Search

Begin New Search Political Geography Russia Content Type Commentary and Analysis

71. China - A Non-neutral Party in the Russo-Ukrainian War

Author:
Medea Ivaniadze
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
In the Russo-Ukrainian war, we cannot call the position of one of the main challenges of the 21st century, communist China, “neutral”. Beijing’s position was obvious even before the war: it is pro-Russian, clearly antiWestern, and especially anti-American. China does not condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine, nor does it call it an invasion. At the same time, reports have emerged of the prospect of Beijing providing military assistance to Moscow, and it is not beyond imagination that China will also help Moscow avoid the sanctions. The course of the war, and time, will show China’s level of support for its strategic partner, Russia. However, despite Moscow’s support and negative attitude towards the West, Beijing will still act according to its long-term strategic goals, and if China distances itself from Russia on specific issues, it will not be because of solidarity with Ukraine, but for its own strategic interests.
Topic:
Security, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

72. Economic Consequences of Sanctions on Russia

Author:
Davit Shatakishvili
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine, coupled with Western political support for Ukraine, was followed by a tough economic response through an unprecedented package of sanctions against Russia set forth by the West. Their decision to do so seeks to make Russia pay an economic price for its military aggression, aiming to reduce its economic and martial capabilities, which are currently costing the lives of thousands of innocent people. The sanctions have already had quite severe economic consequences for Russia, but it is interesting to see whether they will achieve the West’s political goals and push President Putin to suspend the military aggression. Generally, a medium- to long-term period is required to see the effects of sanctions, and, currently, despite heavy economic losses, Russia is managing to coexist with the restrictions. Today, Russia is experiencing its biggest economic downturn since the end of the Cold War. The World Bank estimates that gross domestic product in Russia will reduce by 11% in 2022 (World Bank, 2022), while the International Monetary Fund forecasts this figure to be 8.5% (IMF, 2022). According to some estimates, the economic scale of the reduction may even reach 15% (IIF, 2022). Clearly, this largely depends on the potential consequences of the sanctions already imposed and the possibility of enacting new sanctions, including in terms of energy embargoes. As a result of the global economic crisis of 2008, the Russian economy shrank by about 8%, and now this figure is almost twice as high. Consequently, we can get some idea of its scale. The losses caused by sanctions will become more visible and tangible over time, resulting in much more severe social and economic effects in the coming years. According to the International Finance Institute, Russia will have lost the wealth it generated over the last 15 years by the end of 2023 (IIF, 2022). One of the main reasons for this will be reduced domestic demand, and if the trade-related sanction package is expanded, exports will fall further than expected, which in turn will lead to a sharp decline in budget revenues. Clearly, the Russian military aggression has also caused global economic consequences, such as rising prices for basic consumer goods, disruption of supply chains, and delays in international trade. However, since invading Ukraine, Russia’s financial losses have been high. It is interesting to take a look at what actual consequences the Russian Federation has faced in terms of sanctions, and how the country will be able to continue coexistence with the restrictions and expand its own aggressive foreign policy.
Topic:
Economics, Sanctions, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

73. Putin’s Infantrymen: Kadyrov’s Involvement in the 2022 Ukrainian Conflict

Author:
Aleksandre Kvakhadze and Cerwyn Moore
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
External involvement in the Ukrainian conflict, particularly pro-Russian volunteerism, has been a prominent feature of the Russian war effort. Chechen involvement in the conflict is more complex than is often reported. Pro-Russian groups known as kadyrovtsy serve a number of functions, including bolstering Kadyrov’s cult of personality in Chechnya, although their military significance is negligible. Chechen volunteer groups are involved in support of the Ukrainian military: this raises issues about the role of foreign fighters and volunteerism. The political implications of pro-Kremlin Chechen volunteerism in Ukraine are linked to fierce institutional infighting within Russia.
Topic:
Conflict, Vladimir Putin, Foreign Fighters, Russia-Ukraine War, and Ramzan Kadyrov
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Chechnya

74. Military Effects Of Economic Sanctions On Russia

Author:
Davit Shatakishvili
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Russia’s military industry is a fundamental factor of its national power. The enterprises operating in its defense sector are largely state-owned. Consequently, Russia’s sizeable military corporations and their subsidiary organizations operate not on the principles of a competitive domestic market, which is one of the key foundations of technological progress, but their main goal is to pursue Moscow’s political interests and ensure the stability of the regime. Accordingly, along with military capabilities, having a powerful economic leverage in the form of energy resources, encourages Russia not only to pursue its own economic interests but also intimidate neighboring countries and extort their territories to satisfy its imperialist intentions. The responsibility of the defense industry in Moscow’s current governing model is exactly on what the Russian government itself has based its legitimacy - military modernization, restoring Russia’s strength and greatness. One of its ill-favored manifestations is the military aggression in Ukraine which is claiming the lives of thousands of innocent people. The unprecedented scale of sanctions imposed by the West will clearly affect Moscow’s defense capabilities but the only questions are - when and to what extent? Russian military production, on the one hand, helps the country to pursue an aggressive foreign policy and, on the other hand, arms exports are an important source of country’s budgetary revenues. At the same time, this allows it to exert political influence over the purchasing states. The collapse of the Russian attack on Ukraine may not only sacrifice the hegemonic goals of the latter but also lead to the loss of existing and potential customers of its military weapons. There is no doubt that Russia is experiencing colossal military losses as a result of the war and, at the same time, questions are being raised about the quality of its arms and heavy equipment. Until now, there has been a consensus that Russian armaments were a viable and affordable alternative to Western weapons, although this statement could also be another victim of the war. As a result of the sanctions, Russia faced not only financial but also technical problems. In addition to Western countries, Asia’s leading technology powers have restricted Russia’s access to critical components needed for military production. Existing restrictions apply to advanced technologies such as semiconductors, telecommunications equipment, software and encryption, microelectronics, aviation systems, oil extraction equipment and other manufacturing components. In this context, it is important to discuss the impact that economic sanctions may have on Russia’s military capabilities, its recovery prospects and its aggressive foreign policy in the future.
Topic:
Sanctions, Military Affairs, Economy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

75. The Return of US Leadership in Europe: Biden and the Russia Crisis

Author:
Riccardo Alcaro
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In dealing with Russia’s aggressive policies towards Ukraine, US President Joe Biden has put up a powerful display of competent crisis management. While it may not be enough to stop President Vladimir Putin from escalating, Biden’s policy has nonetheless re-affirmed US leadership in Europe.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Transatlantic Relations, Vladimir Putin, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Caucasus, Balkans, and United States of America

76. Europe’s Post-Cold War Order Is No More

Author:
Riccardo Alcaro
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to recognise the independence of the self-styled separatist republics of Donetsk and Luhansk in the Donbas may very well be the beginning of the end of Ukraine as an independent nation. For Ukraine, a nation of almost 44 million people, catastrophe looms large on the horizon. For Europe, these events are the harbinger of the end of an era. Europe’s post-Cold War order is no more.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, Caucasus, Balkans, and United States of America

77. Putin’s Use and Abuse of History: Back to the 19th Century?

Author:
Leo Goretti
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
“Ukraine is not just a neighbouring country for us. It is an inalienable part of our own history, culture and spiritual space.” This is how Putin introduced the “decisions being made” in his 55-minute address to the nation on 21 February 2022, which paved the way for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Several commentators noted how Putin’s speech was replete with historical references: as historian Benjamin Nathans pointed out, Vladimir Putin seems to be “quite obsessed with history. So part of our attention […] should be looking at how Putin is using history”. Indeed, almost one-quarter of Putin’s speech was devoted to a rather erratic and convoluted discussion of pre-1991 Russian and Soviet history, departing from the assumption that this was necessary “to explain the motives behind Russia’s actions and what we aim to achieve”.
Topic:
Nationalism, History, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Caucasus, and Balkans

78. Energy Markets and the Design of Sanctions on Russia

Author:
Christof Ruhl
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
Sanctions against the citizens, institutions, and products of the Russian Federation are evolving rapidly. Energy sanctions started late, but the number of countries embargoing oil, gas, or coal imports from Russia is expanding. These sanctions are likely to increase global fuel prices while depressing the price of the sanctioned fuel. The experience to date suggests that the current, gradual approach of reducing oil and gas imports from Russia one country at a time may have room to go further. Before the invasion of Ukraine, the sweeping and unprecedented sanctions promised in the event of a Russian invasion were often conceived as a two-pronged pincer movement. The idea was to isolate Russia from the global financial system while limiting its commodity and energy exports. Both moves were aimed at the source of the financial strength of “fortress Russia,” namely, its persistent balance of payment surplus.
Topic:
Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, Sanctions, Financial Markets, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

79. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Identity, History, and Conflict

Author:
Jeffrey Mankoff
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine constitutes the biggest threat to peace and security in Europe since the end of the Cold War. On February 21, 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin gave a bizarre and at times unhinged speech laying out a long list of grievances as justification for the “special military operation” announced the following day. While these grievances included the long-simmering dispute over the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the shape of the post–Cold War security architecture in Europe, the speech centered on a much more fundamental issue: the legitimacy of Ukrainian identity and statehood themselves. It reflected a worldview Putin had long expressed, emphasizing the deep-seated unity among the Eastern Slavs—Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, who all trace their origins to the medieval Kyivan Rus commonwealth—and suggesting that the modern states of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus should share a political destiny both today and in the future. The corollary to that view is the claim that distinct Ukrainian and Belarusian identities are the product of foreign manipulation and that, today, the West is following in the footsteps of Russia’s imperial rivals in using Ukraine (and Belarus) as part of an “anti-Russia project.” Throughout Putin’s time in office, Moscow has pursued a policy toward Ukraine and Belarus predicated on the assumption that their respective national identities are artificial—and therefore fragile. Putin’s arguments about foreign enemies promoting Ukrainian (and, in a more diffuse way, Belarusian) identity as part of a geopolitical struggle against Russia echo the way many of his predecessors refused to accept the agency of ordinary people seeking autonomy from tsarist or Soviet domination. The historically minded Putin often invokes the ideas of thinkers emphasizing the organic unity of the Russian Empire and its people—especially its Slavic, Orthodox core—in a form of what the historian Timothy Snyder calls the “politics of eternity,” the belief in an unchanging historical essence. The salience that Putin and other Russian elites assign to the idea of Russian-Ukrainian-Belarusian unity helps explain the origins of the current conflict, notably why Moscow was willing to risk a large-scale war on its borders when neither Ukraine nor NATO posed any military threat. It also suggests that Moscow’s ambitions extend beyond preventing Ukrainian NATO membership and encompass a more thorough aspiration to dominate Ukraine politically, militarily, and economically. It also helps explain Russia’s military strategy. Moscow appeared to calculate that enough Ukrainians, at least in the eastern part of the country, would accept some form of reintegration into a Russian sphere of influence because of shared cultural, linguistic, religious, and other ties with Russia. Despite pre-war polls showing large numbers of Ukrainians willing to take up arms to defend their country against a Russian invasion, Moscow’s wager was not entirely implausible given the recentness of the shift and the persistence of family and other ties across the Russian-Ukrainian border. Nonetheless, Russia’s war has become bogged down in no small part because this calculation about Ukrainian identity has proven dramatically wrong.
Topic:
War, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

80. What Does $40 Billion in Aid to Ukraine Buy?

Author:
Mark F. Cancian
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Congress has approved $40 billion in aid for Ukraine and other countries affected by the conflict―the sixth aid package since the war began. A major change is that this package looks ahead months rather than weeks. The aid package provides $19 billion for immediate military support to Ukraine, continuing the effort that has been vital to sustaining Ukrainian resistance, and $3.9 billion to sustain U.S. forces deployed to Europe. The package also contains about $16 billion for economic support to Ukraine, global humanitarian relief, and a wide variety of international programs as well as $2 billion for long-term support to NATO allies and DOD modernization programs. Although some elements of the aid package will be available quickly, many will take years to fully implement. This raises questions about why long-term elements could not have gone through the regular congressional authorization and budget processes.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Military Spending, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America