Content Type: Commentary and Analysis / Publication Year: within 5 Years and within 25 Years

401. New Bahrain Poll Reveals Support for Russia, Entente with Iran, Split on Israel

Author:: David Pollock
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: On Iran, Bahrainis (especially among the country’s Shia majority) mostly favor rapprochement, and oppose military action or cooperation with Israel against it. Popular acceptance of business ties with Israel is steady, at around 40% in this small yet strategic island nation that joined the Abraham Accords in late 2020. But other measures show strong anti-Israel sentiment, probably in part because the survey was taken during Ramadan, a time of heightened tension with the Palestinians.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Public Opinion, Polls, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Israel, Bahrain, and Gulf Nations

402. Preserving U.S. Military Advantages in the Middle East

Author:: Nathan P. Olsen
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) calls on the U.S. military to sustain enduring advantages and build new ones for the future fight. According to the NDS, building and maintaining advantages to advance U.S. national interests will allow the military to deter attacks against the United States and its allies and partners, while fostering a resilient military force and defense ecosystem. In the Middle East, this challenge is especially relevant. The United States has several enduring advantages that could eventually disappear if the U.S. government does not make significant changes in how it operates in this part of the world.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Strategic Competition, and Military
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

403. The Future of Repatriation from Northeast Syria

Author:: Devorah Margolin
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: The Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) recently announced that due to the international community’s slow response to the repatriation of thousands of individuals affiliated with the Islamic State (IS), it will begin to hold “fair and transparent trials in accordance with international and local laws related to terrorism.” The announcement comes after representatives from more than eighty countries gathered in Saudi Arabia on June 8 for a ministerial meeting convened by the Global Coalition Against Daesh, where U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken reminded attendees, “We know that repatriation is the only durable solution.” His statement stood out in this context because citizens from many coalition states are still being detained indefinitely in northeast Syria. While the United States has proactively advocated for repatriation across two administrations, most other countries around the world have been reluctant or slow to take such action. To date, approximately 5,500 Iraqis and 2,700 third-country nationals (i.e., not Syrian or Iraqi) have been repatriated from detention camps, and the international community is on track to repatriate more such individuals in 2023 than in years past. Although this is a step in the right direction, it means that more than 10,000 third-country nationals from almost 60 countries remain in detention in northeast Syria, including approximately 2,000 men and boys and 8,000 women and minors. These numbers do not include the more than 18,000 Syrians and 25,000 Iraqis who are also being held indefinitely. With numerous international conflicts dominating daily headlines, much of the international community is no doubt fatigued by the challenges emanating from the fight against IS and the repatriation of IS-affiliated individuals. Yet the AANES announcement and other developments show that these challenges will only proliferate without concerted attention from Washington and its coalition partners.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Islamic State, Repatriation, and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
Political Geography:: Middle East and Syria

404. Hakan Fidan and the New Turkish Diplomacy in Iraq

Author:: Firas Elias
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Following President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s victory in the Turkish general elections in May 2023, Turkish foreign policy in Iraq has the potential to evolve in a different direction under the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hakan Fidan. Though the management of Turkey’s affairs in Iraq has shifted between various Turkish institutions since 2003, President Erdoğan has consolidated decision-making into his own hands since 2017, and his recent appointment of Fidan—a former intelligence director and loyal ally of Erdoğan—signals a continuation of this process, especially vis-a-vis Iraq. As Director of National Intelligence, Fidan oversaw the most sensitive backchannels with various regional and international actors, and he played a leading role in formulating Turkish intelligence and security policy. Notably, Fidan also led Turkey's reconciliation efforts with a variety of adversaries, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia. He has also been intimately involved in Turkish efforts to combat the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), targeting many PKK leaders and allied factions in northern Iraq, particularly in Sinjar, Makhmur, and al-Kuwayr. In this regard, Fidan comes equipped with deep connections to Iraq’s bureaucratic circles, having already succeeded in building bridges between various Iraqi actors and institutions. In particular, Fidan has developed close ties with both Sunni and Kurdish political leaders and has good relations with Falih al-Fayyadh, chairman of the Popular Mobilization Forces, whom he met during one of his secret trips to Iraq in September 2022. Fidan notably conducted such bridge-building efforts during the formation of the current Iraqi government led by Mohammed Shia al-Sudani. Given this background in Iraqi politics along with his experience in intelligence, Fidan is an important player through which Erdoğan can rethink Turkish involvement in Iraq on a number of different issues. Though Fidan’s appointment certainly indicates a shift toward more security-focused policies for Turkey, the new minister will also have to balance Turkey’s political ties, economic and energy interests, environmental concerns, and military operations in Iraq. Indeed, Erdoğan likely hopes that Fidan can both diversify Turkey’s relationship networks in Iraq and reestablish normalized energy negotiations with key partners while also curbing the threat of the PKK and Iranian-aligned militias operating in Turkey’s areas of involvement in Iraq.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, Politics, and Energy
Political Geography:: Iraq, Turkey, and Middle East

405. Sinjar: Challenges and Resilience Nine Years after Genocide

Author:: Izat Noah
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Nearly a decade later, many victims are still missing, and thousands now live in displacement camps in unstable, unsanitary conditions. This anniversary is an opportunity to reflect on the ongoing armed conflict in the Sinjar region and the profound influence on its inhabitants. It also serves as an opportunity to appreciate the resilience of the Yazidis, looking toward a future with new hope and new aspirations—a future where Yazidis can experience peace, stability, justice, and equitable opportunities to reconstruct their lives and their communities. Yazidi resilience is clearly evident in how they bore the burden of this genocide, how they have persevered in the face of ongoing persecution and genocide for centuries, and how they have been steadfast in maintaining their identity and heritage despite these adversities and the repeated campaigns to tarnish their image. Yet Yazidis still face significant challenges in Iraq today. Despite relative stability in the Sinjar region, there are concerns among the Yazidi population about the return of armed conflict between groups vying for influence. Even more troubling, the issue of expulsion and displacement remains unresolved despite the liberation of Sinjar from ISIS in 2015. Many Yazidis still live in displacement camps, where they are without their homes, their land, or their basic rights. These refugees have yet to be materially compensated for their losses.
Topic:: Genocide, Politics, Terrorism, and Yazidis
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, and Sinjar

406. Sudan's Civil War: Mediation Challenges and the U.S. Role

Author:: Yasir Zaidan, Reem Abbas, and Alex Rondos
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Three experts assess the conflict’s effects on regional humanitarian and security issues, outlining the requirements for a durable ceasefire.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Civil War, Conflict, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:: Africa, Sudan, Egypt, and United States of America

407. Iraqi Kurds Face Legitimacy Issues Amid Election Deadlock and Internal Division

Author:: Bekir Aydoğan
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Parliamentary elections were originally set to be held on October 1, 2022 in the KRI, but they were then postponed to November 18, 2023 because the two main Kurdish parties—the Barzani-led Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Talabani-led Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—could not work out an agreement on the elections system. Now, months after the KRI’s Parliament, government, and presidency expired last November, the KRI’s President announced that the elections would take place on February 25, 2024. Though both the KDP and PUK have so far agreed on holding the elections on this date, the parties have yet to resolve a months-long dispute over the parliament’s controversial minority quota. Amidst the uncertainty, there’s no guarantee that the February 2024 target date will come to fruition.
Topic:: Elections, Legitimacy, and Kurds
Political Geography:: Iraq and Middle East

408. Niger Coup Threatens U.S. Strategy on Counterterrorism and Russia

Author:: Ben Fishman, Anna Borshchevskaya, and Aaron Y. Zelin
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: On July 26, Nigerien president Mohamed Bazoum was detained by members of his special guard and put under house arrest, where he remains under harsh conditions. Gen. Abdourahmane Tchiani has since declared himself head of the so-called “National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland” and appointed a twenty-one-person cabinet on August 8. The coup comes in the wake of military takeovers in Guinea, Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad, and Sudan over the past three years, demonstrating regional anti-democratic trends amid trans-regional instability. Diplomatic efforts to quell the crisis have failed to date. U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken has made repeated calls to Bazoum, reflecting a commitment to securing his release and returning to “constitutional order.” Bazoum was a close American security partner prior to his arrest and was accorded a prominent role during the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington last December. Blinken has also reached out to former president Mahamadou Issoufou, who has better personal ties to the junta; he was once an ally of Bazoum but had recently broken with his successor’s anti-corruption initiatives. This call followed Acting Deputy Secretary Victoria Nuland’s unsuccessful August 8 visit to Niamey, where she was prohibited from meeting with Bazoum or Tchiani. Instead, she spoke with Gen. Moussa Salaou Barmou, a longtime U.S. security partner who serves as the military’s new chief of staff but would not offer so much as an assurance of Barzoum’s safety, let alone his release or restoration. With the junta rejecting all U.S. and regional diplomatic initiatives, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has threatened military intervention. The alliance’s leaders met on August 10 and agreed to deploy a standby force, though how quickly it can be assembled remains unclear. In neighboring Algeria, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune strongly condemned the junta but said any military intervention in Niger would represent “a direct threat” to his country, declaring, “There will be no solution without us. We are the first people affected.” In Libya—another neighbor keenly attuned to Niger’s stability given persistent smuggling—the Government of National Unity condemned the junta, while the eastern-based warlord Khalifa Haftar condemned the threats by ECOWAS. Elsewhere, Egypt has remained largely silent about the crisis, while Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates quickly denounced the coup and called for Bazoum’s restoration (in part because he is Niger’s first Arab president). The UAE also sent some military vehicles to neighboring Chad, providing additional border security and signaling their growing bilateral relationship.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Counter-terrorism, Strategic Competition, and Wagner Group
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, West Africa, Niger, and United States of America

409. The Rise and Immediate Fall of Israel-Libya Relations

Author:: Ben Fishman
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: On August 27, Israeli foreign minister Eli Cohen revealed that he had met with his Libyan counterpart Najla al-Mangoush in Rome, sparking an imbroglio in both of their countries and further abroad. Protests erupted immediately across Libya, including at the Foreign Ministry and the residence of Prime Minister Abdulhamid al-Dabaiba, who likely authorized the meeting. Dabaiba tried to calm the situation by suspending Mangoush and naming an interim foreign minister, while his Government of National Unity (GNU) called the incident a chance encounter alongside Italy’s foreign minister rather than a planned meeting. As protests continued on August 28, Dabaiba appeared at the Palestinian embassy in Tripoli, where he donned a scarf depicting the Dome of the Rock, announced that he had officially dismissed Mangoush, and reiterated Libya’s dedication to the Palestinian cause. Fearing further backlash and potential violence, Mangoush fled to Istanbul. Unlike her predecessors, who were experienced diplomats familiar with Libya’s byzantine Foreign Ministry, Mangoush had no diplomatic background. Dabaiba appointed her in March 2021 only after another female candidate drew criticism, and she faced a unique challenge as a woman among exclusively male foreign ministers across the region. She lacked a power base of her own and wielded narrow influence outside of what Dabaiba and his circle granted her. Yet she was resilient during her first two years in office, surviving calls for her resignation over controversial statements criticizing Turkey’s military presence in Libya, praising Russia’s positive relationship with the GNU, and cooperating with the United States on the extradition of a Pan Am 103 bombing suspect (see below). The State Department named her an International Woman of Courage in 2022, citing her work with civil society organizations and her expertise in conflict resolution (gained in part from PhD work at George Mason University).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Normalization
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Libya, and North Africa

410. Iran’s Misunderstood Nuclear Law

Author:: Henry Rome
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: This summer, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei delivered his most detailed remarks in years on Iran’s nuclear trajectory. While his comments on a potential agreement with the West drew the most attention, he also called on Iranian officials to follow a controversial 2020 law that ordered rapid steps to escalate the nuclear program and reduce international monitoring. “Some people think that this law creates problems for the country,” he stated. “They are wrong. This law is a good law...And it must be followed.” Indeed, the 2020 legislation has played a prominent role in Iranian debates about nuclear advances, and Khamenei’s comments suggest this will remain the case. Yet the law is widely misunderstood; more important, it has not been the primary driver of Iran’s actual nuclear activity over the past three years. The governments of Hassan Rouhani and Ebrahim Raisi each sidestepped key provisions of the legislation while also escalating the program in ways the law does not require. Despite Khamenei’s sentiment, neither the existing law nor potential successor legislation is likely to compel escalation or constrain diplomacy.
Topic:: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Legislation, Nuclear Energy, and Military
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

411. Iraqi Officials Eye a Path for Chinese-Iraqi Development

Author:: Baraa Sabri
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Mohammed Shia al-Sudani did not become prime minister in Baghdad as smoothly as desired by the powers close to the “axis of resistance.” Nevertheless, several factors facilitated his rise to power. Domestic concerns, such as Muqtada al-Sadr’s decision to withdraw his bloc from the political process and a push from groups close to Iran to put forward a prime minister with relative acceptance in the regional and international community, played a role. But these considerations compounded with the climate of regional tensions and interests of outside powers—competition between the Gulf and Iran, concerns over the ongoing repercussions of the strained relationship with Washington caused by the Trump administration, and the growing dominance of various armed groups close to Tehran. This precarious reality and confused relationships likewise seem to have driven al-Sudani’s government to attempt to circumvent the traditional binary choice between Washington, the West, and most of the Gulf states on the one hand, and Tehran, Damascus, Lebanon, and their backer Moscow on the other. This new course comes with a distinct and flashy name, the “Development Road” project, and looks to Beijing as a third way forward. Iraq’s political realignment is in large part a response to Iraqis’ shifting views of the United States and the broader geopolitical space: the haphazard American withdrawal from Afghanistan, the political changes in U.S. policy under Biden, the failure to revive the nuclear agreement with Iran, the stagnation in the Syrian issue, Erdogan’s steadfast support of Putin, Russia’s continued attacks on Ukraine, economic movement linked to oil prices, inflation, and financial turmoil in currency rates from Cairo to Tehran, fears of harsh economic sanctions, and, finally and most importantly, the economic rise of China.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Multilateralism, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Iraq, Middle East, and Asia

412. How to Stop Iraqi Kurdistan’s “Bleeding”

Author:: Bilal Wahab
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: In a recent letter to President Biden that was soon reinforced by three U.S. lawmakers, Prime Minister Masrour Barzani of Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government expressed his alarm over the region’s survival. Noting that the KRG is “bleeding economically and hemorrhaging politically,” he laid the blame on Baghdad’s “dishonorable campaign” against Erbil. Barzani has a point—federal authorities have indeed been undoing the KRG’s hard-won autonomy in the years since the Islamic State fell and the Kurds launched an unsuccessful independence bid. Most notably, Baghdad has recentralized policymaking in the capital and blocked Kurdish oil exports amid a decade-old dispute over energy management. Yet Barzani’s narrative does not tell the whole story. The United States has long supported Iraqi Kurdistan’s autonomy, security, and development, fostering greater stability and pro-American sentiment. At the same time, however, Washington has overlooked the KRG’s vulnerabilities—namely, the internal divisions, corruption, and democratic backsliding that have diminished Erbil’s reliability and brought on the current existential crisis. The United States has a strategic interest in continuing to promote a stable and prosperous KRG, but it cannot do so without addressing the region’s internal problems.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, Autonomy, and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, and Kurdistan

413. Syrians' Reactions to the First Weeks of Israel-Hamas War

Author:: Ammar Musarea
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: When the al-Qassam Brigades—the military wing of Hamas which the United States classifies as a terrorist organization—launched their al-Aqsa Flood operation, Syrians were already on edge. They had been following news of peaceful protests that have been taking place for almost two months in the Suwayda Governorate, which is majority Druze, as well as in other Syrian governorates. Protestors have called for the end of the Assad regime, the release of tens of thousands of prisoners, and the implementation of UN resolutions on Syria. Meanwhile, the Syrian regime and Russian aircraft have carried out daily bombings on civilians in Idlib and the surrounding countryside, which have displaced more than 100,000 Syrians. The Syrian Network for Human Rights stated that the Assad regime and Russia’s attacks on northwestern Syria have resulted in around 45 civilian deaths including 13 children, 9 women, and 3 humanitarian aid workers. They said that 51 critical facilities had also been targeted during October 2023. Al-Aqsa Flood also comes at a time when Syrians in regime-controlled areas face increasingly difficult living conditions. Concurrently, the International Court of Justice is beginning initial proceedings for Canada and the Netherlands’ case against the Assad regime for crimes of torture. The response to events in Israel and Gaza have not been monolithic; reactions have varied significantly depending on factions’ alliances and proximity to the conflict. On the one hand, there is widespread disillusionment with actors claiming to liberate Palestine, a reflection of how groups like Hamas failed to support the Syrian people’s revolution against the Assad regime. However, Syrians as a whole empathize with Palestinians and reject the killing and forced displacement of Palestinians and destruction of their homes. Simultaneously, Syrians have not forgotten the crimes that the terrorist organization Hezbollah has carried out against them in support of the regime, as well as Hamas’ backstabbing in trying to reestablish ties with the Assad regime. Hamas' close ties with Iran, the main backer of the Damascus government, are another source of anger in anti-regime circles.
Topic:: Public Opinion, Syrian War, Hamas, and October 7
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and Syria

414. Morocco and North Africa Are Feeling Anti-Normalization Ripples from the Gaza War

Author:: Sabina Henneberg
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: The conflict will make it more difficult for Washington and Israel to preserve—let alone expand—the diplomatic progress they have made with North African governments in recent years, particularly as public opposition intensifies. North Africa has not been spared from the reverberations of the Hamas-Israel war. Morocco may be the country most profoundly affected given its relatively strong relations with Israel and the United States, while anti-normalization trends elsewhere in the region are being firmly reinforced, creating new challenges for Washington.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Conflict, Normalization, and Hamas
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, North Africa, and Morocco

415. After Gaza, Recalibrated Prospects for a Geopolitical Europe

Author:: Selin Uysal
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: On October 26, the European Council adopted a new set of conclusions relating to the war in Gaza. Notably, these reiterated condemnation of Hamas, Israel’s right to defend itself in line with international law, calls to release all hostages, concern for all civilian lives, the need to ensure humanitarian access to Gaza, and a commitment to achieving a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Earlier European dissonance regarding the Gaza conflict thus appeared to be replaced by clearer communication. But European unity could soon be tested again, including on humanitarian messaging, which is less easily consented upon than meets the eye. More broadly, whereas the war in Ukraine had given rise to optimism about the emergence of a “geopolitical Europe”—a European Union capable of defining common strategic international objectives and deploying concrete operational means to achieve them—events following the Hamas attacks have exposed divisions within European institutions and highlighted the absence of a clear strategic approach in the southern neighborhood, potentially undermining the ability to achieve such objectives.
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, Regional Integration, Regional Politics, and Invasion
Political Geography:: Europe, Middle East, Palestine, and Gaza

416. The Next Surge of Conflict in the South Caucasus Is Still Preventable

Author:: Pavel Baev
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: The tragic exodus of the Armenian population from the Nagorno Karabakh region has closed a chapter in the long saga of conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The disappearance of this self-proclaimed republic provides the opportunity to bring these bitter hostilities to an end; it takes, nevertheless, plenty of wishful political thinking to believe that a peace treaty could be swiftly negotiated. Mutual animosity is a profound, but not necessarily insurmountable obstacle. The greater problem is that it is hard to expect from Azerbaijan, ruled by the hereditary autocratic regime of President Ilham Aliyev, a magnanimity in victory. Pushing the defeated adversary further yet and maximizing the damage is much more in the nature of this regime, rendering the prevention of a new spasm of armed conflict an urgent task for all stakeholders in peace in the South Caucasus. The fate of Nagorno Karabakh was predetermined by the outcome of the 44-day long air-land battle in autumn 2020, in which the Armenian forward defense positions were breached, leading to the capture of Shusha, a key stronghold in the rugged theater of operations, by the Azeri forces. In that triumph, Aliyev showed strategic patience and accepted the Russian offer of a ceasefire. Much in the same way he calculated the right moment for starting the offensive operation, he assumed a total victory was inevitable in a matter of a few years, lessening the need to push forward with the military conquest of the whole enclave. The timeframe for the Russian peacekeeping operation was set on five years, but Russia’s aggression against Ukraine made it possible for Azerbaijan to force the closure of the postponed final act of geopolitical drama two years beforehand.
Topic:: Territorial Disputes, Displacement, Armed Conflict, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, South Caucasus, and Nagorno-Karabakh

417. Puerto Rico’s New Leftist Alliance Poses a Threat to US Imperialism

Author:: Jenaro Abraham
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)
Abstract:: The Puerto Rican Independence Party’s (PIP) latest assembly marks a turning point in electoral strategy and a challenge to the colonial paradigms that have long held the archipelago hostage.
Topic:: Imperialism, Elections, Domestic Politics, Colonialism, and Leftist Politics
Political Geography:: Caribbean, North America, United States of America, and Puerto Rico

418. Fact Sheet: Azerbaijan Moves to Retake Artsakh

Author:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:: On 19 and 20 September 2023, Azerbaijan conducted a military operation against Artsakh, a disputed territory also known as Nagorno-Karabakh,1 to dismantle the ethnic Armenian separatist enclave after nine months of blockading it. ACLED records over 570 political violence events along the Armenia-Artsakh-Azerbaijan Line of Contact from the start of the year through the days leading up to the offensive in mid-September. Even before the operation, the number of incidents had surpassed the total recorded for the entire previous year, which had already seen an increase of more than 70% compared to 2021. Clashes spiked in June after peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan stalled, remaining elevated ahead of the operation. In the months leading up to the offensive, increased fighting also led to a surge in the number of attacks on civilians, affecting mostly Artsakh farmers along the Line of Contact, with approximately 50 incidents reported between January and mid-September. With Artsakh’s defeat, the region’s population is now at risk of mass displacement and forced exodus.
Topic:: Political Violence, Territorial Disputes, Displacement, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:: Caucasus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh

419. Fact Sheet: Attacks on Civilians Spike in Mali as Security Deteriorates Across the Sahel

Author:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:: Violence targeting civilians has increased by 38% in Mali so far this year. The main perpetrators of these attacks are JNIM (over 180 events, 33%), Malian state forces and/or the Wagner Group (nearly 160 events, 29%), and IS Sahel (nearly 90 events, 15%). Battles and attacks have spread to new locations in northern Mali amid joint military and Wagner Group operations and the resumption of hostilities with Algiers Accord signatory armed groups. JNIM has also launched a new offensive, carrying out a series of large-scale attacks on military positions and imposing blockades on towns and major transit routes. Overall, in the wake of successive military coups promising to improve security across the region, political violence levels in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have together increased by 5% relative to the same period last year, and by 46% compared to 2021.
Topic:: Security, Violence, Coup, Civilians, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:: Africa and Mali

420. Actor Profiles: Islamic State Mozambique (ISM)

Author:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:: The group now known as Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) emerged as an armed group in October 2017, known locally both as al-Sunna wal-Jamma (ASWJ) for its ideological underpinnings and al-Shabaab for its extensive use of violence. Despite its rapid growth up to 2021, it has been one of the Islamic State’s (IS) most opaque affiliates. ISM was first recognized as a distinct IS province in May 2022, having previously been under the broader Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) organization from as early as 2018. The origins of ISM lie in East African Salafi-jihadist networks that reached into northern Mozambique as early as 2007.1 This profile examines the group’s origins and its development over the past decade. It uses ACLED and other data to assess the group’s objectives and consider its future prospects.
Topic:: Insurgency, Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, Ideology, and Islamic State Mozambique (ISM)
Political Geography:: Africa and Mozambique

421. Importing Instability How the War Against Ukraine Makes Russia Less Secure

Author:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:: ACLED data indicate that cross-border violence between Ukraine and Russia escalated in May-October 2023 in the wake of the ongoing Ukrainian counter-offensive. Conflict incidents inside Russia have become increasingly deadly for both civilians and the Russian military. Although the Russian government has attempted to hush up the impact of the war’s spillover, local authorities — especially those in the border regions — are struggling to fend off cross-border attacks. Ukrainian drone attacks have surged since May 2023, reaching deeper into Russian territory and inflicting significant damage to Russia’s reputation, military, and infrastructure. While the Wagner Group mutiny revealed the Russian state’s inability to control the internal situation, it may also have rallied the establishment around President Vladimir Putin. Still, resistance to the invasion from individuals and armed groups within Russia shows no signs of abating, as attacks on military enlistment offices and rail infrastructure continue despite the government crackdown on opposition and protest.
Topic:: Security, Drones, Wagner Group, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

422. Actor Profile: Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)

Author:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:: Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (Support Group for Islam and Muslims, or JNIM) is a Salafi-jihadist group and the Sahelian branch of the transnational al-Qaeda organization. The armed group’s immediate parent organization is the Algeria-based al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), whose roots emanate from the Algerian civil war of the 1990s. JNIM’s genealogy dates back more than two decades to the founding of AQIM and its predecessor, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), and their implantation in the Sahara and Sahel.1 Since then, the Sahelian insurgency has continued to evolve through splits, mergers, and group and alliance formations, with JNIM emerging from the March 2017 merger of Ansar Dine, AQIM’s Sahara region, al-Murabitun, and Katiba Macina. Each of these groups shares a common ideology and strategic objectives, but exhibits distinct profiles and characteristics in terms of composition, local interests, and operational focus, which to some extent continue to influence JNIM’s activity.
Topic:: Non State Actors, Armed Forces, Al Qaeda, Salafism, and Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)
Political Geography:: Africa and Sahel

423. Kenya: Competition Over Politics and Resources Affect Recent County Border Disputes

Author:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:: From 16 September to 10 November, ACLED records 185 political violence events and nearly 120 reported fatalities in Kenya. Most events took place in Nairobi county, where at least nine incidents of mob violence and almost 40 peaceful protests were recorded. Garissa and Samburu had the highest number of reported fatalities, with 22 and 15 recorded each, respectively. The fatalities in Garissa were attributed to suspected al-Shabaab militants, while in Samburu, the deaths were linked to attacks by pastoral militias. The most common event type was protests, with approximately 200 recorded events, followed by riots, at just over 100. The protests focused on various issues, including support for Palestine in response to the conflict in the Gaza Strip. Pro-Palestine protests were held in major towns and cities like Nairobi, Mombasa, and Kisumu.
Topic:: Political Violence, Politics, Territorial Disputes, Borders, and Resources
Political Geography:: Kenya, Africa, and Horn of Africa

424. Fighting Gangs Under the State of Exception in Honduras

Author:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:: A year after the implementation of the state of exception on 6 December 2022, this report explores the evolution of violence likely related to gang activity between January and November 2023. ACLED data show that the security measures implemented thus far have yielded mixed results. Armed clashes and violence targeting civilians have continued unabated throughout 2023 due to persisting competition among gangs, especially in the country’s overcrowded prisons where violence has surged. Gangs continue to extort transportation workers in order to generate revenues, albeit the rate of these events has slowed down in 2023 compared to 2022. The geography of the violence points to gang violence moderately increasing and spreading beyond the crime hotspots of Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula. This finding substantiates claims that criminal groups have expanded to other strategic areas for drug trafficking and production, a phenomenon potentially exacerbated by state of exception measures and increased pressure on gangs in the most populous urban areas due to frequent law enforcement operations.
Topic:: Security, Law Enforcement, Violence, and Gangs
Political Geography:: Latin America and Honduras

425. Feature Article: In Search of Hope: Gaza’s Youth Face Death and Row the Boat in Uncertain Waters

Author:: Pal-Think for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Pal-Think For Strategic Studies
Abstract:: In the scorching summer of 2023, hundreds of Gaza youths driven by depression and despair queued to submit their applications to obtain Turkish visas. In search of a better life, those youths have made the tough decision to travel to Turkey. However, the story does not end at this point. After landing at Turkey, many will attempt illegal migration to Europe using dangerous boats. Since 2007, local reports have confirmed that over 250,000 youths migrated from the Gaza Strip in pursuit of a thriving life in Europe. In August 2023, alone, there were over 16,700 Turkish visa applications submitted by young adults living in the Gaza Strip’s five governates. Interviews with applicants revealed that the most travelled destination is Turkey through which they can migrate to Europe. Young citizens, aged 18 to 30, emphasised that the already deteriorating economic environment in Gaza has created a space for higher immigration rates. Migration from the Gaza Strip has been increasing in recent years. As a result of stagnating economic situation, prospective migrant youth have highlighted that migration is not a voluntary choice but a consequence of prolonged economic hardships. Several research papers have shown that there are no accurate statistics on the people’s number who left Gaza, however, in May 2019 it was cited that more than 40,000 emigrants left Gaza as of the same time in 2018. While the United Nations estimated about 20,000 people left and according to human rights experts in Gaza, 70,000 people left from the period of 2014 until 2020. Although this is just an approximate estimate, these numbers suggest a high percentage of youth migrating from Gaza. According to UNHCR data, close to 150,000 people made their way into the EU this way in 2022 alone.
Topic:: Push Factor, Economic Crisis, and Irregular Migration
Political Geography:: Middle East, Palestine, Gaza, and Mediterranean

426. Timor-Leste’s uncertain future

Author:: Parker Novak
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:: This paper intends to start a conversation about a broad yet crucial question: what does the future hold for Timor-Leste? And in turn, what does that mean for the Indo-Pacific region? It examines key challenges confronting the country over the next decade, with a focus on how economics, governance, and the transnational issues of climate change, pandemic preparedness, and geopolitics will impact the small island nation. Timor-Leste has accomplished a great deal over the past two decades but faces headwinds that, if left unaddressed, could undo much of what it has achieved. Its future is not preordained, and decisions made by Asia’s youngest nation over the coming years will determine the direction it takes. Australia and Indonesia loom large in this equation, and they will certainly have a vested interest in the course Timor-Leste chooses to take.
Topic:: Governance, Leadership, Economy, Occupation, Multilateralism, and ASEAN
Political Geography:: Australia/Pacific and Timor-Leste

427. International Negotiations Handbook: Success Through Preparation, Strategy and Planning

Author:: Public International Law Policy Group and Baker & McKenzie
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Public International Law Policy Group
Abstract:: All of us at one time or another must negotiate with others – adversaries, interested third parties, friends – to achieve our objectives. Each party to a negotiation has its own desires, goals, and prejudices. The key is for a party to understand these matters for itself and for all other parties to a negotiation. It takes advanced preparation, strategic-thinking, and a written, detailed plan for any party to successfully achieve its objectives. The International Negotiations Handbook: Success Through Preparation, Strategy, and Planning is designed to provide some tools and ideas to assist every party to a negotiation to be a more effective advocate for its interests and, as a result, to achieve successful negotiations overall. This project comes as the result of a year-long joint effort between Baker & McKenzie LLP and the Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG). Baker & McKenzie has provided sophisticated legal advice and services to many of the world’s most dynamic and global organizations for more than 50 years. The Firm’s more than 3500 lawyers are citizens of more than 60 countries and speak more than 65 languages, and one of its core values is to encourage all of its lawyers and staff to participate in service to others. Across its offices, Baker & McKenzie makes a significant commitment to helping others, through pro bono legal service, community service, fund-raising and charitable giving. The Firm’s pro bono and community service activities take many forms, ranging from multi-country projects on behalf of global organizations, such as Save the Children Alliance and Habitat for Humanity, to local efforts to represent children, foster entrepreneurship, raise funds for medical research, support the arts and more.
Topic:: International Law, Treaties and Agreements, Negotiation, and Peace
Political Geography:: Global Focus

428. [Global NK Update] July 2023

Author:: Minah Kang
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Key Updates: 1) North Korea’s launch of the ICBM Hwasongpho-18 on July 12th, with an unprecedented 74-minute flight time, drew condemnation from the US, South Korea, and Japan, as discussions were ongoing at a NATO summit. 2) North Korea marked its 70th War Victory Day with a grand ceremony attended by Chinese and Russian officials, including a military parade showcasing their armed forces and strategic weapons, such as the ICBM Hwasongpho-18.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Regional Security, ICBM, and Armistice
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea

429. Strengthening South Korean Value Diplomacy for U.S.-South Korean Normative Alignment

Author:: Sook Jong Lee
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: The foreign policy of any state is formulated by calculating national interest and normative ideals. If national interest is based on tangible economic and security gains, normative ideals are often understood as universal and transformative values. However, this distinction is often blurred in reality, as normative choices are made in the context of long-term national interest. Furthermore, a state’s normative alignment can change due to ideologically different new governments or contentious domestic challenges. The worst-case scenario occurs when a strong state withdraws from leadership of a normative coalition of like-minded states. Like-minded states tend to disperse when they lose their leader; the decline of the Community of Democracies after the United States’s neglect is such a case. States fail to pursue consistent foreign policy because normative politics are in flux domestically and internationally. Despite this complexity, a strong power can exercise normative foreign policy more effectively than a weaker power, as it can employ both hard and soft power. The United States played such an enforcement role during the post–Cold War unipolar world. A newly emerging strong state, such as China, can challenge an existing norm or establish a new norm. What about middle powers? Lacking unilaterally exercisable power, middle powers frequently champion multilateral rules and norms that can protect their interests from great power coercion. Professor Andrew Cooper characterizes a middle power as normatively more virtuous and trustworthy in the global order and describes its preferred diplomacy as pursuing multilateral solutions to international problems, embracing compromise positions in international disputes, and adopting the notions of “good international citizenship” (Cooper et al. 1993, 116). The government of former South Korean President Lee Myung-bak pursued middle powermanship under the Global Korea slogan, emphasized value-based international contributions by expanding foreign aid, and hosted the Group of Twenty (G20) and other global meetings. Now, the Yoon Suk Yeol government has scaled up its middle-power ambitions to those of being a global pivotal state by highlighting South Korea’s international contributions and values-based diplomacy (Yoon 2022a). Like the Lee government, the Yoon government is building its proactive multilateral diplomacy while deepening its long-standing alliance with the United States. But the U.S.-China relationship has changed significantly between the Lee and Yoon governments: geopolitical competition between the United States and China has intensified during the intervening fifteen years, expanding beyond the economic and military spheres to include technology and ideology. Under U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping, an ideological narrative dividing the world between democracies and autocracies has set in. The Russian war in Ukraine has caused Western European countries to merge democratic unity and collective security. In Northeast Asia, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities now threaten not only South Korea but also the faraway United States. Facing all these high-risk challenges, the Yoon government has tightened military and economic ties with the United States. The two countries’ shared democratic values and liberal norms have emerged as a crucial component of deepening bilateral ties. This normative alignment has invited criticism from Beijing, but the Yoon government has so far not rolled back its advocacy for those values—although it has carefully dubbed them as “universal values” rather than liberal or democratic values. The national confidence gained by globally successful popular Korean culture and deteriorating public opinion against China have helped fuel this value assertiveness.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Human Rights, Norms, and Freedom
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

430. Quo Vadis Indonesian Democracy? A Closer Look at Dynastic Politics

Author:: Irine Hiraswari Gayatri
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: While being recognized as a “reluctant global statesman” (Wee 2022), President Joko Widodo is known for his pace in advancing Indonesia’s infrastructure development and his popularity ratings have been high. However, the stability of Indonesian democracy recently faces a threat from the growing symptom of political dynasties, a recurring political feature in Southeast Asia including Indonesia. Political dynasty in Indonesia refers to the phenomenon where political power or political positions are passed down from generation to generation within one family or lineage. Establishing a political dynasty is often considered a political strategy to gain and maintain power. By using family power and influence, politicians can build strong support networks. In theory, political dynasty has both positive and negative connotations. Positive connotations can occur if the generation holding power is proven competent; however, this may happen when the institutional structure, for instance, a political party, is weak. On the other hand, negative connotations arise when the dynastic systеm is used to maintain power within a family without paying attention to leadership quality. Nevertheless, the case in Indonesia involving President Jokowi’s son in the 2024 election as a Vice President candidate has yielded more negative responses. Several fundamental variables could lead to the establishment of political dynasties. One of these reasons is the desire for personal or family power. Furthermore, there are structured collectives formed by mutual consensus and a feeling of cohesion, leading to the emergence of group leaders and participants. This is made possible by a multi-party democratic systеm. Moreover, the collaboration between leaders and businesses requires certain conditions to combine the power of financial resources with the power of political personalities. Ultimately, there is a propensity to “assign onuses” between the government and influential individuals with money, which often results in corruption.
Topic:: Politics, Democracy, Presidency, and Meritocracy
Political Geography:: Indonesia and Southeast Asia

431. State of Democracy in Asia and the Pacific: The End of the Decline?

Author:: Michael Runey
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: International IDEA’s annual Global State of Democracy report shows that across every region of the world, democracy has continued to contract, with declines in at least one indicator of democratic performance in half of all countries assessed in the report. But after five consecutive years of more countries experiencing declines in their democratic quality than improvements, the data shows that this trend may have, in Asia and the Pacific, largely paused after five years of steady declines in most indicators. These findings are based on the Global State of Democracy Indices (GSoD Indices), International IDEA’s quantitative dataset of democratic performance launched in 2015 and containing data from 1975 to the present. The indices measure democratic trends at the national, regional and global levels across a broad range of different categories of democracy and include data for 174 countries across the globe, 35 of which are in Asia and the Pacific. In lieu of a single democracy score, the GSoD Indices measure four main categories of democracy – Representation, Rights, Rule of Law, and Participation - which are based on 157 individual indicators from 20 diverse sources: expert surveys, standards-based coding by research groups and analysts, observational data and composite measures. Each of these four measures is comprised of several of the 17 factors, as seen in Figure 1 below. This data show that in every region of the world, democracy has continued to contract, with declines in at least one indicator of democratic performance in half of the countries covered by the GSoD Indices. But it is in Asia and the Pacific where the trend is most ambiguous and least severe. When we look at five and one year statistically significant trends in the data for the region what we see in 2022 is not continued decline but mostly scores plateauing after years of declines.
Topic:: Democracy, Media, Rule of Law, Representation, and Civil Rights
Political Geography:: Asia-Pacific

432. EU Digital Services Act and Its Implications to the Potential Regulatory Regime of Disinformation in Asia

Author:: Sofia Calabrese
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: In 2022, after two years of heated negotiations, European Union (EU) institutions reached an agreement on the final text of the Digital Services Act, the new EU law to tackle illegal content online. “The Digital Services Act will set new global standards. [...] We have finally made sure that what is illegal offline is also illegal online,” said Christel Schaldemose, the lead Member of the European Parliament on the file, after the agreement was reached (European Parliament 2022). In a nutshell, this reflects the ambitions of EU policymakers for the file to become both a new golden standard for platform regulation in the EU and beyond; and to fulfil its primary goal to tackle illegal content online. This article will focus on these two aspects: on one hand we will explain how, despite its scope being limited to illegal content, the Digital Services Act can also be effective in addressing online disinformation; and on the other hand we will explore the potential impact of the Digital Services Act beyond the EU, in particular on potential regulatory regimes on disinformation in Asia.
Topic:: European Union, Regulation, Disinformation, Online Platforms, and Digital Services
Political Geography:: Europe

433. India’s Women Quota Law is a Game Changer for Gender Inclusive Politics

Author:: Niranjan Sahoo and Ambar Kumar Ghosh
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: In a historic decision, the Indian Parliament in a special session recently passed the long-awaited Women Reservation Bill (officially called the Nari Shakti Vandan Adhiniyam, 2023). The legislation (106th Constitutional Amendment Act), which received the president’s approval on September 28, establishes a requirement to reserve one-third of the total seats in the Lok Sabha (Lower House of the Parliament), Vidhan Sabha (state legislative assemblies), and the Legislative Assembly of the National Capital Territory of Delhi (Pathak and Roy 2023). The law will become effective following the completion of the Census in 2026 and the delineation of constituencies, which will be used as the basis for allocating seats to women (Government of India 2023). As per the new legislation, this reservation will remain in effect for a period of 15 years and can be extended by the Parliament. Furthermore, the allocation of seats set aside for women will undergo rotation after each delineation. The new law, when implemented, will increase women Members of Parliament (Lok Sabha) to 181 seats (from the current 82) and Members of Legislative Assemblies (Vidhan Sabha) to as much as 2000 (currently 740). The passage of the historic women reservation bill is an outcome of 27 years of relentless struggle by women activists and its strong votaries. While the issue of women’s reservation was flagged up in the 1980s, the first serious attempt to get legislation was made in 1996 by the then Congress government. Though unsuccessfully, further attempts were made by a number of governments at the center in 1998, 1999, and in 2008. The most serious attempt to bring legislation was made in 2010 by the then Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government. A bill seeking women’s reservation in the Lok Sabha and state legislatures was passed in the Rajya Sabha (Upper House) in 2010, but it failed to get the approval of the Lok Sabha due to strong opposition from the politicians of heartland states (Rajvanshi 2023). Finally, the bill was successfully steered by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government with near consensus from opposition parties. Of course, it has taken a few decades of consensus building and political awareness and sensitization on gender equality to get this important legislation passed in a large country with strong patriarchal norms and rigid social mores (Manoj C G 2023).
Topic:: Gender Issues, Women, Representation, Inclusion, Parliament, and Quota
Political Geography:: South Asia and India

434. Diverging Perspectives on Improving Bilateral Relations: Analysis of the 2023 Korea-Japan Joint Opinion Poll

Author:: Yul Sohn, Yang Gyu Kim, and Hansu Park
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: In 2023, relations between South Korea and Japan began to thaw. Since the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea announced the solution to address disputes regarding forced labor under Japanese colonial rule in March, six bilateral summits were held in the following six months. Intergovernmental exchange has also rapidly increased. With mediation from the United States, South Korea and Japan established consultative groups to address various issues, creating channels of communication between their foreign affairs, defense, industry, finance, and national security offices. People-to-people exchanges, primarily driven by tourism, have also returned to pre-COVID-19 pandemic levels. Since 2012, they have been stuck over the issue of Comfort Women, and after the 2018 Supreme Court ruling, they were in a standoff over the issue of forced labor, a period that can be considered a “crisis of trust” between the two governments. Is 2023 really a year for both countries to put the “lost decade” behind them and usher in a new era? How do the citizens of both countries assess the changes in relations between their two governments? What do they think is the driving force behind the improvement in relations? Has mutual perception improved as relations have improved? Do they perceive that the historical issues, the culprits of the “lost decade,” are being resolved? The results of this year’s survey, marking the 11th year since initiated in 2013, are very interesting and carry significant potential interpretations and policy implications. Firstly, citizens of both countries perceived an improvement in their bilateral relations. Positive evaluations have reached their highest levels, while negative evaluations have hit their lowest points since the survey began. Secondly, there is a noticeable difference in the way citizens of both countries view the progress in bilateral relations. In the case of Japan, favorable opinions have increased with rising favorability toward South Korea, the importance of Korea-Japan relations, support for trilateral security cooperation with the United States and South Korea, and support for a solution to the issue of forced labor. On the other hand, South Korean public opinion has not seen a corresponding increase in positive sentiment regarding these issues, despite increased awareness of an improved relations. Thirdly, these result disparities are reflected in how citizens of both countries assess their governments’ efforts to improve relations. Japanese public opinion supports the efforts of both their own government and the South Korean government to improve relations, while South Korean public opinion has not shown strong support for them. Fourthly, historical issues continue to be a major variable affecting bilateral relations. Citizens of both countries consider historical issues as the primary factor in the development of bilateral relations. South Korea focuses on Japan’s historical perceptions, including issues related to wars, history textbooks, forced labor, and Comfort Women. Japan, on the other hand, is concerned with South Korea’s stance, including anti-Japanese education, statements by South Korean politicians and media about Japan, and excessive anti-Japanese actions by South Koreans. From this survey, it can be interpreted that South Korea believes Japan’s historical perceptions have not changed, while Japan believes that South Korea’s anti-Japanese stance is being corrected. However, the fact remains that there are still significant differences in historical perceptions between the two countries. The implications of the survey results are clear. Both countries need to expand and strengthen functional cooperation in areas such as security and the economy while also making progress towards reconciliation in historical perceptions. Only when these two wheels of functional cooperation and historical reconciliation move together can the South Korea-Japan relationship truly move onto the right track.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, Polls, and Cooperation
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and South Korea

435. 2023 EAI-Genron NPO Korea-Japan Joint Public Opinion Poll: Japan and the ROK-Japan Relations

Author:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: East Asia Institute (EAI) and Genron NPO conducted the 11th Korea-Japan Joint Public Opinion Poll in August and September 2023 to gauge the attitudes of people in both countries regarding their bilateral relations. EAI has presented the survey findings in chart format within the "EAI Public Opinion Briefing." According to the results, citizens of both South Korea and Japan assessed that their bilateral relations have advanced and expressed positive opinions about strengthening cooperation in areas like security and economics, both bilaterally and multilaterally. However, there were contrasting viewpoints between Koreans and Japanese on whether this progress and the importance of bilateral relations have resulted in favorable perceptions of each other`s countries.
Topic:: Security, History, Culture, Public Opinion, Economy, and Perception
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and South Korea

436. 2023 EAI Public Opinion Poll on the International Affairs: ② China and the ROK-China Relations

Author:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Amid the deepening U.S.-China strategic competition, East Asia Institute (EAI) conducted a public opinion poll to discern the Korean people’s perception of China and ROK-China relations. EAI presents the survey results in chart form in the “EAI Public Opinion Briefing.” Despite predominantly negative impressions of China and President Xi Jinping, over 80 percent of respondents believe that Korea-China relations is crucial for Korea. The survey results unveiled public opinion that separately recognizes the favorability and significance of China.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, and Polls
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

437. 2023 EAI Public Opinion Poll on the International Affairs: ① The US and the ROK-US Relations

Author:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: In celebration of the 70th Anniversary of the ROK-US alliance, East Asia Institute (EAI) conducted a public opinion poll to assess the Korean people`s perceptions of the United States and the ROK-US alliance. EAI presents the survey results in chart form in the `EAI Public Opinion Briefing.` While many respondents acknowledged the historical benefits of the ROK-US alliance to Korea`s development in the areas of security, economy, and politics over the past 70 years, they expressed reserved outlooks on the current state and future progress of the alliance. Furthermore, the survey results revealed complex viewpoints regarding the role and scope of the alliance, South Korea`s contribution to it, and the extended deterrence provided by the United States.
Topic:: International Affairs, Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, and Polls
Political Geography:: South Korea, North America, and United States of America

438. Young Asians’ Attitude and Behavior Toward Democracy

Author:: Ganbat Damba and Hansu Park
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: As we approach the second quarter of this century, millennials have firmly established themselves as the mainstream of society. The subsequent generation, often referred to as Generation Z, has taken their initial steps into the workforce. This trend is also evident in the political landscape of democratic countries in Asia. As time passes, the proportion of new generations among voters naturally increases, prompting political parties to consider their demands when formulating election strategies and policies. Several Asian countries underwent democratization during the third wave of democracy in the 1980s and 1990s. This wave allowed the new generations in these countries to embrace democracy as an inherent value and norm. As democracy has progressed towards consolidation, it has not only become “the only game in town” but also “the only game in a lifetime” for the new generations. Furthermore, significant advancements in information and communication technologies have opened up new avenues for accessing information and taking into actions for political change. This has led to a widespread belief that younger citizens are generally more pro-democratic compared to their elders. On the flip side, there are concerns that younger generations are relatively less engaged and apathetic towards politics. These concerns often stem from worrisome indicators such as lower voter turnout and occasionally result in a skeptical outlook on the future of democracy. Therefore, it has been increasingly important to delve into the perspectives of the younger generation on democracy, as well as the factors influencing their attitudes toward politics. This brief article reviews previous research conducted through survey analysis and examine youth participation in the Asian region as a case study.
Topic:: Democracy, Youth, Representation, Political Participation, and Attitudes
Political Geography:: Asia

439. [Global NK Update] August 2023

Author:: Minah Kang
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: 1) The recent developments in military cooperation between Russia and North Korea resulted in sanctions on entities that facilitated their arms deals. 2) The South Korea-U.S.-Japan Summit at Camp David laid a strong foundation for continuous and stable trilateral cooperation to address North Korean threats and bolster regional security. 3) North Korea’s second “satellite launch” has raised regional concerns and prompted trilateral action.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Weapons, Cooperation, Military, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Russia, Asia, and North Korea

440. Beginning of the End of Reformasi? Malaysia’s August 2023 State Polls

Author:: Bridget Welsh
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: On August 12th, Malaysia held elections in six states, with voters from nearly a third of the country’s population eligible to vote. The results were a rebuke of Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s eight-month leadership. The conservative Islamist ethno-nationalist opposition Perikatan Nasional, comprised of the Islamist party PAS and ultra-ethnonationalist Malay party Bersatu led by former prime minister Muhyiddin Yassin, gained 61 seats out of 245 and 49% of the popular vote. Given the unevenness of Malaysia’s post-COVID-19 economic recovery and the challenges of Anwar’s coalition ‘unity’ government, it is important to note that this coalition comprises his pro-reform Pakatan Harapan, his former political foe, the Malay nationalist United Malays National Organization (UMNO)-dominated Barisan Nasional (BN), and regional parties from Borneo. This alliance came together after the 2022 general election, which resulted in a hung parliament. Anwar’s preoccupation with promoting himself rather than focusing on policy programs made these election results somewhat expected. Little had been done to effectively communicate a cohesive program to the electorate or to shore up the legitimacy of a new friends-and-foes elitist government that holds the majority in parliament but remains unknown to the majority of voters. Instead, Anwar’s government relied on short-term populist initiatives that only served to fuel perceptions of seeking political security rather than leadership confidence in government.
Topic:: Reform, Elections, Domestic Politics, and Identity Politics
Political Geography:: Malaysia and Southeast Asia

441. Historical Background and Current State of the Grassroots Democracy: Case Study of Four Asian Regions

Author:: Sri Nuryanti and Hansu Park
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Democracy’s authority and legitimacy relies on people’s participation. In modern democracies, representatives elected by the people are the main actors in political processes, as society has been more complex and policies have become increasingly specialized. Nevertheless, people’s direct participation is an essential part of democratic governance, especially at the local level. This direct democracy includes referendums, recalls, petitions, as well as participatory planning and budgeting. Moreover, active approaches such as mobilizing civil society organizations (CSOs) or protesting can be considered “grassroots democracy.” The word “grassroots” is mostly used as a metaphor for ‘sub-national level’ or ‘marginalized sectors,’ but citizens’ direct and collective actions for bringing about political change and improving democracy are not confined to a certain region or group. Citizens in several Asian countries have struggled to resist against authoritarian regimes and establish democratic constitutions and governments. Movements against dictatorship, military regimes, or the suppression of fundamental rights are still ongoing in some regions. In addition, people under democratic regimes continue spontaneous actions to oversee officials, ensure and solidify civil rights, and push politicians to implement policies and budgets in favor of citizens’ common interests. This article will cover cases from four Asian countries, demonstrating how grassroots democracy efforts have incited more democratic and participatory regimes.
Topic:: Civil Society, Protests, Legitimacy, and Democratic Institutions
Political Geography:: Asia

442. The EU-Africa partnership and development aid: Assessing the EU’s actorness and effectiveness in development policy

Author:: Rym Ayadi and Sara Ronco
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: Development aid is considered a policy area where the EU is particularly influential. This CEPS In-Depth Analysis report provides an overview of the evolution of global and European governance in development policy and relations with the African continent. Exploring the period 1995-2021, the research highlights how global governance in development aid and relations with Africa have evolved in terms of both the tools used and the actors involved during the last decades. As supported by the EU, another important pattern is the shift from traditional official development assistance (ODA) to public-private financial frameworks, and from financing development projects to financing investment for infrastructure development. Assessing the dimensions of the EU’s actorness over time reveals an increasing trend, notably concerning its authority, autonomy and cohesion. However, more external dimensions of actorness (such as the opportunity to act and recognition) show a decreasing trend over the time period studied. The need for coherence is one of the main challenges facing the EU if it is to increase its actorness and effectiveness in development policy and its relations with Africa. Future EU policies on migration issues will also play a critical role in the EU’s actorness vis-à-vis Africa. Another challenge will be for the EU to maintain its key role as a development actor, better coordinating its development agencies and financial institutions (both national and international) to implement and coordinate public-private partnerships, co-guarantee schemes and collaborative blended finance platforms. This report is part of a series drawing on the outcomes of the EU-funded TRIGGER (Trends in Global Governance and Europe’s Role) project that ran from 2018 to 2022. Using the conceptual framework developed as part of TRIGGER, the report moves beyond observing the characteristics of the EU as an actor to explore its actorness/effectiveness over time in a specific policy domain – in this case, development policy.
Topic:: European Union, Partnerships, Finance, and Development Aid
Political Geography:: Africa and Europe

443. Forests, foreign policy and trade

Author:: Johannes Weberling
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: The EU’s Regulation for Deforestation-free Products (EUDR) marks an important milestone in addressing demand-side deforestation governance, being the first regulation targeting deforestation driven by agriculture. Yet it must be understood as more than an effort to protect the world’s forests – it showcases the European Commission unilaterally acting to promote values and policy ideas abroad. It displays issues of transnational social justice and power discrepancies, shedding light on shifting market power dynamics in global structures. And it questions the EU’s standing as a trustworthy partner on the international stage as well as its relationships with important producer countries. Analysing the EUDR from these angles offers valuable insights that can be transferred to other due diligence instruments that are currently being drafted or negotiated, such as the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD). Unilateral action may provide a semblance of control but is by nature limited in the depth of scope. As its market influence wanes, the need for the EU to position itself as a reliable partner becomes increasingly important. To prevent leakage, demand-side measures such as the EUDR must be paired with supply-side measures. The EUDR’s success will hinge on careful and efficient implementation, accompanied by meaningful consultations and engagements with producer countries. Overall, prioritising the external dimensions of such legislation must first and foremost uphold trust and strengthen collaborative relationships with partner countries.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Regulation, Trade, Forest, and Deforestation
Political Geography:: Europe

444. An EU global gateway … to what?

Author:: Fanny Sauvignon and Stefania Benaglia
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: What is Global Gateway’s unique offer? How does it beat the competition? Why is Global Gateway a values-based offer and what does this entail in practical terms? Amid criticism and comparisons, the EU’s Global Gateway deserves scrutiny and effort to define its purpose and added value, both within and outside the EU. Initially designed as a foreign policy strategy, Global Gateway has not been put to its intended use. Instead, the first two years of implementation have highlighted conceptual and structural challenges that fall short of the EU’s international needs and ambitions. Up to now, it has focused on delivery, namely Team Europe, flagship projects, and investment packages. The EU’s projected power and credibility with its international partners is at stake. However, trusted and resilient connectivity links are difficult to build without putting the foreign policy versus development debate to rest. Differentiating the EU’s offer from its competitors and addressing dwindling credibility requires strong and coherent international leadership. As this CEPS Explainer outlines, resources aggregation approach ‘à la IMEC’, holds the potential to better connect narrative to implementation and build the EU’s external power. Developing on from this, the strategic connectivity clusters (SCCs) approach streamlines international connectivity cooperation.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Investment, and Engagement
Political Geography:: Europe

445. European Security, Eurasian Crossroads?

Author:: Zachary Paikin and Christos Katsioulis
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: The NATO summit in Vilnius taking place from 11 to 12 July 2023 marks another step towards deepening the relationship between Ukraine and the collective West. When paired with the EU’s reinvigorated enlargement process, there is a growing tendency to assume that Washington and Brussels can – or even must – set the terms of the European security order without input from Moscow. However, in a world of ‘mega-regions’ and competing visions of international order, cooperative security remains relevant if the EU wishes to salvage some degree of rules-based order in the space that connects Europe with Eurasia. As first steps in this direction, the EU should work to keep the OSCE operational, launch a limited dialogue with Belarus on arms control, and envision a future for the European Political Community that someday includes Russia.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and International Order
Political Geography:: Europe and Eurasia

446. Regional actor, global player: Can the EU get the best of both worlds?

Author:: Zachary Paikin, Shada Islam, and Sven Biscop
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: The collapse of Europe’s security order coincides with a period of global transformation. Both these phenomena threaten to change the international environment that the EU has grown accustomed to and that has served its interests relatively well. They also raise major questions over the sort of actor the EU wants to be – regional or global. While the immense challenges of internal reform and breathing new life into a now-geopolitical enlargement process suggest a regional focus for the EU’s core strategic priorities, the EU can still take certain measures to avoid losing sight of the rest of the world. If the EU is serious about retaining its influence as a global actor, it must rethink its traditional way of doing business with the ‘Global South’ and learn how to autonomously navigate an unpredictable – and often fractious – multipolar world.
Topic:: Security, Reform, European Union, and Global South
Political Geography:: Europe

447. The EU accession prospects of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia

Author:: Michael Emerson, Tinatin Akhvlediani, Denis Cenusa, Veronika Movchan, and Artem Remizov
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: In the week following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 all three East European states associated with the EU – Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia – submitted applications to accede to the EU. In response, the European Commission published ‘Opinions’ in June, setting out in each case conditions that should be met for these applications to advance on the path towards membership. This paper reports on the first half-year of the work undertaken by the three states to meet these conditions. All three states have set in motion actions largely concerning the fundamental political and rule of law criteria for membership. In all cases there is much work in progress underway, with some conditions already met, and others at an earlier stage. For both Ukraine and Moldova, it is possible that the majority of conditions will be met in the course of 2023. For Georgia there are still some more basic political obstacles to be overcome. The Commission is due to publish in October 2023 comprehensive evaluations of the preparedness of each of the three states, and in the case that the conditions are largely met, the EU should as a next step open up the formal accession negotiation process. It is also recommended that the EU reform by that time the accession process itself, notably by switching to qualified majority voting on the details of the procedures, and better still adopting a staged accession process that would assure structured incentives for overcoming the blockages in the present system as seen in the Western Balkans.
Topic:: Politics, European Union, Rule of Law, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:: Europe, Moldova, and Georgia

448. Giorgia Meloni’s Italy and Europe: Ambitions and Realities

Author:: Nathalie Tocci and Leo Goretti
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: In autumn 2022, the electoral victory of the right-centre coalition led by Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia (FdI, Brothers of Italy) and the subsequent establishment of her government caused scepticism and apprehension among international commentators. Concerns stemmed not only from it being the first administration in the history of post-war Italy whose majority partner, FdI, is rooted in the post-fascist tradition; more concretely, the inclusion within the coalition of parties such as Matteo Salvini’s Lega (League) and Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia (Come on Italy), which had entertained political and personal relations with Vladimir Putin’s Russia prior to the invasion of Ukraine, raised doubts about Italy’s continuing support for Kyiv and the Western coalition. In reality, unwavering Atlanticist and pro-Ukraine views were repeatedly voiced by Meloni during the election campaign already, and – apart from a few unfortunate remarks by single individuals – this stance has been unambiguously upheld by the new government since it took office, as sealed by the Prime Minister’s visit to Kyiv in February and to Washington in July 2023.[1] A more complex picture emerges regarding relations with the European Union and European partners. Historically, in the post-war period, European integration has been a crucial dimension of Italy’s foreign policy, along with Atlanticism and strong support for multilateralism. Rome was one of the founders of the European communities, and European integration was long seen by ruling and opposition parties alike as key to Italy’s economic, cultural and social modernisation. Since the 1990s, however, criticism of the European project began to emerge in Italy, especially among the new centre-right parties, which developed a so-called “Euro-realist” approach when in government, whereby Italy’s national interest would not necessarily coincide with deeper European integration.[2] Outright Euroscepticism became more apparent since the Eurozone and migration “crises” of the 2010s, leading to the emergence of so-called “sovereigntist” narratives depicting the EU as an “antagonist”, which found resonance especially among populist parties.[3] This narrative, however, lost momentum as a result of the unprecedented level of funding granted to Italy through the NextGenerationEU programme in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. In the aftermath of the 2022 election, managing relations with Europe was thus a crucial task for the newly elected Italian government.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Migration, Political Parties, and Giorgia Meloni
Political Geography:: Europe and Italy

449. Tritium Troubles: The Politics of Fukushima’s Treated Water Release in the Asia-Pacific and Beyond

Author:: Aurelio Insisa
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Following approval from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Japan has begun to release into the Pacific Ocean treated radioactive water from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant on 24 August. The power plant was the site of the nuclear disaster that occurred on 11 March 2011 as a consequence of the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami. Water has been continuously pumped into the nuclear power plant to cool down the reactors’ fuel rods since the disaster. However, current treatment methods are unable to eliminate tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen, resulting in the storage of tons of contaminated water in thousands of tanks on site. The current plans consequently entail the release of more than a million tons of tritium-contaminated water. The Japanese authorities, the IAEA and a majority of scientists concur that the concentration of tritium in the stored water falls within the safety limits.[1] Nevertheless, the release of water containing tritium from the site has encountered opposition from environmental activists and ordinary citizens within and outside Japan. It has also faced criticism from a minority of scientists who argue that the consequences of the release remain unpredictable. This cross-border measure has highlighted, and somehow even exacerbated, political tensions in the Asia-Pacific. Indeed, it has occurred within a regional political order that remains in flux, featuring rampant competition between the US and China, Japan’s own ongoing overhaul of national defence and a consequential tilt in the foreign policy of South Korea after the 2022 elections in favour of Washington and Tokyo. Furthermore, the media clamour surrounding the water release has also extended beyond the region, fuelling the public debate on nuclear energy in several Western countries, including Italy.
Topic:: Environment, Natural Disasters, Nuclear Energy, and Radiation
Political Geography:: Japan, China, South Korea, Asia-Pacific, and Fukushima

450. The EU–US Data Protection Framework: Balancing Economic, Security and Privacy Considerations

Author:: Federica Marconi
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The rapid evolution of digital technology has ushered in a data-centric economy, where data accessibility drives marketplace efficiency and economic growth across various industries. However, this shift, while offering numerous benefits, introduces significant privacy and data security challenges, particularly in the context of transatlantic data transfers. Considering the vast economic ties between the EU and the US, the transatlantic data flow vividly illustrates the complexities involved in governing and transferring data. It grapples with the ongoing challenge of striking a satisfactory balance between economic advantages stemming from data utilisation and various concerns pertaining to national security, digital sovereignty and individual rights. In recent years, the European Commission approved two different frameworks on transatlantic data flow – Safe Harbour in 2000[1] and Privacy Shield in 2016[2] – asserting that the US provided a level of data protection for data transfers essentially equivalent to that guaranteed in the EU. However, despite initial optimism, both adequacy decisions faced a significant setback when the Court of Justice of the European Union invalidated them in what is commonly referred to as the “Schrems saga”,[3] named after the Austrian activist who first challenged both frameworks before the European Court. The core arguments centred on the absence of adequate safeguards for personal data within US domestic law and the extent of state surveillance over such data when it was transferred, as initially disclosed by Edward Snowden in 2013.[4] This legal development led to a period of significant uncertainty and further heightened the ongoing debate concerning the regulation of transatlantic data transfer. To address the consequences of this legal turmoil, both EU and the US committed to establishing “a renewed and sound framework for transatlantic data flows”,[5] seeking a long-term solution to address the complexities of data privacy and security, eventually leading to the recently adopted EU–US Data Privacy Framework (“DPF”).
Topic:: Security, Economics, Political Economy, European Union, Privacy, Transatlantic Relations, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

451. Prospects of and Challenges to Arms Control in South Asia: A Pakistani Perspective

Author:: Sonia Naz
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The arms control stability between Pakistan and India is currently on wobbly grounds due to the increasing development of modern weaponry in South Asia. The already tense situation is intensified by the arms race, as well as by the enforcement of provocative military strategies, actions and speeches.[1] In 2019, an attempted Indian surgical strike on Pakistan after the Pulwama attack[2] and annexation of Indian-occupied Kashmir into the Indian Union by annulling article 370 of the Indian constitution further heightened tensions between the two countries. There is a rising concern that issues such as Kashmir, cross-border terrorism and disputes over shared management of watercourses could escalate into a conventional or even a nuclear war.[3] The modernisation of militaries and expansion of nuclear weapons arsenals seem to be a distinguishing feature of both countries, which is arguably the result of the mutual and wider regional threats that they perceive.[4] The emerging realities of competition between the US and China, and China and India, have made the strategic environment very complex,[5] which has diminished dramatically the prospects of arms control.[6] Indeed, China’s rise fuels Indian insecurity, while, in turn, India’s hegemonic goals and dominance make Pakistan insecure.[7] Amidst these tensions, in 2019, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh clearly stated that Indian No First Use nuclear policy can change into First Use.[8]
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: Pakistan, India, and Asia

452. Climate Action, Geopolitical Risks and Strategic Policy: The Western Race to Secure Critical Raw Materials

Author:: Salvatore Finizio
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Climate action, economic competition and geopolitical shifts are more intertwined than ever. In the wake of the skyrocketing inflation and deteriorating China relations, United States President Joe Biden signed the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) into law on 16 August 2022. Conceived as the foundation of the new US industrial policy, the IRA aims to rebuild the country’s industrial capacity, including 500 billion US dollars in new spending and tax breaks, among which almost 400 billion aimed at boosting clean energy.[1] Across the Atlantic, the European Union expressed concerns about the potential loss of industrial competitiveness resulting from the IRA. In response, the EU unveiled its own Green Deal Industrial Plan (GDIP) in February 2023.[2] The objective of this plan is to promote the enhancement of net-zero manufacturing capacities in order to meet the EU’s climate targets. Both the IRA and the GDIP have a common goal of reducing dependence on China, especially in clean technology, although through different approaches. The US focuses on bringing high-value production back to its shores, while the EU aims to develop and diversify supply chains.[3] This divergence is also reflected in the debate between “decoupling” and “derisking”, with the latter recently gaining prominence as policymakers recognise the challenges of completely reshoring supply chains domestically.[4] The US and the EU share industrial and geoeconomic objectives, but will also encounter similar challenges, in particular concerning the first stages of green supply chains. Despite their heterogeneous approaches, Western policymakers will in fact have to secure critical raw materials for clean technology manufacturing, with the aim of resourcing the energy transition.
Topic:: Security, Politics, European Union, Institutions, Energy, and Raw Materials
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and United States of America

453. In the Middle East, Biden Is on the Razor’s Edge

Author:: Riccardo Alcaro
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: US President Joe Biden is walking on thin ice while he attempts to deal with the most serious crisis in the Middle East since the ill-conceived US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Biden has orientated his administration’s action along three tracks: supporting Israel; protecting as many Palestinian civilians as possible while also resuscitating the defunct Middle East peace process; and preventing the conflict from extending to the wider region.[1] The problem is, reconciling these three priorities may be impossible.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Civilians, Hamas, Protection, and October 7
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, North America, and United States of America

454. Saudi Arabia’s Balancing Game: The Palestinian Cause and Regional Leadership

Author:: Giulia Daga and Luigi Simonelli
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: In the hours following Hamas’s violent attack on Israel of 7 October, the Saudi authorities called for “an immediate de-escalation”, while noting that they had previously warned against the outcomes of “the continued occupation and depriving Palestinians of their legitimate rights and the repeated systematic provocations against their sanctities”.[1] In a more recent declaration, the Saudi Foreign Minister has reiterated the country’s “categorical rejection of calls for the forced displacement of the Palestinian people from Gaza, and its condemnation of the continued targeting of defenceless civilians there”.[2] Reportedly, the heavy retaliation measures adopted by Israel, whose bombing campaign against Gaza has been one of the most intense of this century,[3] also including the apparent use of white phosphorus,[4] resulted in the halt of the normalisation process between Saudi Arabia and Israel, which should have followed suit on the 2020 Abraham Accords. Only a few weeks before, on 20 September, the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had announced on US television that “every day, we get closer” to an agreement with Israel.[5] A few days later, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had reiterated the same optimism in front of the United Nations General Assembly general debate, insisting that the Palestinians should not be given “a veto over new peace treaties with Arab states”.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Leadership, Regional Power, and October 7
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia

455. Europe is Stuck Over the Israel-Hamas War

Author:: Maria Luisa Fantappiè and Nathalie Tocci
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Since the horrific attack launched by Hamas on Israeli citizens on 7 October and the brutal ongoing Israeli military response, European governments and publics have rallied behind two diametrically opposite worldviews: unconditional support for Israel’s right to self-defence versus solidarity with Palestinians massacred by Israel’s military operation in Gaza. Europe should work proactively to chart its way in this inflammatory debate, rather than passively buying into the polarising narratives from Israeli and Arab public debates and allowing these to sow divisions, paralyse action, hamper credibility and poison democracies.
Topic:: Politics, European Union, Hamas, Narrative, and October 7
Political Geography:: Europe, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

456. To Deal or Not to Deal: How to Support Tunisia out of Its Predicament

Author:: Michaël Ayari and Riccardo Fabiani
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Tunisia is beset by deepening political and economic challenges. President Kais Saied is transforming the country’s parliamentary system into an authoritarian presidential one that has become increasingly repressive. Arrests and convictions of opposition politicians have surged. Saied’s aggressive anti-foreigner discourse has fuelled xenophobic sentiment and contributed to a spike in violent attacks against sub-Saharan migrants. Economically, Tunisia is grappling with the fallout of a decade of sluggish growth compounded by a series of economic shocks since 2020. The nation’s public debt has soared, with significant debt repayments looming. As the country tries to deal with mounting financial constraints, its inability to attract foreign loans is further clouding its economic future. Saied now must decide whether to embrace a credit agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or potentially default on Tunisia’s foreign debt. Against this backdrop, the EU and, in particular, Italy have a pivotal role to play. They can either help steer Tunisia toward a more stable economic future or watch it descend into chaos.
Topic:: Economics, Foreign Aid, European Union, and IMF
Political Geography:: North Africa and Tunisia

457. Critical Crossroads: Tunisia’s Choice between a Comprehensive EU Partnership and Economic Collapse

Author:: Ghazi Ben Ahmed
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: ince the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Tunisian authorities reached in October 2022 a staff-level agreement to support Tunisia’s economic policies, Tunisian President Kais Saied has been standing at the Rubicon. Lacking a vision to revive the Tunisian economy, President Saied has opted for a strategy of diversion and scapegoating. By blowing on the embers of xenophobia among his supporters and more recently by stoking the flames in the Middle East, he continues to deflect attention to conceal his economic short-sightedness and claims autonomy from foreign – mainly European – aid, in the name of sovereignty. This posture has now trapped him in his own rhetoric at a time when the Tunisian economy struggles without signs of recovery or resilience in a challenging regional and global landscape. Time is ticking, the situation remains grim, and the country may miss another opportunity to resume economic growth.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Foreign Aid, European Union, Partnerships, and IMF
Political Geography:: Europe, Middle East, Italy, and Tunisia

458. Timing Is Everything: Italy Withdraws from the Belt and Road Initiative

Author:: Aurelio Insisa
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: After months of rumours and speculations, on 6 December 2023, the Italian newspaper of record, the Corriere della Sera, broke the news that Rome had finally withdrawn from China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), via a note sent to Beijing three days earlier.[1] In the absence of an explicit request to withdraw before the end of December, the memorandum of understanding (MoU) instrumental to Italy’s participation in the BRI would have automatically been renewed for another five years starting from March 2024. Italy’s subdued withdrawal from the BRI marked the epilogue of a long, laborious, yet ultimately successful diplomatic process that reflected a reassessment of its bilateral relations with China. The origins of this reassessment can be traced back to the government led by Mario Draghi between 2021 and 2022. In June 2021, during the first post-pandemic, post-Trump G7 Leaders’ Summit in Carbis Bay, Draghi stated that his government would “examine […] carefully” the MoU.[2] Draghi’s words reflected a deeper awareness of the broader implications of Beijing’s assertiveness in international politics and a close alignment with the Biden administration in Rome. This shift also reflected the absence of tangible economic benefits from BRI membership for Italy, although this was also due to the devastating effect of the Covid-19 pandemic on the designed trajectory of Sino-Italian economic relations.[3] Furthermore, the security-driven decision of the Draghi government to repeatedly exercise its “golden power” to veto Beijing’s investments in Italy’s strategic sectors contributed to shaping the MoU’s outcome.[4] This course correction in Rome’s China policy survived the fall of the Draghi government in July 2022 and the victory of the centre-right coalition led by Giorgia Meloni and her Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy, FdI) party in the legislative elections of September that year. After all, Meloni and her party had consistently opposed the MoU with China from the very beginning, a decision arguably also linked to the perceived need to bolster the party’s credentials as a reliable partner in the eyes of Washington – as in the case of the clear support for Ukraine well before the September electoral victory.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Foreign Direct Investment, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and International Politics
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Italy

459. The Humanitarian Response in Post-Earthquake Syria: An Urgent Need for Depoliticisation

Author:: Munqeth Othman Agha
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Less than four days following the deadly earthquake that hit Turkey and Syria on 6 February 2023, Syrians from the less-impacted areas in the northeast sent a convoy of 140 trucks carrying humanitarian aid toward the northwest.[1] Solidarity convoys drove successfully through checkpoints across different zones of control, including those controlled by the Kurdish Autonomous Administration (AA) in northeast Syria, the Syrian regime and the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) in Turkish-influenced areas in northern Syria. While doing so, they overtook other convoys sent by the AA and the UN Damascus that were stuck behind for different political and logistic reasons. Search and rescue activities in northwest Syria were primarily led by local efforts (in particular the Syrian Civil Defense or the White Helmets),[2] with very few international rescue teams joining, especially in the early days. Eyeing this, Syrians furiously, but also sarcastically, wondered how ordinary Syrians already living in harsh living conditions were able to mobilise more aid and deliver it faster than the UN and other INGOs. This event adds another episode to the long history of UN structural failure to deliver aid to disaster-struck zones in the country since the outbreak of the conflict in 2011. As living conditions have never been worse in Syria, and the humanitarian system has never been more paralysed and politicised, there is no more rightful time than now to rethink the whole system of aid delivery.
Topic:: Natural Disasters, Earthquake, Humanitarian Response, and Economic Aid
Political Geography:: Middle East and Syria

460. Why El Salvador’s Anti-Crime Measures Cannot (and Should Not) Be Exported

Author:: Tiziano Breda
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: One year has passed since El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele launched a “war on gangs”, embedded in a state of exception that has since been renewed monthly. The government claims to have arrested 66,000 alleged gang members, projecting the image of an upfront battle against criminal organisations that has yielded results in bringing down murder rates. This has earned Bukele the approval not only of most Salvadorans, but millions of citizens throughout Latin America. His methods have become a foreign policy tool and a driver of electoral disputes in the region. But are they “exportable” to other countries? And should they?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Crime, Human Rights, Law Enforcement, Democracy, and Organized Crime
Political Geography:: South America, North America, El Salvador, and United States of America

461. Shifting Paradigms for Israel-Palestine: Why the EU Must Answer the Wake-Up Call Now

Author:: Akram Ezzamouri and Miriam Zenobio
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Three months ago, the most far-right government in the history of Israel was sworn in by the Knesset under the leadership of Benjamin Netanyahu. Notably, Itamar Ben-Gvir, the Kahanist leader of Jewish Power and former convict for racist incitement, has been appointed the head of the newly created Ministry of National Security.[1] Additionally, Bezalel Smotrich, leader of the settler-based Religious Zionism party, has been given major control over the administration of the occupied West Bank as the head of the Finance Ministry.[2] The new government has spurred a nationwide mobilisation in Israel, as many criticise the proposed judicial reform aimed at curtailing the Supreme Court’s power to exercise judicial review of legislation, giving the government control over judicial appointments and granting the Knesset the power to override the Court’s rulings. After weeks of protests – mainly attended by secular liberal Jewish Israelis[3] – the reform has been put on hold as part of a coalition agreement which includes the establishment of a National Guard led by Itamar Ben-Gvir and tasked with handling “Arab unrest”, thus anticipating even more state-sanctioned violence on Palestinians.[4] In fact, the number of Palestinians killed in 2023 is already set to surpass last year’s data, with at least 95 deaths since January.[5] This record in violence has been characterised by near-daily raids carried out by the Israeli military across the occupied West Bank, particularly in Jenin, Nablus and Jericho, aiming at curbing the resurgence of Palestinian armed resistance to the occupation.[6] In the same time span, at least 16 Israelis have been killed.[7]
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Human Rights, European Union, and Occupation
Political Geography:: Europe, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

462. A Treaty Change for the European Defence Union

Author:: Nicoletta Pirozzi
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The Russian aggression against Ukraine was a turning point for European security and led the European Union and its member states to take important steps in the field of defence. The EU decided to use common funding to equip the Ukrainian government with arms and ammunition through the European Peace Facility for a total of 3.6 billion euro,[1] Germany allocated additional 100 billion euro to its defence budget,[2] Denmark joined the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP),[3] Finland entered NATO[4] and Sweden is willing to follow it soon. Time seems to be ripe for bold decisions on European defence, which would also need to consider a reform of existing provisions.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Politics, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, and Institutions
Political Geography:: Europe

463. Italy’s Pivot to the Indo-Pacific – Towards a Value-driven Foreign Policy?

Author:: Nicola Casarini
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Italy is stepping up its involvement in the Indo-Pacific, both in the economic and security realms. The cabinet led by Giorgia Meloni – a centre-right coalition often portrayed by commentators as right-wing and nationalist – is rebalancing Rome’s policy in the Far East by scaling down ties with Beijing and by effectively lending support to the United States and its Asian allies vis-à-vis an increasingly assertive and self-confident China. Moving away from previous centre-left governments that tended to prioritise commercial relations with Beijing, the conservative coalition in power since September 2022 has been fostering defence-related cooperation with Japan and India and chip-related cooperation and investments with Taiwan. Moreover – and remarkably for a country that has long been absent from Asian security – the Italian government has sent a patrol vessel to the South China Sea and plans to forward the country’s flagship aircraft carrier to the area to conduct joint exercises with the navies of Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. The quantity and quality of initiatives being undertaken warrant the label of an Italian ‘pivot’ to the Indo-Pacific. By upgrading its presence in the region, Italy joins the other G7 nations in their efforts to uphold the rules-based order and dissuade Beijing from invading Taiwan. However, to consolidate the western anchorage of this pivot, the Meloni government needs to fully align its policy towards Beijing with that of the Euro-Atlantic allies – which includes deciding whether to continue to lend Italy’s official support to China’s Belt and Road Initiative or not.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Taiwan, Asia, Italy, and Indo-Pacific

464. The Revolutionary Kids Are Alright: Egypt Ten Years after the Coup

Author:: Stephen R. Grand
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: A decade after the military staged a coup to regain control, Egypt’s revolutionary youth, who took to the streets in 2011 to topple long-time dictator Hosni Mubarak, are unmoved. They are perplexed and saddened by the dramatic turns their revolution has taken over the last dozen years, lurching from autocracy to nascent democracy and back again. But they still dare to dream of a better Egypt – one that emerges from its current political, economic and social crises more free and just and prosperous.
Topic:: Authoritarianism, Arab Spring, Youth, Coup, and Revolution
Political Geography:: Middle East, North Africa, and Egypt

465. Post-conflict Reconstruction in Ukraine: Challenges and Opportunities

Author:: Silvia Samorè
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: During her first visit to Kyiv on 21 February 2023, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni reassured President Volodymyr Zelensky concerning the Italian commitment to the Ukrainian resistance and defence against the Russian invasion. To most people’s surprise, she stated that “we [Prime Minister Meloni and President Zelensky] have spoken a lot today about reconstruction, not only for when the conflict ends, but also now”.[1] As a concrete follow-up on this commitment, on 26 April a bilateral conference on Ukraine’s reconstruction was held in Rome.[2] Indeed, the word “reconstruction” in reference to Ukraine has been used since the spring of 2022 at the EU level. This is a great achievement for the post-conflict researchers’ community and research centres that have restlessly highlighted the importance of dealing with conflict and post-conflict as a complex spectrum, where recovery considerations need to be taken into account from the early stages. When designing international efforts for physical reconstruction and investment, emerging challenges to good governance and rule of law, such as corruption, must be carefully considered and managed. Furthermore, it is paramount to discuss also non-physical aspects of reconstruction, encompassing all the threats to human security, such as the presence of small arms and light weapons (SALW), that could foster instability in the country after the end of the war.
Topic:: Reconstruction, European Union, Post-Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Economic Aid
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

466. Giorgia Meloni’s Foreign Policy and the Mattei Plan for Africa: Balancing Development and Migration Concerns

Author:: Karim Mezran and Alissa Pavia
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Despite Italy’s economic significance as the Eurozone’s third-largest economy and founding member of the G7 and NATO, the country has struggled to translate its economic power into political influence. Yet, with Giorgia Meloni’s ascent to power, Italy’s approach to foreign policy appears to be evolving. In fact, since the very beginning of her term, Meloni displayed a rather bold approach towards reshaping Italy’s international status. As the President of the Council of Ministers – analogous to the post of Prime Minister in other countries – Meloni has adopted a distinct posture in addressing issues related to the Southern Mediterranean. Since taking office in October 2022, Meloni has made numerous visits to North Africa, engaging in a diplomatic offensive aimed at reinvigorating Italian policies. In January this year, following in the footsteps of former Prime Minister Mario Draghi, Meloni travelled to Algeria on her first bilateral visit abroad. Algeria is an instrumental country for Italy due to its vast hydrocarbon reserves and geographical proximity.[1] In 2022, Draghi paved the way for Algeria to become Italy’s top energy supplier, replacing Russia and thus allowing for a swift decoupling from Moscow as the Ukraine war rages on and energy prices continue to soar. Meloni’s posture in Algeria seeks to evidence her willingness to move beyond a mere set of energy memorandums and broaden Italy’s foreign policy to include strategic diplomacy with long-term goals. She described Algeria as Italy’s “most stable, strategic and long-standing” partner in North Africa,[2] and reassured President Tebboune that Italy stands by Algeria. The country has recently felt cornered following Morocco’s joining of the Abraham Accords, a feeling few other countries aside from Italy had the courage to assuage and which had pushed Algeria further towards Russia and China as a result. Meloni’s activism in North Africa did not end there. The prime minister and her cabinet promoted high-level missions and diplomatic efforts with Libyan government officials, allowing Italy to reap diplomatic wins in the energy field. In January, a few weeks after visiting Algeria, Meloni flew to Tripoli for a meeting with Libya’s UN-backed Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh. The visit led to the signing of an 8 billion US dollars gas deal between Italian energy company Eni and Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC).[3]
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Migration, and Giorgia Meloni
Political Geography:: Africa, Libya, Algeria, and Italy

467. The Arctic within EU Strategies: A Renewed Centrality

Author:: Luca Cinciripini
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: In June 2023, the Arctic Council resumed its work after a year’s suspension in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[1] The Council is a pillar of the institutional architecture of the region; the main framework for cooperation between the Arctic states that also involves the North’s indigenous peoples in issues of environmental protection and sustainable development. In recent years, the overlap between climate and security crises has profoundly transformed the region, generating economic opportunities but also endangering local populations and amplifying international competition.[2] The European Union, which is increasingly interested in the issue of climate security (the multiplier effect of climate change and its, even indirect, impact on security risks spanning several dimensions – economic, human and political),[3] has long tried to devise an Arctic policy that takes into account such changes by tackling emerging challenges and grasping opportunities. To better address these issues, since 2013 the EU has been applying for full observer status to the Council; however, it has only been permitted to observe the organisation’s activities without a formalisation of its role. At the same time, however, to be able to play an active role in the region, the EU’s strategy must cover the full width of the Arctic institutional architecture, which encompasses a plurality of diplomatic, legal and institutional instruments that go beyond the framework of the Council.
Topic:: Climate Change, Environment, Politics, European Union, Institutions, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Arctic

468. Shaking Hands with Saied’s Tunisia: The Paradoxes and Trade-offs Facing the EU

Author:: Luca Barana and Asli Selin Okyay
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Over the last year, Tunisia has become a key priority for the European Union and its member states, Italy in particular. The main reason for this increased attention is the growing number of unauthorised arrivals of migrants and asylum-seekers leaving the North African country and reaching Italy from mid-2022 on. Tunisia was the point of embarkation for over 60 per cent of almost 90,000 irregular arrivals registered in Italy in the first seven months of 2023.[1] This is a departure from an established trend of Libya being the main departure point in the Central Mediterranean.[2] To make sense of these new mobility patterns, one also needs to take into account the profound economic crisis and the increasing pace of authoritarianism in Tunisia. Beyond its effects on the local population and civil society, the latter also manifests in severe cases of discrimination and violence against sub-Saharan migrants residing in or transiting through Tunisia.[3]
Topic:: Human Rights, Migration, Authoritarianism, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe, North Africa, Tunisia, and Mediterranean

469. Present and Future of Italy’s Development Cooperation

Author:: Irene Paviotti and Daniele Fattibene
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The Covid-19 pandemic and the war against Ukraine, with their significant socio-economic costs, have put stronger pressure on development assistance spending among traditional donors, as the cases of Sweden and the United Kingdom attest.[1] Confronted with higher energy costs, inflation and a potential recession, the political imperative across Europe is to allocate resources to tackle immediate domestic challenges rather than expanding international development programmes – against all the lessons of interdependence that the pandemic might have taught. Italy is not immune to this trend, as recent developments also seem to suggest.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, International Cooperation, Public Opinion, and Economic Aid
Political Geography:: Europe and Italy

470. Building Climate Resilience in Urban Informal Settlements through Data Co-production

Author:: Giulia Sofia Sarno
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Climate change is worsening the number, frequency and duration of natural hazards across the globe, making disaster risk reduction and resilience building among the most pressing challenges ahead. According to UN-Habitat, informal settlements are where the impacts of climate change are the most acute in urban areas and strengthening resilience in these neighbourhoods represents a very complex yet urgent challenge.[1] Today, urban areas are home to 56 per cent of the world’s population and this figure is projected to increase to 60 per cent by 2030 and 68 per cent by 2050, with 90 per cent of the growth by 2050 expected to occur in less developed economies.[2] In these countries, population growth and displacement (including climate-driven migrations) will lead to rapid and unplanned urbanisation forcing a growing number of people into informal settlements. Currently, one billion people live in informal settlements, mostly in Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and this figure is expected to grow to 3 billion in 2050.[3]
Topic:: Climate Change, Crisis Management, Informal Settlement, and Energy
Political Geography:: Global Focus

471. The video games industry in Europe: current situation, issues and prospects

Author:: Loïse Lyonnet and David Rabineau
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Beyond them being a societal phenomenon, video games are smashing all records. On a national or European scale, the annual figures for the video games industry are rising to record heights: the European market is set to grow to €24.5 billion by 2022, with more than one in two Europeans aged between 6 and 64 enjoying video games as a leisure activity. Its economic performance aside, the video game industry is eminently strategic, with 110,000 jobs across Europe, including around 20,000 in France. Strategically positioned at the crossroads of different disciplines, the video games industry is closely linked to technological developments, placing it at the forefront of all digital revolutions. At a time when the question of sovereignty is a priority, video games are a solid vector of soft power for European countries. Renowned European studios such as CD Projekt in Poland, Crytek in Germany and Paradox Interactive in Sweden have demonstrated their excellence on an international scale, exporting their productions all over the world. Video games are a lever of influence for Europe that should neither be ignored nor underestimated. Although it boasts a number of world champions, such as France's Ubisoft, the European video game industry still suffers a number of handicaps, not least because its stakeholders find it difficult to organise collectively and work together at EU level. As a result, the industry is developing unevenly from one country to the next, with major disparities in terms of political support. The video game industry still suffers from a lack of visibility. The development of the video games industry at European level opens up new prospects for job creation, economic opportunities, innovation and training in strategic sectors. The European institutions and the Member States need to develop a proactive policy in favour of video games, by increasing their financial support for studios, encouraging intra-European collaboration and developing a framework to prevent talent from leaving the European Union. Video games are an issue of sovereignty for Europe: this is an opportunity not to be missed!
Topic:: Science and Technology, Digital Economy, Soft Power, Industry, and Video Games
Political Geography:: Europe

472. VIEWPOINT: IS MILITARY AID REALLY THE BEST WAY TO HELP UKRAINE?

Author:: Alexandre Christoyannopoulos, Molly Wallace, and Ned Dobos
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: Ukraine has received tens of billions of dollars worth of military aid since the Russian invasion began one year ago. The international consensus seems to be that supporting Ukraine means financing its war effort. But a few dissenting voices have emerged of late, more ambivalent about the prudence—and ethics—of the current policy. Colonel Douglas MacGregor, a former advisor to the US Secretary of Defence, has warned that the choice of cure could turn out to be worse than the disease. At least 7,000 Ukrainian civilians have already perished in the war. Thousands more have been injured, and millions have been displaced. MacGregor’s primary concern is that the bleeding will continue for as long as the fighting does. Russian forces advance, Ukrainian forces resist with violence, Russia responds with counter-violence, and the bodies continue to pile up. The Ukrainian state retains its sovereignty, but eventually we get to a point where, to quote MacGregor, “There are no longer any Ukrainians left!” This is hyperbole, of course, but that should not distract from the valid point MacGregor is making. States exist for the sake of their citizens, not the other way around. Therefore, if a given method of defending the state is causing its citizens to be killed or to flee en masse, that is a compelling reason to explore alternatives.
Topic:: Resistance, Armed Conflict, Nonviolence, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

473. DO NO HARM: US AID TO AFRICA AND CIVILIAN SECURITY

Author:: Patricia L. Sullivan
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: During her recent trip to Africa, US Vice President Kamala Harris announced a $100 million commitment over ten years to West African Nations to fend off the increasing threat of extremist groups. The announcement followed President Biden’s pledge of $55 billion to the continent for the next three years. While these promises reveal a US commitment to greater engagement with African states, the often-dodged question is whether citizens of these states will benefit. Will US security aid improve human security in fragile and conflict-affected African states? How is US security assistance likely to affect governance and state repression for citizens that often suffer at the hands of both extremist groups and their own security forces?
Topic:: Security, Development, Human Rights, War on Terror, Civilians, Armed Conflict, Military Aid, and Protection
Political Geography:: Africa, West Africa, and United States of America

474. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT PALESTINIANS

Author:: Michael Barnett
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: A recent headline from the Israeli newspaper Haaretz describes a familiar event: “West Bank Palestinian Village Residents Flee Amid Ongoing Settler Violence.” In many respects, this is old news. Settlers have been terrorizing Palestinian residents for decades, and 2023 appears to be a particularly horrific year. In response to these criminal acts, the Israeli army and government have tended to look the other way. The military is often slow to react or a no-show when settlers take to the streets and rampage through Palestinian villages or uproot olive trees. The Israeli government rarely attempts to arrest or punish the offenders, often citing a lack of evidence or persuasive identification of suspected perpetrator, but the dominant reasons range from ideological sympathies with the settlers to the indirect benefits of keeping Palestinians in fear. The international community has developed a moral register and set of possible responses for such situations: a responsibility to protect. The general claim is that when the state fails in its responsibility to protect its citizens and civilians, then the international community inherits this duty. The original formulation applied to situations of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, but it has expanded over the years to include less severe events and apartheid. These and other state-sponsored or state-enabled actions now sometimes go by the name atrocity crimes. Additionally, the United Nations and other international bodies have a protection of civilian mandate, as do many humanitarian and human rights agencies.
Topic:: Apartheid, Human Rights, Violence, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), UN Security Council, Protection, and Israeli Settlers
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and West Bank

475. THE LIMITS OF PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY IN UKRAINE AND BEYOND

Author:: Costantino Pischedda and Andrew Cheon
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: Drone strikes targeted Moscow last week. Though much remains unknown about it, the episode appears to be part of a series of unclaimed coercive attacks that US officials attributed to Ukrainian government personnel, including the killing of the daughter of a Russian nationalist, the sabotage of the North Stream pipelines, and drone attacks on the Kremlin. With unclaimed coercion, perpetrators impose costs on adversaries to signal their resolve to prevail in disputes while denying involvement or simply not making any claim about responsibility. Unclaimed coercion is not unique to the war in Ukraine. Russia launched cyber attacks in 2007 to extract concessions from Estonia, though Moscow denied responsibility, and in 2010 Seoul claimed North Korea torpedoed a South Korean warship, Pyongyang’s denial notwithstanding. Unclaimed coercion may have strategic benefits. Without unmistakable evidence about the identity of the perpetrator, the absence of a claim of responsibility creates plausible deniability, which, some argue, allows coercers to send intelligible, credible messages to targets while containing escalation risks. It may also reduce the costs of being seen as a norm violator. For instance, Austin Carson observed that, though both Saudi Arabia and the United States viewed the 2019 attacks on Saudi oil facilities as part of an Iranian coercive campaign, the absence both of conclusive evidence and a claim of responsibility prevented Riyadh and Washington from carrying out a tough military response, which would have looked “illegitimate while jeopardizing allies’ support.”
Topic:: Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, Armed Conflict, Coercion, Russia-Ukraine War, and Plausible Deniability
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, South Korea, North Korea, and Cuba

476. Los Emiratos Árabes Unidos: ¿una potencia militar emergente en Oriente Medio?

Author:: Santiago Ott
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
Abstract:: En el año 2014, el periódico norteamericano The Washington Post publicó un artículo que versaba en torno a las capacidades militares y el rol desempeñado por las fuerzas armadas de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos (EAU) en diversas operaciones de combate en Medio Oriente. Según reza la nota, el por entonces general retirado del Cuerpo de Marines, James Mattis, junto con otros oficiales de los servicios armados de los Estados Unidos, habían comenzado a dirigirse al pequeño estado del Golfo Pérsico bajo el apodo "little Sparta," en clara referencia a la antigua ciudad-estado griega conocida por sus destacadas tradiciones marciales. Mientras que para algunos esta etiqueta puede resultar exagerada, la misma refleja en buena medida el espíritu que ha tenido la política exterior y de seguridad internacional llevada a cabo por la federación en los últimos años.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, and Military
Political Geography:: Middle East and UAE

477. Proyecciones para el Medio Oriente

Author:: Diego Fossati
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
Abstract:: La guerra en Ucrania, el juicio a Donald Trump y otros temas menores han desviado la atención respecto de Medio Oriente; sin embargo, la región sigue estando vigente con un número importante de temas que tienen impacto regional e internacional. Este artículo tiene como objetivo, entonces, llamar la atención sobre qué aspectos marcarán la agenda de la política internacional en la región.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Middle East

478. Arabia Saudita ante una disyuntiva, ¿Occidente u Oriente?

Author:: Federico Franceschini
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
Abstract:: La reciente visita en diciembre de 2022 del presidente Xi Jinping a Riad ha sido motivo de intensos y preocupados análisis por parte de politólogos y analistas, que leyeron en la bienvenida otorgada al mandatario chino la culminación del alejamiento de Arabia Saudita de su alianza con Washington. Inmediatas fueron las comparaciones con el viaje en julio del presidente norteamericano Joe Biden. Los periodistas internacionales buscaron, analizando sonrisas y formas de saludos, encontrar diferencias de trato como elemento discriminante para un eventual favoritismo de una potencia sobre la otra.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, and Saudi Arabia

479. Un año después...

Author:: Lila Roldán Vázquez
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
Abstract:: Este artículo pretende inducir una reflexión sobre las consecuencias de la guerra de Rusia en Ucrania, que ya dura nueve años, particularmente después de la invasión total el 24 de febrero de 2022, y su impacto en el escenario geopolítico internacional.
Topic:: Security, War, Sanctions, Global South, Alliance, Russia-Ukraine War, and Invasion
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

480. Visible Limits of the Sino-Russian Unlimited Partnership: Are Spheres of Influence Changing in Central Asia?

Author:: Eka Javakhishvili
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: Russia’s protracted war in Ukraine is not only causing enormous militarypolitical and economic damage to the Kremlin, but it is also gradually eroding Moscow’s traditional spheres of influence. While the Kremlin has directed all its resources to wage the war in Ukraine, Russia’s “ally” China is not wasting time, and is seeking to increase its economic and political involvement with the countries of Central Asia. China’s recent moves reveal a crack in Beijing and Moscow’s “unlimited” friendship, as the leaders of China and Russia called the partnership between the two countries back in February 2022. A visible manifestation of China’s growing influence in the Central Asian region was the China-Central Asia Summit held in May, where the host of the event, Chinese leader Xi Jinping, presented the “Grand Development Plan” for Central Asia. Russia was not invited to attend the summit; therefore, the future cooperation plans between the regional countries were discussed without a Russian representative. The great development plan proposed by China covers the main aspects of cooperation - infrastructural development, strengthening of economic ties, and security challenges in the region. By proposing the mentioned plan, Xi Jinping expressed his willingness to give a new impetus to China’s cooperation with Central Asian countries, but without the official involvement of Moscow. Holding such a high-level summit in China indicates that Beijing is trying to conduct regional policy on its own, without its “ally” Russia, and, in certain areas, without even taking into account Russia’s interests. Due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin’s influence on Central Asia and its role in the region is declining, and China has an ideal moment to fill the vacuum in the absence of Moscow. In addition, Beijing needs to develop its energy and transport land corridors to transport Chinese goods to Europe, for which China is ready to invest billions in Central Asia, and at the same time, to take the regional security initiative on itself. One of the main priorities of China’s foreign policy is to bring the resource-rich countries of Central Asia under its sphere of influence, which obviously means tightening Russia’s interests. It can be assumed that China is aiming to become the dominant political/ economic/military power in the region. Russia’s current military-economic difficulties caused by the war with Ukraine allow Beijing to offer regional countries more prosperity and security guarantees than Moscow can. So the following question arises - is the historically established influence of Russia in Central Asia weakening, while China is gradually strengthening its positioning in the region?
Topic:: International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Regional Power
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

481. Georgia-EU Economic Relations Dynamics and Cooperation Opportunities

Author:: Davit Shatakishvili
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: Rapprochement with the European Union in terms of legislation, trade, logistics, finance and economy, which should result in full-fledged integration, is a task of state importance for Georgia. Since Georgia gained independence, the European Union has been actively supporting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country, helping to improve the infrastructure, digital and investment environment, and has played a major role in strengthening state institutions and the civil sector. In June 2014, an Association Agreement was signed between Georgia and the European Union, including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, which entered into force in July 2016. In March 2017, the visa-free travel regime for Georgian citizens in the Schengen area was launched. In the same year, the Constitution of Georgia was changed to reflect the unwavering will of the Georgian people to integrate into the European and Euro-Atlantic space. Over the decades, the economic relations between Georgia and the European Union have made significant progress. The trade turnover between the parties, investment volume, the export and import goods nomenclature, the number of incoming and outgoing tourists, the volume of remittances, the degree of integration into the common regional transport networks and others are dynamically increasing. For Georgia, a small and developing economy, keeping the European Union as a reliable and stable partner is a critically important task. In this article, we will analyze the existing trade-economic relations between the parties, and review such important sectors as: foreign trade, foreign direct investments, remittances, tourism and the foreign exchange market, as well as outline the opportunities and future perspectives of bilateral regional economic cooperation.
Topic:: Economics, Regional Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe and Georgia

482. Analyzing Mass Demonstration and Counter-Demonstration in 21st Century Georgia

Author:: Theo Schenck
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: In March 2023, Georgians took to the streets of Tbilisi to protest the bill “Law On Transparency of Foreign Influence.”1 This is not the first mass protest in the capital of a country that has already seen large-scale demonstrations in the more than 30 years since its independence, perhaps most notably in the 2003 Rose Revolution. In many cases, protest has produced real results and fulfilled the protesters’ demands. The goal of this article is to analyze the why and the how of Georgian mass demonstrations. It will seek to discuss and ultimately answer the question: “What patterns can be seen throughout events of large-scale demonstrations in Georgia’s recent history, and what lessons can be drawn from them?” In doing so, it will be necessary to differentiate between dividing forces and interests in Georgian society. Specifically, the opposing interests of liberal and nativist2 will need to be addressed. For the purposes of this article, “liberal” protests are associated with anti-authoritarian and pro-Western demonstrations, and “nativist” protests are associated with groups espousing illiberal, nationalistic ideologies and tend to demonstrate against what they view as Western influences on Georgia.
Topic:: Protests, Liberalism, Nativism, Demonstrations, and Activism
Political Geography:: Caucasus and Georgia

483. Relations and Confrontations Between the Iranian and Israeli Special Services

Author:: Vasil Ghlonti
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: In the last ten years, relations between Iran and Israel have become increasingly tense. The Islamic regime of Iran has declared Israel an enemy of the Shiite Islamic world, and has stated its intention to destroy it, while Israel has identified Iran, which actively finances its opponent Palestinian and Lebanese terrorist organizations, as its number one opponent and the main challenge to its statehood. What does Iran want? One of the main goals of its foreign policy is the destruction of the state of Israel and the expulsion of its ally, the USA, from the Middle East region. Iranian special services have a great role to play in this endeavor. What does Israel want? To neutralise the military and terrorist threat from Iran and put a stop to its nuclear program, with the Israeli special services actively engaged in fulfilling these objectives. The conflict between the parties that started in the Middle East has gone on to gain a global character. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the dynamics of the confrontation between the special services of these two influential countries in the Middle East over the last ten years.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Confrontation, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and Israel

484. The End of the Karabakh Conflict: Winners, Losers and New Expectations

Author:: Shota Utiashvili, Alex Petriashvili, Zurab Batiashvili, and Kakha Gogolashvili
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: In this publication, which includes four expert opinion papers, Rondeli Foundation fellows Shota Utiashvili, Alex Petriashvili, Zurab Batiashvili, and Kakha Gogolashvili analyze the geopolitical consequences of the end of the Karabakh conflict as well as the positions and expectations of two South Caucasian countries and several external actors.
Topic:: Territorial Disputes, Geopolitics, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, South Caucasus, and Nagorno-Karabakh

485. How Chinese Propaganda Works

Author:: Grigol Julukhidze
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: China is becoming an ever more powerful player in the international political arena. Once a regional power, it now represents the main rival to US global dominance. Over the last few years, Beijing has actively started to apply “propagandistic methods” in order to increase its importance and demonize actual or potential foes. From this point of view, the visibility of the Chinese propaganda model is not as high in Georgia as, for example, the Russian. The main task of the below-presented expert opinion is to illustrate and analyze one of the most powerful machines of disinformation in the world and answer the question, “How does Chinese propaganda work?”
Topic:: Propaganda, Disinformation, and International Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, and Georgia

486. Iran-US Relations in Light of the Confrontation Between Their Special Services

Author:: Vasil Ghlonti
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: The dynamics of Iran-US relations in the last decade show that there are many ongoing challenges between them. What does Iran want and what is its attitude towards the USA? The political elite of Iran considers the USA to be its number one foreign threat, and seeks to expel it from the Middle East region in its entirety, and in this process, actively using the capabilities of its special services. Meanwhile, the USA considers Iran one of the main financiers of world terrorism and one of the main opponents to its state interests. The American goal is thus to neutralize the terrorist threat coming from Iran and to weaken it both in the region and abroad, and here also the American special services are actively involved. Against this background, there is both a secret and open war between Iran and the US special services, which has been gaining more and more scope in recent years. The purpose of our present work is to discuss and analyze the relations between the Iranian and US special services, and their role in the current political processes happening in the Middle East.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Confrontation
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

487. Sporadic Crises in Europe in the Support for Ukraine: Why the West Should Keep to its Primary Path

Author:: Nino Chanadiri
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: Since the start of the war in Ukraine, there has been ongoing discussion about whether or not the collective West is getting tired of supporting Ukraine. Despite the fact that, overall, the West continues to express support by providing assistance, and Washington and Brussels1 repeatedly state that continued assistance is crucial to keep Ukraine fighting for its independence, there are still periodic attempts by some actors within the European Union to suggest peace treaties that might lead to a ceasefire as soon as possible. For example, in spring 2022, Italy presented a 4-point peace plan that concentrated on demilitarizing the front lines; declaring Ukraine a neutral country, with some unidentified states guaranteeing its security; having an agreement between Russia and Ukraine about the status of Crimea and Donbas that would give those parts of Ukraine full autonomy in every sphere but officially would leave them parts of Ukraine; and having a multilateral agreement signed between Russia, Ukraine and the EU about the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine and the removal of the sanctions.2 However, the plan never saw success because it left space for legitimate concerns associated with Russia not fulfilling its responsibilities and continuing its aggressive policy both against Ukraine and against other neighbors. Italy has had opposition from various political groups to the sending of arms to Ukraine, and Prime Minister Meloni, who has generally been supportive towards Ukraine, has been voicing concerns about “fatigue… from all sides”.3
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Crisis Management, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

488. The People-to-People Exchange Between China and Georgia in the Frames of the Belt and Road Initiative

Author:: Jing Shi
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: Since the launch of the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) in September 2013, the interaction between China and the post-Soviet Eurasian countries has become more dynamic than ever before. Considering the individuality among and differences between these countries (Sun, 2023), and the specific forms of cooperation, China has adopted unified but differentiated objectives and plans for collaboration with them. A key feature is that countries participating in the Belt and Road Initiative receive preferential policies and conveniences within the cooperation framework. Meanwhile, bilateral cooperation is also being actively seen. The primary case study chosen to illustrate the progress and current status of people-to-people exchange in this paper is the relationship between China and Georgia. Georgia’s case serves as a representative example when examining cooperation and interaction within the BRI. The exploration of China’s BRI lays the groundwork for understanding the broader context of international collaboration. Within this expansive framework, the specific case study of China-Georgia relations provides a nuanced lens through which to examine the intricacies of people-to-people exchange and cooperation. Evaluating China-Georgia relations through traditional perspectives may risk overlooking the full reality. Firstly, Georgia actively participates in the BRI, demonstrating significant interest in collaboration with China for mutual benefits and profits (Gürcan, 2020). Secondly, due to its geographical distance from China compared to Central Asian states, the forms of interaction and connectivity between Georgia and China require efforts from both sides. This dynamic not only presents specific challenges for various forms of cooperation within the BRI framework, but also underscores the significance and value of this research. Thirdly, analyzing the China-Georgia interaction uniquely from the perspective of the BRI is necessary. When discussing China-Georgia relations, people-to-people exchange and cooperation in science, education, culture, and health represent the realization of mutual interests and understanding between the two countries (Shi, 2018).
Topic:: Development, Education, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: China, Caucasus, Asia, and Georgia

489. The Key Player in Russia’s Cybersphere: What the West Needs to Know about VK Company

Author:: Philipp Dietrich
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: This paper analyzes the rise of VK Company and the creation of its super app to increase state surveillance and the dissemination of propaganda in Russia. The app is on its way to combining social networking and services related to healthcare, education, and e-government under one roof. Western policymakers need to be aware of why and how the Russian state is pushing its citizens to use such domestic services. Only then can they counter the use of data generated by such services in facilitating the state supervision and control of society.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Governance, Social Media, Surveillance, Cyberspace, and VK Company
Political Geography:: Russia

490. The Sources of China’s Innovativeness: Why China’s “Unstoppable” Innovation Powerhouse Might Falter

Author:: Tim Rühlig
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Western governments appear to fear that China is an innovation powerhouse on an almost unstoppable path to dominating future technologies. This is quite a turnaround. Only a few years ago, Western policies were crafted on the assumption that China was a copycat incapable of innovation. A focus on Intellectual Property theft as the Chinese “sin” that drove China’s technological development led many in the West to miss what I have identified as the “Five Virtues” that have made China the innovation powerhouse it is today. China’s future success is not inevitable, however, but dependent on a delicate policy ecosystem.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Innovation, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: China and Asia

491. Preparing for a Longer War: Is a Ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia possible by 2024?

Author:: Stefan Meister, András Rácz, and Judith Heckenthaler
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine has failed and is now a protracted war of attrition. Russia has adapted to this situation and prepared for a longer war. The legitimization of the Putin system is increasingly built around the war. As long as Ukraine has no security guarantees, a ceasefire is not realistic from either side. Therefore, the focus should be on protecting the territory Ukraine controls and defining together with the Western partners how security can be provided and what victory means.
Topic:: Security, Vladimir Putin, Ceasefire, Armed Conflict, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

492. Israel Is Doing Exactly What Hamas Wants It to Do

Author:: Sarah Cliffe and Hanny Megally
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Center on International Cooperation (CIC)
Abstract:: The conflict between Hamas and Israel is a tragedy in a world already rife with too many crises. Hamas’s massive attack on Israel, predominantly targeting families and children, cannot be justified by the prolonged history of Israel’s occupation of Palestine, no matter how brutal and indifferent the approach to the fate of Palestinians may have been. Just yesterday, a hospital in the north of the Gaza Strip was bombed, causing the loss of hundreds of lives. The ongoing blame game between the two parties further illustrates the deepening hostilities, no matter who is ultimately found to be responsible. In carrying out this attack, Hamas never believed it would overthrow the Israeli state by military force. Rather, it has followed a well-worn playbook of terrorist organizations that aim to provoke excessive retaliation by military and state forces, fostering further grievances and creating a broader base of civil resistance and strife. This basic strategy has been followed by terrorist groups as diverse as the Red Army Faction, Irgun and the Stern Group, and Al-Qaeda. The State of Israel is now, unfortunately, following this playbook, responding with lethal actions in the Gaza Strip. The degree of shock and outrage in Israeli society cannot be overestimated—the more than 1,400 dead are, in proportion to Israel’s size, the equivalent of more than 45,000 dead in the United States. Yet, its response is disproportionate and knowingly breaches international humanitarian law. Israel has demanded that one million Palestinians evacuate their homes and has cut off energy, food supplies, medical supplies, and water to the Gaza Strip. In this piece, Sarah Cliffe and Hanny Megally discuss what should the international community do to prevent an irreversible downward spiral in both societies, in the conflict between them, and in the spillover to the rest of the world?
Topic:: Hamas, Armed Conflict, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

493. UK-Finland defence cooperation in the 2020s: A successful partnership requires continuous effort

Author:: Antti Pihlajamaa
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: The United Kingdom and Finland have conducted rather close defence cooperation in various forums for several years. Finnish NATO membership and the ongoing war in Ukraine also provide many incentives for deeper cooperation. Nevertheless, continued cooperation should not be taken for granted.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Bilateral Relations, Russia-Ukraine War, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Europe, and Finland

494. Mapping Cyber-related Missile and Satellite Incidents and Confidence-building Measures

Author:: Lora Saalman, Larisa Saveleva Dovgal, and Fei Su
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:: Cyber incidents that—whether due to human error, system malfunction or intentional targeting—impact satellite and missile systems extend beyond the ongoing war in Ukraine. These systems are essential to civilian and military operations and disrupting them has the potential to elicit conventional or even nuclear retaliation. Due to the centrality of satellite and missile-related infrastructure, cyber incidents impacting the functionality of such infrastructure have served as a catalyst for previous confidence-building measures (CBMs) that may provide a template for future ones. This paper builds on SIPRI work to map cyber-related missile and satellite incidents, as well as unilateral, bilateral and multilateral CBMs to provide takeaways meant to foster greater predictability and stability in cyberspace.
Topic:: Cybersecurity, Weapons, Cyberspace, Confidence Building Measures, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Ukraine and Global Focus

495. Another Budget for a Country at War: Military Expenditure in Russia’s Federal Budget for 2024 and Beyond

Author:: Julian Cooper
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:: Russia’s war against Ukraine has been waged for over 650 days and has had a significant impact on the country’s economy and society. In April 2023 work started on a new three-year federal budget, which was signed into law at the end of November. It is based on a relatively optimistic economic forecast and is striking for the sharp increase in military spending planned for 2024. Spending under the budget chapter ‘national defence’ is expected to account for 29 per cent of total budget expenditure. This means that total military expenditure will increase to 7.1 per cent of GDP in 2024. Military spending is not the same as spending on the war: there are additional costs, some shown in the new budget. The budget indicates that the Russian government is firmly committed to pursuing the war to a successful conclusion, accepting that this will put pressure on social and economic spending.
Topic:: Budget, Military Spending, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

496. Privilege, Economy and State in Old Regime France: An Interview with Lewis Wade

Author:: Tehreem Husain and Lewis Wade
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Toynbee Prize Foundation
Abstract:: Dr. Lewis Wade’s new book Privilege, Economy and State in Old Regime France: Marine Insurance, War and the Atlantic Empire under Louis XIV (Boydell and Brewer, 2023) closely analyses the rise and fall of Louis XIV's marine insurance institutions in Paris, which were central to the French monarchy's efforts to stimulate commerce, colonial enterprise and economic growth. The book discusses two leading ministers, Jean-Baptiste Colbert and his son, the Marquis de Seignelay who both recognised that marine insurance was crucial for protecting commercial investment in French maritime endeavours. While Colbert looked to private enterprise to lure capital away from passive investments in state debt towards the marine insurance industry. Seignelay, by contrast, leveraged the tools of privilege on which the French economy was built by creating the first chartered company in the history of marine insurance. The book discusses in detail the overarching system of risk management that lay at the heart of absolutism itself. I was delighted to interview Dr. Wade to dig deeper into his book.
Topic:: History, Economy, Economic Growth, State, Interview, and Capital
Political Geography:: Europe and France

497. Saudi-Houthi Talks Resume - The Yemen Review, August 2023

Author:: Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:: The strategic city of Marib saw an increase in fighting on several fronts. The Houthis have been reinforcing their positions in the area, which they attempted to seize in a massive and costly offensive two years ago. Should negotiations break down, Marib is seen as a likely area of renewed contestation due to its oil and gas resources. A new counterterrorist campaign was launched in Abyan to target Al-Qaeda forces in the governorate. Named ‘Swords of Haws’, the operation is being conducted by an array of STC and pro-government forces. The campaign reported it had succeeded in securing the Rafd and Jenin Valleys, but had faced strong resistance from Al-Qaeda forces in Mudiya district. Frontline fighting on the border of Al-Bayda and Lahj rose significantly in August, including a particularly large Houthi assault on STC positions on August 26-27 that resulted in dozens of casualties. Two Doctors Without Borders employees were kidnapped by unidentified gunmen in Marib as they traveled from Seyoun. No group has yet claimed responsibility for the incident. An officer investigating last month’s killing of World Food Programme Moayad Hameidi was assassinated. The officer, a member of the Taiz Political Security department, had received death threats and demanded he halt the investigation. Five UN employees were released on August 11, after being held captive by Al-Qaeda for more than 18 months. The group was reportedly released after lengthy Omani mediation and the payment of a ransom, though the UN has disputed these claims. Houthi forces continue to besiege villages of the Bani Nawf tribe in Al-Jawf following the killing of a prominent local Houthi commander. A number of tribes have responded by calling for united action, others have sided with the Houthis.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Politics, Counter-terrorism, Economy, Houthis, and Dialogue
Political Geography:: Middle East, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia

498. Houthis Target Israel Amid Gaza Conflict - The Yemen Review, September and October 2023

Author:: Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:: The Houthi group (Ansar Allah) claimed responsibility for a series of attempted missile and drone strikes on Israel. The Houthis have threatened to keep up the attacks as long as the Israeli military operation in Gaza continues. Four projectiles were intercepted by a US warship in the Red Sea, where the group has expanded its operations, and it could threaten shipping in the area in the future. Hamas’ deadly incursion into Israel and the subsequent conflict has fueled fears of a broader conflagration across the Arab world, potentially drawing in Iran and the US. While this still appears unlikely, the Houthis’ involvement could yet provoke retaliatory strikes from Israel or the US. The conflict is also proving a boon for recruitment for Al-Qaeda in Yemen. The Houthis staged a massive military parade on September 21 to celebrate the anniversary of their seizure of the capital in 2014. They then cracked down heavily on September 26 revolution celebrations, which mark the end of the Imamate and the beginning of republican rule. Thousands were reportedly arrested and detained, and a number of people were beaten for participation, as the event now carries symbolic importance as resistance against Houthi rule. Yemen has also seen nationwide demonstrations in support of the Palestinians over the course of October. Two border incidents marked a rare resumption of violence between the Houthis and foreign members of the Saudi coalition. Five Bahraini soldiers were killed following a Houthi drone strike along the border on September 25, and four Saudi soldiers were killed in a raid one month later. There has been speculation that the incidents reflect internal dissent over progressing Saudi-Houthi peace talks. Heavy fighting in Al-Dhalea has killed scores of fighters on both sides, though the frontlines have moved little. The renewed violence has been accompanied by the assassination and attempted assassination of local military leaders.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Politics, Economy, Houthis, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Yemen, Palestine, Gaza, and Saudi Arabia

499. The Red Sea Front - The Yemen Review, November and December 2023

Author:: Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Houthi military action in the Red Sea escalated dramatically during November and December, as the group announced the creation of a ‘third front’ against Israel in retaliation for its war in Gaza and military operations along the Lebanese border. Isolated attacks in October, nominally undertaken in solidarity with the besieged residents of Gaza, have mutated into a sustained campaign, with Houthi leaders now threatening to enforce a blockade of all ships headed to Israel through the area. Dozens of missile and drone strikes against maritime traffic have pushed the major shipping and oil companies to reroute their vessels. The attacks have been a public relations coup for the Houthis, who filmed the dramatic hijacking of the cargo ship Galaxy Leader, and have painted themselves as defenders of the Palestinian people. Regional powers have been hesitant to condemn the attacks, which were occurring near daily as of mid-December. The response from the US and other Western powers has been cautious. The US has sent additional warships to the region, and the Pentagon announced the formation of an international task force to protect shipping, though the scope of coordination is not yet clear. Mindful of the popularity of the Houthis’ stance, regional states have refused to officially join the response, with the sole exception of Bahrain. But the task force is unlikely to be the final word in the response. The US, Israel, or other Western nations may still launch strikes if Houthi operations continue unabated. At present they show no signs of stopping, and the group continues to work to improve its maritime power projection. The Houthis have also continued to press on other fronts, launching an attack on Marib in early November. The operation was reportedly the largest in months, and the group has continued to send reinforcements and fortify its positions in the area. Its long-held interest in the governorate’s strategic oil fields does not appear to have abated. The Houthis have also intensified military action in southern Hudaydah, perhaps looking to extend their maritime reach toward the Bab Al-Mandab Strait. A Saudi-Houthi deal, which seemed imminent through much of November, now appears to be on hold. The scale and brazenness of Houthi attacks have given US and Saudi officials pause, even if they still wish for a settlement to be completed. With further military action likely, and the scale of the international response not yet clear, the Houthis’ position vis-à-vis the peace process and the internationally recognized government is now less certain. Should they or the Saudis abandon peace talks, Yemen could face renewed military contestation between the Houthis and their opponents. For its part, the UN Special Envoy’s office announced its continued support for the process. The declining prospects of a deal, which reportedly promised massive Saudi financial relief in the form of public sector salary payments, has further imperiled the cash-strapped internationally recognized government. Saudi assistance promised to the government in August has not arrived, and the Houthis’ Red Sea attacks have dramatically increased already high shipping costs, which are passed on to consumers. The country is particularly vulnerable to such fluctuations as it relies almost entirely on imported foodstuffs, and the economic harm from Houthi operations will be felt most intensely in Yemen. Nearing bankruptcy, the government may no longer be able to pay salaries in the new year. It has already suspended FX auctions to finance basic commodity imports, and with its hard currency reserves exhausted, the value of the new rial has been falling since October. The government’s options to raise revenues are limited. A proposal to sell discounted oil to an Emirati company drew intense backlash, though it is unclear what other avenues are available. The government’s insolvency is perhaps most visible in its inability to provide electricity to the interim capital of Aden. The UAE sent an emergency fuel shipment in November to keep power plants running as an interim measure, but a long-term solution remains elusive.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Houthis, Shipping, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Yemen, Palestine, Gaza, and Red Sea

500. Pandemic Management: Lessons Learned For a Safer Future

Author:: Srdan Hercigonja and Gorana Pebić
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP)
Abstract:: What are the most dominant post-pandemic conclusions, and what do the latest research results on pandemic management in Serbia and the Western Balkans show? Read all about it in the newest analysis made by BCBP. The analysis concludes that the main feature of the pandemic management in Serbia is the dominance of politics and the political interests of the powerholders over expertise. Although there were moments when expertise and containing the spread of the virus were the primary goals of the management (particularly at the very beginning), the major decisions were made based on expected political consequences. This approach towards the administration is also evident in the way in which the government and state officials communicated about the pandemic and what measures were being adopted: from a spread of panic and imposing some of the most rigorous restrictions in Europe to complete silence from officials about the pandemic situation and lifting all measures. The second main characteristic of the pandemic management is non-transparency, of course of actions in various fields: giving false statements about the numbers of infected and deceased people from COVID-19, non-transparent procurement of medical equipment and vaccines, disclosed agreements with third countries and private companies. The pandemic management should have included experts from different areas, such as communicology and psychology, while organizational aspects of the management should have included plans for other vulnerable groups and patients who were totally neglected throughout the course of the pandemic. This analysis report was made possible with support from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund (RBF). The opinions and views of the authors do not necessarily state or reflect those of the RBF.
Topic:: Crisis Management, Transparency, Public Health, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Europe, Serbia, and Western Balkans

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS