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42. To Prevent the PA from Unraveling, Address Internal Reform
- Author:
- Ghaith al-Omari
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- Last year was one of the bloodiest in the West Bank since the second Palestinian intifada two decades ago, and 2023 is already on track to surpass it. Worse yet, the latest surge of violence comes at a time of exceptional fragility within the Palestinian Authority. Much of this fragility can be attributed to Israeli actions that chip away at the PA’s credibility and effectiveness—a fact driven home by Israel’s deadly February 22 raid in Nablus (see below). Yet the PA’s poor governance and political ossification are key contributors as well, as leaders in Ramallah steadily lose control over parts of the West Bank in a vicious cycle of instability and ever-eroding legitimacy. If this trajectory continues, the PA might even run the risk of unraveling altogether. As the United States seeks diplomatic ways to restore calm and curb escalatory policies on both sides, it should pay closer attention to domestic Palestinian factors that contribute to these damaging trends.
- Topic:
- Security, Corruption, Diplomacy, Reform, Democracy, and Palestinian Authority
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, and Palestine
43. Can Federalism Work in Lebanon?
- Author:
- Robert Rabil
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- As Lebanon’s economic and socio-political conditions have spiraled downward since the rise and fractionalization of the 2019 popular protests—known as the October 17 Revolution—various proposals have emerged as to how to remedy the bankrupt and virtually failed state. All agree that the current outlook is grim; today, the Lebanese currency has lost almost all its value and the presidential seat is contested and remains vacant. Political elites are at loggerheads and blamed for robbing the state, society is polarized across intra- and inter-confessional lines, and poverty has reached a popular level not seen since the Great Famine of World War I. Among the proposed suggestions is the federal option, put as an alternative to the country’s confessional system. Such ideas are not new; in fact, the federal option had been championed and the subject of debate among mainly Christian politicians and parties prior to and during Lebanon’s civil war (1975-1990). President Camille Chamoun (1952-1958) offered a detailed plan for a federal Lebanon; the Lebanese Front, representing mainly Maronite aspirations, likewise presented a federal project during the Lebanon National Dialogue in Lausanne in 1984; and president-elect Bashir Gemayel, assassinated in 1982, toyed with the idea of federalism. However, Lebanon’s civil war ended when the antagonistic parties signed the Document of National Reconciliation of 1989, also known as the Taif Agreement, which introduced administrative decentralization instead of federalism. And while the agreement ended the civil war, it subsequently ushered in an era of Lebanese politics marked by the Syrian occupation of Beirut until 2005 and the rise of the Islamist Shia party Hezbollah, effectively building a state within a state and commanding a militia more or less better equipped than the Lebanese Armed Forces. Meanwhile, Lebanon’s political elites entered into a Faustian pact with Hezbollah under which they legitimized the ‘Party of God’ in exchange for turning a blind eye to their theft of the state. It is this bargain that has brought Lebanon to its almost total collapse as a state and a nation.
- Topic:
- Security, Politics, Reform, Shia, and Federalism
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Lebanon
44. The Lebanon Human Rights Report: Punting on Accountability?
- Author:
- David Schenker
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- When the U.S. State Department issued its annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices last week, the document’s assessment of Lebanon’s track record in 2022 stood out for its significant elisions. Although the comprehensive nature of these reports generally makes them a valuable tool for accountability, their diplomatically sensitive content is sometimes colored by an administration’s perceived exigencies regarding a given bilateral relationship. The fact that Lebanon’s report largely avoids some of the country’s more controversial human rights issues therefore seems more than coincidental. Whatever the case, the omissions are a missed opportunity for facilitating just the type of accountability Lebanon needs to pry itself out of its current morass.
- Topic:
- Human Rights, Armed Forces, Economy, and Accountability
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Lebanon
45. Drug Addiction in Syria: A Decades-Long Disease
- Author:
- Emad Bouzo
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- Numerous articles have recently appeared in international media about confiscated shipments of Captagon coming from Syria into various countries in the Middle East. Recent research has examined how Syria turned into a regional center for drug trafficking. Yet media interest appears comparatively silent about the spread of drug abuse inside Syria itself. According to available reports, domestic drug abuse has reached dangerous levels. While such a crisis has no doubt increased, the roots of this issue are decades old. Through my work as a doctor in Damascus from 1980 until September 2011, I witnessed how drug abuse spread during this period. My private clinic was located in one of the most significantly affected neighborhoods, and some of my personal observations from my time as a clinician may help shed light on the deeper origins of Syria’s current drug crisis and perhaps shed light on potential avenues to address it. Initially, the Lebanese civil war served as the main factor in the spread of drugs. Several militias exploited the collapse of state institutions in Lebanon to carry out drug cultivation, manufacturing, and drug trafficking within its borders. The Syrian military intervention in Lebanon in the mid-seventies and the establishment of partnerships between the leaders of these militias and Syrian officers that secured the drug trade with more protection allowed its revitalization and prosperity, as documented in a Washington Post article from that period. Tons of heroin were produced annually in Lebanon, and Syrian officers subsequently trafficked large quantities into Syria. This new ease of access captured the attention of numerous Syrian youth, who began using these highly addictive drugs. Their interest in drugs was often initially driven by being forced to leave education to enter the labor market at an early age and experiencing a sense of a bleak future. And whereas Syrian teenagers used to rebel by smoking or consuming alcohol, peer use of opioids—such as the proximal “dextropopoxyphene” that became popular globally in the sixties—opened the door to growing usage due to the drug’s quick tolerance. Some patients moved rapidly from two capsules to the entire envelope of ten capsules in order to obtain the same sense of euphoria, ultimately leading the user to try other drugs to experience the same high. Young Syrians also took to abusing codeine-containing cough syrup.
- Topic:
- Public Health, Drug Trafficking, Addiction, and Captagon
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Syria
46. Countering “ISIS at Large” in Syria
- Author:
- Devorah Margolin
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- In U.S. Central Command’s 2022 “year in review” statement on the current status of the fight against the Islamic State, commanding general Michael Kurilla highlighted three categories: (1) “ISIS in detention,” meaning the thousands of men and boys affiliated with the group and held in Iraqi and Syrian prisons; (2) the “potential next generation of ISIS,” meaning the approximately 55,000 women and minors held in camps; and (3) “ISIS at large,” meaning the leaders and operatives that the United States and its partners “are currently fighting in Iraq and Syria.” Although Gen. Kurilla praised the ongoing effort to militarily degrade ISIS, he also noted that the group’s ideology persists, and that “partnered operations” are needed to keep up the pressure. This view aligns with the pivot in U.S. strategy in Syria over the past year and a half, from a military mission to “advising, assisting, and enabling” local partners. At the same time, however, U.S. forces have continued launching unilateral strikes against ISIS leaders in Syria as recently as this month.
- Topic:
- Security, Terrorism, Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, Islamic State, and Military
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Syria
47. Preserving U.S. Military Advantages in the Middle East
- Author:
- Nathan P. Olsen
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) calls on the U.S. military to sustain enduring advantages and build new ones for the future fight. According to the NDS, building and maintaining advantages to advance U.S. national interests will allow the military to deter attacks against the United States and its allies and partners, while fostering a resilient military force and defense ecosystem. In the Middle East, this challenge is especially relevant. The United States has several enduring advantages that could eventually disappear if the U.S. government does not make significant changes in how it operates in this part of the world.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Strategic Competition, and Military
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
48. The Future of Repatriation from Northeast Syria
- Author:
- Devorah Margolin
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- The Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) recently announced that due to the international community’s slow response to the repatriation of thousands of individuals affiliated with the Islamic State (IS), it will begin to hold “fair and transparent trials in accordance with international and local laws related to terrorism.” The announcement comes after representatives from more than eighty countries gathered in Saudi Arabia on June 8 for a ministerial meeting convened by the Global Coalition Against Daesh, where U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken reminded attendees, “We know that repatriation is the only durable solution.” His statement stood out in this context because citizens from many coalition states are still being detained indefinitely in northeast Syria. While the United States has proactively advocated for repatriation across two administrations, most other countries around the world have been reluctant or slow to take such action. To date, approximately 5,500 Iraqis and 2,700 third-country nationals (i.e., not Syrian or Iraqi) have been repatriated from detention camps, and the international community is on track to repatriate more such individuals in 2023 than in years past. Although this is a step in the right direction, it means that more than 10,000 third-country nationals from almost 60 countries remain in detention in northeast Syria, including approximately 2,000 men and boys and 8,000 women and minors. These numbers do not include the more than 18,000 Syrians and 25,000 Iraqis who are also being held indefinitely. With numerous international conflicts dominating daily headlines, much of the international community is no doubt fatigued by the challenges emanating from the fight against IS and the repatriation of IS-affiliated individuals. Yet the AANES announcement and other developments show that these challenges will only proliferate without concerted attention from Washington and its coalition partners.
- Topic:
- Security, Terrorism, Islamic State, Repatriation, and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Syria
49. Hakan Fidan and the New Turkish Diplomacy in Iraq
- Author:
- Firas Elias
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- Following President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s victory in the Turkish general elections in May 2023, Turkish foreign policy in Iraq has the potential to evolve in a different direction under the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hakan Fidan. Though the management of Turkey’s affairs in Iraq has shifted between various Turkish institutions since 2003, President Erdoğan has consolidated decision-making into his own hands since 2017, and his recent appointment of Fidan—a former intelligence director and loyal ally of Erdoğan—signals a continuation of this process, especially vis-a-vis Iraq. As Director of National Intelligence, Fidan oversaw the most sensitive backchannels with various regional and international actors, and he played a leading role in formulating Turkish intelligence and security policy. Notably, Fidan also led Turkey's reconciliation efforts with a variety of adversaries, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia. He has also been intimately involved in Turkish efforts to combat the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), targeting many PKK leaders and allied factions in northern Iraq, particularly in Sinjar, Makhmur, and al-Kuwayr. In this regard, Fidan comes equipped with deep connections to Iraq’s bureaucratic circles, having already succeeded in building bridges between various Iraqi actors and institutions. In particular, Fidan has developed close ties with both Sunni and Kurdish political leaders and has good relations with Falih al-Fayyadh, chairman of the Popular Mobilization Forces, whom he met during one of his secret trips to Iraq in September 2022. Fidan notably conducted such bridge-building efforts during the formation of the current Iraqi government led by Mohammed Shia al-Sudani. Given this background in Iraqi politics along with his experience in intelligence, Fidan is an important player through which Erdoğan can rethink Turkish involvement in Iraq on a number of different issues. Though Fidan’s appointment certainly indicates a shift toward more security-focused policies for Turkey, the new minister will also have to balance Turkey’s political ties, economic and energy interests, environmental concerns, and military operations in Iraq. Indeed, Erdoğan likely hopes that Fidan can both diversify Turkey’s relationship networks in Iraq and reestablish normalized energy negotiations with key partners while also curbing the threat of the PKK and Iranian-aligned militias operating in Turkey’s areas of involvement in Iraq.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, Politics, and Energy
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Turkey, and Middle East
50. Sinjar: Challenges and Resilience Nine Years after Genocide
- Author:
- Izat Noah
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- Nearly a decade later, many victims are still missing, and thousands now live in displacement camps in unstable, unsanitary conditions. This anniversary is an opportunity to reflect on the ongoing armed conflict in the Sinjar region and the profound influence on its inhabitants. It also serves as an opportunity to appreciate the resilience of the Yazidis, looking toward a future with new hope and new aspirations—a future where Yazidis can experience peace, stability, justice, and equitable opportunities to reconstruct their lives and their communities. Yazidi resilience is clearly evident in how they bore the burden of this genocide, how they have persevered in the face of ongoing persecution and genocide for centuries, and how they have been steadfast in maintaining their identity and heritage despite these adversities and the repeated campaigns to tarnish their image. Yet Yazidis still face significant challenges in Iraq today. Despite relative stability in the Sinjar region, there are concerns among the Yazidi population about the return of armed conflict between groups vying for influence. Even more troubling, the issue of expulsion and displacement remains unresolved despite the liberation of Sinjar from ISIS in 2015. Many Yazidis still live in displacement camps, where they are without their homes, their land, or their basic rights. These refugees have yet to be materially compensated for their losses.
- Topic:
- Genocide, Politics, Terrorism, and Yazidis
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Middle East, and Sinjar
51. Iraqi Kurds Face Legitimacy Issues Amid Election Deadlock and Internal Division
- Author:
- Bekir Aydoğan
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- Parliamentary elections were originally set to be held on October 1, 2022 in the KRI, but they were then postponed to November 18, 2023 because the two main Kurdish parties—the Barzani-led Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Talabani-led Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—could not work out an agreement on the elections system. Now, months after the KRI’s Parliament, government, and presidency expired last November, the KRI’s President announced that the elections would take place on February 25, 2024. Though both the KDP and PUK have so far agreed on holding the elections on this date, the parties have yet to resolve a months-long dispute over the parliament’s controversial minority quota. Amidst the uncertainty, there’s no guarantee that the February 2024 target date will come to fruition.
- Topic:
- Elections, Legitimacy, and Kurds
- Political Geography:
- Iraq and Middle East
52. The Rise and Immediate Fall of Israel-Libya Relations
- Author:
- Ben Fishman
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- On August 27, Israeli foreign minister Eli Cohen revealed that he had met with his Libyan counterpart Najla al-Mangoush in Rome, sparking an imbroglio in both of their countries and further abroad. Protests erupted immediately across Libya, including at the Foreign Ministry and the residence of Prime Minister Abdulhamid al-Dabaiba, who likely authorized the meeting. Dabaiba tried to calm the situation by suspending Mangoush and naming an interim foreign minister, while his Government of National Unity (GNU) called the incident a chance encounter alongside Italy’s foreign minister rather than a planned meeting. As protests continued on August 28, Dabaiba appeared at the Palestinian embassy in Tripoli, where he donned a scarf depicting the Dome of the Rock, announced that he had officially dismissed Mangoush, and reiterated Libya’s dedication to the Palestinian cause. Fearing further backlash and potential violence, Mangoush fled to Istanbul. Unlike her predecessors, who were experienced diplomats familiar with Libya’s byzantine Foreign Ministry, Mangoush had no diplomatic background. Dabaiba appointed her in March 2021 only after another female candidate drew criticism, and she faced a unique challenge as a woman among exclusively male foreign ministers across the region. She lacked a power base of her own and wielded narrow influence outside of what Dabaiba and his circle granted her. Yet she was resilient during her first two years in office, surviving calls for her resignation over controversial statements criticizing Turkey’s military presence in Libya, praising Russia’s positive relationship with the GNU, and cooperating with the United States on the extradition of a Pan Am 103 bombing suspect (see below). The State Department named her an International Woman of Courage in 2022, citing her work with civil society organizations and her expertise in conflict resolution (gained in part from PhD work at George Mason University).
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Normalization
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, Libya, and North Africa
53. Iran’s Misunderstood Nuclear Law
- Author:
- Henry Rome
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- This summer, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei delivered his most detailed remarks in years on Iran’s nuclear trajectory. While his comments on a potential agreement with the West drew the most attention, he also called on Iranian officials to follow a controversial 2020 law that ordered rapid steps to escalate the nuclear program and reduce international monitoring. “Some people think that this law creates problems for the country,” he stated. “They are wrong. This law is a good law...And it must be followed.” Indeed, the 2020 legislation has played a prominent role in Iranian debates about nuclear advances, and Khamenei’s comments suggest this will remain the case. Yet the law is widely misunderstood; more important, it has not been the primary driver of Iran’s actual nuclear activity over the past three years. The governments of Hassan Rouhani and Ebrahim Raisi each sidestepped key provisions of the legislation while also escalating the program in ways the law does not require. Despite Khamenei’s sentiment, neither the existing law nor potential successor legislation is likely to compel escalation or constrain diplomacy.
- Topic:
- Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Legislation, Nuclear Energy, and Military
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
54. Iraqi Officials Eye a Path for Chinese-Iraqi Development
- Author:
- Baraa Sabri
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- Mohammed Shia al-Sudani did not become prime minister in Baghdad as smoothly as desired by the powers close to the “axis of resistance.” Nevertheless, several factors facilitated his rise to power. Domestic concerns, such as Muqtada al-Sadr’s decision to withdraw his bloc from the political process and a push from groups close to Iran to put forward a prime minister with relative acceptance in the regional and international community, played a role. But these considerations compounded with the climate of regional tensions and interests of outside powers—competition between the Gulf and Iran, concerns over the ongoing repercussions of the strained relationship with Washington caused by the Trump administration, and the growing dominance of various armed groups close to Tehran. This precarious reality and confused relationships likewise seem to have driven al-Sudani’s government to attempt to circumvent the traditional binary choice between Washington, the West, and most of the Gulf states on the one hand, and Tehran, Damascus, Lebanon, and their backer Moscow on the other. This new course comes with a distinct and flashy name, the “Development Road” project, and looks to Beijing as a third way forward. Iraq’s political realignment is in large part a response to Iraqis’ shifting views of the United States and the broader geopolitical space: the haphazard American withdrawal from Afghanistan, the political changes in U.S. policy under Biden, the failure to revive the nuclear agreement with Iran, the stagnation in the Syrian issue, Erdogan’s steadfast support of Putin, Russia’s continued attacks on Ukraine, economic movement linked to oil prices, inflation, and financial turmoil in currency rates from Cairo to Tehran, fears of harsh economic sanctions, and, finally and most importantly, the economic rise of China.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Development, Multilateralism, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- China, Iraq, Middle East, and Asia
55. How to Stop Iraqi Kurdistan’s “Bleeding”
- Author:
- Bilal Wahab
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- In a recent letter to President Biden that was soon reinforced by three U.S. lawmakers, Prime Minister Masrour Barzani of Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government expressed his alarm over the region’s survival. Noting that the KRG is “bleeding economically and hemorrhaging politically,” he laid the blame on Baghdad’s “dishonorable campaign” against Erbil. Barzani has a point—federal authorities have indeed been undoing the KRG’s hard-won autonomy in the years since the Islamic State fell and the Kurds launched an unsuccessful independence bid. Most notably, Baghdad has recentralized policymaking in the capital and blocked Kurdish oil exports amid a decade-old dispute over energy management. Yet Barzani’s narrative does not tell the whole story. The United States has long supported Iraqi Kurdistan’s autonomy, security, and development, fostering greater stability and pro-American sentiment. At the same time, however, Washington has overlooked the KRG’s vulnerabilities—namely, the internal divisions, corruption, and democratic backsliding that have diminished Erbil’s reliability and brought on the current existential crisis. The United States has a strategic interest in continuing to promote a stable and prosperous KRG, but it cannot do so without addressing the region’s internal problems.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Politics, Autonomy, and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Middle East, and Kurdistan
56. Syrians' Reactions to the First Weeks of Israel-Hamas War
- Author:
- Ammar Musarea
- Publication Date:
- 10-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- When the al-Qassam Brigades—the military wing of Hamas which the United States classifies as a terrorist organization—launched their al-Aqsa Flood operation, Syrians were already on edge. They had been following news of peaceful protests that have been taking place for almost two months in the Suwayda Governorate, which is majority Druze, as well as in other Syrian governorates. Protestors have called for the end of the Assad regime, the release of tens of thousands of prisoners, and the implementation of UN resolutions on Syria. Meanwhile, the Syrian regime and Russian aircraft have carried out daily bombings on civilians in Idlib and the surrounding countryside, which have displaced more than 100,000 Syrians. The Syrian Network for Human Rights stated that the Assad regime and Russia’s attacks on northwestern Syria have resulted in around 45 civilian deaths including 13 children, 9 women, and 3 humanitarian aid workers. They said that 51 critical facilities had also been targeted during October 2023. Al-Aqsa Flood also comes at a time when Syrians in regime-controlled areas face increasingly difficult living conditions. Concurrently, the International Court of Justice is beginning initial proceedings for Canada and the Netherlands’ case against the Assad regime for crimes of torture. The response to events in Israel and Gaza have not been monolithic; reactions have varied significantly depending on factions’ alliances and proximity to the conflict. On the one hand, there is widespread disillusionment with actors claiming to liberate Palestine, a reflection of how groups like Hamas failed to support the Syrian people’s revolution against the Assad regime. However, Syrians as a whole empathize with Palestinians and reject the killing and forced displacement of Palestinians and destruction of their homes. Simultaneously, Syrians have not forgotten the crimes that the terrorist organization Hezbollah has carried out against them in support of the regime, as well as Hamas’ backstabbing in trying to reestablish ties with the Assad regime. Hamas' close ties with Iran, the main backer of the Damascus government, are another source of anger in anti-regime circles.
- Topic:
- Public Opinion, Syrian War, Hamas, and October 7
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and Syria
57. Morocco and North Africa Are Feeling Anti-Normalization Ripples from the Gaza War
- Author:
- Sabina Henneberg
- Publication Date:
- 10-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- The conflict will make it more difficult for Washington and Israel to preserve—let alone expand—the diplomatic progress they have made with North African governments in recent years, particularly as public opposition intensifies. North Africa has not been spared from the reverberations of the Hamas-Israel war. Morocco may be the country most profoundly affected given its relatively strong relations with Israel and the United States, while anti-normalization trends elsewhere in the region are being firmly reinforced, creating new challenges for Washington.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Conflict, Normalization, and Hamas
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, North Africa, and Morocco
58. After Gaza, Recalibrated Prospects for a Geopolitical Europe
- Author:
- Selin Uysal
- Publication Date:
- 10-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- On October 26, the European Council adopted a new set of conclusions relating to the war in Gaza. Notably, these reiterated condemnation of Hamas, Israel’s right to defend itself in line with international law, calls to release all hostages, concern for all civilian lives, the need to ensure humanitarian access to Gaza, and a commitment to achieving a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Earlier European dissonance regarding the Gaza conflict thus appeared to be replaced by clearer communication. But European unity could soon be tested again, including on humanitarian messaging, which is less easily consented upon than meets the eye. More broadly, whereas the war in Ukraine had given rise to optimism about the emergence of a “geopolitical Europe”—a European Union capable of defining common strategic international objectives and deploying concrete operational means to achieve them—events following the Hamas attacks have exposed divisions within European institutions and highlighted the absence of a clear strategic approach in the southern neighborhood, potentially undermining the ability to achieve such objectives.
- Topic:
- European Union, Geopolitics, Regional Integration, Regional Politics, and Invasion
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Middle East, Palestine, and Gaza
59. In the Middle East, Biden Is on the Razor’s Edge
- Author:
- Riccardo Alcaro
- Publication Date:
- 10-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- US President Joe Biden is walking on thin ice while he attempts to deal with the most serious crisis in the Middle East since the ill-conceived US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Biden has orientated his administration’s action along three tracks: supporting Israel; protecting as many Palestinian civilians as possible while also resuscitating the defunct Middle East peace process; and preventing the conflict from extending to the wider region.[1] The problem is, reconciling these three priorities may be impossible.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Civilians, Hamas, Protection, and October 7
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, North America, and United States of America
60. Saudi Arabia’s Balancing Game: The Palestinian Cause and Regional Leadership
- Author:
- Giulia Daga and Luigi Simonelli
- Publication Date:
- 11-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- In the hours following Hamas’s violent attack on Israel of 7 October, the Saudi authorities called for “an immediate de-escalation”, while noting that they had previously warned against the outcomes of “the continued occupation and depriving Palestinians of their legitimate rights and the repeated systematic provocations against their sanctities”.[1] In a more recent declaration, the Saudi Foreign Minister has reiterated the country’s “categorical rejection of calls for the forced displacement of the Palestinian people from Gaza, and its condemnation of the continued targeting of defenceless civilians there”.[2] Reportedly, the heavy retaliation measures adopted by Israel, whose bombing campaign against Gaza has been one of the most intense of this century,[3] also including the apparent use of white phosphorus,[4] resulted in the halt of the normalisation process between Saudi Arabia and Israel, which should have followed suit on the 2020 Abraham Accords. Only a few weeks before, on 20 September, the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had announced on US television that “every day, we get closer” to an agreement with Israel.[5] A few days later, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had reiterated the same optimism in front of the United Nations General Assembly general debate, insisting that the Palestinians should not be given “a veto over new peace treaties with Arab states”.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Leadership, Regional Power, and October 7
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia