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1. How the Caspian Can Help Solve Europe’s Gas Woes: A Close Look at the Trans Caspian Connector Project

Author:
John Roberts
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
The plentiful natural gas reserves in and around the Caspian constitute an obvious medium‑ to long‑term source of supply for Europe. What may be more surprising is that they also constitute the only source of sustained pipeline gas delivery that can improve Europe’s gas balance within months or even weeks. There are four elements that define the issue. The first is Europe’s requirement for gas. The second is the availability of gas for immediate or early input into the equation. The third is the question of the capacity of available infrastructure to carry the gas to market. Finally, there is the question of whether there is the political support to implement such measures.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Infrastructure, Gas, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
Europe

2. Drones and Resets: The New Era of Turkish Foreign Policy

Author:
Rich Outzen and Soner Cagaptay
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
Turkish foreign policy under Recep Tayyip Erdogan has gone through a number of turns since 2003, characterized by the country’s leader continuously taking stock of domestic and global dynamics whilst navigating between the U.S. and Europe, Russia, and the Middle East. He came to power in Ankara 19 years ago after rising through Türkiye’s political Islamist movement, serving first as prime minister and since 2014 as president. Erdogan’s foreign policy approach over two decades can be divided into a number of periods: an initial era of aspirational multilateralism with a strong pro‑EU tilt, until roughly 2009; an ambitious period of regional assertion marked by failed support for the Muslim Brotherhood and the Arab uprisings, until around 2015; an increasingly unilateral, hard‑power driven period through 2020; and what appears to be a new era blending hard power—enabled and symbolized by Turkish drones—and a Ukraine war, in which Türkiye is, simultaneously, selling drones to Kyiv and courting Washington while implementing the 1936 Montreux Treaty to limit its frenemy Moscow’s access to the Black Sea. Together with recent steps aimed at rapprochement with Israel and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), these last factors encapsulate the new era of Turkish foreign policy—albeit one overshadowed at the moment by Ankara’s unwillingness to unconditionally approve Swedish and Finnish accession to NATO.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
Europe and Turkey

3. Türkiye and the Russia-Ukraine War: Impact on the West, Central Asia, and the Caucasus

Author:
Matthew Bryza
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
During a recent webinar, I was asked to address the following question: what does Russia’s invasion of Ukraine mean for Türkiye’s approach to the Caucasus and Central Asia? At first, the question struck me as odd. Having worked on these issues since the late 1990s and now living in Istanbul, it seemed obvious to me that Türkiye’s goals in these regions have been enduring since the end of the Cold War and were not changing because of Russia’s latest invasion of Ukraine. These goals, I said, were and remain to: secure westward exports of oil and natural gas produced in the Caspian Basin; promote stability in the South Caucasus; and strengthen Türkiye’s business and cultural ties with the Turkic populations of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Türkiye’s approach toward Russia in this context also remains what it has been since the Ottoman centuries: cooperate where possible but confront where necessary. Reflecting momentarily on this question, however, I realized how different Ankara’s goals appear from the perspectives of Washington, Paris, and Athens. In these and other NATO capitals, Turkish foreign policy seems to have shifted from its pursuit of “zero problems with neighbors” during the early years of the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan to one of “zero neighbors without problems.” Türkiye is thus viewed within the Atlantic Alliance as a belligerent outlier, bent on violating international law to pursue the extraction of Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbons, enabling Azerbaijan to use military force during the Second Karabakh War, and aligning in Syria more with Russia than with its own treaty allies.
Topic:
Security, War, Military Strategy, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
Europe and Asia

4. How the Conflict Over Ukraine Affects Security in the South Caucasus

Author:
Nargiz Gafarova
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
Against the background of the present stage of the conflict over Ukraine, the South Caucasus is experiencing perturbation. Three examples rise immediately to mind: elements of the 10 November 2020 tripartite between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia that ended the Second Karabakh War statement (and the arrangements that have derived from it) are being suboptimally implemented; the leaders of Georgia’s breakaway region of South Ossetia continue to hold out the possibility to conduct a referendum on “unification” with Russia; and the uncertain outcome of the talks in Vienna to revive the Iran nuclear deal. Such and similar examples have led all three South Caucasus states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) to pursue variants of a policy some call “neutrality” and others “hedging” between the parties to the conflict over Ukraine. Located at the intersection of Europe, Russia, and the Greater Middle East—and thus constituting the western part of the Silk Road region, as defined by the Editorial Statement of Baku Dialogues—the South Caucasus is one of the most important and, at the same time, one of the most potentially explosive areas bordering the West. Over the past several decades, developments within all three South Caucasus states have contributed to a general sense of insecurity within the region. These include, most obviously, ethno‑political conflicts, civil wars, and color revolutions; the lackluster development of Western‑style governance institutions; and the widely‑held perception of ongoing high levels of corruption. Even the potentially positive strategic consequences of the outcome of the Second Karabakh War—namely, the prospect for the normalization of two sets of bilateral relationships (Armenia‑Azerbaijan and Armenia‑Türkiye) and the unblocking of all economic and transport connections in the region—have been overshadowed by the ongoing restructuring of world order, manifested by the increase of geopolitical volatility and ambiguity due to the major escalation of the conflict over Ukraine whose present phase began on 24 February 2022. The effects of the Western‑led sanctions and export restrictions regime against Russia have spilled over into the South Caucasus— notwithstanding the fact that none of the region’s states have formally aligned themselves with them. This essay provides an overview of the reverberations of the conflict over Ukraine towards the South Caucasus, with a focus on its impact on the region’s political, economic, and security environment.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Governance, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
Europe, Caucasus, and Asia

5. ‘Strasbourg’ in the South Caucasus: The EU’s Opportunities, Obstacles, and Incentives

Author:
Rick Fawn
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
Implausible might be the hyperbole of “once in a generation.” Occasionally, overstatement is legitimate and necessary. Just as the Baku‑Tbilisi‑Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline revolutionized development and income in the South Caucasus a generation ago, so too (and more) are the prospects of reconstruction in the region due to Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Karabakh War. The possibilities for win‑win progress and growth are truly unprecedented. Hyperbolic hope faces challenges, and they need reconciliation with the unprecedented opportunities now recasting the South Caucasus— with potential betterment of the peoples and countries of the region, and even for the wider world. This essay first considers the momentous changes already underway as well as the significances they portend. It then assesses obstacles, and thereafter suggests ‘Strasbourg’ as a multi‑faceted label for contributions both to overcome them and help to realize fully the ambitions for this region. To be precise: ‘Strasbourg’ here means the physical, technological, and financial involvement of the EU in regional infrastructural development, including linkages of the South Caucasus more widely, and also as a metaphor for deep‑seated, historically truthful reconciliation. (In the Summer 2021 edition of Baku Dialogues, elements of both meanings were put forward by F. Murat Özkaleli in an article titled “Winning the Peace” and are built upon here.) This thinking takes even greater significance as Euro‑Atlantic planning will concentrate on redefining relations in this region due to conflict over Ukraine.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
Europe, Caucasus, and Asia

6. The Lynchpin of the Middle Corridor

Author:
Anthony Kim
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
Particularly in today’s evolving geopolitical and economic reality triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Caspian region has gained greater relevance whilst acquiring renewed significance. More specifically, one of the geostrategic consequences of Putin’s ongoing assault against Ukraine and its broader implications for the global economy has been the enhanced impetus for ensuring the pragmatic and strategic utility of the “Middle Corridor” (also more formally known as the Trans‑Caspian International Transport Route, or TITR) for the Caspian region and beyond as a viable commercial transport route alternative to the long‑established northern pathway through Russia. China, which has been eager to expand its economic networks, had hoped to dominate economically the utilization of the Middle Corridor as part of an expanding BRI. But at least some of the countries in the region (and beyond) have grown increasingly uneasy about participating in it. They have viewed China as leaving many of its BRI promises unfulfilled. And they have also become more concerned that Beijing’s BRI engagement comes with too many geopolitical strings attached and can lead to debt traps. By and large, China has invested in a number of infrastructure projects in Central Asia within the framework of BRI. Most of China’s activity has taken place on the eastern shore of the Caspian. Major port, pipeline, and infrastructure projects on the Caspian’s western shore have been done without much, if any, direct Chinese involvement. Making the Middle Corridor work properly is not an easy task: it will take considerable degrees of time, financial means, and political commitment. With many economic and political challenges lingering around, by no means, the cross‑country transportation route could become the cheapest option any time soon. Nonetheless, in an increasingly raucous world where diversifying supply chains reduce risk and has become more desirable, the route could become not only fully viable but, more importantly, truly cost‑effective.
Topic:
Security, Development, Geopolitics, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe and Asia

7. Bringing Russia Back in From the Cold

Author:
Nikolas Gvosdev and Damjan. Krnjevic Miskovic
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
Our reasoning is straightforward: for better or worse, Ukraine will never be as important to the West as it is to Russia—and this would be true even if Ukraine was the only item on their respective stra- tegic agendas. But this last is very far from being the case today—cer- tainly for the United States, whose leadership of the West has again been reaffirmed thanks to the conflict over Ukraine. To main- tain and perhaps even strengthen that leadership against China—a country that Biden defines as being in “competition [with the United States] to win the twenty-first cen- tury”—America stands to benefit greatly from bringing Russia back in from the cold.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Leadership, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, North America, and United States of America

8. Prospects for Pax Caucasia? The 3+3 Regional Cooperation Initiative

Author:
Vasif Huseynov
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
The 3+3 format for regional cooperation is an initiative that was first proposed by the leaders of Turkey and Azerbaijan in the aftermath of the Second Karabakh War, building somewhat on an idea that originated in Iran during the war itself. This grouping covers the three countries of the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) plus the three most important countries neighboring this region (Russia, Turkey, and Iran). Thus in December 2020, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced the initiative at a joint press conference with his Azerbaijani counterpart, President Ilham Aliyev, during his visit to Baku in which he reviewed the military parade marking Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia in the aforementioned war—a war that heralded the fundamental transformation of regional geopolitical and geo‑economic realities. On this occasion, Erdoğan called 3+3 a win‑win initiative for all actors in the region. Given its obvious potential to promote peace and security in the South Caucasus and facilitate the normalization of relations between former belligerents, some local experts believe that the 3+3 initiative could be instrumental for the emergence of Pax Caucasia. Four of the six countries immediately reacted positively to the initiative, with Armenia and Georgia expressing some reservation. While Armenia initially sounded skeptical, the government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan eventually confirmed its participation in this format. For now, the only country that retains distance from the Pax Caucasia process is Georgia which, due to its ongoing territorial dispute with Russia, refuses to participate in this platform and proposes an alternative 3+2 format (the countries of the South Caucasus + the EU and the United States). Tbilisi has called its counterproposal the “Peaceful Neighborhood Initiative” but has taken no concrete action to set it in motion. Neither Aliyev nor Pashinyan have yet to publicly comment on the 3+2 format. Others have also remained silent. Hence, the likelihood it can prevail over the 3+3 framework in geopolitical substance is low, given that it excludes major active regional players like Russia and Turkey and substitutes them with two Western actors that are evidently less engaged in the region. The advent of the present phase of the conflict over Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, has also not increased the prospects of the Georgian idea being adopted, either.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Caucasus, Middle East, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia

9. The Alliance of Civilizations and the Role of Spain

Author:
Ramon Blecua
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
The crisis over Ukraine reinforces the view that, despite progress in many areas on the international agenda in recent years, the number of people affected by conflict and violence keeps growing. In the past 20 years, the number of forcibly displaced people has doubled, reaching over 80 million. According to United Nations data, over 60 percent of conflicts have relapsed in the last decade, a staggering figure that testifies of the difficulty of conflict resolution in this context. More than 80 percent of conflicts over the past 30 years involve militias and non‑state actors, while the more recent rise in transnational violent extremist groups has increased the challenges for conflict resolution. Civil wars are leading to more protracted conflicts with ethno‑cultural components, which complicate the traditional political approach. Existing multilateral mechanisms and diplomatic negotiations are increasingly ineffective, and a new toolbox for conflict resolution is more urgent than ever. The combination of great power competition, regional struggles for hegemony, and the proliferation of non‑state actors create interlocking and multi‑layered conflicts that impact international peace and stability. At the same time, these elements are challenging the traditional approaches whilst further putting the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals at risk, as recognized inter alia by the latest Strategic Plan of the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. The international multilateral order is being questioned from many different quarters, while the wave of global protests shows the exhaustion of existing economic and political models, as well as the need for a new social contract. The impact of the pandemic and the measures taken to control it are also having a profound impact on these new political and economic dynamics, laying bare the growing inequalities of the new digital economy as well as the weakening of solidarity and common action. The increasingly intricate fabric of peace and conflict and the multiplicity of actors involved have made conflict resolution more complex, as stated in the December 2020 Concept on EU Peace Mediation. Terrorism and radicalization have become a more imminent security threat and tensions related to environmental degradation, irregular migration and forced displacement, are affecting the social fabric in fragile states in unprecedented manners.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Alliance, Multilateralism, and Peace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Spain

10. Armenia Adapts to New Postwar Realities

Author:
Richard Giragosian
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
To many observers, Armenia’s non‑violent change of government in 2018 represented an unusual victory of “people power.” In what became heralded as Armenia’s “Velvet Revolution,” Armenian opposition leader Nikol Pashinyan surprised many with the relative ease with which he displaced an entrenched elite and emerged as the new Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia. After an important free and fair election in December 2018 cemented Pashinyan as Armenia’s new leader, the country ushered in a new period of democracy and reform. Endowed with a rare degree of legitimacy bolstered by popular support, the new democratically‑elected government promised a critical reassessment of a number of critical issues, ranging from Armenian relations with Russia to its policy regarding the conflict over Karabakh. Yet despite these important gains in democratic change and advances in reform, the Armenian leadership faced a looming challenge that was largely obscured by a legacy of arrogance and complacency. With a focus overwhelmingly devoted to domestic reform priorities, the Pashinyan government seemed increasingly ill‑prepared for the inescapable geopolitical and foreign policy demands that loomed large over Armenia. And through much of the period between mid‑2018 and early 2020, Armenia embarked on a foreign policy course characterized more by overconfidence than any realistic reassessment, marked by sporadic mistakes and missteps in its approach toward Russia but also Azerbaijan. Although somewhat explainable by a combination of inexperience and simplistic idealism, Armenia greatly overvalued the advantages of democracy and reform while also overstating its strategic significance. Against that backdrop, such diplomatic overconfidence only exacerbated a mounting crisis over Karabakh, as tensions increased and vulnerability intensified.
Topic:
Conflict, Violence, Peace, and Nonviolence
Political Geography:
Europe and Armenia

11. Turkey’s Changing Posture on Russia and America

Author:
Hasan Unal
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
As of this writing, tensions between Russia and Ukraine appeared to continue unabated, despite the Putin‑Biden online meeting and the exchange of several messages between Washington and Moscow aimed at reducing them. The crisis has kept almost everyone guessing as to where all this is heading: will they subside or spiral out control? Will Russia invade Ukraine? If it does, how will America and its allies respond? As things stand at present, it sure seems as though Russia and the U.S. and its allies have gridlocked themselves into a crisis without any sensible way out. The former was emboldened by the feckless handling of the crisis by the Biden Administration such that Moscow now wants to dictate terms to America and NATO that amount to something like this: “give us proper, preferably written assurances that Ukraine and Georgia will not be admitted to NATO.” Team Biden, which has inadvisably goaded Ukraine against Russia for a second time in less than a year with its much‑hyped ‘America is back’ slogan cannot simply comply with the request. At the same time, America cannot stand up to Russia militarily in that part of the world. Moreover, neither the United States nor its NATO allies that have considerable military clout are prepared to make a promise to Ukraine regarding admission to NATO. Indeed, just as this edition of Baku Dialogues was going to press, the hectic diplomacy between NATO and Russia on the one hand and the U.S. and Russia on the other, climaxing in the latest meetings of 11‑12 January 2022, broke up with no agreement. This has given rise to further concern that the ongoing conflict is going to perpetuate. From Turkey’s perspective, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has turned insoluble— akin in not unimportant ways to the Turkish‑Greek dispute, with its clusters of psychologically combustible elements freely circulating across the board. Should Russia invade Ukraine, it would presumably trigger a harsh package of sanctions by both the EU and the U.S.; this would likely hurt Moscow considerably, albeit hardly enough to budge it from staying the course. Should the U.S. and NATO simply give in to Russia’s ultimatum, then this would amount to a complete surrender of the Western powers— particularly after the disastrous U.S. debacle in Afghanistan. At the same time, the likelihood that Russia will step back entirely from its position—that, in other words, it will calmly accept the prospect of the admission of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO—is close to zero. Thus, it is possible to conclude that the conflict between Russia and Ukraine on the one hand, and the U.S.‑led West and Russia on the other, will perpetuate.
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Infrastructure, Hegemony, and Silk Road
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, North America, and United States of America

12. Terms, Conditions, Intersecting Interests Turkey and Regional Cooperation After the Second Karabakh War

Author:
Ayça Ergun
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
This essay should be understood as a series of reflections on the geopolitics of the South Caucasus in the aftermath of the Second Karabakh War and how this has provided Turkey with a great opportunity to revisit, redefine, and even consolidate its newfound role and mission in the region. It is predicated on the assessment that, starting in July 2020, Turkey became more proactive and involved in the region, which in turn laid the foundation for a game‑changing development; Turkey’s stature then grew even further in the wake of the 10 November 2020 tripartite statement between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia that ended the Second Karabakh War. Now Ankara is taking on a balancing role—if not quite a mediating one—in the region. The situation is not straightforward: the well‑consolidated empowerment of the Russian Federation in the wake of the war has ensured its continuing status as the main mediator in conflict resolution as well as open the possibility for it to become a genuine peacemaker. Turkey is considered the main balancing power to potentially check or restrain Russia’s dominant position, at least down the road. But for now, Russia can be considered as “being fully back” on the ground: its armed forces are present in each of the three South Caucasus states—by invitation or otherwise. This lends a certain pallor of instability to the newly achieved status quo, although this is not widely recognized, much less pronounced in Turkey and in Azerbaijan. It is thus too early to speak about full‑on regional integration, which will take time to bring about. Yet already today there is potential for the realization of regional cooperation. The ideas related to the latter are being discussed in various fora, yet the feasibility of the implementation of these ideas remains open to interpretation.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Hegemony, Geopolitics, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

13. Achieving Full Resolution to the Karabakh Conflict

Author:
Steven J. Klein
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
Azerbaijan’s decisive de­feat of Armenia in the Second Karabakh War is certainly cause for optimism that any remaining issues be­tween the two countries can be resolved through diplomacy rather than military might. After all, Azerbaijan managed to re­cover all the territories outside the Karabakh enclave captured and occupied by Armenia since the 1990s—as well as parts of the former Nagorno‑Karabakh Autonomous Oblast itself—in addition to forcing Armenia to withdraw all its troops from sovereign Azerbaijani terri­tory. However, past indisput­able successes in other conflicts indicate that Azerbaijan must be careful not to overestimate its capabilities to translate the recent military triumph into full resolution of the Nagorno‑ Karabakh conflict. While it is tempting to declare the conflict over and to talk strictly of post‑conflict construction and development, a handful of coun­tries have painfully learned that such declarations can be prema­ture. For instance, in August 1982 Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin predicted that the immi­nent defeat of the Palestine Liber­ation Organization (PLO) in Leb­anon portended 40 years of peace; and in May 2003 U.S. President George W. Bush declared “Mission Accomplished” after ousting Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. Both of these declarations came back to haunt the respective countries that had believed they had put behind them the conflict at issue. The crucial element that both of the aforementioned leaders had missed was that they did not control completely the fate of the conflict they chose to treat as being resolved. In Israel’s case, the PLO relocated to Tunis, from where it was able to rebuild its power base and receive support from the Soviet Union, while Hezbollah—which didn’t even exist at the time of the defeat of the PLO in 1982—arose with the sup­port of Iran to become a much more formidable and menacing force in southern Lebanon than the PLO had been. In the case of America’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the re­sulting power vacuum allowed nu­merous external forces to enter the picture and disrupt the plans of the United States. Moreover, corruption and disorganization within the gov­ernments established with American help contributed to the deterioration of stability in the region.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

14. Spotlight on Normalization Armenian-Azerbaijani Relations in the Wake of the Second Karabakh War

Author:
Gulshan Pashayeva
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
More than half a year has passed since the end of the Second Karabakh War and the signing of the Mos­cow‑brokered trilateral statement by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, and the President of the Russian Federation on a complete ceasefire and a ces­sation of all hostilities in the zone of the Nagorno‑Karabakh conflict. These developments have ended the almost 30‑year‑long illegal Armenian occupation, restoring Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. They have also contributed to the ultimate implementation of nu­merous decisions and resolutions adopted by various international organizations, including four resolutions of the UN Security Council (822, 853, 874, and 884) demanding the immediate, com­plete, and unconditional with­drawal of Armenian armed forces from the occupied Azerbaijani ter­ritories. At the same time, a new political reality has emerged in the region as a result of the war. This has brought about at least seven implications:
Topic:
Conflict, Peace, Normalization, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

15. Winning the Peace Azerbaijan’s Karabakh Reintegration Challenges

Author:
F. Murat Ozkaleli
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
The Karabakh conflict was not resolved peacefully. Decades of unfruitful negotiations held under the aus­pices of the Co‑chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group (France, Russia, and the United States) produced no dip­lomatic solution. The 30‑year‑long stalemate ended when Azerbaijan re‑gained its occupied territories with a decisive military victory after 44 days of fighting. After the Second Karabakh War, Azerbaijan restored its territorial integrity in conformity with four UN Security Council resolutions. Formally, Azerbaijan’s sover­eignty over all Karabakh was re­stored through the signing of a tri­lateral settlement that was reached between Azerbaijan and Armenia on November 10th, 2010, with Russia being the facilitator and third signatory. The settlement, which is more than a conventional truce but less than a full peace agreement, ensured the return of the remaining five occupied Azerbaijani areas immediately. A five‑kilometer‑wide corridor con­necting Armenia to Karabakh was opened through Lachin, with con­trol granted to a newly‑established Russian peacekeeping force, which also took over control of Khan­kendi and some surrounding areas populated by ethnic‑Armenians. Despite some delays, the trilat­eral settlement is being enforced and the Armenian occupation of 20 percent of Azerbaijani territo­ries came to an end in early 2021. Other provisions of the settlement, such as the establishment of the free movement of all Azerbaijani persons, services, and capital to the region, is to follow.
Topic:
Diplomacy, United Nations, Conflict, Peace, and Reintegration
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and Azerbaijan

16. Georgia After the Second Karabakh War

Author:
Mamuka Tsereteli
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
The outcome of the Second Karabakh War between Azerbaijan and Armenia significantly trans­formed the geopolitical reality in the South Caucasus, with im­plications for the wider Black Sea‑Caspian region. The unsettled political geography of the South Caucasus and the ethno‑political separatism fueled by external actors since the early 1990s left bleeding wounds on the bodies of the newly re‑emerged sovereign states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. These conflicts have determined the trajectory of the geopolitical developments of the region for the last 30 years, including on the for­eign policy orientations of these new states. The conflicts in the South Caucasus were the primary challenge for transforming the strategic assets of this region into greater political and economic success. Three major conflict areas in the South Caucasus were former autonomous regions, created in the early Soviet period: Nagorno‑Karabakh, Abkhazia, and the Tskhinvali region, what was called South Ossetia. (Briefly: the latter term was introduced by the Soviets in the 1920s as a name for the newly created autonomous area in Georgia, popu­lated by Ossetians alongside ethnic Georgians. The historic homeland of Ossetians is located to the north of the Greater Caucasus mountains. Following the Soviet tradition of planting ethno‑political time bombs, Ossetia proper—located in the Russian Federation—was named North Ossetia, while the Tskhinvali region of Georgia—with the Ossetian population at the time concentrated in the border areas with Russia—was named South Ossetia.) As of today, all three of these areas are self‑proclaimed indepen­dent states, are formally ruled by de facto governments, and saw fierce military confrontation in the early 1990s. In 2008, the Tskhinvali region became the battleground between Russian and Georgian forces. In 2020, Azerbaijan regained through a combination of military action and diplomatic brinksmanship all seven regions outside of Nagorno‑ Karabakh that had been occupied by Armenia, as well as one‑third of the former Nagorno‑Karabakh region. In the case of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, as of mid‑2021, these ter­ritories remain, in reality, governed by Russian occupational forces. The Russian military influence was in­serted into Karabakh after the war that ended on November 10th, 2020, with Russian peacekeepers playing an increasing role in the governance of the region. In terms of geopolitical orienta­tion, Armenia willingly allowed Russian troops onto its territory, seeing them as a security guar­antee and deterrent against Azer­baijan. Georgia aligned itself with the Western powers, determined to join NATO and the EU. The conflicts on Georgian territory are seen as punishment from Russia for Georgia’s pro‑Western focus. As a result, there has been a heavy Russian military presence in the separatist areas of Georgia since the Russian invasion to Georgia in 2008.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia

17. Azerbaijan’s Pathways After the Second Karabakh War

Author:
Laurence Broers
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
n the aftermath of the Second Karabakh War, Azerbaijan stands at a critical moment in its history. The war has re­solved many of the issues driving Azerbaijani grievances over the last three decades. Yet it leaves others both unresolved and entangled within a new regional configura­tion that more than ever hinges on the interactions of external great powers and the fractured local politics of the South Caucasus. The regionalization of the Armenian‑Azerbaijani conflict— meaning its transition to a Russian‑Turkish condominium— ultimately links the conflict to the vagaries of what Pavel Baev and Kemal Kirişci call the “serpentine” relations between Moscow and Ankara in the era of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Vladimir Putin. The conflict is now one link in a string of conflict theatres where Russia and Turkey are involved, and across which Moscow and Ankara may negotiate trade‑offs that have little to do with the in­terests of local parties. To be sure, Azerbaijan’s closeness to Turkey assuages concerns over Russian in­fluence for now. And the strategic, rather than tactical, outlook on Azerbaijani‑Turkish partnership means that few in Azerbaijan be­lieve that Turkey would ever engage in trade‑offs that cross Azerbaijani red lines. This belief is reflected in the experience of the Turkish‑ Armenian “football diplomacy” normalization initiative that took place in in 2008‑2009. Nevertheless, while the Armenian‑Azerbaijani conflict is now seen by many in Azerbaijan as resolved, it has in fact been re­packaged and embedded in a new, highly complex, and unpredict­able web of linkages.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Conflict, Peace, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and Azerbaijan

18. From Struggle to Permanent Failure Why the Karabakh Attempt at Secession Failed

Author:
Azer Babayev
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
After 44 days of fighting, the Second Karabakh War came to an end on 10 November 2020 as a result of a Russian‑brokered ceasefire agree­ment. The most important questions here appear to be: what led to this dangerous military escalation, and what does it mean for the conflict, given that it seems to have now entered into a (new) political phase, again? In the declining Soviet Union, what was originally a status dispute over the autonomous Nagorno‑Karabakh region escalated into an international violent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the early 1990s. Following the end of a bloody war in 1994 (the First Karabakh War, 1992‑ 1994), a fragile situation around the conflict region took root: the “frozen conflict,” as it came to be known, lasted for nearly three decades and led to conditions of neither war nor peace. And during this period, it was feared that the longer the sides had to wait for a peace agreement to be reached, the more likely the conflict would re‑escalate and even­tually erupt again into a hot war. As it turned out, this is exactly what happened: an all‑out six‑week war erupted again unexpectedly between the conflict parties in late September 2020, and, as a result, the Armenian side more or less capitulated. But first things first: in the First Karabakh War, Azerbaijan suffered a major defeat, ceding to Armenian forces not only the secessionist region itself but also seven surrounding territo­ries. These other lands were, as a whole, twice the size of Nagorno‑ Karabakh itself and contained five times the old oblast’s population, the entirety of which was expelled by the time an armistice was signed in 1994. And that is why during this war the UN Security Council re­sponded by passing four resolutions demanding the withdrawal of Arme­nian forces from the occupied areas of Azerbaijan. However, the UN res­olutions failed to have any effect. Since that time, no international protagonists felt a strong, compelling need to try to resolve the Nagorno‑ Karabakh conflict. In addition, all in­ternational actors dismissed the idea of “power mediation.” Moreover, although Russia as a key international actor is directly involved in all the conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union, its involvement in the Nagorno‑Karabakh dispute has been rather indirect: in the Karabakh case, Moscow has been both a critical and a questionable actor. On the one hand, the Kremlin has taken a central position in me­diating a peaceful settlement to the conflict while, on the other hand, it has been delivering weapons to both sides. This last represents perhaps the most striking situation regarding the international dimension of the con­flict. Russia is militarily allied with Armenia and has a military presence in the country. It has provided secu­rity guarantees to Yerevan, primarily through their shared membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which neu­tralized to a certain extent the poten­tial effects of Russian arms being sold to financially strong Azerbaijan on a purely commercial basis.
Topic:
Security, War, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

19. Hydrocarbon Energy Complexes Central Eurasian Keystone Triangles

Author:
Robert M. Cutler
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
The editorial statement of Baku Dialogues posits a certain geographic defini­tion of what is called the “Silk Road Region,” namely “the geographic space looking west past Anatolia to the warm seas beyond; north across the Caspian towards the Great Plain and the Great Steppe; east to the peaks of the Altai and the arid sands of the Taklamakan; and south towards the Hindu Kush and the Indus valley, looping down around in the direction of the Persian Gulf and across the Fertile Crescent.” When I served on the Executive Board of the Central Eurasian Studies Society 20 years ago, its website provided a lengthy but useful geographic definition of “Central Eurasia.” This definition included “Turkic, Mongolian, Ira­nian, Caucasian, Tibetan, and other peoples in a broad area that geo­graphically extends from the Black Sea region, the Crimea, and the Caucasus in the west, through the Middle Volga region, Central Asia and Afghanistan, and on to Siberia, Mongolia, and Tibet in the east.” To clarify the term “Black Sea re­gion,” which appears in that defini­tion, I adopt the European Union’s characterization of that region as stretching from Romania and Bul­garia, through northern Turkey and on to Georgia, but including only a thin coastal strip some 20‑60 kilo­meters wide within the EU itself, in­cluding the Danube delta. From that definition, it would follow that the Silk Road Region is largely em­bedded in Central Eurasia. The name “Central Eurasia” was sometimes used in the 1990s as a shorthand for the 15 former So­viet republics together (Russia in­cluded), but this usage has faded away. The collapse of the Soviet Union did not assure the even­tual geoeconomic consolidation of Central Eurasia, but the condi­tions for that consolidation have now been established. This has oc­curred thanks to the confluence of international financial and indus­trial interest in the region’s energy resources, the political will of the United States (the only remaining superpower), and the freedom and rapidity of networked information exchanges made possible by the internet.
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Regionalism, and Silk Road
Political Geography:
Europe and Asia

20. The Strategic Benefits of the Southern Gas Corridor

Author:
Vitaliy Baylarbayov
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
At the end of 2020, the Southern Gas Corridor became fully operational. This marked the completion of a journey that began a decade ago when the government of Azerbaijan and the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) took a strategic decision to launch a major natural gas export project. The Southern Gas Corridor is one of the largest and the most expen­sive gas supply projects in the world built to date. In December 2013, SOCAR and its partners signed a Final Investment Decision (FID) to establish a gas pipeline corridor from Azerbaijan through Georgia, Turkey, Greece, and Albania be­fore ending in Italy. A branch pipe­line is now under construction to Bulgaria, which is expected to be completed in the second half of 2021. In July 2018, the project supplied its first gas to the Turkish market and went on to change the dynamics of that country’s gas market, whereby Azerbaijan is now one of its top gas suppliers. On December 31st, 2020, inaugural commercial gas supplies arrived from the Caspian into Europe, signaling the commencement of the Southern Gas Corridor’s full operations. For Azerbaijan, the Southern Gas Corridor provides a major source of revenue unlinked to the global oil market; the project also strengthens Baku’s links with its neighbors and Europe. For SOCAR—as operator of components of the project and investor in all its segments—the project’s success represents a major step in the company’s transition from a national to an international energy company. The Southern Gas Corridor provides new gas supplies to Turkey, Georgia, and Europe and is a platform for in­creased supplies to these markets and also can be extended to reach additional markets in Europe. With the completion of the first stage of the Southern Gas Corridor, Azerbaijan and SOCAR, together with their partners, are examining strategies for the next phase of the corridor’s development.
Topic:
Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, Natural Resources, and Gas
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and Azerbaijan

21. The Southern Gas Corridor and the New Geopolitics of Climate Change

Author:
Morena Skalamera
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
It has been argued that the U.S. shale revolution, the Trump Administration’s energy pol­icies, and the global shift towards low‑carbon energy sources and re­newables have contributed to shape a new energy order—one that chal­lenges the market power tradition­ally enjoyed by petro‑states. No­where are these developments more relevant than in Azerbaijan, as the country’s expensive investments in the Southern Gas Corridor come under increasing pressure. Unless Azerbaijani gas can be decarbon­ized at a competitive cost, it may risk becoming redundant within a couple of decades as Europe embraces a greener future. Geopolitics and Geo‑economics The Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) is a $45bn mega‑project ($25bn for the development of the Shah Deniz II field and at least $15bn for the delivery system) to supply natural gas from the Caspian Sea to Europe and, by so doing, reduce re­liance on Russian imports. This is a priority that has taken on urgency in the wake of Russia’s 2014 an­nexation of Crimea and the sharp deterioration in relations between Moscow and Brussels that ensued. Currently, the SGC is made up of two pipelines to deliver gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz II field to Turkey and Europe—one called TANAP that is already operational and runs the length of Turkey, and another known as TAP stretching from Turkey’s border with Greece across Albania to Italy, which started pumping gas in late 2020. This is how a leading ADA University policy expert described the situation to me in October 2020, in light of technical delays in the pipeline’s inauguration and the big changes in energy markets de­scribed above: “the TAP pipeline is 90 percent completed and will be inaugurated soon. Unlike oil pipe­lines, whose flexible delivery to the end‑consumer can be sorted out once they are built— as oil travels via tanker, rail, etc.— gas pipelines are more rigid invest­ment endeavors. [...] You don’t agree on a gas pipeline unless you have secured a buyer on the other end.” While natural gas supplies from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field are already contracted, the project has seen numerus twists and turns since it was signed with great fan­fare at the end of 2013. The SGC is an expensive endeavor and the in­stitutions that lined up to finance it are a testament to the degree of strategic importance it carries for the EU. The project has, indeed, been designated as one of the EU’s “priority projects.”
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Environment, Natural Resources, and Gas
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and Azerbaijan

22. Trilateral Cooperation Between Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Georgia

Author:
Dr. Richard Weitz
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
Since the breakup of the So­viet Union, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Georgia have achieved unprecedented levels of economic and security collabo­ration. Through this expanding cooperation, the three countries have established themselves as a collective hub of Eurasian energy extraction and multi‑model trans­portation. Their growing ties have accelerated since the opening of the Baku‑Tbilisi‑Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline in 2006 to extend to the construction of additional pipe­lines, the launching in 2017 of the Baku‑Tbilisi‑Kars (BTK) railway, the holding of regular trilateral mil­itary exercises, and the convening of frequent high‑level leadership meetings. The South Caucasus remains one of the world’s most complex geopolitical regions, with several external powers competing for regional influ­ence.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Hegemony, Alliance, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Asia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, North America, and United States of America

23. Ukraine’s Strategic Relations with the South Caucasus With References to Turkey and Russia

Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
kraine’s relations with the three Southern Caucasian states of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia have been varied during the three decades since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Ukraine has paid greater attention to pro‑Western Georgia and multivectoral Azerbaijan, and the least attention to pro‑Russian Armenia. In Soviet times, the Ukrainian and Georgian dissident and nation­alist movements maintained close ties, and this influenced the devel­opment of friendly relations be­tween Ukraine and Georgia in the post‑Soviet era. From the late 1990s onwards, Ukraine and Georgia made joining both NATO and the EU priority goals, which also played a role in bringing Kyiv and Tbilisi together. Azerbaijan pur­sued a multi‑vector foreign policy of integration without membership in these two institutions, managing to be cautiously pro‑Western but at the same time not anti‑Russian. Armenia, on the other hand, has been a member of all Russian‑led regional integration projects since the early 1990s, and therefore Kyiv has had few common interests with Yerevan. Relations with Armenia have de­teriorated since 2014 because of Armenia’s support for Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the presence of Armenian merce­naries fighting against Ukraine in the ranks of Russia’s proxies in the Donbas. During the Second Karabakh War, the Ukrainian media, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and all political parties (except one pro‑Russian one) en­thusiastically supported Azerbaijan.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Regionalism, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, and Ukraine

24. Development or Regression? Eurasia’s Investment Attractiveness

Author:
Stanislav Pritchin
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
In 2021 the countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus—some call it Eurasia, other the Silk Road re­gion—will celebrate thirty years of independence. Theoretically, this period should have provided suffi­cient time for each to have formed a new economic model, set and at least partially attain long‑term de­velopment goals, and developed a foreign policy model for optimal interaction with investors, in­cluding foreign ones. However, the experience of the post‑Soviet republics under consideration in this essay, which does not aspire to be comprehensive but should rather be considered a prelimi­nary assessment, indicates that independence is neither a prereq­uisite for successful development nor one that centers of achieving a sustainable increase in popular welfare. Despite the fact that in 1991 standards of living and educational and economic attainment in the Soviet republics that are examined in this essay were approximately similar, after three decades of inde­pendent development the countries under consideration have been sig­nificantly stratified in terms of na­tional wealth, types of political and social systems, and the specifics of their economic activities.
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Regionalism, and Silk Road
Political Geography:
Europe and Asia