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Begin New Search Topic Diplomacy Content Type Commentary and Analysis

1. The Red-Hot Blue Line

Author:
Assaf Orion
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The first weekend of 2024 saw one of the fiercest exchanges of fire between Hezbollah and Israel since the 2006 war. On January 6, the group launched antitank guided missiles, attack drones, and no less than sixty-two rockets against Israel’s northern air control unit in Mount Meron, causing some damage. Hezbollah described the salvo as an “initial response” to the targeted killing of senior Hamas official Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut days earlier. In response, the Israel Defense Forces struck Hezbollah military compounds, a surface-to-air missile unit, and other targets at seven sites in south Lebanon. On January 8, an IDF strike killed Wissam al-Tawil, a senior commander in the group’s Radwan special forces. The next day, Hezbollah drones attacked the IDF’s northern command headquarters, while Israel killed the head of the group’s southern aerial unit and three of his team. In all, Hezbollah has claimed ten new “martyrs” since Saturday. Amid the fighting, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has restated Israel’s “resolve to return the northern communities home, diplomatically if possible; otherwise, by other means.” Similarly, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant told U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein, “We prefer the path of an agreed-upon diplomatic settlement, but we are getting close to the point where the hourglass will turn over.” Senior U.S. and European officials are now shuttling between Beirut and Jerusalem in a bid to stop the escalation. What exactly will it take to prevent a war in Lebanon and possibly beyond?
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Diplomacy, and Military
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Lebanon

2. Domestic Disagreements Limit Netanyahu’s Options with Washington

Author:
David Makovsky
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
As the Hamas-Israel war enters a new phase, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is finding it increasingly difficult to balance relationships inside his government and with the White House. On the military front, Israel has taken most of northern Gaza, though an estimated 5,000-6,000 Hamas fighters remain active in various tunnel networks. Major combat operations have largely shifted to central and southern Gaza, while the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have released most of the 360,000 reservists mobilized at the beginning of the war and withdrawn some forces for retraining. Yet the situation is murkier on the diplomatic and political fronts. Earlier today, Netanyahu and President Biden spoke with each other for the first time in almost four weeks, and the prime minister is fundamentally at odds with Benny Gantz’s centrist National Unity party. When Gantz joined the government shortly after the October 7 attacks, he helped dilute the influence of the far-right parties led by Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir while focusing the cabinet on the mutual goal of driving Hamas from power in Gaza. Yet their policy differences have become more salient since then, and Netanyahu seems convinced that Gantz—who is riding high in the polls—will soon leave the government to capitalize on the prime minister’s wartime unpopularity in potential early elections. This has made Netanyahu more dependent on his far-right ministers, much to the consternation of the White House.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Domestic Politics, Conflict, and Benjamin Netanyahu
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

3. The Italy-Africa Summit 2024 and the Mattei Plan: Towards Cooperation between Equals?

Author:
Filippo Simonelli, Maria Luisa Fantappiè, and Leo Goretti
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Italy inaugurated its year of G7 presidency with the Italy-Africa summit on 28-29 January in Rome, an event representative of the current government’s ambitions.[1] The long-awaited meeting was the first test for the strategy of “cooperation as equals” with African states that Giorgia Meloni has repeatedly proposed as central to her government's foreign policy. It was also the first occasion to test the real scope of the so-called Mattei Plan for Africa, the project with which the Italian government wants to substantiate this strategy but whose official strategic outline has yet to be announced.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and International Cooperation
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, and Italy

4. The Yemen Annual Review 2023

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Peace talks between Saudi Arabia and the Houthi group (Ansar Allah) dominated Yemeni politics over the last year. The negotiations began as backchannel discussions in October 2022 after the Houthis resisted UN pressure to renew a truce first agreed in April 2022 by making a series of eleventh-hour demands. The talks continued despite Houthi attacks on oil terminals in southern Yemen in late 2022 that effectively put the internationally recognized government under a form of economic blockade. As the months progressed, the government’s increasingly dire economic situation pressured it to accept the Saudi policy of seeking a settlement with Houthi authorities, seemingly at almost any price. The broad terms of a Saudi-Houthi agreement first became public in January, when international media reported that Saudi Arabia had agreed in principle to pay outstanding civil servant salaries in Houthi-run areas, including those of military and security personnel, and to remove restrictions on entry points, including the ports of Hudaydah and Sana’a airport. In return, Saudi Arabia wanted guarantees that there would be no more attacks on its territory and the creation of a buffer zone along the border, an end to the Houthi blockade of southern ports and the siege of Taiz, and for direct Yemeni-Yemeni talks to follow any deal. Within a few months, these proposals had morphed into a comprehensive roadmap for peace involving a six-month ceasefire, to be followed by three months of government-Houthi discussions on managing a transitional phase of two years, during which a final resolution of the conflict would be negotiated. A prisoner swap in April arranged by the International Committee of the Red Cross in Switzerland saw around 973 people released, including high-profile figures, and seemed to augur rapid progress. But Saudi Arabia appeared to overplay its hand when Ambassador to Yemen Mohammed al-Jaber led a delegation on a much-feted trip to Sana’a in April. The Houthis again raised their demands, arguing that an agreement must be signed first with Riyadh alone as a party to the conflict, and that Saudi Arabia should agree to pay compensation for war damage and finance postwar reconstruction. Al-Jaber left Sana’a without an agreement, but the basic terms of a formal de-escalation and path toward a resolution of the conflict were nevertheless laid down. Saudi Arabia’s problem now was how to manage resistance from the government’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC). Ultimately, it was kept in the dark about the details of the proposed arrangement for most of the year, even its chairman Rashad al-Alimi, who was expected to sign off at the end of the process. A Houthi delegation met Saudi officials during a hajj pilgrimage trip in June – posing for photos with Defense Minister Khaled bin Salman – sending the signal that a formal agreement normalizing Saudi-Houthi ties and initiating a Yemeni-Yemeni peace process had become a question not of if, but when. A complication that emerged early on was US reservations about a peace deal following the Saudi-Iran rapprochement brokered by China in March. This seemed to mark China’s arrival as a diplomatic player in the region, putting the Americans on notice that another global superpower was interested in challenging its role in the Middle East, including, perhaps, in Yemen. There was an irony here, in that rising criticism of Saudi Arabia’s conduct during the war in the US Congress, and threats to halt arms sales, played a role in bringing the Saudi leadership around the idea of getting out of Yemen and ending a foreign military adventure that had damaged its global standing.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Investment, Houthis, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia

5. Is the G7 still relevant?

Author:
Raffaele Trombetta
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
In the first of our new Expert Analysis series, former Italian Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Raffaele Trombetta, draws on his career experience to answer the question of whether the G7 is still relevant in today’s international order. Detailing a narrative of the G7’s history, confronting its challenges, and addressing its common criticisms, this paper deals with the alternatives (G20 and BRICS), as well as where the G7’s interests should lie in future relations with China and the African nations.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, G20, G7, BRICS, and International Order
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Europe, and Asia

6. Beijing’s Passive-Aggressive Middle East Policy

Author:
Michael Singh
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The real threat to U.S. interests in the region isn’t rising Chinese influence, but the erosion of Washington's influence. Will China broker a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? It is a question nobody is asking, because the answer is obvious—not a chance. Yet after Beijing hosted Iran-Saudi talks that led those two rivals to re-establish diplomatic relations in March 2023, some observers wondered if China had supplanted the U.S. as the Middle East’s diplomatic broker. Since Hamas’s Oct. 7 massacre, China has put such illusions to rest: its conduct shows that it is less interested in the success of its own initiatives than in the failure of Washington’s. The real threat to U.S. interests in the Mideast isn’t rising Chinese influence, but the erosion of our own...
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, and Asia

7. Renavigating a Soft Power Relationship Between the West and Tunisia

Author:
Oussama Boudhrioua
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Without a sea change, U.S. and European soft power will continue to erode in Tunisia at a moment of increasing crisis for the country. For decades, Tunisians have viewed their country’s relationship with the West as a relationship built on a sense of mutual alliance. Tunisia has long seen itself as a vital ally for both the United States and Europe; in 2012 a host of bilateral and multilateral agreements solidified the economic and political ties between Tunisia and Europe, and in 2015 Washington deemed Tunisia a Major Non-NATO Ally. These relationships span much of the past century; aside from being under French and Italian control during the colonial period, Tunisia became a key site of conflict in the North African theater during World War II, when Allied forces eventually broke into the Italian peninsula from the south. And for many Tunisians coming of age in the 1990s, the United States was seen as the ideal model of a superpower. Despite these deep ties between Tunisia and the West, the true nature of the country’s relationship with the United States and Europe continues to be unclear and ever-changing. However, geopolitical shifts and harsh realities have snuffed out that once-bright optimism. In Tunisia, the recent actions of the United States in the region have damaged its reputation, perhaps irreparably. This was evident in the United States' stance on the ongoing war in Gaza since last October, where it did not intervene effectively to stop the war using its diplomatic leverage. Moreover China, Russia, and other powers are steadily making economic and political inroads at the expense of the United States and Europe.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Soft Power
Political Geography:
North Africa and Tunisia

8. Turkey Wants to Stitch Iraq and Syria Back Together (Part 1)

Author:
Soner Cagaptay
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Having observed two decades of instability across its southern borders and anticipating U.S. withdrawals, Ankara is planning steps to end the volatility, including potentially wide-ranging agreements with the Assad regime. Events in the Fertile Crescent since the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq have not been in favor of Turkish security interests. The ensuing Iraqi civil strife, the rise of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS), and Syria’s civil war collectively resulted in regional instability for over two decades, including numerous terrorist attacks against Turkey. Meanwhile, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a NATO-designated terrorist entity that has been fighting Ankara for decades, took advantage of Iraq’s decentralization to establish itself along the border in the semiautonomous Kurdistan Region. On Turkey’s other southern border, the multinational campaign against IS led to a U.S. partnership with the People’s Defense Units (YPG)—the PKK’s armed Syrian wing that later took a leading role in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and gained control over a large swath of the frontier. This partnership became the greatest impediment to a reset in U.S.-Turkey ties. Today, anticipating that the U.S. military presence in Iraq and Syria will decrease significantly, Ankara aims to promote soft recentralization in both neighbors, toward the broader goals of curbing instability across its borders and denying operational space to the PKK. Part 1 of this PolicyWatch discusses how these goals affect Turkish policy in Syria; Part 2 addresses the implications for Iraq.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Partnerships, PKK, Regional Politics, and Regional Stability
Political Geography:
Iraq, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

9. When Diplomats Are Undiplomatic

Author:
Charles Ray
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The US ambassador to South Africa recently accused South Africa of shipping arms to Russia. The ambassador was criticized by some—including the South African government—for breaking with diplomatic protocol by so openly condemning his host government. However, maintaining an effective working relationship does not mean that a diplomat must never say or do anything that the host country might not like. Far from it. Effective diplomacy is built on trust, honesty, and respect, and the diplomat who never disagrees or who comes across as a sycophant, will be neither trusted nor respected. On the other hand, a diplomat who is consistently honest, but who strives to be polite and considerate, might not be universally liked, but will earn respect.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Weapons, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, South Africa, and United States of America

10. Biden’s Middle East Balancing Act: Iran’s Nuclear Program and Saudi-Israeli Ties

Author:
Leon Hadar
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
This summer, the Biden administration decided to negotiate a temporary deal with Iran involving the release of American prisoners held by the Islamic Republic in exchange for the release of some of the funds that were held by the United States as part of the economic sanctions on Tehran. The White House expects that this package deal will open the road to talks with Iran on its nuclear program. The outline of a deal would include a pause in the accumulation of enriched uranium and an Iranian pledge not to produce weapons-grade fissile material, in exchange for the removal of US economic sanctions. But any diplomatic deal between Washington and Tehran raises fears among two of America’s allies in the region, Saudi Arabia and Israel, that regard Iran as an existential threat. From that perspective, a US-led process of normalizing the relations between Riyadh and Jerusalem could help contain Iran and reinforce the American pledge to strengthen the alliance with Saudi Arabia and Israel.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, Negotiation, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America