1 - 22 of 22
Number of results to display per page
Search Results
2. Actor Profile: The March 23 Movement (M23)
- Author:
- Ladd Serwat
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
- Abstract:
- The March 23 Movement (M23) — Mouvement du 23 Mars in French — is an armed group operating in Nord Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), with alleged backing from the Rwandan government. The roots of the M23 go back to the disrupted integration process of Rwandophone militants following the Congo Wars, splitting those willing to return to Rwanda and others desiring to stay in DRC.1 Many fighters remained in Nord Kivu province to form the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) under the leadership of a former Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) militant, Laurent Nkunda. A precursor to the M23, the CNDP claimed to protect Congolese Tutsi and received Rwandan support.2 The M23’s name comes from the failed negotiation process between the CNDP and the Congolese government on 23 March 2009.3
- Topic:
- Political Violence, Non State Actors, and Armed Forces
- Political Geography:
- Africa and Democratic Republic of Congo
3. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Sustained Resurgence in Yemen or Signs of Further Decline?
- Author:
- Emile Roy
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
- Abstract:
- In the first two months of 2023, suspected United States drone strikes killed two senior leaders of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen’s Marib governorate. One of the group’s top explosives experts, a Yemeni citizen named Husayn Hadbul (also known as Hassan al-Hadrami), was killed on 30 January. The group’s media chief and leader of the group’s Shura Council, Saudi citizen Hamad al-Tamimi (also known as Abu Abd al-Aziz al-Adnani), was killed on 26 February. These strikes on high-profile AQAP leaders took place amid a resurgence of AQAP activity in Yemen, which started during the United Nations-mediated truce between Houthi and anti-Houthi forces that lasted from April to the beginning of October 2022, and that has informally held to this date.1 The lull in fighting between Houthi and anti-Houthi forces induced by the truce allowed for a broader political and military reconfiguration within the anti-Houthi camp. At the political level, former President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi was replaced by an eight-member Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) to enhance coordination among anti-Houthi forces. Armed militias affiliated with the secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) and other United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed forces exploited the new situation to gain control over territory in southern Yemen. As part of this territorial expansion, STC forces spearheaded several offensives against AQAP beginning in August 2022, leading to a sudden rise in AQAP activity in 2022.2 However, the nature of this overall increase is disputed, with some analysts arguing that it is a sign of AQAP’s weakness rather than its strength.3
- Topic:
- Non State Actors, Armed Forces, Conflict, Houthis, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Yemen
4. Actor Profile: The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)
- Author:
- Sandra Pellegrini and María Fernanda Arocha
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
- Abstract:
- The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) is a Mexican criminal group that emerged as a splinter group of the Milenio Cartel – one of the Sinaloa Cartel’s allies – after the capture of its leader in 2009 led to internal divisions.1 Initially, the group operated as an armed wing of the Sinaloa Cartel. As part of this alliance, it engaged in a deadly turf war against Los Zetas in Veracruz state, where the group stood out for its use of violence and involvement in numerous massacres.2 Under the leadership of Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, also known as El Mencho, the CJNG grew as an independent organization and one of the most powerful actors in Mexico’s criminal underworld. Rivaling its erstwhile ally, the Sinaloa Cartel, the CJNG turned from an armed wing into a complex drug-producing and trafficking structure, which supplies markets across the globe.3 It has diversified its activities and sources of income, relying on extortion, kidnapping, human trafficking, illegal mining, and oil theft,4 such as the capture of the avocado and oil trade in Michoacán and Guanajuato states.5 To support its growth and international ambitions, the CJNG has expanded its presence to at least 27 of Mexico’s 32 states.6 The presence of the CJNG has often driven increased violence at the local level, notably in areas of territorial dispute with other criminal groups.
- Topic:
- Non State Actors, Violence, Organized Crime, and Cartels
- Political Geography:
- Latin America, North America, and Mexico
5. The Muqawama and Its Enemies: Shifting Patterns in Iran-Backed Shiite Militia Activity in Iraq
- Author:
- Luca Nevola and Miran Feyli
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
- Abstract:
- The post-2003 security landscape in Iraq has seen the proliferation of dozens of militias identifying with Shiite Islam. Many of these actors are integrated into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) – a paramilitary group established in 2014 to counter the Islamic State and later incorporated into the Iraqi state forces – and have strong relations with the Iranian regime and its security apparatus.1 These Iran-backed groups include prominent militias such as Kataib Hizbullah (KH), Asaib Ahl al-Haqq (AAH), and Haraka Hizbullah al-Nujaba (HHN), as well as a number of recently formed ‘facade groups’ like Ashab al-Kahf and Qasim al-Jabarin. Such facade groups are generally assumed to operate on behalf of KH, AAH, and HHN (see graph below). These groups are notable for portraying themselves as the Muqawama, or the ‘resistance’ against the United States and other foreign forces.
- Topic:
- Security, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Militias
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Iran, and Middle East
6. Actor Profile: The Islamic State Sahel Province
- Author:
- Heni Nsaibia
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
- Abstract:
- The Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel) is a salafi-jihadist militant group and the Sahelian affiliate of the transnational Islamic State (IS) organization. It is primarily active in the border areas between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger — known as the tri-state border area, or Liptako-Gourma — but it has also engaged in sporadic activity in Algeria, Benin, and Nigeria. The group’s composition reflects the social fabric in the areas where it is active. Its members belong to the Fulani, Arab, Tuareg, Dawsahak, Songhai, and Djerma ethnic groups, although its core leadership was historically composed of Western Saharan militants.
- Topic:
- Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, and Islamic State
- Political Geography:
- North Africa and Sahel
7. Fact Sheet: Crisis in Ethiopia’s Amhara Region
- Author:
- Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
- Abstract:
- Violence is escalating in Amhara region, prompting the government to declare a state of emergency Nearly 30 clashes between government forces and Fano militias were recorded in Amhara last week, with most concentrated in North Wello and West Gojam zones, though fighting has been spread throughout the region. This marks an almost eightfold increase in armed clashes in the region relative to the weekly average since the start of the crisis in April. While Amhara was among the least volatile regions in the country prior to the start of the northern Ethiopia conflict in 2021, it is now one of the most unstable. Persistent insecurity in Amhara poses a significant threat to the federal government, the Abiy administration, and Ethiopia’s stability at large.
- Topic:
- Security, Political Violence, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Instability
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Ethiopia, and Amhara
8. Countering “ISIS at Large” in Syria
- Author:
- Devorah Margolin
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- In U.S. Central Command’s 2022 “year in review” statement on the current status of the fight against the Islamic State, commanding general Michael Kurilla highlighted three categories: (1) “ISIS in detention,” meaning the thousands of men and boys affiliated with the group and held in Iraqi and Syrian prisons; (2) the “potential next generation of ISIS,” meaning the approximately 55,000 women and minors held in camps; and (3) “ISIS at large,” meaning the leaders and operatives that the United States and its partners “are currently fighting in Iraq and Syria.” Although Gen. Kurilla praised the ongoing effort to militarily degrade ISIS, he also noted that the group’s ideology persists, and that “partnered operations” are needed to keep up the pressure. This view aligns with the pivot in U.S. strategy in Syria over the past year and a half, from a military mission to “advising, assisting, and enabling” local partners. At the same time, however, U.S. forces have continued launching unilateral strikes against ISIS leaders in Syria as recently as this month.
- Topic:
- Security, Terrorism, Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, Islamic State, and Military
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Syria
9. Drug trafficking in the Pacific Islands: The impact of transnational crime
- Author:
- Jose Sousa-Santos
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Lowy Institute for International Policy
- Abstract:
- The Pacific “drug highway” has spilled over into domestic markets for illicit drug consumption and production in the Pacific Islands region. Drug trafficking has evolved significantly with the rise of local actors in transnational criminal networks. Capacity shortfalls and a disconnect between regional law enforcement infrastructure and national law enforcement agencies undermine trust and are detrimental to intelligence sharing and interoperability in cross-border policing efforts. The deportation policies of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States are exacerbating crime and addiction within Pacific nations. They undermine the policy objectives of development partners in the region and will need urgent review.
- Topic:
- Crime, Non State Actors, Law Enforcement, Transnational Actors, and Drug Trafficking
- Political Geography:
- Australia, New Zealand, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America
10. Hizballah, Lebanon, and Reconciliation with the Gulf: The Impasse
- Author:
- Carl Yonker
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
- Abstract:
- On February 14, in Beirut’s southern, Hizballah-dominated suburb of Ghobeiry, Bahraini opposition groups marked the anniversary of the 2011 failed popular uprising in Bahrain. The gathering, organized by the Bahraini opposition group al-Wifaq, took place despite the Lebanese interior ministry’s orders to cancel it, which were issued in order to avoid offending Bahrain and its Gulf allies.[1] Lebanese ties with a quartet of Gulf states – Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates – have been at an impasse since October 2021. The diplomatic crisis, which has yet to be resolved, was sparked by Lebanese Information Minister George Kurdahi's critical comments regarding Saudi Arabia’s military intervention in Yemen. At its core, however, the crisis in Lebanese-Gulf relations is a dispute over Hizballah and its growing political influence in Lebanon – a source of tension for several years.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Non State Actors, Hezbollah, and Reconciliation
- Political Geography:
- Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, and Gulf Nations
11. HOW DO GOVERNMENTS DECIDE WHICH GROUPS ARE “TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS”?
- Author:
- Brian J. Phillips and Mirna El Masri
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Political Violence @ A Glance
- Abstract:
- US Senator Ted Cruz recently called for Yemen’s Houthis to be added to the Foreign Terrorist Organization list—again. The Iran-backed Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah, were designated as terrorists by the Trump administration on January 19, 2021, criminalizing support of the group, but the designation was removed by the Biden administration the following month. Around the world, national terrorist group lists vary considerably, and change over time. Last fall, the UK government announced it would add Hamas to its terrorist list. Other countries, such as the United States, have long designated Hamas a terrorist group, while others, like Russia, have not. Why do some organizations end up on countries’ terrorist group lists? Why are some terrorist lists different than others?
- Topic:
- Government, Terrorism, Non State Actors, Conflict, and Islamism
- Political Geography:
- United States of America
12. Jihad Takes Root in Northern Benin
- Author:
- Leif Brottem
- Publication Date:
- 09-2022
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
- Abstract:
- The 14 September 2022 killing of two customs agents days after the kidnapping of three individuals with government ties signals an alarming uptick in jihadist violence in northern Benin (Les 4 Vérités, 14 September 2022). ACLED records 28 organized political violence events in northern Benin attributed to Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) or the Islamic State between 1 November 2021 and 14 September 2022 (see map below). It is increasingly clear that jihadist cells have become deeply established in the country’s northern regions. The Beninese government is currently ramping up its threat response, which looks likely to include a security agreement with Rwanda (Radio France Internationale, 10 September 2022). It is more urgent than ever that the country’s counterinsurgency avoids the tragic mistakes of governments in the Sahel by blunting the deepening roots of the insurgency in rural areas.
- Topic:
- Counterinsurgency, Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, and Jihad
- Political Geography:
- Africa and Benin
13. The Hazm Brigades
- Author:
- Raed Khelifi
- Publication Date:
- 08-2021
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
- Abstract:
- This series maps the activity of little-known military brigades and armed groups proliferating throughout the conflict in Yemen. Mapping these actors has become relevant for understanding future trajectories of violence in Yemen as some of them have developed significant combat capabilities with shifting allegiances. While some follow their own interests, others have clear allegiances to the internationally recognized government or the Southern Transitional Council. As with actors in other conflict scenarios, such allegiances are, however, never set in stone. Rather, allegiances are a fluid process, shifting due to changes of outside circumstances (e.g. the behavior of a patron) or battlefield victories. In order to be better prepared for these changes, this series maps the activity of such military brigades and armed groups — some of them have become relevant already, while others may see their turn towards increased relevance in the future.
- Topic:
- Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Yemen and Gulf Nations
14. Sahel 2021: Communal Wars, Broken Ceasefires, and Shifting Frontlines
- Author:
- Heni Nsaibia and Jules Duhamel
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
- Abstract:
- In 2021, the Sahel crisis entered its tenth year. Despite the transnational nature of the crisis, each country has experienced different patterns of violence and transformations in the midst of a protracted conflict. This report looks at the patterns of violence in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali. It concludes with a review of the wider Sahel region. The report finds that both the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and the Al Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat Al Islam Wal Muslimin (JNIM) have shifted their efforts to geographic areas beyond the immediate reach of external forces in the face of military pressure in the tri-state border region (or Liptako-Gourma). Renewed engagement in local conflicts has allowed jihadist militant groups to enlarge their scope of action, reassert their influence, remobilize, and gain resources to rebuild. This can be seen clearly in Niger’s Tillaberi and Tahoua regions, the eastern parts of Burkina Faso, and central Mali (see figure below).
- Topic:
- War, Non State Actors, Islamic State, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Sahel
15. Aden Security
- Author:
- Matthias Sulz
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
- Abstract:
- This series maps the activity of little-known military brigades and armed groups proliferating throughout the conflict in Yemen. Mapping these actors has become relevant for understanding future trajectories of violence in Yemen as some of them have developed significant combat capabilities with shifting allegiances. While some follow their own interests, others have clear allegiances to the internationally recognized government or the Southern Transitional Council. As with actors in other conflict scenarios, such allegiances are, however, never set in stone. Rather, allegiances are a fluid process, shifting due to changes of outside circumstances (e.g. the behavior of a patron) or battlefield victories. In order to be better prepared for these changes, this series maps the activity of such military brigades and armed groups — some of them have become relevant already, while others may see their turn towards increased relevance in the future.
- Topic:
- Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Yemen
16. Iran in Lebanon: A Fatal Occupation
- Author:
- Hassan Mneimneh
- Publication Date:
- 10-2020
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- In 2020, Lebanon should be celebrating its centenary. It is not. Instead, it is close to terminal collapse as a polity, an economy, and even as a society. Lebanon is under Iranian occupation, although ascertaining this condition may demand some attentive consideration from the uninitiated. Iran’s proponents assess it as a confirmation of the “Axis of Resistance” against imperialism and Zionism; its detractors ascribe it to a deliberate plan of Iranian expansion across the region. However, the Iranian occupation of Lebanon may be rooted in Lebanon’s own tumultuous history rather than in Tehran’s designs. Iran in Lebanon may be more an artifact of history than a product of strategy. In fact, the outcome of Lebanon’s present course may not yield Iran any tangible advantage. And it certainly seems to be on the verge of destroying Lebanon.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Corruption, Terrorism, Non State Actors, Radicalization, and Hezbollah
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, and Lebanon
17. Essential Players: How do ‘Mercenaries’ affect conflicts in the Middle East?
- Author:
- FARAS
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
- Abstract:
- The utilization of mercenaries has become one of the key predicaments in the Middle East, particularly in the hotbeds of armed conflict, including Libya, Yemen and Syria. Such militia are usually transferred through the use of civil flights, crossing land borders or smuggling through organized crime networks. This has been reflected by numerous evidence including the escalating tensions between the international powers such as ‘France’ and regional ones such as ‘Turkey’, even affecting the mutual hostility between the ‘Syrian Democratic Forces’ and Ankara, and the latter's policy aiming at disturbing Libya's neighboring countries. In the case of Yemen, the Houthi militia and Islah party have also used African mercenaries. It is further evident in the warning given by the Yemeni government to ‘Tehran Mercenaries’ against turning Yemen into a battlefield after the murder of Qassem Soleimani.
- Topic:
- War, Non State Actors, Houthis, Militias, and Mercenaries
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Turkey, Middle East, France, Libya, Yemen, North Africa, and Syria
18. Maneuvering: Why Iran is Cozying up to Taliban?
- Author:
- FARAS
- Publication Date:
- 01-2019
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
- Abstract:
- Iran is currently making unremitting efforts to further its relations with the Afghan Taliban. Although these attempts are not new, as there have always been unannounced channels of communication between the two parties, Iran is keen to uncover the presence of these channels and its efforts to foster relations with the movement. This was evident in the recent statements of Iranian officials such as its Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and the Secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security Ali Shamkhani. This is, without a doubt, inseparable from the Iranian attempts to pave the Afghan arena for the return of elements of the Fatimid militia, and perhaps prepare in advance for a possible and sudden US withdrawal from the country, like the recent US decision to withdraw from Syria.
- Topic:
- Non State Actors, Taliban, Conflict, and Militias
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, Iran, South Asia, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
19. Perils of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Proliferation: Preventing Non-State Acquisition
- Author:
- Philip Chartoff
- Publication Date:
- 10-2018
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- Throughout the late 90s, Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda allegedly made numerous attempts to acquire nuclear material from illicit actors. Starting in 2004, Hezbollah has been deploying Iranian-made, military-grade drones for surveillance and engagement. Terrorist groups, illicit organisations, and other non-state actors have a long fascination with advanced weapons technologies. In the early 90s, the Japanese death cult Aum Shinrikyo pursued multiple avenues to develop chemical, nuclear and biological weapons, eventually succeeding in the creation and deployment of Sarin gas. Throughout the late 90s, Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda allegedly made numerous attempts to acquire nuclear material from illicit actors. Starting in 2004, Hezbollah has been deploying Iranian-made, military-grade drones for surveillance and engagement. Despite the relative success of less sophisticated weapons, and the substantial expense and difficulty of acquisition for more advanced systems, non-state actors continue to pursue advanced weapons for two significant reasons. For less funded, less powerful non-state actors, advanced weapons substantially increase the scale of the force they can wield against enemies—they promise to “level the playing field”. Advanced weapon systems also offer a significant reputational and symbolic benefit to non-state actors, as the ownership of such weapons confer a status limited to only a handful of powerful nations. States have long recognized these risks, and established numerous arms and export controls to restrict and regulate the transfer of massively destructive weapons. However, international efforts to restrict proliferation of such weapons are currently lagging behind the emergence of new, possibly as-destructive, technologies. In particular, the last few years have marked the rapid development of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). Considering their potential to escalate conflicts and inflict massive collateral damage, the international community has long been debating necessary restrictions on the implementation of autonomy in weapons systems, even considering a ban on fully-autonomous systems. However, such conversations have largely been limited to state use. The international community has been painfully slow to address the possible acquisition and use of LAWS by non-state actors.
- Topic:
- Non State Actors, Weapons, and Nonproliferation
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
20. Continued Confrontations: Will ISIS Employ New Terrorist Tactics?
- Author:
- FARAS
- Publication Date:
- 12-2018
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
- Abstract:
- Despite that ISIS may have dealt with heavy blows, whether in the previously-dominated areas or the emerging ones, it is still able to stage terrorist attacks by employing various tactics, key among them the “lone- wolves” and “sleeper cells”. This has been evident in the recent terrorist operations in many countries, such as Tunisia and Morocco, as well as several European countries, which ISIS have threatened to target by using explosive belts, car-ramming and stabbing during Christmas holidays. Notably, some of such attacks have been carried out using tactics and methods that have not been widely used in the past. This raises questions about the ideological transformations that ISIS, its sleeper cells and sub-groups may have witnessed, given the new realities brought about by the war on the organization.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, and Islamic State
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and North Africa
21. A Reversal: Will al-Qaeda’s Influence Recede in the Coming Period?
- Author:
- FARAS
- Publication Date:
- 10-2018
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
- Abstract:
- Al-Qaeda has sought to exploit the 17th anniversary of the events of 11 September 2001 to assert its survival and ability to stay at the forefront of terrorist organizations worldwide. In doing so, it seems to be trying to cover up the multiple challenges facing it at the present stage, which may cause its influence to diminish in the medium and long term. Thus, it cannot be ruled out that the fears expressed by many of its leaders over the organization declining influence is the main factor that prompted Ayman al-Zawahiri to increase the media messages he sends to the organization cadres and members along with other organizations, especially its rivals, as well as the international and regional powers concerned with combating terrorism. It is a remarkable shift from what happened in the past years, which witnessed a relatively limited appearance of al-Zawahiri to comment on events with the aim of proving that he is still alive and interacting developments. The new development raises many questions about the significance of the flurry of messages, particularly that they come at a time the region is witnessing numerous important variables with profound impacts, such as the receding influence of the pro-al-Qaeda groups in Syria against the backdrop of the recent security and political arrangements.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, and Al Qaeda
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Libya, Yemen, North Africa, Syria, and Maghreb
22. The "Mobile Militia": Will Iran Replicate the Hezbollah Model in Afghanistan?
- Author:
- FARAS
- Publication Date:
- 11-2018
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
- Abstract:
- The prospect of Iran replicating the Lebanese Hezbollah model in other countries can no longer be ruled out, amid the pressure of the new sanctions imposed on Tehran in the wake of the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal on May 8, 2018. One of the objectives that Tehran may seek to achieve through such move is to exploit its regional influence to reduce the US pressure and, perhaps at a later stage, bolster its negotiating position versus Washington in any potential new negotiations. However, there are other objectives that Iran may try to achieve, if it decides to press ahead with this option, such as creating loyal military arms in Afghanistan. Hence, Iran will be able to possess instruments to influence the government decisions in the stage leading up to a settlement of the Afghan crisis, as well as enhance its prospects of participating in the efforts to reach such a settlement.
- Topic:
- Non State Actors, Geopolitics, Hezbollah, and Militias
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, Iran, South Asia, and Middle East