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Begin New Search Topic Conflict Political Geography Russia Content Type Commentary and Analysis Publication Year within 25 Years

1. War in Ukraine: One Year On, Nowhere Safe

Author:
Nichita Gurcov
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, ACLED records nearly 40,000 political violence events across the country. Three-quarters of these events are shelling, artillery, and missile strikes mostly affecting the northeastern, eastern, and southern regions of Ukraine. Quantifying the civilian toll of the conflict presents a challenge – especially in areas continuously engulfed by violence, like eastern Ukraine. In areas under Russian occupation, reports of abductions, forced disappearances, torture, and extrajudicial executions have been widespread, though the scale of violence against civilians becomes known only upon the liberation of territories, evidenced in the case of northern Ukraine and especially the Kyiv suburbs. Meanwhile, long-range strikes, including those deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure, pose a permanent threat and continue to induce extreme hardship for communities even farther afield from the frontline.
Topic:
War Crimes, Conflict, Civilians, Russia-Ukraine War, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

2. One Year After Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: The geopolitical struggle is not where you think it is

Author:
Roshni Menon and Faiza Shaheen
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:
When Russia invaded Ukraine one year ago, there were immediate concerns about the effects on food and energy security, and on geopolitical alignment in other countries. The world was right to be concerned, but the repercussions have been much wider and deeper than many predicted. There are two main ways in which conflict dynamics have shifted, neither of them solely caused by the war but both exacerbated by it: Russian’s war on Ukraine has shone the lens on inter-state conflict and proxy war Compounding the pandemic and climate change, a war started in one corner of the world has resulted in a global cost-of-living crisis and increasing debt for almost every country worldwide—countries that had no hand in Russia’s invasion or in the failure to respond to public health and socio-economic crisis. This analysis looks at the multiple and cascading crises (increasingly referred to as the polycrisis), and how we can take action in the face of polycrisis,
Topic:
Security, Geopolitics, Conflict, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

3. Cyber Crossover and Its Escalatory Risks for Europe

Author:
Lora Saalman, Fei Su, and Larisa Saveleva Dovgal
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The crossover between cybercrime and cyberwarfare has intensified in recent years, particularly against the backdrop of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and mounting tensions between China, Russia and the United States. This paper delves into specific cyber incidents that employ cybercrime tactics with cyberwarfare objectives, allegedly involving Chinese, Russian or US actors. It examines responses within and among the private sector, the public sector and international forums. Although not directly involved in all of the cases, the European Union (EU) was impacted in a variety of ways, including as a result of spillover effects and intentional targeting. Drawing on an examination of cyber incidents, this paper highlights how emerging trends in actors, means and responses present escalatory risks for the EU and emphasizes the pressing need to bolster cybersecurity measures.
Topic:
European Union, Cybersecurity, Conflict, Risk, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

4. Ukraine War and Food Security: How Should ASEAN Respond?

Author:
Jose M. L. Montesclaros and Mely Caballero-Anthony
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
ASEAN should come together and assess what regional mechanisms it can leverage in addressing the looming threat of food trade protectionism within the region, amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Conflict, Violence, Regionalism, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, and ASEAN

5. Ukraine-Russia War Military Analysis

Author:
Daniel L. Davis
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
In the opening phase of its invasion of Ukraine, Russian armed forces made major errors in both the operational and tactical realm, costing the lives of thousands of its troops. Ukraine, by contrast, performed well above expectations and brought the Russian offensive against Kyiv and Kharkiv to a halt. Russia subsequently redeployed a major portion of its combat power, away from Kyiv and Kharkiv, to reinforce its attack on Donbas. This shift plays to Russia’s strengths and exposes Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) to greater risk. Russian forces have made slow but methodical progress on the northern shoulder of the Battle of Donbas, putting 10,000 UAF at risk of encirclement in the Sievierodonetsk pocket, like the loss they suffered at Mariupol. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky declared Ukraine will not stop fighting until all Ukrainian territory has been liberated.1 To have a chance of accomplishing that objective, Ukraine would likely need to recruit and train an additional 100,000 troops, at least, a task that would take 12–18 months, and equip its forces with a comprehensive set of modern, heavy weaponry, provided by the West, numbering in the thousands of armored vehicles and associated weaponry. There is great risk for Ukraine in undertaking such an attempt. It is unclear whether NATO will provide sufficient modern weapons or whether Ukraine can successfully hold off Russia while also recruiting and training so many more troops. If Russia defeats Ukraine in the Battle of Donbas, Kyiv will face a difficult choice: (1) to dig in and continue fighting, even though much of its most effective forces will have been captured or killed, and risk steadily losing more territory or (2) negotiating with Russia to trade territory lost since 2014 for peace to stanch further losses of Ukrainian lives and land.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Conflict, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

6. Lessons for Taiwan from Ukraine

Author:
Sascha Glaeser
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The Russo-Ukraine war is analogous in several ways to a hypothetical war between China and Taiwan. Like Ukraine, Taiwan is a relatively weak state, threatened by a neighboring great power with a sizable nuclear arsenal who makes historical claims to its territory, and has some backing from the United States. Ukraine’s experience provides several lessons for Taiwan. War remains an instrument of statecraft that great powers use in pursuit of their perceived national interests; smaller, weaker states should plan accordingly. In Taiwan’s case, that means continuation of the status quo which has helped provide peace for decades. Taiwan should assume the United States will not engage in direct conflict with China on its behalf. This assumption should encourage Taiwan to focus its military strategy on securing an advantage by acquiring more anti-access, area-denial capability and reforming its reserve force to help it deter or resist an invasion. While Ukraine shows Taiwan could expect an outpouring of global humanitarian and military aid if attacked, its island geography and the likely course of the war means it might not manage to receive or access those supplies, and should therefore maintain strategic stockpiles of weapons, ammunition, food, fuel, and other supplies. The United States and others will likely impose economic sanctions on China. However, sanctions are unlikely to alter China’s behavior in any meaningful way if it has already committed to war.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Taiwan, and Asia

7. Fact Sheet: Global Demonstrations Against the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Sam Jones
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
Following the Russian invasion, a wave of demonstrations in solidarity with Ukraine spread around the world. Between 24 February and 4 March, ACLED records more than 1,800 demonstrations in support of Ukraine and against Russian aggression globally. During this time, demonstrations were reported across at least 93 countries and territories (see map below). Nearly all of these demonstrations — over 99% — were peaceful (i.e. protesters engaged in neither violence nor destructive activity).
Topic:
Solidarity, Conflict, Demonstrations, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Global Focus

8. Turning point? Putin, Xi, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Bobo Lo
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Putin’s war in Ukraine has highlighted the resilience but also the limitations of Sino–Russian partnership. Far from being an “arc of autocracy”, this is an interests-based relationship between strategically autonomous powers. Foreign policy coordination between China and Russia is limited by their different views of global order. Beijing is invested in a stable international system, albeit one skewed in its favour, whereas Moscow thrives on disorder and uncertainty. Xi Jinping aims to preserve the Sino–Russian partnership while maintaining ties with the West. But Beijing’s balancing act will become harder to sustain as the war continues. The balance of power within the bilateral relationship has tilted sharply towards Beijing. Russia is more reliant on China than ever. The long-term outlook for the relationship is unpromising.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Conflict, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Ukraine

9. The Russian invasion to Ukraine: An agribusiness perspective

Author:
Hugo Krajnc
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
Abstract:
It is quite relevant that the arguments used to justify the Russian invasion to Ukraine do not highlight economic components. Although it may be difficult to assert that such decision was also driven by economic issues, it is quite hard as well to deny that those were not involved, given the traditional Russian geopolitical perspective.
Topic:
War, Economy, Conflict, and Agribusiness
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

10. Putin’s Infantrymen: Kadyrov’s Involvement in the 2022 Ukrainian Conflict

Author:
Aleksandre Kvakhadze and Cerwyn Moore
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
External involvement in the Ukrainian conflict, particularly pro-Russian volunteerism, has been a prominent feature of the Russian war effort. Chechen involvement in the conflict is more complex than is often reported. Pro-Russian groups known as kadyrovtsy serve a number of functions, including bolstering Kadyrov’s cult of personality in Chechnya, although their military significance is negligible. Chechen volunteer groups are involved in support of the Ukrainian military: this raises issues about the role of foreign fighters and volunteerism. The political implications of pro-Kremlin Chechen volunteerism in Ukraine are linked to fierce institutional infighting within Russia.
Topic:
Conflict, Vladimir Putin, Foreign Fighters, Russia-Ukraine War, and Ramzan Kadyrov
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Chechnya

11. Putin’s Use and Abuse of History: Back to the 19th Century?

Author:
Leo Goretti
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
“Ukraine is not just a neighbouring country for us. It is an inalienable part of our own history, culture and spiritual space.” This is how Putin introduced the “decisions being made” in his 55-minute address to the nation on 21 February 2022, which paved the way for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Several commentators noted how Putin’s speech was replete with historical references: as historian Benjamin Nathans pointed out, Vladimir Putin seems to be “quite obsessed with history. So part of our attention […] should be looking at how Putin is using history”. Indeed, almost one-quarter of Putin’s speech was devoted to a rather erratic and convoluted discussion of pre-1991 Russian and Soviet history, departing from the assumption that this was necessary “to explain the motives behind Russia’s actions and what we aim to achieve”.
Topic:
Nationalism, History, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Caucasus, and Balkans

12. Energy Markets and the Design of Sanctions on Russia

Author:
Christof Ruhl
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
Sanctions against the citizens, institutions, and products of the Russian Federation are evolving rapidly. Energy sanctions started late, but the number of countries embargoing oil, gas, or coal imports from Russia is expanding. These sanctions are likely to increase global fuel prices while depressing the price of the sanctioned fuel. The experience to date suggests that the current, gradual approach of reducing oil and gas imports from Russia one country at a time may have room to go further. Before the invasion of Ukraine, the sweeping and unprecedented sanctions promised in the event of a Russian invasion were often conceived as a two-pronged pincer movement. The idea was to isolate Russia from the global financial system while limiting its commodity and energy exports. Both moves were aimed at the source of the financial strength of “fortress Russia,” namely, its persistent balance of payment surplus.
Topic:
Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, Sanctions, Financial Markets, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

13. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Identity, History, and Conflict

Author:
Jeffrey Mankoff
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine constitutes the biggest threat to peace and security in Europe since the end of the Cold War. On February 21, 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin gave a bizarre and at times unhinged speech laying out a long list of grievances as justification for the “special military operation” announced the following day. While these grievances included the long-simmering dispute over the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the shape of the post–Cold War security architecture in Europe, the speech centered on a much more fundamental issue: the legitimacy of Ukrainian identity and statehood themselves. It reflected a worldview Putin had long expressed, emphasizing the deep-seated unity among the Eastern Slavs—Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, who all trace their origins to the medieval Kyivan Rus commonwealth—and suggesting that the modern states of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus should share a political destiny both today and in the future. The corollary to that view is the claim that distinct Ukrainian and Belarusian identities are the product of foreign manipulation and that, today, the West is following in the footsteps of Russia’s imperial rivals in using Ukraine (and Belarus) as part of an “anti-Russia project.” Throughout Putin’s time in office, Moscow has pursued a policy toward Ukraine and Belarus predicated on the assumption that their respective national identities are artificial—and therefore fragile. Putin’s arguments about foreign enemies promoting Ukrainian (and, in a more diffuse way, Belarusian) identity as part of a geopolitical struggle against Russia echo the way many of his predecessors refused to accept the agency of ordinary people seeking autonomy from tsarist or Soviet domination. The historically minded Putin often invokes the ideas of thinkers emphasizing the organic unity of the Russian Empire and its people—especially its Slavic, Orthodox core—in a form of what the historian Timothy Snyder calls the “politics of eternity,” the belief in an unchanging historical essence. The salience that Putin and other Russian elites assign to the idea of Russian-Ukrainian-Belarusian unity helps explain the origins of the current conflict, notably why Moscow was willing to risk a large-scale war on its borders when neither Ukraine nor NATO posed any military threat. It also suggests that Moscow’s ambitions extend beyond preventing Ukrainian NATO membership and encompass a more thorough aspiration to dominate Ukraine politically, militarily, and economically. It also helps explain Russia’s military strategy. Moscow appeared to calculate that enough Ukrainians, at least in the eastern part of the country, would accept some form of reintegration into a Russian sphere of influence because of shared cultural, linguistic, religious, and other ties with Russia. Despite pre-war polls showing large numbers of Ukrainians willing to take up arms to defend their country against a Russian invasion, Moscow’s wager was not entirely implausible given the recentness of the shift and the persistence of family and other ties across the Russian-Ukrainian border. Nonetheless, Russia’s war has become bogged down in no small part because this calculation about Ukrainian identity has proven dramatically wrong.
Topic:
War, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

14. CAN ISRAEL REMAIN BOTH NEUTRAL AND PART OF THE WEST?

Author:
Michael Barnett
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Israel is getting some unwanted attention because of its reluctance to outrightly condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine. No one believes that the failure to condemn translates into support for the attack. But Israel’s reticence has placed it in an awkward situation—one that might, in fact, translate into a loss of support from Western countries when Israel needs it most.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Conflict, Neutrality, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Middle East, Israel, and Eastern Europe

15. Russia’s domestic politics have become part of the West’s Russia policy: The stakes are rising when Navalny returns to Russia

Author:
Jussi Lassila
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Among the most signifcant events in Russia in 2020 were the Covid-19 pandemic, reactions to the protests in Belarus, and the poisoning of top opposition politician Aleksey Navalny. Te frst two were clearly events of international signifcance, but so was the medical treatment given to Navalny, frst in Omsk and then in Berlin, after he suffered from symptoms of poisoning dur- ing a flight from Tomsk in Siberia to Moscow in August. In December, a joint study by the investigative journalist groups Bellingcat and The Insider, along with CNN, Der Spiegel and Naval- ny’s FBK Foundation, showed that it was difficult to find more con- clusive evidence of the Kremlin’s involvement in the assassination attempt by a chemical weapons- related poisoning group under the FSB that had been following Na- valny for years. This kind of op- eration would hardly have been possible without the blessing of high-level intelligence. Te ques- tion of whether the FSB leader- ship was proactive in resolving the “Navalny problem” or whether the order came from the Kremlin is irrelevant. Te revealed pattern confrms the long-standing trend of the strengthened role of the se- curity services, especially the FSB, in Russian politics. It is consistent with Putin’s approach to political processes being increasingly seen as issues of national security. Navalny’s self-confidence and style in the revelation videos related to the investigation, receiving ap- proximately 45 million views in less than a month, underscore the extent to which the FSB failed. The target did not die or become paralyzed, but recovered relatively quickly and bounced back, playing for higher and more radical stakes than before. Navalny’s role and reputation as the Kremlin’s most prominent critic has been based on the political pressure on the Kremlin generated by expos- ing elite corruption. While the will- ingness of citizens to see Navalny as an alternative to Putin varies consid- erably – with the majority indifer- ent to politics as a whole – Navalny’s numerous revelations have created an alternative to Russia’s ofcial re- ality, the political potential of which the regime obviously fears.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Conflict, Regionalism, and Domestic Policy
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

16. Can and Will Germany Be a Viable Partner in a U.S. “Pushback” Strategy Towards Russia?

Author:
Hannes Adomeit
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:
Joe Biden, as presidential candidate, is on record as having stated that “the biggest threat to America right now in terms of breaking up our − our security and our alliances − is Russia.” As president, he asserted, “the days of the United States rolling over in the face of Russia’s aggressive actions are over.” The first months of his tenure in office have given some substance to such claims and confirmed that the new administration aims at containing and counteracting Russian malign behavior and to impose costs so as to affect the Kremlin’s risk calculus. Can Germany − and most likely will it − be a viable partner in such a U.S. strategy?
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Leadership, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

17. The Perfect Conflict The Russian strategy in Yemen

Author:
Leonid Issaev
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The operation of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Syria was perceived by the world community as a demonstration of strength, unveiling Moscow and the Kremlin's readiness to defend its interests in the Middle East by military means. It is not surprising that the Russian military presence in Syria has generated a lot of speculation about the possibility of a repetition of the Syrian ‘scenario’ in other hot spots in the region, such as Yemen. We believe that such generalizations are inaccurate and simplify the multifaceted situation. First of all, the Syrian case is rather an exception for Moscow. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist ideology, Russia became more pragmatic, its policy got rid of the prefix ‘pro’, and, in principle, it is trying to serve its own interests. It is not surprising that the rejection of messianic ideas forced Russia to reconsider its attitude to conflicts, including ones in the Middle East. The best example of Russian pragmatism is the Kremlin's policy on the Yemeni crisis since its beginning in 2011 until now.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Conflict, and Air Force
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, Yemen, and Syria

18. Baku Parade Whispers Geopolitical Complexities in the South Caucasus

Author:
Rahim Rahimov
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan attended a military parade in the Azerbaijani capital of Baku on December 10 to celebrate Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia in the war over the Karabakh region that ended with the Russia-brokered armistice on November 9-10. The Russian historian, Andrey Zubov, describes the Baku parade as an occasion “rather to celebrate the birth of a new geopolitical alliance than the victory over Armenia”1 . Following the parade, Russia imposed a ban on tomato imports from Azerbaijan in its flagship manner and Russian peacekeepers attempted to do something around the town of Shusha in Karabakh resembling what they have done in Georgia: “borderization”. Azerbaijani state TV, other media outlets and public figures widely and explicitly condemned such behavior of the Russian peacekeepers as a jealous response to the parade demonstration of Armenia’s Russian-made weapons and military equipment captured by the Azerbaijani armed forces or destroyed using Turkish-made Bayraktar drones . Erdogan and the Azerbaijani President, Ilham Aliyev, watched Turkish soldiers march alongside with Azerbaijanis on the central streets of Baku to the joy of local residents who took to the streets despite the COVID-19 related restrictions in order to salute them. This scene shows a major Russian weakness vis-àvis Turkey in Azerbaijan. Unlike Moscow, whose perception in Azerbaijan is controversial, Ankara enjoys nation-wide support. Recently leaked Russian secret files reveal that it is much more difficult for Moscow to develop proRussian civil society organizations and soft power instruments in Azerbaijan than even in staunchly pro-Western Georgia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Turkey, France, Georgia, and South Caucasus

19. The Regional Security Dynamics of the South Caucasus After the 2020 Karabakh War

Author:
Benyamin Poghosyan
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
The 2020 Karabakh war has significantly shifted the geopolitics of the South Caucasus. Armenia suffered a tough defeat while the non-recognized Republic of Artsakh (Republic of Nagorno Karabakh) lost almost 80 percent of its territories. Azerbaijan won a decisive victory and took not only territories outside of the former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAR) but 30 percent of NKAR itself. The November 10 trilateral statement signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia not only stopped the war in Karabakh but ushered in a new era in regional geopolitics.1 The key features of the new status quo are the increased role of Russia and Turkey and the significant reduction of Western involvement. However, the South Caucasus is far away from stability and, most probably, volatility will continue. We will seek to analyze the main interests of the key regional and external players and what may play out in a short/mid-term perspective.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, War, Geopolitics, Political stability, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh

20. The OSCE and Peacekeeping: Track Record and Outlook

Author:
Fred Tanner
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) is one of the OSCE’s few success stories in recent years. This civilian mission has been uniquely able to operate as a quasi-peacekeeping force in high-risk areas of Donbas, monitoring ceasefire compliance and facilitating dialogue and humanitarian action in support of those living in the conflict zone. In the history of the OSCE, there has been only one other ceasefire monitoring mission: the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). This contribution to OSCE Insights considers the track record of OSCE peace operations, with special attention to the abovementioned missions. All OSCE peace operations to date have been civilian missions, and this paper considers military OSCE mission to be unfeasible also for the future. The paper provides lessons learned and recommendations for future missions by the OSCE and other organizations operating in high-risk environments.
Topic:
International Cooperation, United Nations, Conflict, Peace, Humanitarian Crisis, and OSCE
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

21. Paradox of Relations: Russian - Turkish Relations in the Syrian and Libyan Fronts

Author:
Dania Koleilat Khatib and Aref Bijan
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Over the last few years, Russia has emerged as a significant power broker and military actor in the Middle East. Russia's intervention in the Syrian crisis since 2015 has revived its relations with neighboring countries. This increase in Russia's activity has led to convergence and divergence with other countries in the region. One of those countries is Turkey, which had cooperated at times and had differences at times with Russia in the Middle East, especially in the Syrian and the Libyan crises. Ankara and Moscow are fully engaged in the global competition trying to increase their power and influence. They face off in Syria and Libya. In Syria, Turkey supports the rebels in the North West while Russia supports the Assad regime. In Libya, Turkey supports the Government of National Accord (GNA) while Russia supports Libyan National Army (LNA). Their relation becomes more intricate as both parties got involved in the Caucus, a region of prime importance to both countries. In the vicinity of Russia, the oil route goes Tbilisi-Baku ending up in Ceyhan Turkey. While Turkey supports Azerbaijan, Russia supports Armenia. The Caucus crisis showed how the two countries are rivals that are ready to accommodate each other on a quid pro quo basis. The cease happened concurrently with a partial withdrawal of Turkey from some posts in the North West in Syria. Was there an agreement between Erdogan and Putin in this regard? There are no proofs; however, the various events that are happening from the Caucus to North Africa suggest that those two powers are rivals that are ready to accommodate each other. To add to that, the American retrenchment has encouraged the two powers to flex their muscles in the region. Therefore, given the developments in the region, this article has tried to examine the paradox of Russian-Turkish relations and their strategy in Libya and Syria.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Conflict, Strategic Competition, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, Middle East, and Libya

22. War in NagornoKarabakh A Two-Track Strategy for the EU

Author:
András Rácz
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
After two weeks of heavy fighting, the new war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh is likely to escalate further. International actors have so far been unable to broker a ceasefire. In this case, the EU, with its limited leverage, can add most value by leading a response to the inevitable humanitarian catastrophe. EU diplomatic efforts should be led by France and Germany, coordinated with other member states, and also with Russia, to the extent necessary.
Topic:
Diplomacy, War, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, France, Germany, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh

23. The Last Option: Impact of the Battle for Idlib on the Syrian Conflict

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Idlib has been the delayed battle in the Syrian conflict throughout its various stages, but this seems to be coming to an end, as many indicators reveal. For example, Russia, for the time being, is keen to resolve Idlib’s issue which would reinforce the specter of military intervention. Moscow indicates that there are no options left for the parties to the Sochi agreement, pointing also to the difficulty of implementing its terms. The 10 points-agreement has not achieved its purpose for five months, given the terrorist organizations’ control over the area, in particular al-Nusra Front. This happens amid lack of actions from the Turkish side, which has threatened, more than once, to deter those who jeopardize the agreement, which compelled it to agree, ostensibly, with the other parties on launching a military offensive in Idlib. Despite the challenges and consequences of this option, it is the scenario that looms large over the Syrian scene at present.
Topic:
Terrorism, Military Affairs, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, and Idlib

24. HYBRID WARFARE IS HERE TO STAY. NOW WHAT?

Author:
Kristina Hook
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
“Hybrid warfare is the new normal,” announced NATO Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges Antonio Missiroli at November’s NATO-Ukraine Forum in Kiev, Ukraine. He spoke these words at a fitting venue: Ukraine holds the dubious honor, along with Georgia, as the world’s two nations who have experienced the full gamut of Russia’s modern hybrid war tactics. These methods operate through a mixture of kinetic violence and subversive tactics to destabilize while avoiding retribution. Grounded in historic military strategies, a crippling cyber-attack against Estonia in 2007 signified an emerging form of political violence. The later invasions and annexations of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 demonstrate the Kremlin’s particular hybrid strengths, including exploiting international law by couching their presence in these countries as humanitarian or anti-piracy.
Topic:
NATO, Conflict, Hybrid Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, United Kingdom, Ukraine, France, Germany, Estonia, Georgia, Syria, Montenegro, and United States of America

25. Possible Obstacles: Will Russian Succeed in Reaching a Settlement in Afghanistan?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Moscow hosted a new round of talks in an effort to reach a settlement for the conflict in Afghanistan, on November 9, dubbed as “Moscow Format Consultations on Afghanistan”. Moscow considered that the potential gain would be the participation of Taliban representatives for the first time in two years, since the launcg of the talks. These talks witnessed two previous rounds, which did not yield any results. They were mainly a regional dialogue with the neighbouring countries concerned with the Afghan issue. Although Russia says there has been a considerable progress in the talks, this does not negate the fact that they still face many challenges that were evident in the outcome of the meeting. However, Moscow will likely continue its efforts to hold further talks, especially in the light of the evolving situation on the ground, namely ISIS moving from Syria and Iraq and some Middle Eastern countries to Afghanistan. Such move is considered an eminent threat to Moscow’s national security and interests.
Topic:
Taliban, Islamic State, Conflict, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, South Asia, and Eurasia

26. Contradictions of “Gray Zone” Conflict

Author:
Lada Kochtcheeva
Publication Date:
04-2017
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Rethinking Russia
Abstract:
With the advance of globalization, the spread of new technologies and communication, diffusion of power to non-state actors, as well as the emergence of new forms of rivalry and statecraft, the concept of “gray zone” conflict has very recently produced substantial debates in the US and internationally. Most analysts do not view this phenomenon as entirely new, but they distinguish certain characteristics of gray zone and argue that it will progressively depict and challenge the international system in the near future. The gray zone form of conflict is usually defined by the presence of several crucial elements including rising revisionist states that seek to alter some aspect of the existing, status quo international order, incremental or gradual strategy often ambiguous, and unconventional tools, which are short of outright war. Actors using a gray zone method strive to achieve their goals while minimizing the scope and scale of actual fighting[3]. Russia’s actions in Eastern Europe are often described by the theorists of gray zone conflict as using multi-instrument strategies while employing direct action. China’s use of incremental approaches to produce a critical basis for its claims in the South China Sea also represents a prominent example of the gray zone conflict.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Globalization, Conflict, and Gray Zone
Political Geography:
Russia, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

27. Pragmatism and Common Sense – No Margin for Error

Author:
Maxim A. Suchkov
Publication Date:
04-2017
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Rethinking Russia
Abstract:
The American military strike on a Syrian airbase has rather demonstrated President Trump’s burning desire to adopt a more hawkish stance – both at home and abroad – than has been launched merely in retaliation for the terrible chemical attack. At home, it was a gimmick to consolidate his position in Congress, secure bipartisan support (primarily GOP’s approval), cement his voting base, and shed the image of the Kremlin’s lackey, which has increasingly been weakening his presidential mandate and left little room for political maneuver. Moreover, this step was due to receive the approbation of the major “domestic sponsors”, including the military-industrial complex, the oil industry, and financiers. Finally, it can be treated as the comeback of the “strong leader”, the translation of Trump’s election pledge into a policy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Conflict, Syrian War, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America