester of 2023 Korean Peninsula security issues again commanded disproportionate attention from Seoul and Washington. The proximate cause for this dynamic is North Korea’s mafioso-in-chief, Kim Jong Un, who started 2023 with a January 1 missile launch and kept at it throughout the winter. This, of course, followed record-breaking 2022 North Korean missile tests and demonstrations, which totaled approximately 70 launches of around 100 projectiles. Given the near-zero prospects for North Korean denuclearization and the growing arsenal at Pyongyang’s disposal, it is understandable that any South Korean president would be distracted from interests further afield. The audacious nature of Yoon’s re-focusing on South Korean security was surprising and controversial, however. On January 11, apparently fed up with perceived South Korean vulnerability to its nuclear-armed consanguine, and perhaps irritated with the Biden administration’s slow realization of this South Korean sentiment, he made a pronouncement that no democratic leader in Seoul has ever made publicly before: he stated that South Korea—which benefits from US extended nuclear deterrence—could still consider acquiring its own nuclear weapons, if “North Korean provocations continued intensifying.” This set off a diplomatic kerfuffle that resonated—on both sides of the 38th parallel, as well as in Washington and Beijing—for much of the rest of the January-April reporting period. Given the provocative nature of Yoon’s statement, the South Korean presidential office later backtracked, “clarifying” that Yoon was simply expressing his “firm commitment to defending the nation” against North Korea’s nuclear threats, and while the “worst case scenario must be taken into consideration,” “the principle of abiding by the [Nuclear] Nonproliferation Treaty holds.” In any event, Washington took notice of its anxious ally, responding with demonstrations of commitment to extended deterrence for South Korea—including a visit by Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and strategic asset deployments to South Korea. All this was in addition to regular combined military exercises and naval exercises featuring US aircraft carrier strike groups. Washington also consented to more bilateral consultation with Seoul regarding the US nuclear umbrella. The saga has concluded—at least for now—with the Washington Declaration promulgated at the Biden-Yoon summit in late April. The Washington Declaration promises tightened US-South Korea extended deterrence coordination and consultation, while the leaders’ summit—in the context of Yoon’s state visit to celebrate 70 years of US-South Korea alliance relations—functioned as a renewal of Washington-Seoul ties. These ties are now perhaps as strong as they have ever been. If Pyongyang has reckoned that increased belligerence would decouple the US-South Korea alliance, it has seemingly miscalculated.
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

8. US-China Effort to Set “Guardrails” Fizzles with Balloon Incident

Author:: Sourabh Gupta
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The proposed “guardrail” that Joe Biden and Xi Jinping sought to erect last fall in Bali failed to emerge in the bitter aftermath of a wayward Chinese surveillance balloon that overflew the United States and violated its sovereignty. Though Antony Blinken and Wang Yi met on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference afterward, aspersions cast by each side against the other, including a series of disparaging Chinese government reports, fed the chill in ties. Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s meeting with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy during the return leg of her US transit added to bilateral and cross-strait tensions and were met with Chinese sanctions. Issues pertaining to Taiwan, be it arms sales or a speculated Chinese invasion date of the island, remained contentious. The administration’s attempt to restart constructive economic reengagement with China, including via an important speech by US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, appears to have fallen on deaf ears in Beijing. Following the Biden-Xi meeting on Nov. 14 on the sidelines of the G20 Leaders Summit in Bali, Indonesia, US-People’s Republic of China relations were transitioning to an improving track—or so it seemed. US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin met with his Chinese counterpart, Defense Minister Wei Fenghe, on the sidelines of the ASEAN Defense Ministers” Meeting-Plus meeting in Cambodia on Nov. 22. On Dec. 11-12, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink held “candid, in-depth and constructive” talks in Beijing. On Jan. 18, Secretary Yellen had a “candid, substantive, and constructive conversation” with departing Vice-Premier Liu He in Zurich ahead of the World Economic Forum in Davos. Hours before Secretary Blinken was due to board a flight to Beijing on Feb. 3, which would have been the highest-ranking contact between the two sides since the Bali meeting, the budding rapprochement came to a screeching halt.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

9. The US and Japan Build Multilateral Momentum

Author:: Sheila A. Smith and Charles McClean
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: 2023 brings a renewed focus on the US-Japan partnership as a fulcrum of global and regional diplomacy. With an eye to the G7 Summit in Hiroshima in mid-May, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio began the year with visits to G7 counterparts in Europe and North America. Later in the spring, he toured Africa in an effort to gain understanding from countries of the Global South. The Joe Biden administration looks ahead to a lively economic agenda, as it hosts the APEC Summit in November on the heels of the G20 Summit in New Delhi in September. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan laid out in detail the economic ambitions of the Biden national strategy on April 27, giving further clarity to how the administration’s foreign policy will meet the needs of the American middle class. Regional collaboration continues to expand. Both leaders will gather in Australia on May 24 as Prime Minister Anthony Albanese hosts the third in-person meeting of the leaders of the Quad. Also noteworthy in this first quarter of 2023 is the progress in ties between Japan and South Korea. Trilateral consultations began early in the Biden administration, and after the election of President Yoon Suk Yeol last spring, the groundwork for resolving the many difficulties in the bilateral relationship began. This spring, President Yoon and Prime Minister Kishida revealed their progress in a set of visits to each other’s capitals. A trilateral summit is planned for the G7 Summit, which Yoon will attend as an observer. Overshadowing this active multilateral calendar is the continuing war in Ukraine. Both Kishida and Biden have visited President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in his capitol. The United States and Japan remain stalwart supporters of the Ukrainian defense effort as Ukrainians prepare for the spring counteroffensive against Russian forces. Yet questions have arisen within the US Congress over the scale and duration of military aide provided to Zelenskyy. Interestingly, there remains little doubt about the Kishida Cabinet’s support of Ukraine. While Japan does not provide lethal aid, it has joined in solidarity with European nations to contribute to the complex humanitarian relief needed by the Ukrainian people. Political choices will also shape the remainder of the year. President Biden on April 25 announced his run for a second term in the 2024 election. The Republican field of candidates begins to emerge with former UN Ambassador Nikki Haley officially declaring her candidacy on Feb. 14, and Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, while not yet official, has been the center of media attention. Former President Donald Trump has already begun his rallies, having announced his candidacy on Nov. 15. In Tokyo, talk of a national snap election continues, with the latest rumors suggesting that Kishida, coming off his party’s good showing in local elections in April, might opt for a ballot after the G7 Summit in Hiroshima.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Multilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

10. China-Russia Relations: Ending the War? Or the World?

Author:: Yu Bin
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: As the Ukraine conflict was poised to expand, the “extremely complicated” situation at the frontline (in Vladimir Putin’s words on Dec. 20) gave rise to intensified high-level exchanges between Moscow and Beijing as they searched for both an alternative to the conflict, and stable and growing bilateral ties. As the Ukraine war dragged on and mustered a nuclear shadow, it remained to be seen how the world would avoid what Henry Kissinger defined as a “1916 moment,” or a missed peace with dire consequences for not only the warring parties but all of civilization.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

11. Japan and South Korea as Like-Minded Partners in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Ji-Young Lee and Andy Lim
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The last four months of 2022 saw a flurry of bilateral diplomatic activities between Japan and South Korea in both nations’ capitals and around the world. They focused on 1) North Korea, 2) the issue of wartime forced labor, and 3) the future of Seoul-Tokyo cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. Despite mutual mistrust and the low approval ratings of Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and President Yoon Suk Yeol, both leaders had the political will to see a breakthrough in bilateral relations. Another signal came in the form of new strategy documents in which Seoul and Tokyo explained their foreign and security policy directions and goals. On Dec. 16, the Kishida government published three national security-related documents—the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the Defense Buildup program. On Dec. 28, the Yoon government unveiled South Korea’s Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region, its first-ever Indo-Pacific strategy. Although each document serves a somewhat different purpose, it is now possible to gauge how similarly or differently Japan and South Korea assess challenges in the international security environment, and how they plan to respond to them. Importantly, they signal the other, the United States, and the world that they acknowledge the strategic and economic importance of their partner in their vision of the future. When one considers the future of Japan-South Korea relations, what are some of the most important takeaways?
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, South Korea, and Indo-Pacific

12. Japan-China Relations: A Period of Cold Peace?

Author:: June Teufel Dreyer
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: In the sole high-level meeting in the reporting period, on the sidelines of the APEC meeting in Bangkok in November, General Secretary/President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio essentially talked past each other. At an earlier ASEAN+3 meeting in Phnom Penh, Premier Li Keqiang and Kishida not only talked past each other but pointedly walked past each other. There was no resolution of major issues: the Chinese position is and remains that Taiwan is a core interest of the PRC in which Japan must not interfere. Japan counters that a Chinese invasion would be an emergency for Japan. On the islands known to the Chinese as the Diaoyu and to the Japanese as the Senkaku, Tokyo considers them an integral part of Japan on the basis of history and international law while China says the islands are part of China. On jurisdiction in the East China Sea, Japan says that demarcation should be based on the median line and that China’s efforts at unilateral development of oil and gas resources on its side of the median are illegal. Beijing does not recognize the validity of the median line. Economically, a number of Japanese industries have been decoupling from China out of concern for the integrity of their supply chains and for security reasons while others are planning to expand operations there. Both sides continued their respective defense buildups while accusing the other of military expansionism.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Politics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Japan, China, and Asia

13. China-Korea Relations: Kim Jong Un Tests Xi-Yoon Diplomacy

Author:: Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Regional and global summits presented high-level platforms for China-South Korea engagement in November. The summitry showed that the relationship had returned with solidity with the resumption of international meetings and in-person exchanges. Although the Xi Jinping and Yoon Suk Yeol leaderships advanced diplomatic exchange, concerns emerged over enduring political and security constraints and growing linkages with the economic relationship. Kim Jong Un’s escalation of military threats, through an unprecedented number of missile tests this year, challenged Xi-Yoon bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. China-North Korea bilateral interactions, while brisk, primarily relied on Xi and Kim’s exchange of congratulatory letters around significant founding anniversaries, China’s 20th Party Congress, and expressions of condolences after the death of former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin. The UN Security Council’s failure to take unified action on DPRK threats prompted South Korea to voice frustration with China and expand cooperation with US and Japanese partners. Such responses only reinforced concerns raised in recent leadership exchanges, and Korean domestic division over Yoon’s diplomatic strategies.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

14. Tensions Intensify as Taiwan-US IT Cooperation Blossoms

Author:: David J. Keegan and Kyle Churchman
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: In the wake of then US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August, China’s extensive military exercises continued to impose a more threatening “new normal” in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan continued to be the focus of heated public exchanges between the US and China. US President Biden said, for a fourth time, that the US would defend Taiwan and added an inflammatory codicil that independence was for Taiwan to decide. At the 20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, General Secretary Xi Jinping promised China would strive for peaceful reunification with Taiwan but would not renounce use of force. On Dec. 23, Biden signed the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act and a State Department appropriation providing $2 billion in loans for Taiwan to purchase US equipment. Two days later, China sent 71 military aircraft and seven ships to intimidate Taiwan, its largest-ever one-day exercise near the island. Two days later, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen announced that Taiwan would extend its military conscription to 12 months. TSMC formally broke ground for the first of two factories in the US, a $40 billion investment. The new year will see Taiwan’s DPP and KMT parties launch their presidential election campaigns, debating visions for cross-Strait defense, dignity, and dialogue as the Chinese military appears determined to intensify its intimidation.
Topic:: Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Information Technology, and Military
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

15. US-Korea Relations: Everything Everywhere All At Once, Extremely Close and Incredibly Loud

Author:: Mason Richey and Rob York
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Continuing a trend from the May-August reporting period, the final reporting period of 2022 in US-Korea relations was marked by an accelerated ratcheting up of tension. In short, numerous problems reared up on the Korean Peninsula from September-December, and good solutions have been few. And not only does this describe relations between the US and North Korea, but in their own, friendly way also the situation between Washington and Seoul, whose frequent invocations of rock-solid alliance cooperation belie unease about crucial areas of partnership. Two critical issues have been increasingly affecting the US-South Korea alliance in 2022, with the September-December period no exception. First, South Korea desires ever more alliance-partner defense and security reassurance from the US in the face of a growing North Korean nuclear threat and Chinese revisionism. Yet the US has downward-trending limits on credible reassurance as North Korea masters nuclear weapons technology that threatens US extended nuclear deterrence for South Korea. The US also faces less geopolitical pressure to effusively reassure its Indo-Pacific allies—including South Korea—as China grows to menace the regional order and the US consequently faces lower risk of ally hedging or realignment.
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Military
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

16. US-Japan Relations: Ramping Up Diplomacy and Defense Cooperation

Author:: Sheila A. Smith and Charles McClean
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: In the wake of the death of former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, the fall brought unexpectedly turbulent politics for Prime Minister Kishida Fumio. In the United States, however, President Joe Biden welcomed the relatively positive outcome of the midterm elections, with Democrats retaining control over the Senate and losing less than the expected number of seats in the House. Diplomacy continued to be centered on various impacts of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but both Biden and Kishida focused their attention on a series of Asian diplomatic gatherings to improve ties. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s attendance at the G20 Meeting in Bali and APEC gathering in Bangkok proffered the opportunity finally for in-person bilateral meetings for both leaders. Finally, Japan’s long awaited strategic documents were unveiled in December. A new National Security Strategy (NSS) took a far more sober look at China’s growing influence and included ongoing concerns over North Korea as well as a growing awareness of Japan’s increasingly difficult relationship with Russia. Accompanying the NSS is a 10-year defense plan, with a five-year build-up commitment, that gave evidence that Kishida and his ruling coalition were serious about their aim to spend 2% of Japan’s GDP on its security. The desire for greater lethality was also there, with the inclusion of conventional strike investment.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

17. Exploring the Interplay between Trade and Industrial Policies and the Impact of Geopolitics on the Transformation of Taiwan’s Economy

Author:: Ying-Jun Lin
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Over the past five decades, Taiwan's economy has shifted from inward-oriented to outward-oriented, from an import-substitution policy to an export-expansion policy. This evolution in economic structure has also brought about changes in the industrial landscape. While there is an ongoing debate about the respective roles of the market and the government in promoting Taiwan's economic growth, this article argues that the history of Taiwan's economy demonstrates a mutually beneficial relationship between trade and industrial policies. The integration of market forces and government intervention has played a crucial role in Taiwan's economic success story. However, the dynamics between the United States and China, as well as the emergence of new Asian regionalism, pose challenges to Taiwanese industries and enterprises. In conclusion, this article emphasises the importance of refining trade and industrial policies in line with the geopolitical context in order to maintain the momentum of Taiwan's economy.
Topic:: Economics, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Dependency
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

18. The Sino-French Relationship At 60: China’s Losing Bet On A Reset

Author:: Juliana Bouchard
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Against a background of increasingly fraught relations with the European Commission, China has been doubling down on its outreach to member states, with France chief among them. The two countries have been gearing up to the 60th anniversary of their bilateral relationship in January 2024 with a flurry of diplomatic exchanges. These have included high-level visits by President Emmanuel Macron in April, Economic Minister Bruno Le Maire in July, diplomatic adviser Emmanuel Bonne in late October, and most recently Foreign Affairs Minister Catherine Colonna (FMPRC, November 22). On the Chinese side, Premier Li Qiang traveled to Paris in June to take part in the Summit for a New Global Financing Pact. However, this year also saw Paris deal some blows to China’s economic ambitions, with Macron being one of the driving forces behind Brussels’ ongoing anti-subsidy investigation into China-made electric vehicles and revamping its own EV purchase credits to exclude Chinese-made models (Service Public, October 10). During Bonne’s visit, Wang Yi framed his expectations for the anniversary in no uncertain terms, calling on China and France to “revisit the original intention (重温建交初衷)” of their bilateral ties and “consolidate and reset (巩固和再出发) the relationship” (FMPRC, October 30). Paris’ appetite for meeting Beijing halfway in “resetting” the relationship is far less certain. Most likely, China’s lofty ambitions for a reset will be met with more ambiguity from France, continuing its diplomatic outreach to safeguard economic opportunities in China, all the while pushing for more assertive policies within Brussels to achieve its vision of “strategic autonomy.” While some scholars are not entirely immune to the “dual-faced (两面性)” nature of French diplomacy (Fudan Development Institute, March 2), a prevalent view—or hope—among officials in Beijing is that Macron’s vision of strategic autonomy is primarily about asserting an independent foreign policy from the United States. However, in reality, strategic autonomy also informs France’s own de-risking agenda toward China.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, History, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and France

19. China and Nicaragua’s Deepening Embrace

Author:: Scott B. MacDonald
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In October 2023, Nicaragua signed an agreement with China’s CAMC Engineering Company (中工国际工程) for the reconstruction, expansion, and upgrading of the Punta Huete International Airport (Yicai, October 18). The company is a subsidiary of the conglomerate China National Machinery Industry Corporation (国际集团), also known as Sinomach (Sinomach, accessed November 15). Local and Chinese officials are touting the $492 million project as part of China’s Bridge and Road Initiative (BRI), reflecting a deepening of Daniel Ortega’s regime’s ties to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Global Times, October 18). Closer links between Beijing and Managua demonstrate that China’s economic statecraft remains central to its strategy to further penetrate Latin America and the Caribbean, a region of significant geopolitical importance to the United States. The sustainability of China’s economic statecraft, and BRI in particular, have come into question in recent months due to the country’s domestic economic problems. However, the Nicaraguan airport announcement signals that the PRC remains economically active in the region, and its ambitions have not wavered. This is something of which the remaining handful of countries that officially recognize Taiwan are well aware: Beijing’s attention to regional infrastructure continues, if more selectively than before, but only to those countries who have decided to forgo relations with Taiwan. Beijing is further extending its reach into the strategic underbelly of the United States. For Nicaragua, the restoration of diplomatic ties with China serves the geopolitical needs of President Daniel Ortega in distancing his regime from the United States and softening the blow of sanctions (imposed due to fraudulent elections and gross human rights violations), while providing a source of non-Western funds to finance infrastructure projects.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, and Economy
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Central America, and Nicaragua

20. Money Alone Is Not Enough: The Future Of The China-Argentina Relationship

Author:: Román D. Ortiz
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Observers assessed the outcome of the first round of Argentina’s presidential elections held on October 22 as good news for the Chinese government (VOA, October 26). Against the odds, Sergio Massa, the Peronist candidate and current minister of economy, emerged on top, despite his overseeing an annual inflation rate of almost 140 percent. Meanwhile, Javier Milei, the libertarian opposition candidate, took the second place (Yahoo Noticias, October 23). These two politicians will compete for the presidency in the second round of the election scheduled for November 19. At first glance, the victory of Massa should be an encouraging sign for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since it keeps open the possibility that the China-friendly Peronist party remains in government. However, a more granular analysis suggests two alternative outcomes: First, Milei is likely to be the eventual winner after the second round of voting, which would make the new occupant of the Casa Rosada (the Argentinian presidential palace) a politician who has called the PRC an “assassin” and who plans to freeze relations with Beijing. Second, if Massa wins the presidency, his more moderate Peronism is far from the Third-World foreign policy promoted by the outgoing president, Alberto Fernandez, and his vice-president and former president, Cristina Fernandez. Thus, regardless of the outcome of the presidential election, Beijing’s desires to increase political influence over Buenos Aires, which have focused particularly on its defense policy, are likely to be curtailed. A decrease in political influence with Buenos Aires would deal a serious blow to the Chinese strategy in Latin America, in which Argentina plays a critical role. Argentina is the only large country in the region to join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It also exports food, minerals, and oil needed by the Chinese industrial sector. Argentina’s expansive territory represents a natural platform to project power within South America and to the South Atlantic. Buenos Aires’s geopolitics makes it particularly attractive for Beijing, which is exploring opportunities to secure rights for a naval base on the west coast of Africa in order to gain access to the Atlantic. Argentina also forms a key part of PRC efforts to consolidate its hegemony over the Global South. Specifically, the PRC views Argentina as a counterbalance to Brazilian regional hegemony, which motivated China’s interest in Argentina joining the BRICS grouping of countries, against Brazilian opposition.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Industry
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Argentina, and South America

21. The PRC Eyes Vietnam: Chinese Assessments of Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy

Author:: Nathan Waechter
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In July, the Barbie movie––an ostensibly apolitical and innocuous film––was banned by the Vietnamese Department of Cinema over real-world tensions between Vietnam and China. According to the state film council, the new Barbie movie was barred from the Vietnamese market over its inclusion of a map purportedly showing China’s preferred territorial “Nine-Dash” line in the South China Sea (Vietnam News, July 7). As the head of the national film evaluation council stated, “Vietnam’s stance has been clear. It does not accept movies that are ambiguous in matters related to territorial sovereignty” (Vietnam News, July 7). The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning responded to the incident by asserting that “China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests are solidly grounded in history and law” (Global Times, July 7). Accusing the Vietnamese government of overstating the issue, the Chinese state media outlet Global Times urged all “relevant parties to control domestic hype and nationalist sentiment” (Global Times, July 7). Viewed within a broader context, the Barbie movie incident is only the most recent expression of the historical baggage between Vietnam and China. Many PRC military officials and academics largely perceive Southeast Asia as China’s proverbial “backyard” that should rightfully remain in its sphere of influence. Within Southeast Asia, Vietnam occupies an important position directly on China’s periphery. Publicly, China considers Vietnam’s governing regime to be close “comrades and brothers” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 28). However, Vietnam has a long, acrimonious history with China. Vietnam has been invaded by China numerous times and subjugated to Chinese rule and the exaction of tribute for thousands of years. The “Vietnam Military Museum in Hanoi … lists 13 “Vietnamese Resistance Wars Against Invaders,” with the majority fought against the Chinese. To some extent, Vietnam has also benefited from its contact with China. The Chinese written script, ideas of ethics and governance, and even chopsticks were absorbed from China. [1] During America’s war in Vietnam, China provided Vietnam with vast amounts of material support. From 1965-1969, a total of 320,000 Chinese troops covertly served in North Vietnam. [2] Despite this, China invaded Vietnam in 1979 in a war that the PRC refers to as the “Self-defensive counterattack against Vietnam” (对越自卫还击保卫边疆作战) (Baidu Encyclopedia). In more recent years, Vietnam and China have clashed rhetorically over islands in the South China Sea and had a tense standoff over a Chinese oil exploration rig in Vietnamese-claimed waters in 2014 (CSIS, December 23, 2014). With its historical domination by China and its position as a small, weak, and still developing country, Vietnam has pursued a strategy of hedging. Research by Thi Bich Tran and Yoichiro Sato, Le Hong Hiep, and Tuan Uy Tran provide robust definitions of Vietnam’s hedging strategy from Vietnamese and Western perspectives (Contemporary Southeast Asia, December 2013; Asian Politics and Policy, January 2018; Naval Post-Graduate School Monterey, March 1, 2018). However, it is important to understand how China views Vietnam’s strategy as well. Further analysis is needed to examine primary Chinese sources and understand Chinese elite perceptions, their conclusions, and what “countermeasures” they believe China should take against Vietnam’s approach. On balance, while Chinese security analysts have a clear understanding of Vietnam’s hedging strategy, they exhibit a modern version of historical Chinese paternalism towards Vietnam. Many contemporary Chinese analysts believe that Vietnam, as a developing country, will inevitably fall into China’s sphere of influence as it remains dependent on Chinese economic ties for growth. While Vietnam does benefit from its economic relations with China, however, the Chinese analyses fail to fully recognize Hanoi’s fundamental apprehensions and insecurity caused by the historical enmity between the two countries, as well as China’s modern-day rise and its aggressive actions in the South China Sea. To a certain degree, China is guilty of exhibiting a degree of the same imperial hubris towards Vietnam as it has often accused the US of in the latter’s relations with other countries. While PRC strategists appear to have concluded that time is on their side, Beijing’s paternalistic complex may ultimately handicap China’s ability to pull Vietnam closer into its orbit.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Hedging, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Vietnam

22. U.S.-China Data War Intensifies as Bilateral Relations Nosedive

Author:: Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: U.S.-China relations appear headed for further deterioration despite the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) efforts to lure back American multinationals and Beijing’s relatively limited support for Russia in its war with Ukraine. Washington has characterized the “existential competition” with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as an entrenched struggle on all fronts, but the data and information sectors have recently become areas of particularly intense contention. The Xi Jinping leadership has sternly retaliated against purported efforts by the U.S. and its allies to choke off the PRC’s high-tech development pathways. Recent moves targeting American and other foreign firms are also closely linked to General Secretary Xi Jinping’s obsession with cybersecurity and control of data. Last weekend, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), the administrative arm of the policy-setting Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission (CCAC) that Xi chairs, announced an investigation into the operations of leading American memory-chip maker Micron Technology. The CAC cited the need to safeguard the supply chains of Chinese IT and data companies. Regardless, Micron, whose China operations account for 11 percent of worldwide sales, has insisted that it “stands by the security of our products” (Straits Times, April 1; South China Morning Post [SCMP], March 31).
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Cybersecurity, Information Technology, and Data Governance
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

23. Assessing the Role of the PLA Southern Theater Command in a China-India Contingency

Author:: Suyash Desai
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Soon after Xi Jinping assumed charge as the Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman in November 2012, he set the stage for a sweeping military restructuring. On February 1, 2016, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) moved away from the old Soviet-inspired Military Regions (MR) system to the U.S.-inspired Theater Command (TC) model. Under this new model, the seven Military Regions—Shenyang, Beijing, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Chengdu and Lanzhou—were reorganized into five geographic TCs, each with a specific “strategic direction” (战略方向). [1] Following the force restructuring, the three TCs that concern India are the Western Theater Command (WTC) along with Tibet and Xinjiang Military Districts (TMD and XMD), the Southern Theater Command (STC) and the Central Theater Command (CTC). WTC’s 76th and 77th Group Armies (GA) under the PLA Army’s (PLAA) jurisdiction are mandated to ensure the security of China’s land boundaries with Central Asian states, India, Nepal, and Bhutan. The TMD and XMD were retained to oversee security on the Chinese border with the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh and the Union Territory of Ladakh, respectively. In addition to the PLAA, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) and the PLA Logistic Support Force (JLSF) are also significant services under the WTC command, while the PLA Navy (PLAN) plays a minor role at Pangong Tso in the Aksai Chin region. Elsewhere, PLAN forces under the STC’s jurisdiction are responsible for securing Chinese interests not only in the South China Sea but also possibly in the Indian Ocean Region and the Western Pacific Ocean. The CTC is mandated to protect the capital but also acts as an anchor to provide additional troops to other theaters in case of a contingency, including WTC. This is an important division of responsibilities for the Chinese armed forces after Xi’s recent military reforms. [2] However, recent developments have highlighted that the STC’s 75th Group Army could also play an important role in securing the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) territorial integrity in Tibet, especially in the eastern sector bordering the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. Furthermore, the troops from the STC’s 75th Group Army could be used for rotation in the Tibetan theater, and the 75th GA’s artillery could be mobilized during a contingency with India. The four major reasons that the STC’s 75th GA could play such a role are improving connectivity between Tibet and the Southwestern Chinese province of Yunnan, minor changes to the 75th GA’s force composition, recent military exercises by STC’s 75th GA in Tibet and historical precedent.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Armed Forces, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, South Asia, India, and Asia

24. The Lion, the Wolf Warrior and the Crossroads: UK-China Relations at a Turning Point

Author:: Matthew Brazil
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In early 2018, UK Prime Minister Theresa May visited China with a British business delegation, seeking a free trade deal and expressing optimism over Beijing’s “one country, two systems” formula for governing Hong Kong (Global Times, January 31, 2018; Zaobao, January 31, 2018). In her first foreign trip since moving into 10 Downing Street, she promised that the “golden era of relations” between the UK and China would be even better after Brexit (Xinhua, February 1, 2018). Since May’s visit, however, a great deal has happened to move UK-China relations in the opposite direction, with the PRC’s suppression of mass demonstrations in Hong Kong (Global Times, July 29, 2020); the implementation of the 2020 Hong Kong National Security Law that London sees as a breach of “one country, two systems” (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs [FMPRC], June 12, 2020); the British riposte in offering a path to citizenship for Hong Kongers (Gov.cn, April 14, 2021); and the escalation of tensions between China and its trading partners, particularly the UK’s closest ally, America (FMPRC, September 24, 2021; Xinhua, October 5, 2021). The British establishment, like their American cousins, have changed tack on China of late. In June 2022, MI5 Director Ken McCallum and FBI Director Chris Wray gave a joint address warning business and academic leaders in Britain of the “massive shared challenge” posed by China (MI5, July 6, 2022). Two years earlier, McCallum said that if Russian behavior is like “bursts of bad weather,” then “China is changing the climate” (CIGI, June 2, 2022). Last November, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, referring to UK-China relations, said that “the so-called ‘golden era’ is over, along with the naive idea that trade would lead to social and political reform” in the People’s Republic (ThePrint, November 29. 2022). Even the pro-engagement business weekly Beijing to Britain admits that no one in the UK Parliament “believes that an enriched Chinese middle class will steer the country towards democracy” (Beijing to Britain, January 24, 2021). Britain’s conundrum in stabilizing commercial relations with Beijing while heeding American sensibilities is as difficult as at any time since Nixon’s groundbreaking trip to China in 1972. Meanwhile in Beijing, the decades-old ordeal of striving to play the British off against the Americans has become an increasingly uphill battle. In fact, much of today’s menu of bilateral issues between London and Beijing, with the Washington factor always hovering in the background, might be familiar to Clement Atlee, Winston Churchill, Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong. That brings some predictability to the rollercoaster ride of UK-China relations, but unsettling variables have changed the course of relations and pushed London, not to mention the rest of NATO, ever closer to Washington. Specific aspects of the PRC’s increasingly destabilizing and aggressive policies that have rankled London include the removal of Hong Kong as a centerpiece of the UK-China bilateral relationship; and Beijing’s announcement immediately prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, that “the Sino-Russian cooperation has no limits, no exclusion zone, no ceiling” (中俄合作没有止境 ,没有禁区,没有上限) (Global Times, December 24, 2021; Gov.cn, February 4, 2022).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, United Kingdom, Europe, and Asia

25. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Socio-Cultural and Political Implications for Pakistan Amid Covid19 and the Way Forward

Author:: Mubeen Adnan and Reema Murad
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Political Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: Through the ‘game changer’ project of China Pakistan Economic Corridor, China is aiming to stabilize its western part by promoting investment and economic development in its neighbour to the West, Pakistan, which will lead to a boost in the Pakistani economy through investments in infrastructure and construction of gas and oil pipeline. There is also the aim of reducing extremism in the Xinjiang region. However, there are several social, cultural and political changes that the project has the potential to bring about in Pakistan. This research work has made an attempt to understand the variousimplications of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor on Pakistan as well as how the COVID-19 pandemic impacted CPEC and the path ahead as the world slowly transitions out of COVID-19. This research paper has used secondary sources in order to answer these pertinent topics. Major opportunities which Pakistan and China have gained through this ChinaPakistan economic Corridor as well as some challenges are also discussed.
Topic:: Economics, Bilateral Relations, Investment, Economic Development, COVID-19, and Opportunity
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

26. Sino-Iranian Relations and Their Impact on South and Central Asia

Author:: Stephen J. Blank
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: In July 2020, a draft text of a series of Sino‑Iranian agreements outlining a comprehensive 25‑year strategic partnership between Iran and China was leaked. The leaked text accords presaged the formal accords signed in 2021 whose text has not been released. These agreements fundamentally transformed Sino‑Iranian relations and also converted the Middle East into another theater of the global Sino‑American confrontation. That latter consideration shows that the significance of these accords transcends the Middle East. Although most Western commentary naturally emphasize the Sino‑American and Middle Eastern repercussions of these accords, we cannot neglect their no less enormous impact on Central and South Asia and focus on those unduly neglected issues. China’s agreement to the terms, as leaked—$400 billion in investments in Iran over 25 years, particularly in large scale transportation energy, infrastructure, telecommunications, projects, and access to Iranian ports—signified a vast expansion of China’s policy of forming a global network of partnerships with countries wary of American dominance. Even if this is more a declaration of intent than what will actually happen, the parties’ intentions are clearly serious. The agreements also stipulated that these programs would come under the administrative rubric of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s signature policy, and very much a Chinese‑directed series of projects. Commitments on this scale also clearly denote a major new strategic orientation by China and Iran. Even observers who underplay these revelations like Jonathan Fulton, a Non‑Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, concede their dramatic impact on Sino‑Iranian relations and world politics more generally. This is particularly significant as China does not cavalierly establish comprehensive strategic partnerships (CSP) with other states. For example, China has signed such agreements with other Gulf states like Saudi Arabia—so signing one with Riyadh’s main Middle Eastern revival cannot have been a routine or impulsive decision. Neither will its impact be restricted to the Gulf and Middle East. A CSP is (or was, before the February 2022 agreement with Russia) the highest level in China’s hierarchy of diplomatic relations. In a CSP, the partner states commit to the “full pursuit of cooperation and development on regional and international affairs.” Since Beijing does not offer this level of partnership easily, as Fulton has also observed, a state receiving that status must be perceived by China as playing an important political and economic role internationally, and the bilateral relationship must already feature a high level of political trust, dense economic relations, and a strong, well‑established relationship in other areas.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

27. Time to Get U.S.-Azerbaijani Relations on Track Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Karabakh War has created a new geopolitical reality in the South Caucasus and the Caspian region.

Author:: Luke Coffey
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Karabakh War has created a new geopolitical reality in the South Caucasus and the Caspian region. This new geopolitical reality creates challenges and opportunities for the United States. Azerbaijan’s victory in the war means that NATO member Turkey’s influence in the South Caucasus, and by extension Central Asia, is on the rise. If Washington and Ankara can get their bilateral relationship back on track, Turkey’s ascendancy in the region can benefit broader U.S. strategic interests. In the aftermath of the conflict there is also an opportunity for America to increase and deepen regional economic and energy cooperation. However, Moscow now has troops—either by invitation or by occupation—in all three countries of the South Caucasus and in Kazakhstan on the other side of the Caspian. From the American point of view, this does not help bring stability or security to the region. Azerbaijan is in a strategic region where many U.S. geopolitical interests converge. Since 2001, Azerbaijan has proven to be a reliable partner for America against terrorism as well as in the war in Afghanistan. With the new geopolitical reality in the region, U.S. policymakers would be remiss to ignore this limited window of opportunity for improving Washington’s relationship with Baku.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Asia, Azerbaijan, North America, and United States of America

28. Strategic Ambiguity in US-Taiwan Relations During the Donald Trump Administration

Author:: Filip Grzegorzewski
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: Strategic ambiguity, or the deliberate policy of uncertainty as to whether the United States would use force to defend Taiwan against an invasion by the People's Republic of China, has been the centrepiece of US policy towards the Taiwan issue for decades. This paper discusses the factors driving the redefinition of strategic ambiguity and its recalibration throughout Donald Trump's presidency (2017–2021). The fundamental driver of this change was to balance the rising power of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The paper applied offensive realism as a theoretical framework for its analysis. Under President Donald Trump, Washington modified its policy of strategic ambiguity, explicitly framing relations with Taiwan within a broader Indo-Pacific strategy. While the US retained key elements of strategic ambiguity, including the 'One China' policy, it added new features to deploy it offensively against Beijing's growing regional hegemony. The increased dynamism and unpredictability of relations with Taiwan were matched by a welcoming attitude towards strengthening Taiwanese identity and highlighting the systemic differences between communist China and democratic Taiwan. America stepped up arms sales and encouraged Taiwan to build its self-defence capabilities. Washington engaged in countering Chinese attempts to isolate Taiwan internationally and included it in restructuring global supply chains. Although the United States has not formally revised the boundaries of the 'One China' policy, the modification of strategic ambiguity increased Taiwan's prominence in US-China power competition and pushed back the prospect of peaceful unification.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Leadership
Political Geography:: Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

29. Indo–French Defence Cooperation in the Light of Regional Security Balance in South Asia

Author:: Mukesh Shankar Bharti
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: The article aims to describe the regional security challenges to India in South Asia. Since the partition of India in 1947, the country has continuously been under external threat as a form of proxy warfare and terrorism. For this purpose, the article highlighted the core hotspots where India has major border issues with China in the Himalayan terrain. India has been facing a bigger security challenge from China and Pakistan in the South Asia region. This article analyses the defence ties between India and France in the context of security. India's neorealist approaches expand its strategic partnership in global politics. Therefore, India has been getting strategic support from the French side whenever India seeks support in a critical situation. The article uses the methods of case study and discourse analysis to answer the question and find out the study's relevance. As a result of severe security threats, India had to negotiate the purchase of defence equipment from France. India had to buy Rafael fighter jet, submarine and other heavy military weapons. Indo-French relations are stronger than in the past and will develop as friendly relations in the future.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Regionalism
Political Geography:: South Asia, Indonesia, Asia, and France

30. U.S. Relations With China: DACOR Conference Summary

Author:: Keith McCormick and Emma W. Sandifer
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: As relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) loom ever larger for the U.S., DACOR’s annual conference in 2022 focused on “Balancing Competing Interests in U.S. Relations With China.” The Washington-based organization of foreign affairs professionals brought together diplomats and academics to explore the idea that U.S. policy toward China needs to pursue cooperation in some areas and competition in others while simultaneously confronting Beijing and preparing to deter or win a conflict, if it comes to war. The hybrid conference, with some attendees present at the historic DACOR-Bacon house and others joining online, was conducted under Chatham House Rules. The keynote address, by Ambassador (ret.) J. Stapleton Roy, was live-streamed to a classroom of political science faculty and students at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Diplomacy, Human Rights, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Conference
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

31. Meloni at the Helm: What Does Italy’s New Government Mean for Sino-Italian Relations?

Author:: Andrew R. Novo
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Questions about the unity of Italy’s new government on several key foreign policy issues persist, ranging from the extent of its support for Ukraine to its commitment to various European Union institutions. However, on the issue of China, the new government of Prime Minister (PM) Giorgia Meloni appears united. This bodes well for transatlantic cooperation and could spell trouble for Beijing, which not too long ago entertained ideas of using Italy as a friendly counterweight in Europe. Under Meloni, Italian foreign policy, particularly toward China, is unlikely to chart a dramatically new course. This is largely because the current government has prioritized its commitment to NATO and needs to focus on domestic issues rather than risk upsetting the international arena. While openings remain for Sino-Italian cooperation in economic terms, such cooperation will be geared toward supporting Italy’s domestic challenges and is unlikely to provide Beijing with the significant foothold that it has long hoped to gain in Europe.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Government, Bilateral Relations, and Giorgia Meloni
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Italy

32. China Increases Support for Pakistan’s Naval Modernization with an Eye on the Indian Ocean

Author:: Syed Fazl-e-Haider
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In mid-July, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and the Pakistan Navy (PN) held the “Sea Guardians-2” exercise in the waters off Shanghai (China Brief, October 4; Pakistan Television, July 12). The joint naval drills focused on neutralizing maritime security threats, particularly those that might jeopardize strategic sea lanes. The bilateral exercise also included joint target practice, anti-submarine, anti-aircraft and anti-missile drills (China Military Online [CMO], July 10). The drills built on the first iteration of the exercise, Sea Guardians-1, which was held in January 2020 in the North Arabian Sea off Karachi, Pakistan. The participation in these exercises of the guided missile frigate Taimur, which is the most advanced warship built by China for the PN, demonstrates the increasing level of Chinese support for the training and modernization of Pakistan’s naval forces (Global Times, July 10). Bilateral military ties, which are a mainstay of the China-Pakistan all-weather friendship and strategic partnership, have strengthened in recent years. China is the main supplier of military equipment to Pakistan, which from 2017-2021 absorbed nearly 47 percent of all Chinese arms exports (China Brief, March 25). In a move to further deepen defense ties, China provided Pakistan with J-10C multi-role fighters in late 2021 (South Asian Voices , April 12). In June, a high-powered Pakistani delegation comprising top brass from the army, navy and air force paid a visit to China at a time when tensions between China and the West were on the rise (CMO, June 12). The visit was part of the Pakistan-China Joint Military Cooperation Committee (PCJMCC), which is the highest body involved in facilitating bilateral defense cooperation. Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff General Qamar Javed Bajwa also attended the top-level committee’s meeting, along with senior-most counterparts in the PLA. Both countries vowed to further deepen their strategic partnership in challenging times and enhance their joint military cooperation in training, technology and counterterrorism (Express Tribune , June 12).
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Navy, Modernization, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, Asia, and Indian Ocean

33. Beijing Makes a Big Long-term Bet on Nuclear Power

Author:: John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Last fall, China suffered extensive power outages due to a combination of surging electricity demand and tight supply. A confluence of factors contributed to the energy supply shortage, but nearly all traced back to China’s struggle to manage its overdependence on coal for power generation: rising global coal prices; shuttering of old power plants as part of a push to enhance energy efficiency; emission-reduction efforts; an “unofficial” embargo on Australian coal imports due to geopolitical strife between Beijing and Canberra; and disparities in government price controls (power plants must purchase coal at market rates, but consumer prices are set in a narrow band) that incentivized plants to cease or slow operations rather than produce electricity at a financial loss (Caixin, October 12, 2021; Zaobao, July 14). In 2022, China has avoided a replay of last year’s energy crunch despite the supply shocks in the energy markets induced by the Ukraine conflict by increasing domestic coal production, exploiting the opportunity to import Russian oil and coal at discounted rates and continuing to steadily increase its renewable energy capacity. Boosting domestic coal production has been particularly essential to meet demand. This month, the National Energy Administration (NEA) reported that during the second quarter, China’s raw coal output rose 10 percent year-on-year, which the NEA highlighted as particularly noteworthy given it came on the basis of 16 percent growth in coal output in the same quarter last year (NEA, August 2). Another mitigating factor for China on the energy front has been heavy spring rainfall in many areas of the country that has increased hydropower output over 20 percent in the first half of this year—a substantial boost as hydroelectricity already accounts for about 15 percent of China’s overall energy mix (NEA, August 2; Global Times, May 5).
Topic:: Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, Nuclear Power, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

34. With an Eye on Tibet, China Reacts Warily to Warming U.S.-Nepal Ties

Author:: Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: U.S. Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Uzra Zeya’s three-day visit to Nepal in May evoked a strong reaction from China. During the visit, Zeya, who is also President Joseph Biden’s Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, met with an array of high-level Nepali officials, including Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba as well as Nepali human rights activists. She also visited two Tibetan refugee settlements in Nepal where she interacted with refugees and enquired about their problems (Kathmandu Post, May 22). Zeya had arrived in Kathmandu after meeting the Dalai Lama, senior officials of the Tibetan exile government as well as officials and representatives of the Tibetan refugee community in India (The Hindu, May 18). The Chinese response was swift. The U.S. “should stop meddling in China’s internal affairs under the pretext of Tibet-related issues, and offer no support to the anti-China separatist activities of the Dalai clique,” People’s Republic of China (PRC) Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian said in a press conference (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 19). At the 14th meeting of the Nepal-China Bilateral Consultative Mechanism, which was held a few days after Zeya’s visit, Chinese officials reportedly expressed their misgivings over her engagements to their Nepali counterparts (Kathmandu Post, August 4). Then in July, Liu Jianchao, the head of the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) visited Kathmandu, where at meetings with leaders of Nepal’s major political parties, he asked them to reaffirm their commitment to the ‘One-China’ policy (Nepal Foreign Affairs, July 14).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Nepal, and Tibet

35. Will the China-Pakistan Corridor Get a Boost with a New Government in Islamabad?

Author:: Syed Fazl-e Haider
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On June 10, the Foreign Office in Islamabad received a diplomatic communication from the Pakistani ambassador in Beijing (The News, June 13). China assured Prime Minister (PM) Shehbaz Sharif, who replaced former PM Imran Khan in April, that it is eager to work with the present government (PRC Foreign Ministry [FMPRC], June 17). China also confirmed the rollover of a $2.3 billion loan to Pakistan at a reduced rate, which is a great help to the cash-strapped nation (The Express Tribune, June 22). Furthermore, China agreed to extend additional financial assistance between $2.5 to $2.8 billion, and pledged to support Pakistan’s fragile economy through the multi-billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) (Business Standard, June 29). Chinese leadership also urged the present government to reinvigorate CPEC projects, which were neglected under Imran Khan’s government (The News, June 13; Business Recorder, June 15). However, PM Sharif’s government has inherited a plethora of problems and issues plaguing progress and causing delays in the execution of projects that fall under the umbrella of CPEC.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Economy
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

36. China and Russia: Shackled to a Corpse?

Author:: John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Almost as soon as Russian tanks began their bloody crawl toward Kyiv, debate ensued over whether Chinese leaders had advance knowledge of the Kremlin’s war plans. The broader Chinese foreign policy community was certainly dumbstruck as U.S. warnings of an imminent Russian attack on Ukraine were discounted as geopolitical ploys (Global Times, February 18; Stimson, February 28). However, given the highly personalized nature of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership— President Xi Jinping has met with his counterpart Vladimir Putin 38 times since 2013 — the top leadership was assuredly not entirely in the dark (FMPRC, December 15, 2021). As competition with the U.S. has intensified under Xi, Russia has consolidated its position as China’s most consequential strategic partner. However, China is increasingly concerned that Putin’s war and the resultant international backlash are severely damaging Russia. Some elites have also condemned Russia’s brutality and unilateral aggression, which underscores mounting anxiety that China is tied to a partner that is both weaker and more belligerent than it had previously realized (China Times, March 1). In the current situation, Xi comes off poorly regardless of how much foreknowledge he possessed. If he was naïve about Putin’s designs, he looks weak for allowing a lesser partner to drag China into a confrontation with the West. If Xi cut Putin a blank check for aggression, this may intensify muted but pointed domestic criticism of his foreign policy acumen including his decision to privilege ties with Russia over relations with the West, which are more integral to China’s economic and technological development.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eastern Europe, and Asia

37. China and Pakistan: Strains in the All-Weather Partnership?

Author:: Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: China and Pakistan have formally launched Phase II of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship venture in China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). During Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan’s visit to Beijing on February 3-6 for the Winter Olympics, the two sides signed a Framework Agreement on Industrial Cooperation to kick off the second phase of CPEC, which will focus on the development and industrialization of special economic zones (SEZs) (Pakistan Today, February 4). The joint statement issued at the end of Khan’s visit noted that “the two sides signed or concluded a number of agreements / MoUs, covering bilateral cooperation in areas of economic and technical, industry, investment, infrastructure, space, vaccine, digitalization, standardization, disaster management, culture, sports, and vocational education” (for the full text of the China-Pakistan joint statement see People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 6). According to Pakistan’s Special Assistant to the Prime Minister (SAPM) on CPEC Affairs Khalid Mansoor, CPEC’s second phase will attract multi-billion dollar investments to Pakistan. Representatives of around 500 Chinese companies met with Khan in Beijing, and per the Prime Minister’s remarks to Pakistani media following the visit, expressed interest in investing in industry, agriculture, information technology, infrastructure, housing and construction, mining and oil refining (Business Recorder, February 8). The big question, however, is whether this ostensible interest from Chinese businesses will translate into hard cash commitments. China is concerned over the deteriorating security situation in Pakistan. In the run-up to Khan’s visit, Pakistani militants carried out several major attacks in the country. On January 17, the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP), also known as Pakistani Taliban, opened fire on a security checkpoint in Islamabad (Dawn, January 19). A few days later, the newly formed Baluch Nationalist Army (BNA) carried out a bomb attack in a busy market in Lahore (Express Tribune, January 20). Hours before Khan left for China, Baluch militants struck again, this time attacking security forces’ camps in Panjgur and Naushki in Baluchistan province in southwestern Pakistan (Dawn, February 2). Then on February 5, the TTP killed five Frontier Corps personnel at a security checkpoint in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (Dawn, February 7). Last year, Pakistan suffered 207 terrorist attacks, a 42% increase over 2020, according to a study by the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, an independent think-tank based in Islamabad. Fatalities from terror attacks increased by 51% over the previous year. [1] Worryingly for Beijing, Pakistani militant groups have increasingly threatened Chinese nationals. Four of the attacks in 2021 targeted Chinese nationals and at least 17 Chinese workers were killed in these attacks. As China and Pakistan move into Phase II of CPEC, the safety of Chinese projects and personnel in Pakistan will be a key concern.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

38. What is at Stake in China-Bhutan Boundary Negotiations?

Author:: Jagannath P. Panda
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Satellite imagery reveals that China has recently accelerated construction along its border with Bhutan. Underway since 2020, the project includes over 200 structures, with several two-story buildings in six locations (Times of India, January 13). Bhutan has not commented on the situation in keeping with its policy to refrain from public discussion of border issues, whereas Beijing has framed the development as “normal construction activities on its own territory” (The Hindu, January 13). India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has acknowledged that it is monitoring China’s bridge-building activities over the Pangong Tso lake (India MEA, January 6). In late December, China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs announced the “standardization” of the names of 15 places (eight residential areas, four mountains, two rivers, and one mountain pass) in the Northeast Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh that China also claims and calls “Southern Tibet” (藏南, Zangnan). This is the second instance of China renaming localities in Arunachal Pradesh; the first occurred in 2017 (Global Times, December 30, 2021). India called it a “ridiculous exercise to support untenable territorial claims” (Indian MEA, January 6). Though 2022 has only begun, China’s various intimidation tactics against India are already in full swing: from renaming places and circulating videos of People’s Liberation Army soldiers raising the five-starred red flags of China, supposedly, in the Galwan Valley as part of their New Year celebrations, to expanding its dual use infrastructure along the Himalayan border (Global Times, January 1; The Print, January 13). According to state media, China has been strengthening infrastructure-related projects in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Beijing claims its infrastructure push in Tibet is intended to support economic development, but the Indian side interprets the projects as serving dual use, or, military purposes (China Brief, November 19, 2021). While Chinese sources claim that India was making a “fuss,” they did not, however, entirely deny these reports (Global Times, January 19).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:: China, India, Asia, and Bhutan

39. The U.S.-China Perception Gap: A Recipe for Disaster?

Author:: Harry He
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In December, a war of words raged across the Pacific over the very meaning of the word “democracy” (China Brief, December 14, 2021). The United States held its Summit for Democracy, inviting other democracies of various stripes, while China convened its own competing “Dialogue on Democracy,” calling out the U.S. for fomenting a cold war-style global geopolitical split (CGTN, December 2, 2021; U.S. Department of State). This discourse battle exemplifies a trend in Chinese views of the U.S. that has been gradually forming over the past 15 years. The 2008 global financial crisis, ill-fated American military campaigns, and mismanagement of the COVID-19 pandemic have led Chinese leaders to doubt U.S. power and capabilities. Yet, Washington has held on to the belief that it is capable of shaping China’s behaviors, either through inducement or deterrence. Even as the U.S. recognizes the limits of its influence and the recent relative decline in prestige, it still sees tremendous strengths in its military and economic prowess, alliance networks, democratic values, and soft power. The perception gap between China and the U.S. concerning American power is a potential recipe for disaster. While this does not imply that conflict is imminent or unavoidable, it does make miscalculations and miscommunications in the U.S.-China relationship both more likely and more dangerous.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Discourse, and Perception
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

40. Pak-China Geostrategic Interdependence: Impact on Rising Economies of Asia

Author:: Ameena Nasim
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: China and Pakistan have enjoyed a close and mutually beneficial relationship during the last seven decades. Both the nations‘ leadership pronounced the bilateral relationship between China and Pakistan as the ―All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partnership‖ and ―Iron Brother.‖ The strategic partnership between China and Pakistan has a significant impact on the Asian strategic environment in particular and global politics. The Indian strategic enclave regards China-Pakistan‘s multifaceted relationship as a substantial obstacle for India‘s rise as a Great Power within the regional context. The study‘s primary objective is to critically examine impact on Asia‘s main actors such as India and Russia. So that one can profess about the dynamics of this relationship and implications of China and Pakistan‘s geo-strategic relations on the rising economies. A qualitative study with qualitative interviews and thematic analysis was applied to conduct this study. The analysis reveals that South Asian RSC has no change in the patterns of amity and enmity. The region continues to be conflictive, where their enduring rivalry and continued distrust shape enmity patterns between Pakistan and India. On the contrary, Pakistan and China‘s amity patterns can be seen growing in the longstanding strategic relationship and deep-rooted cooperation. The investigation discovers that on a bilateral level, several new factors in the post-9/11 era have molded Pakistan-China Strategic relations, which have intricate linkages with the regional and global security complexion.
Topic:: Economics, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Interests, Interdependence, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Russia, China, South Asia, and Asia

41. Scope and Limitations of Soft Power Diplomacy: A Quantitative Analysis of Afghans' Perceptions about India

Author:: Mohammad Reyaz and Sabir Ahamed
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: Before the Taliban came back to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, India and Afghanistan had cordial bilateral relations and were often described as great friends. Since 2002, India had helped build several infrastructure projects as part of its promised development assistance program of over $2 billion (later increased to $3 billion). Considering India’s investments in Afghanistan, the goodwill it enjoyed among common Afghans was understandable. However, it would be wrong to imply that these unique, multifaceted bilateral relations between the two countries were simply due to India's helping hand. This research paper is one of its kind attempt to explain the perceptions Afghans had about India based on the field survey done in Afghanistan in 2019. Using responses of over 321 Afghan participants, the paper attempts to quantitatively analyze the goodwill and positive vibes that India enticed among Afghans. However, many Afghans felt that India did not do enough during the crisis in August 2021. Based on the survey and the general perceptions of Afghans in the aftermath of the return of the Taliban, this paper argues that the soft power investments in Afghanistan helped India in its nation-branding, making it attractive and creating goodwill. However, New Delhi lacked the will to act smartly and hence did not get the desired strategic influences due to ‘soft power behavior’.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Interests, and Public Diplomacy
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Middle East, India, and Asia

42. When only China wants to play: Institutional turmoil and Chinese investment in Brazil

Author:: Niels Sondergaard, Ana Flavia Barros-Platiau, and Hyeyoon Park
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:: The political and institutional crisis in Brazil from 2015, fueled largely by corruption probes and lawfare, had severe repercussions within the Brazilian construction and energy sectors. While many international investors withdrew from Brazil in this period, Chinese investment surged. This article accounts for the particular characteristics of Chinese investments, such as sectorial complementarities, risk assessment, market size attraction, and state-drivenness, which may explain this development.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Hegemony, Investment, and Institutions
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Brazil, and South America

43. The Coronavirus: Fueling Concerns and Contrasts between India and China

Author:: Tanvi Madan
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: On February 26, 2020, an Indian plane landed in Wuhan carrying medical supplies for China, which was then the epicenter of the COVID-19 outbreak. On its return, it evacuated a number of Indian and Bangladeshi nationals, as well as citizens of other countries. On the face of it, this is the kind of cooperative effort that is expected during a global public health crisis, with countries—even competitors—coming together at a time of need. However, the saga of that flight reflected another (prescient) dynamic—that COVID-19 would reinforce and increase rather than alleviate competition between China and India and complicate cooperation, with pandemic response and recovery efforts being seen through a competitive prism. That flight to Wuhan was not smooth; indeed, it was much delayed. Delhi had announced it a week earlier. It was a way to help China, demonstrate India’s capacity, and assist India’s neighbors by evacuating their citizens. But then Indian officials publicly, albeit anonymously, revealed that Beijing was not clearing the flight. The reason was unclear—China, after all, had been requesting international support. There also did not seem to be a bureaucratic snafu. So, was it the visual of Beijing accepting support from India, which Chinese officials and analysts sometimes dismiss as a less capable, even chaotic, neighbor? Was it the desire not to give India a soft power win, including with its neighbors? Was it because the flight involved a military transport aircraft procured from the U.S.? Was it retaliation for the temporary Indian detention of a Chinese ship bound for Pakistan due to a tip-off of dual-use items on board? Or was the reason Chinese unhappiness about Indian travel restrictions to and from China, or Indian export limits on certain medical products? Whatever the reason, China eventually gave the flight clearance, but only a week later and after much Indian negotiation. It was an early sign that the public health arena would not be immune from the competitive atmosphere prevailing between the two countries, and in the region as a whole. Subsequent events only bore that out. There has been considerable discussion about how countries’ perceptions of China would change due to the pandemic—at the beginning because of its mishandling, and then because of its recovery. This chapter argues that, rather than change perceptions, Beijing’s handling of COVID-19 increased the largely skeptical views of China that prevail in India, which had at least 29 million cases and over 385,000 deaths in India by mid-June 2021 (the 2nd and 3rd highest in the world respectively). This trend was further bolstered by the worst boundary crisis between the two countries since they fought a war in 1962. Together, the pandemic and the boundary crisis have ensured that the competitive and conflictual elements of the India-China relationship have been front and center over the last year. They have reinforced and accelerated concerns in India about China’s lack of transparency, its uncertain commitment to the rules-based order, as well as its growing influence in the Indo-Pacific and in international institutions. And they have demonstrated that despite Delhi and Beijing’s efforts to cooperate and to stabilize their relationship over the last two decades, it remains a fundamentally competitive one that can spill over into conflict. This chapter examines the impact of first the pandemic and then the boundary crisis on perceptions of China among the Indian government, establishment, and public. It proceeds to outline the consequences of these perceptions on Indian domestic policy, its partnerships with like-minded major and middle powers, and its counter-COVID activism. Finally, it considers China’s response, particularly to Indian policy changes.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Culture, Domestic Politics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China, South Asia, India, and Asia

44. The Sino–U.S. National Identity Gap and Bilateral Relations

Author:: Danielle Cohen
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The national identity gap between China and the United States has become increasingly apparent. Under Xi Jinping, China has sought to reclaim its historical greatness and proclaimed itself to be a responsible great power that offers a credible alternative to Western values, while also promoting increasingly authoritarian policies at home, complete with extensive repression in Xinjiang and renewed state control of the economy. Assertions of U.S. national identity were somewhat muted under Donald Trump, confused by the battle between those who supported the administration’s “America First” policy, its transactional approach to foreign affairs, and its deemphasis on human rights and democracy promotion in U.S. foreign policy, and those who worried about the global repercussions of an isolationist, nativist policy. For a time, the United States seemed more preoccupied with its trade war with China than with claims that the United States should act as the global protector of human rights and democracy. The COVID-19 pandemic further complicated already tense Sino–U.S. relations and called both countries’ national identities into question. While China had, as of spring 2021, succeeded in keeping its COVID-19 outbreak remarkably small, the damage caused by its initial suppression of medical reports, along with successful virus mitigation in a number of non-authoritarian states, called into question its claim to be a responsible world power on the basis of its pandemic performance. Meanwhile, the Trump administration failed to protect U.S. citizens from catastrophic death tolls and prevented the United States from taking a leading role in resolving this global crisis. In January 2021, the Biden administration took office with a focus on swiftly ending the pandemic, while also reasserting the traditional U.S. global leadership role. When combined with its assessment of U.S. power after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and of U.S. domestic social and political instability evident throughout 2020-2021, the pandemic has strengthened China’s perceptions of the United States as a country in decline, and of China as a “risen” great power that should now play a major role in shaping the global order. At the same time, although U.S. policy towards China remains firm despite the presidential transition, the underlying rationale has shifted from the “America First” approach of the Trump administration to the democratic values-infused approach of the Biden administration. As the world struggles to move beyond the pandemic, the national identities of China and the United States are increasingly defined in opposition to each other and seem likely to drive an ever more challenging bilateral relationship in the coming years.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Culture, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

45. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

Author:: Ali Haider Saleem and Arhama Siddiqa
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: The term Silk Road is used by scholars to describe a network of trading posts and markets linking East Asia to the Mediterranean. In terms of geographical context, the editors of Baku Dialogues define the region as the “geographic space looking west past Anatolia to the warm seas beyond; north across the Caspian towards the Great Plain and the Great Steppe; east to the peaks of the Altai and the arid sands of the Taklamakan; and south towards the Hindu Kush and the Indus valley, looping down around in the direction of the Persian Gulf and across the Fertile Crescent.” States falling under this parasol include China, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, the five Central Asian republics, Azerbaijan, and Russia. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which traverses several continents, is a long‑term, strategic investment plan with the objective of facilitating economic integration of countries in line with the historic Silk Road. In April 2015, China’s President, Xi Jinping announced the China‑Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which amounts to BRI’s flagship project. This enterprise, which encompasses road, rail, and oil pipeline links, will help Beijing advance its influence across South and Central Asia.
Topic:: Economics, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, and Silk Road
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, and Asia

46. The United States in India's Strategy in the Indo-Pacific Region Since 2014

Author:: Jakub Zajaczkowski
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: The article's objective is to analyze the main assumptions of India's strategy in the Indo-Pacific region and define the role of the US in it. The time frame of the article is determined by the assumption of power in India in 2014 by the Indian People's Party (Bharatiya Janata Party, BJP), led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, as well as the opening of a new stage of the US-led Indo-Pacific rebalancing strategy, which followed China's initiation in 2013 of its Belt and Road Initiative (previously known as the One Belt One Road project). The article seeks to answer the following main research question: What role has India attributed to the United States in its Indo-Pacific strategy since 2014? It hypothesizes that the United States has assumed an increasingly significant role in India's regional strategy over the past seven years, but not to the extent of a formal alliance, only approaching at best the status of a strategic partnership. The theoretical framework used to analyze the case study of the US role in India's regional strategy is the category of institutional balancing and the assumptions of neoclassical realism. The choice of such research tools was determined by their explanatory value. Moreover, both models complement each other. Bearing the above in mind, the following structure of the article was adopted. The first part presents the general assumption of the analysis and the theoretical framework. The second discusses the evolution of India's approach to the US from 2014 to 2021, indicating the reasons for its change and reconstructing the role of the US in the Indian regional strategy, especially after 2020. The third part draws on the theoretical framework adopted in the article, i.e., the assumptions of institutional balancing and neoclassical realism, to offer conclusions that answer the main research questions.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Hegemony, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: India, Asia, North America, and United States of America

47. China-India New Intricacies: Rivalry and Cooperation in a New Changing Global Context

Author:: Buddhi Prasad Sharma
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: At the changing geopolitical landscape with the Covid-19 pandemic scenario, the China-India tussle and scale of regional and global exposition has begun to display with certain consequences, which seems to shake the existing regional balance of power. A mounting political and military confrontation between these two powers as experts suggested could create a hurdle on regional-global stability and can strike on the path of globalization. With historical and existing context analysis, this paper explores that putting genuine differences aside, China and India being responsible stakeholders of the global community, can cooperate and contribute to regional and global peace and prosperity. This paper is based on qualitative research and explorative form in a pattern. This paper concludes that to reduce protracted political and border-related tensions, continuous institutional dialogue, regular communication, and formal-informal exchanges could be effective tools for a peaceful resolution. At this juncture, the competition and cooperation approach could be useful for fostering China-India bilateral relations, and this situation will help to address common challenges of the global community, restructure the global order, and re-adjust regional and global scenarios crippled by the Covid-19 pandemic.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Hegemony, Borders, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China, India, and Asia

48. China's Belt and Road Initiative and Georgia: A Short Overview

Author:: Ekaterine Lomia
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: Since the beginning of the 2000s, China has embarked on an unprecedented path of economic development, as evidence of which is the largest economic project of the XXI century initiated by the People's Republic of China. The global Belt and Road Initiative announced by the first person of the country, Xi Jinping, is a shortened name of the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ and ‘XXI Century Maritime Silk Road’. It covers the Asia-Pacific, Europe, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, West Asia, and Africa and involves more than a hundred countries, international organizations, and leading economic actors. The main participants in the project are China, Mongolia, Russia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Poland, Germany, the Netherlands, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran, and India. The article reviews the role of the Chinese project in a global context. The paper focuses on the role and purpose of Georgia in the Belt and Road Initiative. This study will try to reveal the results for the benefit of Georgia, which is one of the participating countries, and the role of China through research to be made from documents and academic studies on the subject. Georgia tries to conduct its relations with China, as a partner in the project, with a policy of balance without disturbing its relations with the West.
Topic:: Economics, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, Hegemony, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Georgia

49. Indo-Iran Relations in the Changing Regional Environment Implications for South Asia

Author:: Shehzada Afzal and Nazir Hussain
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: International relations are determined by systemic and structural factors at the global, regional and state/domestic levels. Inter-state relations require common interests, shared goals, inter-related threat perception and eminent security challenges. Indo-Iranian relations have been on a progressive trajectory since the beginning of current century; their relations are focussed on political, economic, security and strategic spheres. As an emerging major power, India intends to enhance its influence across regions. This paper attempts to examine how Indo-Iranian relations have shaped up over the years. How convergence of interests by these two far-off neighbors have developed to join and cooperate in economic, political and social domains. For Pakistan, any development on its eastern and western borders holds important bearing on its national security; therefore, what new challenges are posed by Indo-Iranian relations in the changing regional environment of South Asia.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Peace, and Regionalism
Political Geography:: Iran, South Asia, Indonesia, Middle East, and Asia

50. Is Re-calibration Feasible in Turkey-Egypt Relations? Limits and Possibilities

Author:: Osman Bahadir Dinçer, Busra Nur Ozguler-Aktel, and Mehmet Hecan
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: The ideological dimension of the bilateral Turkey-Egypt ties constitutes a particular focal point in terms of predicaments, which could be quite tricky to overcome. Yet, it seems that the geopolitical necessities tighten the noose for Turkey to feel obliged in fixing the strained relations with the Sisi administration. It is also evident that the first step towards a compromise is expected to be taken by Ankara. Within this context and providing a brief background, this piece aims to lay out specific policy contexts to discuss the possibility and limits of recalibration between Turkey and Egypt based on a 2016 visit to Cairo in which numerous interviews with the political and academic elite were conducted.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Leadership
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, Turkey, Asia, and Egypt

51. Chinese Investments in Brazil: Economic Diplomacy in Bilateral Relations

Author:: Virginia Soledad Busilli and Maria Belen Jaime
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Contexto Internacional
Institution:: Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
Abstract:: The People’s Republic of China has consolidated its status as a great power and strengthened its presence in different regions of the planet. In accordance with its economic development strategy, Beijing’s growing bond with Latin America is part of China’s need to guarantee access to raw materials and energy resources. In this framework and through economic diplomacy, China has strengthened its trade relations, as well as loans and investments in most of the region’s countries.Brazil is an example of this relationship pattern, as one of China’s most important partners and top investment destination in Latin America. It became Beijing’s top commercial partner in 2012. This paper will analyse the composition and evolution of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Brazil between the years of 2004 and 2020. In order to do so, we will study the main projects carried out by the country, as well as the characteristics of the Chinese companies (state or non-state) that participated in the process, in order to understand their most important features. Likewise, we will analyse the articulation of the Chinese FDI with its trade flows. We will start from the premise that Chinese investments in Brazil are directly linked to Beijing’s strategic interests, while at the same time guided by market logics that try to maximise profits. In this vein, within the framework of the ‘going out strategy’,state companies play a fundamental role.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, and Hegemony
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Brazil, and South America

52. Defence diplomatic relations between Poland and China and how they can be improved

Author:: Lech Drab
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:: War Studies University
Abstract:: The main purpose of the article is to examine diplomatic relations between China (official name: the People’s Republic of China) and Poland with a special focus on defence. It also gives an overall assessment of the relations between the armed forces of the two countries and evaluates what has been achieved so far and possible involvements that the countries (especially Poland) should take. A comparative analysis and a historical approach were used whilst investigating the facts. Qualitative research, including participant observation, archival resources, analysis and selection of studies, reports and expertise were the methods employed for collecting research material. Comparative studies were used to analyse other countries’ relations with China to help come to a conclusion. Based on the research, the author recommends an intensification of defence diplomacy between Poland and China which would bring a number of defence and economic benefit to both Warsaw and Beijing. The latest changes in the global balance of power, especially economic, political and military, should be taken into account in the process of developing and implementing a comprehensive and long-term strategic programme in the field of defence diplomacy between Poland and China.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Poland

53. India and Iran Relations under the Shadow of Global Politics: A Brief Historical Overview

Author:: Mukhtar Ahmad Bhat
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Novus Orbis: Journal of Politics & International Relations
Institution:: Department of International Relations, Karadeniz Technical University
Abstract:: In contemporary world politics, India and Iran occupy great strategic significance. Both countries have huge convergence of national interests. Collaboration and cooperation between the countries would resolve their respective domestic issues and challenges and play a determining role in strengthening their role in global affairs. For a fast-growing economy and energy deficit country like India, Iran provides access to a huge amount of natural resources and opens up its vast untapped market for Indian finished goods and services. In addition to that, Iran, due to its geographic location can act as a transit route for India to reach strategically important countries in Central Asia and Afghanistan. Being the second-largest Shia populated country in the world after Iran and one of the highest energy importing countries, India occupies an important place in the strategic thinking of Iran. In the past, India was the second-largest oil-exporting destination for Iran and an important trading partner for Iran. Taking the structural realism as a theoretical framework, the article attempts to seek an answer to the questions, why despite belonging to a single-family, living together for many centuries and sharing common social, religious and traditional values, the two countries have been unable to transform their mutual understanding into a long term strategic partnership, and how the global events have affected their mutual understanding and replaced it with trust deficit.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, India, and Asia

54. U.S. Trade Policy toward China: Learning the Right Lessons

Author:: Scott Lincicome
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Cato Journal
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: Labor market and cultural disruptions in the United States are real and important, as is China’s current and unfortunate turn toward illiberalism and empire. But pretending today that there was a better trade policy choice in 2000—when Congress granted China “permanent normal trade relations” (PNTR) status and paved the way for broader engagement—is misguided. It assumes too much, ignores too much, and demands too much. Worse, it could lead to truly bad governance: increasing U.S. protectionism; forgiving the real and important failures of our policymakers, CEOs, and unions over the last two decades; and preventing a political consensus for real policy solutions. Indeed, that is happening now.
Topic:: International Relations, Economics, Markets, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Protectionism
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

55. “Mainlandization” of Hong Kong, A Model of Influence, Resistance and Adjustment

Author:: Lukasz Zamecki
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: The aim of this article, based on the author’s field research in Hong Kong and critical analysis of publications, is to conceptualize the process of “mainlandization” of the Hong Kong SAR. “Mainlandization” is understood here as the process of transfer and institutionalization of political visions, policy paradigms, procedures, and norms which originate from the PRC. The model is inspired by various theoretical perspectives (e.g. diffusion of regimes, dependence, political convergence, and processes of “Europeanization”). The article differentiates the “top-down” transfer of values and/or policy standards and the “bottom-up” adjustment. All institutions engaged in intermediation (such as the “one country, two systems” principle) are mentioned, as well as the processes connected to the reaction to PRC activity in Hong Kong and their variations (e.g. accommodation, resistance, resignation). Moreover, the concept of “sinoscepticism” is introduced.
Topic:: Politics, Sovereignty, Bilateral Relations, Institutions, Autonomy, and Asymmetric Relations
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Hong Kong

56. Fair-Weather Friends: The Impact of the Coronavirus on the Strategic Partnership Between Russia and China

Author:: Johan Van de Ven
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In June 2019, during a visit to the Kremlin by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation announced that they had “agreed…to upgrade their relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era” (Xinhua, June 6, 2019). This continued the warming of bilateral relations nurtured by Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin, who have met at least 30 times during their respective tenures. The strengthening of ties has seen unusually relaxed encounters between the pair, such as when they made blini (traditional Russian pancakes) together in Vladivostok in September 2018 (People’s Daily, September 12, 2018). In more substantive terms, support from Chinese state-linked financial institutions has played a critical role in the construction of a new wave of Russian energy infrastructure, ranging from the Yamal Liquified Natural Gas Project to the “Power of Siberia” gas pipeline. However, the ongoing COVID-19 coronavirus outbreak has opened a stress fracture in the bilateral Sino-Russian relationship. After weeks of gradually escalating restrictions, reports emerged in late February that Moscow public transit drivers had been instructed to call police if they witnessed Chinese passengers using the transit system (Wangyi Keji, February 25). The PRC Embassy in Russia warned that such actions “will harm the good atmosphere for developing Chinese-Russian relations” (Novaya Gazeta, February 25). While China was initially restrained it its public criticism of Russian measures taken in the course of the COVID-19 epidemic, the decision of the PRC Embassy in Moscow to highlight the discrimination being faced by Chinese citizens in Moscow is a reminder of just how quickly tensions can arise between the two countries, even in the age of “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era.”
Topic:: Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

57. China-Iran Relations: The Not-So-Special “Special Relationship”

Author:: John Calabrese
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Over the years, unremitting hostility between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran has created opportunities as well as dilemmas for the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018, and the subsequent adoption of a “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, presented mixed challenges and opportunities for the PRC. Beijing has sought to exploit the rift between Washington and Tehran without further fueling Sino-American tensions. For the past year, Washington and Tehran have been locked in an action-reaction cycle of escalation. This dangerous spiral reached new heights with the January 2 U.S. drone strike that killed Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force commander General Qasem Soleimani, which was followed by retaliatory Iranian missile attacks on two coalition bases in Iraq that injured dozens of American troops. Although both sides managed to pull back from the brink of war in early January, underlying tensions remain—as does the possibility of a more direct military confrontation. In what manner and to what extent has the current unstable situation affected China’s interests in, and relationship with, Iran? What is the likelihood that, as this latest round of high-stakes poker between Washington and Tehran continues to unfold, Beijing will seize it as yet another opportunity to profit from America’s entanglements in the wider Middle East?
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

58. The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor: Delays Ahead

Author:: Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Although no new deals were struck during People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping’s trip to Myanmar on January 17 and 18, the visit was significant for several reasons. The visit was the first by a PRC president to Myanmar in 19 years, and the first by Xi to this country in his role as president. The visit was widely touted as marking the 70th anniversary of the establishment of relations between the PRC and Myanmar. However, Xi’s first trip abroad this year was aimed at expediting implementation of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a key component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (CGTN, January 17). During the visit, the two governments signed 33 agreements, memorandums of understanding, protocols and letters of exchange relating to railways, industrial and power projects, and trade. Several of these agreements firm up Myanmar’s commitment to the CMEC’s three central components: the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ), which includes a deep-sea port, an industrial park and other projects; the China-Myanmar Border Economic Cooperation Zone; and an urban development plan for Yangon (The Irrawaddy, January 18). However, just weeks after Xi’s visit saw the two sides take steps to expedite CMEC projects, Beijing’s plans have run into new problems. CMEC projects are running late, and in an op-ed piece published on the eve of his Myanmar visit, Xi stressed the need for CMEC projects to be moved from “the conceptual stage to concrete planning and implementation” (New Light of Myanmar, January 16). The coronavirus pandemic has emerged as the latest challenge in the long list of obstacles that have slowed CMEC projects over the years. According to Khriezo Yhome, a New Delhi-based analyst of developments in Myanmar, it “may be too early to assess the impact of the coronavirus crisis on CMEC projects,” given that the pandemic is still only at an “initial phase” in Myanmar; however, there is “no doubt” that it “will slow down the implementation of CMEC projects in the short-term.” [1]
Topic:: Diplomacy, Economics, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Burma, and Myanmar

59. Indo- US Strategic Objectives in Afghanistan: Security Calculus of Pakistan

Author:: Muhammed Tayyab Zia
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: Washington and New Delhi have converged interests in Afghanistan. US aspires a greater Indian role in Afghanistan in the wake of its withdrawal from Afghanistan and India, in order to pose itself an international power, seeks in Afghanistan a deeper involvement. Although both of the states, India and the US, have devised a commonality of interests since 9/11, yet since the current US Administration bilateral ties have been intensified to the extent where Pakistan have severe implications. US President Trump‟s verdict of regionalization of Afghan issue has implied concerns for Islamabad. Pakistani authorities relate the terrorist activities in the country, particularly insurgency in Baluchistan with the role of various powers‟ role in Afghanistan. Strategic and security related objectives and concerns would be discussed in this article.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, and Peace
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Middle East, India, Asia, North America, and United States of America

60. Religious Tourism and Peace Building: Kartarpur Corridor as a Peace Symbol in India-Pakistan Conflict and Inter-Faith Harmony

Author:: Asma Qadir Hasan and Iram Khalid
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: Sri Kartarpur Sahib is one of the most sacred religious sites for over twenty-seven million followers of Sikh religion around the world. This religious site known as gurdwara became a part of the premises of the state of Pakistan according to the partition plan in 1947. Sikh pilgrims desiring to visit this sacred place have always found it difficult due to the tensions between the two states of India and Pakistan. Finally, in August 2018, the newly elected Pakistani government under premiership of Mr. Imran Khan announced its intention to build a connecting corridor from Dera Baba Nanak in India to Kartarpur Sahib for the Sikh pilgrims. While it was generally considered a highly positive gesture towards building peace in the region, there was some negative response from the Indian side in particular. This paper discusses brief history of Kartarpur Sahib, the implications of the decision of constructing corridor by the Pakistan government and its importance in building peace between the two states and creating inter-faith harmony within Pakistan. An exploratory, historical and descriptive method has been applied. Besides consulting books and newspaper reports on this issue, two interviews were conducted to analyze contemporary situation. The results show that the move by the Pakistani government can very well be considered a way forward in peace building process and hurdles in implementation of a peace-oriented gesture need to be removed to promote inter-faith and inter-state harmony.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Religion, Bilateral Relations, Tourism, Conflict, Peace, and Symbolism
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Middle East, India, and Asia

61. Analytical Review of Pak-China Strategic Cooperation 1950-2017

Author:: Muhammad Azhar Naeem and Abdul Majid
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: The present study is aimed to provide analytical review of Pak-China strategic cooperation starting from 1950 to 2017. Pakistan started to establish her strategic relations with the outer world soon after her independence in 1947 in order to maintain balance of power in the region. Bilateral ties remained very encouraging from the beginning of Pak-China relations. However, bilateral ties touch its heights in the decade of 1960s. After 1960s, bilateral relation turned to diplomatic relations because of changing world scenario i.e. cold war, terrorism, One China Policy and change of world order. Still China helped Pakistan financially, technologically and assisted in developing nuclear program. In 21st century, relations became stronger of and both the nations started helping each other to materialize their goals in diverse fields. One such example is the implementation of (China – Pakistan Economic Corridor) CPEC which is expected to change the fate of both the countries in future.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Peace
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, and Asia

62. China Pakistan Ties: Challenges and Implications for the region (2013-2018)

Author:: Rabia Bashir
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: China’s active role in South Asia is based on a “win-win” approach which is also beneficial for the economic progress of the regional states. China’s rapid economic integration represents its intention to maintain peace and stability in its vicinity. To hold its presence in the Indian Ocean region it is developing strong economic and trade ties with South Asian states. This region has become a center of attention where the interests of major powers China, India and the United States intersects. The joint venture of “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor” strategically holds huge significance for China, Pakistan and major powers like India and the US being rival to China. This corridor will enhance the economic conditions of not only China and Pakistan but also the other developing and the landlocked states of CARs and Afghanistan.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, Peace, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, and Asia

63. CPEC and Re-Orientation of China-Pakistan Relations

Author:: Muhammad Ikram
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: The ̳One Belt One Road‘ term refers to ̳The Maritime Silk Road and the Silk Road Economic Belt. This mega initiative was announced by Chinese president, Xi Jiping, in September 2013 during his official state visit to Kazakhstan. Pakistan is most important pillar of this Chinese initiative. Under the One Belt One Road framework, several corridors will be built in future. Whereas, with the development of OBOR, regional economies will boost up to $2.5 trillion and more than 4.4 billion population will get benefits across 65 countries. The Silk Road Economic Belt will link China, Central Asia, Russia, and Europe through the Persian Gulf and South East Asia and Indian Ocean. However, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor will be built to connect the Pakistan's Port Gawadar with Chinese city of Kashagar in autonomous province Xinjiang. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project is a game changer for the region and particularly for China and Pakistan, through the development of roads, railways, oil and gas pipe lines. Thus, the project brings wealth and prosperity across the region, particularly in Pakistan. But on the other hand, Pakistan is facing serious internal and external threats from terrorism and extremism since 2001. This work is an attempt to enlighten the prospects of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and constraints in the way of this mega projects.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Peace, Economic Development, and Silk Road
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, and Asia

64. India-Pakistan Relations: Can Guru Nanak be a Factor of Peace?

Author:: Tawseef Ahmad Mir
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: Guru Nanak Dev was born in November, 1469. He grew up to be the founder of Sikhism along with other nine Gurus. It soon emerged as an independent faith, and instantly won many followers to its fold. Therefore, the purpose of this research paper will be to delve into Guru Nanak’s role and appreciating his importance as far as bridging the wide gulf of enmity particularly between India and Pakistan and in the wider South Asia region in general. As all his life he focussed on fostering amity, peace, brotherhood, tolerance and harmony among people of various backgrounds, his teachings therefore promise to have all the necessary ingredients of peace which is currently wanting in the region.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, Peace, and Regionalism
Political Geography:: Pakistan, India, and Asia

65. The First Contacts between China and Poland in History

Author:: Bi Wei
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:: Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:: Poland is one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with People’s Republic of China. Since the establishment of diplomatic ties 70 years ago, both countries have conducted close cooperation in all areas and the bilateral relations have witnessed steady development. In particular, the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, launched in 2013, got the positive responses and support from many countries, including Poland, which became an important partner for China to promote the construction of the initiative. This paper, from a historical perspective, reviews the first interaction between China and Poland in the period of Yuan Dynasty which is arranged in chronological order. The narrations mainly concentrate on accounts of the western expeditions by Genghis Khan and his descendants as well as the Battle of Legnica, during the period of which the Mongolia Empire was successively set up. Each entry will include a concrete description, highlighting where possible issues such as where the Mongolia went, why the expedition and its record are important. The paper also expounds the first record about Poland and the change of the name of Poland in Chinese literature so as to deepen the mutual understanding between two countries.
Topic:: Diplomacy, History, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Poland

66. New Silk Road – An Opportunity for the Development of Rail Container Transport in Poland?

Author:: Aleksandra Bartosiewicz and Paulina Szterlik
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:: Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:: Poland, due to its location in the center of Europe, is a key element of the New Silk Road (NSR), an initiative that attempts to create the shortest land connection between China and Western Europe. This article analyzes various industry reports, national development strategies up to 2030, and EU and local projects to see is the further development of NSR an opportunity for container rail transport in Poland. As it turns out, the issue discussed in the article has hitherto been outside the circle of researchers’ interest, thus the analysis is an important supplement to the existing research gap. It indicates that the further participation of Poland in the Chinese One Belt One Road initiative is a great opportunity for the economic growth of the Republic of Poland (RP).
Topic:: Development, Bilateral Relations, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Trade, Transportation, and Railways
Political Geography:: China, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Poland

67. A Look at Taiwan's Cooperation with Paraguay (2009-2019)

Author:: Maria Antonella Cabral Lopez
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: Taiwan's situation in the international system is particular and the recognition of other states is key to its survival. Paraguay has maintained diplomatic relations with this Asian country continuously since 1957. This research aims to describe the south - south cooperation of Taiwan with Paraguay during the period 2009 - 2019, a very important facet of the bilateral relationship between both parties. For this, a bibliographic-documentary research was used. In addition is important to mention the level of this was descriptive and primary and secondary sources were employed. Among the main results obtained, it can be seen that non-reimbursable cooperation projects are being adjusted according to five-year negotiations, that there is some continuity regarding the issues addressed by technical cooperation and the existence of other less known initiatives such as conferences and participation in fairs.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, South America, and Paraguay

68. Is China’s Innovation a Threat to the South Korea-China Economic Relationship?

Author:: Wonho Yeon
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This paper reviews China’s technological rise and assesses whether it poses a threat to the South Korean economy. In terms of comparative advantage between the two countries, many experts have long believed that China’s strength is low-cost labor and Korea’s is technology and capital. However, this has changed as China’s economy grows. Now China has enough capital to invest in its economy. Some scholars even argue that China has the potential to meet its “innovation imperative” and emerge as a driving force in innovation on a global level.1 This paper examines the Korea-China economic relationship from the innovation productivity perspective, organized into sections: briefly introducing the Korea- China economic relationship; describing the technological rise of China, based on recent data; developing the model to analyze the innovation productivity of China and report the estimation results; evaluating the concern of the South Korean semiconductor industry; and presenting conclusions.
Topic:: International Relations, Economics, Science and Technology, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

69. Japanese Views of South Korea: Enough is Enough

Author:: Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: While the sources of contention are deep and enduring, relations between Japan and South Korea have been especially troubled in the last few years. The two countries are grappling with deeply entrenched, emotional legacies that have been inflamed by recent controversies, rendering history both immediate and real. This chapter explores Japan’s perception of and reaction to those events. While it aims to provide an objective assessment of Japanese thinking, it does not purport to be even-handed or balanced. It is an analysis of the Japanese view of the relationship with South Korea. To be brief and blunt, Japanese are frustrated with and angered by South Koreans. Frustrated because they have been unable to build a future with them that rests on a foundation of shared concerns and values; domestic politics continues to override strategic interests. Angry because Korean complaints deny the many changes that have occurred in Japan since the end of World War II. Japanese do not deny that atrocities took place, but they are offended when they are laid at the feet of current generations. A growing number of Japanese believe that Koreans prefer to occupy the moral high ground over building a mutually beneficial long-term partnership. This belief increasingly colors the way that Korean actions and statements are interpreted.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

70. Moon Jae-in: Putting North Korea at the Center

Author:: Kathryn Botto
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: While President Moon Jae-in has a calmer demeanor than his mentor and friend, former President Roh Moo-hyun, there can be no doubt that his vision for transforming Northeast Asia is as far-reaching. While Moon has been more careful to assuage the U.S. president, less abrasive in his language toward Japan, and more strategic in reaching out to leaders in China and Russia, his strategy of putting North Korea at the forefront of regional realignment has similar geopolitical ambition. The objective is the rejuvenation of a reintegrated peninsula with the capacity to steer actions by all of the great powers rather than falling prey again to their machinations that are not in Korea’s interest.
Topic:: Politics, Bilateral Relations, Elections, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

71. U.S. Policy Options Toward China: An Appraisal

Author:: Simon Lester
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Cato Journal
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: Most Americans will agree that the Chinese government has behaved badly in a number of ways, although they may not agree on exactly which Chinese government behavior is a problem. Perhaps it’s the treatment of ethnic or religious minorities, such as the Uighurs or Tibetans or Christians; maybe it’s the crackdown on protests in Hong Kong and failure to uphold the “one country, two systems” principle; or assertiveness in territorial disputes; or censorship; or protectionist trade practices; or intellectual property theft; or cyber‐hacking; or spying; or most recently, being slow to disclose the emergence of the coronavirus and engaging in a propaganda war regarding who is at fault. It’s a long list, and everyone has their own priorities. But while there is loose agreement on the existence of a problem, there is great difficulty in coming up with an appropriate response. What can or should the United States government do about any of this? Is it possible to change the behavior of other governments? Is the U.S. government in a position to do it? Is it appropriate to do so?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Bilateral Relations, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

72. The North Korean Détente: Peace Prospects on the Korean Peninsula

Author:: Jonathan Lim
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: This paper conceptualizes the emerging détente within inter-Korean relations as evidence of tangible transformations within North Korea’s domestic and foreign policy, establishing how this phenomenon represents a unique and conclusive opportunity for peace and engagement. It contextualizes the inter-Korean and Singapore summits as foundations for the détente, before expanding upon the nature of the détente through the contrasting objectives of North and South Korea, and the transitional nature of domestic affairs in North Korea. The article establishes the bona fide nature of North Korea’s détente, as revealed by a direct connection between North Korea’s international diplomatic gestures vis-av-vis transitional domestic circumstances; involving incremental economic modernization and political liberalization under a shift in focus within Kim Jong-un’s Byungjin Line policy. This analysis departs from and orthodox Western interpretation of inter-Korean relations, providing a holistic analysis of inter-Korean affairs and North Korean domestic politics.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Singapore

73. India-China relations reconsidered: A realist perspective on India´s border dispute with its neighbour

Author:: Jayanta Kumar Ray
Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: India’s relations with Communist China have evolved through various twists and turns. India’s lack of realist approach and naiveté about emerging global politics helped China in gaining an upper hand over India in achieving regional dominance particularly displayed through the bilateral disputes over the border determination. While the defeat of 1962 is a distant past, it has continued to wield great influence over India’s overall approach towards China. This article, thus, goes for a reappraisal of the border issues which have and still continue to influence Indo-China relations.
Topic:: Communism, History, Bilateral Relations, and Borders
Political Geography:: China, South Asia, India, and Asia

74. The Prospects for Sino-Indian Relations During Modi’s Second Term

Author:: Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On May 30, Narendra Modi was sworn in for a second term as India’s Prime Minister. Conspicuous by their absence at the inauguration ceremony were Imran Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan; Lobsang Sangay, President of the Central Tibetan Authority (CTA), more commonly known as the Tibetan government-in-exile; and Tien Chung-Kwang, Taiwan’s trade representative to India. While Khan was not invited on account of the serious deterioration in India-Pakistan relations since early this year, the absence of Sangay and Tien can be attributed to the Modi government adopting a more cautious approach to China in its second term. Modi’s administration seems keen to avoid needling the People’s Republic of China (PRC), especially at a time when Sino-Indian relations are improving (Deccan Herald, May 29). This caution on the part of India notwithstanding, Sino-Indian relations during Modi’s second term (scheduled to run through May 2024) are unlikely to be tension-free.
Topic:: Security, Regional Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Territorial Disputes
Political Geography:: China, India, Asia, and Tibet

75. Italy Joins the Belt and Road Initiative: Context, Interests, and Drivers

Author:: Dario Cristiani
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In March 2019, Italy and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) signed a broad and comprehensive, albeit not legally binding, Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for Italy to join the Chinese-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This has triggered a significant debate—in Brussels as well as in Washington—about whether this decision signalled an Italian shift away from its historical pro-European and pro-Atlantic position, to a more nuanced position open to deepening strategic ties with China. The MoU is not definite proof of such a shift, and the Italian government has denied any strategic change. However, Italy is the first major European country, and the first Group of Seven (G7) member, to formalize its participation with the BRI project. As such, this development is particularly remarkable.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Trade and Finance, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Economy
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Italy

76. Redefining U.S.-Japan Trade Relations Under Trump

Author:: Shihoko Goto
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The Trump administration has had no qualms about going against conventional U.S. policy norms and long-established rules of engagement. Thinking outside of the box has not been without its merits; it has certainly led to much-needed reassessment of practices that could benefit from change. The greatest risk of such change, however, is when policy shifts are sudden, unexpected, and unexplained, especially with long-established partner nations. In the two years since President Donald Trump took office, the single biggest challenge for key U.S. allies has been to scramble to adapt to those drastic changes. That, in turn, has led them to reexamine and even alter their own longer-term strategies. For Japan, the pressure to adapt to such changes has been particularly intense, given its continued dependence on the United States for security in an increasingly unstable region on the one hand, and its reliance on robust trade relations with the world’s largest economy on the other. At the midway point of the Trump administration, Japan has actually emerged stronger over the past two years, at least on the trade front. Against the odds and defying expectations, it has succeeded in strengthening its position as a stabilizing force amid ongoing uncertainties in global trade rules. Yet, its success so far does not mean that the latter half of Trump’s tenure will be smooth sailing for Tokyo. In fact, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s balancing act of managing robust relations with the United States while ensuring Japan’s own economic interests may prove to be more difficult. The challenge is to further the gains it has made as an economic stabilizer, even as that outcome will redefine its broader role as a champion of the liberal international order, which has been put on shakier ground.
Topic:: Economics, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and United States of America

77. The Trump Economic Impact on East Asia after Two Years: The Case of South Korea

Author:: Yoon Yeo-joon
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The U.S.-South Korea relationship has traditionally been characterized as a security alliance, meeting the interests of both countries for a stable Korean Peninsula. Economically, Korea was a major recipient of U.S. development assistance after the Korean War. The U.S. also provided non-reciprocal preferential trade treatment, which played an important role in Korea’s economic development. After Korea’s unprecedented economic development, the economic relationship between the two countries progressed from mere donor-recipient relations. The U.S.-Korea economic partnership culminated in the Korea-U.S. free trade agreement (KORUS FTA), which came into effect in 2012. During the past 70 years, the U.S. has become the second most important export destination and the third most important importer for Korea. Korea has also risen to be the sixth largest trading partner for the U.S. During these years, Korea has also benefited from common values shared with the U.S., such as democracy, rule of law, and an open and free market economy. Two years into the Trump administration, the U.S.-Korea economic relationship is facing another turning point. Trump is a game changer, trying to alter the global trading system and its relation to China. Korea has been only partially affected by his grand scheme so far. However, Trump specifically blamed the KORUS FTA as a major contributing factor to the U.S.’ huge trade deficit and domestic job losses in manufacturing. As a result, the KORUS FTA was amended. Various protectionist measures, such as Section 201 tariffs on washing machines and solar panels as well as Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum, could have a substantial impact on Korea. Rising protectionism in the U.S. is a grave concern for Korea considering the significance of the U.S. to the Korean economy. This chapter explores U.S.-Korea economic relations two years into the Trump administration—too short a time to make definitive statements such as whether the relationship has deteriorated or not. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economic relations between Korea and the U.S., focusing on trade and investment. Section 3 covers the KORUS FTA renegotiations, which were recently settled. It includes what was decided and the implications for the Korean economy. Section 4 summarizes the protectionist measures that the Trump administration has imposed and how these measures would impact Korea, adding a simple empirical analysis that investigates whether the U.S. trade balance with Korea improved over the two years. Section 5 concludes the chapter.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

78. U.S.-China Economic Relations Under the Trump Administration at the 2-Year Mark

Author:: Peter Harrell
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: Since entering office in 2017, President Trump has upended longstanding tenets of U.S. trade policy and launched the most aggressive set of new U.S. tariffs and trade restrictions since at least the Reagan administration in the 1980s. Actions include renegotiating the U.S.-Korea FTA (KORUS) and NAFTA, using “Section 232” of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to impose tariffs on most steel and aluminum imports into the U.S. in a bid to support U.S. smelters, using “Section 301” of the Trade Act of 1974 to impose tariffs on approximately half of U.S. imports from China, and threatening to use Section 232 to impose tariffs reportedly up to 25% on U.S. imports of automobiles. The administration’s aggressive stance on trade has upended diplomatic relationships and prompted multinational companies to re-consider aspects of their global supply chains. It has also brought retaliation, including Chinese tariffs on most Chinese imports of U.S. goods. European countries and other U.S. allies affected by Trump’s steel and aluminum tariffs have also retaliated with tariffs of their own against imports of U.S. goods, with many of the retaliatory tariffs targeting perceived politically important constituencies in the U.S., such as U.S. whisky distillers, who are heavily concentrated in the home state of Republican Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell. But Trump’s aggressive trade policies also began to deliver some successes in 2018, including a successful renegotiation of NAFTA, now renamed the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA), a renegotiated Korea-U.S. FTA, and at least some willingness by European and Japanese officials to discuss greater market access for U.S. products. While many major U.S. importers and trade associations have complained about the tariffs, the tariffs continue to draw support from several of the key constituency groups that they are intended to assist, such as the U.S. steel industry. While U.S. tariffs against imports from allies are seemingly driven largely by the Trump administration’s general protectionist bent, Trump’s trade actions against China reflect a broader set of concerns that is more widely supported by members of the United States congress and American experts outside of government. These include both longstanding U.S. concerns over Chinese trade practices and market access barriers, and growing U.S. geopolitical competition with China—what the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy, released in December 2017, refers to as the return of “great power competition.” These geopolitical concerns have been central to the administration’s recent aggressive efforts to block the deployment of Huawei telecommunications technologies in new “5G” mobile communications networks around the world, and in the administration’s increasingly vociferous opposition to China’s “Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI). And because of increased U.S.-China geopolitical competition, U.S. use of targeted trade controls, investment restrictions, potential targeted sanctions, and other measures against China, will likely continue even if, as is widely expected, Trump and President Xi reach a broad agreement on many trade issues in the coming months and reduce some of the tariffs that are currently in place.
Topic:: Economics, Bilateral Relations, Tariffs, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

79. Just a Dash? China’s Sharp Power and Australia’s Value Diplomacy

Author:: John Fitzgerald
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: When supporters of China’s President Xi Jinping point to his many accomplishments they highlight his impressive anti-corruption drive, the end of the one-child family policy, the intensive monitoring of social organizations and citizens, his reorganization of the party and its armed forces, the unilateral occupation and militarization of contested territories in the South China Sea, and the massive Belt and Road Initiative advanced under his administration. Among these larger accomplishments, one that is easily overlooked is his role in compelling the people and government of Australia to recalibrate their relationship with China. In particular, the actions of his government have triggered a major rethink on the place of values in Australian foreign policy and diplomacy.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Australia, and Asia-Pacific

80. The North Korean Factor in the Sino-Russian Alliance

Author:: Stephen Blank
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The Kim-Putin summit in April 2019 and the abortive Trump-Kim summit in February 2019 compel us to review Korean issues from the regional security standpoint, rather than primarily as a proliferation question. Despite apparent failure of the Trump-Kim summit, the search for denuclearization and peace in Korea will continue. North Korea is obviously resuming discussions with Russia and China to decide their future course of action, inasmuch as Kim went to Vladivostok. The summit with Putin in April only reinforced those considerations, as it is clear from the subsequent press conference that Kim asked Putin to transmit his views to Washington and that Putin agreed to do so. Likewise, Washington must rethink its approach. Instead of emphasizing denuclearization, Washington would likely benefit from viewing Korean issues primarily as regional security questions. Certainly, Russia and China do so. Therefore, rethinking Russo-Chinese ties to North Korea offers valuable insights in the quest for a lasting Korean peace, especially as Russia and China have become allies.5 The argument of a Sino-Russian alliance is admittedly a minority view among scholars, but the mounting evidence of their alliance is apparent not only in regard to Korea—as the other chapters in this collection show—but in larger military-political affairs as well.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea

81. Sino-Russian Relations, South Korea, and North Korea

Author:: Robert Sutter
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This examination of the relations among these four governments assesses the ever-closer China-Russia relationship featuring stronger strategic alignment against the United States and its interests in many parts of the world, including the Korean Peninsula. It also considers how the Sino-Russian relationship reacted to the major changes in the Korean Peninsula brought on by the string of remarkable developments on the peninsula since 2017. Those developments include: the Donald Trump administration’s heavy pressure against North Korean nuclear weapons development in 2017; North Korea’s abrupt shift away from confrontation and toward negotiations with the U.S. and South Korea in early 2018; the subsequent dramatic shift toward top-level U.S.-North Korea negotiations to ease tensions and improve relations seen in Trump’s meetings with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in June 2018 and February 2019; and active, related North Korean summitry with South Korea and China. In this period, China and Russia in relations with South Korea and North Korea repeatedly worked together to offset U.S. pressures and undermine U.S. influence. Developments over the past two years have seen China emerge as a critically important player with a major role in all aspects of negotiations involving the crisis caused by North Korea’s rapid development and repeated testing of nuclear weapons and related development and testing of ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead as far as the continental U.S. By contrast, Russia’s role and influence have declined in importance. The failed revival of the Six-Party Talks, in which Russia and Japan played a direct role along with North and South Korea, China, and the U.S. in dealing with the North Korean nuclear weapons crisis, and the current regional dynamic focused on only the four latter powers means that Moscow and Tokyo have been marginalized by recent developments. Such an outcome challenges the Russian government of President Vladimir Putin and its drive to play a prominent role as a leading world power on issues important to Russian interests. Demonstrating new prominence, Putin hosted visiting Kim during a brief summit long sought by Russia in Vladivostok on April 25. The Russian leader said North Korea’s security concerns would be better met with international guarantees involving Russia and China rather than bilateral North Korean agreements with the U.S. Up until this point, Russia had been playing second fiddle to Beijing, repeatedly siding with China in matters regarding the Korean Peninsula. China, for its part, seemed comfortable with close cooperative relations with Russia as it deals with Korean matters. Whatever differences the two may have over Korean issues have been difficult to discern amid their collaboration and cooperation, which focus on weakening the American position in Korea and Northeast Asia.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

82. Sino-Indian Nuclear Dynamics: Taking the Global Lead

Author:: Prakash Menon
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Technology often seduces potential adversaries through a promise of relief from security threats only to deceive through the inevitable action-reaction cycle. In the universe of security, technology is contestable both by technology itself and by doctrinal prescriptions and operational countermeasures. The advantage provided by new technology is mostly ephemeral in that provides the momentum for an endless cycle that is best described as chasing one’s own tail. Only political intervention through mutual understanding, doctrinal prudence, and regulating the search for operational supremacy holds potential to escape the stranglehold of the action-reaction cycle. The elusive search for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) is a prime example. This paper seeks to interrogate the role of the technology-security dynamics in the context of the Sino-Indian nuclear weapon relationship. The context of the Sino-Indian nuclear weapon relationship is clouded by the enhancing reach of India’s missiles[1], the evolving Chinese reaction to U.S. nuclear modernization accompanied by a shift in nuclear posture, and a shared belief in the role of nuclear weapons that is signified by No First Use (NFU) doctrine. The latter point represents political intervention while the two former signify the action-reaction cycle which is primarily a product of technology. However, both China and India must contend with nuclear powers that espouse First Use. China in dealing with the United States and Russia who are quantitatively superior nuclear powers, while India deals with Pakistan whose claims of quantitative superiority are contested. In technological terms, the rise of China and the U.S. reaction resulting in contemporary geopolitical flux at the global level has impacted the evolution of China’s nuclear arsenal. The most prominent illustration of this is China’s reaction to the United States’ withdrawal from the Ballistic Missile Defense Treaty. Earlier China had eschewed development of BMD, but the United States’ quest to create BMD has caused China to attempt to develop its own BMD system as well as systems that can overcome BMD like multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and Hyper Glide Vehicles (HGVs). Similarly, India has reacted to developments in China and Pakistan by launching an indigenous BMD development program...
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Weapons
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, South Asia, India, and Asia

83. U.S.-China Relations: The Way Forward

Author:: P. H. Yu
Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Cato Journal
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: As confrontation looms over Washington and Beijing, it is critical to identify the true nature of this challenge from an international relations perspective before any attempt to devise a counter measure. Wrong presumptions or prejudicial interpretations may lead to dire consequences of unforeseeable magnitude. One past example would be the U.S. government’s belief that Iraq was developing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) before the American invasion in 2003. A more current example would be the American nuclear anxiety on North Korea and how President Trump bypassed conventional American strategic thinking and circumvented hawkish threats of preemptive nuclear annihilation to resolve a “draconian crisis” via “smart diplomacy.” These examples may shed light on a pathway to resolution for the current U.S.-China trade conflict. The United States and China have ample experience of weathering a crisis on the brink of war, whether it was on the Korean Peninsula or in Indochina. China today remains on the U.S. sanctions list for certain high-tech products and military equipment. Both the Trump administration and Congress continue to criticize China regularly, ranging from human rights to religious rights, from the rule of law to the autocratic political system, from the state-owned banks to restrictive market access to foreign corporations, and from currency manipulation to unfair trade practices.
Topic:: International Relations, Bilateral Relations, Trade Wars, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

84. Working hand in hand to create a brighter future for China and Poland

Author:: Liu Guangyuan
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:: Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:: Ambassador Liu Guangyuan’s keynote speech at the conference on the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Poland

85. The 10th Special Measures Agreement between the U.S. and South Korea: Analysis and Implications for Northeast Asia

Author:: Elton J. Chun
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: The United States and the Republic of Korea concluded the 10th Special Measures Agreement on February 10, 2019. The two countries agreed to a one-year agreement after difficult negotiations in which Washington demanded that Seoul increase the amount paid to offset the costs of stationing American forces in Korea. Since 1991, Washington and Seoul have concluded 10 Special Measures Agreements. Unlike the previous five-year agreement, the 10th SMA was a “stopgap deal” that covered a one year of bilateral defense budgets with an option of extending the agreement for an additional year; it was the first SMA negotiated by the Trump administration. This article examines the 10th Special Measures Agreement, exploring the history of defense cost sharing between the two countries, effects on South Korea, implications for coordinating policy on North Korea, and influences on Japan, Russia, and China. The article concludes with an assessment on how the 10th Special Measures Agreement and other factors will affect future agreements.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, and Armed Forces
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

86. The U.S.- ROK Alliance and its Discontents: Investigating the Effects of the Alliance on Civil-Military Relations in South Korea

Author:: Trisha Ray
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: Until the late 1980s, the Republic of Korea was under de facto military rule. Accordingly, South Korea’s uniformed military had an outsized influence on domestic and foreign policy for much of the nation’s history. When the military regime gave way to civilian rule, scholars chronicled the emergence of democratic ideals in South Korea, including the cornerstone: civilian control of the military. As civil-military relations evolved, the uniformed military continued to influence areas of defense policy that are reserved for civilian leaders in other liberal democracies. This paper analyzes the United States-Republic of Korea Alliance’s influence on civil-military relations in South Korea using institutional and alliance legitimacy theories of organization. It proposes a triangular relationship between the uniformed military, civilian government, and military alliance with the United States. Institutional biases influence the uniformed military’s interactions with the alliance, while public opinion shapes the civilian government’s relationship with the alliance. In turn, how military officers and elected civilians view and relate to the alliance affects their relationship with one another. There is a positive correlation between perceptions of the alliance and the modes of civilian control over the military. Additionally, South Korean views of American leadership play a greater role in determining alliance favorability than perceptions of common security threats.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Alliance, Legitimacy, and Institutions
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

87. China’s Role in Inter-Korean Relations

Author:: Gordon G. Chang
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: China has great power over both Koreas, but its influence looks to be at its peak. There are many reasons for this, but the most important is that the two Koreas are moving closer together and in the process shutting out outsiders. Moreover, the U.S., as it seeks to disarm North Korea, is pursuing policies undercutting Beijing’s role on the peninsula. And to make matters worse, China is beginning to limit its own effectiveness.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

88. Tensions in U.S.-Korea Economic Relations

Author:: Troy Stangarone
Publication Date:: 04-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: Following a relatively successful period for U.S.-South Korea economic relations under the Bush and Obama administrations, Washington and Seoul have entered a new period of economic tension in the Trump administration. Unlike prior U.S. presidents, who placed a priority on negotiating fair rules in the United States’ economic relationships, President Trump has prioritized outcomes. As a result, one of his administration’s earliest moves was to renegotiate the KORUS Free Trade Agreement. While the results of the renegotiation were modest, they may help to expand the sale of American automobiles in the Republic of Korea in the long-run. The largest outcome of the negotiations may be to protect the Ford Motor Company from South Korean competition in the U.S. market as the company transitions to sales focused on light trucks. While the renegotiation has eased tensions for the moment, the prospect of economic engagement with North Korea, the Trump administration’s continued use of national security to erect trade barriers, and the emergence of new technologies such as artificial intelligence and autonomous vehicles could result in growing tensions in the relationship.
Topic:: Economics, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, Negotiation, Free Trade, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

89. Why India Won’t Play Its ‘Tibet Card’

Author:: Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:: 05-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Upon coming to power in May 2014, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) adopted a more muscular approach to China than its predecessors. As part of this, it was not averse to using the Dalai Lama and the CTA to gain leverage in its dealings with China. Its recent move to put distance between itself and Dharamsala reflects an understanding that playing the ‘Tibet card’ brought India no benefits. In fact, the failure of the BJP’s four-year gambit reaffirms what many Indian diplomats and scholars have been saying for decades: there is no ‘Tibet card’ for India to play.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Territorial Disputes
Political Geography:: China, India, Asia, and Tibet

90. U.S. Embassy Tokyo Role in the Establishment of U.S.-Mongolia Relations

Author:: Alicia Campi
Publication Date:: 11-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: The U.S. and Mongolia established diplomatic relations in 1987, after earlier failed attempts and many years of Cold War frostiness. In this account, Dr. Campi describes the negotiations leading up to relations with the Mongolian People’s Republic, at the time a communist country closely allied to the Soviet Union, and her own role in the process.
Topic:: Cold War, Diplomacy, History, Bilateral Relations, Negotiation, and Memoir
Political Geography:: Japan, Mongolia, Asia, and United States of America

91. India-China Relations: Conflict and Cooperation in Indo-Pacific Region

Author:: Balwinder Singh
Publication Date:: 07-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Political Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: From the last three decades, the Indo-Pacific has been a central theme in the global geopolitical scenario. India, China, and several other rising powers have shifted the balance of power. Thus, Indo-Pacific region marks instability and uncertainty especially caused by consistent crises of the world economy. In the present globalized era, both India and China are paramount drivers of the global economy. They are simultaneously reacting to this shifted balance of power in Indo-Pacific region. The actions of China and India towards each other and especially in Indo-Pacific region have significantly changed in last decades. At present, the Indian government has started to focus on Indo-Pacific region. The Trump Administration has focused India to contain China in Indo-Pacific region. At that moment, the Indo-Pacific region has thus become more important region than ever before. The geo-strategic significance of the Indo-Pacific region has attracted the main global-powers to preserve their strategic interests in this region. So, the Indo-Pacific has got enormous significance in the present context. From the last few years, the region has got international acknowledgment. The US`s Asia-pivot policy and China’s ‘String of Pearl’ policy have been focusing on India. The geopolitical importance of the Indo-Pacific region has dragged the western powers to counterweight growing Chinese power. That’s why; Indo-Pacific has shaped the new subject of divergence between China and India. Yet, there is no need to undermine the enlarging economic relations between the two big nations of Asia. This study also examines that how US and Pakistan are affecting the bilateral India-China relations. The study observes that how India and China satisfying their strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific region. Thus, the study tries to find out the new issues of cooperation and conflict between the two nations. Thus, the study tries to find out the new issues of cooperation and conflict between the two nations.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
Political Geography:: China, India, and Asia

92. Chinese Views of Korean History in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries

Author:: Kirk W. Larsen
Publication Date:: 04-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: In July 2014, Ambassador Qiu Guohong in preparation for Xi Jinping’s visit to Seoul stated that the “relationship between South Korea and China couldn’t be any better.”1 Among the many reasons for this—economic, geostrategic, cultural—was a shared sense of history. China and Korea, officials and commentators in both nations claimed, were close because of their agreement regarding the significance of their experiences as victims of foreign, particularly Japanese, imperialism in the 19th and 20th centuries. History, that constellation of memories, stories, and notions about the past, has often been deployed to reinforce conceptions of identity, to support certain courses of action, and to demarcate between the in-group and the other. But history is ever malleable and protean. Not only do individuals, institutions, and ideas change but so does the understanding of them. When one draws on the past, one inevitably focuses on a limited set of events or narratives that best serve one’s interests—to the exclusion of potentially equally valid candidates. Their utility can vary over time; one need only think of how figures such as Zheng He or Confucius have been imagined and re-imagined over the last century. This has been the case with the history of relations between China and Korea from the latenineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries. For many Chinese, Korea has served first as a subject of contestation as China’s position in Korea was challenged by both Western and Japanese powers. Then, when it became increasingly clear that China (or the Qing Empire) was losing this contest, Korea became an omen of China’s own fate absent significant course changes. As Japan’s growing empire engulfed Korea and subsequently threatened parts of China, resistance served to bring China and Korea closer; many in China celebrated what they saw as courageous resistance to Japan—such as when An Chunggun assassinated Ito Hirobumi in 1909. Shared status as victims of Japanese imperialism in an age of “humiliation” brought the two closer, and the mutually shared memory of “humiliation” has been deployed by contemporary Chinese and South Korean leaders—Xi Jinping and Park Geun-hye—to foster greater levels of cooperation. However, past conceptions of China, Korea, and the Sino-Korean relationship have sometimes ranged far afield from the cherished tropes of humiliation and the struggle for independence. Even seemingly universally agreed upon symbols, such as An’s heroic 1909 assassination, find themselves subject to changing interpretations such as recent emphasis by some on his pan-Asian vision of Sino-Korean-Japanese cooperation rather than his bold anti-Japanese act. As interests and priorities change, so does the utility of any particular historical narrative.
Topic:: International Relations, History, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

93. Go Global, Meet the Locals: Pragmatism, Plunder, and AntiChinese Populism in Africa

Author:: Richard Aidoo
Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:: From Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward to Deng Xiaoping’s Opening Up, through Jiang Zemin’s Going Out (also known as the Going Global strategy) to Xi Jinping’s recent Chinese Dream, China has pursued diverse diplomatic engagements with African countries within these broad development visions. These engagements have evolved along with Africa’s changing political and economic circumstances, as well as China’s resurgence as a global economic power. Most significantly, in large parts of the developing world (including Africa), China has shifted away from its support for the struggle for ideological identity to assume geopolitical and geo-economic weight, as anti-imperialism rhetoric and support have given way to its business-is-business mantra, and noninterference diplomacy. In other words, from the late 1970s, Africa encountered Beijing’s gradual shift away from an ideological proselytizer to a global economic adventurer. After the Cold War, Chinese influence in Africa has grown significantly as it has traded, invested, and constructed its way to the most relevant economic partner to African economies. Chinese capital, aid, expertise, and diplomacy have brought increasing numbers of Chinese to the continent to serve as expatriate workers as they heed the call to “go out” and enhance the national ambitions and seek personal fortunes. In the past two decades, it has been remarkably evident that the relationship between China and Africa has entered into a different phase. Contrary to the rather simplistic and unilinear account of China’s scramble of the African continent, current engagements are rather complex with China as a pragmatic economic actor with both complementary and competitive impacts that draw different reactions from African populations – from the often reported embrace to intense local anger in certain parts. Along with a political independent and largely democratically governed Africa, China is also currently engaging mostly empowered African populations who will readily assert and preserve their sovereignties, political rights and civil liberties through public protests, pronouncements and political competitions like elections, and referendums. So, in spite of Beijing’s touted African embrace as the partner-in-development option for African states, some growing popular resentment for “most things Chinese” in some parts of Africa is confronting China as it deals with a continent in transition. Alternatively, though the effectiveness of popular African reactions towards the Chinese in African countries may be shaped by factors such as regime type, and economic status of the state in question,3 sustainability and longterm impacts of these people centered movements depend on more than any visceral efforts. Consequently, how will Beijing’s motives and strategies in Africa be impacted by popular reactions as African populations look to the past and present?
Topic:: Development, Politics, Bilateral Relations, Natural Resources, and Populism
Political Geography:: Africa, China, and Asia

94. Beijing’s Policy Towards President Tsai Ying-wen and the Future of Cross-Strait Relations

Author:: Jean-Pierre Cabestan
Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:: ions through the lens of both asymmetry and (re-)balancing. Beijing-Taipei relations have become more and more asymmetrical. While this structural asymmetry has allowed the former to exert all sorts of pressures on the latter (economic, ideological and military), this very asymmetry has not prevented the latter from keeping some room of maneuver vis-à-vis the former.1 Balancing against China and bandwagoning with the United States has, since 1950, been Taiwan’s security and survival strategy even if after the U.S. de-recognition of the ROC in 1978, Taipei and Washington have not been linked by a formal alliance but a much more narrow and vague security arrangement, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). However, in this paper, I will argue that under the Tsai Administration, Taiwan’s balancing strategy has remained rather “soft,” because of the island’s hard economic dependence upon China. At the same time, Taiwan cannot ignore the U.S. Administration’s “rebalancing” strategy in Asia and the consequences it has on U.S.-China relations and the region. Using this double approach, I will first present Beijing’s new Taiwan policy. Then, I will explore its root-causes and main drivers. Finally, I will venture to speculate on the chances of success of China’s strategy towards the Tsai Administration, particularly after the new U.S. President Donald Trump comes into office and in view of the telephone call that he accepted to have with Ms. Tsai in early December 2016. My tentative conclusion is that for many domestic and international reasons—the KMT’s inability to reform, Taiwan’s consolidated identity and the U.S.’s likely continuing, and perhaps stronger strategic support and overall “rebalancing” under Trump—Beijing will probably not reach its major objectives, at least in 2020. As a result, Taiwan will be able to continue to go its own way; the political gap between both sides will keep widening; and the relations across the Taiwan Strait will probably remain a mixture of political and perhaps military tensions as well as dense exchanges and inevitable interactions.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

95. China’s Relationship with Chile: The Struggle for the Future Regime of the Pacific

Author:: Evan Ellis
Publication Date:: 11-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Though superpower diplomacy dominated coverage of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) leaders summit in November, China’s upgrading of a free-trade agreement with Chile served to highlight the strength of an economic and political relationship that it has built with the country, and the influential position Chile currently occupies in shaping Chinese engagement with Latin America.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, and Foreign Direct Investment
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South America, and Chile

96. China’s Role and the Potential of Pak-China Cooperation in Regional Organizations

Author:: Manzoor Khan Afridi and Mansoor Akbar Kundi
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Political Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: The paper attempts to analyze China’s role in various regional organizations and potential cooperation between China and Pakistan within these forums. SAARC, SCO, OIC, Heart of Asia-Istanbul Peace Process, APEC, CICA and Boao Forum have been selected here for analysis. Pakistan is one of the founding members of SAARC and China has an observer status. Pakistan supports Chinese membership in SAARC to reduce Indian role and hegemony. China wants to have easy access to Indian Ocean, Middle East and influence in South Asia, for which India is the biggest hurdle. In SCO, China is the founding member while Pakistan joined it as observer in 2005 and as a member in 2015. Combating terrorism, extremism and separatism and to enhance the trade opportunities, stability in neighborhood and energy security are the common objectives of the two states in SCO. Pakistan, being a founding member in OIC, has always played an active and dynamic role for the cause of Muslims. Pakistan wants China to have greater role in OIC where the later showed interest for observer status in 2012. Chinese interest in Muslim states, particularly in Middle East and Central Asia, is triggered by the energy hunt and growing posture of these regions in contemporary world politics. Pakistan can play a bridge role, not only geographically, but also ideologically and culturally, to bring these states closer to China. China and Pakistan are increasing their cooperation in the Heart of AsiaIstanbul Process on Afghanistan, APEC, CICA and Boao Forum for Asia, as well. The paper concludes that both states share similar views on all bilateral and multilateral issues, support each other’s position, and enhancing their cooperation in regional organizations and multilateral forums.
Topic:: International Relations, Regional Cooperation, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

97. The Run-up to Xi Jinping’s State Visit

Author:: Bonnie S. Glaser and Jacqueline Vitello
Publication Date:: 09-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Preparations for Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to the US in September were the primary focus of the US-China relationship from May to August. The seventh Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) was held in June in an effort to tee up agreements for the summit. Friction increased on a range of issues, including China’s artificial island building in the South China Sea, Chinese cyber hacking against US companies and the US government, and repressive laws and actions undertaken by the Chinese government, some of which are likely to have negative repercussions for future US-China people-to-people exchanges. National Security Adviser Susan Rice traveled to China at the end of August to finalize deliverables for the summit amid reports of a possible Obama administration decision to impose sanctions on China for cyber-enabled theft of US intellectual property before Xi’s arrival.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Governance, and Leadership
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

98. US-Japan Relations and the Trump Effect

Author:: Sheila A. Smith and Charles McClean
Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The US presidential election was the primary influence affecting US-Japan relations in the fall of 2016. Japan was brought into the spotlight during the campaign with Trump repeatedly criticizing Tokyo for unfair trade practices and free riding in the alliance. The outcome of the election left many Japanese worried about the future of the alliance. Prime Minister Abe quickly reached out to President-elect Trump, arranging a meeting with him in New York on Nov. 18. Beyond the attention given to the election, the LDP and Abe also sought to support the Obama administration by ratifying the Trans-Pacific Partnership and promoting maritime capacity building in Southeast Asia. President Obama and Prime Minister Abe met for the last time in Hawaii on Dec. 27. Uncertainty abounds on the economic and strategic fronts in the coming year, but the biggest unknown for the bilateral relationship will be the new US president and his approach to Asia.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Elections, and Leadership
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

99. Philippine Follies

Author:: Sheldon Simon
Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The rather bizarre behavior of Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte dominated the news in late 2016. The former Davao mayor displayed his well-known anti-US feelings while aggressively pursuing his allegedly extrajudicial campaign against Philippine drug trafficking. Duterte’s invective ran the gamut from accusations that the US still treated the Philippines as a colony to a vulgar epithet directed at President Obama. There were also threats to end all bilateral military exercises and to terminate bilateral defense agreements. Philippine officials tried to soften Duterte’s remarks and US officials offered reassurances that the US would remain a reliable defense partner and planned to continue providing military assistance. Elsewhere, the US continued to focus attention on maritime security while avoiding direct involvement in the emerging controversy over treatment of the Muslim population in Rakine State, Myanmar.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Human Rights, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Governance, Leadership, and Discrimination
Political Geography:: Asia and Philippines

100. Abe-Xi Met; Diplomats Talked; Wait ‘Til Next Year…

Author:: James J. Przystup
Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Prime Minister Abe and President Xi met twice in the last four months of 2016. Both committed to advancing the relationship during 2017, taking advantage of the opportunities presented by historic anniversaries – the 45th anniversary of normalization and the 40th anniversary of the Japan-China Friendship Treaty. Both leaders also committed to the early implementation of an air and maritime communications mechanism. Notwithstanding the increasing air and maritime interactions between the PLA and the Japanese SDF and Coast Guard, working-level officials were unable to reach agreement. At the end of the year, the Abe government announced a record high defense budget for 2017; days later the China’s aircraft carrier transited in international waters between Okinawa and Miyakojima into the western Pacific. Meanwhile public opinion polling revealed growing pessimism in Japan with respect to China and Japan-China relations.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Leadership, and Peace
Political Geography:: Japan, China, and Asia

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS