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812. THE END OF THE WAR ON TERROR
- Author:
- Navin Bapat
- Publication Date:
- 08-2021
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Political Violence @ A Glance
- Abstract:
- On August 15, 2021, almost twenty years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Taliban recaptured Afghanistan from the American-supported government led by Ashraf Ghani. Afghans pushed to get on American transport planes to evacuate, conjuring images of the US evacuation of Saigon at the end of the Vietnam War. Others, afraid of Taliban retaliation, turned to social media to plea for help. Meanwhile, in Kabul, militants paraded in front of the evacuated US embassy, signifying the Taliban’s total victory.
- Topic:
- Taliban, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, 9/11, War on Terror, Vietnam War, COVID-19, Joe Biden, Ashraf Ghani, and Hamid Karzai
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, and United States of America
813. WHY THE “TERRORIST” LABEL HELPS SOME GROUPS AND HURTS OTHERS
- Author:
- Rebecca Best
- Publication Date:
- 09-2021
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Political Violence @ A Glance
- Abstract:
- Does adding a terrorist group to the US State Department’s Foreign Terrorist Organization list reduce its violence? Since 1997, the US State Department has maintained a list of designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO), or foreign organizations that use terrorism and threaten US nationals or US national security. The United States has designated a wide array of terrorist organizations and groups—including Hamas, FARC, and ISIL–Khorasan—but has refrained from using the designation for others. For example, the United States never designated the Taliban an FTO. Why not?
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Taliban, Islamic State, 9/11, Boko Haram, Hamas, Uyghurs, FARC, Haqqani Network, Khorasan Group, Mujahedeen-e-Khalq, and Tamil Tigers
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, Iran, South Asia, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, and United States of America
814. 9/11 DIDN’T CHANGE US—OUR RESPONSE TO IT DID
- Author:
- Joe Young
- Publication Date:
- 09-2021
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Political Violence @ A Glance
- Abstract:
- This Saturday is the 20th anniversary of the terrorist attacks that changed the US and me. It is an important time to reflect on the events themselves, but also on the scale of violence meted out in response to the attacks. The ill-fated Iraq war—a war of choice, built on at best faulty intelligence and at worst political manipulation and hidden agendas—cost thousands of American lives and hundreds of thousands of Iraqi lives. It also upended the lives of millions of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons. The so-called war on terror intended not only to punish the 9/11 perpetrators but also deter states who would support them—created a new category of violent actors, “enemy combatants”. The Bush administration used this label to place these actors in a sort of legal limbo where the rules of war wouldn’t apply. Enemy combatants, the administration determined, could be held indefinitely, denied habeas corpus, and interrogated using enhanced techniques. Most of these memos and rules are collectively called the torture memos today.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Torture, 9/11, War on Terror, Iraq War, and George W. Bush
- Political Geography:
- Iraq and United States of America
815. Building an Energy and Climate Coalition with Latin America and the Caribbean: An Agenda for the Biden Administration
- Author:
- Mauricio Cardenas and Laurie Fitzmaurice
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
- Abstract:
- The initial months of the Biden administration’s foreign policy have underscored the importance of defining the type of relations with China (cooperative in some areas, adversarial in others) and revamping relations with Europe on areas of common interest. However, the United States should look closer to home, where it can find some major opportunities for international policy advancement. The Biden administration has a window of opportunity to rethink its relations with and policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). In particular, there are very good reasons—political and economic—for putting the energy and climate change agenda at the center of the hemispheric partnership. On the political front, building a hemispheric bloc will increase the influence of its members in global negotiations. On the economic front, the countries in the region offer significant opportunities for trade and investment for the United States. Canada, which earlier in the year pledged to work with the United States on addressing climate change,[1] could also have an interest in promoting and potentially participating in this initiative. Prior to the arrival of the pandemic, the economies of LAC had already been confronting a complex series of economic growth challenges after the end of the commodities supercycle. Many countries in the region faced high levels of public indebtedness, currency depreciation, credit rating risk, insufficient tax revenue bases, and low investment rates.[2] The appearance of the COVID-19 crisis only served to exacerbate these conditions. The LAC region contains 8.4 percent of the world’s population but represents 30 percent of COVID-19 fatalities to date.[3] Forecasts now predict that per capita GDP will remain below the 2019 level at least until 2023.[4] The continuing surge of undocumented immigration into the southern border of the United States, the social and economic impacts of COVID-19, and the growing influence of China in the region could increase political pressure on the United States to develop a coherent policy toward LAC. These urgent and competing dynamics represent an opportunity for the United States to recast its policy toward the region as one of engagement. The United States could utilize the tools of technology and financing focused on energy and climate to put the region on a path toward sustained economic growth and social progress. LAC needs technology and financing to build clean infrastructure, develop alternative energies, and reduce energy poverty.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Energy Policy, Environment, Regional Cooperation, and Regionalism
- Political Geography:
- Latin America, Caribbean, North America, and United States of America
816. The Carbon-Neutral LNG Market: Creating a Framework for Real Emissions Reductions
- Author:
- Erin Blanton and Samer Mosis
- Publication Date:
- 07-2021
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
- Abstract:
- As governments and companies consider options to decarbonize their energy systems, addressing greenhouse gas emissions from natural gas and liquified natural gas (LNG) will inevitably become a greater concern. Natural gas is viewed by some as potentially providing a bridge in a broad energy transition from dependence on fossil fuels to lower-emission sources. Even with advancements in renewable energy, many forecasts show natural gas will remain core to meeting global energy demand for some time, including as a backup fuel source for renewables.[1] But as the emissions profile of the natural gas value chain has become clearer, estimates of its footprint have increased, raising questions about natural gas’s transitory function. While gas will continue to have a prominent role in the energy mix,[2] without action to better account for, reduce, and offset natural gas and LNG emissions, the breadth and length of its use will increasingly come into question—including by countries with growing energy demand who see diminishing incentive to favor natural gas over high-emitting but fiscally cheap fuel sources, such as coal. Amid these considerations, discussions of value chain carbon intensity and greenhouse gas (GHG) accounting are becoming an important component of LNG trade, giving rise to the concept of “carbon-neutral LNG.” In the trade of carbon-neutral LNG, GHG emissions from supply and/or consumption are accounted for and offset by procuring and retiring carbon credits generated through GHG abatement projects, such as afforestation, farm/soil management, and methane collection.[3] Currently, carbon-neutral LNG makes up a slim portion of global LNG trade, with just 14 cargoes traded transparently since the first was sold in 2019, compared to over 5,000 cargoes of LNG being delivered globally in 2020 alone.[4] By examining the efficacy of the market at this early stage, as this commentary does, areas for improvement in the carbon-neutral LNG trade are highlighted. Procurement of carbon credits does not negate the emissions from natural gas and LNG, and accordingly, adoption of offsets should be paired with a broader and deeper reduction in the emissions intensity of these fossil fuels to ensure they remain conducive to meeting growing energy demand without needlessly jeopardizing global, national, and corporate efforts to reduce emissions. When considering this alongside the important role LNG and natural gas are likely to continue to play in meeting energy demand in key parts of the world during the transition period, it becomes clear that efforts must be made to scale GHG emissions mitigation throughout the value chain, such as through leakage reduction and employment of less carbon-intensive liquefaction technology, as well as to offset remaining emissions through the procurement and retirement of high-quality carbon credits. Serious questions remain about scaling the carbon-neutral LNG trade, including which emissions are accounted for, what methodology is employed in the emissions measurement and verification, and how the emissions are priced—either through a carbon credit or a carbon tax. If these questions are sufficiently addressed, natural gas and LNG may align better with global policy direction and emissions requirements. That is to say, GHG verification and mitigation will be critical to the sustainability of LNG in the decarbonizing global energy stack in the coming decade, with knock-on impacts on long-term LNG contract structure, trade flows, and market pricing. While this commentary does not prescribe policy to meet carbon neutrality or Paris Agreement goals specifically, it does examine an existing and growing market trade behavior that has the potential to assist countries dependent on natural gas in meeting their climate targets during this transitory period for the global energy system. Section 1 outlines the current state of the carbon-neutral LNG trade, while section 2 suggests a structure for LNG GHG accounting based on existing accounting methodologies. Section 3 discusses the different forms through which emissions mitigation can be integrated into the LNG trade, including a discussion on the risks of greenwashing. Section 4 highlights the implications of the growing carbon-neutral LNG market and provides recommendations to market participants and policy makers.
- Topic:
- Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, Natural Resources, Carbon Emissions, and Decarbonization
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
817. The New US-EU Energy Security Agenda: Roundtable Report
- Author:
- Jonathan Elkind
- Publication Date:
- 07-2021
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
- Abstract:
- On June 3, 2021, Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP) and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP, the German Institute for International and Security Affairs), in cooperation with the European Climate Foundation (ECF) and the European Union (EU) Delegation to the US, cohosted a private virtual roundtable focusing on energy security issues during a period of heightened action on climate goals. This document summarizes the June 3 roundtable, which was conducted on a not-for-attribution basis. Participants in the roundtable included just over 50 senior corporate executives, civil society representatives, academic and think tank experts, energy analysts, and government officials from the European Union and United States. In June 2021, President Joe Biden traveled to Europe, his first overseas trip since his inauguration as president, and he met with European heads of state and government in the context of a British-hosted G7 meeting, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit, and a US-EU Summit.[1] The journey signaled a concerted effort by the United States and the European Union to rebuild bilateral relations, which were battered during the Trump administration. Protecting the global climate and accelerating the transition to clean energy are objectives that unify top leaders on both sides of the Atlantic today. The European Union has a legislated mandate of climate neutrality by the year 2050 and is implementing its comprehensive European Green Deal and elaborating a corresponding legal and regulatory framework for an enhanced 2030 target. In the United States, the Biden administration reentered the Paris climate agreement and announced plans to reach net-zero emissions by midcentury, though climate protection still faces significant political challenges in the US Congress and in certain states. If the European Union and the United States proceed as these plans indicate, their energy systems face a period of accelerating, unprecedented, and sustained change—new technologies, new supply chains, new business models, and new interdependencies between economic sectors.
- Topic:
- Security, Climate Change, Energy Policy, Environment, International Cooperation, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Europe, North America, and United States of America
818. National Oil Companies and the Energy Transition: Ecopetrol's Acquisition of an Electric Transmission Company
- Author:
- Mauricio Cardenas and Luisa Palacios
- Publication Date:
- 08-2021
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
- Abstract:
- The energy transition strategies of international oil companies have come under increased scrutiny from investors and the media as countries across the globe grapple with targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.[1] It is unclear if national oil companies (NOCs) are going to feel the same pressure given their government-majority ownership and, if so, how they will adjust their business models. This commentary explores recent moves by Colombian national oil company Ecopetrol to adapt to the energy transition, especially its bid to acquire a majority stake in Interconexión Eléctrica SA (ISA), an electricity transmission company, for 14.2 trillion Colombian pesos (equal to about $3.6 billion).[2] The proposed acquisition was met with mixed reactions, with some critics suggesting it was an opportunistic move on the part of the Colombian government (which has a majority interest in both companies) to book some revenues and reduce the ballooning fiscal deficit. But rather than analyzing its fiscal merits, this piece analyzes the potential transaction from the viewpoint of Ecopetrol and whether there are lessons from the deal for other NOCs navigating the energy transition. This commentary begins with a brief background on both companies and the potential benefits for Ecopetrol in pursuing a path that is different relative to what some other oil companies are doing in order to adjust their business models. Ecopetrol faces specific as well as regional challenges that make transition strategies used by the European oil companies less attractive. The piece then discusses how, if part of the goal of the acquisition is to accelerate Ecopetrol’s energy transition and to add shareholder value, a number of complementary actions should be taken to help with the governance aspect of this acquisition while at the same time strengthening Ecopetrol’s pledge to become net zero by 2050. For example, in arranging financing, Ecopetrol could explore issuing an environmental, social, and governance (ESG) bond where the proceeds are earmarked for the purchase of ISA, which is already a net-zero company. In addition, the coupon rate could be linked to specific emissions reductions on Ecopetrol’s oil and gas activities. Tying these targets to the coupon rate could be seen as a credible mechanism to ensure that the company will comply with its ambitious climate goals. In addition, we propose that Ecopetrol maintain ISA’s current governance structure unmodified and preserve its operational independence. This would allow ISA to benefit from its investment grade status (which Ecopetrol does not enjoy) and continue to deploy its capital expenditures (CapEx) plan geared toward investing in Latin America’s electricity sector without interference. To conclude, this transaction by itself does not guarantee a successful energy transition for Ecopetrol’s core business. If Ecopetrol’s goal is to diversify its portfolio of activities and reduce its carbon footprint, then it should ensure the sum of the two companies results in synergies that reduce emissions beyond what each one of them can achieve individually. This is not a guaranteed outcome but one that will depend on how ISA performs under Ecopetrol’s ownership, the extent to which this transaction brings new opportunities in the renewable energy space, and how the revenues derived from this acquisition help to finance the decarbonization of Ecopetrol.
- Topic:
- Energy Policy, Oil, Regional Cooperation, Natural Resources, and Renewable Energy
- Political Geography:
- Colombia, South America, and Latin America
819. Stronger International Safeguards as a Condition of Supply to Nuclear Energy Programs: Coming to Consensus in the Nuclear Suppliers Group
- Author:
- Matt Bowen
- Publication Date:
- 08-2021
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
- Abstract:
- Nations that are party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons but are not allowed nuclear weapons under the treaty (“non-nuclear-weapon states”) must have international safeguards applied to civil nuclear energy facilities if they pursue such programs. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) applies these safeguards and conducts inspections on nuclear energy programs, and determined in the 1990s that it needed additional capabilities to verify states were not engaging in secret (i.e., undeclared) nuclear activities. Subsequently, the IAEA developed a set of stronger safeguards measures, known as the Model Additional Protocol (“Additional Protocol”), which was approved in 1997. Today, most nations have an Additional Protocol in force, but a few dozen do not. The nations that do not may pose a concern if they pursue nuclear energy as a means of addressing energy and environmental challenges, such as decarbonization to meet climate goals. The greater reporting requirements and inspection measures in the Additional Protocol give the international community assurance that a nation’s declarations about its civil nuclear program are both correct and complete. The enhanced inspections in turn provide greater deterrence against states pursuing illicit nuclear activities. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)—which comprises 48 governments, including those representing the major reactor vendor countries—maintains guidelines governing the export of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology. The NSG has been considering modifying those guidelines for many years to support more universal adoption of the Additional Protocol. But adoption has been hard to come by, in part because of potential disruptions to existing supply relationships given that not all countries participating in the NSG have Additional Protocols in force and some client states of countries participating in the NSG also do not have these upgraded inspections in place. There may be room for consensus building among NSG states, however, since most support requiring an Additional Protocol as a condition of supply to further the nonproliferation regime. The remaining governments may agree if measures are proffered to address challenges that have blocked acceptance to date. This commentary discusses a history of related policy developments in the NSG, examines some of the group’s roadblocks to consensus, and suggests options for making progress on adding stronger international safeguards as a condition of supply to nuclear energy programs.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Energy Policy, International Cooperation, and Nuclear Energy
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
820. Methane Emission Controls: Redesigning EPA Regulations for Greater Efficacy
- Author:
- Robert Kleinberg
- Publication Date:
- 10-2021
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
- Abstract:
- Natural gas holds a critical role in the US energy economy, providing 32 percent of primary energy evenly distributed among electric power generation, industrial use, and residential and commercial consumption (LLNL 2020). As countries set targets to minimize climate change, however, widespread reliance on fossil fuels, with their attendant greenhouse gas emissions, is being scrutinized. Methane, the main constituent of natural gas, is second only to carbon dioxide in its contribution to greenhouse gas warming (Kleinberg 2020). It holds the potential to be a primary driver of global average temperature change between now and 2050—no matter what progress is made in controlling increases of atmospheric carbon dioxide over the next thirty years (Shindell et al. 2012). Half of global methane emissions come from natural sources, such as swamps and seeps, and half from anthropogenic sources, such as agriculture and fossil fuels. Regulations curbing methane emissions from the oil and gas industry are essential to mitigating global climate change over the next three decades. In the United States, current regulations were devised at a time when the technology for the measurement of natural gas emissions was relatively immature. Comprehensive performance-based regulations were not an option, and because of this, many regulations put in place were highly prescriptive. Data show these regulations have been largely ineffective. This commentary examines the potential to reduce emissions of methane from oil and natural gas infrastructure. It begins with a brief history of natural gas regulations and the effectiveness of rulemaking, before exploring unregulated and underregulated sources of methane. This is followed by a discussion about improvements in measurement capabilities and how regulations could be used to more effectively address methane emissions. This work shows the complexities of oil and gas production do not lend themselves to prescriptive regulation. Performance-based regulation, including quantitative compliance monitoring, would engage the talents of thousands of engineers, encouraging them to solve problems using locally appropriate solutions rather than relying on a prescriptive checklist approach that cannot anticipate every eventuality. The key to performance-based regulation is accurate measurement, and this capability has improved rapidly in recent years. Aircraft-based, facility-scale measurements encompassing tens of thousands of facilities spread over tens of thousands of square kilometers are economically viable and increasingly common. Permanently installed continuously monitoring sensors show promise in detecting intermittent sources; oil field pilot studies are underway. However, aircraft- and ground-based facility-scale measurements are not compliant with the current regulatory regime, which focuses on individual components. Therefore, the current regulatory regime must be completely rethought. (A comprehensive exposition of this topic, with evidentiary support, has been submitted to the Environmental Protection Agency [Kleinberg 2021b].)
- Topic:
- Economics, Energy Policy, Natural Resources, Gas, and Methane
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America