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Begin New Search Topic Military Strategy Content Type Commentary and Analysis Publication Year within 5 Years Publication Year within 25 Years

1. Reach for the Stars: Bridging Italy’s Potential in Space with Its Foreign and Security Policy

Author:
Karolina Muti
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Italian capabilities, expertise and potential in the space sector are not widely known. Among state actors, Rome has actually been a pioneer in the field, boasting a long tradition that started in 1964 when Italy became the third country, after the Soviet Union and the United States, to send a nationally manufactured satellite into orbit.[1] From an industrial standpoint, Italy is among the few countries whose companies cover the whole space value chain.[2] In Europe, Rome is ranked second for total number of assets in orbit and is currently the third contributor to the European Space Agency (ESA).[3] An Italian astronaut, Samantha Cristoforetti, has recently become the first European woman to take command of the International Space Station (ISS).[4]
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, European Union, and Space
Political Geography:
Europe and Italy

2. Three Reasons Why CHIPS-plus is a Big Win for US National Security

Author:
Tom Klein
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
On August 9th, 2022, President Biden signed vital bipartisan legislation to compete with China. H.R. 4346, called the CHIPS and Science Act or “CHIPS-plus,” would pave the way for nearly $280 billion in incentives to boost US-based chip manufacturing, scientific research, technology standards setting, and STEM education. These initiatives directly protect our immediate security vulnerabilities in the US military and support our long-term national security competition with China by promoting democratic norms and spurring critical defense innovations.
Topic:
Security, National Security, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Innovation, and CHIPS
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

3. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Identity, History, and Conflict

Author:
Jeffrey Mankoff
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine constitutes the biggest threat to peace and security in Europe since the end of the Cold War. On February 21, 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin gave a bizarre and at times unhinged speech laying out a long list of grievances as justification for the “special military operation” announced the following day. While these grievances included the long-simmering dispute over the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the shape of the post–Cold War security architecture in Europe, the speech centered on a much more fundamental issue: the legitimacy of Ukrainian identity and statehood themselves. It reflected a worldview Putin had long expressed, emphasizing the deep-seated unity among the Eastern Slavs—Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, who all trace their origins to the medieval Kyivan Rus commonwealth—and suggesting that the modern states of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus should share a political destiny both today and in the future. The corollary to that view is the claim that distinct Ukrainian and Belarusian identities are the product of foreign manipulation and that, today, the West is following in the footsteps of Russia’s imperial rivals in using Ukraine (and Belarus) as part of an “anti-Russia project.” Throughout Putin’s time in office, Moscow has pursued a policy toward Ukraine and Belarus predicated on the assumption that their respective national identities are artificial—and therefore fragile. Putin’s arguments about foreign enemies promoting Ukrainian (and, in a more diffuse way, Belarusian) identity as part of a geopolitical struggle against Russia echo the way many of his predecessors refused to accept the agency of ordinary people seeking autonomy from tsarist or Soviet domination. The historically minded Putin often invokes the ideas of thinkers emphasizing the organic unity of the Russian Empire and its people—especially its Slavic, Orthodox core—in a form of what the historian Timothy Snyder calls the “politics of eternity,” the belief in an unchanging historical essence. The salience that Putin and other Russian elites assign to the idea of Russian-Ukrainian-Belarusian unity helps explain the origins of the current conflict, notably why Moscow was willing to risk a large-scale war on its borders when neither Ukraine nor NATO posed any military threat. It also suggests that Moscow’s ambitions extend beyond preventing Ukrainian NATO membership and encompass a more thorough aspiration to dominate Ukraine politically, militarily, and economically. It also helps explain Russia’s military strategy. Moscow appeared to calculate that enough Ukrainians, at least in the eastern part of the country, would accept some form of reintegration into a Russian sphere of influence because of shared cultural, linguistic, religious, and other ties with Russia. Despite pre-war polls showing large numbers of Ukrainians willing to take up arms to defend their country against a Russian invasion, Moscow’s wager was not entirely implausible given the recentness of the shift and the persistence of family and other ties across the Russian-Ukrainian border. Nonetheless, Russia’s war has become bogged down in no small part because this calculation about Ukrainian identity has proven dramatically wrong.
Topic:
War, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

4. What Does $40 Billion in Aid to Ukraine Buy?

Author:
Mark F. Cancian
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Congress has approved $40 billion in aid for Ukraine and other countries affected by the conflict―the sixth aid package since the war began. A major change is that this package looks ahead months rather than weeks. The aid package provides $19 billion for immediate military support to Ukraine, continuing the effort that has been vital to sustaining Ukrainian resistance, and $3.9 billion to sustain U.S. forces deployed to Europe. The package also contains about $16 billion for economic support to Ukraine, global humanitarian relief, and a wide variety of international programs as well as $2 billion for long-term support to NATO allies and DOD modernization programs. Although some elements of the aid package will be available quickly, many will take years to fully implement. This raises questions about why long-term elements could not have gone through the regular congressional authorization and budget processes.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Military Spending, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

5. The Militarization of Cyberspace? Cyber-Related Provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act

Author:
Michael Garcia
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
With Congress struggling to pass stand-alone cybersecurity legislation, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is now the primary vehicle to pass all matters of cybersecurity legislation. Because the annual defense bill typically requires provisions to have a tie to national security, other cyber issues, like those pertaining to criminal justice, tend to be excluded. As a result, the authorities and resources awarded to Department of Defense (DoD) cyber mission far outpace those provided to civilian agencies responsible for partnering with state, local, private, and international partners. With ransomware and cyber incidents at an all-time high, Congress should either include a new title in future Defense bills to bolster US cyber enforcement and civilian agencies’ capabilities or pass a cyber-omnibus bill to fix policy gaps and provide commensurate funds to federal and local agencies to combat malicious cyber activity. In this paper, we analyzed the last five NDAAs (2017-2021) to chronicle Washington’s reliance on the NDAA to shepherd through a wide swath of cybersecurity legislation. We found that: Members of Congress included 290 cyber-related provisions in the past five NDAAs, with the past two NDAAs accounting for 60% of those provisions. In fact, the FY 2021 NDAA contained 380% more cyber-related provisions than the FY 2017 NDAA. The 179 cyber-provisions included in the past two NDAAs far outpace the 14 cybersecurity bills that the 116th Congress passed (two of which were those NDAAs). Across 13 categories, three of the top four were aimed at the DOD core cyber missions, such as changing organizational processes and structures, protecting DoD assets, and engaging with foreign partners while deterring nation-state adversaries. In FY 2020, the number of non-DoD-related cyber provisions began increasing, such as supply-chain security and industrial policy, critical infrastructure protection, and election security. The provisions in these NDAAs helped improve US offensive cyber capabilities, implement measures to deter cyber adversaries, and shore up our cybersecurity defenses, all of which are needed. But because cybersecurity is a multifaceted issue that expands beyond national security and touches on criminal justice, workforce development, private-sector collaboration, and privacy issues, Congress must ensure it takes a holistic approach when creating cybersecurity laws.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Legislation, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

6. President Biden: Try for a Double Play on Iran and Afghanistan

Author:
Jon Greenwald
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Council on International Policy (CIP)
Abstract:
Southwest Asia is increasingly dangerous. Negotiations about Iran’s nuclear program appear stuck near a breakpoint. With the Kabul government’s precipitous collapse, President Biden’s courageous decision to remove U.S. troops from Afghanistan has gone badly. Each situation threatens grave consequences for the administration. Together they suggest more deadly chaos looms from the Middle East to China’s borders. Iran is an important common factor, central to the first case, important in the second due to geography and potential leverage. The concurrence of threat – but also perhaps opportunity – justifies a new strategy for dealing with it that cuts across both situations. Joe Biden said before taking office that it was a priority to restore the nuclear deal that was working well until Donald Trump took the U.S. out. He pledged to conclude the endless war in Afghanistan. Today neither objective appears promising. Iran has more enriched and closer to weapons level uranium than when the original deal was signed. U.S. officials acknowledge that negotiating time is limited and, by implication, that military action may be required to keep the president’s pledge never to allow an Iranian bomb. As the Taliban takes over Afghanistan, Washington is focused as it should be on safely extracting U.S. citizens and the many thousands of Afghans whose lives are at risk for having helped the Americans over 20 years. Soon, however, there will be new proposals, including preparations for off-shore responses to what many anticipate will be a revival of the kind of civil war that ravaged Afghanistan in the 1990s. Any reasonable proposal should include at the least a significant diplomatic component in which Afghanistan’s neighbors, Iran prominent among them, apply their weight to persuade the Taliban to rule more moderately than it did its first time in power and in particular to keep out international terrorists. Most acknowledge that a key weakness of that approach is U.S. inability to work with Tehran.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

7. Afghanistan: Before Time Runs Out

Author:
Owen Kirby
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Council on International Policy (CIP)
Abstract:
The withdrawal of remaining U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan is nearly complete. As they go, the country begins a new, uncertain chapter in a long uncertain history. With the U.S. and our allies having made significant investments and great sacrifices in an attempt to develop self-sustaining Afghan institutions – and the Taliban now rampaging through the countryside – this is the moment of truth for the country’s government and post-9/11 political order. Whether Afghanistan’s institutions, security forces, and civil society prove sufficiently resilient to meet current challenges is not solely a matter of local capacity and resolve (or wisdom of previous donor decisions). Nor is it a matter of free choice between competing political views, as Afghans are not going to the voting booth to decide the outcome. It is equally about the commitment of the U.S. and our allies to continue supporting the equality of Afghan women and minorities, rule of law, free speech, and basic human rights. These are not foreign impositions, as some might argue, but rather vital weapons, absent U.S. troops, in the Afghan people’s own struggle against extremism and political regression. For many, there is justifiable fatigue with America’s “forever war” and its costs; but the Taliban’s repressive rule and its consequences are not a specter of another lifetime. It has only been 20 years since Afghan girls were banned from going to school; women barred from the workforce and life outside the home; and summary justice, including stoning and decapitation, for transgressions against the Taliban’s medieval code meted out in the national stadium. It has only been 17 years since Afghans were first given the constitutional right to choose their leadership at the ballot box. Progress is recent, and the Taliban is determined to make it reversible.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Military Strategy, Transition, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

8. The EU’s Strategic Approach to CSDP interventions: Building a Tenet from Praxis

Author:
Tyyne Karjalainen
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Crisis management forms an integral part of the expanding toolbox with which the European Union (EU) reacts to external crises. This FIIA analysis aims at understanding the strategic approach of the EU to crisis management as it develops from the interplay between growing institutional infrastructure and member states’ reactions to crises and conflicts in their neighbourhood. In particular, this analysis investigates the creation of objectives for Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) interventions. Drawing on a series of expert interviews, the article challenges a tradition in European studies of analysing EU strategy based on strategic documents alone. Instead, it explores the strategic approach as it has been developed, practised and interpreted by practitioners working in the CSDP framework. The research argues that the development of the EU’s approach is characterized by experimentalism and emergence, which are enabled by repetitive processes of intergovernmentalism and institutional learning in the framework. At the same time, discrepancies in the Integrated Approach and decision- making are found to limit the capabilities of the EU as a strategic actor. Finally, three trends are argued to curtail the EU approach to crisis management at present: a decreasing level of ambition, squeezing between other instruments for foreign and security policy, and a rhetorical shift from external to internal security.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe

9. Can and Will Germany Be a Viable Partner in a U.S. “Pushback” Strategy Towards Russia?

Author:
Hannes Adomeit
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:
Joe Biden, as presidential candidate, is on record as having stated that “the biggest threat to America right now in terms of breaking up our − our security and our alliances − is Russia.” As president, he asserted, “the days of the United States rolling over in the face of Russia’s aggressive actions are over.” The first months of his tenure in office have given some substance to such claims and confirmed that the new administration aims at containing and counteracting Russian malign behavior and to impose costs so as to affect the Kremlin’s risk calculus. Can Germany − and most likely will it − be a viable partner in such a U.S. strategy?
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Leadership, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

10. PTSS Virtual Global Alumni Community of Interest Workshop: The Impact of the COVID–19 Pandemic on Terrorism and Counterterrorism

Author:
James K. Wither
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:
This paper presents the findings of a George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) Counterterrorism (CT) Virtual Global Alumni Community of Interest (COI) workshop held on January 20-21, 2021. The objectives of the workshop were as follows: Analyze the effect of the coronavirus pandemic on terrorism and CT nationally and internationally. Identify the extent to which the pandemic has created vulnerabilities that terrorists have been able to exploit to mount attacks and/or attract new recruits. Explore the extent to which the pandemic might make societies more vulnerable to terrorism and irregular warfare in the longer term and the reasons why this could happen. Formulate policy recommendations for the global counterterrorism community from the perspective of GCMC CT Alumni. The virtual workshop was structured around four panels, each with two alumni panelists with practical or academic expertise on the selected topics. GCMC CT faculty acted as panel moderators. The panels examined the impact of the pandemic on terrorist financing as well as terrorism and CT in the Middle East, the Americas, and the Sahel in Africa. Thirty selected global alumni took part in the workshop and raised additional questions and comments after the formal panel sessions. Initially, planning for the COI took place in spring 2020, when it was wrongly assumed that the worst of the pandemic would be over by 2021 and assessments of its impact would, therefore, be relatively conclusive. However, given the continued threat posed by COVID-19, with countries around the world still suffering from its impact, the assessments below must be regarded as interim. Therefore, the workshop made no specific policy recommendations. Marshall Center CT faculty members, along with their colleagues at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia–Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), have researched the impact of the pandemic on terrorism since March 2020.1 The COI followed a survey of alumni on the impact of the pandemic on terrorism and CT conducted in October 2020.2 Over four hundred military and civilian counterterrorism practitioners responded to the survey from Europe, North and South America, Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. Unsurprisingly, many of the conclusions from the recent workshop are similar to impact statements in the earlier survey.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Counter-terrorism, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

11. "Melian Strategy": Why does Taliban fight and negotiate at the same time?

Author:
Irfan Yar
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
As the US completes its troops’ withdrawal from Afghanistan, Taliban has seized security vacuum to launch massive assaults. The group has unleashed violent chaos across the country and captured more than two-third of the territory, as per senior EU official estimates. On one hand, the insurgents have tightened their grip on seizing the provinces through military means. On the other hand, the insurgents claim that they want to resolve the issue in peaceful ways. “We are committed to finding a diplomatic solution for Afghanistan; the US-Taliban Doha agreement and the Intra-Afghan dialogue are the proofs that the Taliban want to solve the issue through negotiations,”[ii] said Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the deputy leader of the Taliban, on Wednesday, in Doha. Furthermore, Taliban leaders urge governors, military leaders, and other Jamiat Islami party leaders to surrender and put an end to the 40-years long conflict via negotiations. So, the question is, why have the Taliban fighters intensified violence and, at the same time, stress on making peace?
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Taliban, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, and Kabul

12. Military cooperation between Serbia and the USA: dynamically under the public radar

Author:
Marija Ignjatijevic
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Military cooperation between Serbia and the United States is the topic of the latest analysis by BCBP researcher Maria Ignjatijevic. Serbia and the United States have had intensive cooperation in the field of security and defense for years, members of the armed forces have participated in over 70 military exercises in the last ten years, and the United States is one of the largest donors to the Serbian defense system. However, if we follow only media reports in Serbia, the intensity of this cooperation will not be so obvious. Defense cooperation with Russia gets far more space in the media than activities with the US and NATO members. Thus, for example, the military exercise “Slavic Shield” completely occupied the public’s attention before and after its organisation in October 2019. Although undeniably a significant activity between the two armed forces, to which Russia brought its S-400 and Pantsir systems, it gained a disproportionately large space in the media compared to other exercises that took place that year with other partner countries. Apart from the image being sent to the public through media and various foreign policy moves, a very dynamic and practical defense cooperation with all partners takes place behind the scenes. The United States is one of Serbia’s important partners in the field of defense, and cooperation with the US Department of Defense has been achieved in various fields. Every year, Serbia and the US conduct about 100 different bilateral activities. In the eyes of the Serbian public, perception of relations with the United States, and especially perception of military cooperation, is burdened by the NATO intervention in 1999. In order to avoid losing political points at home and endangering relations with Russia, the political elite in Serbia avoids talking about cooperation with the United States and other NATO members, and the pro-regime media report accordingly. Regardless of the fact that military cooperation is often used as a foreign or domestic policy tool, it is important to discuss the practical aspects of this cooperation, benefits for Serbia and the US, their defense systems, but also the citizens. At the online discussion “Serbia and the USA: Together we are safer”, specific examples of military cooperation between Serbia and the US and practical benefits for our defense system and its members from this cooperation were discussed. Defense cooperation between Serbia and the United States takes place on several levels, through joint exercises, cooperation with the Ohio National Guard, a student exchange program, as well as donations.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, Serbia, North America, and United States of America

13. Reducing Military Risks through OSCE Instruments

Author:
Naomi Egel
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
CBMs for AWS would make a significant contribution to reducing the military risks posed by AWS and - equally important - are a realistic goal. Although agreement within the OSCE cannot be assured, its strong history of developing CBMs and its ability to make progress towards reducing military risk even in a climate of geopolitical tensions makes the OSCE uniquely well positioned to develop AWS CBMs. The growing proliferation of AWS and their increasing importance in military operations means that risk reduction is an urgent priority. Given the numerous challenges to arms control and cooperative security measures in other international organisations, OSCE CBMs offer one of the best opportunities for making progress in reducing the military risks of AWS. Moreover, they would provide a foundation for further governance of AWS by other international organisations. The CBMs proposed here would provide greater transparency regarding states’ capabilities and intentions regarding AWS, and in doing so, would reduce the risks of miscommunication, miscalculation and inadvertent conflict escalation that these systems pose.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, and Peace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

14. The Fauda Effect: Israeli Active Defense on the Screen

Author:
Asaf Romirowsky
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies (BESA)
Abstract:
Strategically, Israel’s fundamental military premise is defensive but its tactics are offensive—a result of its geography and absence of territorial depth. Israeli decision-making has always been driven by the active defense ethos, and this is reflected in Israeli filmmaking and TV-making.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Culture, Media, Film, and Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

15. U.S. Troops Injured in Altercation with Russian Forces: What It Means for the War in Syria

Author:
Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
On August 26, Politico reported that U.S. service members were injured after an altercation with Russian forces in northeast Syria. This pattern of Russian challenges to U.S. forces was enabled by the Trump administration’s decision to retreat from parts of northern Syria in 2019, allowing Russia to fill the void. Until this decision was made, the two countries had agreed to make the Euphrates River the deconfliction line to keep U.S. and Russian forces separated. Russia stayed on the west side of the river, and the United on the east side, where this incident took place. Robert Hamilton, Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, commented on the story and warned that it will not be a one-off incident: “We need to respond to this immediately and forcefully. Russian forces deliberately escalated against U.S. partners when I was running the ground deconfliction cell for Syria in 2017, but tended to be careful when U.S. forces were present. Unless we make it clear that we’ll defend ourselves, these escalations will continue with dangerous and unpredictable results.” Below, we offer readers an excerpt from a chapter written by Robert Hamilton from a forthcoming edited volume on Russia’s Way of War in Syria.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, War, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Troop Deployment
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, Syria, United States of America, and North America

16. Special Commentary: COVID-19 and Indo-Pacific Strategy: Korea is Up, China is Down, and the US (For Now) is Out

Author:
John Schaus and Mr. Nathan P. Freier
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic has led to over three million confirmed infections and more than one hundred thousand dead globally. In the United States, over sixty thousand people have died and more than 1 million have been infected. According to epidemiologists, this is only the first phase. Thus, near-term “success” against the outbreak reflects a current snapshot in time, not necessarily a permanent outcome. In light of our very preliminary understanding of the long-term impact of the outbreak and national-level responses, there are discernible trends about how countries’ responses are impacting their standing in key regions and around the world. Few regions offer such stark contrast in stories as the Indo-Pacific. In that region, South Korea is up, China is down, and the United States is out. These shifts may or may not endure. What is increasingly clear, however, is that ineffective responses—perceived at home or abroad—will limit policymakers’ freedom of action for some time to come.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Armed Forces, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Korea, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

17. Special Commentary: Scenarios for a Post-COVID Middle East

Author:
Christopher J. Bolan
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
It is worth approaching an assessment of the likely impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the Middle East with a strong dose of humility. Nonetheless, it is clear that the spread of this disease has already had major impacts on the global economy, drastically reducing demand for Middle East oil exports, and leading to a historic collapse in oil prices. The immediate challenges of dealing with the monumental health and economic challenges posed by COVID-19 will add to the troubles of a region already burdened by multiple civil wars, poorly performing economies, growing civil discontent, and intensified sectarian divisions. This article offers a preliminary assessment of the potential impacts of COVID-19 on the security landscape of the Middle East and advances recommendations for how US military strategy and operations might adapt.
Topic:
Security, Oil, Military Strategy, Economy, Exports, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Middle East

18. Commentary on “The US Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028”

Author:
Huba Wass de Czege
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Does The US Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 lack a clear theory of victory? A comparative analysis of the development of MDO and the historical concepts of Active Defense and AirLand Battle reveals the necessity of greater insight into sources of Russian and Chinese behavior and countering mechanisms, what constitutes effective deterrence, and greater clarity regarding the political will of Allies to assist in this deterrence.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Army
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

19. Iran’s Involvement in Syria during the COVID-19 Pandemic: Continuity or Change?

Author:
Hamidreza Azizi
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Iran is trying to maintain its political and military position in Syria until it recovers from the impact of COVID-19. Protection of its interests via securing Damascus, driving out the military forces of the United States, and maintaining control of the areas that allow access to Lebanon (and the Eastern Mediterranean) are still priorities. The deteriorating economic situation and the slump in oil prices will most likely relax Iran’s control over its proxies in Syria, such as the Fatemiyoun and local tribes existing in Deir ez-Zor. The consolidation of the Turkish military presence in Idlib and the northeast will only make Iran more determined to expel American forces after the COVID-19 crisis subsides. The real challenge for Iran is losing the competition with Russia over influence in the security and economic sectors in Syria.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Syria

20. Tensions escalate in the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean

Author:
Paulo Botta
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
Abstract:
The main objective of this study is to analyze the presence of the Russian Navy in the Black Sea and in the East Mediterranean Sea, taking into account the operations in Syria and the overall strategy employed in this region.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Navy, Oceans and Seas, and Seapower
Political Geography:
Russia, Syria, Mediterranean, and Black Sea