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1. Domestic Disagreements Limit Netanyahu’s Options with Washington

Author:
David Makovsky
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
As the Hamas-Israel war enters a new phase, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is finding it increasingly difficult to balance relationships inside his government and with the White House. On the military front, Israel has taken most of northern Gaza, though an estimated 5,000-6,000 Hamas fighters remain active in various tunnel networks. Major combat operations have largely shifted to central and southern Gaza, while the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have released most of the 360,000 reservists mobilized at the beginning of the war and withdrawn some forces for retraining. Yet the situation is murkier on the diplomatic and political fronts. Earlier today, Netanyahu and President Biden spoke with each other for the first time in almost four weeks, and the prime minister is fundamentally at odds with Benny Gantz’s centrist National Unity party. When Gantz joined the government shortly after the October 7 attacks, he helped dilute the influence of the far-right parties led by Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir while focusing the cabinet on the mutual goal of driving Hamas from power in Gaza. Yet their policy differences have become more salient since then, and Netanyahu seems convinced that Gantz—who is riding high in the polls—will soon leave the government to capitalize on the prime minister’s wartime unpopularity in potential early elections. This has made Netanyahu more dependent on his far-right ministers, much to the consternation of the White House.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Domestic Politics, Conflict, and Benjamin Netanyahu
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

2. The Pursuit of Memory and Justice in Bojayá

Author:
Marlon Londoño
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)
Abstract:
Twenty-one years after the Bojayá Massacre destroyed their town, survivors in the community of Bellavista Nueva in northwestern Colombia recount their story on their own terms.
Topic:
Transitional Justice, Conflict, Memory, Justice, and Extrajudicial Killings
Political Geography:
Colombia, South America, and Latin America

3. War in Ukraine: One Year On, Nowhere Safe

Author:
Nichita Gurcov
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, ACLED records nearly 40,000 political violence events across the country. Three-quarters of these events are shelling, artillery, and missile strikes mostly affecting the northeastern, eastern, and southern regions of Ukraine. Quantifying the civilian toll of the conflict presents a challenge – especially in areas continuously engulfed by violence, like eastern Ukraine. In areas under Russian occupation, reports of abductions, forced disappearances, torture, and extrajudicial executions have been widespread, though the scale of violence against civilians becomes known only upon the liberation of territories, evidenced in the case of northern Ukraine and especially the Kyiv suburbs. Meanwhile, long-range strikes, including those deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure, pose a permanent threat and continue to induce extreme hardship for communities even farther afield from the frontline.
Topic:
War Crimes, Conflict, Civilians, Russia-Ukraine War, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

4. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Sustained Resurgence in Yemen or Signs of Further Decline?

Author:
Emile Roy
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
In the first two months of 2023, suspected United States drone strikes killed two senior leaders of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen’s Marib governorate. One of the group’s top explosives experts, a Yemeni citizen named Husayn Hadbul (also known as Hassan al-Hadrami), was killed on 30 January. The group’s media chief and leader of the group’s Shura Council, Saudi citizen Hamad al-Tamimi (also known as Abu Abd al-Aziz al-Adnani), was killed on 26 February. These strikes on high-profile AQAP leaders took place amid a resurgence of AQAP activity in Yemen, which started during the United Nations-mediated truce between Houthi and anti-Houthi forces that lasted from April to the beginning of October 2022, and that has informally held to this date.1 The lull in fighting between Houthi and anti-Houthi forces induced by the truce allowed for a broader political and military reconfiguration within the anti-Houthi camp. At the political level, former President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi was replaced by an eight-member Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) to enhance coordination among anti-Houthi forces. Armed militias affiliated with the secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) and other United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed forces exploited the new situation to gain control over territory in southern Yemen. As part of this territorial expansion, STC forces spearheaded several offensives against AQAP beginning in August 2022, leading to a sudden rise in AQAP activity in 2022.2 However, the nature of this overall increase is disputed, with some analysts arguing that it is a sign of AQAP’s weakness rather than its strength.3
Topic:
Non State Actors, Armed Forces, Conflict, Houthis, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
Political Geography:
Middle East and Yemen

5. One Year After Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: The geopolitical struggle is not where you think it is

Author:
Roshni Menon and Faiza Shaheen
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:
When Russia invaded Ukraine one year ago, there were immediate concerns about the effects on food and energy security, and on geopolitical alignment in other countries. The world was right to be concerned, but the repercussions have been much wider and deeper than many predicted. There are two main ways in which conflict dynamics have shifted, neither of them solely caused by the war but both exacerbated by it: Russian’s war on Ukraine has shone the lens on inter-state conflict and proxy war Compounding the pandemic and climate change, a war started in one corner of the world has resulted in a global cost-of-living crisis and increasing debt for almost every country worldwide—countries that had no hand in Russia’s invasion or in the failure to respond to public health and socio-economic crisis. This analysis looks at the multiple and cascading crises (increasingly referred to as the polycrisis), and how we can take action in the face of polycrisis,
Topic:
Security, Geopolitics, Conflict, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

6. Cyber Crossover and Its Escalatory Risks for Europe

Author:
Lora Saalman, Fei Su, and Larisa Saveleva Dovgal
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The crossover between cybercrime and cyberwarfare has intensified in recent years, particularly against the backdrop of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and mounting tensions between China, Russia and the United States. This paper delves into specific cyber incidents that employ cybercrime tactics with cyberwarfare objectives, allegedly involving Chinese, Russian or US actors. It examines responses within and among the private sector, the public sector and international forums. Although not directly involved in all of the cases, the European Union (EU) was impacted in a variety of ways, including as a result of spillover effects and intentional targeting. Drawing on an examination of cyber incidents, this paper highlights how emerging trends in actors, means and responses present escalatory risks for the EU and emphasizes the pressing need to bolster cybersecurity measures.
Topic:
European Union, Cybersecurity, Conflict, Risk, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

7. The United States Is Rapidly Losing Arab Hearts and Minds Through Gaza War, While Competitors Benefit

Author:
Munqith Dagher and Karl Kaltenthaler
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Throughout the fifteen years that following the 2011 withdrawal from Iraq, each American presidential administration has experienced domestic calls to leave the Middle East. However, each time these voices grew louder, a new regional variable emerged that compelled the American administration to return to its traditional role dictated by urgent strategic security and economic interests. After the withdrawal from Iraq, a strategic vacuum led to the emergence of and fight against ISIS, with the deaths of thousands both locally and internationally, and millions from the region displaced. The U.S. military was forced to return to the region to contribute to the efforts to eliminate ISIS. When this goal was declared completed, new regional threats emerged in the form of Iran and its weapons, which threatened not only America’s allies but also the free flow of global oil supplies. While the Biden administration thought this problem could be resolved through a package of incentives and agreements with Iran, the war in Gaza has emerged to confirm once again the error of U.S. assessments that contend that this region is no longer important to America’s strategic interests. According to the third section of the U.S. National Security Strategy document signed by President Biden in October 2022, America's top priority on the global stage is to surpass China, followed by limiting Russia's influence. The national security priorities also include combating terrorism in the Middle East.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Islamic State, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America

8. New Poll Sheds Light on Saudi Views of Israel-Hamas War

Author:
Catherine Cleveland and David Pollock
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
AWashington Institute poll conducted from November 14 to December 6, a nationally representative sample of 1,000 Saudi citizens measured how Saudi attitudes have shifted due to the Israel-Hamas war. According to responses, the Saudi popular attitude towards the outcome of the war is clear: the overwhelming majority (91%) express agreement with the statement that “despite the destruction and loss of life, this war in Gaza is a win for the Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims.” And as for the role of the broader Arab world, almost all (96%) agree with the proposal that “Arab countries should immediately break all diplomatic, political, economic, and any other contacts with Israel, in protest against its military action in Gaza.” Polling during a war is likely to produce more volatile results as circumstances shift quickly on the ground—during the current polling period, for instance, the Israel-Hamas war had several major shifts, including a temporary ceasefire from November 24-30 and the subsequent expansion of Israel’s incursions into southern Gaza. However, comparisons with Saudi polling fielded in August can help provide a barometer as to just how sharply this conflict has, at least temporarily, shifted certain attitudes, and how little it has moved others. While Hamas as a movement remains unpopular among the majority of Saudis—in contrast to a new trend of widespread popular support in countries like Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt—just 16% of Saudis say that “Hamas should stop calling for the destruction of Israel, and instead accept a permanent two-state solution to the conflict based on the 1967 borders.” Nor do most believe that Hamas’s attack on October 7 targeted Israeli civilians—the overwhelming majority of Saudis (95%) responded that Hamas did not actually kill civilians when asked about whether they believed the Hamas killing of civilians was against Islam. This view is widespread across the eight countries polled by TWI, and similar results appear in a recently released poll of Palestinians from PSR. There, the overwhelming majority reported that they had not seen any videos of Hamas members committing atrocities, and only 10% of Palestinians (17% of Gazans and 5% of West Bankers) stated that they believed that Hamas committed war crimes in the current war, in comparison to 95% who say the same about Israel. While the majority of Saudis continue to express a negative opinion of Hamas, the Israel-Hamas war has generated a significant boost in its popularity. There has been a thirty point shift in positive attitudes towards Hamas, from just 10% in August to 40% in November/December. Responses in the most recent poll, alongside those in 2014 and 2021, demonstrate the increased popularity Hamas achieves among some Saudis during or in the immediate aftermath of conflict between Hamas and Israel, along with its likely disappearance over time. In the aftermath of the 2021 Hamas-Israel conflict, for instance, five years of steadily decreasing popularity in Saudi Arabia suddenly reversed, though just to a quarter (23%) of the total population.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Conflict, Hamas, and Polls
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and Gulf Nations

9. What Does the War in Gaza Mean for Jordan's National Security?

Author:
Saud Al-Sharafat
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
As the war between Israel and Hamas continues, focus is turned towards the Gaza Strip and Israel proper. Although the ongoing hostilities will eventually die down or cease altogether, the lasting impacts of the war on the broader region are still unknown. Nowhere is this truer than in neighboring Jordan. When Hamas launched its attack on October 7, it had an immediate impact on the Jordanian street and the country’s national security. Despite the chaotic and passionate outpouring of emotion among the public, bilateral cooperation between Jordan and the United States can contribute to assisting the conflicting parties in ultimately achieving peace and security.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Conflict, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Middle East, Palestine, Gaza, and Jordan

10. Sudan's Civil War: Mediation Challenges and the U.S. Role

Author:
Yasir Zaidan, Reem Abbas, and Alex Rondos
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Three experts assess the conflict’s effects on regional humanitarian and security issues, outlining the requirements for a durable ceasefire.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Civil War, Conflict, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Africa, Sudan, Egypt, and United States of America

11. Morocco and North Africa Are Feeling Anti-Normalization Ripples from the Gaza War

Author:
Sabina Henneberg
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The conflict will make it more difficult for Washington and Israel to preserve—let alone expand—the diplomatic progress they have made with North African governments in recent years, particularly as public opposition intensifies. North Africa has not been spared from the reverberations of the Hamas-Israel war. Morocco may be the country most profoundly affected given its relatively strong relations with Israel and the United States, while anti-normalization trends elsewhere in the region are being firmly reinforced, creating new challenges for Washington.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Conflict, Normalization, and Hamas
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, North Africa, and Morocco

12. Putin’s Use and Abuse of History: Back to the 19th Century?

Author:
Leo Goretti
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
“Ukraine is not just a neighbouring country for us. It is an inalienable part of our own history, culture and spiritual space.” This is how Putin introduced the “decisions being made” in his 55-minute address to the nation on 21 February 2022, which paved the way for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Several commentators noted how Putin’s speech was replete with historical references: as historian Benjamin Nathans pointed out, Vladimir Putin seems to be “quite obsessed with history. So part of our attention […] should be looking at how Putin is using history”. Indeed, almost one-quarter of Putin’s speech was devoted to a rather erratic and convoluted discussion of pre-1991 Russian and Soviet history, departing from the assumption that this was necessary “to explain the motives behind Russia’s actions and what we aim to achieve”.
Topic:
Nationalism, History, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Caucasus, and Balkans

13. Carbon Pricing During an Energy Crisis

Author:
Harrison Fell and Pierre Noel
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
The European energy crisis, aggravated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, amplifies the tension between climate mitigation action and energy affordability. Introducing a more effective safety valve to the EU carbon market could reduce affordability concerns and the political pressure associated with extreme price spikes, making the system more resilient. It could be accompanied by a more effective price floor too.
Topic:
Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, Conflict, Carbon Emissions, and Energy Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe

14. Energy Markets and the Design of Sanctions on Russia

Author:
Christof Ruhl
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
Sanctions against the citizens, institutions, and products of the Russian Federation are evolving rapidly. Energy sanctions started late, but the number of countries embargoing oil, gas, or coal imports from Russia is expanding. These sanctions are likely to increase global fuel prices while depressing the price of the sanctioned fuel. The experience to date suggests that the current, gradual approach of reducing oil and gas imports from Russia one country at a time may have room to go further. Before the invasion of Ukraine, the sweeping and unprecedented sanctions promised in the event of a Russian invasion were often conceived as a two-pronged pincer movement. The idea was to isolate Russia from the global financial system while limiting its commodity and energy exports. Both moves were aimed at the source of the financial strength of “fortress Russia,” namely, its persistent balance of payment surplus.
Topic:
Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, Sanctions, Financial Markets, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

15. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Identity, History, and Conflict

Author:
Jeffrey Mankoff
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine constitutes the biggest threat to peace and security in Europe since the end of the Cold War. On February 21, 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin gave a bizarre and at times unhinged speech laying out a long list of grievances as justification for the “special military operation” announced the following day. While these grievances included the long-simmering dispute over the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the shape of the post–Cold War security architecture in Europe, the speech centered on a much more fundamental issue: the legitimacy of Ukrainian identity and statehood themselves. It reflected a worldview Putin had long expressed, emphasizing the deep-seated unity among the Eastern Slavs—Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, who all trace their origins to the medieval Kyivan Rus commonwealth—and suggesting that the modern states of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus should share a political destiny both today and in the future. The corollary to that view is the claim that distinct Ukrainian and Belarusian identities are the product of foreign manipulation and that, today, the West is following in the footsteps of Russia’s imperial rivals in using Ukraine (and Belarus) as part of an “anti-Russia project.” Throughout Putin’s time in office, Moscow has pursued a policy toward Ukraine and Belarus predicated on the assumption that their respective national identities are artificial—and therefore fragile. Putin’s arguments about foreign enemies promoting Ukrainian (and, in a more diffuse way, Belarusian) identity as part of a geopolitical struggle against Russia echo the way many of his predecessors refused to accept the agency of ordinary people seeking autonomy from tsarist or Soviet domination. The historically minded Putin often invokes the ideas of thinkers emphasizing the organic unity of the Russian Empire and its people—especially its Slavic, Orthodox core—in a form of what the historian Timothy Snyder calls the “politics of eternity,” the belief in an unchanging historical essence. The salience that Putin and other Russian elites assign to the idea of Russian-Ukrainian-Belarusian unity helps explain the origins of the current conflict, notably why Moscow was willing to risk a large-scale war on its borders when neither Ukraine nor NATO posed any military threat. It also suggests that Moscow’s ambitions extend beyond preventing Ukrainian NATO membership and encompass a more thorough aspiration to dominate Ukraine politically, militarily, and economically. It also helps explain Russia’s military strategy. Moscow appeared to calculate that enough Ukrainians, at least in the eastern part of the country, would accept some form of reintegration into a Russian sphere of influence because of shared cultural, linguistic, religious, and other ties with Russia. Despite pre-war polls showing large numbers of Ukrainians willing to take up arms to defend their country against a Russian invasion, Moscow’s wager was not entirely implausible given the recentness of the shift and the persistence of family and other ties across the Russian-Ukrainian border. Nonetheless, Russia’s war has become bogged down in no small part because this calculation about Ukrainian identity has proven dramatically wrong.
Topic:
War, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

16. UK Must Engage with Argentina Over Future of Falkland Islands

Author:
Carole Concha Bell
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)
Abstract:
For Argentina, it’s position in the decades-old dispute over the British Overseas Territory remains clear: Las Malvinas son Argentinas.
Topic:
International Relations, Politics, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Argentina, South America, and Falkland Islands

17. Indigenous Groups Occupy Bogotá Park in Protest

Author:
Christoph Sponsel
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)
Abstract:
Members of Colombia's Emberá community, many of whom are victims of conflict, have camped for months in Colombia's capital to generate attention and demand change.
Topic:
Social Movement, Conflict, Protests, and Indigenous
Political Geography:
Colombia and South America

18. Fact Checking Power, April 11, 2002 and Beyond

Author:
David Smilde
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)
Abstract:
In the face of a fraught conflict with missteps and misinformation on both sides, empirically informed analysis offers one tool to cut through the noise.
Topic:
Elections, Domestic Politics, Conflict, Protests, Misinformation, and Hugo Chavez
Political Geography:
South America and Venezuela

19. HOW DO GOVERNMENTS DECIDE WHICH GROUPS ARE “TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS”?

Author:
Brian J. Phillips and Mirna El Masri
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
US Senator Ted Cruz recently called for Yemen’s Houthis to be added to the Foreign Terrorist Organization list—again. The Iran-backed Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah, were designated as terrorists by the Trump administration on January 19, 2021, criminalizing support of the group, but the designation was removed by the Biden administration the following month. Around the world, national terrorist group lists vary considerably, and change over time. Last fall, the UK government announced it would add Hamas to its terrorist list. Other countries, such as the United States, have long designated Hamas a terrorist group, while others, like Russia, have not. Why do some organizations end up on countries’ terrorist group lists? Why are some terrorist lists different than others?
Topic:
Government, Terrorism, Non State Actors, Conflict, and Islamism
Political Geography:
United States of America

20. A WIDENING RIFT BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE SAHEL

Author:
Silvia D'Amato
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Two weeks ago, the Malian military junta, in power after a coup in May 2021, proposed to hold elections in December 2025 instead of this month as promised. The move was widely condemned. West Africa’s main regional bloc, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), immediately imposed new sanctions while the French Minister of Defense Florence Parly floated the possibility of reviewing the French and European military engagement in the country. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean-Yves Le Drian openly called the junta “illegitimate”. In response, on January 31 Malian authorities gave 72 hours to the French Ambassador in Bamako to leave the country, an unprecedented diplomatic decision. The European Union (EU) also took a firm stance by imposing targeted sanctions against 5 members of the junta, including Prime Minister Choguel Maïga. The current querelle is arguably only the latest in an ongoing dynamic of political fragmentation in the cooperation between European and regional actors in the Sahel.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Counterinsurgency, Armed Forces, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe, North Africa, and Sahel

21. CAN ISRAEL REMAIN BOTH NEUTRAL AND PART OF THE WEST?

Author:
Michael Barnett
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Israel is getting some unwanted attention because of its reluctance to outrightly condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine. No one believes that the failure to condemn translates into support for the attack. But Israel’s reticence has placed it in an awkward situation—one that might, in fact, translate into a loss of support from Western countries when Israel needs it most.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Conflict, Neutrality, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Middle East, Israel, and Eastern Europe

22. The UN-Mediated Truce in Yemen: Impacts of the First Two Months

Author:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
Key Trends: Both Saudi-led coalition airstrikes from fighter jets in Yemen and Houthi drone and missile attacks on Saudi Arabia stopped entirely. In the year leading up to the truce, ACLED records an average of more than 40 coalition airstrike events per week in Yemen,3 and an average of four Houthi drone and missile attacks per week in Saudi Arabia.4 Shelling across the main frontlines increased significantly, becoming the main form of political violence in Yemen. During the first two months of the truce, shelling, artillery, and missile attack events accounted for 55% of all political violence events, compared to 19% in the two months preceding the truce. While armed clashes between conflict parties remained at relatively high levels in April and May 2022, their lethality decreased considerably. The lethality of armed clashes was five times lower during the first two months of the truce than during the two months prior. April and May 2022 saw the lowest levels of reported fatalities since January 2015, but civilians suffered disproportionately from political violence. Although reported fatalities from civilian targeting decreased by more than 50% from March to April, their share of the total reported fatalities increased by more than 50%.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, United Nations, Conflict, and Violence
Political Geography:
Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

23. Fact Sheet: Global Demonstrations Against the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Sam Jones
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
Following the Russian invasion, a wave of demonstrations in solidarity with Ukraine spread around the world. Between 24 February and 4 March, ACLED records more than 1,800 demonstrations in support of Ukraine and against Russian aggression globally. During this time, demonstrations were reported across at least 93 countries and territories (see map below). Nearly all of these demonstrations — over 99% — were peaceful (i.e. protesters engaged in neither violence nor destructive activity).
Topic:
Solidarity, Conflict, Demonstrations, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Global Focus

24. Turning point? Putin, Xi, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Bobo Lo
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Putin’s war in Ukraine has highlighted the resilience but also the limitations of Sino–Russian partnership. Far from being an “arc of autocracy”, this is an interests-based relationship between strategically autonomous powers. Foreign policy coordination between China and Russia is limited by their different views of global order. Beijing is invested in a stable international system, albeit one skewed in its favour, whereas Moscow thrives on disorder and uncertainty. Xi Jinping aims to preserve the Sino–Russian partnership while maintaining ties with the West. But Beijing’s balancing act will become harder to sustain as the war continues. The balance of power within the bilateral relationship has tilted sharply towards Beijing. Russia is more reliant on China than ever. The long-term outlook for the relationship is unpromising.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Conflict, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Ukraine

25. The role of Nagorno-Karabakh in the shaping of Armenian and Azeri identity

Author:
Ricardo Juan Torres
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
Abstract:
The paper discusses the effect of the 19th century rebirth of Armenian nationalism in the Ottoman or Western Armenia and Russian or Eastern Armenia and that of Azeri nationalism in Russian Azerbaijan with its ramifications in Iran and Ottoman Turkey on the formation of Armenian and Azeri identity from the late 1800s to the present and the key role of Nagorno-Karabakh - called Artsakh by the Armenians - from the beginning of the 20th century, using the theories of Anthony D. Smith.
Topic:
Nationalism, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, and Identity
Political Geography:
Caucasus, Eastern Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh

26. The Russian invasion to Ukraine: An agribusiness perspective

Author:
Hugo Krajnc
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
Abstract:
It is quite relevant that the arguments used to justify the Russian invasion to Ukraine do not highlight economic components. Although it may be difficult to assert that such decision was also driven by economic issues, it is quite hard as well to deny that those were not involved, given the traditional Russian geopolitical perspective.
Topic:
War, Economy, Conflict, and Agribusiness
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

27. Armenia-Turkey Normalization Process: Opportunities and Barriers

Author:
Nino Chanadiri
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Armenia-Turkey relations have experienced numerous tensions over the decades associated with both the historic issues between the two nations and contemporary regional developments. Turkey’s refusal to recognize the mass killings of Armenians as a genocide1 in the Ottoman Empire during World War I has long been an important difficulty in bilateral relations. However, relations significantly worsened during the Nagorno-Karabakh war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the 1990s. As a response to Armenia’s capture of the territories surrounding NagornoKarabakh, Turkey closed the border with Armenia in 1993 in support of its ally Azerbaijan.2 The attempts to normalize relations did not have any fruitful outcome in the past decades which resulted in the two countries not having diplomatic or commercial relations for almost 30 years.
Topic:
International Relations, Territorial Disputes, Geopolitics, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Turkey and Armenia

28. Putin’s Infantrymen: Kadyrov’s Involvement in the 2022 Ukrainian Conflict

Author:
Aleksandre Kvakhadze and Cerwyn Moore
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
External involvement in the Ukrainian conflict, particularly pro-Russian volunteerism, has been a prominent feature of the Russian war effort. Chechen involvement in the conflict is more complex than is often reported. Pro-Russian groups known as kadyrovtsy serve a number of functions, including bolstering Kadyrov’s cult of personality in Chechnya, although their military significance is negligible. Chechen volunteer groups are involved in support of the Ukrainian military: this raises issues about the role of foreign fighters and volunteerism. The political implications of pro-Kremlin Chechen volunteerism in Ukraine are linked to fierce institutional infighting within Russia.
Topic:
Conflict, Vladimir Putin, Foreign Fighters, Russia-Ukraine War, and Ramzan Kadyrov
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Chechnya

29. To Prevent War and Secure Ukraine, Make Ukraine Neutral

Author:
Stephen W. Van Evera
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The U.S.-NATO-Russia-Ukraine crisis could be resolved by a grand bargain among the parties that defines Ukraine as a neutral state. Neutrality deals worked well in the past to forestall Franco-British conflict over Belgium in the 1830s and East-West conflict over Finland and Austria in the Cold War. The Belgian, Finnish, and Austrian neutrality deals enhanced the security of the states they made neutral. Neutrality was an asset for Belgium, Finland, and Austria, not a handicap. Major powers never calmly accept the close approach to their borders of unfriendly powers or alliances. Russia is no exception. It will not accept a settlement that leaves open the possibility of Ukraine in NATO or NATO in Ukraine. Hence, a neutrality solution is both sufficient and necessary to resolve the current crisis. Ukraine is not worth a costly confrontation for the U.S. Hence, U.S. leaders should be open to compromise. If compromise proves elusive, the U.S. should not pay high costs or run large risks to impose a deal on its terms, as it has higher priorities at home and elsewhere.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Alliance, Conflict, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

30. The Wisdom of U.S. Military Withdrawal from Afghanistan

Author:
Andrew Doris
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Afghanistan was not Korea. False analogies to peacetime military garrisons cheapen war and conflate wildly different forms of “support” to U.S. allies. War in Afghanistan was costly—to taxpayers, to civilians, to American soft power, to democratic legitimacy, and to the West’s strategic attention. Thus, withdrawal saved a fortune, saved lives, aided America’s reputation, honored democratic and constitutional principles, and focused Western strategists. War was not protecting Americans from terrorism. Keeping troops in but one of many places terrorists may operate did not meaningfully reduce Americans’ microscopic risk of being harmed in a terrorist attack. War was not helping Afghanistan. Democracy is a strong word for what U.S. forces propped up. Far from maintaining stability, the continued presence of those forces only prolonged armed struggle against a corrupt rentier state, impeding organic or sustainable long-term development. Credibility is highly contextual and unaffected by admitting defeat after 20 years of futile effort. If anything, the resources freed up by withdrawal make the United States better able to honor other commitments.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Terrorism, Military Affairs, Taliban, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America

31. Ukraine-Russia War Military Analysis

Author:
Daniel L. Davis
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
In the opening phase of its invasion of Ukraine, Russian armed forces made major errors in both the operational and tactical realm, costing the lives of thousands of its troops. Ukraine, by contrast, performed well above expectations and brought the Russian offensive against Kyiv and Kharkiv to a halt. Russia subsequently redeployed a major portion of its combat power, away from Kyiv and Kharkiv, to reinforce its attack on Donbas. This shift plays to Russia’s strengths and exposes Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) to greater risk. Russian forces have made slow but methodical progress on the northern shoulder of the Battle of Donbas, putting 10,000 UAF at risk of encirclement in the Sievierodonetsk pocket, like the loss they suffered at Mariupol. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky declared Ukraine will not stop fighting until all Ukrainian territory has been liberated.1 To have a chance of accomplishing that objective, Ukraine would likely need to recruit and train an additional 100,000 troops, at least, a task that would take 12–18 months, and equip its forces with a comprehensive set of modern, heavy weaponry, provided by the West, numbering in the thousands of armored vehicles and associated weaponry. There is great risk for Ukraine in undertaking such an attempt. It is unclear whether NATO will provide sufficient modern weapons or whether Ukraine can successfully hold off Russia while also recruiting and training so many more troops. If Russia defeats Ukraine in the Battle of Donbas, Kyiv will face a difficult choice: (1) to dig in and continue fighting, even though much of its most effective forces will have been captured or killed, and risk steadily losing more territory or (2) negotiating with Russia to trade territory lost since 2014 for peace to stanch further losses of Ukrainian lives and land.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Conflict, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

32. Lessons for Taiwan from Ukraine

Author:
Sascha Glaeser
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The Russo-Ukraine war is analogous in several ways to a hypothetical war between China and Taiwan. Like Ukraine, Taiwan is a relatively weak state, threatened by a neighboring great power with a sizable nuclear arsenal who makes historical claims to its territory, and has some backing from the United States. Ukraine’s experience provides several lessons for Taiwan. War remains an instrument of statecraft that great powers use in pursuit of their perceived national interests; smaller, weaker states should plan accordingly. In Taiwan’s case, that means continuation of the status quo which has helped provide peace for decades. Taiwan should assume the United States will not engage in direct conflict with China on its behalf. This assumption should encourage Taiwan to focus its military strategy on securing an advantage by acquiring more anti-access, area-denial capability and reforming its reserve force to help it deter or resist an invasion. While Ukraine shows Taiwan could expect an outpouring of global humanitarian and military aid if attacked, its island geography and the likely course of the war means it might not manage to receive or access those supplies, and should therefore maintain strategic stockpiles of weapons, ammunition, food, fuel, and other supplies. The United States and others will likely impose economic sanctions on China. However, sanctions are unlikely to alter China’s behavior in any meaningful way if it has already committed to war.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Taiwan, and Asia

33. Exploring the Meaning of Borders in an Interconnected World

Author:
Amanda Ribichini
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The word “border” carries much complexity. It encompasses many facets of the human condition, from purely geographical locations to intangible beliefs and personal or individual traits. Yet, today, the term border is often manipulated, coupled with verbs or adjectives that aim to emphasise its importance or demonise its significance; the border has increasingly become a stigma, used indiscriminately by all political forces, with some calling for its demolition and others its strengthening. Frequently, borders tend to be considered as vestiges of a now deceased past or as a sort of chimera, a utopia whose return is preached as a solution to many everyday challenges. Yet, the term border is not just a word: the border exists, it is there, and there are people who inhabit it. By examining the case of the Italian-Slovenian border crossing in the Italian town of Gorizia, one can understand if the border itself has actually lost value in today’s world, or if it still retains traces of its past significance.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Globalization, Conflict, and Borders
Political Geography:
Europe, Italy, and Slovenia

34. India–China Boundary Dispute: Progress on Disengagement, but De-escalation Remains Far-fetched

Author:
Amrita Jash
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
On 13 September 2022, India and China confirmed the completion of their respective disengagements from another friction point along their mutually contested border. The disengagement took place in eastern Ladakh, resulting in the withdrawal of troops from Patrolling Point (PP) 15 in the Gogra-Hot Springs area.[1] This was the fourth disengagement from the area, marking a step towards ending the 28-month stand-off in the eastern Ladakh ongoing since the military clashes of May 2020. This stand-off has not only been the longest but also one of the most violent confrontations between India and China. On 15 June 2020, the Galwan Valley clash led to multiple casualties, twenty on the Indian side, while less clarity exists on the numbers of Chinese deaths.[2] All in all the incident was the bloodiest military clash since the Sumdorong Chu crisis in 1986–87.
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, Conflict, Borders, and Disengagement
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia

35. Ukraine War and Food Security: How Should ASEAN Respond?

Author:
Jose M. L. Montesclaros and Mely Caballero-Anthony
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
ASEAN should come together and assess what regional mechanisms it can leverage in addressing the looming threat of food trade protectionism within the region, amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Conflict, Violence, Regionalism, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, and ASEAN

36. Australia in the Middle East: Enduring risks, interests, and opportunities

Author:
Rodger Shanahan
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
As Australia refocuses its foreign and defence policies on its near abroad, it must be careful not to allow ties with the Middle East to fall into neglect. This analysis examines the impact that two decades of security engagement in the Middle East have had on Australia’s relations with the region and argues that while Canberra may have largely ended the country’s military commitments in the Middle East, the region is more important in more ways to Australia than it was before that commitment got underway. An expanded Australian diplomatic footprint, growing economic ties, and more extensive people-to-people links with the Middle East means that the region and its security risks have greater domestic relevance for Australia than they did two decades ago.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Migration, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Middle East and Australia

37. CONFLICT MINERALS LEGISLATION: SHOOTING AT THE WRONG TARGET… AGAIN

Author:
Marijke Verpoorten and Nik Stoop
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
On January 1, 2021, the European Conflict Minerals Act came into force. It aims to regulate the trade in four minerals—tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold, also known as 3TG—that are often sourced from conflict-affected countries where the profits may allow armed groups to finance their activities. The regulation aims to break the link between minerals and conflict by ensuring that European Union (EU)-based companies only import minerals from conflict-free sources. If companies import minerals from conflict regions, the law requires them to report where the minerals were mined, the location of processing and trade, and the taxes and fees that were paid.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Conflict, and Minerals
Political Geography:
Global Focus

38. IS CLIMATE CHANGE DRIVING GLOBAL CONFLICT?

Author:
Nina von Uexkull and Halvard Buhaug
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
While former US President Donald Trump frequently denied man-made climate change, the Biden administration has pledged to make climate change a priority, including for national security. In line with years of thinking within the defense sector, the Biden-Harris team refers to climate change as a “threat multiplier,” pointing to risks of regional instability and resource competition driven by worsening environmental conditions. This perspective also aligns with the initiatives of other countries that have pushed climate security in the UN Security Council and other international bodies.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Climate Change, International Security, Conflict, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Global Focus

39. Can and Will Germany Be a Viable Partner in a U.S. “Pushback” Strategy Towards Russia?

Author:
Hannes Adomeit
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:
Joe Biden, as presidential candidate, is on record as having stated that “the biggest threat to America right now in terms of breaking up our − our security and our alliances − is Russia.” As president, he asserted, “the days of the United States rolling over in the face of Russia’s aggressive actions are over.” The first months of his tenure in office have given some substance to such claims and confirmed that the new administration aims at containing and counteracting Russian malign behavior and to impose costs so as to affect the Kremlin’s risk calculus. Can Germany − and most likely will it − be a viable partner in such a U.S. strategy?
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Leadership, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

40. Afrocentric Conceptions of Conflict Transformation: Beyond Ubuntu Mythology and Romantic Traditionalism

Author:
Brian Kagoro
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR)
Abstract:
Peacebuilding is an overtly political act laden with sociocultural assumptions, preferences and values. It is also an act impelled by the geoeconomic and geopolitical considerations of both the protagonists and some "invisible hands" with a stake in the ongoing conflict. In essence, the process of defining African peacebuilding and its socioeconomic value is both revolutionary and futuristic in pointing to a possible trajectory for the development of the sector beyond its bureaucratic organizational forms. This discussion paper explores the relationship between the African philosophy of Ubuntu and the practice of peacebuilding in historical and contemporary Africa. In particular, it seeks to establish Ubuntu's actual and potential value-added to shaping the theory and praxis of peacebuilding in Africa.
Topic:
Peacekeeping, Conflict, Social Roles, and Mythology
Political Geography:
Africa

41. The Aftermath of Demonstrations: The reasons behind the conflict about Tunisian cabinet reshuffle

Author:
Karam Saeed
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
On January 27, 2021, the political climate in Tunisia was charged up, following the parliament’s approval on a cabinet reshuffle on January 26, supported by 144 parliamentarians. This included new ministers joining the government of ‘Hichem Mechichi’, which had been formed on August 24, 2020. The proposed amendments intensified the political crisis in the country, against the backdrop of President Kais Saied’s announcement of his rejection of the cabinet reshuffle under the claims of the potential corruption of some ministers. Yet, Mechici resorted to the parliamentary majority led by Al-Nahda movement to gain the confidence of the parliament. Despite the lapse of a week since the new reshuffle won the confidence of the Parliament, the President rejected summoning the new ministers to take the constitutional oath, which paves the way for more complications in the Tunisian scene. Furthermore, the Parliament's approval of the amendments may fuel a constitutional struggle between the Prime Minister and the President.
Topic:
Government, Conflict, and Demonstrations
Political Geography:
North Africa and Tunisia

42. Under Observation: The Libyan conflict and the election of a new government

Author:
Ahmed Abdel-Alim Hassan
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The internationally-supported political dialogue forum in Geneva succeeded in selecting a new government, including Abdul Hamid Mohammed al-Dabaib as Prime Minister, and Muhammad Al-Manfi as President of the Presidential Council as well as two other members of the Council. These results were well received internally, regionally and internationally, which raises a key question relevant to the ability of the new government, though temporary, to effect positive accomplishments leading to the general elections in December 2021.
Topic:
Politics, Conflict, Transition, Khalifa Haftar, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
Libya and North Africa

43. Intertwined challenges: How will the ‘Berlin 2’ conference affect the Libyan crisis?

Author:
Mahmoud Qassem
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
About a year and a half following the first Berlin conference on the Libyan crisis held in January 2020, the ‘Berlin 2’ conference was held on June 23, 2021 raising a number of questions. Some of the questions pertain to the future of this crisis and the outcome of such interactions, in light of the significant momentum accompanying the current internal and external developments. The post ‘Berlin 2"’conference interactions were shaped according to two tracks, one of which is optimistic about the possibility of building on the outcomes of the conference and adopting a settlement path in Libya, while the other is loaded with anticipation and uncertainty, particularly with the ongoing challenges and issues that may undermine any future developments.
Topic:
Conflict, Negotiation, Crisis Management, and Conference
Political Geography:
Middle East, Libya, and Germany

44. Ethiopian Perspective: Elections in Strained Dynamics

Author:
Anwar Ibrahim
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The election, which was held in Ethiopia on Monday, June 21, 2021, was the most complicated election that the country has witnessed in more than three decades, or, more accurately, since the 1994 constitution was approved. The reason is that this election was held amid lots of internal challenges, not to mention the strong criticism of its legitimacy (both domestically and internationally) even before it was held. Ethiopians are warily looking forward to the results, which are supposed to be announced within a few days, despite that it is not unlikely that these results will escalate the tensions in an already unrest-ridden country.
Topic:
Government, Elections, Conflict, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
Africa, Ethiopia, and Tigray

45. The Perfect Conflict The Russian strategy in Yemen

Author:
Leonid Issaev
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The operation of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Syria was perceived by the world community as a demonstration of strength, unveiling Moscow and the Kremlin's readiness to defend its interests in the Middle East by military means. It is not surprising that the Russian military presence in Syria has generated a lot of speculation about the possibility of a repetition of the Syrian ‘scenario’ in other hot spots in the region, such as Yemen. We believe that such generalizations are inaccurate and simplify the multifaceted situation. First of all, the Syrian case is rather an exception for Moscow. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist ideology, Russia became more pragmatic, its policy got rid of the prefix ‘pro’, and, in principle, it is trying to serve its own interests. It is not surprising that the rejection of messianic ideas forced Russia to reconsider its attitude to conflicts, including ones in the Middle East. The best example of Russian pragmatism is the Kremlin's policy on the Yemeni crisis since its beginning in 2011 until now.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Conflict, and Air Force
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, Yemen, and Syria

46. Unfulfilled Hopes: Strategic Implications of Re-opening Libya’s Coastal Highway

Author:
Mustafa Gamal Omar
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
While many Libyans look forward to implement the outcome of the Berlin II Conference on Libya and achieve stability across their country, others believe that the first steps towards such stability should be through breaking the deadlock on unresolved issues. Such issues require urgent but decisive action, and the most prominent of which is the reopening of the coastal road between Sirte and Misrata. The announcement on June 20, 2021, by head of the National Unity Government, Prime Minister Abdelhamid Dbeibah, that the main coastal highway will be re-opened, following months of talks on a ceasefire, has revived Libyan hopes. The move is projected to yield significant political, security and economic benefits for the country. However, according to media reports circulated in late June, the 5+5 committee, formally named the 5+5 Libyan Joint Military Commission, decided to put off the re-opening of the vital highway, claiming that only damages will be repaired, which made the situation murky once again. The 5+5 committee, on July 2, dispelled the confusion by announcing that the highway linking Sirte to Misrata will be re-opened over the next week upon the completion of maintenance work. Member of the committee, Major General Faraj Al-Sousaa, confirmed that arrangements were underway for the re-opening.
Topic:
Government, Armed Forces, Conflict, and Ceasefire
Political Geography:
Libya and North Africa

47. "Melian Strategy": Why does Taliban fight and negotiate at the same time?

Author:
Irfan Yar
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
As the US completes its troops’ withdrawal from Afghanistan, Taliban has seized security vacuum to launch massive assaults. The group has unleashed violent chaos across the country and captured more than two-third of the territory, as per senior EU official estimates. On one hand, the insurgents have tightened their grip on seizing the provinces through military means. On the other hand, the insurgents claim that they want to resolve the issue in peaceful ways. “We are committed to finding a diplomatic solution for Afghanistan; the US-Taliban Doha agreement and the Intra-Afghan dialogue are the proofs that the Taliban want to solve the issue through negotiations,”[ii] said Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the deputy leader of the Taliban, on Wednesday, in Doha. Furthermore, Taliban leaders urge governors, military leaders, and other Jamiat Islami party leaders to surrender and put an end to the 40-years long conflict via negotiations. So, the question is, why have the Taliban fighters intensified violence and, at the same time, stress on making peace?
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Taliban, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, and Kabul

48. Baku Parade Whispers Geopolitical Complexities in the South Caucasus

Author:
Rahim Rahimov
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan attended a military parade in the Azerbaijani capital of Baku on December 10 to celebrate Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia in the war over the Karabakh region that ended with the Russia-brokered armistice on November 9-10. The Russian historian, Andrey Zubov, describes the Baku parade as an occasion “rather to celebrate the birth of a new geopolitical alliance than the victory over Armenia”1 . Following the parade, Russia imposed a ban on tomato imports from Azerbaijan in its flagship manner and Russian peacekeepers attempted to do something around the town of Shusha in Karabakh resembling what they have done in Georgia: “borderization”. Azerbaijani state TV, other media outlets and public figures widely and explicitly condemned such behavior of the Russian peacekeepers as a jealous response to the parade demonstration of Armenia’s Russian-made weapons and military equipment captured by the Azerbaijani armed forces or destroyed using Turkish-made Bayraktar drones . Erdogan and the Azerbaijani President, Ilham Aliyev, watched Turkish soldiers march alongside with Azerbaijanis on the central streets of Baku to the joy of local residents who took to the streets despite the COVID-19 related restrictions in order to salute them. This scene shows a major Russian weakness vis-àvis Turkey in Azerbaijan. Unlike Moscow, whose perception in Azerbaijan is controversial, Ankara enjoys nation-wide support. Recently leaked Russian secret files reveal that it is much more difficult for Moscow to develop proRussian civil society organizations and soft power instruments in Azerbaijan than even in staunchly pro-Western Georgia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Turkey, France, Georgia, and South Caucasus

49. The Regional Security Dynamics of the South Caucasus After the 2020 Karabakh War

Author:
Benyamin Poghosyan
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
The 2020 Karabakh war has significantly shifted the geopolitics of the South Caucasus. Armenia suffered a tough defeat while the non-recognized Republic of Artsakh (Republic of Nagorno Karabakh) lost almost 80 percent of its territories. Azerbaijan won a decisive victory and took not only territories outside of the former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAR) but 30 percent of NKAR itself. The November 10 trilateral statement signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia not only stopped the war in Karabakh but ushered in a new era in regional geopolitics.1 The key features of the new status quo are the increased role of Russia and Turkey and the significant reduction of Western involvement. However, the South Caucasus is far away from stability and, most probably, volatility will continue. We will seek to analyze the main interests of the key regional and external players and what may play out in a short/mid-term perspective.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, War, Geopolitics, Political stability, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh

50. Are we facing a wave of conflict in high-income countries?

Author:
Sarah Cliffe, Daniel Mack, Céline Monnier, Nendirmwa Noel, Paul von Chamier, and Leah Zamore
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:
The recent wave of violent protests and unrest across the developed world – the storming of the US Capitol during the electoral college process and the riots in the Netherlands, among others – questions the assumption that high-income countries have become immune to large-scale internal political violence. Are we facing a new wave of high-income conflict? At a minimum, increased violent unrest, political assassinations, and domestic terrorism in the next ten years seem possible, unless governments focus on avoiding impunity and establishing shared understanding of facts, reducing inequality and prejudice, and building institutional resilience. This analysis examines whether these recent events augur a wider shift in conflict risk to high-income countries, akin to the shift seen from low to middle-income countries 20 years ago. Given these events, this analysis systematically reviews conflict risks in high-income countries, as well as offers a framework that has been widely applied in the developing world to examine the risk factors for violent conflict in wealthy countries, including second generation impacts of COVID-19.
Topic:
Conflict, Protests, COVID-19, and Civil Unrest
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America