Content Type: Journal Article / Political Geography: Asia / Publication Year: within 10 Years and within 1 Year

1. Warnings and Welcomes: China’s Reopening and the Politics of International Travel

Author:: John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Over the past two months, as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has rapidly rolled back its strict zero-COVID epidemic prevention policy, COVID-19 has spread rapidly throughout the country. The combination of the PRC reopening its borders to outbound travel on January 8 and the ongoing pandemic has put countries that are major travel destinations for Chinese nationals in a bind. Governments have responded differently to the situation, with some imposing testing and quarantine requirements and others declining to do so. In China, official and social media have generally lauded countries that have desisted from testing requirements and opened their doors to Chinese tourists. Thailand, in particular, has been widely celebrated. Not only did Thailand decline to impose testing requirements on inbound travelers from the PRC, but several senior Thai government ministers went to the airport to welcome the first planeload of Chinese tourists following the lifting of travel restrictions on January 8 (Guangming Daily, January 17). Scenes of smiling Thai officials and airport workers greeting the first group of arriving tourists circulated widely in Chinese media.
Topic:: Politics, COVID-19, Health Crisis, and Travel
Political Geography:: China and Asia

2. At a Dead End? China’s Drive to Reform Defense Science and Technology Institutes Stalls

Author:: Arthur S. Ding and K. Tristan Tang
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Since becoming China’s top leader ten years ago, General Secretary Xi Jinping has sought to sustain a three-decade effort to reform the defense industry in order to advance the development of defense technology and improve the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) capabilities. Recent reforms have focused on transforming defense science and technology (S&T) institutes into enterprise-like entities, but due to political and economic impediments, progress has been slow. This article examines the rationale for defense industry reform, assesses progress in implementation and explains difficulties encountered in the reform process.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Reform, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:: China and Asia

3. The Clash at Tawang: Tensions Rise on the China-India Border

Author:: Amrita Jash
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On December 9, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Indian army clashed at Yangtse along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Tawang Sector in Arunachal Pradesh resulting in injuries on both sides. Following the incident, the local Indian commander held a flag meeting with his Chinese counterpart on December 11 in order to restore peace. The clash at Tawang marked the first major skirmish between the two armies in the eastern sector since the Galwan Valley clash in the western sector in Eastern Ladakh on June 15, 2020 (China Brief, July 15, 2020).
Topic:: Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:: China, India, and Asia

4. A Future Projection of Post-Covid-19 in Japan: Universal Values and International Cooperation

Author:: Yukio Sakurai
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: This essay aims to clarify the most popular impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and examine a future projection of Post-COVID-19 in Japan. This is based on interdisciplinary studies, particularly the literature survey on global governance in English and Japanese. Japan has consistently lived after WWII under the principles of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Given the challenges caused by the pandemic, it is unpredictable how much conflict between multiple powers will hinder national security and economic globalization. The following five actions should be executed: Japan should participate in international research activities to envision a future society, Japan should adopt a unique future concept to address ageing populations and social security reform in their international cooperation, a review of neoliberalism, construction of a society that can respond to societal risks, and political leadership and freedom of speech to deal with serious social risks should be championed.
Topic:: Health, Governance, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

5. Distrust in the heartland: explaining the Eurasian “Organization Gap” through the Russo-Chinese relations

Author:: Valdir da Silva Bezerra and Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conjuntura Austral: Journal of the Global South
Institution:: Conjuntura Austral: Journal of the Global South
Abstract:: The concept of Eurasia is one of the most important elements of geopolitics, dating back to the beginning of the last century, and whose development owes much to the works of geographers and political thinkers alike. Nevertheless, although comprising a big portion of the planet’s political space, this region suffers from a relative ‘organizational gap’, especially if compared with neighboring regions such as Western Europe and Southeast Asia for instance. This paper contends that the lack of an overarching political arrangement in Eurasia owes much to particular aspects of the Russia-China relationship, which encompasses Great Power aspirations and competing organizational schemesin the region. Different views about Eurasia itself, associated with a quest for leadership in regional institution-building, put both Russia and China on competitive tracks, essentially obstructing the formation of a broad political design in the broader continent. To substantiate our point, the present work applies certain concepts from historical institutionalism, whose mechanisms enabled a thorough evaluation of patterns of inception, continuation, and change of political institutions, alliances and principles affecting the Sino-Russian relationship over time, as well as its effects on Eurasia’s ‘organizational gap’ per se.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, History, Geopolitics, Institutions, and International Institutions
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

6. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) through economic diplomacy strategy. Study of Indonesia-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement

Author:: Shanti Darmastuti, Arry Bainus, Widya Setiabudi, and Dudy Heryadi
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Free trade is considered to make a positive contribution to both domestic and international economy because of the removal of trade barriers. The importance of free trade can be seen from the increasing free trade agreements between developed and developing countries. The involvement of developing countries in free trade agreements enables them to make efficiency and maximize the benefits of implementing free trade agreements. Developing countries however often do not get results that are as expected in the Free Trade Agreement (FTA). For example, Indonesia has not yet obtained the outcomes that were expected in the implementation of the Indonesia-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (IJEPA). The results highlight that one fundamental factor for obtaining optimal benefits from a trade agreement is internal coordination prior to the negotiation process.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Partnerships, Economy, Policy Implementation, and Free Trade
Political Geography:: Japan, Indonesia, and Asia

7. State Identity, Perception to Diaspora, and Diaspora Policies in the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia

Author:: Tonny Dian Effendi
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam have many diasporas, but they implement different diaspora policies. The Philippines and Vietnam implemented dual nationality and established specific institutions for the diaspora. Meanwhile, Indonesia implements a single citizenship policy, and the MOFA established only a particular unit for the diaspora. This study explains those countries’ diaspora policies by analyzing their interpretation of diaspora and the influence of the state identity. By adopting the constructivism theory of International Relations, this study shows that the Philippines includes its diaspora as part of its global nation identity, and Vietnam includes its diaspora as a broader pan-Vietnamese family member. At the same time, Indonesia perceives its diaspora as a partner for development. The home countries’ perception and identity concerning the diaspora affect their interest and diaspora policy. Besides, the institutionalization of diaspora plays a critical role in the diaspora policy process.
Topic:: Diaspora, State, Identity, and Perception
Political Geography:: Indonesia, Asia, Vietnam, and Philippines

8. Talking with Terrorists: Hostage Release Negotiation with the Abu Sayyaf Group in Southern Philippines

Author:: Putu Agung Nara Indra Prima Satya
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: A hostage crisis is one of the hardest and most dangerous situations in the field of negotiation. For example, it happened in the Mindanao hostage crisis on May 2016 when 10 Indonesian sailors were captured by the Abu Sayyaf militia. The crisis was solved successfully because of a small team of non-government personnel from the Sukma Bangsa Foundation. One of the main factors behind their success was the trust-building process in which the negotiators symbolically showed that they have commonalities instead of differences with the perpetrators especially the religion (Islam), cultural background (Malay) and so forth. This article explains the trust-building process in the first phase of the hostage negotiations between the Sukma Bangsa Foundation and the Abu Sayyaf militia. The article takes a qualitative approach using primary data from an interview with one of the negotiators. Furthermore, this article uses the concept of "relatedness" in the trust-building process to analyze the effect of cultural and religious background in bridging the dialogue.
Topic:: Terrorism, Negotiation, Abu Sayyaf, Hostage Crisis, and Trust-building
Political Geography:: Asia and Philippines

9. Dispute Resolution between the Philippines and China: Fishing Activities in the South China Sea

Author:: Yordan Gunawan, Dwilani Irrynta, Caterina García Segura, and Pablo Pareja-Alcaraz
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Chinese fishing vessels and maritime militias were found in Philippine waters on April 12, 2021. Diplomatic protests raised by the Philippines have been ignored by China, which still claims most of the South China Sea, although in 2016 The Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague under Annex VII of the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), ruled that such a claim is inconsistent with international law. In the article, the authors use a normative research method and a comprehensive literature review in which sources are obtained from secondary data. The results show that China violates the tribunal ruling by infringing the sovereign rights of the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). For the avoidance and prevention of further issues between the two states, the establishment of a Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ) may be used as a settlement.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Sovereignty, Fishing, and Disputes
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Philippines, and South China Sea

10. Hong Kong´s Football Rivalry With the People´s Republic Of China as a Reflection of Local Identity Evolution

Author:: Lukasz Zamecki
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: In the 20th century and in contemporary Hong Kong, different identities of inhabitants of the region overlap. In that article, through the prism of the attitudes manifested by Hong Kongers during football matches between HK and the PRC teams, two local identities and their evolution are distinguished. The matches until the 1980s aroused tensions on slightly different grounds when compared to the conflicts in the 21st century, which also correlates with the differently built local identity in the 1970s and 1980s and the present one. The article argues that the football rivalry between HK and mainland China reflects the evolution of HK’s local identity based on proud of local achievements toward more nativist form of identity mixed with evident hostility toward mainland China. This article can make a contribution to the studies on sociology of football and shows how identity can be studied through sport events.
Topic:: Sports, Rivalry, Identity, Football, and Soccer
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Hong Kong

11. The Indo-pacific and Southeast Asia: The Impact of External Strategies on Southeast Asia and Asean’s Response

Author:: Gracia Abad Quintanal
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: The Indo-Pacific concept is imprecise and designates more a geopolitical reality than a geographical space, but it is not, as is often suggested, a recent creation of the US, nor of the Trump administration. On the contrary, several actors have used it before the United States itself. And the US will not be the last actor to adopt it, either. On the contrary, it has gradually been adopted by other actors, including ASEAN, which tries to turn the concept in its favor in a way that reaffirms the importance of the group in the region as a whole and does not put in question neither “its centrality or its unity”, something that is far from being achieved.
Topic:: Geopolitics, ASEAN, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: China, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

12. Estados Unidos y África. Historia de una no-política

Author:: Pablo Rey-García and Pedro Rivas Nieto
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: En este artículo se estudian las relaciones entre Estados Unidos y África, desde los puntos de vista económico, político y de seguridad. Son, estos tres campos, interdependientes, pero a la vez enormemente dinámicos, tanto por la inercia política estadounidense, como por los condicionantes propios de África (déficit en desarrollo, pobreza, inseguridad o inestabilidad política) como por el contexto internacional. En este último aspecto, cobra especial relevancia la invasión rusa de Ucrania o la emergencia de la ambición militar China, pues ambos países compiten con Estados Unidos por tener una mejor posición en el continente africano.
Topic:: International Relations, Development, Economics, National Security, and Terrorism
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, China, Asia, North America, Sahel, United States of America, and Horn of Africa

13. Women’s Liberation in Soviet, Sino, and American State Building: Theory and Practice

Author:: Emily B. Finley
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Humanitas
Institution:: The Center for the Study of Statesmanship, Catholic University
Abstract:: Women’s liberation is a concept that is almost always found at the heart of revolutionary thinking. Plato, devising the ideal state in which all perform work according to inborn ability and hold goods in common according to the dictates of justice, very soon discovers that marriage and the nuclear family are hindrances to the perfectly just republic. Plato’s plan for abolishing the traditional family pertains to the guardian class and exemplifies a deep suspicion of the family as fostering attitudes detrimental to building the just state. Plato was the opposite of an egalitarian, but the view of the family as a harbinger of “private morality” would in the modern period characterize radically egalitarian philosophies that envision an all-dominating public consciousness and a corresponding collective activism. Family life, especially for women, is not naturally suited to this political objective. The construction of Plato’s perfectly just city entails the assurance that women worthy of being “guardians” can outsource childcare and can freely produce guardian-worthy children.
Topic:: Women, Feminism, State Building, Gender, and Liberation
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, Soviet Union, North America, and United States of America

14. Strategic Ambiguity in US-Taiwan Relations During the Donald Trump Administration

Author:: Filip Grzegorzewski
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: Strategic ambiguity, or the deliberate policy of uncertainty as to whether the United States would use force to defend Taiwan against an invasion by the People's Republic of China, has been the centrepiece of US policy towards the Taiwan issue for decades. This paper discusses the factors driving the redefinition of strategic ambiguity and its recalibration throughout Donald Trump's presidency (2017–2021). The fundamental driver of this change was to balance the rising power of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The paper applied offensive realism as a theoretical framework for its analysis. Under President Donald Trump, Washington modified its policy of strategic ambiguity, explicitly framing relations with Taiwan within a broader Indo-Pacific strategy. While the US retained key elements of strategic ambiguity, including the 'One China' policy, it added new features to deploy it offensively against Beijing's growing regional hegemony. The increased dynamism and unpredictability of relations with Taiwan were matched by a welcoming attitude towards strengthening Taiwanese identity and highlighting the systemic differences between communist China and democratic Taiwan. America stepped up arms sales and encouraged Taiwan to build its self-defence capabilities. Washington engaged in countering Chinese attempts to isolate Taiwan internationally and included it in restructuring global supply chains. Although the United States has not formally revised the boundaries of the 'One China' policy, the modification of strategic ambiguity increased Taiwan's prominence in US-China power competition and pushed back the prospect of peaceful unification.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Leadership
Political Geography:: Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

15. Indo–French Defence Cooperation in the Light of Regional Security Balance in South Asia

Author:: Mukesh Shankar Bharti
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: The article aims to describe the regional security challenges to India in South Asia. Since the partition of India in 1947, the country has continuously been under external threat as a form of proxy warfare and terrorism. For this purpose, the article highlighted the core hotspots where India has major border issues with China in the Himalayan terrain. India has been facing a bigger security challenge from China and Pakistan in the South Asia region. This article analyses the defence ties between India and France in the context of security. India's neorealist approaches expand its strategic partnership in global politics. Therefore, India has been getting strategic support from the French side whenever India seeks support in a critical situation. The article uses the methods of case study and discourse analysis to answer the question and find out the study's relevance. As a result of severe security threats, India had to negotiate the purchase of defence equipment from France. India had to buy Rafael fighter jet, submarine and other heavy military weapons. Indo-French relations are stronger than in the past and will develop as friendly relations in the future.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Regionalism
Political Geography:: South Asia, Indonesia, Asia, and France

16. Restarting Educational Exchanges with China after the Cultural Revolution

Author:: John C. Thomson
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: When I arrived in Beijing in June 1978, foreign diplomats were forbidden to visit any schools or universities and they had minimal contact with government organizations. Although both the U.S. and China were interested in resuming academic exchanges, the obstacles were daunting. I was assigned to the U.S. Liaison Office (USLO), an unofficial organization representing U.S interests in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the absence of an official embassy. After establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries in January 1979, I became part of the newly opened U.S. embassy in China, the successor to the Liaison Office. I am pleased to have worked directly on the restoration of U.S.-PRC educational exchanges after a hiatus of 30 years that followed the communist take-over in 1949.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Education, Foreign Exchange, and Cultural Revolution
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

17. U.S. Relations With China: DACOR Conference Summary

Author:: Keith McCormick and Emma W. Sandifer
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: As relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) loom ever larger for the U.S., DACOR’s annual conference in 2022 focused on “Balancing Competing Interests in U.S. Relations With China.” The Washington-based organization of foreign affairs professionals brought together diplomats and academics to explore the idea that U.S. policy toward China needs to pursue cooperation in some areas and competition in others while simultaneously confronting Beijing and preparing to deter or win a conflict, if it comes to war. The hybrid conference, with some attendees present at the historic DACOR-Bacon house and others joining online, was conducted under Chatham House Rules. The keynote address, by Ambassador (ret.) J. Stapleton Roy, was live-streamed to a classroom of political science faculty and students at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Diplomacy, Human Rights, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Conference
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

18. Social Credit System in the People’s Republic of China. Theoretical Assumption and Implementation

Author:: Maciej Walkowski
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: In the European Union, the United States and other countries of the so-called Western world, the perception of the functionalities of AI, and other instruments of Industrial Revolution 4.0 significantly differs from its perception by the PRC’s authorities, which – for a few years – have been implementing solutions aimed at comprehensive scrutiny and social supervision rather than facilitating life and work. This idea has been reflected in the so-called Social Credit System since at least 2014 and has given rise to plenty of controversies and disputes, unfortunately based on emotions and imprecise interpretation of the characteristics, aims, and implementation of the project rather than knowledge. While the new, digital model of social management in China is extensively discussed in the literature, it is rarely addressed in Polish studies, which results in the scarcity of publications on this subject. This paper attempts to fill this gap by presenting the essence of the system and the progress of its implementation.
Topic:: Economics, Hegemony, Artificial Intelligence, and Credit
Political Geography:: China and Asia

19. The Digital Asset Battlefield Between the United States and China

Author:: Michael B Greenwald
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: United States dollar dominance has underpinned American economic and geopolitical leadership since the Second World War. The tremendous structural and geopolitical advantages the United States derives from the hegemony of the dollar have contributed substantially to Washington’s military power, alliances, and strong hand in trade relations with other states. However, the convergence of a shifting international balance of power and the accelerated digitalization of the world economy will have major implications for this pillar of American strength.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Currency, Strategic Competition, and Digitization
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

20. China Makes a Move in the Middle East: How Far Will Sino-Arab Strategic Rapprochement Go?

Author:: Sine Ozkarasahin
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: With a well-planned strategy and a careful exploitation of the gaps opened by U.S. foreign policy shifts, China has successfully increased its role as a strategic actor in the Middle East, including by gaining a foothold in the regional arms market. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s early December visit to Saudi Arabia, upon King Salman’s invitation, exemplifies the recent improvement in Sino-Arab ties (Xinhua, December 8). While in Saudi Arabia, Xi initiated two new multilateral forums intended to strengthen engagement between China and the Arab world: the China-Arab States Summit and the China-Gulf Cooperation Council summit (Xinhua, December 11). In addition to deepening political rapprochement between Beijing and several regional countries, China is simultaneously establishing crucial military-strategic ties with key Middle Eastern states. Chinese-made drones are already present in the arsenals of multiple Arab countries and technological cooperation between Beijing and its regional counterparts is rapidly increasing. The most striking example in this regard was the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) revocation of the F-35 deal that constrained its cooperation with the Chinese tech and telecommunications giant Huawei over 5G technology (Al Arabiya News, December 14, 2021). As many Arab countries’ doubts about Washington’s commitment to regional security grow, more and more countries are increasingly open to entreaties from China.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Rapprochement
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, Asia, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

21. Will Mass Protests Force Xi to Change Course on Zero-COVID?

Author:: Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The apparent failure by Beijing to determine new ways to handle the COVID-19 pandemic given what many consider the largest mass protests since the student movement of 1989 has exposed the limited abilities of the new Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership to handle unexpected events despite its extensive security and surveillance apparatus. CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping, who gained near-total control of the party apparatus at the 20th Party Congress late last month, is nowhere to be seen after tens of thousands of students on at least 50 campuses in a dozen-odd cities staged protests against the three-year-long pandemic-related lockdowns on Sunday, November 27. Crowds on the streets of cities including Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Chengdu and Urumqi also held impromptu demonstrations (Chinese New York Times, November 28; Deutsche Welle Chinese, November 28). The protestors demanded not only an end to Xi’s signature “zero tolerance” COVID regime but also called for the introduction of universal values banned by the party, such as personal liberty, freedom of expression and the rule of law. Some demonstrators even shouted incendiary slogans such as “CCP, step down” (共产党下台, Gongchandang xiatai) and “Xi Jinping, step down” (习近平下台, Xi Jinping xiatai) (Liberty Times, November 28). Many held aloft pieces of white paper, which simultaneously symbolized press censorship in China and the fact that their protests had nothing to do with “color revolutions” supposedly spread by “hostile foreign forces” (Radio French International, November 27; Voice of America, November 27).
Topic:: Protests, COVID-19, and Zero-COVID
Political Geography:: China and Asia

22. Meloni at the Helm: What Does Italy’s New Government Mean for Sino-Italian Relations?

Author:: Andrew R. Novo
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Questions about the unity of Italy’s new government on several key foreign policy issues persist, ranging from the extent of its support for Ukraine to its commitment to various European Union institutions. However, on the issue of China, the new government of Prime Minister (PM) Giorgia Meloni appears united. This bodes well for transatlantic cooperation and could spell trouble for Beijing, which not too long ago entertained ideas of using Italy as a friendly counterweight in Europe. Under Meloni, Italian foreign policy, particularly toward China, is unlikely to chart a dramatically new course. This is largely because the current government has prioritized its commitment to NATO and needs to focus on domestic issues rather than risk upsetting the international arena. While openings remain for Sino-Italian cooperation in economic terms, such cooperation will be geared toward supporting Italy’s domestic challenges and is unlikely to provide Beijing with the significant foothold that it has long hoped to gain in Europe.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Government, Bilateral Relations, and Giorgia Meloni
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Italy

23. The Long Shadow of the 1962 War and the China-India Border Dispute

Author:: Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In the war that India and China fought between October 20 and November 20, 1962, India not only suffered a humiliating defeat but also lost a chunk of territory in Aksai Chin in Ladakh in eastern Jammu and Kashmir. Sixty years later, the Indian Army and China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) are locked in a standoff along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the de facto border, at Ladakh, which began in mid-2020 and continues through the present (Jamestown Foundation, March 1). Both sides’ corps commanders have held sixteen rounds of bilateral talks thus far and have reached agreements on the disengagement of troops from several points of friction and the establishment of several “buffer zones” in these areas (Xinhua, July 28). However, China has refused to return to the April 2020 status quo and the buffer zones have been carved largely out of Indian territory. Sixty years after it lost a large swath of territory in Ladakh, is India ceding ground there again to China?
Topic:: War, History, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:: China, India, and Asia

24. China’s Economy: More Debt than Meets the Eye

Author:: Antonio Graceffo
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Since the beginning of this year, investment banks and international financial organizations, including the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, have steadily downgraded their forecasts for the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) GDP growth in 2022 to around 3.2 percent (Nikkei Asia, October 7). Most analysts agree that Beijing is in a difficult economic position, but the situation has the potential to become far worse due to off-balance sheet liabilities. Such debt risks defaulting, or may otherwise need to be covered by the central government. Another drag on the country’s balance sheet that has yet to fully hit home is the impact of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) financing. Due to economic problems and debt crises in BRI partner countries, a large percentage of the initiative’s loans may have to be forgive or at least restructured. Before looking at its financing and hidden liabilities, it is necessary to establish an overall picture of the current PRC economy across a broad spectrum of indicators.
Topic:: Debt, Economy, Economic Growth, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Investment
Political Geography:: China and Asia

25. China Increases Support for Pakistan’s Naval Modernization with an Eye on the Indian Ocean

Author:: Syed Fazl-e-Haider
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In mid-July, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and the Pakistan Navy (PN) held the “Sea Guardians-2” exercise in the waters off Shanghai (China Brief, October 4; Pakistan Television, July 12). The joint naval drills focused on neutralizing maritime security threats, particularly those that might jeopardize strategic sea lanes. The bilateral exercise also included joint target practice, anti-submarine, anti-aircraft and anti-missile drills (China Military Online [CMO], July 10). The drills built on the first iteration of the exercise, Sea Guardians-1, which was held in January 2020 in the North Arabian Sea off Karachi, Pakistan. The participation in these exercises of the guided missile frigate Taimur, which is the most advanced warship built by China for the PN, demonstrates the increasing level of Chinese support for the training and modernization of Pakistan’s naval forces (Global Times, July 10). Bilateral military ties, which are a mainstay of the China-Pakistan all-weather friendship and strategic partnership, have strengthened in recent years. China is the main supplier of military equipment to Pakistan, which from 2017-2021 absorbed nearly 47 percent of all Chinese arms exports (China Brief, March 25). In a move to further deepen defense ties, China provided Pakistan with J-10C multi-role fighters in late 2021 (South Asian Voices , April 12). In June, a high-powered Pakistani delegation comprising top brass from the army, navy and air force paid a visit to China at a time when tensions between China and the West were on the rise (CMO, June 12). The visit was part of the Pakistan-China Joint Military Cooperation Committee (PCJMCC), which is the highest body involved in facilitating bilateral defense cooperation. Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff General Qamar Javed Bajwa also attended the top-level committee’s meeting, along with senior-most counterparts in the PLA. Both countries vowed to further deepen their strategic partnership in challenging times and enhance their joint military cooperation in training, technology and counterterrorism (Express Tribune , June 12).
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Navy, Modernization, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, Asia, and Indian Ocean

26. Can Beijing be Flexible on U.S. Policy?

Author:: John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: General Secretary Xi Jinping did not mention “America” in his opening report to the 20th Party Congress (Xinhua, October 16). Nevertheless, Xi made clear that China faces a difficult international environment, precipitated in large part by the U.S. challenge, which threatens the realization of national rejuvenation. For Xi, the threat appears particularly acute in two areas: technology and Taiwan. He called for winning the “battle of key core technologies” by building on breakthroughs in areas such as supercomputing and quantum computing, space exploration, nuclear energy, satellite navigation and biomedicine (Xinhuanet, October 16). On Taiwan, Xi issued a thinly veiled ultimatum to Washington, stating that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will strive for “peaceful reunification” to incorporate Taiwan into the Motherland, which he called “an inevitable requirement for realizing the great rejuvenation.” Should this approach fail, Beijing reserves the right to employ military force to counter “interference by external forces” and “Taiwan independence” separatists (Central Committee Taiwan Work Office, October 16).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

27. Exploring the Domestic Foundations of Chinese Economic Sanctions: The Case of Australia

Author:: Scott Waldron, Darren J. Lim, and Victor Ferguson
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: More than two years have passed since the People’s Republic of China (PRC) began imposing a broad range of restrictions on Australian trade in what is widely regarded to be a campaign of economic coercion. Despite the apparent sanctions affecting numerous Australian export industries with high exposure to the mainland market, there is now a broad consensus that Beijing’s efforts have been unsuccessful. [1] The measures had a negligible impact on the Australian macroeconomy and did not drive Canberra to make any policy concessions to address Beijing’s long list of ostensible grievances (Australian Department of Treasury, September 6, 2021). It is well established that economic sanctions often fail to change state behavior, typically because the political demands of the sanctioning state are too high. But most sanctions still impose significant economic costs on their targets. Curiously—despite a widely held view that Australia was highly vulnerable to Chinese economic pressure (Global Times, June 10, 2020)—Beijing’s campaign fell short and appeared poorly targeted. The overwhelming majority of affected Australian industries were able to redirect their exports to other markets without significant friction.[2] The economic costs of some barriers, such as those on barley, were significantly higher for China than Australia (Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences, June 2020). Some of Australia’s industries that are most reliant on the Chinese market were left untouched altogether. [3] If—as is widely assumed—China’s objective was to coerce, why did its apparent sanctions not hit the mark and asymmetrically impose politically significant costs on the Australian economy? Exploring this question can yield new insight into the dynamics shaping Chinese economic sanctions—an instrument of statecraft Beijing continues to employ regularly, including recently against Lithuania in 2021 and Taiwan in early August (PRC Charge d’affaires Lithuania, May 3; United Daily News, August 5).
Topic:: Sanctions, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Australia

28. China’s Interests in Afghanistan One Year After the U.S. Withdrawal

Author:: Zafar Iqbal Yousafzai
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In late June, a severe earthquake struck southeastern Afghanistan. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) announced it would provide 50 million RMB ($7.2 million) in emergency aid, including tents, blankets, cots and other sorely needed supplies to the impacted areas (People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs (FMPRC), June 25). Beijing invests in Afghanistan to further its long-term economic, strategic and political interests. Since the U.S. withdrawal last year, China has had an opportunity to advance its interests and deepen its clout in Afghanistan. When Kabul fell, China did not condemn the move and announced that it respected the choice of the Afghan people—a sign of goodwill from Beijing to the Taliban that it subscribes to the narrative that the new government has the full support of the population (Xinhua, August 16, 2021). China has never been militarily involved in Afghanistan. Uyghur militants have found safe-haven in the country for decades, but the level of threat they pose to the PRC is debated even among Chinese analysts (China Brief, February 11). Despite such long-running concerns, Beijing was unperturbed by the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan last year. The PRC kept its embassy open through the fall of Kabul, and Beijing has sustained extensive diplomatic contact with the Taliban leadership to safeguard its security, economic and strategic interests in Afghanistan (Global Times, August 17, 2021). In fact, the PRC is seeking to carry out a complex balancing act in Afghanistan. Concerns about Afghanistan becoming a safe haven for extremist groups that could target neighboring states persist, but Beijing also perceives huge opportunities in Afghanistan’s natural resources, markets and potential to serve as a key node linking western China with South and Central Asia. In order to achieve a stable and secure Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which will advance China’s interests throughout Central Asia, Beijing needs a stable Afghanistan.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Taliban, Political stability, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, Asia, and United States of America

29. The Economic Outlook for Xi’s Third Term: Mounting Challenges, Dwindling Fiscal and Monetary Options

Author:: Alicia Garcia-Herrero
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: China’s decade-long economic slowdown is accelerating. The pace has picked up since former U.S. President Donald Trump launched his trade war against China in early 2018, and even more so since the COVID-19 pandemic started in early 2020. This year has been particularly difficult as stubborn zero-COVID policies have ground the economy to a halt, further pushed by the bursting of the real estate bubble that had been China’s most important engine of growth for decades. Many ask themselves how much of China’s deceleration is cyclical and how much is structural, but also how much can be reverted. On the first issue, the cyclical element of the ongoing deceleration of the Chinese economy is clearly important and adds additional downward pressure to the well-known structural factors, such as aging and decreasing labor productivity.
Topic:: Monetary Policy, Economy, Xi Jinping, and Zero-COVID
Political Geography:: China and Asia

30. All the President’s Men – Corruption in the Xi Jinping Era

Author:: Martin Purbrick
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Since the opening up of the Chinese economy by Deng Xiaoping in 1979, China has grown wealthy, but corruption has also become pervasive at all levels of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Corruption has been a part of Chinese business and governance for millennia, but despite the grand pronouncements of the CCP about eradicating corruption, it has not only endured under the current system but grown to extraordinary heights. Due to deeply entrenched corruption across the government, as well as the variable spread of economic benefits, this issue will remain a severe challenge for the CCP as the Xi Jinping era enters its second decade. The necessity for the state security agencies to support political control by Xi will also ensure that anti-corruption purges continue to impact the police and security agencies.
Topic:: Security, Corruption, Economy, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:: China and Asia

31. Will the Xi Jinping Leadership Take Up Reformist Policies After the 20th Party Congress?

Author:: Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: That President Xi Jinping and his faction will dominate the 20th Party Congress is apparent from the Politburo announcement that the week-long, five-yearly conclave will take place on October 16. The Politburo meeting, which was held on August 30, said that the guiding principle of the party and country would remain “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era” (Gov.cn, October 16). The Politburo reasserted that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would follow principles laid down by Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and above all, Xi Jinping. However, the dictums on reform and the open door – as well as the “lie low” foreign policy – promulgated by “Chief Architect of Reform” Deng in the 1980s and 1990s were conspicuously absent from the Party Congress announcement. Instead, the communique emphasized the so-called “three continuances” (三个继续, san ge jixu). This is a reference to Xi’s efforts to uphold Mao Zedong-style “common prosperity” (共同富裕, gongtongfuyu); to sustain “party construction” (党的建设 (dang de jianshe) in order to ensure the loyalty of cadres; and to work toward the formation of a “community with a shared future for mankind” (人类命运共同体,renlei mingyun gongtongti) (Xinhua, August 30; Ming Pao, August 30).
Topic:: Politics, Reform, Leadership, Domestic Politics, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:: China and Asia

32. The Russia-India-China Trilateral After Ukraine: Will Beijing Take the Lead?

Author:: Jagannath P. Panda and Wooyeal Paik
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) foreign ministers’ meeting in late July, which included China, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, People’s Republic of China (PRC) State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi exhorted member states to uphold the “Shanghai Spirit” (上海精神, Shanghai Jingshen) of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, mutual consultations, diverse civilizations, and the pursuit of common development (Gov.cn, July 29). He then presented a “five-point proposal” for building an SCO community “with a shared future” (CGTN, July 30). In doing so, Wang echoed President Xi Jinping’s call in his four-point proposal at the BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa) summit in June —albeit via a rather elemental poetic allegory of fire, wind, and water –to embark on a “righteous course” toward a shared global future premised on inclusive, comprehensive and close win-win cooperation (Qiushi, June 24). BRICS already has a “Plus” mechanism and is mulling an expansion to include “like-minded” partners.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, India, and Asia

33. Beijing Makes a Big Long-term Bet on Nuclear Power

Author:: John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Last fall, China suffered extensive power outages due to a combination of surging electricity demand and tight supply. A confluence of factors contributed to the energy supply shortage, but nearly all traced back to China’s struggle to manage its overdependence on coal for power generation: rising global coal prices; shuttering of old power plants as part of a push to enhance energy efficiency; emission-reduction efforts; an “unofficial” embargo on Australian coal imports due to geopolitical strife between Beijing and Canberra; and disparities in government price controls (power plants must purchase coal at market rates, but consumer prices are set in a narrow band) that incentivized plants to cease or slow operations rather than produce electricity at a financial loss (Caixin, October 12, 2021; Zaobao, July 14). In 2022, China has avoided a replay of last year’s energy crunch despite the supply shocks in the energy markets induced by the Ukraine conflict by increasing domestic coal production, exploiting the opportunity to import Russian oil and coal at discounted rates and continuing to steadily increase its renewable energy capacity. Boosting domestic coal production has been particularly essential to meet demand. This month, the National Energy Administration (NEA) reported that during the second quarter, China’s raw coal output rose 10 percent year-on-year, which the NEA highlighted as particularly noteworthy given it came on the basis of 16 percent growth in coal output in the same quarter last year (NEA, August 2). Another mitigating factor for China on the energy front has been heavy spring rainfall in many areas of the country that has increased hydropower output over 20 percent in the first half of this year—a substantial boost as hydroelectricity already accounts for about 15 percent of China’s overall energy mix (NEA, August 2; Global Times, May 5).
Topic:: Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, Nuclear Power, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

34. With an Eye on Tibet, China Reacts Warily to Warming U.S.-Nepal Ties

Author:: Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: U.S. Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Uzra Zeya’s three-day visit to Nepal in May evoked a strong reaction from China. During the visit, Zeya, who is also President Joseph Biden’s Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, met with an array of high-level Nepali officials, including Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba as well as Nepali human rights activists. She also visited two Tibetan refugee settlements in Nepal where she interacted with refugees and enquired about their problems (Kathmandu Post, May 22). Zeya had arrived in Kathmandu after meeting the Dalai Lama, senior officials of the Tibetan exile government as well as officials and representatives of the Tibetan refugee community in India (The Hindu, May 18). The Chinese response was swift. The U.S. “should stop meddling in China’s internal affairs under the pretext of Tibet-related issues, and offer no support to the anti-China separatist activities of the Dalai clique,” People’s Republic of China (PRC) Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian said in a press conference (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 19). At the 14th meeting of the Nepal-China Bilateral Consultative Mechanism, which was held a few days after Zeya’s visit, Chinese officials reportedly expressed their misgivings over her engagements to their Nepali counterparts (Kathmandu Post, August 4). Then in July, Liu Jianchao, the head of the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) visited Kathmandu, where at meetings with leaders of Nepal’s major political parties, he asked them to reaffirm their commitment to the ‘One-China’ policy (Nepal Foreign Affairs, July 14).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Nepal, and Tibet

35. Security Dialogues with Chinese Characteristics

Author:: John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: This summer, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) organized two multilateral security dialogues with African nations, which highlight Beijing’s efforts to promote an alternative model of international security. In June, representatives of the PRC and six East African states convened in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia for the first China-Horn of Africa Peace, Governance and Development Conference, which is an initiative that was originally proposed by Foreign Minister Wang Yi during his January visit to Kenya (Guangming Daily, June 27; PRC Foreign Ministry, January 7). At the meeting, PRC Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa Xue Bing said that Beijing sought a greater role in the region, “not only in trade and investments but also in the area of peace and development” (South China Morning Post, June 23). The conference resulted in a joint statement committing to utilize confidence building, dispute resolution, dialogue and negotiation to achieve a “lasting peace” in the region (China News Service, June 23). In doing so, the parties pledged to uphold the “common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security concept,” which was first laid out by President Xi Jinping in 2014 as a core element of his vision for a new international security architecture (Xinhua, May 24). Xi cited the need to remain committed to this concept as motivation for the PRC’s new Global Security Initiative, which he introduced in April (China Brief, May 13). Earlier this week, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) hosted the second “China-Africa Peace and Security Forum,” which was virtually attended by senior defense leaders from nearly fifty African countries (Gov.cn, July 26). In his keynote remarks, State Councilor and Defense Minister Wei Fenghe read a congratulatory letter from Xi, which hailed the resilience of Sino-African friendship in a challenging international landscape and called for the implementation of the Global Security Initiative (People’s Daily, July 26). Although somewhat short on specifics, Beijing has promoted the Global Security Initiative as a positive-sum, “common security” model in contrast to the militaristic, zero-sum approach it ascribes to the United States (China Brief, July 15).
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:: China and Asia

36. The Real U.S.-China 5G Contest is Just Getting Started

Author:: Philip Hsu
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On June 6, China declared the three-year anniversary of its business deployment of 5G, with the country having invested nearly 185 billion yuan in related infrastructure in 2021 alone (Xinhua Baoye, June 5). However, China’s 5G ambitions, which continue to form a substantial component of its national and international development policies, began years ago with Huawei. After Apple revolutionized the smartphone, demand for sophisticated computer “chips” and other components skyrocketed. Companies like Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) and Foxconn capitalized on this shift to become the main pillars of Taiwan’s economy. In addition to supplying Samsung, Apple and HTC, a lesser-known, nominally private Chinese company, Huawei was also starting to make smartphones around this time using Taiwanese hardware (Nikkei Asia, 2016). Although in recent years up to 60 percent of 5G-capable Huawei phone components have been manufactured in China, which is due in large part to U.S. sanctions against it and other Chinese technology companies, a new technological Cold War is unlikely to materialize over 5G. The economic stakes over advanced computing and a new generation of telecommunications infrastructure are too high for the international community to afford any one nation or corporation primacy across the deep and diverse set of software, hardware and human capital requirements this technology will demand.
Topic:: Development, Science and Technology, Infrastructure, Strategic Competition, and 5G
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

37. China’s Shifting Approach to Alliance Politics

Author:: John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: For decades, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has abstained from seeking formal alliances. Chinese leaders often invoke the principle of advancing state-to-state relations through “dialogue rather than confrontation [and] partnerships rather than alliances” (对话不对抗、结伴不结盟, duihua bu duikang, jieban bu jiemeng) (Xinhuanet, June 23; Gov.cn, November 22, 2021). The PRC highlights its multitude of strategic partnerships and lack of official alliances as emblematic of its self-proclaimed anti-hegemonic approach to international relations, which is predicated on inclusivity, mutual respect and “win-win cooperation.” Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propaganda regularly juxtaposes this purportedly positive-sum approach to world politics with its stock depiction of the United States as a decaying but violent empire, which practices a ruthless brand of power politics based on zero-sum thinking. For the CCP, America’s “cold war mentality” manifests in its global military presence and formal security alliances in Europe and Asia, which Beijing characterizes as “closed and exclusive cliques” (PRC Foreign Ministry [FMPRC], April 12; China Brief, October 22, 2021).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Security, and Alliance
Political Geography:: China and Asia

38. Will the China-Pakistan Corridor Get a Boost with a New Government in Islamabad?

Author:: Syed Fazl-e Haider
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On June 10, the Foreign Office in Islamabad received a diplomatic communication from the Pakistani ambassador in Beijing (The News, June 13). China assured Prime Minister (PM) Shehbaz Sharif, who replaced former PM Imran Khan in April, that it is eager to work with the present government (PRC Foreign Ministry [FMPRC], June 17). China also confirmed the rollover of a $2.3 billion loan to Pakistan at a reduced rate, which is a great help to the cash-strapped nation (The Express Tribune, June 22). Furthermore, China agreed to extend additional financial assistance between $2.5 to $2.8 billion, and pledged to support Pakistan’s fragile economy through the multi-billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) (Business Standard, June 29). Chinese leadership also urged the present government to reinvigorate CPEC projects, which were neglected under Imran Khan’s government (The News, June 13; Business Recorder, June 15). However, PM Sharif’s government has inherited a plethora of problems and issues plaguing progress and causing delays in the execution of projects that fall under the umbrella of CPEC.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Economy
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

39. No Choice but to Lie Flat: Youth Unemployment Surges in China

Author:: John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Pity the class of 2022. The job market in China has long been a gauntlet for college graduates as the country’s largely industrial economy does not generate sufficient opportunities in the knowledge industries to satisfy the career aspirations of its growing number of college graduates. However, prospects for the current crop of jobseekers are particularly grim with a record 10.76 million college students graduating this year (Wuhan Evening News, May 24). Recent graduates must navigate an intensely competitive labor market where demand for jobs greatly outstrips supply due to the negative ramifications of the dynamic clearance zero-COVID policy, which has led to mass hiring freezes and layoffs. Regulatory crackdowns on private businesses, which reached a crescendo last year, have fostered uncertainty in the technology and private education industries, sectors where many graduates had previously found work (South China Morning Post, March 20). According to the annual “College Student Employability Survey Report” released by the recruitment firm Zhaopin (招聘), only 46.7 percent of graduating college students had received job offers as of mid-April, which is down from 62.8 percent last year (Hangzhou Daily, April 28). Not only have fewer graduates found work, but those that have, are earning less this year with an expected monthly salary of 6,295 yuan ($939), a six percent decrease from 2021.
Topic:: Economy, Youth, and Unemployment
Political Geography:: China and Asia

40. 16 + 1: China’s Push Into Central and Eastern Europe Loses Momentum

Author:: Filip Jirouš
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Since its inception in 2012, the Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries (China-CEEC; 中国—中东欧国家合作, Zhongguo—Zhong Dong Ou Guojia Hezuo), better known as the 16+1 or 17+1 initiative, has often been described as a security risk with the potential to divide European structures and make them serve the interests of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC). The 16+1 is a Sinocentric economic cooperation initiative comprising China and 16 Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, which share only a mutual Communist past as a common denominator (in 2019, Greece, which is heavily indebted to China, joined, and the platform was briefly renamed to 17+1). Apart from several different formats such as inter-party dialogues and think tank conferences, the 16+1 holds annual summits attended by state heads, with Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝) and then Li Keqiang (李克强) the official highest-ranking PRC representatives in attendance. In comparison, two other, similar, Sinocentric regional platforms — China-CELAC Forum (中国-拉共体论坛, Zhongguo- Lagongti Luntan); and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC: 中非合作论坛, Zhongfei Hezuo Luntan) — are regularly attended by President and General Secretary Xi Jinping (习近平) (China-CELAC Forum, March 1, 2018). Thus far, FOCAC has generated the greatest level of interest from participating regional countries (China Brief, December 3, 2021). By contrast, several CEE countries have distanced themselves from the 16+1 platform: in 2021, Lithuania quit the group and this May, a Czech parliamentary committee urged the government to consider making the same move.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Eastern Europe, and Asia

41. Unemployment Monitoring and Early Warning: New Trends in Xinjiang’s Coercive Labor Placement Systems

Author:: Adrian Zenz
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In mid-2019, the first efforts to systematically research and conceptualize state-sponsored forced labor systems in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) took place (Journal of Political Risk, December 2019). First, this research examined the placement of detainees in Vocational Skills Education and Training Centers (VSETCs, 职业技能教育培训中心, zhiye jineng jiaoyu peixun zhongxin), which function as re-education camps; and second, the findings detailed the transfer of rural surplus laborers (农村劳动者转移就业, nongcun laodongzhe zhuanyi jiuye) into secondary or tertiary sector work – referred to as Poverty Alleviation through Labor Transfer (脱贫转移就业, tuopin zhuanyi jiuye). In addition to general evidence for coercive labor placements into labor-intensive manufacturing, scholars uncovered evidence of coercive labor transfers for specific economic sectors such as cotton and tomato picking, as well as the production of polysilicon for solar panels (Newlines Institute, December 2020; CBC News, October 29, 2021; Bloomberg, April 2021).[1] Much of the evidence implicating these industries came from publicly available government data, media or company reports, typically dating from between 2017 and 2020. Unfortunately, since then, such evidence has become much sparser. This examination argues that this falloff in information is not just due to government censorship. Rather, it also reflects systemic and concerning changes to the ways that coercive labor placements in Xinjiang are being consolidated.
Topic:: Labor Issues, Unemployment, Domestic Policy, and Forced Labor
Political Geography:: China and Asia

42. The Enemy of My Friend Remains My Friend: China’s Ukraine Dilemma

Author:: Horia Ciurtin
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: State media in China remains equivocal about the level of destruction and mayhem caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, the Chinese government has stated it will meet the challenge of overcoming strained global supplies resulting from the conflict, and has emphasized that the nation’s food security will be ensured (People’s Daily, June 2; China News Service, May 27). Nevertheless, given Ukraine’s position as a global agricultural supplier, China has not fully appreciated the scope of the problem. At a broader level, the war is a litmus test for China’s ability to navigate geopolitical troubles along the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Thus far, the conflict has underscored the difficulties facing China in moving beyond convenient cordialities to play the role of a benign ‘balancer’ in global politics. In its relationships with Moscow and Kyiv, Beijing is entangled financially with both sides. Furthermore, China is now exposed to secondary sanctions due to its economic entanglement with Russia. At the same time, its investments, construction projects and supply chains that traverse Ukraine risk destruction as the war drags on.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Investment, Supply Chains, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Asia

43. China and Sri Lanka’s Debt Crisis: Belt and Road Initiative Blowback

Author:: Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Sri Lanka is in the grip of an unprecedented crisis. For several months, the country has been reeling under a severe foreign exchange crisis. In early May, Foreign Minister Ali Sabry said that its usable forex reserves were just $50 million (Daily News, May 5). As a result, Sri Lanka has been forced to suspend repayment of $51 billion worth of debt owed to China, Japan and other foreign creditors (The Hindu, April 12; The Island, April 13). The country has also been unable to pay for imports of essential commodities, and has experienced serious shortages of food, fuel and medicine (The Island, January 15). The economic crisis has in turn triggered a political crisis. Public anger has boiled over onto the streets. Angry protesters have been calling for the resignation of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and his brother, Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa (Colombo Telegraph, April 7). The Rajapaksa family has dominated Sri Lankan politics for decades and several members of the family are in positions of power as ministers, legislators or heads of corporations and departments. Sri Lankans want the entire clan out. Some of them, including Mahinda, resigned under public pressure in recent months (Island, April 17). Although Gotabaya remains president and under the country’s executive presidential system, continues to wield enormous power, it is evident that the influence of the Rajapaksas has declined. The unfolding crises in Sri Lanka have implications beyond the island. China is among Sri Lanka’s largest bilateral lenders and has played a big role in the island’s infrastructure development. Sri Lanka is a part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Despite China’s pledges that BRI would boost Sri Lanka’s economic and social development by transforming it into “the hub of the Indian Ocean”, Chinese loans are widely believed to have pushed the country into a ‘debt trap’ (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Sri Lanka, June 16, 2017). How have the crises impacted China’s image in Sri Lanka and will the decline of the Rajapaksas, widely regarded as ‘pro-China,’ impact Sino-Sri Lankan relations? Finally, will the Sri Lankan crises affect the fate of BRI?
Topic:: Debt, Development, Politics, Infrastructure, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: China, South Asia, Asia, and Sri Lanka

44. Mongolia’s Currency Crisis: Made in China?

Author:: Antonio Graceffo
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: When COVID-19 lockdowns closed the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) borders in 2020, imports entering Mongolia came to a grinding halt, leading to domestic inflation and product shortages. Exports also declined significantly, further constricting the flow of U.S. dollars into the country. More than two years later, China continues to pursue its “Zero-COVID” policy and the Russia-Ukraine war is driving up global gas and energy costs. An unwitting victim of decisions made in Beijing and Moscow, Mongolia is facing currency devaluation, high inflation, and a shortage of dollars.
Topic:: Currency, COVID-19, Economic Crisis, and Zero-COVID
Political Geography:: China, Mongolia, and Asia

45. Another Potemkin Visit? Rethinking the UN Human Rights Chief’s Upcoming Trip to Xinjiang

Author:: Christelle Genoud
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In March, United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet announced an agreement with China for a May visit, which includes access to Xinjiang. The exact date for the visit has yet to be determined, but recent reports indicate it is due to take place before the end of this month, which will make Bachelet the first UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to visit China in 17 years (China Daily, May 11). Negotiations were stalled for years with Bachelet first indicating intent to report on Xinjiang in a 2018 request for unhindered access to “all regions of China” (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), September 10, 2018). At the end of April, a UN advance team arrived in Guangzhou to quarantine before traveling to Xinjiang to lay the groundwork for Bachelet’s visit (South China Morning Post (SCMP), April 25.
Topic:: Human Rights, United Nations, and Uyghurs
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Xinjiang

46. Future Global Policeman? The Growing Extraterritorial Reach of PRC Law Enforcement

Author:: Martin Purbrick
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The recently signed security agreement between the Solomon Islands and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), along with the support of Chinese police to the Solomon Islands government to suppress social unrest in November 2021, highlight the increasing international deployment of PRC law enforcement (China Daily, April 2). This deployment follows several decades of expanding PRC international law enforcement activity, which is intended for extraterritorial enforcement action, seeking the return of fugitives, and as part of China’s engagement with other countries. The 2021 violence in the capital, Honiara, led to destruction in the local Chinatown and the subsequent deployment of Chinese police officers, who have previously provided equipment and training to the Solomon Islands. The China Police Liaison Team is led by Zhang Guangbo, an officer of the rank of Commissioner third class, who stated that the deployment is intended to protect the safety of Chinese communities in the Solomon Islands as well as to contribute to the overall stability in the islands (Embassy of the PRC in the Solomon Islands, March 4). There has been considerable unease in wider region over the expanded deployment of Chinese police officers to the Solomon Islands. The governments of Australia, Japan, and the United States have all criticized the security pact, and have raised concerns that the deployment of Chinese police officers could lead to a future military presence. Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs Marise Payne stated on March 25 that “Australia is aware of the proposed draft Security Cooperation agreement between China and Solomon Islands…We would be particularly concerned by any actions that undermine the stability and security of our region, including the establishment of a permanent presence such as a military base” (Australian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, March 2022). In response to these concerns, the Solomon Islands High Commissioner to Australia has said that if Chinese police officers were called on for assistance they would be under the command of the Royal Solomon Islands Police and stated that “We will try and do our best in terms of dealing with them to make sure that what is happening in other countries where, like Hong Kong, doesn’t happen in our country” (Solomon Times, 6 May 2022).
Topic:: Security, Politics, Law Enforcement, and Economy
Political Geography:: China and Asia

47. The Storms to Come: China and Natural Disasters

Author:: John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The Chinese government is currently focused on sustaining its “dynamic clearance” zero-COVID strategy, while also mitigating the negative externalities of this approach, including shortfalls in food supply and access to medical services in Shanghai and other major urban centers (China Brief, April 8). Last Friday, netizens temporarily overwhelmed censors on WeChat to widely share the video- “Voices of April” (四月之声, si yue zhi sheng), which highlights the nightmarish lockdown experiences of many Shanghai residents (China Digital Times, April 23, 2022). Mounting popular frustration with the government’s pandemic response underscores how environmental factors, which include not only diseases but also natural disasters, threaten the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) political standing. Water-related disasters such as the severe flooding that devastated Henan province last summer, and the extended drought that hit southeast China beginning in late 2020 are a rising risk due to climate change and extensive environmental degradation in China (Xinhuanet, July 31, 2021; Sina, December 9, 2021).
Topic:: Natural Disasters, Governance, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:: China and Asia

48. China’s 2022 Defense Budget: Behind the Numbers

Author:: Amrita Jash
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: At the fifth session of the 13th National People’s Congress in early March, the Chinese government announced a defense budget of 1.45 trillion yuan (about $229 billion) for fiscal year 2022, which is a 7.1 percent year-on-year increase from 2021 (Xinhua, March 5). After years of double digit increases in the 2000s and early 2010s, this is the seventh consecutive year that China’s defense spending has grown by single digits. Nevertheless, China has moved up in the global defense spending rankings, and is now second only to the United States in expenditures. In the Indo-Pacific region, China’s military spending increasingly dwarfs that of its neighbors. For example, China now spends more on its military than Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and India combined (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI], April 2021). For instance, at $229 billion, China’s military spending is three times that of India’s $70 billion figure for 2022 (The Economic Times, March 5). An increase in Beijing’s defense budget raises red flags for China’s neighbors and the U.S. given the growing tensions over Taiwan, the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the Sino-Indian border dispute in the Himalayas. However, in Chinese eyes, as Beijing-based military expert Wei Dongxu argues, the budget is “proper and reasonable” (Global Times, March 5).
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Budget, and Transparency
Political Geography:: China and Asia

49. China and the Ongoing Political Crisis in Pakistan

Author:: Syed Fazl-e Haider
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is closely monitoring the rapidly developing political crisis in Pakistan. The current upheaval stems from the introduction in Parliament of a no-confidence vote against Prime Minister Imran Khan, and his subsequent allegation that the motion is due to a foreign conspiracy to topple his government. On Sunday, the Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly (the lower house of parliament), who is a member of Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party (PTI) party, dismissed the no-confidence vote as a violation of Article 5 of the Constitution, which establishes loyalty to the state as the basic duty of every citizen (Dawn, April 3). Following the dismissal, President Arif Alvi dissolved the National Assembly on the Prime Minister’s advice (The News , April 3). These developments are unfolding in the context of “letter gate,” which refers to Khan’s recent allegations that the no-confidence motion introduced by the opposition is driven by the efforts of a foreign power, which he later claimed was the US, to induce regime change in Pakistan. Yesterday, Pakistan’s Supreme Court declared both the Deputy Speaker’s dismissal of the motion again Khan, and the president’s decision to dissolve parliament unconstitutional. The Supreme Court restored the National Assembly and ordered it to reconvene on Saturday to hold a vote on the no-confidence motion (Dawn, April 7). China’s state-run media has reported extensively on the whole drama from the deputy speaker’s ruling to the Supreme Court’s verdict (Xinhua, April 8; NDTV, April 3).
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Strategic Stability, and Political Crisis
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, and Asia

50. The Beijing Olympics in Retrospect: An Anti-Human Rights Politics Machine

Author:: Christelle Genoud
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: As the U.S. and other Western nations announced diplomatic boycotts of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) frequently exhorted the international community to keep politics out of the games (People’s Daily, December 8, 2021). Spokespersons of the Beijing Organizing Committee also objected to the “politicization” of the Olympic Games, and claimed that the closed loop Olympic bubble was solely a COVID-19 containment measure necessitated by growing concerns over the spread of the Omicron variant in China (Global Times, January 5). Although, the creation of a closed loop bubble was ostensibly undertaken for epidemic prevention purposes, it also had the impact of isolating athletes and journalists, and forestalling unwanted international focus on poor human rights conditions in China.
Topic:: Human Rights, Politics, Sports, and Olympics
Political Geography:: China and Asia

51. Organized Crime on the Belt and Road

Author:: Martin Purbrick
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The continued rapid economic growth of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the past decade has brought greater commerce and investment to Asia through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, as China’s overseas economic footprint has grown, Chinese organized crime groups have also expanded their activities to become a regional problem. President Xi Jinping first introduced the BRI in 2013 when he proposed to Asian leaders jointly building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, both of which PRC officials later commonly came to call the BRI. The expansion of Chinese organized crime across Asia encompasses multiple areas of activity: online fraud (including pyramid schemes), online gambling, human trafficking (for slavery and prostitution), animal or animal parts trafficking (for use in traditional Chinese medicine), and money laundering (of the proceeds of crime from the PRC).
Topic:: Infrastructure, Economic Growth, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Organized Crime
Political Geography:: China, Malaysia, Asia, Philippines, Cambodia, and Myanmar

52. Why Beijing Wants the Dalai Lama to Reincarnate

Author:: Tenzin Dorjee
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: A strange battle is waiting to unfold at the center of the Sino-Tibetan conflict: the fight over the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation. As the 86-year-old Tibetan leader, who has spent most of his life in exile, advances further in age, there is growing uncertainty about where, or whether, his reincarnation might appear. In a 2011 statement, he laid out several different succession scenarios, one of which was the possibility that he might bring the lineage to an end (Office of his Holiness the Dalai Lama, September 24, 2011). The Chinese government was incensed; it vowed to install its own 15th Dalai Lama after the demise of the incumbent—with or without his consent (Tibetan Review, December 3, 2015).
Topic:: Religion, Domestic Politics, Dalai Lama, and Reincarnation
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Tibet

53. China and Russia: Shackled to a Corpse?

Author:: John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Almost as soon as Russian tanks began their bloody crawl toward Kyiv, debate ensued over whether Chinese leaders had advance knowledge of the Kremlin’s war plans. The broader Chinese foreign policy community was certainly dumbstruck as U.S. warnings of an imminent Russian attack on Ukraine were discounted as geopolitical ploys (Global Times, February 18; Stimson, February 28). However, given the highly personalized nature of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership— President Xi Jinping has met with his counterpart Vladimir Putin 38 times since 2013 — the top leadership was assuredly not entirely in the dark (FMPRC, December 15, 2021). As competition with the U.S. has intensified under Xi, Russia has consolidated its position as China’s most consequential strategic partner. However, China is increasingly concerned that Putin’s war and the resultant international backlash are severely damaging Russia. Some elites have also condemned Russia’s brutality and unilateral aggression, which underscores mounting anxiety that China is tied to a partner that is both weaker and more belligerent than it had previously realized (China Times, March 1). In the current situation, Xi comes off poorly regardless of how much foreknowledge he possessed. If he was naïve about Putin’s designs, he looks weak for allowing a lesser partner to drag China into a confrontation with the West. If Xi cut Putin a blank check for aggression, this may intensify muted but pointed domestic criticism of his foreign policy acumen including his decision to privilege ties with Russia over relations with the West, which are more integral to China’s economic and technological development.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eastern Europe, and Asia

54. City of Vice: Macau, Gambling, and Organized Crime in China

Author:: Martin Purbrick
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In November 2021 and January 2022, the Macau Special Administrative Region (SAR) Judiciary Police arrested 13 individuals involved in operating two separate casino VIP customer “junkets” for engaging in illegal gambling activities, running a criminal syndicate, and money laundering (Macau Judiciary Police, November 29, 2021; January 31). The criminal groups used their VIP junket business in Macau casinos to recruit mainland Chinese residents to engage in illegal online gambling on overseas platforms, and illicit side-betting. The proceeds of the syndicate were then laundered and transferred through the junket accounts of the casinos using underground banks. These developments underscore how gambling in Macau has grown from small beginnings, as tolerant Portuguese administrators did not want to unduly antagonize local Chinese, to a multi-billion dollar business that has been infiltrated by organized crime groups for much of its modern history. During Portuguese rule (1557–1999) Macau was described as the “city of the name God,” hosting the religious orders of St. Augustine, St. Dominic, and St. Francis, as well as convents and Catholic churches (Cultural Affairs Bureau, Macau Government). In the 20th century, Macau became a city of vice as casino gambling emerged as the dominant business, supported by related prostitution, money lending, and money laundering from mainland China. After the return of sovereignty and administration from Portugal to China in 1999, Macau has had extraordinary economic success and relative political stability compared to the neighboring Hong Kong SAR. Macau’s gross domestic product (GDP) rose from $6.458 billion in 1999 to $45,103 billion in 2016 at average annual growth rate of 12 percent. This economic growth, however, has been increasingly dominated by the gambling sector, which in 2013 accounted for over 60 percent of GDP. Casino “gross gambling revenue” in Macau has surpassed Las Vegas and the city is effectively the world’s largest gambling center. [1] However, as the gambling sector has grown, so has the organized crime long associated with that business that has become a domestic problem for China and has impacted other countries in Asia. A particular concern for Beijing is the Macau gambling industry’s role in facilitating capital flight.
Topic:: Law Enforcement, Borders, Gambling, and Organized Crime
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Macau

55. Gay in the PLA: Chinese Military Views on Homosexuals Serving in the Armed Forces

Author:: Brian Waidelich
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Chinese President Xi Jinping has identified the recruitment and retention of top-notch human capital as key to the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) transformation into a “world-class military” by mid-century. In late January 2022, under Xi’s guidance as chairman, China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) issued its “Decision on Strengthening Military Talent Work in the New Era” (关于加强新时代军队人才工作的决定, Guanyu jiaqiang xin shidai jundui rencai gongzuo jueding), which calls human talent “a key element driving the Chinese military’s high-quality development and for winning the initiative in military competition and future warfare.” The decision calls on the PLA to develop high quality, professional talent in key areas—joint operations command, new-type combat forces, science and technology innovation, and strategic management—and for these individuals to provide “firm support” for achieving the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) military-strengthening goal and building the PLA into a world-class military (Xinhua, January 26). The CMC’s decision echoes similar past statements by Chinese leaders who have emphasized the need for the “right” kind of people to lead and support China’s armed forces (US Army War College, July 23, 2021). A common thread is the requirement for PLA personnel to fill increasingly specialized billets as the force receives and operates new, high-tech information systems, weapons, and equipment (China Brief, January 14). Apart from pronouncements of desired education and experience levels for incoming servicemembers, the PLA also publicizes certain exclusion criteria. The PLA’s official conscription and recruitment website, for example, specifies several physical requirements including minimum height and passable body mass index (Zhongguo Zhengbing Wang, January 14, 2021). However, evidence indicates other potential exclusion criteria for Chinese service members that are less clearly stated. This article offers a preliminary analysis of PLA views on homosexuals—in most cases, gay men specifically—serving in China’s armed forces. [1] The analysis draws upon 12 academic papers published by PLA-affiliated authors between 2009 and 2019 whose research focused on issues related to homosexuality and/or homosexuals serving in China’s armed forces. Ten of the 12 studies involved test subjects. This topic was difficult to explore due to the paucity of primary source material (PLA authorities may deem content on sexual minorities sensitive and unfit for public consumption). Yet it remains an important issue, as it has implications for the talent pool the PLA can draw from and for homosexual servicemembers’ ability to survive, thrive, and contribute to China’s objective of developing a world-class military force.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Military Affairs, LGBT+, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

56. China and Pakistan: Strains in the All-Weather Partnership?

Author:: Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: China and Pakistan have formally launched Phase II of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship venture in China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). During Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan’s visit to Beijing on February 3-6 for the Winter Olympics, the two sides signed a Framework Agreement on Industrial Cooperation to kick off the second phase of CPEC, which will focus on the development and industrialization of special economic zones (SEZs) (Pakistan Today, February 4). The joint statement issued at the end of Khan’s visit noted that “the two sides signed or concluded a number of agreements / MoUs, covering bilateral cooperation in areas of economic and technical, industry, investment, infrastructure, space, vaccine, digitalization, standardization, disaster management, culture, sports, and vocational education” (for the full text of the China-Pakistan joint statement see People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 6). According to Pakistan’s Special Assistant to the Prime Minister (SAPM) on CPEC Affairs Khalid Mansoor, CPEC’s second phase will attract multi-billion dollar investments to Pakistan. Representatives of around 500 Chinese companies met with Khan in Beijing, and per the Prime Minister’s remarks to Pakistani media following the visit, expressed interest in investing in industry, agriculture, information technology, infrastructure, housing and construction, mining and oil refining (Business Recorder, February 8). The big question, however, is whether this ostensible interest from Chinese businesses will translate into hard cash commitments. China is concerned over the deteriorating security situation in Pakistan. In the run-up to Khan’s visit, Pakistani militants carried out several major attacks in the country. On January 17, the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP), also known as Pakistani Taliban, opened fire on a security checkpoint in Islamabad (Dawn, January 19). A few days later, the newly formed Baluch Nationalist Army (BNA) carried out a bomb attack in a busy market in Lahore (Express Tribune, January 20). Hours before Khan left for China, Baluch militants struck again, this time attacking security forces’ camps in Panjgur and Naushki in Baluchistan province in southwestern Pakistan (Dawn, February 2). Then on February 5, the TTP killed five Frontier Corps personnel at a security checkpoint in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (Dawn, February 7). Last year, Pakistan suffered 207 terrorist attacks, a 42% increase over 2020, according to a study by the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, an independent think-tank based in Islamabad. Fatalities from terror attacks increased by 51% over the previous year. [1] Worryingly for Beijing, Pakistani militant groups have increasingly threatened Chinese nationals. Four of the attacks in 2021 targeted Chinese nationals and at least 17 Chinese workers were killed in these attacks. As China and Pakistan move into Phase II of CPEC, the safety of Chinese projects and personnel in Pakistan will be a key concern.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

57. What is at Stake in China-Bhutan Boundary Negotiations?

Author:: Jagannath P. Panda
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Satellite imagery reveals that China has recently accelerated construction along its border with Bhutan. Underway since 2020, the project includes over 200 structures, with several two-story buildings in six locations (Times of India, January 13). Bhutan has not commented on the situation in keeping with its policy to refrain from public discussion of border issues, whereas Beijing has framed the development as “normal construction activities on its own territory” (The Hindu, January 13). India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has acknowledged that it is monitoring China’s bridge-building activities over the Pangong Tso lake (India MEA, January 6). In late December, China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs announced the “standardization” of the names of 15 places (eight residential areas, four mountains, two rivers, and one mountain pass) in the Northeast Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh that China also claims and calls “Southern Tibet” (藏南, Zangnan). This is the second instance of China renaming localities in Arunachal Pradesh; the first occurred in 2017 (Global Times, December 30, 2021). India called it a “ridiculous exercise to support untenable territorial claims” (Indian MEA, January 6). Though 2022 has only begun, China’s various intimidation tactics against India are already in full swing: from renaming places and circulating videos of People’s Liberation Army soldiers raising the five-starred red flags of China, supposedly, in the Galwan Valley as part of their New Year celebrations, to expanding its dual use infrastructure along the Himalayan border (Global Times, January 1; The Print, January 13). According to state media, China has been strengthening infrastructure-related projects in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Beijing claims its infrastructure push in Tibet is intended to support economic development, but the Indian side interprets the projects as serving dual use, or, military purposes (China Brief, November 19, 2021). While Chinese sources claim that India was making a “fuss,” they did not, however, entirely deny these reports (Global Times, January 19).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:: China, India, Asia, and Bhutan

58. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Hits Bottom in Balochistan

Author:: Kiyya Baloch and Akbar Notezai
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In early January, several hours of heavy rain exposed poor infrastructure and exaggerated claims of massive development in Gwadar. The largely deserted port city sits on the Iranian border in Pakistan’s southwestern Balochistan province, which is wracked by poverty, militancy, and violence. Despite its challenging location, Gwadar has long been touted as the crown jewel of the much heralded China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the $62 billion megaproject connecting western China with the Arabian sea (China Brief, January 17, 2020). On January 4, heavy rains disrupted routine activities, forcing schools, restaurants, and shops to shut down. The town’s main streets and roads, as well as its tiny airport, were flooded (Twitter/KiyyaBaloch, January 4). Cars floated down roads and people used small wooden dhows to navigate flooded streets. Local reports claimed that in the remote southern parts of Gwadar, thousands of people fled their homes (Dawn, January 5). In the city center, which is about three miles from the seaport where the China Overseas Port Holding Company (COPHC) is building a $250 million coastal port, officials from the Pakistan Disaster Management Authority (PDMA) said floodwaters had reached heights of four to six feet (ARY News, January 4; Balochistan Times, January 4). As Gwadar has fallen on hard times, residents have blamed Beijing and Islamabad for ignoring them in their CPEC megaproject plans. The governments of both China and Pakistan claim that they are modernizing Gwadar by building a well-equipped hospital, parks, technical colleges, modern roads, an industrial park, and a seaport. For years, Chinese and Pakistani officials have claimed that this coastal backwater would soon compete with Dubai, Singapore, and Shenzhen to attract huge foreign investment. However, the currently poor state of Gwadar’s infrastructure underscores that this narrative remains illusory. The rain and flooding have wreaked havoc in Gwadar as it grapples with huge protests demanding better civic facilities and an end to economic injustices. Some have called the recent protests a struggle for civil rights, while others have labeled the movement — the “Baloch Spring” (Dawn, January 2). In December, the protests, which lasted for more than a month, became a heated topic of discussion on Pakistani social media. However, the protests attracted only modest international media attention, and were officially called off on December 16. While it is too early to determine the full impact of the protests, Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan and the Chief Minister of Balochistan province have formed a committee to address protesters’ concerns.
Topic:: Infrastructure, Economy, and Investment
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

59. China-Lithuania Tensions Boil Over Taiwan

Author:: William Yuen Yee
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: After Lithuania decided to open a Taiwanese Representative Office in July 2021, China responded with an all-out diplomatic and economic pressure campaign against the Baltic nation of 2.8 million people. The Chinese government expelled the Lithuanian ambassador, recalled its own ambassador from Vilnius in August, and downgraded Lithuania’s overall diplomatic status in China (Xinhua, August 10, 2021). In response, Lithuania announced a diplomatic boycott of the upcoming Beijing Winter Olympics in protest of China’s human rights abuses, even before the United States, Australia, Canada, and Britain announced their own Olympic boycotts (LRT, December 2, 2021). “Anyone who would choose Lithuania as an enemy has also made an enemy of the United States of America,” former U.S. President George W. Bush told a crowd of thousands gathered in the capital city of Vilnius in 2002 (Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, November 25, 2002). Back then, Bush lauded Lithuania’s entry into NATO and pledged that its people would no longer stand alone against external aggression. Two decades later, rapidly intensifying tensions between Lithuania and China are putting Bush’s famous words to the test. As Lithuania looks to its democratic partners in the EU and U.S. for support amid a firestorm of Chinese sanctions, the response has been mixed and somewhat uncertain.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Eastern Europe, Taiwan, Asia, and Lithuania

60. The U.S.-China Perception Gap: A Recipe for Disaster?

Author:: Harry He
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In December, a war of words raged across the Pacific over the very meaning of the word “democracy” (China Brief, December 14, 2021). The United States held its Summit for Democracy, inviting other democracies of various stripes, while China convened its own competing “Dialogue on Democracy,” calling out the U.S. for fomenting a cold war-style global geopolitical split (CGTN, December 2, 2021; U.S. Department of State). This discourse battle exemplifies a trend in Chinese views of the U.S. that has been gradually forming over the past 15 years. The 2008 global financial crisis, ill-fated American military campaigns, and mismanagement of the COVID-19 pandemic have led Chinese leaders to doubt U.S. power and capabilities. Yet, Washington has held on to the belief that it is capable of shaping China’s behaviors, either through inducement or deterrence. Even as the U.S. recognizes the limits of its influence and the recent relative decline in prestige, it still sees tremendous strengths in its military and economic prowess, alliance networks, democratic values, and soft power. The perception gap between China and the U.S. concerning American power is a potential recipe for disaster. While this does not imply that conflict is imminent or unavoidable, it does make miscalculations and miscommunications in the U.S.-China relationship both more likely and more dangerous.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Discourse, and Perception
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

61. A Bitter Winter: Omicron Tests the Limits of China’s Zero-COVID Approach

Author:: John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has sought to achieve a “zero-infection” (零感染,ling ganran) rate among its population. The Chinese government has pursued this objective through the “dynamic clearance” (动态清零, dongtai qing ling) policy, which is predicated on keeping China’s international borders largely closed, and rapidly detecting, isolating, and eliminating domestic outbreaks (People’s Daily, January 7). Dynamic clearance relies on digital monitoring, mass testing, and controlling population movement to achieve early detection and reduce of COVID-19 transmission. Responses to even single-digit case clusters include mandatory lockdowns, and centralized quarantines in government health centers for potentially infected or exposed groups (Xinhua, August 19, 2021).
Topic:: Crisis Management, COVID-19, Health Crisis, and Zero-COVID
Political Geography:: China and Asia

62. Impact of CPEC on Pakistan’s Economic Outlook

Author:: Sajid Mehmood Shahzad
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: Pakistan‟s vital geopolitical position is an advantage for this South Asian nation. It is located at the apex of the Arabian Peninsula. Thus, the People‟s Republic of China has setup the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with a futuristic strategy to gain long-term benefits. This planning is not random at all. It is a cohesive plan to revitalize the financial system of its long-standing collaborator and ally through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which is currently the talk of the town. The present study analyzes how Pakistan‟s conventional economic outlook can be transformed through the CPEC. While harnessing the power of Pakistan as a „trade route‟, the CPEC has the potential to reshape transport & security options, increase the cost-effectiveness of goods, and widen the scope for new and existing businesses. it will develop a networking coherence among agricultural & industrial hubs and connect special economic zones (SEZs) with the rest of the country and beyond. This paper evaluates the CPEC‟s fiscal footprint on Pakistan‟s economy and examines the correlation between overcoming economic shortcomings and increasing future gains through a cause-and-effect relationship.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

63. Pak-China Geostrategic Interdependence: Impact on Rising Economies of Asia

Author:: Ameena Nasim
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: China and Pakistan have enjoyed a close and mutually beneficial relationship during the last seven decades. Both the nations‘ leadership pronounced the bilateral relationship between China and Pakistan as the ―All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partnership‖ and ―Iron Brother.‖ The strategic partnership between China and Pakistan has a significant impact on the Asian strategic environment in particular and global politics. The Indian strategic enclave regards China-Pakistan‘s multifaceted relationship as a substantial obstacle for India‘s rise as a Great Power within the regional context. The study‘s primary objective is to critically examine impact on Asia‘s main actors such as India and Russia. So that one can profess about the dynamics of this relationship and implications of China and Pakistan‘s geo-strategic relations on the rising economies. A qualitative study with qualitative interviews and thematic analysis was applied to conduct this study. The analysis reveals that South Asian RSC has no change in the patterns of amity and enmity. The region continues to be conflictive, where their enduring rivalry and continued distrust shape enmity patterns between Pakistan and India. On the contrary, Pakistan and China‘s amity patterns can be seen growing in the longstanding strategic relationship and deep-rooted cooperation. The investigation discovers that on a bilateral level, several new factors in the post-9/11 era have molded Pakistan-China Strategic relations, which have intricate linkages with the regional and global security complexion.
Topic:: Economics, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Interests, Interdependence, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Russia, China, South Asia, and Asia

64. Japanese Non-State Actors’ Under-Recognised Contributions to the International Anti-Nuclear Weapons Movement

Author:: Lili Chin, Geetha Govindasamy, and Md Nasrudin Md Akhir
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:: Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:: Since the 1950s, Japanese non-state actors in the international anti-nuclear weapons movement have disseminated the dangers of nuclear weapons, tied to Japanese experiences of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Coming from the only country that has experienced nuclear attacks, they provide much needed evidence of the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons. These actors include survivors of the atomic bombings, commonly known as hibakusha, who have initiated and persistently maintained the humanitarian focus on nuclear discourse for decades. This paper examines their contributions to eyewitness testimonies on the impacts of nuclear weapons and their efforts leading to major milestones in international efforts for nuclear abolition. It also focuses on the roles played by the Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organization (Nihon Hidankyo) and the Japan Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (JALANA), which made tremendous contributions facilitating the success of the World Court Project in the 1990s and the Humanitarian Initiative in the 2010s that led to the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Non-state Japanese contributions were, unfortunately, under-recognised, and the successes of international nuclear abolition were often attributed to other international actors. Hence, this paper recognises the contributions of non-state Japanese actors in sustaining the international anti-nuclear weapons movement and achieving the nuclear ban treaty.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Non State Actors, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

65. Through the Lenses of Morality and Responsibility: BRICS, Climate Change and Sustainable Development

Author:: Goktug Kiprizli
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: The aim of this article is to shed a broader light on the social identity of the BRICS group of countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) whose growing economic power is the defining motive of their social construct in international relations. In line with this purpose, the article examines the BRICS nations’ positions concerning the moral aspect and the notion of responsibility for the nexus between climate change and sustainable development. This article argues that their statements and discourse on climate change and sustainable development forge the process of constructing a separate group identity for the BRICS partners. The articulation of moral appraisals and the notion of responsibility in the areas of climate change and sustainable development help the BRICS countries build their self-conception and self-categorization corresponding to their identity as emerging powers, so their actions are accomplished accordingly.
Topic:: Development, Sustainability, BRICS, Morality, Identity, and Emerging Powers
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, China, Europe, India, Asia, South Africa, Brazil, and South America

66. COVID-19 Implications for China's National Security

Author:: Marta Gębska
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:: War Studies University
Abstract:: The COVID-19 pandemic began in March 2020 and China has since been under public scrutiny for neglecting the first signs of this global health challenge and for its lockdown strategy. Although lockdowns have not lasted for long, China needs to confront the political, social, and economic implications for its national security. The paper aims to fill a gap in the knowledge and investigate aspects of China’s national security in light of the pandemic. The study is based on desk research using secondary data and statistical and comparative analysis. It also employs an inductive method to build general theorems. The Chinese government can be seen as successful in dealing with the pandemic because of a low death toll and minimal economic losses. By early February 2022, only 106,863 Chinese had been diagnosed, and 4,636 had died from the virus. China also achieved enviable economic success and, its output grew by 18.3% year on year in the first quarter of 2021, the fastest rate since the 1990s, and it was the first major economy to withdraw its pandemic stimulus. China consolidated its position in low-income countries and improved its image as a global leader in trade by supplying vaccines, masks and ventilators, and strengthened its geopolitical standing. It will face threats from other countries working on a joint approach to the challenges posed by Beijing and while the aftereffects of the crisis can be seen, it also fears that they might further affect China's national security.
Topic:: National Security, International Security, Economy, COVID-19, and Economic Security
Political Geography:: China and Asia

67. Bringing Russia Back in From the Cold

Author:: Nikolas Gvosdev and Damjan. Krnjevic Miskovic
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: Our reasoning is straightforward: for better or worse, Ukraine will never be as important to the West as it is to Russia—and this would be true even if Ukraine was the only item on their respective stra- tegic agendas. But this last is very far from being the case today—cer- tainly for the United States, whose leadership of the West has again been reaffirmed thanks to the conflict over Ukraine. To main- tain and perhaps even strengthen that leadership against China—a country that Biden defines as being in “competition [with the United States] to win the twenty-first cen- tury”—America stands to benefit greatly from bringing Russia back in from the cold.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Leadership, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, North America, and United States of America

68. The CSTO Intervention in Kazakhstan Implication for Regional and World Order

Author:: Filppo Costa Buranelli
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: In the first two weeks of 2022, Kazakhstan was ravaged by an unprecedented scale of protests, violence, and repression. While it is still very much difficult to know what exactly caused the clashes, what seems to be the case is that it involved the meeting of two different and separated dynamics. The first was peaceful protest, which originated in the west of the country because of the doubling of LPG prices alongside the solidarity expressed with the protesters in other parts of the country, i.e., in the north as well as in the east and the south. The second was the presence of violent bandits, criminals, and hooligans that in less than perfect coordination set ablaze Almaty, Taraz, Shymkent, and other centers in the south, which led to the bloodiest clashes in the history of independent Kazakhstan. In a series of rapid escalations, which even those inside the Central Asian nation are still struggling to understand, the initially peaceful marches descended into violence. On 5 January 2022, the Kazakhstani authorities, fearing for the collapse of the constitutional order and for the state to spiral into country‑wide bloodshed, decided to request the intervention of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to protect sensitive and strategic infrastructural objectives such as power grids and airports so to allow to the internal security forces to repress and quell the violence. On 6 January 2022, the CSTO Collective Security Council issued a statement indicating its decision to “send the CSTO Collective Peacekeeping Forces to the Republic of Kazakhstan for a limited period of time to stabilize and normalize the situation in that country.” The same day, these forces began to arrive in Kazakhstan. On 19 January 2022, the CSTO Secretary General informed the CSTO Collective Security Council that all contingents of its Collective Peacekeeping Forces have been withdrawn from the territory of Kazakhstan. Much ink has been spilled in writing about why these events took place, what caused them, who was behind them, and who or what favored them. Most of what has appeared in print has not been particularly coherent or accurate. The truth is that too little is known at the moment: much time will need to pass for scholars to gain a clear understanding of what exactly happened within the Kazakhstani security and elite apparatus so that these violent dynamics could be unleashed.
Topic:: Conflict, Protests, Violence, and Intervention
Political Geography:: Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and Asia

69. Sino-Iranian Relations and Their Impact on South and Central Asia

Author:: Stephen J. Blank
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: In July 2020, a draft text of a series of Sino‑Iranian agreements outlining a comprehensive 25‑year strategic partnership between Iran and China was leaked. The leaked text accords presaged the formal accords signed in 2021 whose text has not been released. These agreements fundamentally transformed Sino‑Iranian relations and also converted the Middle East into another theater of the global Sino‑American confrontation. That latter consideration shows that the significance of these accords transcends the Middle East. Although most Western commentary naturally emphasize the Sino‑American and Middle Eastern repercussions of these accords, we cannot neglect their no less enormous impact on Central and South Asia and focus on those unduly neglected issues. China’s agreement to the terms, as leaked—$400 billion in investments in Iran over 25 years, particularly in large scale transportation energy, infrastructure, telecommunications, projects, and access to Iranian ports—signified a vast expansion of China’s policy of forming a global network of partnerships with countries wary of American dominance. Even if this is more a declaration of intent than what will actually happen, the parties’ intentions are clearly serious. The agreements also stipulated that these programs would come under the administrative rubric of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s signature policy, and very much a Chinese‑directed series of projects. Commitments on this scale also clearly denote a major new strategic orientation by China and Iran. Even observers who underplay these revelations like Jonathan Fulton, a Non‑Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, concede their dramatic impact on Sino‑Iranian relations and world politics more generally. This is particularly significant as China does not cavalierly establish comprehensive strategic partnerships (CSP) with other states. For example, China has signed such agreements with other Gulf states like Saudi Arabia—so signing one with Riyadh’s main Middle Eastern revival cannot have been a routine or impulsive decision. Neither will its impact be restricted to the Gulf and Middle East. A CSP is (or was, before the February 2022 agreement with Russia) the highest level in China’s hierarchy of diplomatic relations. In a CSP, the partner states commit to the “full pursuit of cooperation and development on regional and international affairs.” Since Beijing does not offer this level of partnership easily, as Fulton has also observed, a state receiving that status must be perceived by China as playing an important political and economic role internationally, and the bilateral relationship must already feature a high level of political trust, dense economic relations, and a strong, well‑established relationship in other areas.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

70. Repatriating Azerbaijani IDPs Policy Priorities and Recommendations

Author:: Fariz Ismailzade
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: The conflict over Karabakh between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which started in 1988 and resulted in the occupation of some 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized territories, produced a massive humanitarian catastrophe in the region. Around 350,000 ethnicAzerbaijanis were driven from their homes in the Republic of Armenia in 1988‑1989, becoming refugees in the Republic of Azerbaijan. At the same time, the armed conflict in and around the former Nagorno‑Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) resulted in the ethnic cleansing of an additional 650,000 ethnicAzerbaijanis from their homes in 1992‑1993. By some estimates, back in 1993 Azerbaijan was one of the largest refugee‑ and IDPhosting countries in the world, given that 1 out of every 7 of the country’s Azerbaijani population fell into one of those two categories. In addition to that, Azerbaijan also hosted large numbers of Chechen, Afghan, and Meskheti Turks. Azerbaijani refugees and IDPs mostly came from towns and villages outside the former NKAO part of the Karabakh region. Forcibly driven from their homes, they first settled in temporary tent camps, railway wagons, university dormitories, public buildings, and old sanatoriums. After being ethnically cleansed, their houses in Karabakh were looted and destroyed by Armenian occupational forces. Towns like Fuzuli, Jabrayil, Agdam, Gubadly, and Zangelan were entirely raised to the ground. During the last 30 years, refugees and IDPs received significant humanitarian assistance from various foreign donors, a plethora of national charity organizations, and, of course, the Azerbaijani government. The latter had even launched a housing program for them with the funds accrued by the State Oil Fund, the country’s sovereign wealth fund, which enabled many families to move from tent camps into purpose‑built single‑family home developments that oftentimes included land plots for agricultural activities. When Ilham Aliyev first ran for president in 2003, he had promised to eliminate the need for all tent camps in the country—a promise that he fulfilled in 2007 thanks to the priority allocation of resources from increasing oil revenues. Nevertheless, large number of refugees and IDPs continued to live in temporary housing in Baku and other urban centers that sometimes had significant safety issues and subpar sanitation facilities. Despite the fact that refugees and IDPs receive many welfare benefits from the government of Azerbaijan (e.g., free education, free utilities, monthly remuneration for food and other social payments), their living standards remain suboptimal, and the rate of poverty, health risks, and other social problems among the refugee and IDP community remains higher than the country’s average. At the same time, serious concerns remain regarding the employability and religious education of young people belonging to refugee and IDP communities, with many analysts fearing that this part of the population can be more susceptible to recruitment by foreign radical sects and similar such groups.
Topic:: Ethnic Cleansing, Conflict, Humanitarian Crisis, and Repatriation
Political Geography:: Central Asia, Asia, and Azerbaijan

71. Mine Action and the Environment in Karabakh

Author:: Emil Hasanov
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: The now‑liberated areas of Azerbaijan are contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), the clearance thereof being one of Baku’s highest post‑conflict priorities. Before proceeding any further, we must provide proper definitions of these terms, since they are technical in nature and thus may not be familiar to the general reader. According to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti‑Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction that was adopted in Oslo in 1997 and entered into force in 1999 (it is colloquially called the AntiPersonnel Mine Ban Convention, or APMBC), an anti‑personnel mine “means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.” An antivehicle or antitank mine is effectually the same thing, except that it is designed to explode when triggered by a vehicle. Together, they fall under the catchall term mine, which the same document defines as a “munition designed to be placed under, on, or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or a vehicle.” Furthermore, explosive remnants of war (ERW) are defined as explosive munitions left behind after a conflict has ended. They include unexploded artillery shells, grenades, mortars, rockets, air‑dropped bombs, and cluster munitions. If such weapons fail to detonate as intended for whatever reason, they are called unexploded ordnance (UXO); if, on the other hand, they have not been used during an armed conflict and have been left behind by the party that brought them to the battlefield, they are called abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO). Lastly, cluster bombs or cluster munitions, which are defined as weapons containing from several to hundreds of explosive submunitions. They are dropped either from the air or fired from the ground and are designed to break open in mid‑air, releasing submunitions and saturating an area that can be as wide as several football pitches. Based on past practice, the failure rate of cluster munitions to explode as intended stands at between 10 and 30 percent.
Topic:: Climate Change, Economics, Environment, Mining, and Recovery
Political Geography:: Central Asia, Asia, and Azerbaijan

72. Time to Get U.S.-Azerbaijani Relations on Track Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Karabakh War has created a new geopolitical reality in the South Caucasus and the Caspian region.

Author:: Luke Coffey
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Karabakh War has created a new geopolitical reality in the South Caucasus and the Caspian region. This new geopolitical reality creates challenges and opportunities for the United States. Azerbaijan’s victory in the war means that NATO member Turkey’s influence in the South Caucasus, and by extension Central Asia, is on the rise. If Washington and Ankara can get their bilateral relationship back on track, Turkey’s ascendancy in the region can benefit broader U.S. strategic interests. In the aftermath of the conflict there is also an opportunity for America to increase and deepen regional economic and energy cooperation. However, Moscow now has troops—either by invitation or by occupation—in all three countries of the South Caucasus and in Kazakhstan on the other side of the Caspian. From the American point of view, this does not help bring stability or security to the region. Azerbaijan is in a strategic region where many U.S. geopolitical interests converge. Since 2001, Azerbaijan has proven to be a reliable partner for America against terrorism as well as in the war in Afghanistan. With the new geopolitical reality in the region, U.S. policymakers would be remiss to ignore this limited window of opportunity for improving Washington’s relationship with Baku.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Asia, Azerbaijan, North America, and United States of America

73. Azerbaijan in the Struggle for Eurasia Restoring America’s Geostrategic Approach

Author:: Michael Doran
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: Azerbaijan is “geopolitically critical” to the United States, argues the 1997 book, The Grand Chessboard, by Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security advisor to former President Jimmy Carter. Counterbalancing Russia is a primary duty of the United States, and the mere placement of Azerbaijan on the map makes it a crucial partner in that effort. The benefits of partnership extend well beyond Azerbaijan’s immediate neighborhood, the South Caucasus. The country is the sole gateway to the West of the former Soviet states of Central Asia. The independence of those states, Brzezinski explains, “can be rendered nearly meaningless if Azerbaijan becomes fully subordinated to Moscow’s control.” Brzezinski was not alone in championing this view. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, American foreign policy professionals on both sides of the political aisle espoused the same perspective, which we shall dub the “the geostrategic approach.” Its influence generated significant American support for the creation of an East‑West land bridge, across which rail tracks and energy pipelines now stretch—the Silk Road region’s only terrestrial supply lines from Asia to Europe that Russia cannot control. This land bridge opened the way for an air corridor which, during the war in Afghanistan, allowed planes from America’s military bases in the Middle East to reach the battlefield by a route much shorter than any alternative, and one that required no haggling with difficult partners, such as Russia. As it emerged defeated three decades ago from the First Karabakh War (1988‑1994), Azerbaijan was virtually a failed state, inundated with hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons. Today it is the wealthiest, most prosperous, and most influential country in its neighborhood. Its victory in the 2020 Second Karabakh War also revealed the startling power of its military. The rise of Azerbaijan has vindicated Brzezinski and his cohort, but even as the country grows stronger and fulfills the role envisioned for it, the geostrategic approach grows weaker. Supporters of this perspective in Washington today are few and far between. Are we witnessing the temporary eclipse of an influential foreign policy doctrine, or its total demise?
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Hegemony, Geopolitics, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Asia, Azerbaijan, North America, and United States of America

74. Armenian-Azerbaijani Relations in the Wake of the Second Karabakh War

Author:: Agil Rustamzade and Anar Valiyev
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: The Second Karabakh War was more than a war between two belligerents; essentially, it represented a war between two strategic paradigms: one belonging to the twenty‑first century and the other a relic of twentieth‑century military thinking. Azerbaijan’s achievement of air supremacy with the help of drones was not only one of the crucial factors that decided the outcome of that particular war; it will almost certainly contribute to the further development of the military art in armed conflicts of various scopes across various theaters in the time ahead. At the same time, referring to this war as a “drone war” does not reflect reality. In this, as in much else, impressionable journalists got it wrong: this could be a proper designation only if the drones had fought also on the ground instead of soldiers. Certainly, the use of drones was decisive; but the laurels of victory in this war do not belong solely to this contingent of the Azerbaijani military: the mobile groups of special forces were also decisive. Each played a critical part in the country’s military achievement. We begin with an examination of the area of hostilities and the respective dispositions of the parties to the conflict before getting into a discussion about some relevant aspects of Operation Iron Fist—the official designation used by Azerbaijan for the Second Karabakh War. We conclude with remarks of a more geopolitical nature.
Topic:: War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:: Asia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

75. Towards Guanxi? Reconciling the “Relational Turn” in Western and Chinese International Relations Scholarship

Author:: Siyang Liu, Jeremy Garlick, and Fangxing Qin
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:: Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:: In recent years, the “relational turn” in International Relations (IR) theory has attracted extensive attention. However, the limitations of the substantialist ontology of mainstream (Western) IR theory means that it encounters difficulties and dilemmas in interpreting the evolving international system. Against the background of the rapid development of globalization and regional integration, the reality of world politics is constantly changing, and increasingly shows obvious characteristics of interconnection and high interdependence. In this context, there is insufficient research comparing the Western and non-Western versions of the “relational turn”. Relational ontology may be able to provide a bridge between Chinese Confucian philosophy, Western philosophy, Western sociology, and mainstream western IR theories capable of generating productive synergies. However, there are major theoretical and cultural obstacles to be overcome if a reconciliation of the Western and Chinese versions of relationalism is to be achieved.
Topic:: International Relations, International Relations Theory, Academia, Confucianism, Relationality, and Relational Ontology
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Guangxi

76. The Geopolitical Consequences of COVID-19: Assessing Hawkish Mass Opinion in China

Author:: Joshua Byun, D. G. Kim, and Sichen Li
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Political Science Quarterly
Institution:: Academy of Political Science
Abstract:: JOSHUA BYUN, D.G. KIM, and SICHEN LI examine the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the Chinese public’s foreign policy attitudes. Drawing on original surveys fielded in China during the first six months of the global pandemic, they find that ordinary Chinese citizens are optimistic about China’s future global position, and that this optimism corresponds with the widespread perception that the COVID-19 pandemic is accelerating China’s rise relative to the United States.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Geopolitics, Survey, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

77. Korean Newspapers, Korean Sovereignty over Dokdo and Ulleungdo, and Early Japanese Intrusions

Author:: Kyu-hyun Jo
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: Contrary to the Japanese Foreign Ministry's claim that Koreans never demonstrated any clear basis for its claims that it had taken effective control over Dokdo (Takeshima) before 1905, the Ministry ignores the critical role of the Korean media, especially major Korean newspapers such as the Hwangsŏng Newspaper and Dongnip Sinmun (Independent), in publicizing and mobilizing Korean nationalism through a sustained assertion of Korean sovereignty over Dokdo. By publishing articles which officially denounced Japanese intrusion into Dokdo or the Japanese government's feigned ignorance and disregard for such an act, or articles which explicitly discussed the long history of Korea's recognition of Dokdo and Ulleungdo as her nascent territories, Korean newspapers not only expressed Korean nationalism by incorporating anti-Japanese sentiment. They also emphasized Korea's ancient consciousness of national unity by clearly declaring that at the heart of such nationalism and rhetoric was a strong identification of Dokdo and Ulleungdo as Korea's historic territories. Korean newspapers were instrumental in publicizing Korean consciousness about Dokdo and Ulleungdo by not only reporting on Japanese intrusions into Dokdo, educating the Korean public on the ancient history of Dokdo and Ulleungdo, but also serve as crucial evidence proving that Japan willfully ignored Korea's national sovereignty and judicial authority to wrest away Korean sovereignty over Dokdo and Ulleungdo.
Topic:: Sovereignty, History, Newspapers, and Intrusion
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and Korea

78. Tying Human Rights to U.S.-DPRK-ROK Negotiations

Author:: Greg Scarlatoiu
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: For over three decades, the United States and the international community has been attempting to engage North Korea diplomatically, aiming for the complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization of North Korea. The Kim family regime has been committing crimes against humanity, but human rights concerns have been discounted by U.S. and other negotiators, fearing they would be an obstacle to a negotiated solution to the grave military and security challenges Pyongyang poses. North Korea has breached each and every one of the international obligations it has assumed, from imembership in the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework to the Six Party Talks to the 2012 Leap Day Agreement. While its negotiating counterparts have neglected human rights concerns in multilateral and bilateral talks, North Korea has continued to develop and test its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. It is time for a new paradigm, that brings human rights into the conversation, in a bilateral or multilateral setting.
Topic:: Security, Human Rights, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, United Nations, and Appeasement
Political Geography:: Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

79. Getting North Korean Human Rights Right, Now and for the Future

Author:: George Hutchinson
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes the agency, dignity and rights of the individual, North Korea’s collectivist notion of freedoms are conditioned to preserve and perpetuate the Kim regime, resulting in the denial of human rights for North Koreans. Pyongyang’s defensive outbursts and angry rhetoric in defense of its distorted definition of sovereignty has deeply affected South Korea’s policy approach over the issue of North Korean human rights. Sensitive to Pyongyang’s feelings, South Korea’s progressive camp prefers to engage with North Korea in the wishful hopes that relations will gradually improve. The conservative camp at times uses the Kim regime’s sensitivity to dial up pressure on issues such as denuclearization. Progressives are willing to concede aid and benefits up front to get to inter-Korean engagement while conservatives make these concessions conditional. Neither approach has alleviated the brutal denial of human rights in North Korea. This paper explores South Korea’s “wicked problem” of partisan treatment of North Korean human rights through careful examination of present and past administrations and concludes with recommendations for a middle ground safe enough so that neither progressives nor conservatives feel they have strayed too far outside of the partisan boundaries of their respective camps
Topic:: Human Rights, Authoritarianism, and Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Political Geography:: Asia and North Korea

80. North Korea’s Plan for Unification by Federation: What It Really Means

Author:: Tara O
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: North Korea has long pursued “unification by federation.” This has been a non-kinetic option of dominating the entire Korean Peninsula under North Korea’s Kim Family Regime’s totalitarian rule and creating a socialist society. Kim Jong-un even described this as the “One state, Two Systems” formula that China uses for Hong Kong. In Kim Il-sung’s Three Great Charters for Motherland Unification, the Koryo Federation Unification Scheme is one of the charters. The prerequisites to “unification by federation” include abolishing the National Security Act, dismantling the National Intelligence Service, legalizing pro-North Korea groups, and withdrawing U.S. Forces Korea--all to occur in South Korea. Kim Ilsung’s other two charters have a similar theme of expelling the U.S. military from South Korea. Over the years, North Korea has used different terms, such as Koryo Federation and Low-Level Federation. Surprisingly, South Korean Presidents Moon Jae-in, Rho Moo-hyun, and Kim Dae-jung have supported “Low-Level Federation.” This paper explains in detail what unification by federation entails, its history, and its ramifications. Unification through federation is dangerous, because it is about a unified Korea that is not free.
Topic:: Authoritarianism, Socialism, Unification, and Federation
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

81. China’s Role in Korean Security Issues

Author:: Gordon G. Chang
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: China’s great power over North Korea eroded when COVID-19 control measures ended most trade with the Kim regime. Moreover, China’s conflicts with various countries mean Beijing cannot afford to alienate any friend, and Kim Jong Un knows that. Beijing is still influential in Seoul, but it lost much of its clout when the conservative-leaning candidate prevailed in the March 2022 presidential election. China will also suffer a loss in standing because it is paying less attention to Korean affairs and is closing itself off to the world.
Topic:: Security, Politics, Elections, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

82. “Strong, but Anxious State”: The Fantasmatic Narratives on Ontological Insecurity and Anxiety in Turkey

Author:: Umut Can Adisonmez and Recep Onursal
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: The political discourse on the problem of state survival in Turkey is hegemonic. What is central to this discourse is Sévresphobia: the idea that Turkey is surrounded by internal and external enemies who are ready to destroy it. This article aims to explain why the political discourse on the problem of state survival in Turkey sustains itself over time and how it captures the collective mode of being. The article argues that fantasmatic narratives play an important role in maintaining the hegemonic discourse and governing collective anxiety. First, fantasmatic narratives simplify the socio-political space by offering a comforting explanation for the ongoing insecurities and making anxiety tolerable. Second, they act as an ideological force by keeping the political dimension of the discourse on ontological security at bay. Drawing on the Post-foundational Theory of Discourse (PTD) and Ontological Security Theory (OST), the article problematizes and analyzes the political discourse on the problem of state survival in Turkey.
Topic:: Security, Governance, Hegemony, and Fear
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, and Asia

83. Identity change, anxiety and creativity: How 19th century Japan sought to leave Asia and become part of the West

Author:: Karl Gustafsson
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: Identity change is an important phenomenon in international politics. It can radically alter how states orient themself and act internationally. But how does identity change occur? For some, it is merely an epiphenomenal result of changes in the international distribution of power. Others highlight domestic factors, while still others see it as occurring through a social process of interaction with other states. There are also explanations that combine these and other factors. While existing accounts have pushed the debate on identity change forward, this article suggests that incorporating anxiety into our understanding of identity change would help us better understand two important aspects of it: how an existing identity comes to be doubted and how a new one becomes thinkable and eventually accepted. Drawing on the work of psychologist Rollo May, this article explores the link between identity change, anxiety and creativity. The argument is illustrated through reference to 19th century Japan. For much of its history, Japan was part of the Sino-centric order and looked up to China as a “teacher in the ways of civilization”. However, in the 19th century, Japan radically redefined its identity in relation to China, and Asia more broadly, and rejected the Sino-centric world view as it sought to become a “civilized” state similar to the Western countries.
Topic:: Security, Diversification, Identity, and Fear
Political Geography:: Asia

84. Ontological Insecurity, Anxiety, and Hubris: An Affective Account of Turkey-KRG Relations

Author:: Özlem Kayhan Pusane and Asli Ilgit
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: Given Iraqi Kurds’ special place in Turkey’s ‘biographical narrative’, Turkey-Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) relations are not simply strategic or economic but also highly affectively charged. These relations involve emotional encounters filled with anxiety, pride, anger, and disappointment that generate concerns for not only Turkey’s physical security but also its ontological security. This paper traces the emotional context of Turkey- KRG relationship. It suggests that a combination of Turkey’s deep-rooted ‘anxiety’ and ‘hubris’ toward the Iraqi Kurds prevented the emergence of a close partnership between these two actors and fostered merely a ‘fragile rapprochement’ since 2008.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, and Identity
Political Geography:: Iraq, Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, and Kurdistan

85. Beyond Geopolitics: A Geoeconomic Perspective of China-Iran Belt and Road Initiative Relations

Author:: Seyedashkan Madani
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the largest regional development project in the history of global development. It is estimated that Chinese companies will invest up to $1.2 trillion in infrastructure development in Asia and elsewhere in the coming years. However, there are many obstacles to the successful implementation of this initiative in the host countries, including geographical factors, local culture, geopolitical contestation, public attitudes, institutional capacity, and governance quality. These challenges can substantially diminish the coherence of the BRI and prevent its effective implementation. This study aims to develop an analytical framework for exploring the risks associated with and challenges of executing BRI projects in Iran. To this end, all risks are categorized into three broad groups: operational, financial, and geopolitical. The results show that Iran generally faces many internal and external challenges in attracting foreign investment. The critical question is: Why is Iran receiving substantial investment from Chinese companies despite its unfavorable business environment? A geoeconomic approach is used to develop a theoretical framework to explain Iran-China BRI relations. In this context, Iran’s geoeconomic significance is the main factor encouraging the flow of Chinese investment into the country. The BRI comprises mostly functional cooperation between China and countries along the Silk Road based on a specific geospatial environment. Iran’s geospatial environment encourages Chinese investments in infrastructure, which is the main content of functional cooperation.
Topic:: Development, International Trade and Finance, Infrastructure, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

86. The Complexity Effect in U.S.-Turkey Relations: The Restructuring of the Middle East Regional Security

Author:: Devrim Sahin and Ahmet Sözen
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: This paper proposes a discussion of its core theoretical argument that the international order is more complex than the theories generated by traditionalist state-centric approaches and critical approaches, including the regional security complex approach. The complexity approach highlights the sensitive dependency of complex systems on the nonlinear feedback loops and dynamic interactions by which the longer term reactions to the behavior of actors could set off actions-reaction spirals. This path dependency is evident in the erosion of U.S.-Turkey relations which is a cause and a consequence of the realignment in the international system and the Middle East regional system.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, Asia, North America, and United States of America

87. The Geopolitical Dimensions of Chinese Infrastructure

Author:: David M. Lampton
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:: Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:: David M. Lampton is Senior Fellow at the SAIS Foreign Policy Institute and Professor Emeritus at Johns Hopkins--SAIS. Immediately prior to his current post he was Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at Stanford University’s Asia-Pacific Research Center from 2019-2020. For more than two de- cades prior to that he was Hyman Professor and Director of China Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Lampton is former Chairman of The Asia Foundation, former President of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, and for- mer Dean of Faculty at SAIS. Among many written works, academic and popular is his most recent book (with Selina Ho and Cheng-Chwee Kuik), Rivers of Iron: Railroads and Chinese Power in Southeast Asia (University of California Press, 2020). He received his B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees from Stanford University in political science where, as an undergraduate student, he was a firefighter. Lampton has an honorary doctorate from the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Far Eastern Studies. He is a Life Trustee on the Board of Trustees of Colorado College and was in the US Army Reserve in the enlisted and commissioned ranks.
Topic:: Infrastructure, Geopolitics, Interview, and Railways
Political Geography:: China and Asia

88. Small State Dilemma: Cambodia Between The Asean And China In The Indo-Pacific Context

Author:: Khath Bunthorn
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: As a small state, Cambodia viewed the ASEAN and China as almost equally important pillars of its foreign policy. Amid the intense strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific, Cambodia faced the dilemma of how to maintain the ASEAN centrality without diplomatic cost to its key ally China, and how to balance its national interest with regional interest. In this context, the article aimed to explain the importance of the ASEAN as a cornerstone of Cambodia’s foreign policy, examine the motivations of Cambodia’s deep political embrace of the Asian giant, and underline its implications for the Indo-Pacific from the lens of small state foreign policy. The article was based on qualitative, empirical analysis that comprises primary and secondary data pertinent to the current topic. The article concluded that Cambodia leaned more towards China than it did towards the ASEAN, thus weakening its centrality in driving the broader regional architecture and that domestic politics was the primary driving force of Cambodia’s foreign policy towards that direction. At this juncture, Cambodia should step back from the present degree of its strategic engagement with China and look for ways to diversify its relations with other major powers while getting back on the democratic path and upholding human rights.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Hegemony
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Cambodia, Indo-Pacific, and ASEAN

89. Post-Pulwama Indo-Pak COnflict: Reconnoitering The Role of Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Author:: Bawa Singh, Aslam Khan, Jagmeet Bawa, and Balinder Singh
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: Terrorism has emerged as one of the major challenges for the Eurasian regional peace, security, and cooperation. Keeping these challenges in perspective, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was established to eliminate the menace of terrorism, fundamentalism, and secessionism. Against this background, the main objectives of this paper are to examine how terrorism emerged as a major determining factor in the Indo-Pak relations and how the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), was failed to play its effective role in the Indo-Pak conflict given the Pulwama terror attack. For this research, descriptive and analytical methods were used and the data was collected from secondary sources. The major findings of this article are that terrorism has emerged as one of the major determinants of Indo-Pak relations and the same has become a major challenge for the SCO to resolve the issue. Against the background of terror attacks, it was anticipated that the SCO would play a crucial role to pacify the situation. However, the role played by the SCO in this situation proved marked as a Whack-a-Mole.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Terrorism, Hegemony, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, India, and Asia

90. China's Development Assistance to the Western Balkans and Its Impact on Democratic Governance and Decision-Making

Author:: Ana Krstinovska
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: China’s development assistance to the Western Balkans has been little researched and aid-funded projects are often mistermed as Chinese investments. This article aimed to shed light on specific ‘China Aid’ disbursement and management procedures by examining the signed agreements and contracted projects in five countries - Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, N. Macedonia, and Serbia during the period 2000-2020. The objective was to determine the impact of China’s development assistance on democratic governance and decision-making. Attride-Stirling’s thematic networks tool was used to analyze the procedures in each project cycle phase and their compliance with the principles of good governance and aid effectiveness. The findings suggest that the assistance, shaped by Chinese rules in combination with Western Balkans domestic agency, is marked by the opacity of the procedures, lack of accountability, disregard for rules in public finance management, and public procurement. Moreover, China could use its grant and loan agreements to influence sovereign decision-making on issues that affect China’s interests. To conclude, although China’s development assistance to the Western Balkans could benefit the recipients’ economic development, it also constrains their democratic governance and decision-making and serves China’s foreign policy interests.
Topic:: Development, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Hegemony
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Balkans

91. Assessing the Effects of Trade Liberalization With Third Countries: The Case of the Eurasian Economic Union

Author:: Simon Sngryan
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: The processes of objectively conditioned integration in the economic, political, legal, and institutional spheres of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) Member States took place step by step, starting from preferential trade agreements, passing to the customs union, the common market and other stages of integration. This process is accompanied by the gradual deepening of trade liberalization with potential partners. The selection of potential partners should be carried out through a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the structure and volumes of foreign trade of the EEU Member States (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia) with third parties, their markets structure, existing customs regulation, trade barriers, and possible export potential. The research evaluated the EEU's possible enlargement effects on the Member States' economic indicators. The research aimed to assess the possible consequences of EEU expansion and signing free trade agreements, considering Pakistan, Korea, and Malaysia as potential trade partners. Modeling the effect of an FTA assumes horizontal zeroing of tariffs between partners. Then, using the GTAP model, a new state of general equilibrium was calculated corresponding to the changed parameters of customs and tariff regulation. In this case, most variables, such as change in GDP, production output, and export-import volumes, were estimated, manifesting the economic effect of trade liberalization.
Topic:: Economics, International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, and Trade Liberalization
Political Geography:: Europe, Eurasia, and Asia

92. The Relationship Between Public Service Motivation, Work Enjoyment, and Task Performance: A Preliminary Study of Healthcare Workers in Vietnam

Author:: Thanh Nguyen Nghi, Hang Tran Thu, and Thao Tran Dinh
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: This study aimed to examine the impact of health workers' public service motivation during their participation in response to the Covid-19 pandemic at a time of the highest number of infections and deaths in Vietnam. This study was conducted through a cross-sectional survey using an intentional sampling technique (n=200). In addition, Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) was applied to illustrate the proposed hypotheses. We found that compassion in the workplace, self-sacrifice, and attraction to policy-making impacted work enjoyment positively and significantly. In particular, there was a positive and significant relationship between work enjoyment and task performance but no evidence of the relationship between Commitment to the public interest and work enjoyment. This study further demonstrates the importance of public service motivation of health workers in pandemic response, as previous studies have found. This finding suggests that the government and policymakers in Vietnam should develop policies to promote health workers' public service motivation during their engagement in response to the health crisis.
Topic:: Labor Issues, Health Care Policy, Work Culture, and Public Service
Political Geography:: Asia and Vietnam

93. Scope and Limitations of Soft Power Diplomacy: A Quantitative Analysis of Afghans' Perceptions about India

Author:: Mohammad Reyaz and Sabir Ahamed
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: Before the Taliban came back to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, India and Afghanistan had cordial bilateral relations and were often described as great friends. Since 2002, India had helped build several infrastructure projects as part of its promised development assistance program of over $2 billion (later increased to $3 billion). Considering India’s investments in Afghanistan, the goodwill it enjoyed among common Afghans was understandable. However, it would be wrong to imply that these unique, multifaceted bilateral relations between the two countries were simply due to India's helping hand. This research paper is one of its kind attempt to explain the perceptions Afghans had about India based on the field survey done in Afghanistan in 2019. Using responses of over 321 Afghan participants, the paper attempts to quantitatively analyze the goodwill and positive vibes that India enticed among Afghans. However, many Afghans felt that India did not do enough during the crisis in August 2021. Based on the survey and the general perceptions of Afghans in the aftermath of the return of the Taliban, this paper argues that the soft power investments in Afghanistan helped India in its nation-branding, making it attractive and creating goodwill. However, New Delhi lacked the will to act smartly and hence did not get the desired strategic influences due to ‘soft power behavior’.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Interests, and Public Diplomacy
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Middle East, India, and Asia

94. China's Geo-Economic Interest in Africa: A Short Overview

Author:: Jajati K. Pattnaik and Chandan K. Panda
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: The article examines China’s geo-economic interest in Africa. China intends to exercise its leverage over both coastal frontiers for trade and defense and its hinterland for rich mineral, metal, and fossil deposits. Furthermore, the debt trap seems to be one of the methods through which China intended to bargain with Africa to bag as much advantage as it could gain. The question that emerges from this critical engagement with China-Africa relations is to look into how the reality of Africa’s narrative of development is projected both from outside and within and the contradiction embodied in that projection. China used the narrative of development to set its feet on African soil. This paper discusses China’s penetration into Africa by offering interest-free loans and its gradual emergence as a neocolonial power through expanding its network. The method used in the study to establish China’s monopoly and interfering streak in African affairs through BRI is the analysis of available data based on which the objectives and the conclusions are drawn.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Infrastructure, Hegemony, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China and Asia

95. Politico Legal Dynamics of Seaborne Piracy in the Pelagic Waters of South East Asia

Author:: Sreemoyee Sarkar
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: Geopolitical location places the seaborne piracy infested pelagic waters of South East Asia (SEA) astride a very different façade of international relations and maritime legal regime of the littoral states disturbing the commercial route and the energy lifelines. The littoral states of the SEA are the immediate stake holders who have a primary role to play in addressing the challenges arising out of this seaborne menace. The present study specifically includes three littoral states of the SEA as representative references, for examination against the backdrop of UNCLOS regime and they are Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand. The present work offers a comparative analysis of anti-piracy legal regime of the above selected maritime states who are also the ASEAN states. They all belong to the group of high-income and middle-income developing economies, as categorised by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank). These nation states have maritime, economic and strategic interests in the oceans and seas adjacent to them. Another striking commonality is that, most of them are poised to industrialise their economies, can be observed from the relatively high-average annual growth rate in the industrial sectors vis-a-vis the agricultural sectors of their respective economies, since the 1990s. Hitherto, the issues raised are, what are the stake holds of the concerned states? Is the prevailing legal regime adequate enough to maintain the maritime stake holds? Are the littoral states triggered to ‘use of force’ law by post-9/11 developments related? It also addresses how regional and national actors are functioning differently within the scope of a discourse of international law and agencies like UN, ASEAN, etc.
Topic:: Development, International Cooperation, Water, and Maritime
Political Geography:: Asia and South East Asia

96. Istanbul Journal of Economics: Volume 72 Issue 1

Author:: Gökhan Karabulut
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Istanbul Journal of Economics
Institution:: Istanbul University Faculty of Economics
Abstract:: Istanbul Journal of Economics-İstanbul İktisat Dergisi is an open access, peer-reviewed, scholarly journal published two times a year in June and December. It has been an official publication of Istanbul University Faculty of Economics since 1939. The manuscripts submitted for publication in the journal must be scientific and original work in Turkish or English. Being one of the earliest peer-reviewed academic journals in Turkey in the area of economics, Istanbul Journal of Economics-İstanbul İktisat Dergisi aims to provide a forum for exploring issues in basicly economics and publish both disciplinary and multidisciplinary articles. Economics is the main scope of the journal. However, multidisciplinary and comparative approaches are encouraged as well and articles from various social science areas such as sociology of economics, history, social policy, international relations, financial studies are welcomed in this regard. The target group of the journal consists of academicians, researchers, professionals, students, related professional and academic bodies and institutions.
Topic:: Debt, Development, Economics, Budget, Finance, Investment, Trade, Unemployment, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, and Asia

97. Istanbul Journal of Economics: Volume 72 Issue 2

Author:: Gökhan Karabulut
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Istanbul Journal of Economics
Institution:: Istanbul University Faculty of Economics
Abstract:: Istanbul Journal of Economics-İstanbul İktisat Dergisi is an open access, peer-reviewed, scholarly journal published two times a year in June and December. It has been an official publication of Istanbul University Faculty of Economics since 1939. The manuscripts submitted for publication in the journal must be scientific and original work in Turkish or English. Being one of the earliest peer-reviewed academic journals in Turkey in the area of economics, Istanbul Journal of Economics-İstanbul İktisat Dergisi aims to provide a forum for exploring issues in basicly economics and publish both disciplinary and multidisciplinary articles. Economics is the main scope of the journal. However, multidisciplinary and comparative approaches are encouraged as well and articles from various social science areas such as sociology of economics, history, social policy, international relations, financial studies are welcomed in this regard. The target group of the journal consists of academicians, researchers, professionals, students, related professional and academic bodies and institutions.
Topic:: Economics, Islam, Religion, Communications, Natural Resources, Finance, Internet, Economic Growth, Macroeconomics, Currency, Unemployment, Sustainability, COVID-19, BRICS, Labor Market, Economic Stability, Consumer Behavior, Rent-seeking, Energy, and Wages
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, and Asia

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS