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1. China Threats and the Exploitation of China Threats: The 2024 Taiwan General Election

Author:
Chin-en Wu
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The presidential and legislative elections took place in Taiwan on January 13, 2024. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP or so-called the green camp) selected Vice President Lai Ching-te as their candidate, who also serves as the party chairman. The opposing Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang, KMT or so-called the blue camp) nominated the incumbent mayor of New Taipei, Hou Yu-ih, for the presidential candidacy. The Taiwan People’s Party (TPP or so-called the white camp) chose its leader, former Taipei City mayor Ko Wen-je, as the presidential candidate. Despite initial plans for a joint campaign team between KMT and TPP, a final agreement was not reached. Lai’s victory marked a historic moment, representing the first time since the introduction of direct elections in 1996 that a party has won more than two consecutive presidential terms. Lai secured the presidency with 40% of the votes, followed by Hou with 34%, and Ko with 26%. Lai Ching-te and Hou Yu-yi are political figures within traditional political parties, lacking individual charisma, especially Hou Yu-yi, the former police-in-chief. Ko Wen-je, on the other hand, is a candidate with populist characteristics, appearing as a political outsider at the national level, free from the burden of past ruling records, providing an option beyond the blue-green divide. His interactive style sometimes resembles that of an internet celebrity, using straightforward language to comment on issues or point out social and political problems, in many cases without proposing feasible solutions to these problems. Young people prefer Ko’s relaxed, somewhat sarcastic way of communication. The other part of the general election is the legislative election. DPP gained 51 seats out of 113 seats and lose its majority in the parliament. KMT won 52 seats and become the largest party. TPP gained eight seats. The result makes the new DPP government a minority government.
Topic:
Elections, Domestic Politics, and Cross-Strait Relations
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

2. The G7’s Geoeconomic Future: Insights from Conflicts with Russia, China, and Iran

Author:
Claudia Schmucker, Stormy-Annika Mildner, and Avi Shapiro
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
In an increasingly conflictual global environment, the G7 has become a more and more important geoeconomic actor. Yet looking at the case studies of Russia, Iran, and China reveals that the geoeconomic role the G7 plays has been mixed. For the G7 countries to improve their geoeconomic impact, they need to align their interests and risk perceptions, as well as improve their ability to propose and enact geoeconomic measures. In addition, the G7 should bolster its partnerships with other democracies and like-minded countries.
Topic:
Partnerships, G7, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

3. The Open Gap in the “Free and Open” Indo-Pacific

Author:
Kenneth Gofigan Kuper
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
"For many of us in Guam, a free and open Indo-Pacific cannot be fully accomplished without resolving the paradox of the United States maintaining a modern-day colony even though the local government has supported moving forward with a decolonization process."
Topic:
Politics, Decolonization, Strategy, and Colonization
Political Geography:
China, United States of America, Indo-Pacific, and Guam

4. The Taiwan election result: A strategic opportunity for a calmer Taiwan Strait

Author:
Mikael Mattlin and Jyrki Kallio
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Taiwan held combined presidential and legislative elections last weekend. The international media generally expected that a win by Lai Ching-te (DPP), who in the past has favoured independence, would lead to tensions and even conflict in the Taiwan Strait. However, there are several reasons why the opposite could be the case.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Elections, and Lai Ching-te
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

5. Challenges to Chinese blue-water operations

Author:
Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Despite having the world’s largest navy, important questions can be asked about China’s ability to challenge the U.S. Navy on a global scale. A number of factors—geography, logistical infrastructure, force structure, and command culture—all argue that China cannot do so at this time. In particular, China would need to significantly expand the number and caliber of its overseas bases in order to support large-scale, blue-water operations by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). China currently has just two overseas bases—at Djibouti and Cambodia—and both are of limited capacity. Absent such a basing network, the PLAN is reliant on at-sea replenishment, a capability that is inherently vulnerable in wartime. China possesses some quality at-sea replenishment vessels but not nearly in sufficient quantities to support widespread global operations. While Chinese naval aviation has shown important improvements over the last year, the PLAN does not appear to have the logistical capacity to sustain high-tempo carrier operations outside the First Island Chain for an extended period of time. Super-quiet Chinese nuclear submarines would be game-changers in terms of Chinese blue-water operations. But thus far China has not shown mastery of the requisite technologies to build boats with this capability. It would also take China several years to grow a fleet of super-quiet submarines once the necessary technological challenges have been solved. Structural issues with the Chinese economy raise new concerns about Beijing’s ability to fund a blue-water navy over the long term. Such calculations must include the expense of ship construction, but also the massive operations and maintenance budget needed to deploy a potential navy of over 400 ships.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Navy, Economy, and Submarines
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

6. China’s “Catchup” on Growing Genetically Modified Crops

Author:
Paul Teng and Genevieve Donnellon-May
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
China, the world’s largest importer of corn and soybean, seems finally to accept the potential of using genetically modified (GM) feed crops. Will this be enough to reduce China’s dependency on such imports and will it meet the demands of other countries that are also experiencing an increase in demand for feed to increase production of animal meat?
Topic:
Agriculture, Science and Technology, Food, and Production
Political Geography:
China and Asia

7. Australia’s Role Supporting Democracies as a Middle Power

Author:
Michael J. Green and Victoria Cooper
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Michael J. Green (Professor and CEO of the United States Study Centre (USSC) in Sydney) and Victoria Cooper (Research Editor at the USSC) analyze Australia’s strengths as a middle power in the face of Beijing’s pressure campaign, and offer areas of regional cooperation that like-minded countries, including Australia, can build upon in order to defend democracy against authoritarian regimes. While acknowledging the limited capacity of Australia to independently counter Beijing’s illiberal behavior, the authors argue that through the expansion of development initiatives, promotion of women’s empowerment, and anti-corruption drives, Canberra can play a key role in leading multilateral efforts to promote democratic resilience in the region.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Statecraft, Middle Power, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Australia

8. Pyongyang in Search of a New Cold War Strategy

Author:
Jihwan Hwang
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Jihwan Hwang, a professor at the University of Seoul, predicts that the strengthening alliance between North Korea, China, and Russia could enable North Korea to overcome its international isolation, weakening the influence of the US-South Korea alliance and increasing China’s leverage over the Korean Peninsula. Dr. Hwang points out that even without the establishment of a new Cold War order, the strengthened cooperation among the authoritarian regimes will pose a significant strategic challenge to South Korea. As Seoul’s approach to Pyongyang has been based on a unipolar system led by Washington, Dr. Hwang highlights the need for South Korea to explore new approaches to address the changing security environment.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Ukraine, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

9. U.S. Stance on North Korea’s “New Cold War” Narrative

Author:
Hyun-wook Kim
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Hyun-wook Kim, Professor at Korean National Diplomatic Academy, assesses that North Korea is advocating a new Cold War discourse to strengthen its strategic solidarity with China. However, the intensified Cold War dynamic would lead the United States to prioritize its strategic competition with China, and the Biden administration should turn to a more passive approach toward North Korea. In this context, Dr. Kim anticipates that Washington would not offer incentives to Pyongyang for engaging in dialogue, which would lead Pyongyang to continue its military provocations to influence the direction of Washington’s policy course and gain recognition as a nuclear power. Given the volatility of the situation, Dr. Kim emphasizes the importance of reaffirming the ROK-US military alliance to counter the escalating crisis on the Korean Peninsula.
Topic:
Cold War, International Cooperation, Deterrence, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

10. Will Spring Ever Come? Security Landscape of Northeast Asia in 2023

Author:
Kyung-joo Jeon
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Kyung-Joo Jeon, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, predicts that the Korean peninsula might repeat the days of fire and fury in 2017 this year. North Korea will likely turn to its military provocation tactics ahead of the ROK-US Freedom Shield Exercises in mid-March, DPRK’s 70th Anniversary of The Day of Victory in the Great Fatherland Liberation War in July, and another ROK-US joint military drill in August. Dr. Jeon suggests that Seoul should increase its strategic value as an essential global player while Washington seeks a stronger alliance network in the Indo-Pacific region if South Korea wants to live up to its policy goal of the “Global Pivotal State.”
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

11. China’s Stance on North Korea’s “New Cold War” Narrative

Author:
Dong Ryul Lee
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Dong Ryul Lee, Chair of the China Research Center at EAI (Professor at Dongduk Women’s University), highlights that although China and North Korea might seem to have a close relationship, Beijing maintains a reserved stance regarding the North’s perspective on its strategic value amid the US-China competition. Professor Lee explains that Xi Jinping prioritizes political stability by boosting the economy and tries to avoid a full-scale confrontation with the US. Accordingly, China seeks to manage the risk spurred on by Pyongyang’s military provocations, given that they legitimize stronger US-Japan-ROK trilateral security cooperation.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Cold War, Xi Jinping, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

12. China Is Finally Making Progress on the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway

Author:
Niva Yau
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Since the 1990s, China has tried to build the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway. The railway would advance China’s geopolitical and economic interests in Central Asia. Until recently, China has been unable to overcome opposition to the project in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. However, local concerns about the railway may be giving way since Russia’s war in Ukraine has made new trade routes bypassing Russia more profitable, and a new Uzbek government is looking to expand regional and international engagement.
Topic:
Economics, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China, Central Asia, Asia, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan

13. Stress-Testing Chinese-Russian Relations

Author:
Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
A debate over the nature of the China-Russia relationship has raged for almost two decades. One side believes the two are strategic partners; the other believes their ties are an “axis of convenience” lacking depth. Understanding the true nature of their relationship is of vital importance to U.S. national security. A true strategic partnership represents a grave threat; less robust ties between the two give the U.S. more latitude in dealing with them. We can gain a deeper, more nuanced understanding of China-Russia ties by observing how they interact in regions of the world where they both have important interests at stake. Four regions emerge as key here: Central Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, and East Asia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

14. Australia and India’s New Military Bases: Responses to China’s Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean

Author:
Felix K. Chang
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Australia and India have built and expanded military bases in and around the Indian Ocean in anticipation of a larger Chinese naval presence in its waters. Most of the construction has focused on creating the capacity to monitor the three main passages into the ocean through the Indonesian archipelago, namely the Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda Straits. India has established two new naval air stations in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and boosted its maritime patrol forces at others nearby. Australia is working to establish a military base in the Cocos (Keeling) Islands and is beefing up its Stirling naval base near Perth to support and sustain nuclear-powered attack submarines.
Topic:
Security, Navy, Military, and Military Bases
Political Geography:
China, India, Asia, Australia, and Indo-Pacific

15. Cyber Crossover and Its Escalatory Risks for Europe

Author:
Lora Saalman, Fei Su, and Larisa Saveleva Dovgal
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
The crossover between cybercrime and cyberwarfare has intensified in recent years, particularly against the backdrop of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and mounting tensions between China, Russia and the United States. This paper delves into specific cyber incidents that employ cybercrime tactics with cyberwarfare objectives, allegedly involving Chinese, Russian or US actors. It examines responses within and among the private sector, the public sector and international forums. Although not directly involved in all of the cases, the European Union (EU) was impacted in a variety of ways, including as a result of spillover effects and intentional targeting. Drawing on an examination of cyber incidents, this paper highlights how emerging trends in actors, means and responses present escalatory risks for the EU and emphasizes the pressing need to bolster cybersecurity measures.
Topic:
European Union, Cybersecurity, Conflict, Risk, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

16. The Restraining Effect of Nuclear Deterrence

Author:
William D'Ambruoso
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Recent developments in international affairs and military technology have led some analysts to conclude that the nuclear revolution, which purportedly prevents war between nuclear powers, no longer has much effect—that the world is getting safer for nuclear war or conventional war beneath the nuclear umbrella. This conclusion is wrong; technological change has not meaningfully shifted the political calculus pacifying relations between nuclear weapons states. The war in Ukraine demonstrates the continued strength of nuclear restraint: while Russian President Vladimir Putin is risk-acceptant and brutal, he did not attack a country protected by U.S.-extended deterrence, and, like NATO members, he appears deterred by the possibility that a Russia-NATO war could escalate out of control. North Korea provides another example of the endurance of mutual deterrence: Despite heated rhetoric and a barrage of missile tests, North Korea remains deterrable, and its small arsenal has also been able to deter the United States. Because the chances of nuclear war are usually low but never zero, the nuclear age should continue to be an era of great power restraint. Traditional foreign policy approaches emphasizing strategic ambiguity and arms control, including with China, remain useful tools to help keep the peace.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, International Affairs, Deterrence, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North Korea, and United States of America

17. Why China Is Taking Sides Against Israel—and Why It Will Likely Backfire

Author:
Michael Singh
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
When news broke of the Hamas attack on Israel last month, the silence from Beijing was conspicuous amid the din of international statements. When the government finally addressed the conflict at a press conference the day after, its words were remarkable for being unremarkable. An unnamed Foreign Ministry spokesperson expressed “deep concern,” called on “relevant parties to remain calm, exercise restraint, and immediately end the hostilities,” and lamented the “protracted standstill of the peace process”—a diplomatic endeavor in which Beijing has never shown more than a passing interest. The wording was nearly identical to China’s reactions during past Gaza conflicts, despite the fact that the circumstances were radically different. Because the brief remarks failed to condemn Hamas or even recognize the scale of the horrors that occurred on October 7, Israeli commentators interpreted them not as neutral, but as hostile. Beijing soon confirmed that interpretation. On October 14, Foreign Minister Wang Yi asserted that Israel’s actions went “beyond the scope of self-defense” and demanded that it stop imposing “group punishment” on Palestinians, while still refusing to condemn Hamas. (For a full listing of Beijing’s official statements on the conflict, see The Washington Institute’s statement tracker.) Chinese media have likewise presented the war as one of Israeli aggression—despite being heavily censored, their early reports were rife with anti-Semitic, anti-Israel commentary claiming that Hamas was defending the two-state solution, even though the group’s past and present actions are patently bent on destroying the Israeli state. Notably, the strident tone in online Chinese commentary moderated in the run-up to President Xi Jinping’s November 15 meeting with President Biden, underscoring the government’s well-established influence over such messaging. This approach is a stark departure from Beijing’s past impassivity toward Middle East conflicts, in which Chinese officials had usually sought to avoid entanglement. Rather, it reflects the government’s new inclination to use far-flung conflicts as opportunities to undermine the United States and score points in the “Global South.” Yet it could also hold longer-term consequences for China, particularly regarding the government’s three-decade effort to improve relations with Israel. In addition, using the current crisis to take potshots at Washington may constrain Beijing’s ability to project impartiality in other regional conflicts.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Strategic Competition, and Palestinians
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Israel, Asia, and Gaza

18. Preserving U.S. Military Advantages in the Middle East

Author:
Nathan P. Olsen
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) calls on the U.S. military to sustain enduring advantages and build new ones for the future fight. According to the NDS, building and maintaining advantages to advance U.S. national interests will allow the military to deter attacks against the United States and its allies and partners, while fostering a resilient military force and defense ecosystem. In the Middle East, this challenge is especially relevant. The United States has several enduring advantages that could eventually disappear if the U.S. government does not make significant changes in how it operates in this part of the world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Strategic Competition, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

19. Iraqi Officials Eye a Path for Chinese-Iraqi Development

Author:
Baraa Sabri
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Mohammed Shia al-Sudani did not become prime minister in Baghdad as smoothly as desired by the powers close to the “axis of resistance.” Nevertheless, several factors facilitated his rise to power. Domestic concerns, such as Muqtada al-Sadr’s decision to withdraw his bloc from the political process and a push from groups close to Iran to put forward a prime minister with relative acceptance in the regional and international community, played a role. But these considerations compounded with the climate of regional tensions and interests of outside powers—competition between the Gulf and Iran, concerns over the ongoing repercussions of the strained relationship with Washington caused by the Trump administration, and the growing dominance of various armed groups close to Tehran. This precarious reality and confused relationships likewise seem to have driven al-Sudani’s government to attempt to circumvent the traditional binary choice between Washington, the West, and most of the Gulf states on the one hand, and Tehran, Damascus, Lebanon, and their backer Moscow on the other. This new course comes with a distinct and flashy name, the “Development Road” project, and looks to Beijing as a third way forward. Iraq’s political realignment is in large part a response to Iraqis’ shifting views of the United States and the broader geopolitical space: the haphazard American withdrawal from Afghanistan, the political changes in U.S. policy under Biden, the failure to revive the nuclear agreement with Iran, the stagnation in the Syrian issue, Erdogan’s steadfast support of Putin, Russia’s continued attacks on Ukraine, economic movement linked to oil prices, inflation, and financial turmoil in currency rates from Cairo to Tehran, fears of harsh economic sanctions, and, finally and most importantly, the economic rise of China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Multilateralism, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Iraq, Middle East, and Asia

20. Tritium Troubles: The Politics of Fukushima’s Treated Water Release in the Asia-Pacific and Beyond

Author:
Aurelio Insisa
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Following approval from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Japan has begun to release into the Pacific Ocean treated radioactive water from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant on 24 August. The power plant was the site of the nuclear disaster that occurred on 11 March 2011 as a consequence of the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami. Water has been continuously pumped into the nuclear power plant to cool down the reactors’ fuel rods since the disaster. However, current treatment methods are unable to eliminate tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen, resulting in the storage of tons of contaminated water in thousands of tanks on site. The current plans consequently entail the release of more than a million tons of tritium-contaminated water. The Japanese authorities, the IAEA and a majority of scientists concur that the concentration of tritium in the stored water falls within the safety limits.[1] Nevertheless, the release of water containing tritium from the site has encountered opposition from environmental activists and ordinary citizens within and outside Japan. It has also faced criticism from a minority of scientists who argue that the consequences of the release remain unpredictable. This cross-border measure has highlighted, and somehow even exacerbated, political tensions in the Asia-Pacific. Indeed, it has occurred within a regional political order that remains in flux, featuring rampant competition between the US and China, Japan’s own ongoing overhaul of national defence and a consequential tilt in the foreign policy of South Korea after the 2022 elections in favour of Washington and Tokyo. Furthermore, the media clamour surrounding the water release has also extended beyond the region, fuelling the public debate on nuclear energy in several Western countries, including Italy.
Topic:
Environment, Natural Disasters, Nuclear Energy, and Radiation
Political Geography:
Japan, China, South Korea, Asia-Pacific, and Fukushima

21. Climate Action, Geopolitical Risks and Strategic Policy: The Western Race to Secure Critical Raw Materials

Author:
Salvatore Finizio
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Climate action, economic competition and geopolitical shifts are more intertwined than ever. In the wake of the skyrocketing inflation and deteriorating China relations, United States President Joe Biden signed the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) into law on 16 August 2022. Conceived as the foundation of the new US industrial policy, the IRA aims to rebuild the country’s industrial capacity, including 500 billion US dollars in new spending and tax breaks, among which almost 400 billion aimed at boosting clean energy.[1] Across the Atlantic, the European Union expressed concerns about the potential loss of industrial competitiveness resulting from the IRA. In response, the EU unveiled its own Green Deal Industrial Plan (GDIP) in February 2023.[2] The objective of this plan is to promote the enhancement of net-zero manufacturing capacities in order to meet the EU’s climate targets. Both the IRA and the GDIP have a common goal of reducing dependence on China, especially in clean technology, although through different approaches. The US focuses on bringing high-value production back to its shores, while the EU aims to develop and diversify supply chains.[3] This divergence is also reflected in the debate between “decoupling” and “derisking”, with the latter recently gaining prominence as policymakers recognise the challenges of completely reshoring supply chains domestically.[4] The US and the EU share industrial and geoeconomic objectives, but will also encounter similar challenges, in particular concerning the first stages of green supply chains. Despite their heterogeneous approaches, Western policymakers will in fact have to secure critical raw materials for clean technology manufacturing, with the aim of resourcing the energy transition.
Topic:
Security, Politics, European Union, Institutions, Energy, and Raw Materials
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

22. Timing Is Everything: Italy Withdraws from the Belt and Road Initiative

Author:
Aurelio Insisa
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
After months of rumours and speculations, on 6 December 2023, the Italian newspaper of record, the Corriere della Sera, broke the news that Rome had finally withdrawn from China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), via a note sent to Beijing three days earlier.[1] In the absence of an explicit request to withdraw before the end of December, the memorandum of understanding (MoU) instrumental to Italy’s participation in the BRI would have automatically been renewed for another five years starting from March 2024. Italy’s subdued withdrawal from the BRI marked the epilogue of a long, laborious, yet ultimately successful diplomatic process that reflected a reassessment of its bilateral relations with China. The origins of this reassessment can be traced back to the government led by Mario Draghi between 2021 and 2022. In June 2021, during the first post-pandemic, post-Trump G7 Leaders’ Summit in Carbis Bay, Draghi stated that his government would “examine […] carefully” the MoU.[2] Draghi’s words reflected a deeper awareness of the broader implications of Beijing’s assertiveness in international politics and a close alignment with the Biden administration in Rome. This shift also reflected the absence of tangible economic benefits from BRI membership for Italy, although this was also due to the devastating effect of the Covid-19 pandemic on the designed trajectory of Sino-Italian economic relations.[3] Furthermore, the security-driven decision of the Draghi government to repeatedly exercise its “golden power” to veto Beijing’s investments in Italy’s strategic sectors contributed to shaping the MoU’s outcome.[4] This course correction in Rome’s China policy survived the fall of the Draghi government in July 2022 and the victory of the centre-right coalition led by Giorgia Meloni and her Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy, FdI) party in the legislative elections of September that year. After all, Meloni and her party had consistently opposed the MoU with China from the very beginning, a decision arguably also linked to the perceived need to bolster the party’s credentials as a reliable partner in the eyes of Washington – as in the case of the clear support for Ukraine well before the September electoral victory.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Foreign Direct Investment, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and International Politics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Italy

23. Italy’s Pivot to the Indo-Pacific – Towards a Value-driven Foreign Policy?

Author:
Nicola Casarini
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Italy is stepping up its involvement in the Indo-Pacific, both in the economic and security realms. The cabinet led by Giorgia Meloni – a centre-right coalition often portrayed by commentators as right-wing and nationalist – is rebalancing Rome’s policy in the Far East by scaling down ties with Beijing and by effectively lending support to the United States and its Asian allies vis-à-vis an increasingly assertive and self-confident China. Moving away from previous centre-left governments that tended to prioritise commercial relations with Beijing, the conservative coalition in power since September 2022 has been fostering defence-related cooperation with Japan and India and chip-related cooperation and investments with Taiwan. Moreover – and remarkably for a country that has long been absent from Asian security – the Italian government has sent a patrol vessel to the South China Sea and plans to forward the country’s flagship aircraft carrier to the area to conduct joint exercises with the navies of Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. The quantity and quality of initiatives being undertaken warrant the label of an Italian ‘pivot’ to the Indo-Pacific. By upgrading its presence in the region, Italy joins the other G7 nations in their efforts to uphold the rules-based order and dissuade Beijing from invading Taiwan. However, to consolidate the western anchorage of this pivot, the Meloni government needs to fully align its policy towards Beijing with that of the Euro-Atlantic allies – which includes deciding whether to continue to lend Italy’s official support to China’s Belt and Road Initiative or not.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Taiwan, Asia, Italy, and Indo-Pacific

24. [Global NK Update] July 2023

Author:
Minah Kang
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Key Updates: 1) North Korea’s launch of the ICBM Hwasongpho-18 on July 12th, with an unprecedented 74-minute flight time, drew condemnation from the US, South Korea, and Japan, as discussions were ongoing at a NATO summit. 2) North Korea marked its 70th War Victory Day with a grand ceremony attended by Chinese and Russian officials, including a military parade showcasing their armed forces and strategic weapons, such as the ICBM Hwasongpho-18.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Regional Security, ICBM, and Armistice
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea

25. 2023 EAI Public Opinion Poll on the International Affairs: ② China and the ROK-China Relations

Author:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Amid the deepening U.S.-China strategic competition, East Asia Institute (EAI) conducted a public opinion poll to discern the Korean people’s perception of China and ROK-China relations. EAI presents the survey results in chart form in the “EAI Public Opinion Briefing.” Despite predominantly negative impressions of China and President Xi Jinping, over 80 percent of respondents believe that Korea-China relations is crucial for Korea. The survey results unveiled public opinion that separately recognizes the favorability and significance of China.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, and Polls
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Korea

26. Arabia Saudita ante una disyuntiva, ¿Occidente u Oriente?

Author:
Federico Franceschini
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
Abstract:
La reciente visita en diciembre de 2022 del presidente Xi Jinping a Riad ha sido motivo de intensos y preocupados análisis por parte de politólogos y analistas, que leyeron en la bienvenida otorgada al mandatario chino la culminación del alejamiento de Arabia Saudita de su alianza con Washington. Inmediatas fueron las comparaciones con el viaje en julio del presidente norteamericano Joe Biden. Los periodistas internacionales buscaron, analizando sonrisas y formas de saludos, encontrar diferencias de trato como elemento discriminante para un eventual favoritismo de una potencia sobre la otra.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, and Saudi Arabia

27. Visible Limits of the Sino-Russian Unlimited Partnership: Are Spheres of Influence Changing in Central Asia?

Author:
Eka Javakhishvili
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Russia’s protracted war in Ukraine is not only causing enormous militarypolitical and economic damage to the Kremlin, but it is also gradually eroding Moscow’s traditional spheres of influence. While the Kremlin has directed all its resources to wage the war in Ukraine, Russia’s “ally” China is not wasting time, and is seeking to increase its economic and political involvement with the countries of Central Asia. China’s recent moves reveal a crack in Beijing and Moscow’s “unlimited” friendship, as the leaders of China and Russia called the partnership between the two countries back in February 2022. A visible manifestation of China’s growing influence in the Central Asian region was the China-Central Asia Summit held in May, where the host of the event, Chinese leader Xi Jinping, presented the “Grand Development Plan” for Central Asia. Russia was not invited to attend the summit; therefore, the future cooperation plans between the regional countries were discussed without a Russian representative. The great development plan proposed by China covers the main aspects of cooperation - infrastructural development, strengthening of economic ties, and security challenges in the region. By proposing the mentioned plan, Xi Jinping expressed his willingness to give a new impetus to China’s cooperation with Central Asian countries, but without the official involvement of Moscow. Holding such a high-level summit in China indicates that Beijing is trying to conduct regional policy on its own, without its “ally” Russia, and, in certain areas, without even taking into account Russia’s interests. Due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin’s influence on Central Asia and its role in the region is declining, and China has an ideal moment to fill the vacuum in the absence of Moscow. In addition, Beijing needs to develop its energy and transport land corridors to transport Chinese goods to Europe, for which China is ready to invest billions in Central Asia, and at the same time, to take the regional security initiative on itself. One of the main priorities of China’s foreign policy is to bring the resource-rich countries of Central Asia under its sphere of influence, which obviously means tightening Russia’s interests. It can be assumed that China is aiming to become the dominant political/ economic/military power in the region. Russia’s current military-economic difficulties caused by the war with Ukraine allow Beijing to offer regional countries more prosperity and security guarantees than Moscow can. So the following question arises - is the historically established influence of Russia in Central Asia weakening, while China is gradually strengthening its positioning in the region?
Topic:
International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

28. How Chinese Propaganda Works

Author:
Grigol Julukhidze
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
China is becoming an ever more powerful player in the international political arena. Once a regional power, it now represents the main rival to US global dominance. Over the last few years, Beijing has actively started to apply “propagandistic methods” in order to increase its importance and demonize actual or potential foes. From this point of view, the visibility of the Chinese propaganda model is not as high in Georgia as, for example, the Russian. The main task of the below-presented expert opinion is to illustrate and analyze one of the most powerful machines of disinformation in the world and answer the question, “How does Chinese propaganda work?”
Topic:
Propaganda, Disinformation, and International Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and Georgia

29. The People-to-People Exchange Between China and Georgia in the Frames of the Belt and Road Initiative

Author:
Jing Shi
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Since the launch of the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) in September 2013, the interaction between China and the post-Soviet Eurasian countries has become more dynamic than ever before. Considering the individuality among and differences between these countries (Sun, 2023), and the specific forms of cooperation, China has adopted unified but differentiated objectives and plans for collaboration with them. A key feature is that countries participating in the Belt and Road Initiative receive preferential policies and conveniences within the cooperation framework. Meanwhile, bilateral cooperation is also being actively seen. The primary case study chosen to illustrate the progress and current status of people-to-people exchange in this paper is the relationship between China and Georgia. Georgia’s case serves as a representative example when examining cooperation and interaction within the BRI. The exploration of China’s BRI lays the groundwork for understanding the broader context of international collaboration. Within this expansive framework, the specific case study of China-Georgia relations provides a nuanced lens through which to examine the intricacies of people-to-people exchange and cooperation. Evaluating China-Georgia relations through traditional perspectives may risk overlooking the full reality. Firstly, Georgia actively participates in the BRI, demonstrating significant interest in collaboration with China for mutual benefits and profits (Gürcan, 2020). Secondly, due to its geographical distance from China compared to Central Asian states, the forms of interaction and connectivity between Georgia and China require efforts from both sides. This dynamic not only presents specific challenges for various forms of cooperation within the BRI framework, but also underscores the significance and value of this research. Thirdly, analyzing the China-Georgia interaction uniquely from the perspective of the BRI is necessary. When discussing China-Georgia relations, people-to-people exchange and cooperation in science, education, culture, and health represent the realization of mutual interests and understanding between the two countries (Shi, 2018).
Topic:
Development, Education, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China, Caucasus, Asia, and Georgia

30. The Sources of China’s Innovativeness: Why China’s “Unstoppable” Innovation Powerhouse Might Falter

Author:
Tim Rühlig
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Western governments appear to fear that China is an ­innovation power­house on an almost unstoppable path to dominating ­future technologies. This is quite a turnaround. Only a few years ago, Western policies were crafted on the assumption that China was a copycat incapable of innovation. A focus on Intellectual Property theft as the Chinese “sin” that drove China’s technological development led many in the West to miss what I have identified as the “Five Virtues” that have made China the innovation powerhouse it is today. China’s future success is not ­in­evitable, however, but dependent on a delicate policy ecosystem.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Innovation, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
China and Asia

31. Raising the Minimum: Explaining China’s Nuclear Buildup

Author:
Lyle J. Goldstein
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
China’s nuclear buildup, consisting of new ICBMs, submarine-launched weapons, a new generation of strategic bombers, and advances in hypersonic weapons, implies a significant recalibration of Beijing’s traditional “minimum deterrence” strategy. Beijing deliberated for decades about whether to increase its nuclear arsenal, and it finally seems to be doing so, at least partially in response to the precipitous decline in U.S.-China relations, U.S. initiatives to develop ballistic missile defense, and U.S. nuclear doctrine. China is not bidding for numerical nuclear superiority against the United States with its buildup. Rather, China is likely looking to secure its “second strike” deterrence forces and negate any perception of U.S. nuclear predominance to avoid being coerced by the United States, especially with respect to Taiwan. China’s buildup reflects a strengthening of its deterrent and thus does not contradict China’s long-time policy of no first use (NFU). Beijing wants decision-makers in Washington to recognize its credible deterrent. The United States should both preserve strong nuclear deterrent forces and avoid an overreaction to China’s buildup. U.S. nuclear modernization should focus on survivability and be accompanied by attempts at dialogue, arms control, and the development of crisis management mechanisms.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Crisis Management, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

32. How Militarily Useful Would Taiwan Be to China?

Author:
Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The military value of Taiwan to China should be viewed in the aggregate. There are detriments that could come with seizing the island in addition to advantages for China’s military position. Taiwan is likely to be of greater utility to China in consolidating its hold over the East and South China Seas, as opposed to projecting power deep into the Pacific Ocean. Basing sensors on Taiwan would enhance the effective range of China’s anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities against mobile targets, like U.S. aircraft carriers. The technical deficiencies of Chinese nuclear submarines will limit the advantages of occupying Taiwan in terms of undersea warfare, but there could be gains with respect to operation of China’s conventionally powered submarines. Depending on the depth of resistance China encounters, force requirements for permanently garrisoning Taiwan could place major stress on Chinese military and security forces.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Strategic Competition, and Military
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

33. Deterring a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan: Upholding the Status Quo

Author:
Peter Harris
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The U.S. has a goal to avoid a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, but the overriding U.S. interest is to avoid a ruinous war with China. The imperative to avoid a conflict with China should take priority for U.S. leaders. Proposals to deter China by bolstering U.S. military deployments in the Western Pacific are unlikely to succeed and fraught with danger. China has advantages in terms of geographical proximity to Taiwan and superior commitment to resolving the issue on favorable terms. The United States should not commit to fighting a great-power war at a time of China’s choosing. The Taiwanese obviously have the strongest interest in deterring a Chinese invasion of their island. Regional powers such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia have the next-strongest interests in preserving stability in East Asia. These actors should do the heavy lifting in deterring China. The U.S. should encourage Taiwan and other regional actors to develop their own means of deterring a Chinese invasion. Working with others, Taiwan has the capacity to inflict severe costs upon Beijing in the event of an armed attack. If calibrated correctly, Taiwan and others might convince Beijing that the various costs of invasion—economic sanctions, opprobrium, military balancing—outweigh the benefits and thus deter China from invading. America’s role should be to support Taiwanese-led efforts to deter China while working to convince all sides that the status quo is sustainable and the U.S. remains committed to its longstanding One China policy. This is the best chance of preventing a war in the Taiwan Strait.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Deterrence, Military, Status Quo, and Invasion
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

34. Implications of a Melting Arctic

Author:
Sascha Glaeser
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Melting ice is making the Arctic more accessible, which in turn may affect three key issues in the region—militarization, maritime trade, and natural resource development. U.S. security interests in the Arctic remain deterring an attack on the United States and NATO allies and ensuring the lawful use of Arctic waters. The United States can secure both at minimum cost and risk. Greater accessibility does not increase threats emanating from the Arctic, so the United States does not need to do more militarily to ensure its security. Militarization absent threats could lead to a destabilizing security dilemma. Trans-Arctic maritime trade routes and natural resource development present potential economic opportunities; however, both still face significant challenges that limit their near-term viability. The United States should be vigilant to Russian and Chinese activity in the Arctic and avoid overreacting or reflexively mirroring their behavior. A U.S. Arctic strategy built on the reality that the United States enjoys a strong conventional and nuclear deterrent, a robust network of Arctic allies, and favorable geography, is the best avenue to protect U.S. interests and keep the Arctic at peace.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Natural Resources, Trade, and Militarization
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Arctic, and United States of America

35. War Is a Choice, Not a Trap: The Right Lessons from Thucydides

Author:
Michael C. Desch
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
A careful reading of the Greek Thucydides’ The History of the Peloponnesian War suggests that a U.S.-China war is hardly inevitable. Such a war is a choice, not a trap, and selecting the appropriate U.S. grand strategy is the way to avoid it. China faces important geographical and technological obstacles to expanding its hegemonic position in the region. Thucydides’ fundamental lessons for the contemporary United States in its rivalry with China is that democratic Athens erred when it sought primacy by expanding its empire during the Peloponnesian War; today we do not need to preserve a position of primacy in East Asia but can instead rest content with maintaining a balance of power. Despite China’s rise, the United States and its regional allies are in a strong position to maintain a regional balance of power that keeps a peace and serve U.S. interests in Asia.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Defense Policy, War, History, Alliance, and Geography
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

36. Semiconductors Are Not a Reason to Defend Taiwan

Author:
Christopher McCallion
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Taiwan’s dominance in advanced semiconductor manufacturing and rising U.S.-China tensions have produced alarm that a Chinese invasion or blockade of Taiwan could cause a major disruption of the global semiconductor supply chain. This has led some to claim that the U.S. should defend Taiwan in order to maintain its supply of advanced chips. Fears that China could seize Taiwan’s chip-manufacturing capacity and leapfrog the U.S. technologically are overblown. Interdependence cuts both ways; if China invaded Taiwan, it would be cut off from the vital inputs controlled by the U.S. or its allies, and therefore unable to resume chip production under new management. Others fear Taiwanese chips could be disrupted during a Chinese blockade or a protracted conflict and tend to recommend bolstering U.S. capabilities to deter China. However, there are strong reasons to doubt the U.S. can ultimately deter Beijing if it feels that force is its only option for national reunification. Further efforts by the U.S. to deter China may only present Beijing with a closing window, encouraging it to use force before its prospects worsen, and precipitating the very conflict the U.S. seeks to prevent; a war between the U.S. and China would be exponentially costlier than any potential semiconductor supply shock resulting from a cross-strait invasion. Instead, the U.S. should seek to dial down the temperature with Beijing in order to maintain the political and territorial status quo and buy the time needed to diversify its own semiconductor supplies by onshoring or “allyshoring” chip manufacturing. The U.S. should therefore avoid provoking Beijing unnecessarily, and reaffirm the substance of the One China Policy while seeking to develop a longer-term settlement with Beijing over the future of the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Manufacturing, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

37. How China’s Environments Changed its Modern History: An interview with Micah Muscolino

Author:
Micah Muscolino and Rustam Khan
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Toynbee Prize Foundation
Abstract:
It is hard to imagine the environmental calamities of our age without invoking China today. The “world’s factory” – as it is colloquially and sometimes derogatively called – has come to forefront of many discussions about the need to avert the dangers of planetary degradation. Images such as the thick carpets of smog covering Beijing or gripping documentaries, such as Death by Design (AMBRICA, 2016) and Plastic China (Jiu-Liang Wang, 2016), have revealed how China’s social and natural landscapes have experienced the ‘Anthropocene’s’ coming of age. In such narratives, the environment in China is usually seen as the victim of unfettered industrial production and global consumption starting with the country’s ‘reform and opening up’ period in the late 1970s. But to what extent does this periodization and the logics of the Anthropocene that rest upon it make sense against the longer historical record? A wave of scholarship has scrutinized the abstract idea of the environment in China’s restless history over the past two centuries. Bracketing the origins of the today’s environmental crises exclusively within the globalization debate is to miss something important. Namely, ecological thinking featured prominently in the country’s experiences with modernization, colonialism, and nation-building starting in the long 19th century. Micah Muscolino’s work is a great example that rethinks the conventional framework of modern Chinese history. Muscolino shows how the making of Qing, National, and PRC rule were often built on its relationships to natural resources. He has also come to see many similarities between today’s environmentalist transformations and China’s past. China stands, as he asserts, at the heart of the world’s present-day predicaments. The Toynbee Prize Foundation had the pleasure of interviewing Professor Micah Muscolino. He is the author of two acclaimed monographs, Fishing Wars and Environmental Change in Late Imperial and Modern China (2009) and The Ecology of War in China: Henan Province, the Yellow River, and Beyond, 1938-1950 (2015). With his Ph.D. in Chinese history from Harvard in hand, Muscolino taught at St. Mary’s College of California, Georgetown University, and the University of Oxford, before taking up the Pickowicz Endowed Chair in Modern Chinese History at UC San Diego in 2018. He took the time to tell us more about the China’s past and present entanglements with the environment.
Topic:
Environment, Globalization, History, Displacement, Ecology, and Food Crisis
Political Geography:
China and Asia

38. WILL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE WORLD BANK AND CHINA LAST?

Author:
Richard Clark
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
International development organizations, which provide concessional loans and grants to help finance developing countries, often overlap with one another, performing similar tasks in similar countries. For instance, dozens of such organizations have offered COVID-19 relief to developing country member states. In one case, the World Bank approved a $95 million package for Uzbekistan to strengthen its medical systems in April 2020. The Asian Development Bank pledged another $1.1 billion to Uzbekistan over the last two years, and the World Health Organization doled out another $10 million in personal protective and laboratory equipment. Overall, 28 international organizations provide development assistance today.
Topic:
Development, International Organization, World Bank, and Finance
Political Geography:
China and Asia

39. Turning point? Putin, Xi, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Bobo Lo
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Putin’s war in Ukraine has highlighted the resilience but also the limitations of Sino–Russian partnership. Far from being an “arc of autocracy”, this is an interests-based relationship between strategically autonomous powers. Foreign policy coordination between China and Russia is limited by their different views of global order. Beijing is invested in a stable international system, albeit one skewed in its favour, whereas Moscow thrives on disorder and uncertainty. Xi Jinping aims to preserve the Sino–Russian partnership while maintaining ties with the West. But Beijing’s balancing act will become harder to sustain as the war continues. The balance of power within the bilateral relationship has tilted sharply towards Beijing. Russia is more reliant on China than ever. The long-term outlook for the relationship is unpromising.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Conflict, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Ukraine

40. Revising down the rise of China

Author:
Roland Rajah and Alyssa Leng
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
China will likely experience a substantial long-term growth slowdown owing to demographic decline, the limits of capital-intensive growth, and a gradual deceleration in productivity growth. Even with continued broad policy success, our baseline projections suggest annual economic growth will slow to about 3% by 2030 and 2% by 2040, while averaging 2–3% overall from now until 2050. China would still become the world’s largest economy, but it would never enjoy a meaningful lead over the US and would remain far less prosperous and productive per person even by mid-century.
Topic:
Demographics, Economy, Economic Growth, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

41. The Geopolitics of Human Trafficking and Gendered North Korean Migration

Author:
Eunyoung Christina Choi
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
According to the “White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2021,” human-trafficking targeted at North Korean defectors in China remains a grave issue ? not only are North Korean women sold without their consent, but they are also forced to prostitution at entertainment establishments. In this commentary, Eunyoung Christina Choi, Senior Fellow at the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies (IPUS) at Seoul National University, looks into the dire circumstances North Korean women defectors find themselves in during their pursuit to defect. She explains that the international community’s interest in and measures against the human-trafficking of North Korean female defectors have been dominated by geopolitical interests and have in turn exacerbated women’s prospects to safely defect.
Topic:
Women, Borders, and Human Trafficking
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and North Korea

42. India–China Boundary Dispute: Progress on Disengagement, but De-escalation Remains Far-fetched

Author:
Amrita Jash
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
On 13 September 2022, India and China confirmed the completion of their respective disengagements from another friction point along their mutually contested border. The disengagement took place in eastern Ladakh, resulting in the withdrawal of troops from Patrolling Point (PP) 15 in the Gogra-Hot Springs area.[1] This was the fourth disengagement from the area, marking a step towards ending the 28-month stand-off in the eastern Ladakh ongoing since the military clashes of May 2020. This stand-off has not only been the longest but also one of the most violent confrontations between India and China. On 15 June 2020, the Galwan Valley clash led to multiple casualties, twenty on the Indian side, while less clarity exists on the numbers of Chinese deaths.[2] All in all the incident was the bloodiest military clash since the Sumdorong Chu crisis in 1986–87.
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, Conflict, Borders, and Disengagement
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia

43. NATO’s New Strategic Concept: Novelties and Priorities

Author:
Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
NATO’s new Strategic Concept provides a clear set of guidelines for the Alliance in a mid-term perspective. Adopted on 29 June in Madrid, the Concept outlines a number of priorities stemming from Russia’s war on Ukraine, but also puts forward relevant novelties concerning China and the Indo-Pacific. During the NATO Summit in Madrid, alliance members affirmed that Russia can no longer be considered a partner, effectively internalising the geopolitical earthquake represented by the return of a major conventional and multi-domain war on European soil.[1] The Strategic Concept also identifies deterrence and defence as the Alliance’s number one priority, in comparison to the other core tasks: crisis prevention and management and cooperative security.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

44. Constraints for Engagement with China: Dutch Ports and the BRI

Author:
Vera Kranenburg and Frans-Paul van der Putten
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Rising US–China rivalry is shaping and constraining the relations between European states and China. The Netherlands is no exception and recent tensions with China have carried over to impact its trade and cooperative engagements with Beijing. The Netherlands never formally signed onto the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)[1] – the Chinese policy framework for international transport, communication and energy development. Nevertheless, the BRI is very relevant to the Netherlands, in particular for the Dutch port of Rotterdam and its ambition to preserve its role as a major logistical hub for trade with Europe.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Trade, Engagement, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Netherlands, and United States of America

45. China - A Non-neutral Party in the Russo-Ukrainian War

Author:
Medea Ivaniadze
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
In the Russo-Ukrainian war, we cannot call the position of one of the main challenges of the 21st century, communist China, “neutral”. Beijing’s position was obvious even before the war: it is pro-Russian, clearly antiWestern, and especially anti-American. China does not condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine, nor does it call it an invasion. At the same time, reports have emerged of the prospect of Beijing providing military assistance to Moscow, and it is not beyond imagination that China will also help Moscow avoid the sanctions. The course of the war, and time, will show China’s level of support for its strategic partner, Russia. However, despite Moscow’s support and negative attitude towards the West, Beijing will still act according to its long-term strategic goals, and if China distances itself from Russia on specific issues, it will not be because of solidarity with Ukraine, but for its own strategic interests.
Topic:
Security, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

46. Chinese Surveillance Devices: Coming to a Neighborhood Near You

Author:
Jayson Browder, Valerie Shen, and Mike Sexton
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
The Chinese government conducts cyber espionage against the US on an unprecedented scale. Senior US intelligence officials have warned the “Internet of Things” is a US counterintelligence and cybersecurity vulnerability. Tens of billions of connected physical devices from Chinese-made webcams to “smart” appliances could be exploited at scale by the Chinese intelligence services. In 2016, the malware “Mirai” was able to weaponize more than half a million devices in a Denial-of-Service attack causing a massive East Coast Internet outage. Unaddressed, these threats will only increase as China exports surveillance devices around the world.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Surveillance, and Innovation
Political Geography:
China and Asia

47. Three Reasons Why CHIPS-plus is a Big Win for US National Security

Author:
Tom Klein
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
On August 9th, 2022, President Biden signed vital bipartisan legislation to compete with China. H.R. 4346, called the CHIPS and Science Act or “CHIPS-plus,” would pave the way for nearly $280 billion in incentives to boost US-based chip manufacturing, scientific research, technology standards setting, and STEM education. These initiatives directly protect our immediate security vulnerabilities in the US military and support our long-term national security competition with China by promoting democratic norms and spurring critical defense innovations.
Topic:
Security, National Security, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Innovation, and CHIPS
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

48. CAN DEBT RELIEF CONSTRAIN REPRESSIVE GOVERNMENTS?

Author:
Brett L. Carter
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
The African continent is confronting the prospect of a new debt crisis. The COVID-19 pandemic wreaked havoc on government finances. The Russian government’s war against Ukraine has increased the cost of food and energy, and compelled investors to sell off government bonds in emerging markets. Rising interest rates in the United States will increase the cost of borrowing. The Chinese economy is struggling under the weight of Xi Jinping’s “Zero COVID” policy and accumulated real estate debt. In 2015, the International Monetary Fund announced that eight countries were in debt distress. By March 2022, 23 were. In June, public debt ratios reached a 20-year high. Africa’s debt-distressed governments “are unlikely to default” in 2022,” The Economist observed, “but face trouble by 2024.” There is some evidence that the debt crisis is especially acute for Africa’s non-democracies. The impending debt crisis coincides with a general sense that Africa is experiencing a democratic recession. Voters are increasingly subject to intimidation and violence. Incumbent presidents are removing term limits. The longstanding norm against military coups is fading.
Topic:
Cold War, Debt, World Bank, GDP, Repression, and IMF
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, China, Ukraine, Asia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and United States of America

49. DOES THE GLOBAL CONSENSUS ON APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA HOLD CLUES FOR THE UYGHURS?

Author:
Maria Lotito
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
A new report from the United Nations finds that China may have committed crimes against humanity in Xinjiang and that human rights violations are ongoing. The abuse flows from China’s “Strike Hard” campaign, executed to counter separatism and extremism, subjecting Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities to mass detentions, forced labor and sterilizations, cultural suppression, and surveillance. The report comes months after the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, before which some governments sympathetic to the Uyghurs’ plight staged diplomatic boycotts, to little avail. The UN report, much like the Olympic boycotts, will change few minds. What does it take to generate intergovernmental consensus around broad-scale human rights violations? Such convergence, even upon opposition to egregious human rights abuse, is rare and difficult to achieve. This is because violating governments are skilled at subverting international human rights norms and onlooking states have many reasons to avoid acting. Abusive practices might be reframed as responsible policy, or covered up. Meanwhile, supposedly compliant governments contend with a panoply of bilateral interests, some incompatible with international norms.
Topic:
Apartheid, Human Rights, Arab Spring, Color Revolutions, Soviet Union, and Consensus
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, China, India, South Africa, and Iceland

50. WILL NANCY PELOSI’S VISIT TO TAIWAN TRIGGER A CRISIS?

Author:
James Lee and Jackie Wong
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
The controversy surrounding Nancy Pelosi’s (D-CA) potential visit to Taiwan centers on what it implies about United States’ relations with Taiwan. When the United States normalized relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1979, it said it would continue relations with Taiwan on an unofficial basis. The Normalization Communique said that “the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.” Beijing has interpreted this statement as a commitment, and it has warned Washington that closer government-to-government interactions with Taipei would violate that commitment and have dire, though unspecified, consequences. But there’s no formula for determining what “unofficial” means. The canonical statements of the United States’ One-China policy—the Shanghai Communiqué, the Normalization Communiqué, the Arms Sales Communiqué, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six Assurances—are written at a high level of abstraction. There is no communiqué in which the United States said that the Speaker of the House would never visit Taiwan; those kinds of details are left to diplomatic protocols (such as the “contact guidelines”) that the United States has defined on its own. It is an act of interpretation—an art rather than a science—and the question now is whether a visit by Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan would be outside the bounds of a reasonable interpretation of “unofficial” relations.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Nancy Pelosi
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

51. MANAGING CONFLICT BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL RIVALS

Author:
Elizabeth Radziszewski and Jeremy Berkowitz
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Sweden’s and Finland’s recent decisions to join NATO marked a historic moment for the two Nordic states known for their neutrality. The move not only reflects evolving security concerns about Russia’s aggression in Ukraine but marks a shift that is set to end decades of accommodation toward Russia. It also sheds light on a broader question about why some rival countries—or those that have a history of tensions—sustain policies of accommodation over the years, and what pushes them to abandon such policies. Why would Sweden and Finland refrain from alienating Russia for years only to break suddenly with this tradition with their unprecedented decision to apply for NATO membership?
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Military, and Conflict Management
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Finland, Asia, Spain, North Africa, Sweden, Morocco, and United States of America

52. WeChat’s role in Australian democracy: A grassroots view

Author:
Xueyin Zha
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
The social media messaging app WeChat is often portrayed in expert and media commentary as being inherently incompatible with democracy in Australia because the platform is subject to the scrutiny and censure of China, an authoritarian one-party state. This study provides the first in-depth snapshot of how politicians and everyday Chinese-Australians use WeChat at the grassroots level during council elections. It finds that WeChat, in these circumstances, can be broadly compatible with liberal democracy and significantly enhances democratic participation in a multicultural society. Using the December 2021 New South Wales (NSW) local elections as a case study, this paper analyses qualitative data collected from private group chats, interviews with Chinese-Australian politicians, and editors from media outlets on WeChat. The study finds that, overall, the app expanded, rather than restricted, Chinese-Australian voters’ access to quality news content to better inform their choices at the ballot box. The platform was used to bridge gaps in the provision of public services and information to Chinese-Australian communities and facilitated their civic engagement. Despite its benefits, WeChat is afflicted by issues relating to censorship, transparency, online polarisation, and mis- and disinformation. Australia’s stark political differences and fraught bilateral relations with China add additional layers of complexity to managing these challenges. However, improved oversight and governance arrangements, alongside enhanced funding for reliable Chinese-language online media, would help offset the risk of foreign influence and better harness the platform’s utility for bolstering the participation of Chinese-Australian communities in Australia’s democracy.
Topic:
Democracy, Social Media, Political Participation, and WeChat
Political Geography:
China and Australia

53. Chinese coercion, Australian resilience

Author:
Richard McGregor
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Australians have grown in confidence about the country’s ability to withstand economic coercion from China since the imposition of punitive trade measures in 2020. Beijing suspended high-level political exchanges and imposed a range of informal sanctions and trade blockages against Australia in the wake of a series of escalating disputes, culminating in Canberra’s call for an independent inquiry into the origins of Covid-19 in April that year. Two years on, it is prudent to plan on the basis that it is still early days in China’s use of trade measure against Australia. Canberra and Beijing resumed ministerial-level dialogue after the election of the Albanese Labor government in May 2022. But given the long-term structural divide between the United States and China, and Australia’s position as a strong US ally, Australian governments of all persuasions should assume that China’s trade policies against Australia will remain largely in place. Beijing may tactically retreat now and again to fill shortfalls or if it wants for political reasons to present itself as a conciliatory partner. But a solution to the fundamental bilateral political tensions driving trade disruptions is not on the horizon. The sectors in which bilateral trade with China have continued to prosper are not those in which Australian producers are dependent on China but rather where the two countries are interdependent. Australia cannot find alternative markets to match China for commodities such as iron ore, liquefied natural gas, and wool. Nor can China wean itself off a substantial reliance on Australia as a supplier. For this reason, the core elements of bilateral trade will remain reasonably resilient for some years. However, absent a huge change in the structure of the Australian economy and its export profile, the longer-term picture for exports to China looks worse. As China’s economy grows and its structure changes and becomes less resource intensive, Australia will likely get a decreasing share of a growing pie. Over time, the cost of trade bans and other punitive measures will likely mount as Chinese investment in Australia diminishes and the cost of diversifying from the region’s largest economy grows. Australia has maintained its reputation as a reliable supplier of commodities throughout the downturn in bilateral relations with China. It is imperative that it continue to do so — both to benefit the Australian economy and to maintain leverage of its own. Control over critical commodities carries considerable strategic value, as the role of gas and oil in the Ukraine war has shown.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Commodities, Trade, Resilience, and Coercion
Political Geography:
China and Australia

54. Sharper choices: How Australia can make better national security decisions

Author:
Ben Scott
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
As Australia’s national security environment has grown more complex and competitive, the country’s governments have gradually articulated their strategic response, primarily in the 2016 Defence White Paper, the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, and the 2020 Defence Strategic Update. In these documents, and in major speeches, Australian governments have adopted four broad strategic concepts: the embattled rules-based order, the return of great power competition, the expansion of grey zone competition, and the increased likelihood of major power war. There is no master theory that can entirely explain Australia’s situation and guide its decision-makers. A national security strategy is necessary, but its utility will be limited by the increasingly unpredictable course of geopolitics. The strategic concepts Australia has adopted illuminate its interests, objectives, and the types of issues Canberra must grapple with. But these concepts also mask many of the difficult choices Australia will face. Focusing on the paradox of “competitive independence” brings additional clarity to the country’s policy dilemmas but does not resolve them. Responding to greater uncertainty will require greater case-by-case decision-making. But this does not mean the government should simply muddle through. Rather, it should seek to improve the quality of its decision-making by following through on Australia’s history of imposing more structure on national security decision-making. Acknowledging the complexity of the challenges it faces, the government should more often seek discrete assessments of national security problems to ensure that all relevant dimensions are considered. This would help ensure that Australia’s long-term strategic goals are considered when critical decisions are made.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, and Decision-Making
Political Geography:
China and Australia

55. Mixed report card: China’s influence at the United Nations

Author:
Courtney J. Fung and Shing-hon Lam
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
China is of growing importance to the United Nations. Beijing aims to exert influence at the world body to legitimise and disseminate its foreign policy values and interests. This report contextualises China’s growing presence at the United Nations by examining publicly available data on four metrics that gauge Beijing’s success in steering the global governance agenda. Those metrics are: funding for UN departments, programs, and initiatives; staffing of executive-level personnel positions; voting in the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council; and the use of PRC-specific discourse and language in UN-generated documentation. The United Nations has become progressively more reliant on China’s general contributions, and in turn China has used a combination of levers to elevate its position within the UN system. However, this report finds that China is still selective in its overall approach to UN participation and that efforts by the PRC do not necessarily translate into successful influence at the body. The report makes three recommendations for UN stakeholders. First, a deeper understanding must be gained of what China contributes across different UN agencies and functional areas to establish a more complete picture of its multilateral input. Second, efforts should be made to shape China’s engagement in multilateral issues, in particular those that the PRC is yet to prioritise, such as refugee management. Third, it is vital to articulate an inclusive multilateral vision for a rules-based international order that specifies under which conditions China’s contributions are embraced, rather than framing PRC input solely as a source of concern.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, United Nations, Governance, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:
China and Asia

56. China Under Xi Jinping’s One-Man Rule

Author:
Young Nam Cho
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Young Nam Cho, Professor at Seoul National University, claims that Xi Jinping’s third consecutive term breaks a decades-long practice regarding party leadership in China, which would increase political uncertainty, hinder innovation, pose challenges to future succession and have negative implications for China’s elite politics. While all the members of the Central Committee Politburo filled with Xi’s loyalists, no amendments have been made to the constitution related to the collective leadership and consensus-based decision-making process. Professor Cho emphasizes that this would continue to pose limitations on the personalistic rule by Xi Jinping in the future.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Leadership, Xi Jinping, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, East Asia, and Asia

57. Analysis of Xi Jinping’s Work Report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China and its Implications on Foreign Policy

Author:
Hankwon Kim
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Hankwon Kim, an Associate Professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, provides an analysis of Xi Jinping's "Work Report" to the 20th Party Congress which includes an ideological and political framework for understanding the likely direction of Chinese domestic and foreign policy for the next five years. Dr. Kim claims that the chances of China shifting its foreign policy seem to be low as the report contained indirect criticisms towards the United States by opposing all forms of hegemonism, coercive politics, Cold War thinking, interference in domestic affairs, and double standards. In addition, as 2027 marks the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the People's Liberation Army of China and the time Xi Jinping should decide whether to run for a fourth consecutive term, Dr. Kim predicts that Chinese leadership could move toward armed unification by 2027. Accordingly, Dr. Kim suggests that South Korea should investigate possible future scenarios in the Taiwan Strait and prepare for concrete countermeasures.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Xi Jinping, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, North Korea, and United States of America

58. The Influence of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the DPRK-China Economic Ties and their Impact on the Korean Peninsula

Author:
Eun-lee Joung
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
In normal economies, currencies weaken in times of difficulty, but something counter-intuitive happens in North Korea. Eun-lee Joung, a research fellow at Korea Institute for National Unification claims that the value of the North Korean won appreciated, and the market prices were remarkably stable although North Korea’s economy suffered its biggest contraction during the pandemic situation. Dr. Joung states that the partial lockdown of the border between North Korea and China, and North Korea’s various changes to deal with the sanctions including the substitution of imported goods with domestic goods may have contributed to the outcome. Meanwhile, she mentions that intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition and the possibility of a prolonged conflict between Russia and Ukraine could increase North Korea’s economic reliance on China and Russia which will impede the re-establishing relations between the two Koreas. However, as the cooperation between North Korea and China in tourism has increased up before the COVID-19 outbreak, Dr. Joung highlights that Pyongyang’s tourism industry is likely to expand, which is expected to stimulate non-governmental exchange and induce North Korea toward openness.
Topic:
Economy, Currency, COVID-19, and Unification
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

59. Reviewing 30 Years of “China’s Role” in North Korea’s Nuclear Issue

Author:
Dong Ryul Lee
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Dong Ryul Lee, Professor at the Department of Chinese Studies at Dongduk Women’s University and the Chair of the China Research Center at EAI, writes that China’s policies toward North Korea and its nuclear program has been consistent for the past 30 years, has taken caution not to pressure North Korea to the extent that would escalate instability and has played a role in easing tensions. Professor Lee highlights that Beijing actively intervened to secure its position and influence in the Korean Peninsula when significant changes to the region’s strategic landscape were made. He suggests that South Korea should seek the support of China in its North Korea policy based on the accurate understanding of China’s policy stance and the maximum degree to which South Korea can influence.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Denuclearization, and Unification
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

60. President Yoon's Trip to Madrid: Rethinking Seoul's Policies toward Moscow, Beijing, Tokyo, and Pyongyang

Author:
Yang Gyu Kim
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
In this Commentary, Yang Gyu Kim, Principal Researcher at the East Asia Institute (EAI), explains the objectives behind the U.S.’ invitation of its key allies the Indo-Pacific to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit. He posits that the U.S. aims to establish a highly institutionalized cooperative mechanism that combines the capacities of existing alliances among like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific. In this context, the author stresses the need for South Korea to address the implications of the Russia-Ukraine War, the emerging Chinese threat, and reestablish ROK-Japan relations. Lastly, Dr. Kim proposes that the administration should carefully consider how it might restore international cooperation on the North Korea issue and resume the denuclearization process.
Topic:
International Relations, NATO, Denuclearization, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

61. Filling the Geopolitical Void in Central Asia

Author:
Bruce Pannier
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
A new era in foreign policy is starting for the five Central Asian states—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—in which the role of former colonial master Russia is significantly diminished as Moscow concentrates its attention and resources on the debacle it created when it started a war on Ukraine. China also has considerable influence in Central Asia, but China has not indicated it is willing to fill the vacuums Russia is leaving in Central Asia’s security, finances, or trade. The Central Asian states of necessity are seeking new partners, but it is possible that as the Central Asian states develop new foreign partnerships, they will create new divisions regionally, and the case of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is possibly an example of what is come for Central Asia.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Finance, and Trade
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Central Asia, Eurasia, Kazakhstan, Asia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan

62. America’s Great-Power Challenge: Managing Russia’s Decline and China’s Rise

Author:
Thomas F. Lynch III
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Geopolitics today is characterized by an evolving multipolar great-power competition between China, Russia, and the United States. The zero-sum nature of bipolar Cold War competition logic does not apply so relative losses in power by Russia could help the relative power position of China, and harm long-term American strategic interests, unless carefully managed in Washington. Washington should learn from past multi-state great-power competitions. Great Britain’s approach to Imperial Russia and Imperial Germany in the early 20th century is especially instructive. Like London in 1905, Washington today must stay attentive to the balance of power between itself and China as it manages Moscow’s relative power decline from the military debacle in Ukraine. The United States should defend its interests in Eastern Europe without so undermining Russia that a new period of instability spreads across Eurasia or that China aggrandizes strategically significant relative power gains from Moscow’s infirmity.
Topic:
Power Politics, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

63. Putin Is Doing Xi’s Dirty Work (and the West Is Helping Him)

Author:
William R. Spiegelberger
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Vladimir Putin’s diplomatic turn to China has been a disappointment for good reason: Beijing is more interested in advancing its own anti-Western interests than in helping Moscow. The more fruitful and natural partnership would be between Russia and the West, since both face a common threat from China and the infrastructure for mutual prosperity is already in place. The main impediment to improved Russian-Western relations is the continued rule of Putin, who is increasingly doing China’s bidding at Russia’s expense.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Xi Jinping, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

64. Treading Lightly: China’s Footprint in a Taliban-led Afghanistan

Author:
Jiayi Zhou, Fei Su, and Jingdong Yuan
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
This SIPRI Insights Paper provides a preliminary assessment of China’s attitudes to and policies on Afghanistan since the August 2021 Taliban takeover. It examines the scope of China’s security, economic and humanitarian interests, and the depth of its engagement so far. It finds that China’s footprint has been minimal due not only to China’s non-interference policy but also to a range of broader challenges: the militant extremist groups that continue to operate on Afghan soil, the risks of investing in a country where the government remains unrecognized by any member of the international community and a fragile stability that is far from conducive to long-term planning. While there may be prospects and opportunities for China to contribute to Afghan peace and development, particularly from a broader regional perspective, current realities mean that China’s overall approach to Afghanistan will remain cautious, pragmatic and limited.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Development, Taliban, and Investment
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, China, and South Asia

65. Don’t Fear Vacuums: It’s Safe To Go Home

Author:
Benjamin H. Friedman
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
“We will not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia, or Iran,” President Biden said this July in defense of his administration’s continued commitment to the Middle East.1 His comments reflect a widely held misconception: that a U.S. military exit from the Middle East would empower U.S. adversaries, and thus somehow make Americans less secure.2 U.S. leaders and pundits have expressed similar fears about the danger of creating vacuums by leaving Syria, Afghanistan (before U.S. exit of course), and even Africa, where only smatterings of U.S. troops are stationed.3 Vacuum fears also fuel more general warnings against surrendering influence in the developing world. Chinese investments via its Belt and Road Initiative—a massive set of infrastructure-development loans—for example, are said to exploit a vacuum the United States should compete to fill. Chinese trade in South America, or Russian port calls there, are said to reflect a failure to exert U.S. influence.4 The burgeoning idea behind these claims is that “great power competition,” which once seemed a useful rationale for exiting conflicts and lingering endeavors of the global war on terror, demands winning an open-ended, ill-defined contest for influence with Russia and China in the greater Middle East and developing world, or what is now sometimes called the global south.5 Vacuums that could be said to follow a U.S. exit—not the terrorists or insurgents U.S. forces were deployed to fight—are the new justification for staying.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, and United States of America

66. Whitsun Reef Incident: Duterte’s China Strategy Sinking?

Author:
Julius Caesar Trajano
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
The recent swarming of Chinese militia boats in Whitsun Reef may indicate that President Duterte’s appeasement strategy towards China does not really work. Asserting the Arbitral Ruling must therefore be explored by Manila.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Militias
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Vietnam, and Philippines

67. Restoring Civic Trust in the Post-Pandemic Era: What makes citizens trust governments?

Author:
Sarah Cliffe and Paul von Chamier
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation (CIC)
Abstract:
We are still engaged in a race against time of increasing urgency, not only in terms of flattening the pandemic curve in situations such as those India and many Latin American countries face, but also in restoring trust that government and international institutions can act, and act successfully, in face of 21st century crises. We are seeing both deeply negative and truly positive developments. Many parts of the world enter the depths of the third wave of the pandemic, with record highs in new daily infections, and in human suffering behind the numbers. Yet at the same time there is positive news: on medical innovation, on international liquidity, on tax cooperation, and on climate. The question is which will win out: can positive progress move fast enough to counteract the trust crisis? In 2020, CIC published a number of pieces on trust in high-, middle- and low-income countries and in international organizations. Last summer, trust in government had in many parts of the world increased: we made the argument that people were faced with a brutal reminder of what governments are for and hence had turned back to the state, but also warned that trust bubbles in crises often evaporate within a year if people do not see sustained and credible action. This analysis from the CIC team looks at what empirical research says about why trust matters for many different forms of political, social, and economic development—and why we should take declining trust seriously. The team also takes a look at what we know about the determinants of trust, in particular corruption, inequality, and history. Lastly, this analysis discusses the different policy options to restore and nurture trust.
Topic:
Security, Governance, Reform, Multilateralism, Economic Development, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

68. Divisions on US-China Policy: Opinion Leaders and the Public

Author:
Craig Kafura, Dina Smeltz, Joshua W. Busby, Joshua D. Kertzer, and Jonathan Monten
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
Craig Kafura, Dina Smeltz, Joshua Busby, Joshua D. Kertzer, Jonathan Monten, and Jordan Tama analyze recent surveys of foreign policy professionals and the American public on the degree of threat posed by China and how the United States should respond. As President Joseph Biden returns to the White House, this time to sit behind the Resolute desk, perhaps no foreign policy question looms larger than that of US-China relations. The results of the 2020 Chicago Council Survey and the 2020 Chicago Council on Global Affairs-University of Texas at Austin survey of foreign policy professionals and the American public find there are significant partisan differences among leaders and the public on the degree of threat posed by China and how the United States should respond. When it comes to defending Taiwan, however, the divisions are not between partisans but between the public and opinion leaders, with the public in opposition and leaders in support of an American defense of Taiwan.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Public Opinion
Political Geography:
China, East Asia, North America, and United States of America

69. Russians See Greater Reward than Risk in Closer Relations with China

Author:
Dina Smeltz, Brendan Helm, Denis Volkov, and Stepan Goncharov
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
As Russia and China grow closer through economic ties, a joint Chicago Council on Global Affairs-Levada Analytical Center survey finds that the Russian public sees little downside to the growing bilateral relationship. With China and Russia on the outs with the United States, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping have broadened bilateral economic and military cooperation over the last few years. Recent cooperation has included energy and infrastructure projects, and even a little bit of panda diplomacy. While some observers warn about the potential risk that Russia may grow too dependent on Beijing, a joint Chicago Council on Global Affairs-Levada Analytical Center survey finds that the Russian public sees little downside to the growing bilateral relationship.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, and Survey
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Eastern Europe, and Asia

70. Ahead of Biden-Moon Summit, South Koreans and Americans Align on China and North Korea

Author:
Karl Friedhoff and Suh Young Park
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
Chicago Council survey data find majorities in South Korea view China as more of a security threat than a security partner and as more of an economic threat than an economic partner. On May 21, South Korea’s President Moon Jae-in will meet President Joe Biden at the White House. In his first 100 days in office, Biden’s foreign policy has focused on repairing alliances and setting the administration’s policy toward China—in March and April alone, the administration participated in US-China talks in Alaska, 2+2 meetings in South Korea and Japan, trilateral talks among national security advisers, and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga's visit to Washington. Moon’s visit will add North Korea to the agenda. The two leaders meet at a time when there are significant gaps on their preferred paths forward to dealing with Beijing and Pyongyang. However, recent Chicago Council surveys find that attitudes among publics in South Korea and the United States are remarkably similar when it comes to China and North Korea.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, and Public Opinion
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and Southeast Asia

71. EU-China Investment Agreement: the EU’s Balancing Act between Values and Economic Interests

Author:
Saila Turtiainen
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The ratification process for the EU’s new investment agreement with China is expected to be very difficult. Although the aim is to improve EU-China relations, the process of getting the agreement approved in the EU will end up causing further tensions with China as the EU tries to strike a balance between promoting its values and economic interests.
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, European Union, Conflict, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

72. What the Quad Is, Is Not, and Should Not Be

Author:
Daniel Depetris
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Since its establishment in 2007, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD or Quad) has transformed into a multilateral forum to enhance military coordination in the Indo-Pacific among the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia and to address issues of mutual concern—particularly the rise of China. The U.S. has pushed for this transformation. Quad members speak of the group as a forum for issues in the Indo-Pacific ranging from COVID-19 and climate change to emerging technologies. But China, Asia’s biggest power, is integral to addressing each issue. In early 2021, the group’s leaders signed a joint statement reiterating the importance of a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific—a reference to what all four members regard as China’s illegitimate claims in the South and East China Seas. Indo-Pacific Quad members also have disputes with China: India over its shared border with China; Japan over China’s sovereignty claims over the Senkaku islands; and Australia over worsening ties, including onerous trade restrictions and tariffs.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, COVID-19, and Quad Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, China, India, Australia, and United States of America

73. The Folly of a Democracy-based Grand Strategy

Author:
Benjamin Denison
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
President Biden’s Summit for Democracy exacerbates regime security fears in states such as Russia and China, further destabilizing relations and making it more difficult to advance U.S. interests. U.S. policymakers may claim democracy promotion and regime change are clearly different policies. But years of excessive pursuit of both to prop up U.S. hegemony mean Russia, China, and other non-democracies perceive them as part of a unified U.S. threat to their regimes. China and Russia’s fears for their regime security may be overwrought, but regardless, they encourage those states to collaborate more with each other; resist diplomacy with the United States on other issues, such as arms control; and crack down on dissidents and civil society. Viewing U.S.-backed democracy promotion as a tool of regime change, China and Russia do more to suppress democracy at home and work to undermine it abroad. The U.S. alleviating all of China and Russia’s apparent concerns is impossible and unnecessary; indeed, some regime insecurity is welcome for its restraining influence. But to advance its own interests, the United States should find ways to diminish piqued regime security fears. To reduce regime security fears, especially in China and Russia, the United States should separate democracy promotion from its grand strategy—democracy promotion is not a security priority. Democracy promotion is good but starts at home, by being an exemplar of liberal values.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Authoritarianism, Democracy, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and United States of America

74. WHY THE “TERRORIST” LABEL HELPS SOME GROUPS AND HURTS OTHERS

Author:
Rebecca Best
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Does adding a terrorist group to the US State Department’s Foreign Terrorist Organization list reduce its violence? Since 1997, the US State Department has maintained a list of designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO), or foreign organizations that use terrorism and threaten US nationals or US national security. The United States has designated a wide array of terrorist organizations and groups—including Hamas, FARC, and ISIL–Khorasan—but has refrained from using the designation for others. For example, the United States never designated the Taliban an FTO. Why not?
Topic:
Terrorism, Taliban, Islamic State, 9/11, Boko Haram, Hamas, Uyghurs, FARC, Haqqani Network, Khorasan Group, Mujahedeen-e-Khalq, and Tamil Tigers
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, Iran, South Asia, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, and United States of America

75. Manufactured Crisis: “Deindustrialization,” Free Markets, and National Security

Author:
Scott Lincicome
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Both the American left and right often use “national security” to justify sweeping proposals for new U.S. protectionism and industrial policy. “Free markets” and a lack of government support for the manufacturing sector are alleged to have crippled the U.S. defense industrial base’s ability to supply “essential” goods during war or other emergencies, thus imperiling national security and demanding a fundamental rethink of U.S. trade and manufacturing policy. The COVID-19 crisis and U.S.-China tensions have amplified these claims. This resurgent “security nationalism,” however, extends far beyond the limited theoretical scenarios in which national security might justify government action, and it suffers from several flaws. First, reports of the demise of the U.S. manufacturing sector are exaggerated. Although U.S. manufacturing sector employment and share of national economic output (gross domestic product) have declined, these data are mostly irrelevant to national security and reflect macroeconomic trends affecting many other countries. By contrast, the most relevant data—on the U.S. manufacturing sector’s output, exports, financial performance, and investment—show that the nation’s total productive capacity and most of the industries typically associated with “national security” are still expanding. Second, “security nationalism” assumes a need for broad and novel U.S. government interventions while ignoring the targeted federal policies intended to support the defense industrial base. In fact, many U.S. laws already authorize the federal government to support or protect discrete U.S. industries on national security grounds. Third, several of these laws and policies provide a cautionary tale regarding the inefficacy of certain core “security nationalist” priorities. Case studies of past government support for steel, shipbuilding, semiconductors, and machine tools show that security‐​related protectionism and industrial policy in the United States often undermines national security. Fourth, although the United States is not nearly as open (and thus allegedly “vulnerable”) to external shocks as claimed, global integration and trade openness often bolster U.S. national security by encouraging peace among trading nations or mitigating the impact of domestic shocks. Together, these points rebut the most common claims in support of “security nationalism” and show why skepticism of such initiatives is necessary when national security is involved. They also reveal market‐​oriented trade, immigration, tax, and regulatory policies that would generally benefit the U.S. economy while also supporting the defense industrial base and national security.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, COVID-19, Free Market, and Deindustrialization
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

76. China: Rise or Demise?

Author:
John Mueller
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
China, even if it rises, does not present much of a security threat to the United States. Policymakers increasingly view China’s rapidly growing wealth as a threat. China currently ranks second, or perhaps even first, in the world in gross domestic product (although 78th in per capita GDP), and the fear is that China will acquire military prowess commensurate with its wealth and feel impelled to carry out undesirable military adventures. However, even if it continues to rise, China does not present much of a security threat to the United States. China does not harbor Hitler‐​style ambitions of extensive conquest, and the Chinese government depends on the world economy for development and the consequent acquiescence of the Chinese people. Armed conflict would be extremely—even overwhelmingly—costly to the country and, in particular, to the regime in charge. Indeed, there is a danger of making China into a threat by treating it as such and by engaging in so‐​called balancing efforts against it. Rather than rising to anything that could be conceived to be “dominance,” China could decline into substantial economic stagnation. It faces many problems, including endemic (and perhaps intractable) corruption, environmental devastation, slowing growth, a rapidly aging population, enormous overproduction, increasing debt, and restive minorities in its west and in Hong Kong. At a time when it should be liberalizing its economy, Xi Jinping’s China increasingly restricts speech and privileges control by the antiquated and kleptocratic Communist Party over economic growth. And entrenched elites are well placed to block reform. That said, China’s standard of living is now the highest in its history, and it’s very easy to envision conditions that are a great deal worse than life under a stable, if increasingly authoritarian, kleptocracy. As a result, the Chinese people may be willing to ride with, and ride out, economic stagnation should that come about—although this might be accompanied by increasing dismay and disgruntlement. In either case—rise or demise—there is little the United States or other countries can or should do to affect China’s economically foolish authoritarian drive except to issue declarations of disapproval and to deal more warily. As former ambassador Chas Freeman puts it, “There is no military answer to a grand strategy built on a non‐​violent expansion of commerce and navigation.” And Chinese leaders have plenty of problems to consume their attention. They scarcely need war or foreign military adventurism to enhance the mix. The problem is not so much that China is a threat but that it is deeply insecure. Policies of threat, balance, sanction, boycott, and critique are more likely to reinforce that condition than change it. The alternative is to wait, and to profit from China’s economic size to the degree possible, until someday China feels secure enough to reform itself.
Topic:
Government, GDP, Geopolitics, and Economic Growth
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

77. The Crisis after the Crisis: How Ladakh will Shape India’s Competition with China

Author:
Arzan Tarapore
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
The still-unresolved Ladakh crisis has created a new strategic reality for India, marked by renewed political hostility with China, and an increased militarisation of the Line of Actual Control. This new strategic reality imposes unequal costs on India and China. India is likely to defer much-needed military modernisation and maritime expansion into the Indian Ocean — which would impair its ability to compete strategically with China. In contrast, China incurred only marginal material costs; it was probably more concerned with the prospect of continued deterioration in its relationship with India. Even that cost was more threatened rather than realised, and largely reduced when the disengagement plan was agreed.
Topic:
Crisis Management, Strategic Competition, Militarization, and Disengagement
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, and Asia

78. Countering China’s Adventurism over Taiwan: A Third Way

Author:
Patrick Porter and Michael Mazarr
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
There is a growing bipartisan consensus in Washington on a tighter embrace of Taiwan, which may soon become a stronger implied US commitment to go to war in the event of a Chinese invasion. Taiwan matters to US security and the regional order, and the United States should continue to make clear that aggression is unacceptable. But those advocating a stronger US security commitment exaggerate the strategic consequences of a successful Chinese invasion. The stakes are not so high as to warrant an unqualified US pledge to go to war. American decision-makers, like their forebears confronting the seeming threat of communism in Indochina, may be trapping themselves into an unnecessarily stark conception of the consequences of a successful Chinese invasion of Taiwan. It would be irresponsible for the United States to leave itself no option in the event of Chinese aggression other than war. But nor should Washington abandon Taiwan. There is a prudent middle way: the United States should act as armourer, but not guarantor. It should help prepare Taiwan to defend itself, to raise costs against aggression, and develop means of punishing China with non-military tools.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

79. Jagged Sphere: China’s quest for infrastructure and influence in mainland Southeast Asia

Author:
Greg Raymond
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
China has land borders with mainland Southeast Asia and strong strategic imperatives to develop land routes to the sea. It has both potential and motivation to pursue an infrastructural sphere of influence in the Mekong subregion through Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects joining southern China and mainland Southeast Asia. The poorer states, especially Laos and Cambodia, have been receptive to the BRI and infrastructure investment, but Thailand and Vietnam, strong states and protective of sovereignty, have been more cautious. This means China’s impact is significantly varied across the subregion. China’s Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar are in some cases dissolving borders and in others carving out Chinese-controlled enclaves, all increasing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) presence and influence.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Foreign Direct Investment, Regional Integration, Borders, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Southeast Asia, Laos, and Myanmar

80. The Avoidable War: The Decade of Living Dangerously

Author:
Kevin Rudd
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
The year 2020 was a devastating one, but also a year of great change and transformation as the world adapted with difficulty to meet challenges largely unprecedented in living memory, and the trends of global power appeared to shift dramatically. And it was a revelatory year — one that pulled the lid off the true extent and meaning of our globalized, interconnected world, revealed dysfunction present in our institutions of national and international governance, and unmasked the real level of structural resentment, rivalry, and risk present in the world’s most critical great power relationship — that between the United States and China. 2020 may well go down in history as a great global inflection point. It is thus worth looking back to examine what happened and why and to reflect on where we may be headed in the decade ahead. The Avoidable War: The Decade of Living Dangerously, the third volume of ASPI’s annual Avoidable War series, does precisely that. It contains selected essays, articles, and speeches by Asia Society and ASPI President the Hon. Kevin Rudd that provide a series of snapshots as events unfolded over the course of 2020 — from the COVID-19 pandemic, through an implosion of multilateral governance, to the impact on China’s domestic political economy. Finally, it concludes with a discussion of the growing challenges the world will face as the escalating contest between the United States and China enters a decisive phase in the 2020s. No matter what strategies the two sides pursue or what events unfold, the tension between the United States and China will grow, and competition will intensify; it is inevitable. The Chinese Communist Party is increasingly confident that by the decade’s end, China’s economy will finally and unambiguously surpass that of the United States as the world’s largest, and this will turbocharge Beijing’s self-confidence, assertiveness, and leverage. Increasingly, this will be a “decade of living dangerously” for us all. War, however, is not inevitable. Rudd argues that it remains possible for the two countries to put in place guardrails that can prevent a catastrophe: a joint framework he calls “managed strategic competition” that would reduce the risk of competition escalating into open conflict.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Power Politics, Governance, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and United States of America

81. Tehran Signals: Uncovering the limitations of the Chinese Iranian agreement

Author:
Mervat Zakaria
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Uncovering the limitations of the Chinese Iranian agreement The Economic Cooperation Agreement signed between Iran and China in March 2021 unfolded a development plan that includes China injecting $ 400 billion into various sectors of the Iranian economy. This grants Tehran an opportunity to increase the pressures imposed on the new US administration, regarding resumption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action held with the P5+1 in 2015, as well as confronting the surrounding regional threats and alleviating internal pressures by improving the Iranian standard of living.
Topic:
Economics, International Cooperation, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

82. The internet of things: China’s rise and Australia’s choices

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
The Internet of Things (IoT) is connecting a growing range of economic and social activity across national borders, while simultaneously expanding the security challenges implied by these connections, including to Chinese state power. Despite US-led efforts to exclude Chinese actors from digital networks worldwide, the economies of East and Southeast Asia are becoming more densely integrated with China through evolving IoT ecosystems and supply chains. These trends threaten to disadvantage Australia and require policies to build up the country’s own technological capacities while devising innovative ways to manage, rather than avoid, the risks entailed in growing digital connections with China.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Science and Technology, Internet of Things, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Australia, and United States of America

83. Lines blurred: Chinese community organisations in Australia

Author:
Jennifer Hsu, Richard McGregor, and Natasha Kassam
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Australia’s foreign interference debate and the souring of bilateral relations between China and Australia has left many Chinese-Australians and their community organisations caught in a contest for their loyalty. The Chinese Party-state actively reaches out to overseas Chinese communities, in Australia and elsewhere, to promote China’s political interests and economic development, with mixed results. Australia’s efforts to combat this outreach have also had mixed results. A survey of Chinese-Australians found that many believed the new anti-foreign interference laws helped to protect community members from Beijing’s overtures. However, a greater number said attacks on the community in Australia — political, verbal, and sometimes physical — had alienated Chinese-Australians and in some cases made them more receptive to messages critical of Australia. Many Chinese-Australians said they had little or no engagement with Chinese community organisations. The newer organisations in particular, which often have closer economic ties to China, were not considered to be representative of broader community sentiment. The area in which community associations were reported to have the greatest traction was in promoting business opportunities in China.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Foreign Interference, and Community Organizing
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Australia

84. China, climate politics and COP26

Author:
Sam Geall
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
There is no credible emissions pathway towards limiting global warming to 1.5°C without significant movements from China over the next decade to accelerate its energy transition and decarbonisation. China aims to become carbon-neutral by 2060. Yet Beijing is hedging in the near term, in part due to an uncertain global macro and geopolitical environment, and in part due to domestic threats of social instability and economic stagnation. China’s negotiating position at COP26 in Glasgow stands to benefit from support from many developing countries — unless the United States and other rich countries make an effective alternative appeal to the Global South with respect to climate finance, mitigation and adaptation.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
China, Global Focus, and United States of America

85. Translating tension: Chinese-language media in Australia

Author:
Fan Yang
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Chinese-language media outlets in Australia are more likely to support Australian government policy than Chinese government policy when reporting on tensions in the Australia–China relationship, but editorialise to soften or remove criticism of China and the Chinese government. This is, in part, because Chinese-language media outlets in Australia produce little original content, and instead translate and reproduce the majority of their content from Australian, rather than Chinese, news sources. Chinese-language media professionals say they prefer to re-publish Australian content because this helps Chinese migrants integrate into society. However, self-censorship is embedded in these media organisations’ editorial processes. This is particularly the case for Chinese-language media outlets whose content is distributed to mainland China via WeChat, news apps, and websites. Outlets self-censor out of concerns for a loss of market share and reprisals from Beijing.
Topic:
Diaspora, Media, News Analysis, and Translation
Political Geography:
China, Australia, and Asia-Pacific

86. Australia and the growing reach of China’s military

Author:
Thomas Shugart
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
China’s recent military development constitutes the greatest expansion of maritime and aerospace power in generations and is most obviously seen in its expanding long-range missile force, bomber force, and modernising blue-water navy. While Australia’s defence interests and territorial integrity are largely unthreatened for now, a future Indo-Pacific dominated by China would present a grave possibility of military coercion by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. The prospect of Chinese military action against Australia remains remote. But China has the military and industrial potential to field a long-range power projection capacity that would dwarf anything Japan threatened Australia with during the Second World War.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, Maritime, Military, and Aerospace
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Australia

87. Asia, Europe and Global Democracy: Beyond the Summit for Democracy

Author:
Richard Youngs
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
After much build-up during 2021, the U.S. administration held its Summit for Democracy on 9-10 December. President Biden succeeded in attracting 100 leaders to the online event and convinced states to make commitments to deepen democracy. After the success of the summit, details are now awaited on the follow-up. Governments will submit their reform commitments by mid-January, and decisions will then be needed on how progress on these will be monitored.[1] Work is also due on broader international initiatives of democracy support beyond the national-level commitments. A ‘year of action’ will now lead up to a second in-person summit in December 2022. The intention is for a more permanent process and set of initiatives to flow out of the two summits. Rolled together this set of developments can be referred to as an incipient ‘summit process’.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Democracy, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

88. From the G7 to D10: The U.S.-China Competition and the Complexity of the Clash of Systems within the Multilateral Order

Author:
Sook-Jong Lee
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Upon the expanded G7 summit held in Cornwall, England, a joint statement was released, reflecting the participating democracies’ willingness to further advocate democratic values within the traditional multilateral rule-based system and prevent challenges to the liberal international order. Such behavior has drawn backlash from China. In this issue briefing, Sook Jong Lee, Professor at Sungkyunkwan University and Senior Fellow at EAI, explains the status of democracy and the role of democracies amidst the U.S.-China competition. The author stresses that the clash of systems between democracy and autocracy may create blocs in functional areas and force democracies positioned between the U.S. and China to opt for unrealistic choices. She argues that democratic values should be approached as universalistic values beyond the clash of systems. Furthermore, democracies in Europe and Asia must continue to protect democracy and strengthen independent regional cooperation among budding democracies for the promotion and advocacy of democratic values.
Topic:
Democracy, Multilateralism, Strategic Competition, and G7
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

89. Protecting Taiwan’s Democracy from China with US Support

Author:
Jason Kuo
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
In the late 1980s, Taiwan successfully transformed from an authoritarian rule to representative democracy. However, the country is receiving global attention due to the existing influence of China. Jason Kuo, an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at National Taiwan University, argues that Chinese influence on Taiwan threatens Taiwan’s democracy. The author utilizes the result of a public opinion poll conducted by the Asian Barometer Survey to support his argument. According to the poll, 91 % of Taiwanese citizens answered that Taiwan is influenced by China, and about half of the respondents were unsatisfied with democracy’s economic performance and problem-solving decisiveness. To protect Taiwan’s democracy from China, Dr. Kuo states that maintaining U.S. supremacy is crucial as the U.S. plays an important role in protecting Taiwan’s democracy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Democracy
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

90. Populism and the Pandemic in Southeast Asia

Author:
Paul D. Kenny
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Southeast Asian countries that are within close proximity to China were immediately affected by the spread of COVID-19 virus. Paul D. Kenny, Professor at the Australian Catholic University discusses the role of populism in public health responses to the virus and the reciprocal effect of the pandemic on the fate of populists in the region focusing on the Philippines and Indonesian cases. He argues that while the two governments took different responses to the pandemic crisis, both measures led to similar results in terms of how it affected support for the government. While President Duterte responded aggressively towards the pandemic with the issuance of Proclamation 922, President Jokowi’s response was substantially less coercive than that of Duterte’s. Professor Kenny states that both countries, in their current state, have seen similar results — support for both presidents in their respective countries remain considerably high. Nonetheless, the author adds that the continuing decline in Philippines’ economy may hamper his efforts in securing presidency.
Topic:
Government, Economy, Populism, Public Health, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Indonesia, Philippines, and Southeast Asia

91. North Korea’s Energy Crisis: What Are the Problems?

Author:
Kyung-sool Kim
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
North Korean businesses run by state-supplied energy have not been properly operated due to a sharp decrease in energy supply. Long-standing energy shortages have paralyzed the state energy supply and demand system, causing further disruptions in statewide functions. In this commentary, Kyung-sool Kim, Honorary Senior Research Fellow at the Korea Energy Economics Institute, states that this resulted from a complex accumulation of various problems: the characteristics of the regime, national capacity, state monopoly of production factors, the lack of a market, limitations of policy functions, the absence of capital and technology, and international isolation. The author argues that radical changes such as systemic reform and market opening are necessary to resolve these issues. The author adds that North Korea should be free from international isolation and propagate change in order to utilize external support.
Topic:
International Relations, Energy Crisis, and Energy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and North Korea

92. The China Challenge Prompts Recovery of a Strained ROK-Japan Relations: Analyzing ROK-Japan Relations Through the 9th Joint Korea-Japan Public Opinion Survey

Author:
Yul Sohn
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Korea-Japan relations have been strained for the past 3 years as the feelings of fatigue between the two citizens has been steadily increasing due to the Korean Supreme Court’s ruling on the forced wartime labor in October 2018. Bilateral cooperation to reorganize the world order after COVID-19 also remains bleak. The East Asia Institue (EAI, President Yul Sohn) and Genron NPO (President Yasushi Kudo) conducted the “9th Joint Korea-Japan Public Opinion Poll.” Based on the results of the survey, this issue briefing examines the differences in public opinion between the two countries on security and economic cooperation. This briefing also analyzes the Korean public’s call to improve ROK-Japan relations and increase cooperation. President Sohn argues that ROK-Japan relations should be re-examined under the intensified U.S.-China strategic competition and the possible post-pandemic global risks. He also states that Japan should abandon its one-track approach and understand the Korean’s preference for “future-oriented” cooperation. Additionally, the next Korean administration should respond to public opinion and strive towards the reconstruction of ROK-Japan relations.
Topic:
International Relations, Regional Cooperation, Public Opinion, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

93. New Silk Road - China’s Grand Strategy and Georgia

Author:
Gvantsa Chachanidze
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
One Belt, One Road is no doubt the most ambitious project of the century. The initiative was first announced by China’s President Xi Jinping in 2013. He said that China founded a massive infrastructure program that would involve 140 states and 30 international organizations. Xi’s grandiose ambition is to build a global network of infrastructure to ease commerce, investment and connectivity with China. Originally, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) consisted of the Economic and Maritime Silk Road. Eventually the Digital Silk Road, the Belt and Road Space Information Corridor and the Health Silk Road were added to the list. The BRI helps China gain economic advantage by sending goods to European and other foreign markets cheaper and faster than competitors while also ensuring low-cost access to natural resources via BRI corridors. In fact, the shortage of natural resources is a huge issue for both Chinese economics and society. China wants to establish a strong and wealthy society by 2049 by increasing competitiveness and ensuring stable energy imports. The New Silk Road has been continuously portrayed by China’s authorities as an economic cooperation project based on a “win-win” collaboration that promotes global peace and development.
Topic:
Markets, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
China and Asia

94. Germany Between a Rock and a Hard Place in China-US Competition

Author:
Markus Jaeger
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The Biden administration has just issued its Interim National Security Strategic Guidance. The guidance document states the need to “build back better at home” and acknowledges that “international economic policies must serve all Americans” – a theme often referred to as “foreign policy for the middle class”. While the interim guidance does not preclude cooperation with China in selected policy areas, it is unambiguous in considering China a strategic competitor. The prospect of intensifying China-US geopolitical and (geo)economic competition is bad news for Germany, which has high value trading and investment relationships with both countries.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, National Security, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, Germany, North America, and United States of America

95. Assessing China and Russia’s Influence on the German Parliamentary Elections

Author:
Didi Kirsten Tatlow and András Rácz
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
China and Russia want to maintain Germany’s political status quo: Centrist, at times mercantilist policies, have often worked in their favor. Now, with the Green Party ascendant and public opinion shifting, neither Russia nor China can be sure that classic "centrism” will emerge after September. Russia and China will increase their influence and interference efforts in the run-up to the election and beyond, using informational, political, and cyber tactics, and economic and political networks.
Topic:
Economics, Politics, Public Opinion, and Elections
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

96. Hun Sen's Mistake? The Domestic Political Ramifications of His Chinese Shelter

Author:
Charles Dunst
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen’s close relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has led scholars and policymakers alike to suggest that Beijing’s backing will keep him in power. While Hun Sen himself seems to believe this to be true, his reliance on China is actually enflaming Cambodian discontent to such an extent that his planned patrimonial succession is at risk. Given the fragility of regimes mid-succession, Hun Sen’s Chinese shelter is augmenting the potential of his clan’s fall. Yet as Hun Sen faces increased domestic opposition, he will only further deepen ties with China in hopes of remaining in power, thereby creating a vicious cycle from which escaping will prove difficult.
Topic:
International Relations, Power Politics, Bilateral Relations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Cambodia, and Southeast Asia

97. Paper Fairy Tales VS Steel Brotherhood – Media Portrayals of Serbia’s Alliances in the Age of Pandemic

Author:
Luka Steric and Maja Bjelos
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
BCSP researchers Maja Bjeloš and Luka Šterić analyzed how media in Serbia reported about Chinese, Russian and EU help during the pandemics. Because the pandemic was used as a framework for an excessive pro-Chinese campaign, the research examines how pro-Chinese narratives in mainstream media during the pandemic were used to position China, displacing Russia as Serbia’s main non-Western partner, while simultaneously propelling the anti-EU narrative of incompetence and hypocrisy. The analysis was carried out for the period between 1 March 2020 and 31 March 2021 and focused on two key events – media coverage of the first shipments of medical supplies to Serbia and media reporting of the supply of vaccines. Media monitoring included data collection using social listening software from the online portals of most-watched televisions (TV Happy, TV Prva), the most visited news portals (Blic, Kurir, Politika, B92 and Nova.rs), and the most circulated online portals of tabloids (Informer and Alo). Chinese medical aid to Serbia during the COVID-19 pandemic attracted unprecedented foreign media attention and much speculation about a shift in Serbia’s foreign policy. Many foreign and domestic policy experts have interpreted the enthusiastic acceptance of Chinese aid by Serbian politicians as a departure from Serbia’s proclaimed accession to the European Union. Since Serbia did not greet Russian assistance with the same enthusiasm, this sparked speculation that Serbia is replacing Russia with China as its preferred eastern partner. In Serbian media, the narrative of a ‘brotherhood’ has long been reserved for describing relations between Serbia and Russia. Serbia’s ruling political elite voluntarily promoted President Putin and Russia in the mainstream media to increase political support among pro-Russian votes and at the same time exaggerating Russia’s influence in Serbia as a bargaining chip with the West over its political goals. Due to the silent crisis of relations with Moscow, Belgrade officials saw the partnership with China as a stronger card to play ahead of the 2020 elections to convince voters that the government was capable of dealing with the COVID-19 crisis, as well as acquiring a new ally in the East to leverage in the West. Consequently, China emerged as a ‘savior of Serbs in trouble’ during the pandemic overshadowing roles of both Russia and the EU.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, European Union, Media, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and Serbia

98. Is America Really Back?

Author:
Thomas Fingar
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:
Following the 2021 Taihe Civilizations Forum, the Taihe International Communications Center hosted an online discussion on October 8 that captures the candid and profound reflections of senior officials whose actions have shaped the course of ties between China and the United States. Dr. Thomas Fingar, Shorenstein APARC Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, and former Assistant Secretary of State, and Senior Colonel Zhou Bo (ret.), Senior Fellow at Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University, China Forum Expert, and former Director of Center for Security Cooperation of the Office for International Military Cooperation of Ministry of National Defense, were invited to join this dialogue. During their conversation, Dr. Fingar and Senior Colonel Zhou exchanged ideas on important topics such as the current state of China-U.S. relations, the future development of the two countries' bilateral ties, the rationale behind the US foreign policy and the American alliance system, as well as the "extreme competition" that China and the U.S. are trapped in.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Hegemony, Conflict, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

99. An International Digital Yuan: (Vane) Ambitions, (Excessive) Alarmism and (Pragmatic) Expectations

Author:
Nicola Bilotta
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Days after the European Central Bank (ECB) publicly disclosed its roadmap for a digital euro project on 24 July, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) published a white paper describing the advancements of its plan for a digital yuan (e-CNY). While the EU roadmap outlines an investigation phase which will end in five years, China has already introduced several pilot experiments for its e-CNY. In June 2021, the e-CNY was employed in more than 70.7 million transactions for a value of 34.5 billion yuan by 20.8 million retail users and 3.5 million corporate users.
Topic:
International Political Economy, Political Economy, Governance, Finance, Currency, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
China and Asia

100. The World After the Pandemic: European Unity and the Challenge of Reviving Multilateralism

Author:
Sonia Bianconi
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Covid-19 has dramatically re-focussed the world’s attention on the adverse implications of globalisation. Coming on the heels of the 2008 financial crisis, the global pandemic has further weakened the image and credibility of the United States, causing the West to lose appeal compared to a more authoritarian but equally efficient East.
Topic:
Globalization, Politics, European Union, Multilateralism, Institutions, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America