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21. Saudi-Houthi Talks Sow Cracks in Coalition – The Yemen Review, January & February 2023

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Ongoing bilateral talks between Saudi Arabia and the armed Houthi movement have renewed optimism that a negotiated political settlement in Yemen might yet be possible. But the talks are an exclusively Saudi initiative and threaten to serve only the narrow interests of their current participants. To date, their primary effect has been the easing of restrictions on imports to Hudaydah, a development quickly weaponized by the Houthis, who have sought to coerce traders to use the port exclusively, which would deprive the internationally recognized government of much-needed customs revenue. Importantly, the talks include neither the government, whose sidelining does little for its popular legitimacy, nor Saudi Arabia’s primary coalition partner, the UAE. On the heels of its massive military reengagement in Yemen over the last eighteen months, the UAE has so far rejected Houthi overtures. The divergent interests of the coalition have come to the fore in Hadramawt, where the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council has sought to extend its influence by agitating against forces affiliated with the Islamist Islah party. This has come up against resistance from local tribal groups, increasingly supported by Saudi Arabia, who are now recruiting thousands of local fighters and protesting outside interference. Increased Saudi involvement in Hadramawt is a blow to the aspirations of the STC and has been compounded by the formation of the new Nation’s Shield forces under President Rashad Al-Alimi. Paid directly by Saudi Arabia, the force could go some way toward enshrining Alimi’s administration; unlike most other members of the council, he previously had no military forces of his own.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Negotiation, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

22. Saudi-Houthi Talks Move Toward Ceasefire – The Yemen Review, March 2023

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Saudi-Houthi talks regained traction over the course of March, and the announcement of a ceasefire is expected as Riyadh looks to wind down its direct military involvement in Yemen. At month’s end, Presidential Leadership Council chief Rashad al-Alimi and his government were summoned to the Saudi capital to be briefed on the negotiations. Despite the flurry of activity, there has been little information given on how the Saudis intend to resolve some of the longstanding issues that have bedeviled earlier rounds of talks. The negotiations have not forestalled continued fighting, with clashes escalating clashes across multiple frontlines. The Houthis made gains in southern Marib and along the Al-Bayda-Shabwa border, and heavy fighting took place in Al-Dhalea and southern Hudaydah. Taiz Governor Nabil Shamsan, Minister of Defense Mohsen al-Daeri, and Chief of Staff Saghir bin Aziz survived separate assassination attempts in Taiz governorate believed to have been undertaken by Houthi forces. The Houthi-controlled parliament in Sana’a has banned the payment of interest as a “usurious transaction,” in an attempt to Islamicize the financial sector. Implementation could have disastrous effects on Yemen’s faltering economy, contributing to its isolation and discouraging international investment. The law could rapidly limit the ability to finance basic imports and cut off access to foreign financing.
Topic:
Negotiation, Houthis, Ceasefire, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

23. Saudis Visit Sana’a as Warring Parties Conduct Prisoner Exchange

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Saudi-Houthi talks in Sana’a during Ramadan failed to produce a final agreement on a roadmap for final status peace talks and a permanent ceasefire. Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) leaders in Riyadh were left out of the loop although the Saudis continued to insist that the Houthis co-sign any deal with the internationally recognized government. A major prisoner exchange took place in mid-April following a deal reached in March in which the government and Houthis agreed to the release of 973 detainees. Included among the prisoners released were former defense minister Mahmoud al-Subaihi, Nasser Mansour Hadi, the brother of former president Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi, and Samira Marish, a woman accused of planning several bombings and assassinations on behalf of the Houthi movement. A senior government military commander, Faisal Rajab, was released in a separate deal following a mediation in Sana’a between an Abyan tribal delegation and Houthi officials. Fighting continued on several frontlines, most significantly in Marib governorate, where Houthi forces are trying to capitalize on their gains in March. On the economic front, the government-held port of Aden received a commercial ship without it being subject to inspection in Jeddah, and more than 500 types of goods were removed from a list of banned products, including fertilizers and batteries. The government is still struggling to cover the cost of public sector salaries after losing oil revenues following Houthi drone attacks late last year and Houthi pressure on importers to redirect shipments from Aden to Hudaydah, while the Houthi authorities drew in revenue from various informal taxes and duties imposed during Ramadan.
Topic:
Negotiation, Houthis, Ceasefire, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

24. A Southern Reshuffle – The Yemen Review, May 2023

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Political news in May was dominated by the reorganization and resurgence of the Southern Transitional Council (STC). Seemingly sidelined by the Saudi-Houthi talks and the Kingdom’s support of Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) chief Rashad al-Alimi, the Emirati-backed group extended its influence through the recruitment of powerful politicians, an internal reorganization, and a conference resulting in a new ‘Southern National Charter.’ Saudi-Houthi negotiations appear to have stalled over disagreement on a number of long-standing issues, but the recent involvement of China could bring additional resources and leverage to the table. The STC’s revived fortunes have led to renewed political and military mobilization in Hadramawt. The Nation’s Shield forces, paid for and supplied by Saudi Arabia, but under the nominal control of President Al-Alimi, increased their presence in the governorate, and were visited by the Saudi coalition commander before assuming control of an important border crossing. For their part, STC-affiliated forces took up positions on the strategic Ataq-Al-Abr road linking Hadramawt and Shabwa, including a key stretch used by Islah-affiliated forces. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula also stepped up its activity, conducting at least two drone strikes in Shabwa as it publicly condemned the easing of tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Houthis launched their latest offensive in the economic war, banning the sale of domestically produced cooking gas in favor of imports. Imported gas is more expensive, but the brunt of the impact will be felt by the internationally recognized government and its production facilities in Marib. Having shut down the government’s oil exports and rerouted trade to deprive it of customs fees, the sanction will further cripple the government’s finances. It is already having trouble purchasing sufficient fuel to keep the lights on – May saw an extension of rolling blackouts in Aden as a Saudi grant has expired without extension. Summer sees the highest demand for electricity, but a number of generators in the interim capital have already shut down due to the shortage.
Topic:
Economy, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Gulf Nations

25. Temperatures, Tensions Roil Government – The Yemen Review, June & July 2023

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Summer has been dominated by rising tensions among the Saudi-led coalition, as competition between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates continues to undermine the internationally recognized government. The current phase of the rivalry is centered on Hadramawt, the vast eastern governorate bordering Saudi Arabia that has seen repeated bouts of political and military agitation. Saudi talks with the Houthi group (Ansar Allah) are currently on hold, hung up on now-familiar disagreements over the kingdom’s belligerent status and payment of public sector salaries. Perhaps stung by its lack of progress in the negotiations, Saudi Arabia announced new support for the government, totaling some US$1.2 billion. The funding rescued a government in financial crisis: battered by an effective Houthi blockade of oil and gas exports, it could not even afford to keep the lights on. Lengthening blackouts during the hottest months of the year and the cratering value of the Yemeni rial led to protests and political recriminations as the situation grew more desperate. But the faltering peace talks may also augur new rounds of violence. Houthi forces have deployed in increasing numbers outside Marib, and may yet renew their aspirations to capture the city and nearby oilfields. Foreign observers and senior Houthi military commanders have been on hand at maneuvers in the governorate. Tensions are also building on the Red Sea Coast, where the Houthis are mobilizing naval forces on islands near international shipping lanes. Pro-government forces have also moved to the sea, competing to occupy bases near the strategic Bab al-Mandeb Strait.
Topic:
Negotiation, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

26. Saudi-Houthi Talks Resume – The Yemen Review, August 2023

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The strategic city of Marib saw an increase in fighting on several fronts. The Houthis have been reinforcing their positions in the area, which they attempted to seize in a massive and costly offensive two years ago. Should negotiations break down, Marib is seen as a likely area of renewed contestation due to its oil and gas resources. A new counterterrorist campaign was launched in Abyan to target Al-Qaeda forces in the governorate. Named ‘Swords of Haws’, the operation is being conducted by an array of STC and pro-government forces. The campaign reported it had succeeded in securing the Rafd and Jenin Valleys, but had faced strong resistance from Al-Qaeda forces in Mudiya district. Frontline fighting on the border of Al-Bayda and Lahj rose significantly in August, including a particularly large Houthi assault on STC positions on August 26-27 that resulted in dozens of casualties. Two Doctors Without Borders employees were kidnapped by unidentified gunmen in Marib as they traveled from Seyoun. No group has yet claimed responsibility for the incident. An officer investigating last month’s killing of World Food Programme Moayad Hameidi was assassinated. The officer, a member of the Taiz Political Security department, had received death threats and demanded he halt the investigation. Five UN employees were released on August 11, after being held captive by Al-Qaeda for more than 18 months. The group was reportedly released after lengthy Omani mediation and the payment of a ransom, though the UN has disputed these claims. Houthi forces continue to besiege villages of the Bani Nawf tribe in Al-Jawf following the killing of a prominent local Houthi commander. A number of tribes have responded by calling for united action, others have sided with the Houthis.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Negotiation, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

27. Petroleum and Progress in Iran: An Interview with Gregory Brew

Author:
Mirek Tobiáš Hošman and Gregory Brew
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Toynbee Prize Foundation
Abstract:
Between the 1940s and the 1960s, Iran developed into the world’s first petro-state. In the recently published Petroleum and Progress in Iran: Oil, Development, and the Cold War (2022, Cambridge University Press), author Gregory Brew argues that Pahlavi petro-state emerged from a confluence of global and local forces in the context of the Cold War, the global oil economy, and the nascent practice and discourse of international development assistance. The Toynbee Prize Foundation interviewed Gregory Brew on the main arguments and events of his book. Next to providing a brief chronology of the political and economic development of Iran in post-WW2 decades – including the episode of the failed attempt to nationalize Iranian oil industry in the early 1950s followed by the coup d’état in 1953 – Brew explained the concept of dual integration introduced in his book, which tries to account for both local and global integration of the Iranian oil industry. He also highlighted the role of the international development actors, including the World Bank, American developmentalists and development economists in shaping the Pahlavi regime and the Iranian development project.
Topic:
Development, Oil, History, and Industry
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

28. Reset U.S.-Syria Policy

Author:
Daniel Depetris
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
After 12 years of civil war, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government has consolidated its power and defeated credible threats to its rule. The anti-Assad armed opposition, which once controlled half of Syria, is relegated to the northwestern province of Idlib. While the Biden administration recognizes that Assad will likely remain in office, U.S. policy remains punitive, maintaining comprehensive sanctions on Syria until Assad negotiates political reforms with his opponents and agrees to free and fair elections. This policy will not produce the desired results. Assad is firmly entrenched, benefits from the help of security partners in Iran and Russia, who prefer that he stays in power, and remains highly unlikely to comply with U.S. demands. The status quo amounts to collective punishment of the Syrian population. Approximately 900 U.S. troops remain in eastern Syria, allegedly to train and advise the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces against ISIS. But ISIS lost its territorial caliphate more than four years ago. The risk of keeping U.S. forces there in perpetuity which includes sporadic attacks on U.S. positions and escalation risks with various actors, outweighs any rewards. Neither the sanctions nor the occupation of eastern Syria serves U.S. security interests. The former does no good, and the latter risks embroiling the United States in a mission without an end date. The United States should withdraw its remaining forces and offload what is left of the counter-ISIS mission to local actors. The United States should also reduce if not end its failing sanctions regime.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Armed Forces, Islamic State, Syrian War, and Bashar al-Assad
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

29. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SAUDI-IRAN DEAL FOR YEMEN

Author:
Marta Furlan
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
In 2014, the Houthis, a Zaydi Shia armed group from the Sa’ada region of northern Yemen, aligned with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had been removed following the Arab Spring uprisings. Together, they defeated the government led by President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, and established control over the Yemeni capital of Sana’a and the entirety of northern Yemen. At that time, Iran began to progressively increase its support for the Houthis, seeing partnership with the group as an opportunity to advance its revisionist agenda in the region and establish its influence in the southern Red Sea, an area of immense strategic significance. Threatened by aggressive Iranian expansionism at its doorstep, in March 2015, Saudi Arabia entered the war alongside Hadi. As Iran sided with the Houthis and Saudi Arabia sided with Hadi, Yemen became the battlefield of both a domestic competition for power between different local factions and a regional competition for influence between Teheran and Riyadh.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Syrian War, Houthis, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Syria

30. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Sustained Resurgence in Yemen or Signs of Further Decline?

Author:
Emile Roy
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
In the first two months of 2023, suspected United States drone strikes killed two senior leaders of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen’s Marib governorate. One of the group’s top explosives experts, a Yemeni citizen named Husayn Hadbul (also known as Hassan al-Hadrami), was killed on 30 January. The group’s media chief and leader of the group’s Shura Council, Saudi citizen Hamad al-Tamimi (also known as Abu Abd al-Aziz al-Adnani), was killed on 26 February. These strikes on high-profile AQAP leaders took place amid a resurgence of AQAP activity in Yemen, which started during the United Nations-mediated truce between Houthi and anti-Houthi forces that lasted from April to the beginning of October 2022, and that has informally held to this date.1 The lull in fighting between Houthi and anti-Houthi forces induced by the truce allowed for a broader political and military reconfiguration within the anti-Houthi camp. At the political level, former President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi was replaced by an eight-member Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) to enhance coordination among anti-Houthi forces. Armed militias affiliated with the secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) and other United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed forces exploited the new situation to gain control over territory in southern Yemen. As part of this territorial expansion, STC forces spearheaded several offensives against AQAP beginning in August 2022, leading to a sudden rise in AQAP activity in 2022.2 However, the nature of this overall increase is disputed, with some analysts arguing that it is a sign of AQAP’s weakness rather than its strength.3
Topic:
Non State Actors, Armed Forces, Conflict, Houthis, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
Political Geography:
Middle East and Yemen