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Begin New Search Topic Armed Forces Political Geography North America Content Type Commentary and Analysis Publication Year within 25 Years

1. Reset U.S.-Syria Policy

Author:
Daniel Depetris
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
After 12 years of civil war, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government has consolidated its power and defeated credible threats to its rule. The anti-Assad armed opposition, which once controlled half of Syria, is relegated to the northwestern province of Idlib. While the Biden administration recognizes that Assad will likely remain in office, U.S. policy remains punitive, maintaining comprehensive sanctions on Syria until Assad negotiates political reforms with his opponents and agrees to free and fair elections. This policy will not produce the desired results. Assad is firmly entrenched, benefits from the help of security partners in Iran and Russia, who prefer that he stays in power, and remains highly unlikely to comply with U.S. demands. The status quo amounts to collective punishment of the Syrian population. Approximately 900 U.S. troops remain in eastern Syria, allegedly to train and advise the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces against ISIS. But ISIS lost its territorial caliphate more than four years ago. The risk of keeping U.S. forces there in perpetuity which includes sporadic attacks on U.S. positions and escalation risks with various actors, outweighs any rewards. Neither the sanctions nor the occupation of eastern Syria serves U.S. security interests. The former does no good, and the latter risks embroiling the United States in a mission without an end date. The United States should withdraw its remaining forces and offload what is left of the counter-ISIS mission to local actors. The United States should also reduce if not end its failing sanctions regime.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Armed Forces, Islamic State, Syrian War, and Bashar al-Assad
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

2. WILL NANCY PELOSI’S VISIT TO TAIWAN TRIGGER A CRISIS?

Author:
James Lee and Jackie Wong
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
The controversy surrounding Nancy Pelosi’s (D-CA) potential visit to Taiwan centers on what it implies about United States’ relations with Taiwan. When the United States normalized relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1979, it said it would continue relations with Taiwan on an unofficial basis. The Normalization Communique said that “the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.” Beijing has interpreted this statement as a commitment, and it has warned Washington that closer government-to-government interactions with Taipei would violate that commitment and have dire, though unspecified, consequences. But there’s no formula for determining what “unofficial” means. The canonical statements of the United States’ One-China policy—the Shanghai Communiqué, the Normalization Communiqué, the Arms Sales Communiqué, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six Assurances—are written at a high level of abstraction. There is no communiqué in which the United States said that the Speaker of the House would never visit Taiwan; those kinds of details are left to diplomatic protocols (such as the “contact guidelines”) that the United States has defined on its own. It is an act of interpretation—an art rather than a science—and the question now is whether a visit by Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan would be outside the bounds of a reasonable interpretation of “unofficial” relations.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Nancy Pelosi
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

3. Italian Military Operations: Coping with Rising Threats and Declining US Leadership

Author:
Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The Italian armed forces need to adjust to a changing operational environment, whereby threat levels are on the rise and the United States is more reluctant to lead military operations than in the past.
Topic:
International Relations, NATO, Armed Forces, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Europe, Italy, North America, and United States of America

4. Commentary on “The US Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028”

Author:
Huba Wass de Czege
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Does The US Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 lack a clear theory of victory? A comparative analysis of the development of MDO and the historical concepts of Active Defense and AirLand Battle reveals the necessity of greater insight into sources of Russian and Chinese behavior and countering mechanisms, what constitutes effective deterrence, and greater clarity regarding the political will of Allies to assist in this deterrence.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Army
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

5. U.S. Dynamic Force Employment and the Pandemic: Implications for the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Author:
Tetsuo Kotani
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
"We're not at war. Sailors don't need to die," wrote the captain of the U.S. aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt, which was infected with the novel coronavirus while on a mission at sea in March, in a letter to the Navy's leadership asking for permission to isolate the bulk of his roughly 5,000 crew members on shore. The U.S. Navy dismissed the captain for unnecessarily spreading the sensitive letter, while more than 1,000 crew members, including the captain himself, have been confirmed infected and one has died. In the meantime, the acting chief of the Navy, who had inappropriately criticized the dismissed captain, was forced to resign, and the command and control of the military has been brought into question in the midst of the pandemic of COVID-19.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Armed Forces, Alliance, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

6. Space Force: Ahead of Its Time, or Dreadfully Premature?

Author:
Claire Farley
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
In December 2019, Congress established the U.S. Space Force as an independent uniformed military service within the Department of the Air Force. Although many defense analysts had long argued for a reorganization of the Department of Defense’s space capabilities, few had settled on this particular solution. This policy analysis evaluates the reasoning behind the Space Force’s establishment, concluding that the service’s creation is premature. The Space Force is the first new independent U.S. service since the creation of the Air Force in 1947. At its inception, the Air Force had hundreds of thousands of personnel, several years of battle experience, a coherent body of doctrine, and a robust organizational culture. Even so, the creation of the Air Force sparked bitter interservice conflict for the first decade of its existence. However, the Space Force lacks a strong institutional basis, an identifiable organizational culture, and an established foundation of strategic theory. In the short term, it runs the risk of disrupting existing procedures and relationships that enable the U.S. military to function. In the long term, it runs the risk of distorting the procurement and force structure of U.S. space capabilities.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Space Force
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

7. The Implications of Withdrawing American Troops from Germany

Author:
Alexander Luck
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
On June 6, the Wall Street Journal set off an avalanche of commentary by reporting that U.S. President Donald Trump ordered a drastic reduction in U.S. troops deployed in Germany within a space of only six months. The move was met with significant pushback in Washington and Brussels, causing Congressional Republicans to raise their concerns in letters and public statements. Trump’s announcement, however, was in fact an extension of earlier plans mooted in June 2019, when the administration first suggested moving at least 1,000 troops from Germany to Poland. At the time, Trump suggested that the proposed move was to “affirm the significant defense cooperation between our nations.” Washington picked up this potential troop move again in a rather unrelated context following a spat over the German refusal to participate in a naval mission in the Persian Gulf to deter Iran, reinforcing the notion Trump keeps using American deployments in Germany as a bargaining chip for any interaction on foreign policy with the Merkel government.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

8. The US Troop Withdrawal Plan: Bogus Strategic Claims and a Warning Signal for Europe

Author:
Heinrich Brauß
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
President Trump wants to withdraw US troops from Germany because it spends too little on defense. US Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, however, is trying to present the decision as the result of a strategic analysis. That seems grotesque. The withdrawal not only weakens NATO, but also the security of Europe and America’s ability to act. The Europeans must finally close their capability gaps, and Germany must make its armed forces fully operational earlier than planned.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

9. Special Commentary: Memorandum for SECDEF: Restore “Shock” in Strategic Planning

Author:
Mr. Nathan P. Freier, Robert Hume, and John Schaus
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The Department of Defense (DOD) needs to re-institutionalize horizon scanning for “strategic shock” and integrate this perspective into its strategy, plans, and risk assessment. Defense-relevant “strategic shocks” are disruptive, transformational events for DOD. Though their precise origin and nature are uncertain, strategic shocks often emerge from clear trends. Shocks are often recognized in advance on some level but are nonetheless “shocking” because they are largely ignored. Too often, rapid strategic shock catches the DOD off guard because leadership fails to account for it. To be sure, accounting for shock is a value judgment. Many may actually see what ultimately becomes a shock well in advance. However, readying for shock requires leadership to understand a contingency event’s potential for strategic-level hazard. Failing that, and once confronted with shock, leadership frequently mischaracterizes it as defying reasonable prediction and prior planning.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Army, COVID-19, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

10. Special Commentary: The Impact of COVID-19 on Civil-Military Relations

Author:
C. Anthony Pfaff
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
There has been a great deal of speculation regarding how the current COVID-19 pandemic could affect civil-military relations in the United States. Oona Hathaway observes that after the terrorists attacks on September 11, 2001, which killed approximately three thousand Americans, the United States “radically re-oriented” its security priorities and embarked on a two-decadelong global war on terror that cost $2.8 trillion from 2002 to 2017. Given that COVID-19 could kill more than one hundred thousand Americans, she argues that it is time to re-orient those priorities again.1 Of course, simply re-orienting security priorities by themselves will not be transformative. Nora Bensahel and David Barno, for example, argue that diminished defense budgets resulting from shrinking revenues will make less funds available to maintain expensive forward bases and legacy weapons programs. Moreover, they argue, the increased sense of vulnerability will give the National Guard and reserve components a greater priority than active forces given their more prominent role in addressing the current crisis.2 They are probably right that these things will occur. However, a smaller active force and an empowered National Guard and reserve components will not fundamentally alter the role the military plays in American society. That kind of transformation requires not only taking on new missions, but more importantly, taking on new expert knowledge. Since a profession’s status is contingent on a distinct body of expert knowledge, and the autonomy to apply that knowledge within a given jurisdiction, prioritizing human security will require developing expertise in more than the use of force. Doing so will shift the military’s focus from lethality to the prevention, or failing that, the alleviation of suffering, potentially blurring the lines between military and civilian realms. Of course, such an outcome is not inevitable and the US military has played a role in disaster response before without re-orienting its security priorities. However, the COVID-19 pandemic may prove a pivotal moment but not simply because of reduced funding for military expenditures or increased vulnerability to pandemics. Diminishing external security threats, due in some part to the effects of the virus, coupled with increasing demand to assure human well-being both in the United States and abroad, could lead to a rethinking of the military’s role in American society. This rethinking could include the redistribution of roles between the military, civilian agencies, and other organizations, which extends beyond simply decreasing funds spent on defense.
Topic:
Security, Armed Forces, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

11. Special Commentary: Post-COVID Transformation: DOD Goes into the Matrix?

Author:
Nathan Freier, Robert Hume, Al Lord, and John Schaus
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
These are complex, turbulent, and uncertain times to be sure. The Department of Defense (DOD) is at an important inflection point. COVID-19 has irrevocably altered the dynamics of international security and reshaped DOD’s decision-making landscape. As a result, DOD will have to adapt to significantly different strategic circumstances post-COVID than those assumed operative in the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS18). We recommend that DOD recognize this to be true, seize the initiative, create opportunity from crisis, and recraft defense strategy to re-emerge from COVID as a stronger, more hypercompetitive institution. The past is definitely prologue in this regard. DOD’s current strategic circumstances mirror those of the immediate post-9/11 period. The wars that followed 9/11 forced a substantial strategic course correction on DOD. By 2003, it was clear that the azimuth set in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR01) was fundamentally compromised by the stark reality of the Iraq and Afghan wars and the wider “Global War on Terrorism.” There was corporate recognition at the time that the path described in QDR01 was not likely to position the American military for the demands of the post-9/11 environment. Just as war reshaped DOD’s strategic agenda then, COVID-19 will change the dynamics of great power rivalry and the defense choices associated with it going forward as well. By itself, we suggest this necessitates a thoughtful re-examination of the assumptions and approach described in NDS18. To use a pop culture analogy, DOD’s current situation is reminiscent of “Neo’s choice” in the dystopian movie The Matrix. In the film, rebel leader Morpheus offers protagonist Neo the choice of a red pill or a blue pill. The red pill extends to Neo an unvarnished view of “the matrix” and its broader and more difficult set of governing facts. The blue pill, on the other hand, returns Neo to his prior blissfully naïve existence plugged into a land of computer make-believe. The blue pill is all about doubling down on a comfortable yet already discredited past. The red pill offers Neo the opportunity to boldly enter a difficult but nonetheless transformational future. In the end (spoiler alert), Neo chooses red. Like Neo, DOD has its own difficult “red or blue” choice on the near-horizon. COVID forced the issue. DOD’s choice is between prudent risk-taking, transformation, and increased hypercompetitiveness (red) on the one hand, and status quo, steady decline, and inevitable loss of position in key regions and domains on the other (blue). As in the case of Neo, we suggest that DOD choose the former (red pill) transformational option.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Strategic Competition, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America