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Begin New Search Political Geography Asia Content Type Commentary and Analysis Publication Year within 5 Years

1. Mongolia’s Electoral Reform and the State Great Khural (Parliamentary) Elections

Author:
Ganbat Damba and Byambakhand Luguusharav
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Since the transition to a democratic systеm and market economy in the early 1990s, Mongolia has held its 9th parliamentary election. In a historic first, the election held on June 28 was carried out under the new electoral systеm. A total of 78 members of parliament (MPs) were elected from 13 majoritarian districts, with an additional 48 MPs elected through proportional representation in a nationwide constituency (General Election Commission of Mongolia 2024). The new parliament consists of 126 seats, in accordance with the amendments to the Constitution introduced in 2023. The election results demonstrated that the Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) secured 68 seats, followed by the Democratic Party (DP) with 42 seats, the HUN Party with 8 seats, and both the National Alliance and the Civil Will-Green Party with 4 seats each. It is noteworthy that the MPP won 50 constituency seats and 18 from the party list, thereby ensuring a majority presence in parliament alongside three other parties that surpassed the legal threshold for representation (Oyunchimeg 2024). This distribution of seats underscores the diversity of representation in parliament, reflecting the electorate’s support for multiple political entities and ensuring a legislative body that is balanced and representative of the political spectrum. Over the past 34 years, various electoral systеms have been employed, including majoritarian voting systеms with single or multiple mandates and mixed systеms that combine majoritarian and proportional representation voting elements. Each systеm has its strengths and weaknesses. However, the criticism from both the public and political parties of the contemporary electoral systеm has resulted in frequent changes to it. Before the new systеm was introduced, the Mongolian parliament had maintained 76 seats since 1990. The number of seats in the parliament was increased by approximately 40 percent, from 76 to 126. Since 1990, Mongolia’s population has grown from 2.15 million to 3.5 million, an increase of about 40 percent. As a representative institution of the people, there has been significant debate in recent years regarding the potential expansion of the parliamentary seats. The proposed increase in seats has prompted a considerable number of individuals to seek election. In the first democratic election held after new democratic Constitution in 1992, only 293 individuals representing 10 parties and independents ran for the parliament. The 2024 Election saw the largest number of candidates to date, with the highest number of candidacies. A total of 372 individuals from 22 parties and coalitions contested the election through party lists, while 969 candidates ran in constituencies, resulting in a total of 1,341 candidates, marking a record high.
Topic:
Elections, Democracy, Voting, and Parliament
Political Geography:
Mongolia and Asia

2. The 4IR and the Future of the North Korean Police State

Author:
Ken Gause
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The term Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) has gained widespread acceptance as the overarching concept used to describe the impact of new technologies on various aspects of society in the early 21st century. Technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), 5G networks, 3D printing, cloud computing, robotics, drones, VR, AR, IoT, genomics, biometrics, and blockchain are commonly associated with this revolution. The speed, scope, and profound influence of 4IR technological advancements are unprecedented in human history. This revolution is rapidly progressing and transforming nearly every industry globally, as well as all aspects of societal life (Watson 2020). The technologies listed are often considered part of the current wave of emerging technologies that are expected to help human societies tackle global issues such as disease, poverty, and ignorance. Despite its promise, there are also shadowy aspects of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. It is widely acknowledged that technology has the potential to foster human progress and advancement, but it also has the capability to exert control over individuals. In George Orwell’s novel 1984, the character Winston takes precautions to avoid detection by the telescreen in his home while writing in his diary out of fear of facing severe consequences. The concept of being monitored by a “Big Brother” figure is not a new one, yet in today’s era of the 4IR, this dystopian narrative may resonate with a sense of unease and familiarity. The rapid advancements in technology could pave the way for, or may already be facilitating, a form of surveillance and control reminiscent of totalitarian regimes seeping into the daily lives of certain nations. In nations like China and Russia, we have witnessed widespread implementation of increasingly advanced surveillance systеms in order to maintain control, monitor the activities of citizens, and suppress opposition and threats to their authority. These countries have also established an international model for the utilization of digital technologies for such purposes. This paper will briefly examine how coercion, control, surveillance, and punishment by the North Korean Police State will change in the era of the Fourth Industrial Revolution and the AI revolution. Will new technologies make the Kim regime’s control more effective, or will they enforce reforms and shifts in North Korean society? Will 4IR lead to transformation inside North Korea and create a pathway to reunification?
Topic:
Artificial Intelligence, Police State, and Fourth Industrial Revolution
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

3. Knowledge State in the Era of Generative AI and the Future of the Korean Peninsula

Author:
Chaesung Chun
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Korea failed to transform into a fully modern sovereign state when modern international politics was being established. Traditionally, the Korean Peninsula was a single nation and state. However, as the Westphalian modern state systеm, originating in the West, was introduced in the form of imperialism, Korea failed to become a fully sovereign state, ultimately leading to its division. The causes of this division include external factors such as the competition among surrounding empires and Cold War rivalry, as well as internal factors like the fragmentation of state-building capabilities. However, the most significant reason was the civilizational gap, as Korea could not fully absorb and follow the new civilizational standards set by the West after the Industrial Revolution. The current world order is at a turning point following the unipolar era of the United States. While the Western Westphalian domain is maintained, the core element of the liberal international order is being significantly challenged by revisionist states like China and Russia, as well as countries from the Global South. It is uncertain whether global politics will form and maintain a single integrated sphere (권역) or divide into multiple regions experiencing fundamental conflicts. If modern international politics, standardized by Western civilization, were to fragment again, the division of the Korean Peninsula could deepen based on this regional separation. The recent intensification of strategic alliances between North Korea, China, and Russia illustrates this situation. A crucial phenomenon in this process is that the Fourth Industrial Revolution and emerging technologies are redefining the international political order. Unlike previous technological advancements, current technological progress is characterized by enabling technologies or meta-technologies that define the direction of technological development. Generative artificial intelligence, in particular, exemplifies the innovation of these foundational technologies. The role and function of generative artificial intelligence, which significantly impacts military, economic, social, cultural, and governmental governance capabilities, are just beginning. The future development of foundational technologies will have a critical impact on the international political order and the development of various diverging regions. Countries, companies, societies, and international organizations that quickly adapt to these technological changes will advance further, while those that do not will face deepening material and perceptual gaps. Considering the unification of the Korean Peninsula, the current stage of digital technology development in the North and South has maintained ethnic homogeneity and power balance to a level that can aim for unification. However, as new foundational technologies like generative artificial intelligence grow, the development paths, power balance, ethnic homogeneity, and differences in state forms and functions between South and North Korea will likely deepen. If unification is a goal based on a certain degree of homogeneous historical experience and similarity in state systеms and societies, the possibility of such similarity is decreasing. South Korea, as a liberal democratic state with the world's tenth-largest economy, a close alliance with the United States, and an innovative social and corporate atmosphere, has the capacity to rapidly absorb and disseminate artificial intelligence advancements throughout society. In this context, South Korea strives for economic development, international cooperation, and social and cultural innovation. In contrast, North Korea is an exceptionally poor country on a global scale, an unprecedentedly dictatorial state, and maintains its state through strong repression of society. In this context, it is difficult to expect societal innovation, and the acquisition and dissemination of new technologies are solely state-driven, with technological innovation also being state-led. In the increasingly polarized international technology supply chain, North Korea will find it challenging to find alternatives other than relying on China and Russia. North Korea is also striving to develop foundational technologies like artificial intelligence, but its direction will be very different from South Korea's. North Korea utilizes artificial intelligence for strong repression, control, and surveillance of society and aims to use open-source artificial intelligence for political intervention in South Korea and hacking and illegal manipulation in the international community. As the civilizational standards and technological gaps, political systеms, and socio-cultural perceptions between the South and North widen, what will be the future of the power balance and systеmic homogeneity between the two Koreas? Will South Korea's advanced national capabilities increase the possibility of unification with North Korea, or will artificial intelligence act as a larger element of conflict between the two Koreas? It is necessary to recognize and respond to these issues.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, Artificial Intelligence, and Unification
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

4. Tailored Deterrence Strategy on the Korean Peninsula

Author:
Gary Samore
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Over the last decade, the most significant change in the international strategic environment has been the reemergence of a great power rivalry between the U.S. and its European and Asian allies on one hand and Russia and China on the other. This trend began in the second term of President Obama, with the Russian invasion of Crimea in early 2014 and the Chinese construction of a network of military bases in the South China Sea beginning around 2013. Since then, the trend has sharpened. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has locked the U.S. and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies against Russia in a long-term struggle for the survival of Ukraine and future of European security. In Asia, tensions between Beijing and Washington have become worse, as both the Trump and Biden admіnistrations pursued economic measures against China, and as China appears to be building military options to unify Taiwan and the mainland by force. The reemergence of great power rivalry has important nuclear dimensions, increasing concerns about “strategic stability” – the nuclear balance among the great powers – and the risk of nuclear conflict. The Ukraine war has lowered the nuclear threshold. Russia has deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus and threatened to use tactical nuclear weapons to discourage NATO intervention or assistance to Ukraine. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) - the last remaining arms control treaty limiting U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals - expires in February 2026, and Russia has refused U.S. offers to negotiate a new treaty as long as the U.S. is assisting Ukraine. In the meantime, Russia continues to develop an array of exotic nuclear delivery systеms intended to overcome U.S. missile defenses, including hypersonic reentry vehicles, nuclear-armed submarine drones, and nuclear anti-satellite weapons. China is pursuing an unprecedented nuclear build-up, including new strategic bombers, more advanced nuclear-armed submarines, and three new missile bases with more than 300 silos for solid fuel ICBMs with multiple reentry vehicles. According to U.S. Department of Defense estimates, China has more than 500 operational nuclear warheads as of May 2023 and will “probably have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030” (U.S. Department of Defense 2023a). Like Russia, China is also pursuing hypersonic reentry vehicles, anti-satellite weapons, and strategic cyber operations. Some analysts fear that China’s nuclear build-up will make it more confident that it can deter U.S. intervention in the face of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or increase the risk that a U.S.-China confrontation over Taiwan will escalate to nuclear use. To address the reemergence of great power threats, the U.S. has introduced the concepts of “tailored deterrence” and “integrated deterrence” into its nuclear doctrine. According to the Trump admіnistration Nuclear Posture Review, released in February 2018, The United States will apply a tailored and flexible approach to effectively deter across a spectrum of adversaries, threats, and contexts. Tailored deterrence strategies communicate to different potential adversaries that their aggression would carry unacceptable risks and intolerable costs according to their particular calculations of risk and cost (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2018). The tailored deterrence concept was also adopted by the Biden admіnistration in its October 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, saying, Central to U.S. deterrence strategy is the credibility of our nuclear forces to hold at risk what adversary leadership values most. Effectively deterring – and restoring deterrence if necessary – requires tailored strategies for potential adversaries that reflect our best understanding of their decision-making and perceptions (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2022). Building on the concept of tailored deterrence, the Biden admіnistration Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) also introduced the concept of “integrated deterrence,” which is based on the idea that traditional nuclear deterrence can be reinforced by non-nuclear capabilities. According to the NPR, The role of nuclear weapons is well established and embedded in strategic deterrence policy and plans. Non-nuclear capabilities may be able to complement nuclear forces in strategic deterrence plans and operations in ways that are suited to their attributes and consistent with policy on how they are to be employed. A pragmatic approach to integrated deterrence will seek to determine how the Joint Force can combine nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities in complementary ways that leverage the unique attributes of a multi-domain set of forces to enable a range of deterrence options backstopped by a credible nuclear deterrent (Ibid.).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

5. Horizontal Accountability Requires More than Legal Checks and Balances Systеm: Ten Asian Country Cases

Author:
Sook Jong Lee
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Most countries, except closed autocracies, conduct popular elections. However, the quality of global democracy has been deteriorating. One of the most significant illiberal trends is the aggrandizement of executive power led by a popularly elected political leader. Strongmen often bend or simply violate democratic rules by abusing their executive power. The electoral mandate gives them legitimacy, making the efforts to check their executive power difficult. In this context, horizontal accountability based on the checks and balances systеm and oversight institutions is important to prevent the emergence of strongmen. However, horizontal accountability cannot function effectively unless its legal mechanisms are implemented in practice. Ten Asian country cases, presented in previously published ADRN working papers, demonstrated that horizontal accountability perform better when the legislature is not politically captured by the executive power and the judiciary is independent. Oversight institutions also require both political independence and institutional capacity. The electoral accountability of elected elites to voters helps the legislative branch to fulfill its role of constraining the excessive executive power. Independent media and civil society participation always assist both electoral and horizontal accountability.
Topic:
Law, Democracy, Accountability, Civic Engagement, and Political Participation
Political Geography:
Asia

6. Panel Survey on the 22nd Legislative Election

Author:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The East Asia Institute (EAI) presents key insights from a web-based public opinion survey conducted following the 22nd general election in 2024. The survey aimed to analyze the factors influencing voter behavior and the landscape of political perceptions. The findings indicate that controversies involving the President`s family and close associates, and policy issues?such as rising costs of living and the proposal to increase medical school admission quotas?were pivotal in shaping voter decisions. Furthermore, the survey reveals a prevalent sentiment among voters that Korean society is characterized by inequality and significant intergroup conflicts. A consensus also emerged on the necessity of electoral systеm reforms to mitigate political polarization and more accurately reflect public opinion.
Topic:
Reform, Elections, Conflict, and Survey
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

7. Inside the Summit for Democracy: What’s Next?

Author:
Ken Godfrey and Anthony Smith
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The third iteration of the Summit for Democracy (S4D) in Seoul from March 18 to 20 was an improvement on several elements of previous versions of S4D but still inherited some of the challenges. With this third summit in the rearview mirror, it is a good moment to take stock of the concrete impact of the summit itself and the goals of the S4D process in the future. We argue that the S4D has significant shortcomings but still has added value moving forward if the format can be adjusted in a more pragmatic direction.
Topic:
Civil Society, Democracy, Global South, Cooperation, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Asia

8. The Current Status of Japan’s Countering Digital Influence Operations

Author:
Kazuki Ichida
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Digital influence operations have the capacity to shape and undermine public perceptions and opinions in targeted countries. The United States National Intelligence Council found that China, Russia, and Iran prioritize digital influence operations over cyber attacks, underscoring their perceived efficacy (National Intelligence Council 2023). Digital influence operations are variously referred to as cognitive warfare and information warfare. For the purposes of this briefing, the term “digital influence operations” will be used. This briefing describes the current status of countermeasures employed by major actors in Japan. In Japan, entities such as the Ministry of Defense (MOD), the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the National Police Agency, and the National Center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC), have been developing their budgets and organizations. However, efforts by the private sector, including fact-checking organizations, think tanks, and academics, still face limitations in terms of human resources and scale and are far from sufficient. In recent years, there have been signs of expansion due to increased support from the Japanese government. Three challenges impede Japan’s efforts to counter digital influence operations. First, there is a severe shortage of knowledge and human resources. Second, the measures are primarily focused on countering disinformation, improving literacy, and enhancing strategic communication. Lastly, the attacks leveraging domestic polarization in the target country have not been addressed. This issue is not unique to Japan but also prevalent in Europe and the United States.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Cybersecurity, Disinformation, and Preventive Measures
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

9. China Threats and the Exploitation of China Threats: The 2024 Taiwan General Election

Author:
Chin-en Wu
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The presidential and legislative elections took place in Taiwan on January 13, 2024. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP or so-called the green camp) selected Vice President Lai Ching-te as their candidate, who also serves as the party chairman. The opposing Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang, KMT or so-called the blue camp) nominated the incumbent mayor of New Taipei, Hou Yu-ih, for the presidential candidacy. The Taiwan People’s Party (TPP or so-called the white camp) chose its leader, former Taipei City mayor Ko Wen-je, as the presidential candidate. Despite initial plans for a joint campaign team between KMT and TPP, a final agreement was not reached. Lai’s victory marked a historic moment, representing the first time since the introduction of direct elections in 1996 that a party has won more than two consecutive presidential terms. Lai secured the presidency with 40% of the votes, followed by Hou with 34%, and Ko with 26%. Lai Ching-te and Hou Yu-yi are political figures within traditional political parties, lacking individual charisma, especially Hou Yu-yi, the former police-in-chief. Ko Wen-je, on the other hand, is a candidate with populist characteristics, appearing as a political outsider at the national level, free from the burden of past ruling records, providing an option beyond the blue-green divide. His interactive style sometimes resembles that of an internet celebrity, using straightforward language to comment on issues or point out social and political problems, in many cases without proposing feasible solutions to these problems. Young people prefer Ko’s relaxed, somewhat sarcastic way of communication. The other part of the general election is the legislative election. DPP gained 51 seats out of 113 seats and lose its majority in the parliament. KMT won 52 seats and become the largest party. TPP gained eight seats. The result makes the new DPP government a minority government.
Topic:
Elections, Domestic Politics, and Cross-Strait Relations
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

10. South Korea’s Official Development Assistance for Democracy Support

Author:
Sook Jong Lee
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
As of 2022, South Korea provides Official Development Assistance (ODA) amounting to 2.79 billion USD, 0.17% of its gross national income, ranking 16th among the donor countries in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which includes 30 countries. Since joining the DAC in 2010, South Korea’s ODA has been steadily increasing. The successful transition from a recipient to a donor country is a significant achievement globally. However, in the context of South Korea’s high status in liberal democracy, its level of support for democratic governance is relatively low. There is no clear definition of ‘democracy aid,’ but it generally refers to aid used to advocate and support democracy. Given that democracy aid could be perceived as interference in the internal affairs of recipient countries, it is not prominently emphasized in development assistance where poverty alleviation and socio-economic development are the primary goals. The DAC aims to promote development cooperation and related policies, targeting Sustainable Development 2030, which includes inclusive and sustainable economic development, progress in national and international equality, poverty eradication, and improving living conditions in developing countries. It establishes a standard of assistance policy in various fields such as development, trade, industry, environment, gender equality, anti-corruption, and strengthening civil society. In essence, the DAC does not explicitly state that spreading democracy is the purpose of ODA (OECD n.d.). South Korea’s Framework Act on International Development Cooperation also stipulates the purpose of itself to “enhance the appropriateness of policies for international development cooperation and the efficiency of the implementation thereof, and effectively achieve the policy objectives of international development cooperation by providing for basic matters concerning international development cooperation, thus contributing to the co-prosperity of humanity and to world peace.” This law outlines the principles of international development cooperation, such as “respect for all the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; support for the self-help efforts and abilities of developing countries; respect for the necessity of development of developing countries; increase in sharing of development experiences; and mutual harmony with the international community and promotion of cooperation therewith,” but there is no mention of linking ODA to democracy (OECD 2005; Korea Legislation Research Institute n.d.).
Topic:
Development, Democracy, Civil Society Organizations, and OECD
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

11. Climate Change in Japan’s New Defence and Security Strategies

Author:
Alistair D B Cook
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
Japan has taken concrete steps to integrate climate change into its defence and security strategy going forward, and to provide the necessary budget for implementing the relevant measures needed in mitigating the impacts of this threat. This may signal a more prominent leadership role for Japan on climate security in the Indo-Pacific.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Climate Change, and Environment
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

12. Disaster Management in Southeast Asia: 20 Years of Progress and Challenges

Author:
Mely Caballero-Anthony, Alistair D B Cook, and Jonatan Anderias Lassa
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
The management of consequences arising from natural hazards in Southeast Asia has seen laudable advancement in the last 20 years. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has played a positive role in this progress. However, there is emerging disaster policy inertia that reflect local realities at the ASEAN and global levels.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Regionalism, and Disaster Management
Political Geography:
Asia and ASEAN

13. China’s “Catchup” on Growing Genetically Modified Crops

Author:
Paul Teng and Genevieve Donnellon-May
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
China, the world’s largest importer of corn and soybean, seems finally to accept the potential of using genetically modified (GM) feed crops. Will this be enough to reduce China’s dependency on such imports and will it meet the demands of other countries that are also experiencing an increase in demand for feed to increase production of animal meat?
Topic:
Agriculture, Science and Technology, Food, and Production
Political Geography:
China and Asia

14. Southeast Asia Aid Map - Key Findings Report

Author:
Alexandre Dayant, Grace Stanhope, and Roland Rajah
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Official development finance plays an important role in financing Southeast Asia’s development, equivalent to around 10% of total government development spending in the region. China is Southeast Asia’s single largest development partner and leads infrastructure financing. Yet, implementation problems have seen the scale of China’s financing decline in recent years. Traditional development partners collectively still dominate development financing in Southeast Asia at 80% of the total. The multilateral development banks lead the way, followed by Japan, Europe, and South Korea. The United States and Australia are mid-sized players. India and the Middle East have become notable sources of non-traditional development finance, with the Islamic Development Bank playing an important role. Climate development finance is increasing, but Southeast Asia will need more support if it is to transition towards resilient, low-carbon development. Intraregional development cooperation is growing, but only makes up a small part of development finance in Southeast Asia.
Topic:
Climate Change, Development, Humanitarian Aid, Finance, and Economy
Political Geography:
Asia and Southeast Asia

15. Australia’s Role Supporting Democracies as a Middle Power

Author:
Michael J. Green and Victoria Cooper
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Michael J. Green (Professor and CEO of the United States Study Centre (USSC) in Sydney) and Victoria Cooper (Research Editor at the USSC) analyze Australia’s strengths as a middle power in the face of Beijing’s pressure campaign, and offer areas of regional cooperation that like-minded countries, including Australia, can build upon in order to defend democracy against authoritarian regimes. While acknowledging the limited capacity of Australia to independently counter Beijing’s illiberal behavior, the authors argue that through the expansion of development initiatives, promotion of women’s empowerment, and anti-corruption drives, Canberra can play a key role in leading multilateral efforts to promote democratic resilience in the region.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Statecraft, Middle Power, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Australia

16. Japan’s Gradual Move to Address Technological Challenges to Democracy

Author:
Maiko Ichihara
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Maiko Ichihara, a professor at Hitotsubashi University Graduate School of Law, explores the challenges that technological advancements pose to democracy and analyzes Japan’s recent efforts to regulate disinformation and protect private data. Despite the absence of global regulations on digital technology, Ichihara highlights Japan’s domestic fact-checking efforts as well as its multilateral initiatives with G7 to create action plans promoting international cooperation against disinformation and data privacy abuse. In order to bolster democracy in the digital realm, she advocates for a proactive development of counter-narratives to fake news on social media.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Democracy, Regulation, Privacy, Social Media, G7, Disinformation, Data Collection, and Digital Space
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

17. Restoring Democracy in Myanmar: A Call for Bolstered Anti-Junta Resistance Forces

Author:
Lin Htet Myat
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
February 2023 marks the second anniversary of the military coup in Myanmar that ousted its civilian government and cracked down on democratic protests. Lin Htet Myat, a political analyst from Myanmar, assesses the grim situation in the country and offers new approaches that both the international community and the Burmese anti-junta forces should take to facilitate the restoration of democracy. The author argues that the international community must not engage the junta to seek for a peaceful resolution, and instead strengthen material support and communication with anti-junta forces within Myanmar. Meanwhile, Burmese democratic resistance forces should bolster military cooperation among like-minded groups and build trust in preparation for a federal democratic Myanmar.
Topic:
Democracy, Coup, Humanitarian Crisis, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
Asia and Myanmar

18. Taiwan’s Civic Space Threatened by Chinese Misinformation and the Government’s Worrisome Legislative Responses

Author:
Chin-en Wu
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Civic space in Taiwan is consistently threatened by misinformation campaigns and operations run by external forces, particularly mainland China. Chin-en Wu, an associate research fellow at the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica, assesses that China disseminates fake news to portray positive image of itself while creating internal polarization and competition in Taiwan. The Taiwanese government has attempted to take various measures, such as amending the Social Order Maintenance Act and introducing social media regulation bill, to counter the rampant Chinese misinformation activities. Although Wu acknowledges that the Taiwanese government should collaborate with the civil society to safeguard the island from misinformation, Wu warns that the government must be conscious of the potential damage that the restrictive measures against fake news could inflict on Taiwan’s liberal democracy.
Topic:
Democracy, Social Media, Misinformation, and Civic Engagement
Political Geography:
Taiwan and Asia

19. One Thing It Lacks: South Korea’s North Korea Policy in 2023 National Security Strategy

Author:
Yang Gyu Kim
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Yang Gyu Kim, Principal Researcher at the East Asia Institute, conducts a critical analysis of the new National Security Strategy published on June 7, 2023 and offers policy recommendations for the ROK government’s DPRK policy outlined in the document. While Kim identifies with the National Security Office’s emphasis on strengthening deterrence measures against growing DPRK nuclear and missile threats, he highlights that South Korean countermeasures create a feedback loop that affects North Korea’s threat perception. The author, therefore, points out the limits of the current 3D (Deterrence, Dissuasion, Dialogue) approach and recommends including a “Development” strategy to encourage Pyongyang to envision an alternative future path of prosperity and voluntarily take the denuclearization path.
Topic:
Development, National Security, Deterrence, Dialogue, and Threat Perception
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

20. Tasks for North Korea Policy After the Washington Declaration

Author:
Yu-hwan Koh
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Yu-hwan Koh, the President of the Korea Institute for National Unification, acknowledges the progress made in maintaining the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty regime and bolstering extended deterrence capabilities against North Korean nuclear threats through the Washington Declaration. Nevertheless, he underscores the lack of a fundamental solution to halt further advancements in Pyongyang's nuclear capabilities. Dr. Koh emphasizes the importance of establishing normalized relations between the United States and North Korea, particularly considering that North Korea now possesses nuclear weapons and is unlikely to return to denuclearization talks. In response, he reiterates the significance of the ROK-US alliance in strengthening the Three-Axis system and developing new weapon systems that can effectively counter North Korea's nuclear capabilities.
Topic:
International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, and United States of America