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61. The No Limits Partnership: PRC Weapons Support for Russia

Author:
Martin Purbrick
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Amid the ongoing war in Ukraine, there is growing concern about the possible involvement of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in supplying Russia with weapons, munitions, and various other technology that could have dual-use applications. Notably, no significant provision of large-scale military hardware from the PRC to Russia is evident, as such equipment would have been easily identified on the battlefield amongst the major equipment losses suffered by Russian forces. There are, however, consistent reports substantiating the claim that Chinese companies are providing military and dual-use equipment to Russia. In the PRC’s political system, this type of transaction would be difficult to conduct without the government’s tacit approval or—at the very least—the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) authorities turning a blind eye. In February 2022, following a meeting ahead of the opening ceremony of the Beijing Winter Olympic Games, Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed the dimensions of their two countries’ strategic partnership (Global Times, February 5, 2022). Xi and Putin reiterated that “friendship between the two states has no limits, there are no ‘forbidden’ areas of cooperation, [and the] strengthening of bilateral strategic cooperation is neither aimed against third countries nor affected by the changing international environment and circumstantial changes in third countries” (The Kremlin, February 4, 2022). The closing ceremony for the Beijing Winter Olympics was held on February 20. Four days later, Russia invaded Ukraine. Since then, there has been widespread speculation that the PRC leadership knew about the Russian invasion. Additionally, there have been heightened concerns regarding the extent of Chinese support for Russia since the start of the war in Ukraine. In July, the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) reported on the “Support Provided by the People’s Republic of China to Russia”, with indications of increased Russian reliance on the PRC (ODNI, July 2023). In 2022 total Russian imports from the PRC increased by 13 percent to $76 billion. In the same year, PRC chip exports to Russia increased by 19 percent. Many of these transactions were facilitated by shell companies in Hong Kong acting as agents of secondary sales from international suppliers via the PRC to Russia. The ODNI report stated that “the PRC is providing some dual-use technology that Moscow’s military uses to continue the war in Ukraine, despite an international cordon of sanctions and export controls. The customs records show PRC state-owned defense companies shipping navigation equipment, jamming technology, and fighter jet parts to sanctioned Russian government-owned defense companies” (ODNI, July 2023). French diplomats further corroborated this report, notifying the public of intelligence indicating that the PRC has been supplying Russia with dual-use technologies as well as non-lethal assistance equipment, such as helmets and body armor (SCMP, July 22). When asked if the PRC is assisting Russia’s war efforts in Ukraine, French presidential advisor Emmanuel Bonne responded by saying “there are indications that they are doing things we would prefer them not to do” (SCMP, July 22). The PRC government has emphatically denied allegations that it has provided any weapons or military assistance to Russia. Former PRC Foreign Minister Qin Gang was reported by his own ministry as saying that “China does not sell weapons to parties involved in the Ukraine crisis and prudently handles the export of dual-use items in accordance with laws and regulations. Normal exchanges and cooperation between Chinese and Russian enterprises should not be affected” (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 10). The second part of Qin Gang’s statement is significant, as he clearly states that exchanges between Chinese and Russian enterprises—such as commercial ties—are not be impacted by the war in Ukraine. Upon closer examination, his comments appear to suggest that dual-use technologies and equipment could be subject to the PRC government turning a blind eye.
Topic:
Partnerships, Weapons, Drones, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

62. China’s Floods and Party Priorities

Author:
Arran Hope
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Typhoon Doksuri (杜苏芮) crashed onto the Chinese mainland over Fujian Province on Friday, July 28. From there it pushed northward, where a constellation of meteorological factors led it to slow down over North China, where it unleashed huge volumes of rain over the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region. Over 1600 weather stations in Hebei Province, which surrounds Beijing, recorded rainfall in excess of 250 mm across a 72 hour period, with one station in Xingtai City recording a maximum of over 1003 mm. Beijing saw the highest rainfall since its meteorological records began in 1860 (Xinhua, August 9). The storm was the proximate cause for severe flooding. Already by Tuesday, August 1, state media was reporting that 20 people had been killed in the floods, and 127,000 had already been evacuated from the capital (Global Times, August 1). However, the full-scale of the human impact is unlikely to be clarified by the government any time soon: much information about the floods has already been censored or deleted from China’s internet, and official statistics, when they have been released, are almost certainly underplaying the costs. [1] Perhaps most unhelpfully, the website for China’s Ministry of Water Resources, has been inaccessible all week (水利部, Ministry of Water Resources). Nevertheless, drawing on the information that has been forthcoming from China’s central and regional governments, as well as firsthand accounts posting on Chinese social media and Twitter (X), we can make a preliminary assessment of the potential political and economic consequences of this event.
Topic:
Natural Disasters, Crisis Management, and Flood
Political Geography:
China and Asia

63. The Demise of Diplomatic Ambiguity: Parsing South Korea’s Estrangement From China

Author:
Matthew Fulco
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In July, the US Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) visited South Korea for the first time since 1981. Not one, but two of the 560-foot-long warships—which carried a payload of 24 long-range Trident ballistic missiles—surfaced in South Korean waters (Korea JoongAn Daily, July 24, 2023). From Washington and Seoul’s perspective, the SSBN deployment was a pointed reminder to the mercurial North Korean regime to exercise restraint, but the symbolism of the SSBN visit was not lost on China—Pyongyang’s closest ally. For all its military modernization efforts, Beijing has no effective defense against the Ohio-class sub. That South Korea would support the deployment of the SSBNs to its territory illustrates both its concern about rising North Korean brinkmanship and newfound willingness to risk Beijing’s ire. Indeed, after three decades of stable ties anchored in economic interdependence, major changes are afoot in the South Korea-China relationship. Compared to Japan, which also counts China as its largest trading partner, South Korea has historically been less willing to stand its ground in the face of political pressure from Beijing. On the one hand, Seoul and Beijing have no major territorial disputes, but more importantly, South Korea had previously calculated that its political deference—especially on China’s “core interests” like Taiwan—would encourage Beijing to support denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) top foreign policy objective. For many years, South Korea handled Beijing with kid gloves, irrespective of who was in the Blue House. While the left-leaning Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) is traditionally more China-friendly, it was the conservative President Park Geun-hye who attended China’s jingoistic September 2015 military parade. After a summit between Xi Jinping and Park, both leaders made a commitment to oppose any unilateral actions that could lead to tension on the Korean Peninsula. The following day, President Park joined Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin in China’s military parade. South Korea was the only US ally to attend the event (The Korea Herald, September 3, 2015). Since then, however, the two countries have drifted apart. The catalyst for this change was Seoul’s decision to deploy the THAAD missile defense system in 2017, which China views as a security threat and South Korea deems essential for self-defense. China has repeatedly demanded that South Korea dismantle its THAAD system (Xinhua, September 21, 2017). When those demands failed to bear fruit, it resorted to sanctions against South Korea (The Korea Herald, March 8, 2017). Furthermore, both China’s imposition of a draconian national security law in Hong Kong and its mismanagement of the coronavirus pandemic have hurt its reputation in South Korea (The South China Morning Post, October 20, 2020). It is against this backdrop that the ROK’s anti-China sentiment has surged to an all-time high—a development that will inevitably spill over into Seoul’s foreign policy. According to a 2021 survey conducted by SisaIN, for the first time since the ROK and the PRC normalized relations in 1992, South Koreans view China even more negatively than they do Japan (SisaIN, November 29, 2021). China’s ruling Communist Party seems oblivious to the existential threat that South Korea feels in the face of surging missile tests by North Korea. The JoongAng Daily noted in June that it takes just two minutes for a North Korean missile to hit Seoul. According to the editorial, “South Korea is technically still at war with North Korea. The government and people must not forget that” (Yonhap News Agency, June 1, 2023). Concluding that political appeasement and economic engagement with China have failed to pay off, South Korea is taking two significant steps: strengthening its ties with its top security partner, the US, and mending fences with its former rival, Japan. The implications of Seoul’s estrangement from Beijing could have far-reaching implications for geopolitics in the broader Indo Pacific region.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Economics, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Korea

64. Water Warriors: How China’s River Chiefs Aim to Tackle Water Pollution

Author:
Genevieve Donnellon-May
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In many ways, China’s history is one of water management. As Chinese historiographers often remark, the unique hydrological conditions within China led to the creation of three historical miracles: China, Chinese civilisation, and the Chinese people. In both ancient and modern times, Chinese rulers have acknowledged the importance of water for its role in maintaining social stability as well securing their legitimacy. Beijing’s leaders are acutely aware of the importance of water in maintaining social stability and ensuring the regime’s survival. The government has focused on engineering its way to water security, an approach traceable in part to Mao Zedong’s idea that man must conquer nature. This is reflected in the Chinese state’s construction of large-scale hydroengineering projects, encompassing numerous dams and inter-basin water-transfer projects. More recently, water governance was explicitly tied to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “ecological civilization” (生态文明) concept (China Brief, June 23) and his published book titled “The In-depth Learning and Implementation of Xi Jinping’s Important Discourse on Water Governance” (People’s Daily, July 19). In May, China announced new plans to improve water quality. According to the “Guideline on Water Ecology and Environmental Protection in Major River Basins”, by 2025 China’s water governance aims to accomplish two main objectives: first, eliminate surface water below Grade V quality, and second, raise the proportion of “fairly good quality” surface water to 85 percent—an increase of 1.6 percentage points from 2020 (Ministry of Ecology and the Environment, May 5; State Council, May 5). China has a six-tier water quality system, with water below Grade V classified as the worst quality. At Grade III or above, surface water is considered to be of “fairly good quality”. As a core convention of the central government, guidelines on the water management of major river basins are typically issued once every five years. In contrast to older guidelines, the most recent guidelines explicitly specificizes the improvement of surface water quality as an obligatory target and includes projected targets for the conservation of water resources and ecosystems. By 2025, for instance, China has set ambitious plans to recover waters levels in 53 dried-up water bodies and restore native fish species to a stable population in 107 major water bodies. China also aims to create an additional 213 square kilometers of wetlands by 2025.
Topic:
Water, Governance, Pollution, and Rivers
Political Geography:
China and Asia

65. The PRC Eyes Vietnam: Chinese Assessments of Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy

Author:
Nathan Waechter
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In July, the Barbie movie––an ostensibly apolitical and innocuous film––­­was banned by the Vietnamese Department of Cinema over real-world tensions between Vietnam and China. According to the state film council, the new Barbie movie was barred from the Vietnamese market over its inclusion of a map purportedly showing China’s preferred territorial “Nine-Dash” line in the South China Sea (Vietnam News, July 7). As the head of the national film evaluation council stated, “Vietnam’s stance has been clear. It does not accept movies that are ambiguous in matters related to territorial sovereignty” (Vietnam News, July 7). The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning responded to the incident by asserting that “China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests are solidly grounded in history and law” (Global Times, July 7). Accusing the Vietnamese government of overstating the issue, the Chinese state media outlet Global Times urged all “relevant parties to control domestic hype and nationalist sentiment” (Global Times, July 7). Viewed within a broader context, the Barbie movie incident is only the most recent expression of the historical baggage between Vietnam and China. Many PRC military officials and academics largely perceive Southeast Asia as China’s proverbial “backyard” that should rightfully remain in its sphere of influence. Within Southeast Asia, Vietnam occupies an important position directly on China’s periphery. Publicly, China considers Vietnam’s governing regime to be close “comrades and brothers” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 28). However, Vietnam has a long, acrimonious history with China. Vietnam has been invaded by China numerous times and subjugated to Chinese rule and the exaction of tribute for thousands of years. The “Vietnam Military Museum in Hanoi … lists 13 “Vietnamese Resistance Wars Against Invaders,” with the majority fought against the Chinese. To some extent, Vietnam has also benefited from its contact with China. The Chinese written script, ideas of ethics and governance, and even chopsticks were absorbed from China. [1] During America’s war in Vietnam, China provided Vietnam with vast amounts of material support. From 1965-1969, a total of 320,000 Chinese troops covertly served in North Vietnam. [2] Despite this, China invaded Vietnam in 1979 in a war that the PRC refers to as the “Self-defensive counterattack against Vietnam” (对越自卫还击保卫边疆作战) (Baidu Encyclopedia). In more recent years, Vietnam and China have clashed rhetorically over islands in the South China Sea and had a tense standoff over a Chinese oil exploration rig in Vietnamese-claimed waters in 2014 (CSIS, December 23, 2014). With its historical domination by China and its position as a small, weak, and still developing country, Vietnam has pursued a strategy of hedging. Research by Thi Bich Tran and Yoichiro Sato, Le Hong Hiep, and Tuan Uy Tran provide robust definitions of Vietnam’s hedging strategy from Vietnamese and Western perspectives (Contemporary Southeast Asia, December 2013; Asian Politics and Policy, January 2018; Naval Post-Graduate School Monterey, March 1, 2018). However, it is important to understand how China views Vietnam’s strategy as well. Further analysis is needed to examine primary Chinese sources and understand Chinese elite perceptions, their conclusions, and what “countermeasures” they believe China should take against Vietnam’s approach. On balance, while Chinese security analysts have a clear understanding of Vietnam’s hedging strategy, they exhibit a modern version of historical Chinese paternalism towards Vietnam. Many contemporary Chinese analysts believe that Vietnam, as a developing country, will inevitably fall into China’s sphere of influence as it remains dependent on Chinese economic ties for growth. While Vietnam does benefit from its economic relations with China, however, the Chinese analyses fail to fully recognize Hanoi’s fundamental apprehensions and insecurity caused by the historical enmity between the two countries, as well as China’s modern-day rise and its aggressive actions in the South China Sea. To a certain degree, China is guilty of exhibiting a degree of the same imperial hubris towards Vietnam as it has often accused the US of in the latter’s relations with other countries. While PRC strategists appear to have concluded that time is on their side, Beijing’s paternalistic complex may ultimately handicap China’s ability to pull Vietnam closer into its orbit.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Hedging, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Vietnam

66. Xi Jinping’s Hidden Goals for the PRC Law on Foreign Relations

Author:
Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Chinese President Xi Jinping has promulgated a new law on foreign affairs to legitimize tough measures that Beijing is taking against the “bullying” of the “hegemonic West.” The statute, “The Law on Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China (PRC),” which takes effect on July 1, will also anchor the supreme leader’s long-standing aspiration to build a China-centric global order that will challenge the framework established by the US-led Western Alliance since the end of World War II. The law also codifies the total control that Xi, who is Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary and Chairman of its Central Military Commission (CMC), exercises on all policies regarding diplomacy and national security (People’s Daily, June 30; Xinhua, June 28). The law states that the PRC “stays true to the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable global security, and endeavors to strengthen international security cooperation and its participation in mechanisms of global security governance.” It stresses Beijing’s right to “take corresponding countermeasures and restrictive measures” against acts that violate international law and norms and that “endanger China’s sovereignty, security and development interests.” The official Global Times said the statute was a response to “new challenges in foreign relations, especially when China has been facing frequent external interference in its internal affairs under the western hegemony with unilateral sanctions and long-arm jurisdiction” (The Global Times, June 28). The legislation legalizes measures such as counter-sanctions and blacklisting of foreign nationals and institutions in retaliation against similar measures that the US and other Western countries have taken against PRC firms (New York Times Chinese Edition, December 16, 2022).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Law, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:
China and Asia

67. China’s Collaboration with the Myanmar Junta: A Case of Strategic Hedging?

Author:
Sudhan Rmachandran
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On June 27, in Kachin State, northern Myanmar, a convoy of vehicles carrying a Chinese delegation, including a consul, came under fire. The convoy was being guarded by Myanmar military and police personnel. While local media blamed the Lisu National Development Party, a military-aligned militia, the Myanmar junta held the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) — an ethnic armed organization (EAO) aligned with the anti-junta resistance— responsible for the attack (The Irrawaddy, June 30). Attacks on Chinese targets have grown in recent months in Myanmar. On May 7, the anti-junta Natogyi Guerrilla Force (NGF) attacked an off-take station in the Mandalay Region’s Natogyi Township due to its China-affiliated oil and gas pipeline. The attack came amid a surge in mass protests on the streets of Yangon, and the townships of Yinmabin, Salingyi and Letpadaung in Sagaing Region. Angry online campaigns criticizing Beijing’s support of “fascist criminals” — referring to the Myanmar generals — gained widespread public backing (Economic Times, May 15). On May 2, the surge in anti-China protests and violence came close on the heels of a meeting in Naypyidaw between Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang and Myanmar junta chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. Qin is the highest Chinese official to meet Min Aung Hlaing since the 2021 military coup, which overthrew the elected National League for Democracy (NLD) government (Frontier Myanmar, May 3). Since the junta’s rise to power, public ire in Myanmar has been directed not only at the military regime but also at China, the junta’s principal foreign backer. In the early days of the coup, crowds gathered outside the Chinese embassy in Yangon to protest against the alleged Chinese role in the insurrection (Times of India, February 14, 2021). Chinese-owned factories in Myanmar were damaged and burned, and Chinese workers were attacked (CGTN, March 14, 2021). With visible collaboration between the PRC and the junta growing, the targeting of Chinese projects and properties in Myanmar has grown in frequency and intensity. To cite one such instance, last April resistance groups fired missiles at factories manufacturing long-range rockets and surface-to-air missiles, specifically when Chinese and Russian military officials were visiting the facilities (Burma News International, April 8). As anti-China sentiment surges in Myanmar, it is likely that resistance groups will continue to deliberately target Chinese interests in the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Coup, Strategic Interests, and Junta
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Myanmar

68. PLA Airborne Capabilities and Paratrooper Doctrine for Taiwan

Author:
Daniel Fu
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In the event of a Taiwan contingency, PLA airborne troops are likely to assume a substantial role. Decapitation strike scenarios and the prospects of an airborne invasion are widely discussed by analysts, scholars, and policy practitioners in both the US and Taiwan. Despite PLA ambitions to rapidly expand their airborne capabilities, there are a growing number voices that downplay the threat or likelihood of an airborne assault across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwanese security analysts such as Liu Tai-ying (劉泰英), founder of the Taiwan Research Institute, have stated that “if paratroopers were used, the losses for China would be very high” and minimized their threat by stating that there are few landing spots available to PLA airborne forces (Taipei Times, September 26, 2022). Notably, many of these conclusions revolve around the viewpoint held by a growing number of military experts, who contend that “mass airborne operations are a thing of the past” (Modern War Institute, December 10, 2016). These views, however, fail to consider the robust drive on part of the PLA to improve the combat readiness and capabilities of its airborne troops. They also ignore substantial progress the PLA has already made towards that goal, both in terms of the training and preparation of its paratroopers and in decisive factors such as heavy airlift. In short, documenting the progress of PLA airborne troops’ capabilities may play a crucial role in assessing Chinese deployment strategies during a potential Taiwan invasion scenario.
Topic:
Security, Armed Forces, Military, and Invasion
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

69. The Long Arm of the Law(less): The PRC’s Overseas Police Stations

Author:
Martin Purbrick
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In April, the FBI charged two Chinese-Americans, both U.S. citizens, with conspiring to act as agents of the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) by establishing an “overseas police station” on behalf of the Fujian Public Security Bureau in New York. The defendants allegedly organized counter-protests against the Falun Gong, harassed a Chinese fugitive to return to the PRC and hassled a pro-democracy activist living in California. On June 6, the UK Government Minister of State for Security, Tom Tugendhat, made a statement with an update on Chinese “Overseas Police Service Stations” reportedly located in Croydon, Glasgow and Hendon (UK Parliament, June 6). He stated that “the Police have visited each of the locations identified by Safeguard Defenders [the NGO that reported the locations], and carefully looked into these allegations to consider whether any laws have been broken and whether any further action should be taken. I can confirm that they have not, to date, identified any evidence of illegal activity on behalf of the Chinese state across these sites.” The reactive approach in the UK is notably different from the US, where proactive intelligence led investigations by the FBI have led to multiple arrests. International concern regarding the extent of law enforcement activity by Chinese agencies outside of their home country jurisdiction has recently increased. Such activity has been reported as “Chinese Overseas Police Service Centers” (Safeguard Defenders, September 2022), “Chinese Assistance Centers” (China Brief, January 5, 2019), joint patrols in Italy with local police, structured training to local police such as in the Solomon Islands, harassment and intimidation of Chinese dissidents, and extra-judicial action to return fugitives from overseas that effectively constitutes extraordinary rendition. These activities are characterized by their diversity and, as a result, should not be considered part of a single strategy. Rather, the multiple purposes served by Chinese police forces’ expanding overseas activities can be better understood by tracing how these efforts have evolved over the past decade.
Topic:
Security, Law Enforcement, Law, and Police
Political Geography:
China and Asia

70. Missile Defense in South Korea: Will President Yoon Heed China’s Concerns?

Author:
Debalina Ghoshal
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Earlier this week, some residents of Seoul, South Korea, received an emergency alert to prepare for a potential evacuation following military reports that North Korea had fired a projectile southward (Yonhap, May 31). The alerts, which stemmed from an errant North Korean satellite launch that sparked grave but fleeting alarm, underscore the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) growing apprehensions regarding the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) ballistic and cruise missile development and testing, coupled with its expanding nuclear arsenal (NK News, January 1). In addition, North Korea’s long-range artillery systems remain a persistent threat, which not only endanger counter-force targets in South Korea, but also threaten counter-value targets, in particular Seoul, the nation’s capital and largest metropolis.
Topic:
Weapons, Missile Defense, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

71. Party Ties: Vietnam, Cuba and China’s Relations with Other Marxist-Leninist States

Author:
John S. Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Last month, on the 15th anniversary of the establishment of the China-Vietnam comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership (中越全面战略合作伙伴关系), Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping met with Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) Politburo Member and Head of the Central Committee Organization Commission Truong Thi Mai and asked her to convey his greetings to General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong (People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs [FMPRC], April 26). [1] The visit to Beijing by Mai, who has headed the VCP’s powerful organization commission since 2021 and was appointed to the Secretariat in March, occurred days after U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Vietnam (NhanDan, April 15; VN Express, March 6). As the maritime dispute between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea has intensified over the past fifteen years, Washington has deepened its ties with Hanoi based on overlapping geostrategic interests. Nevertheless, the Biden administration’s ability to achieve its goal of upgrading the U.S. relationship with Vietnam to a “strategic partnership” this year to mark the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the U.S.-Vietnam “comprehensive partnership” remains in question (Fulcrum.sg, April 20). Vietnam undoubtedly perceives the PRC’s drive to consolidate control over the South China Sea as its main geopolitical challenge. Moreover, Vietnam’s relationship with its larger northern neighbor is colored by mistrust derived from historical memories of Chinese occupation and a long legacy of conflict, including the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War and the subsequent series of border and naval clashes in the 1980s. However, the VCP, particularly the conservative faction, now views the U.S. as posing its primary ideological threat and is fearful that Washington aims to undermine its grip on power (Nikkei Asia, May 11, 2022). As two scholars at Ho Chi Minh City University of Social Sciences note in a recent analysis, Hanoi’s reluctance to upgrade ties with the U.S. stems not only from fear of angering China but also from concern with “Washington’s excessive focus on press freedom, religious freedom, and human rights as an internal intrusion and potential threat to Vietnam’s political security.” [2] Hence, Beijing is able to arrest Hanoi from drifting towards closer alignment with Washington by leveraging their shared Communist systems and mutual concerns about Western efforts to facilitate the “peaceful evolution” of communist states into liberal democracies. During his meeting with VCP General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong in Beijing last October, Xi spoke to both Party leaderships’ mutual concern with regime security. He stressed that each side “should stay committed to the socialist orientation” and called for increased party-party exchanges to facilitate “mutual learning in party governance and state administration, maintain high-level communication and strategic dialogue between the two militaries, achieve more outcomes in cooperation on law enforcement and security, and safeguard the political security and social stability of respective countries” (FMPRC, October 31). Party-to-party ties are a key element of the PRC’s relationships with the other three states with ruling Communist Parties: Vietnam, Cuba and Laos. [3] As with the CCP, the Vietnamese, Cuban and Laotian Communist Parties have each adapted and modified Marxist-Leninism to suit their national conditions, regional situations and elite political preferences. Despite their considerable differences, these states’ mutual Marxist-Leninist ideological orientations and systems foster shared interests, including maintaining regime security and “stability,” opposing perceived external attempts to define and impose Western conceptions of democracy and human rights, advancing a state-led model of economic development and promoting a more multipolar world.
Topic:
International Relations, Socialism/Marxism, Partnerships, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Vietnam, and Cuba

72. China’s Emerging Approach to Taiwan: Blockade and Disinformation

Author:
Chihwei Yu
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
It has been suggested that China intends to unify Taiwan through a military operation within the next five years. However, based on the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) actions during the 1945-1949 civil war, military means may not be the most effective way for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to achieve its longstanding goal of unification with Taiwan. Since its inception in 1921, the CCP has relied on producing and disseminating disinformation to advance its policy objectives. This strategy is also frequently employed by China towards Taiwan, with the aim of undermining the morale of Taiwanese society through the spread of certain kinds of false information, for example, by claiming that the U.S. will eventually betray Taiwan. In fact, the CCP’s military tactics during the civil war share some similarities with its current Taiwan policy, particularly with regard to the so-called “Peiping Mode” (北平模式). This approach seeks to achieve its goals through a combination of deterring the opponent through superior force and employing United Front work, including deploying agents and spreading fake news to persuade opponents.
Topic:
Security, Disinformation, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Military, and Blockade
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

73. Taiwan’s Dwindling Diplomatic Allies

Author:
John S. Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Amidst the drama surrounding Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s early April stopover in Southern California, where she met with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy and the subsequent People’s Liberation Army (PLA) maneuvers around Taiwan that followed, it can be easy to forget why the Taiwanese President was transiting the U.S. in the first place. Tsai was returning home after a trip to Taiwan’s two remaining diplomatic allies in Central America, Guatemala and Belize, which was organized around the theme of “Meeting Democratic Partners, Fostering Shared Prosperity” (民主夥伴共榮之旅) (Office of the President, Republic of China [ROC] [Taiwan], March 29). Days prior to Tsai’s arrival in the Western Hemisphere, Honduras, which had maintained official relations with the Republic of China (ROC) for 82 years, established formal ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs [FMPRC], March 26). The move occurred despite U.S. efforts to dissuade Honduras. On March 18, the Biden administration dispatched senior envoy and special adviser for the Americas, former Senator Chris Dodd, who is also well-regarded in Taipei, to Honduras in a last-minute effort to encourage the Xiomara Castro government to change course in derecognizing Taiwan (Taipei Times March 18). Under the government of Xiomara Castro, who took office early last year, Honduras has sought to pit Taipei and Beijing against each other in a bidding war for diplomatic recognition. While China has offered inducements, Taiwan has both rejected and called out the Castro government’s efforts to condition the continuation of the official relationship on major increases in financial assistance. Foreign Minister Eduardo Enrique Reina initially denied Taipei’s claims that Honduras had asked Taiwan for $2.5 billion but eventually acknowledged to the media that the Castro government had sought to obtain $2 billion in aid (ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Taiwan MOFA], March 23). However, he also claimed his country “never received a substantive response from the Taiwanese side” (TVBS, March 24). In a notice regarding these revelations and regretting the pending shift in recognition, the Taiwanese Foreign Ministry warned Honduras not to fall prey to China’s “debt trap diplomacy” (Taiwan MOFA, March 23). Upon announcing the termination of relations with Honduras, Tsai cautioned Taiwan’s other diplomatic allies against following the same course, stressing that “we will not engage in a meaningless contest of ‘dollar diplomacy’ with China.” She also criticized the PRC’s efforts to employ “any and all means to suppress Taiwan’s international participation” (Office of the President, Taiwan, March 26). Earlier this week, the Tsai government averted another diplomatic setback with the election of Santiago Pena of the ruling conservative Colorado Party to the presidency in Paraguay. Pena’s opponent, Efrain Alegre, who led a broad center-left coalition, campaigned on switching recognition from the ROC to the PRC in order to facilitate Paraguay’s access to China’s large agricultural import market (Nikkei Asia, April 18). In a response to a congratulatory tweet from President Tsai, Pena stated that “we are going to continue strengthening our historic ties of brotherhood and cooperation between our countries” (Taiwan News, May 2). However, the Tsai administration is hardly free from the challenge of maintaining the ROC’s dwindling network of official relationships. Guatemala, which is Taiwan’s largest diplomatic ally, will go to the polls to elect a new president in late June. President Alejandro Eduardo Giammattei Falla, who has been a staunch supporter of maintaining close ties with the ROC, is constitutionally barred from seeking a second term. According to long-time China-Latin America analyst R. Evan Ellis the prospect of “a victory by either a center-left-oriented candidate more open to working with the PRC such as Sandra Torres, or a right-oriented candidate such as Zury Rios, whose Presidency might deepen policy conflict with the Biden Administration, could present a small but not insignificant risk of Guatemalan diplomatic recognition of the PRC” (CEEP, March 7).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Military, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

74. A Preliminary Survey of PRC United Front Activities in South Korea

Author:
Russell Hsiao
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) exercises influence over South Korea in multiple ways. Chinese influence operations against Seoul have been characterized as not subtle and even blatant compared to the more covert and subversive methods employed in other countries (China Brief, December 19, 2014). Indeed, the more overt and aggressive ways in which Beijing exercises influence were on full display when the PRC responded to Seoul’s decision to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in 2016 with boycotts, military exercises and diplomatic pressure (China Brief, March 31, 2017). Less well known, however, is how China employs other, more subtle means to influence South Korean politics and society. A general presumption exists that influence must be exerted overtly or in forms such as diplomatic protests or through sanctions, yet Beijing’s influence activities also take on a less pronounced and more obscured nature, which is commonly associated with its United Front activities. This article will provide a preliminary assessment of the local Chinese Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification of China (CCPPNR, 韩华中国和平统一促进联合总会) and the web of other United Front organizations that operate in South Korea. [1] This article does not seek to offer an exhaustive examination of these organizations, but to provide a preview of the key United Front apparatuses and their activities in South Korea.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Diaspora, Soft Power, and Influence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Korea

75. U.S.-China Data War Intensifies as Bilateral Relations Nosedive

Author:
Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
U.S.-China relations appear headed for further deterioration despite the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) efforts to lure back American multinationals and Beijing’s relatively limited support for Russia in its war with Ukraine. Washington has characterized the “existential competition” with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as an entrenched struggle on all fronts, but the data and information sectors have recently become areas of particularly intense contention. The Xi Jinping leadership has sternly retaliated against purported efforts by the U.S. and its allies to choke off the PRC’s high-tech development pathways. Recent moves targeting American and other foreign firms are also closely linked to General Secretary Xi Jinping’s obsession with cybersecurity and control of data. Last weekend, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), the administrative arm of the policy-setting Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission (CCAC) that Xi chairs, announced an investigation into the operations of leading American memory-chip maker Micron Technology. The CAC cited the need to safeguard the supply chains of Chinese IT and data companies. Regardless, Micron, whose China operations account for 11 percent of worldwide sales, has insisted that it “stands by the security of our products” (Straits Times, April 1; South China Morning Post [SCMP], March 31).
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Cybersecurity, Information Technology, and Data Governance
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

76. Central African Republic Mine Attack: Can China Protect its Overseas Nationals?

Author:
John S. Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On March 19, gunmen stormed a gold mine near Bambari, in the heart of the Central African Republic (CAR), killing nine Chinese workers. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) Embassy in the CAR issued successive warnings for Chinese nationals to evacuate all areas outside of Bangui, the capital. On the same day as the attack, the Embassy called on Chinese citizens in the CAR’s external provinces to immediately evacuate themselves and report their whereabouts (PRC Embassy in CAR, March 19). A subsequent Embassy warning on March 22 went further, stressing that the situation in the CAR is now “red” or “extremely high risk,” emphasizing that the March 19 attack demonstrated the “extreme necessity of evacuating Chinese companies and nationals” in areas outside the capital “as soon as possible” (PRC Embassy in CAR, March 22). Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin stressed that General Secretary Xi Jinping was closely monitoring the situation and had instructed that immediate action be taken to ensure the safety of Chinese nationals in the CAR and to “severely punish the murderers” (严惩凶手) (PRC Foreign Ministry [FMPRC], March 20). Exactly who perpetrated the attack remains, however, unclear. The CAR government faulted the rebel alliance, the Coalition of Patriots for Change, for the gold mine attack. However, the rebel group blamed Russia’s Wagner Group, which has been deployed in the country to protect the central government since 2018 (South China Morning Post [SCMP], March 20). The timing of the attack and subsequent allegations of Wagner’s involvement was inopportune for Xi as he prepared to travel to Moscow the following day for meetings with Russian leader Vladimir Putin, as Beijing sought to position itself as a mediator in the Russia-Ukraine War (Xinhuanet, March 21). In a blog post on the CAR attack, the well-known nationalist firebrand and former Global Times editor Hu Xijin observed that in “the chaotic situation in CAR anything can happen,” but rejected Western media conjecture concerning the Wagner Group’s involvement as an attempt to “undermine Sino-Russian relations” (Sohu, March 22). He even claimed that due to Wagner’s cooperative relationship with the CAR government, its operators reportedly “helped the authorities deal with the aftermath of the situation and evacuate the bodies of the dead Chinese miners back to Bangui.” Finally, Hu averred that in the “2020s anyone who kills a Chinese national will face severe punishment and retribution.” A post on Tencent echoed these sentiments, stating: “the Central Africa Republic owes us nine lives” before castigating the U.S.-led West for treating Africa as a “modern colonial territory” and creating conditions for “vicious attacks” on Chinese companies to drive them out of emerging markets (Tencent, March 28). Putting aside the murkiness of the March 19 mine attack in the CAR, the incident highlights a growing problem for China, which is the sheer proliferation of state-owned and private businesses operating overseas, either in conflict zones or in areas with chronic political instability. The population’s widespread expectation that the government will exact swift retribution against the perpetrators of attacks on Chinese nationals overseas also puts Xi in a difficult position, as popular assumptions about the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) ability to target armed groups in distant and difficult operational environments do not align with its actual capabilities.
Topic:
Security, Non State Actors, Violence, and Mining
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Asia, and Central African Republic

77. Beyond Arms and Ammunition: China, Russia and the Iran Back Channel

Author:
Sine Ozkarasahin
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Along with Iran’s increasing involvement in supplying Russia’s war effort against Ukraine, a potential increase in Chinese support for Russia presents a challenge for both Kyiv and NATO (Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 6). Indeed, Western governments have recently expressed alarm over China’s potential provision of dual-use or military equipment to Russia (U.S. Department of Defense, February 28). According to U.S. intelligence, Chinese arms transfers to Russia would probably take the form of artillery and drones (Straits Times, February 26). As both items are badly needed by Russia to sustain its war efforts, the entry of Chinese arms on the Ukrainian battlefield may drastically shift the balance of power in the ongoing conflict. However, in addition to trackable military aid packages, Chinese assistance is manifesting itself more subtly in ways that are often overlooked. Consequently, a forthcoming Chinese aid package to Russia is likely to take several forms.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Arms Trade, and Investment
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Eurasia, Middle East, and Asia

78. The Chinese Steel Industry: Three Pathways to Green Steel

Author:
Chin Hsueh
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On February 6, the China Meteorological Association (CMA) published the 2022 China Climate Bulletin (中国气候公报) (China Climate Bulletin, February 7). The annual report provides an overall analysis of China’s climate conditions and tracks significant meteorological disasters and major climate events from the previous year (CMA, February 24). The newly released China Climate Bulletin noted that the country recorded its second-highest annual mean temperature in history last year. In fact, last year’s spring, summer and autumn temperatures were the highest since record keeping began (China Climate Bulletin, February 7). During the press conference for the release of the bulletin, Jia Xiaolong, deputy director of China’s National Climate Center, stressed the importance of remaining alert to those “low probability, high impact” (小概率, 高影响) climate events, such as the heat wave that hit China in 2013, driving temperatures above 104 degrees Fahrenheit in at least 40 cities and counties (China News Service, February 7; Sohu, July 30, 2013). No plausible path to mitigating global climate change exists without China, the world’s largest carbon emitter, greatly reducing its carbon footprint. Among China’s major GDP drivers, few play a more critical role in the country’s decarbonization efforts than the steel sector (International Energy Agency, September 13, 2021). The steel industry is second only to power generation in terms of its carbon footprint, generating about 17 percent of China’s annual emissions (China Dialogue, May 23, 2022). In fact, the state-owned conglomerate China Baowu Steel Group (中国宝武),which is the world’s largest steel producer, put more CO2 into the atmosphere in 2020 than Pakistan (Jiemian, August 21, 2020).
Topic:
Climate Change, Manufacturing, Industry, Carbon Emissions, and Steel
Political Geography:
China and Asia

79. Why Taiwan’s 2024 Presidential Election is Wide Open

Author:
Matthew Fulco
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Shortly after Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) suffered the worst loss in its 37-year history, Nikkei Asia Review published an article entitled “Taiwan’s KMT has a mountain to climb for 2024 presidential race” that cautioned not to read too much into the opposition Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) success in the local elections last November (Nikkei Asia, November 29, 2022). The piece argued that voters still perceive the KMT as being too close to China, a liability in a national election focused on cross-Strait relations, and hamstrung by uncertainty about who should serve as its presidential candidate next year. Although the KMT confronts significant challenges heading into Taiwan’s 2024 elections, the difficulties the party faces should not be overestimated. Rather than a mountain, the KMT has a modest hill to climb. Over the past 22 years, Taiwan’s national politics have swung like a pendulum, favoring the DPP from 2000-2008, the KMT from 2008-2016 and the DPP again since 2016. Taiwanese voters, like their counterparts in other thriving democracies, sometimes vote for change even if they are not enamored with a particular candidate. Since Taiwan fully democratized in 1996, no political party has won three consecutive presidential terms, with DPP and KMT presidents alternating every eight years. President Tsai Ing-wen has avoided the kinds of issues, corruption scandals and major popular demonstrations against her policies that undid the presidencies of her predecessors, Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou, leading to opposition wins in the 2008 and 2016 presidential elections, respectively. Nevertheless, Tsai has been dramatically weakened by the DPP’s crushing defeat in the November 2022 local elections (Jamestown Foundation, November 29, 2022). She stepped down as DPP party chair after the elections as the party has taken a hit for its many pandemic missteps, a flagging economy and a contentious cross-Strait policy (United Daily News, November 27, 2022). The DPP’s likely candidate in the 2024 election, current Vice President Lai Ching-te, while personally popular, would represent continuity with Tsai’s policies (China Brief, March 3). Together, these factors will likely make the 2024 race the closest since 2004, when the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian and Annette Lu eked out a victory against the KMT’s Lien Chan and James Soong of the People First Party (PFP) by a margin of just 0.22 percent (Taipei Times, March 21, 2004).
Topic:
Elections, Domestic Politics, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

80. Ten Years On, How is the Belt and Road Initiative Faring in Indonesia?

Author:
William Yuen Yee
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
“It is not merely talk, but it is about actually building something. From airports to railways, these are industries we can see and touch. This is exactly the sort of courage and real action the world needs right now.” So said Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo about China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) at the inaugural Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF) in 2017 (BRF, May 14, 2017; Jakarta Globe, May 16, 2017). This year marks the tenth anniversary of this ambitious, globe-spanning infrastructure development project. Today, 151 countries and 32 international organizations have joined the initiative, which Foreign Minister Qin Gang recently described as a “global enterprise to build a belt of prosperity and a road to happiness” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China [PRC], January 20). A decade ago, Chinese President Xi Jinping launched the BRI with a series of speeches in Kazakhstan and Indonesia calling for a “Silk Road Economic Belt” and a “Maritime Silk Road,” respectively (Consulate General of the PRC in Toronto, September 7, 2013; China Daily, October 4, 2013). The following year, China announced the creation of a $40 billion Silk Road fund at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Beijing and a $20 billion Maritime Silk Road fund in Indonesia (China Daily, November 9, 2014). From the BRI’s inception, it has been clear that Southeast Asia and its largest economy— Indonesia—are intended to serve as a centerpiece of the megaproject (Global Times, November 16, 2022). Roughly two-thirds of all people of ethnic Chinese ancestry outside of China are in Southeast Asia. [1] The 142-kilometer (88 mile) Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway (HSR) is one of the BRI’s flagship projects (China Brief, December 22, 2022). Indonesia also hosts nearly half of the eight overseas industrial parks that China has established across the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states: the China-Indonesia Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone, the China-Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park, and the China-Indonesia JuLong Agricultural Industry Cooperation Zone (China Development Institute, June 26, 2019). While Beijing has pulled back its overseas BRI lending—and Xi has exhibited some notable reticence toward hosting a third Belt and Road Forum—Indonesia challenges the broader narrative that the BRI is somehow fading away (Green Finance & Development Center, July 24, 2022). In the world’s fourth-most populous country, Chinese investment has continued apace, and both governments continue to champion the BRI’s ability to deliver “mutual benefit” and “win-win results.” Still, understanding Indonesia’s experience with the BRI requires closer examination of the history behind China-Indonesia infrastructure cooperation, major projects beyond the oft-discussed Jakarta-Bandung HSR and their impacts on the Indonesian public, and the extent of economic engagement between Jakarta and Beijing.
Topic:
Development, Infrastructure, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China, Indonesia, Asia, and Southeast Asia