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1. Russia’s 2023 foreign policy concept: war against Ukraine, confrontation with the west, and continuation of the tradition of imperialism

Author:
Medea Ivaniadze
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
On March 31, 2023, the sixth Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation was published (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2023). The document was updated for the first time in six years, the main reason for which is the deteriorating international situation for Moscow amid the Russo-Ukrainian war. The text of the concept is highlighted by harsh and revanchist calls against the West and especially the USA. The document almost entirely refers to the Russo-Ukrainian war, at the same time, the concept shows that the current war is only one part of Russia’s confrontation with the Western world. The concept contains a number of statements inconsistent with the real policy of Russia and even lies, but despite the absurd, propagandistic content of the new document, it is important to find out how the new concept differs from its predecessor, and also what factors Russia relies on in the current difficult international situation? Based on the 2023 Concept of the Foreign Policy of Russia the impact of Russia’s imperialist worldview on its foreign policy in the light of full-scale military intervention in Ukraine, the changed attitude towards the West, the prospects of Russia-West relations, Russia’s attempt to strengthen ties with non-Western countries, and finally, threats from Russia to Georgia are discussed in this publication.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Politics, Russia-Ukraine War, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Georgia, and United States of America

2. One Year After Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: The geopolitical struggle is not where you think it is

Author:
Roshni Menon and Faiza Shaheen
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:
When Russia invaded Ukraine one year ago, there were immediate concerns about the effects on food and energy security, and on geopolitical alignment in other countries. The world was right to be concerned, but the repercussions have been much wider and deeper than many predicted. There are two main ways in which conflict dynamics have shifted, neither of them solely caused by the war but both exacerbated by it: Russian’s war on Ukraine has shone the lens on inter-state conflict and proxy war Compounding the pandemic and climate change, a war started in one corner of the world has resulted in a global cost-of-living crisis and increasing debt for almost every country worldwide—countries that had no hand in Russia’s invasion or in the failure to respond to public health and socio-economic crisis. This analysis looks at the multiple and cascading crises (increasingly referred to as the polycrisis), and how we can take action in the face of polycrisis,
Topic:
Security, Geopolitics, Conflict, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

3. Naval Incident Management in Europe, East Asia and South East Asia

Author:
Ian Anthony, Fei Su, and Lora Saalman
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
Unprecedented global turbulence in 2022 has demonstrated the need to pay increased attention to naval operations. Enhanced military capability allows naval power projection far beyond home waters. New threats and challenges are emerging from technological advances and new applications, not least the vulnerability of warships and naval facilities to cyber intrusions and cyberattacks. As states implement the programmes they need to protect and promote their interests at sea, there is also likely to be an increase in the number of close tracking incidents. How effective current risk reduction mechanisms will be at dealing with incidents at sea is unclear. This Insights Paper provides a preliminary assessment of the existing mechanisms and suggests areas for further improvement.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Navy, Crisis Management, and Military
Political Geography:
Europe, East Asia, Asia, and Southeast Asia

4. Neutrality Not NATO: Assessing Security Options for Ukraine

Author:
Benjamin H. Friedman
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The United States should not guarantee Ukraine’s security, whether via the NATO alliance or some lesser means. Guaranteeing Ukraine’s security serves no major U.S. interest and would increase the risk of a U.S. or NATO war with Russia and nuclear escalation. Those dangers are why the United States refuses to fight directly for Ukraine against Russia today, and they would induce similar caution if the United States guaranteed Ukraine’s security. Lacking a major interest, U.S. promises to defend Ukraine will be unserious and unbelievable. Fake security guarantees for Ukraine might have some deterrent value, despite their lack of credibility, given the terrible risks involved for Russia in testing those promises. However, fake security guarantees would likely degrade Ukraine’s security on balance, both by preserving a cause of the war and by encouraging Ukrainian leaders to make dangerous choices based on the false prospect of U.S. protection. Announcing plans to guarantee Ukraine’s security once the war ends would encourage Russia to continue fighting. Guaranteeing Ukraine’s security now would demand a choice between ignoring the commitment and undermining other U.S. security guarantees or fighting for Ukraine and sparking an immediate nuclear crisis. What the United States can credibly offer Ukraine is armed neutrality, where the United States, ideally with European allies taking the lead, provides Ukraine with arms and training without security guarantees.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Deterrence, Neutrality, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

5. European Security and Defence: Don’t Get Your Hopes Up Just Yet

Author:
Adaja Stoetman
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
“2022 will be the year of European defence”.[1] These were the words of European Council President Charles Michel in October 2021. When he gave his speech at the Charlemagne Prize Award Ceremony in Aachen, no one expected that his statement would materialise in the way it did. Yes, headway was to be expected with the adoption of the Strategic Compass and European countries demonstrating commitment to investing more in defence cooperation. Although there is still a world of difference between ambitions and reality, the degree of progress accomplished in the past twelve months was not foreseen.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Politics, European Union, and Institutions
Political Geography:
Europe

6. The War against Ukraine and Russia’s Position in Europe’s Security Order

Author:
Stephen Blank
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Russia’s aggressions against its neighbours since 2008 – first Georgia, then Ukraine twice – impel the urgent reconstruction of European security. While articulating a post-war European security order and Russia’s place there is easy, implementing it is extremely difficult. Nevertheless, in Ukraine, Russia has unilaterally, and unprovokedly, violated or broken at least eight major international treaties and accords, ranging from the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, according to which Moscow had pledged to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity, to the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, which prohibits nuclear threats against non-nuclear states.[1] It has also broken NATO’s (and especially Washington’s) conventional deterrence.[2]
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

7. Reach for the Stars: Bridging Italy’s Potential in Space with Its Foreign and Security Policy

Author:
Karolina Muti
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Italian capabilities, expertise and potential in the space sector are not widely known. Among state actors, Rome has actually been a pioneer in the field, boasting a long tradition that started in 1964 when Italy became the third country, after the Soviet Union and the United States, to send a nationally manufactured satellite into orbit.[1] From an industrial standpoint, Italy is among the few countries whose companies cover the whole space value chain.[2] In Europe, Rome is ranked second for total number of assets in orbit and is currently the third contributor to the European Space Agency (ESA).[3] An Italian astronaut, Samantha Cristoforetti, has recently become the first European woman to take command of the International Space Station (ISS).[4]
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, European Union, and Space
Political Geography:
Europe and Italy

8. European Security, Eurasian Crossroads?

Author:
Zachary Paikin and Christos Katsioulis
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
The NATO summit in Vilnius taking place from 11 to 12 July 2023 marks another step towards deepening the relationship between Ukraine and the collective West. When paired with the EU’s reinvigorated enlargement process, there is a growing tendency to assume that Washington and Brussels can – or even must – set the terms of the European security order without input from Moscow. However, in a world of ‘mega-regions’ and competing visions of international order, cooperative security remains relevant if the EU wishes to salvage some degree of rules-based order in the space that connects Europe with Eurasia. As first steps in this direction, the EU should work to keep the OSCE operational, launch a limited dialogue with Belarus on arms control, and envision a future for the European Political Community that someday includes Russia.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and International Order
Political Geography:
Europe and Eurasia

9. Regional actor, global player: Can the EU get the best of both worlds?

Author:
Zachary Paikin, Shada Islam, and Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
The collapse of Europe’s security order coincides with a period of global transformation. Both these phenomena threaten to change the international environment that the EU has grown accustomed to and that has served its interests relatively well. They also raise major questions over the sort of actor the EU wants to be – regional or global. While the immense challenges of internal reform and breathing new life into a now-geopolitical enlargement process suggest a regional focus for the EU’s core strategic priorities, the EU can still take certain measures to avoid losing sight of the rest of the world. If the EU is serious about retaining its influence as a global actor, it must rethink its traditional way of doing business with the ‘Global South’ and learn how to autonomously navigate an unpredictable – and often fractious – multipolar world.
Topic:
Security, Reform, European Union, and Global South
Political Geography:
Europe

10. The EU–US Data Protection Framework: Balancing Economic, Security and Privacy Considerations

Author:
Federica Marconi
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The rapid evolution of digital technology has ushered in a data-centric economy, where data accessibility drives marketplace efficiency and economic growth across various industries. However, this shift, while offering numerous benefits, introduces significant privacy and data security challenges, particularly in the context of transatlantic data transfers. Considering the vast economic ties between the EU and the US, the transatlantic data flow vividly illustrates the complexities involved in governing and transferring data. It grapples with the ongoing challenge of striking a satisfactory balance between economic advantages stemming from data utilisation and various concerns pertaining to national security, digital sovereignty and individual rights. In recent years, the European Commission approved two different frameworks on transatlantic data flow – Safe Harbour in 2000[1] and Privacy Shield in 2016[2] – asserting that the US provided a level of data protection for data transfers essentially equivalent to that guaranteed in the EU. However, despite initial optimism, both adequacy decisions faced a significant setback when the Court of Justice of the European Union invalidated them in what is commonly referred to as the “Schrems saga”,[3] named after the Austrian activist who first challenged both frameworks before the European Court. The core arguments centred on the absence of adequate safeguards for personal data within US domestic law and the extent of state surveillance over such data when it was transferred, as initially disclosed by Edward Snowden in 2013.[4] This legal development led to a period of significant uncertainty and further heightened the ongoing debate concerning the regulation of transatlantic data transfer. To address the consequences of this legal turmoil, both EU and the US committed to establishing “a renewed and sound framework for transatlantic data flows”,[5] seeking a long-term solution to address the complexities of data privacy and security, eventually leading to the recently adopted EU–US Data Privacy Framework (“DPF”).
Topic:
Security, Economics, Political Economy, European Union, Privacy, Transatlantic Relations, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

11. Climate Action, Geopolitical Risks and Strategic Policy: The Western Race to Secure Critical Raw Materials

Author:
Salvatore Finizio
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Climate action, economic competition and geopolitical shifts are more intertwined than ever. In the wake of the skyrocketing inflation and deteriorating China relations, United States President Joe Biden signed the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) into law on 16 August 2022. Conceived as the foundation of the new US industrial policy, the IRA aims to rebuild the country’s industrial capacity, including 500 billion US dollars in new spending and tax breaks, among which almost 400 billion aimed at boosting clean energy.[1] Across the Atlantic, the European Union expressed concerns about the potential loss of industrial competitiveness resulting from the IRA. In response, the EU unveiled its own Green Deal Industrial Plan (GDIP) in February 2023.[2] The objective of this plan is to promote the enhancement of net-zero manufacturing capacities in order to meet the EU’s climate targets. Both the IRA and the GDIP have a common goal of reducing dependence on China, especially in clean technology, although through different approaches. The US focuses on bringing high-value production back to its shores, while the EU aims to develop and diversify supply chains.[3] This divergence is also reflected in the debate between “decoupling” and “derisking”, with the latter recently gaining prominence as policymakers recognise the challenges of completely reshoring supply chains domestically.[4] The US and the EU share industrial and geoeconomic objectives, but will also encounter similar challenges, in particular concerning the first stages of green supply chains. Despite their heterogeneous approaches, Western policymakers will in fact have to secure critical raw materials for clean technology manufacturing, with the aim of resourcing the energy transition.
Topic:
Security, Politics, European Union, Institutions, Energy, and Raw Materials
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

12. Italy’s Pivot to the Indo-Pacific – Towards a Value-driven Foreign Policy?

Author:
Nicola Casarini
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Italy is stepping up its involvement in the Indo-Pacific, both in the economic and security realms. The cabinet led by Giorgia Meloni – a centre-right coalition often portrayed by commentators as right-wing and nationalist – is rebalancing Rome’s policy in the Far East by scaling down ties with Beijing and by effectively lending support to the United States and its Asian allies vis-à-vis an increasingly assertive and self-confident China. Moving away from previous centre-left governments that tended to prioritise commercial relations with Beijing, the conservative coalition in power since September 2022 has been fostering defence-related cooperation with Japan and India and chip-related cooperation and investments with Taiwan. Moreover – and remarkably for a country that has long been absent from Asian security – the Italian government has sent a patrol vessel to the South China Sea and plans to forward the country’s flagship aircraft carrier to the area to conduct joint exercises with the navies of Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. The quantity and quality of initiatives being undertaken warrant the label of an Italian ‘pivot’ to the Indo-Pacific. By upgrading its presence in the region, Italy joins the other G7 nations in their efforts to uphold the rules-based order and dissuade Beijing from invading Taiwan. However, to consolidate the western anchorage of this pivot, the Meloni government needs to fully align its policy towards Beijing with that of the Euro-Atlantic allies – which includes deciding whether to continue to lend Italy’s official support to China’s Belt and Road Initiative or not.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Taiwan, Asia, Italy, and Indo-Pacific

13. WHO ATTACKED MONTENEGRO? THE MORAL AND STRATEGIC HAZARDS OF MISASSIGNING BLAME

Author:
Erica Lonergan and Maggie Smith
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
A few weeks ago, Montenegro—a NATO member—was hit with a cyber attack that targeted government servers. Montenegro’s outgoing Prime Minister, Dritan Abazovic, initially hedged about potential responsibility for the attack, stating on August 26: “We do not have clear information about the organizers… Security sector authorities couldn’t confirm that there is an individual, a group, a state behind [the attack].” Nevertheless, later that same day officials from Montenegro’s national intelligence agency attributed the attack to Russia. They also implied that the attack was related to Montenegro’s support for Ukraine and push for membership in the European Union. Yet, the extent of Russian involvement in the cyber attack remains ambiguous, which poses significant political and strategic challenges.
Topic:
Security, NATO, European Union, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, Montenegro, and United States of America

14. MANAGING CONFLICT BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL RIVALS

Author:
Elizabeth Radziszewski and Jeremy Berkowitz
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Sweden’s and Finland’s recent decisions to join NATO marked a historic moment for the two Nordic states known for their neutrality. The move not only reflects evolving security concerns about Russia’s aggression in Ukraine but marks a shift that is set to end decades of accommodation toward Russia. It also sheds light on a broader question about why some rival countries—or those that have a history of tensions—sustain policies of accommodation over the years, and what pushes them to abandon such policies. Why would Sweden and Finland refrain from alienating Russia for years only to break suddenly with this tradition with their unprecedented decision to apply for NATO membership?
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Military, and Conflict Management
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Finland, Asia, Spain, North Africa, Sweden, Morocco, and United States of America

15. A New and Better Security Order for Europe

Author:
Rajan Menon
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Far-reaching changes in the global balance of power and Europe’s security environment call for a new U.S. strategy toward Europe—for the benefit of Americans and Europeans alike. European states should take deliberate steps toward autonomy in defense, which the U.S. should foster by reducing its military presence in, and security commitments to, Europe, gradually and in coordination with its NATO allies. The eventual goal should be to eliminate permanent U.S. military deployments in Europe. Europe, particularly France and Germany, possesses the material wherewithal to balance Russia’s military power. What Europe lacks is the motivation, something it will not acquire so long as it can count on a blanket, open-ended American commitment. Europe’s stability and security demand a regional order into which Russia—the continent’s strongest single military power—is eventually integrated, rather than one from which it has become progressively alienated. The post-Cold War crises over Ukraine arose from complex circumstances; but one of them has been the absence of a pan-European security order that extends from the Atlantic to the Urals and contains provisions for engagement with Russia, including arms control and crisis management, as well as confidence-building measures designed to reduce the risk of war. Restructuring Europe’s security order to promote European strategic autonomy will improve, not harm, trans-Atlantic relations and cooperation. The U.S. and Canada are bound to Europe by centuries-old ties—historical, cultural, and economic. While the extent and nature of these ties will necessarily change over time, their existence does not depend on an American willingness to serve indefinitely as Europe’s prime defender.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Europe, France, Germany, North America, and United States of America

16. NATO Should Defend Europe, Not Pivot to Asia

Author:
Jan Gerber
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
In 2021, the U.K., France, and Germany deployed 21 naval ships to the Indo-Pacific with a stated aim of helping the U.S. shoulder the burden of collective security and sustaining the “rules-based international order.” Naval deployments by the U.K., France, and Germany are symbolic and unlikely to affect the balance of power in Asia. A European pivot to the Indo-Pacific draws scarce attention and resources away from defense issues in Europe. Instead of encouraging Asian forays, the U.S. should encourage its European allies to assume primary responsibility for European security, freeing the United States to focus on the Pacific, if needed.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, France, Germany, and Indo-Pacific

17. Hypotheses on the Implications of the Ukraine-Russia War

Author:
Barry R. Posen
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Structural realism is a useful tool to examine the implications of the war in Ukraine for global politics. Because structural realism emphasizes the anarchic nature of international relations, it suggests the war is unsurprising, a reminder that states still compete for security, sometimes violently, and the prudent will prepare for it with tools for self-preservation. The realist lens also sees lessons for nuclear deterrence: The prospect of mutual nuclear destruction constrains great power war and has limited U.S. and NATO support for Ukraine. Other states may take note and seek their own nuclear deterrents. The war demonstrates some limits of economic interdependence, which not only failed to pacify Russia, but also left Russia exposed to economic coercion, in a way both it and China may look to avoid in the future. Other important lessons for states from a realist perspective include the importance of military power—large, capable armies and the enduring advantages of defensive warfare, especially when infused with nationalism. The war leaves the “liberal international order,” a byproduct of the eroding post-Cold War U.S. power position, looking threadbare, but it is thus far reviving the U.S. Cold War coalition—a less liberal grouping—which could prove useful in dealing with China.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, NATO, Sanctions, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

18. Questions Concerning Finnish Membership in NATO

Author:
Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Admitting Finland into NATO constitutes a permanent defense commitment by the alliance. In the case of the United States, it also entails a further extension of its nuclear umbrella. Such moves warrant a fulsome public debate, not a rush to action. Consideration of the defensibility of Finland must take into account a revitalized, long-term Russian threat, not just the force currently mired in a grinding war in Ukraine. More thorough discussion is needed about Finland’s capacity to defend itself and the level of outside support it would require from NATO and, specifically, the U.S. military. Regardless of whether it admits Finland, NATO should support it in any future crises with Russia. But the nature of that support changes depending on whether Finland is an alliance member or not, with attendant implications for the level of risk NATO incurs. U.S. forces cannot be everywhere at once. New, permanent security commitments in northern Europe need to be examined relative to other U.S. global priorities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Finland, and Eastern Europe

19. Importance of Maintaining and Strengthening NATO’s Nuclear Deterrence: A Historical Overview

Author:
Megi Benia
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Nuclear deterrence is a core pillar of NATO’s defense and deterrence policy. At the same time, the Alliance, which is not a formal party to any arms control negotiation, has a long-standing commitment to an active policy in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The Alliance has been regularly conducting consultations in different fora - the North Atlantic Council, the Nuclear Planning Group and the Defense Planning Committee – to constantly address the ongoing challenges of the arms control architecture. Currently, NATO successfully maintains the balance between its nuclear deterrence and disarmament aspirations. However, it does not represent an easy task for the organization of 30 member states. Over the years, NATO has suffered from a serious nuclear identity crisis. Many Allies tried to increase the Alliance’s arms-control profile while others gradually opposed any further changes in this direction. The positioning of NATO in this regard has been constantly shaped by significant shifts in the international security environment. Despite the contested view on maintaining NATO’s nuclear deterrence, the Alliance managed to evolve as a nuclear alliance, effectively ensuring peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Today, European security faces the biggest security challenge since World War II when one state wages an unprovoked and unjustified war against another sovereign and independent state on the doorsteps of NATO, threatening the world with the use of nuclear weapons. In this unprecedented environment, it is important for NATO to maintain and further strengthen its nuclear deterrence posture to ensure peace and stability for generations to come. Therefore, this article will demonstrate a historical overview of the evolution of NATO as a nuclear alliance and the importance of strengthened nuclear deterrence and conventional defense capabilities.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, History, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe

20. Can we ever build a common European home? The perils and promise of an old idea

Author:
Zachary Paikin and Michael Kimmage
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the idea of a ‘common European home’ inspired many different political leaders. This idea has now crumbled amid Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine. Historians will long debate what went wrong. For now, the West will have little choice but to inhabit a continental security context based on deterrence rather than romantic visions and shared identities. But Western governments should also not give up on the more flexible, accepting approach to European security and integration that animated the 1990s. The EU granting candidate status to Ukraine last June was a landmark event. But the EU cannot have an effective strategy for Ukraine without also having a strategy for Russia. Even with the continent afflicted by war, the aspiration of a common European home must not be discarded. This CEPS Explainer evaluates the principal lessons of the Ukraine War for European security and outlines a pathway to putting the continent back on the road towards a more inclusive order.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

21. The EU vis-à-vis Turmoil in Burkina Faso: Towards Europeanisation?

Author:
Francesca Lenzi
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In late September 2022, Burkina Faso experienced its second coup in eight months. In the name of national security, Captain Ibrahim Traoré took control of the country on 30 September, deposing Paul-Henri Damiba, who had come to power through his own coup in January. Insecurity and the inability of the political class to deal with the jihadist threat are among the determining factors that led to two coups in such a short time. The coups unfolded in a context marked by competition between the European Union (EU) – initially led by France, the traditional European hegemon in the region – and Russia for influence in the Sahel.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, and Coup
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, and Burkina Faso

22. NATO’s New Strategic Concept: Novelties and Priorities

Author:
Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
NATO’s new Strategic Concept provides a clear set of guidelines for the Alliance in a mid-term perspective. Adopted on 29 June in Madrid, the Concept outlines a number of priorities stemming from Russia’s war on Ukraine, but also puts forward relevant novelties concerning China and the Indo-Pacific. During the NATO Summit in Madrid, alliance members affirmed that Russia can no longer be considered a partner, effectively internalising the geopolitical earthquake represented by the return of a major conventional and multi-domain war on European soil.[1] The Strategic Concept also identifies deterrence and defence as the Alliance’s number one priority, in comparison to the other core tasks: crisis prevention and management and cooperative security.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

23. Russian Energy Exports and the Conflict in Ukraine: What Options for Italy and the EU?

Author:
Margherita Bianchi and Pier Paolo Raimondi
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Putin’s war on Ukraine has shaken the European Union to its core. Implications will be long lasting in numerous domains, but it is in the security and energy dimensions that concrete changes are already becoming evident as the EU fast tracks its strategy for energy diversification. The Russian invasion has drastically changed the European energy paradigm, with the new political absolute being a fast reduction of Europe’s overdependence on Russian gas. Diversifying energy supplies away from Russia is a means to tighten the economic noose around Putin, seeking to deprive the Kremlin of billions in energy revenue given that Russia continues to export oil, gas and coal to Europe at very high prices.
Topic:
Security, Sanctions, European Union, Gas, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Italy

24. The AUKUS Partnership: A Wake-up Call for Europe

Author:
Gabriele Abbondanza
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Now that some dust has settled over the surprise announcement of AUKUS on 16 September, it is possible to analyse the implications of this partnership not just for its members, but for Europe as well.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Politics, European Union, Partnerships, Maritime, and Institutions
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and Asia-Pacific

25. Critical Infrastructure Protection in Europe: Strengthening Resilience Under Article 3 of The Washington Treaty

Author:
Megi Benia
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
NATO is a major military organization responsible for security in the Euro-Atlantic space. Consequently, the current security environment in the world and, especially, in Europe stimulates debates about NATO’s readiness to resist an armed attack. However, these debates are normally held around the Alliance’s Article 5 as a key component of collective defense and in this process, the principles of Article 3 are ignored, something which is a wrong approach. NATO’s Article 3 states that: “In order to more effectively achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack” (NATO, Resilience and Article 3 2020). Therefore, fulfilling obligations under Article 3 is a crucial part of the organization’s main idea of collective defense as it enables NATO to fulfil the obligations of Article 5. However, one must remember that in today’s unpredictable security situation, “capacity to resist armed attack” (NATO, Resilience and Article 3 2020) means not only military readiness. To be able to deploy rapidly during operations or a potential armed attack, military forces need the support of transport systems, satellite communications and power supplies, etc. However, it is a well-known fact that these systems are highly vulnerable during an attack in both peace and war.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Infrastructure, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

26. De-Securitising and Re-Prioritising EU-Iraq Relations

Author:
Flavio Fusco
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Located at the heart of the Middle East, connecting the Levant to the Persian Gulf, Iraq has always been at the centre of regional dynamics. Yet, the country is today reduced to a quasi-failed state fundamentally damaged in its political, social and economic fabric, with long-term consequences that trace a fil rouge from the 2003 US-led invasion to the emergence of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) and the country’s current structural fragility.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Iraq, Europe, Middle East, and United States of America

27. The New US-EU Energy Security Agenda: Roundtable Report

Author:
Jonathan Elkind
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
On June 3, 2021, Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP) and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP, the German Institute for International and Security Affairs), in cooperation with the European Climate Foundation (ECF) and the European Union (EU) Delegation to the US, cohosted a private virtual roundtable focusing on energy security issues during a period of heightened action on climate goals. This document summarizes the June 3 roundtable, which was conducted on a not-for-attribution basis. Participants in the roundtable included just over 50 senior corporate executives, civil society representatives, academic and think tank experts, energy analysts, and government officials from the European Union and United States. In June 2021, President Joe Biden traveled to Europe, his first overseas trip since his inauguration as president, and he met with European heads of state and government in the context of a British-hosted G7 meeting, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit, and a US-EU Summit.[1] The journey signaled a concerted effort by the United States and the European Union to rebuild bilateral relations, which were battered during the Trump administration. Protecting the global climate and accelerating the transition to clean energy are objectives that unify top leaders on both sides of the Atlantic today. The European Union has a legislated mandate of climate neutrality by the year 2050 and is implementing its comprehensive European Green Deal and elaborating a corresponding legal and regulatory framework for an enhanced 2030 target. In the United States, the Biden administration reentered the Paris climate agreement and announced plans to reach net-zero emissions by midcentury, though climate protection still faces significant political challenges in the US Congress and in certain states. If the European Union and the United States proceed as these plans indicate, their energy systems face a period of accelerating, unprecedented, and sustained change—new technologies, new supply chains, new business models, and new interdependencies between economic sectors.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Energy Policy, Environment, International Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

28. Military cooperation between Serbia and the USA: dynamically under the public radar

Author:
Marija Ignjatijevic
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Military cooperation between Serbia and the United States is the topic of the latest analysis by BCBP researcher Maria Ignjatijevic. Serbia and the United States have had intensive cooperation in the field of security and defense for years, members of the armed forces have participated in over 70 military exercises in the last ten years, and the United States is one of the largest donors to the Serbian defense system. However, if we follow only media reports in Serbia, the intensity of this cooperation will not be so obvious. Defense cooperation with Russia gets far more space in the media than activities with the US and NATO members. Thus, for example, the military exercise “Slavic Shield” completely occupied the public’s attention before and after its organisation in October 2019. Although undeniably a significant activity between the two armed forces, to which Russia brought its S-400 and Pantsir systems, it gained a disproportionately large space in the media compared to other exercises that took place that year with other partner countries. Apart from the image being sent to the public through media and various foreign policy moves, a very dynamic and practical defense cooperation with all partners takes place behind the scenes. The United States is one of Serbia’s important partners in the field of defense, and cooperation with the US Department of Defense has been achieved in various fields. Every year, Serbia and the US conduct about 100 different bilateral activities. In the eyes of the Serbian public, perception of relations with the United States, and especially perception of military cooperation, is burdened by the NATO intervention in 1999. In order to avoid losing political points at home and endangering relations with Russia, the political elite in Serbia avoids talking about cooperation with the United States and other NATO members, and the pro-regime media report accordingly. Regardless of the fact that military cooperation is often used as a foreign or domestic policy tool, it is important to discuss the practical aspects of this cooperation, benefits for Serbia and the US, their defense systems, but also the citizens. At the online discussion “Serbia and the USA: Together we are safer”, specific examples of military cooperation between Serbia and the US and practical benefits for our defense system and its members from this cooperation were discussed. Defense cooperation between Serbia and the United States takes place on several levels, through joint exercises, cooperation with the Ohio National Guard, a student exchange program, as well as donations.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, Serbia, North America, and United States of America

29. Don’t Talk to Me about Democracy while I’m Guarding Kosovo – analysis of narratives used to capture the state

Author:
Maja Bjelos and Bojan Elek
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Based on an analysis of top officials’ speeches, this text will show how officially promoted narratives about Kosovo serve to capture the state. This analysis has shown the mechanism by which the Serbian authorities, by controlling and strategically using narratives on resolving the Kosovo dispute, manage to increase their own discretionary powers while simultaneously abolishing control mechanisms. In other words, under the pretext of resolving the Kosovo issue, the separation of powers and democratic decision-making are being abolished, leading to an even greater level of state capture. The analysis is divided into five thematic units. The first chapter shows how the executive power instrumentalises Kosovo and, using the media, creates a false impression in the public that, when it comes to Serbia’s membership in the European Union, Kosovo is more important than the rule of law, thus putting a false premise before the citizens: that their choices are either Kosovo or a future governed by the rule of law. The second part of the analysis shows how the government in Belgrade traded stability for democracy and ensured the tacit consent of the West in preserving political stability in Serbia for the purpose of reaching a final agreement with Pristina. The third and fourth parts point to the absence of real social dialogue on Kosovo, and reveal how the President of Serbia and a narrow circle of his associates strive to increase their discretionary power to decide on Kosovo beyond the Constitution and democratic institutions, all under the pretext of protecting national interests. Finally, in the last part, the authors will provide additional evidence for understanding why citizens of Serbia cannot come to terms with the loss of state control over Kosovo, that is, why the opinion of the majority of Serbian citizens – that Kosovo should not be recognised – is still relevant.
Topic:
Security, Media, Leadership, State Building, and State Capture
Political Geography:
Europe and Serbia

30. The Crime-Politics Nexus Entrapping The Balkans

Author:
Bojan Elek and Giorgio Fruscione
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
We are presenting you the Dossier on organized crime in the Balkans, produced in cooperation between the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) and Belgrade Centre for Security Policy. In some of the countries of the Western Balkans, criminal groups and political elites have grown increasingly interdependent. In particular, Serbia’s and Montenegro’s societies have suffered the most from these links. The two countries have long been considered frontrunners in the EU integration process, whose final completion, however, is difficult to foresee. Similarly, Albania’s EU negotiating process has also been delayed for years, in part because of the country’s role in global drug trafficking schemes. The crime-politics nexus is contributing to the erosion of the rule of law in several Balkan countries, where the risk – or reality – of state capture is increasingly worrisome. In light of recent events, Serbia appears to be the most concerning case as its authoritarian drift currently seems hard to reverse. Which consequences does the situation in Serbia have on other Balkan countries? What impact does state capture have on regional stability? And what is changing for the region’s integration prospects with the EU?
Topic:
Security, Crime, Rule of Law, Organized Crime, and State Capture
Political Geography:
Europe and Serbia

31. Implementation of the Law on Operational Technical Agency and the Law on Interception of Communications

Author:
Bijana Karovska Andonovska
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
The analysis reflects the current state from the viewpoint of legal solutions, but also from the viewpoint of real problems seen in practice, which come in part as the result of inconsistent and insufficiently precise legal provisions. Thus, a special emphasis was put on the provisions that do not fully serve the reform priorities and the segments that do not correspond to international documents and the practice of European courts. The analysis offers alternative solutions and concrete recommendations to overcome the evident weaknesses in some of the existing legal provisions. This is especially true for several segments underlined in the text (provisions on interception of communications without the mediation of OTA; provisions on metadata; certain aspect in the interception of communications in the interest of security and defense; security of data; as well as the provisions on oversight and control over the interception of communications). The structure of the document is comprised of an introduction, approach to the reforms, analysis of the legal framework, opportunities and challenges, and conclusions.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Communications, Law, and Reform
Political Geography:
Europe

32. Russia’s domestic politics have become part of the West’s Russia policy: The stakes are rising when Navalny returns to Russia

Author:
Jussi Lassila
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Among the most signifcant events in Russia in 2020 were the Covid-19 pandemic, reactions to the protests in Belarus, and the poisoning of top opposition politician Aleksey Navalny. Te frst two were clearly events of international signifcance, but so was the medical treatment given to Navalny, frst in Omsk and then in Berlin, after he suffered from symptoms of poisoning dur- ing a flight from Tomsk in Siberia to Moscow in August. In December, a joint study by the investigative journalist groups Bellingcat and The Insider, along with CNN, Der Spiegel and Naval- ny’s FBK Foundation, showed that it was difficult to find more con- clusive evidence of the Kremlin’s involvement in the assassination attempt by a chemical weapons- related poisoning group under the FSB that had been following Na- valny for years. This kind of op- eration would hardly have been possible without the blessing of high-level intelligence. Te ques- tion of whether the FSB leader- ship was proactive in resolving the “Navalny problem” or whether the order came from the Kremlin is irrelevant. Te revealed pattern confrms the long-standing trend of the strengthened role of the se- curity services, especially the FSB, in Russian politics. It is consistent with Putin’s approach to political processes being increasingly seen as issues of national security. Navalny’s self-confidence and style in the revelation videos related to the investigation, receiving ap- proximately 45 million views in less than a month, underscore the extent to which the FSB failed. The target did not die or become paralyzed, but recovered relatively quickly and bounced back, playing for higher and more radical stakes than before. Navalny’s role and reputation as the Kremlin’s most prominent critic has been based on the political pressure on the Kremlin generated by expos- ing elite corruption. While the will- ingness of citizens to see Navalny as an alternative to Putin varies consid- erably – with the majority indifer- ent to politics as a whole – Navalny’s numerous revelations have created an alternative to Russia’s ofcial re- ality, the political potential of which the regime obviously fears.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Conflict, Regionalism, and Domestic Policy
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

33. President Niinistö’s two-track initiative: towards stronger Arctic dialogue and revitalization of the Helsinki Spirit?

Author:
Matti Pesu and Henri Vanhanen
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In his recent op-ed, President Sauli Niinistö reintroduced the idea of an Arctic summit. The timing of the meeting could be favourable. As the 50th anniversary of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act is approaching, Niinistö also hoped for a revitalization of the “Spirit of Helsinki”. The aim is hampered by global tensions, however.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and International Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe, Finland, and Arctic

34. The EU’s Strategic Approach to CSDP interventions: Building a Tenet from Praxis

Author:
Tyyne Karjalainen
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Crisis management forms an integral part of the expanding toolbox with which the European Union (EU) reacts to external crises. This FIIA analysis aims at understanding the strategic approach of the EU to crisis management as it develops from the interplay between growing institutional infrastructure and member states’ reactions to crises and conflicts in their neighbourhood. In particular, this analysis investigates the creation of objectives for Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) interventions. Drawing on a series of expert interviews, the article challenges a tradition in European studies of analysing EU strategy based on strategic documents alone. Instead, it explores the strategic approach as it has been developed, practised and interpreted by practitioners working in the CSDP framework. The research argues that the development of the EU’s approach is characterized by experimentalism and emergence, which are enabled by repetitive processes of intergovernmentalism and institutional learning in the framework. At the same time, discrepancies in the Integrated Approach and decision- making are found to limit the capabilities of the EU as a strategic actor. Finally, three trends are argued to curtail the EU approach to crisis management at present: a decreasing level of ambition, squeezing between other instruments for foreign and security policy, and a rhetorical shift from external to internal security.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe

35. The EU and the North Korean Conundrum: Supporting Reconciliation and Denuclearization

Author:
Ramon Pacheco Pardo
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
While the EU had initially engaged with North Korea through a conciliatory approach, its stance against the authoritarian state has been more critical, manifest in its policy of ‘critical engagement.’ In this commentary, Ramon Pacheco Pardo, Professor of International Relations at King's College London and the KF-VUB Korea Chair at the Brussels School of Governance, claims that the EU, among key players, cannot remain idle amid the growing security dilemma on the Korean Peninsula fueled by mutual hostility. The author claims that the EU should adopt a more proactive approach in order to accommodate reconciliation between the two Koreas and address the issue of denuclearization. The author adds that the EU's role in dealing with issues on the Korean peninsula is irreplaceable, given its experience and technical expertise. Specifically, the union and European countries can support security on the Korean Peninsula by hosting track-2 dialogues or pressing Pyongyang on its human rights record.
Topic:
Security, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

36. The COVID-19 Pandemic and European Security: Between Damages and Crises

Author:
Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic will negatively affect the defence field from a budgetary, industrial and politicostrategic point of view, particularly in Europe. Depending on the pandemic’s duration, its economic consequences and national and EU responses, effects may range from contained damages to a much wider European security crisis.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Crisis Management, and Coronavirus
Political Geography:
Europe and European Union

37. Security Sector Capture in Serbia – An Early Study

Author:
Predrag Petrovic and Jelena Pejic Nikic
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Report on state capture in Serbia is BCSP genuine and pioneering work aiming to document and deconstruct ongoing process of state capture in the security sector through presentation of mechanisms, actors and consequences of this process. For several years now, various international indexes have been measuring the stagnation and decline of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental freedoms in Serbia. Although the country is still formally in the process of European integration, the European Commission noticed back in 2018 that there are elements of state capture in the entire Western Balkans region. Due to the significance and ubiquity of this phenomenon in Serbia, the BCSP has embarked upon a pilot research project that aims to establish the main factors and conditions, as well as the mechanisms and actors, involved in state capture in the security sector. The capturing of the police, the security services and the defence sector in Serbia is analysed in this early study. Furthermore, it was necessary to situate the analysis in the country’s political context, and special chapters cover parliamentary oversight and control and the security sector financing. The research was conducted from May 2019 to April 2020 and is based on insights gleaned from both primary and secondary sources.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Democracy, Rule of Law, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:
Europe and Serbia

38. Boosting Armament to Fight Demographic Decline, Crime and Corruption – Public Opinion on Security

Author:
Marija Pavlovic
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The main finding of this study is that the Serbian public have conflicting views on national and personal security and their relationship with the country’s institutions. On the one hand, people instinctively recognise that the main security threats are internal and are related to poor governance – such as organised crime and corruption and low levels of trust in institutions that serve the interests of politicians – which is why they rely on themselves and their own good conduct, from which they derive a sense of personal security. On the other hand, under the influence of media messaging and dominant narratives about threats to national security, presenting a maelstrom of great power rivalry and adversarial actors in the region, they continue to believe that hard power is the best response to security issues. Therefore, they see solutions mainly in the continued strengthening of the country and investment in the security sector. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that public opinion is diametrically opposed to the threats and risks defined by the official National Security Strategy and Defence Strategy adopted last year. Both documents place (the relatively unlikely events of) armed aggression and separatist tendencies within the country in first place on the list of threats to Serbia’s security – threats that only appear in the lower half on the list of priorities in the eyes of the public, who see human security issues as the priority problems. This discord between public perception and the strategic documents is a consequence of the almost complete lack of public debate during the adoption process of these documents. At the same time, it is testimony to the wrongheaded priorities of Serbia’s security policy, which is clearly at odds with the needs of the public, even though the National Security Strategy cites their subjective feelings in defining national security.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Corruption, Crime, and Public Opinion
Political Geography:
Europe and Serbia

39. Serbia in the Jaws of the COVID-19 Pandemic

Author:
Srdan Hercigonja
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The public opinion poll conducted by the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) in October 2020 shows that the society is divided, both when it comes to measures taken in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic and regarding the reaction of the competent institutions to the health crisis. Although no less than a third of the Serbian citizens do not believe in or have serious doubts about the existence of the COVID-19 pandemic, the vast majority of them are of the opinion that the health crisis will have serious economic consequences, while a third are convinced that it has affected the level of democracy in Serbia. Most people see the pandemic as a threat to human and national security, but they are divided over how this crisis has affected their everyday lives. Polarisation was identified in relation to the level of trust in state institutions. Citizens trust the health care system the most, which is not surprising since the health care system commonly occupies a very high position in general surveys conducted to measure trust in all institutions. The reason for the high level of trust in the health system is the fact that it is the entire health system – not just the specialised COVID departments – that is bearing the brunt of the pandemic. As for other institutions, the percentage of trust in the President of the Republic and the Crisis Task Force for the Protection of the Population from the Infectious Disease COVID-19 stands at almost fifty-fifty, which again reflects the broader picture of citizens’ (dis)trust in these permanent and temporary institutions. One of the reasons for the division in the perception of disease as a threat to the personal safety of citizens is poor informing and reporting on the course and consequences of the pandemic (frequent contradictory messages provided by the Crisis Task Force and the authorities), which has been identified in the survey as one of the biggest problems of pandemic management. An enormous number of citizens perceive China as the largest financial and humanitarian donor during the period of the pandemic, which also influences – in the general survey – positive opinions about foreign countries, where China ranks first. Despite the fact that it was in fact the European Union that helped Serbia the most in the fight against the Coronavirus, in both financial and humanitarian terms, in the eyes of the citizens China still convincingly holds the first place.
Topic:
Security, Public Opinion, Health Care Policy, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe and Serbia

40. In the Aegean, Energy Sustainability = Increased Security

Author:
Katerina Sokou and Aristotle Tziampiris
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies (BESA)
Abstract:
The challenging geography of Greece makes it hard for the country to take full advantage of its natural resources and expand its energy grid. Though it has doubled its share of renewables, it needs to redouble those efforts to reach the EU’s ambitious goal of covering a third of its energy needs from renewable sources by 2030. The Greek islands that have been at the forefront of the migration and refugee crises would particularly benefit from a targeted policy to reach that goal, as the transition would increase their energy security, reduce their energy costs, and diversify their economies. Greece has the potential to be a model of sustainability that would enhance the stability of the entire Eastern Med.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Energy Policy, Natural Resources, Refugee Crisis, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
Europe, Greece, and Mediterranean

41. WHAT GAME OF THRONES CAN TELL US ABOUT RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

Author:
Betcy Jose and Christoph Stefjes
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
White House National Security Advisor John Bolton recently declared, “In this administration, we’re not afraid to use the phrase ‘Monroe Doctrine.’” The Monroe Doctrine harkens back 200 years to a policy that captures the idea that a hegemonic power holds dominion over a particular geographic region—its sphere of influence—where it serves as the sole arbitrator of the rules of the game. Bolton likely referred to the doctrine’s Roosevelt corollary where, “the United States was justified in exercising ‘international police power’ when there was unrest in Latin America.” In explicitly referencing this doctrine from the past, Bolton seemingly took a page from the playbook of the Game of Thrones’s (GoT) Night King, bringing back to life things once considered dead. As President Obama’s Secretary of State John Kerry stated, “’The era of the Monroe Doctrine is over. The relationship that we seek and that we have worked hard to foster is not about a United States declaration about how and when it will intervene in the affairs of other American states.’”
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, United Nations, and International Order
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America