Political Geography: Asia / Content Type: Commentary and Analysis / Publication Year: within 5 Years

1. The US TikTok Ban, the RedNote Moment and China

Author:: Aurelio Insisa
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: On 23 April 2024, the US Senate passed a bill forcing the Chinese company ByteDance to choose between divesting from its prized social platform TikTok, one of the dominant apps among Americans aged 18-29,[1] or accepting its ban on US soil. Following ByteDance’s refusal to divest, the US Supreme Court upheld the ban on 17 January 2025. The ban on TikTok rested on national security grounds. TikTok is technically a limited liability corporation registered in Delaware and with headquarters in Singapore and Los Angeles. Yet, its parent company ByteDance, while incorporated in the Cayman Islands, is based in Beijing and subject to a domestic legal framework legally requiring it to “provide assistance” to the Chinese government, including, crucially, giving up the data of TikTok users.[2] Further highlighting the limited autonomy of the company vis-à-vis Chinese authorities, “cells” of the Chinese Communist Party have been embedded within the structures of the company since 2017.[3] In short, ByteDance cannot guarantee that the personal data of its users could be kept at arm’s length from Beijing. While the Senate’s bill enjoyed bipartisan support, then President-elect Donald J. Trump publicly stated that he would not enforce the ban. Throughout the 2024 electoral campaign, Trump had announced – in contrast with most of the Republican Party members of Congress – his opposition to the bill, acknowledging how the platform had been a relevant tool for re-election.[4] On 19 January, Trump announced that he would consider imposing a 90-day delay of the ban and search for a joint-venture between ByteDance and a US company.[5] Two days later, he suggested the possibility that either Elon Musk (CEO of Tesla, owner of X, and Administrator of the Department of Government Efficiency in the new administration), or Larry Ellison (chairman of Oracle) would buy the social media platform.[6]
Topic:: Social Media, Digital Policy, and TikTok
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

2. The European Screening Mechanism and Its Implications for Chinese FDI

Author:: Emanuele Ballestracci
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The European Commission has recently proposed a revision of the EU foreign direct investment (FDI) screening mechanism, originally established in 2020. The aim is to further strengthen the EU’s economic security within the framework of its “de-risking” policy, which aims to manage risks coming from the economic and technological engagement with China.[1] The new proposal aims to address major shortcomings in the current screening mechanism, expanding its scope to greenfield investments and European outward FDI. However, this could conflict with the EU’s goal of encouraging Chinese greenfield investment and joint ventures, particularly in the electric vehicle (EV) sector.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Foreign Direct Investment, European Union, and Economic Security
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

3. Collateral Effects of the Tariff War on ASEAN Food Security

Author:: Jose M. L. Montesclaros and Kayven Tan
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: The United States and China are locked in a cycle of escalating tariffs, with likely knock-on impacts on global food supplies and prices. In response to increases in tariff rates imposed by the US on China’s exports, China hit back with additional tariffs on US$21 billion worth of US agricultural products in March 2025. Beijing’s retaliatory tariffs will mean an additional 10 per cent tariff on soybeans, sorghum, beef, pork, aquatic and dairy products, fruits, and vegetables, and an additional 15 per cent tariff on wheat, corn, maize, and chicken from the US. Given the tense words exchanged by leaders and officials on both sides in recent days, neither side appears ready to back down from these trade measures. The food security concern for ASEAN states is whether the trade war will impact the supply and prices of food in a region where 37 per cent, or 251 million people, cannot afford a healthy diet. Many Asian states rely heavily on imports for their food. Wheat is used in household staples such as noodles and bread, while corn and soybeans are used for food and livestock feed.
Topic:: Food Security, Tariffs, Trade Wars, ASEAN, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

4. Protecting Food Security in the Face of Tariffs and Trade Wars

Author:: Paul Teng
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: The uncertainty caused by tariffs and trade disputes affects food security. Increases in geopolitical tensions will undermine the best plans to maintain global supply chains, encouraging countries to develop alternative ones. Consumers in Southeast Asia, even though far from the geographic areas of dispute, will ultimately suffer from interruptions in food availability and price hikes. National strategies to ensure food security are needed.
Topic:: Food Security, Tariffs, Trade Wars, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: Asia and Southeast Asia

5. Biosecurity Awareness and Education in Southeast Asia

Author:: Julius Caesar Trajano and Jeselyn
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: ASEAN leaders recognise the critical importance of biosecurity. But there is a need to enhance the security culture and biosecurity awareness among life science, medical, and biotechnology professionals to mitigate the misuse of biological materials.
Topic:: Security, Education, Biosecurity, and Biotechnology
Political Geography:: Asia and Southeast Asia

6. Trapped in debt: China’s role in Laos’ economic crisis

Author:: Keith Barney, Roland Rajah, and Mariza Cooray
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:: Laos is trapped in a severe debt crisis with no resolution in sight, threatening a decade of economic and social malaise. Recent global shocks were key triggers. Yet a crisis was almost inevitable, driven by poor planning and over-investment in the domestic energy sector, financed mostly by Chinese loans and exacerbated by broader fiscal and governance problems. Exiting the crisis will require China to provide substantial debt relief. However, the politics appear unfavourable, as neither side wants to admit failure and accept the consequences. Whether by design or neglect, China has created a debt trap in Laos. The crisis illustrates some of the most troubling pathologies of Chinese lending under the Belt and Road Initiative, and its unwillingness to provide sufficient debt relief, despite the clear-cut need.
Topic:: Debt, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Economic Crisis, and Energy Sector
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Laos

7. Mongolia’s Electoral Reform and the State Great Khural (Parliamentary) Elections

Author:: Ganbat Damba and Byambakhand Luguusharav
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Since the transition to a democratic systеm and market economy in the early 1990s, Mongolia has held its 9th parliamentary election. In a historic first, the election held on June 28 was carried out under the new electoral systеm. A total of 78 members of parliament (MPs) were elected from 13 majoritarian districts, with an additional 48 MPs elected through proportional representation in a nationwide constituency (General Election Commission of Mongolia 2024). The new parliament consists of 126 seats, in accordance with the amendments to the Constitution introduced in 2023. The election results demonstrated that the Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) secured 68 seats, followed by the Democratic Party (DP) with 42 seats, the HUN Party with 8 seats, and both the National Alliance and the Civil Will-Green Party with 4 seats each. It is noteworthy that the MPP won 50 constituency seats and 18 from the party list, thereby ensuring a majority presence in parliament alongside three other parties that surpassed the legal threshold for representation (Oyunchimeg 2024). This distribution of seats underscores the diversity of representation in parliament, reflecting the electorate’s support for multiple political entities and ensuring a legislative body that is balanced and representative of the political spectrum. Over the past 34 years, various electoral systеms have been employed, including majoritarian voting systеms with single or multiple mandates and mixed systеms that combine majoritarian and proportional representation voting elements. Each systеm has its strengths and weaknesses. However, the criticism from both the public and political parties of the contemporary electoral systеm has resulted in frequent changes to it. Before the new systеm was introduced, the Mongolian parliament had maintained 76 seats since 1990. The number of seats in the parliament was increased by approximately 40 percent, from 76 to 126. Since 1990, Mongolia’s population has grown from 2.15 million to 3.5 million, an increase of about 40 percent. As a representative institution of the people, there has been significant debate in recent years regarding the potential expansion of the parliamentary seats. The proposed increase in seats has prompted a considerable number of individuals to seek election. In the first democratic election held after new democratic Constitution in 1992, only 293 individuals representing 10 parties and independents ran for the parliament. The 2024 Election saw the largest number of candidates to date, with the highest number of candidacies. A total of 372 individuals from 22 parties and coalitions contested the election through party lists, while 969 candidates ran in constituencies, resulting in a total of 1,341 candidates, marking a record high.
Topic:: Elections, Democracy, Voting, and Parliament
Political Geography:: Mongolia and Asia

8. The 4IR and the Future of the North Korean Police State

Author:: Ken Gause
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: The term Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) has gained widespread acceptance as the overarching concept used to describe the impact of new technologies on various aspects of society in the early 21st century. Technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), 5G networks, 3D printing, cloud computing, robotics, drones, VR, AR, IoT, genomics, biometrics, and blockchain are commonly associated with this revolution. The speed, scope, and profound influence of 4IR technological advancements are unprecedented in human history. This revolution is rapidly progressing and transforming nearly every industry globally, as well as all aspects of societal life (Watson 2020). The technologies listed are often considered part of the current wave of emerging technologies that are expected to help human societies tackle global issues such as disease, poverty, and ignorance. Despite its promise, there are also shadowy aspects of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. It is widely acknowledged that technology has the potential to foster human progress and advancement, but it also has the capability to exert control over individuals. In George Orwell’s novel 1984, the character Winston takes precautions to avoid detection by the telescreen in his home while writing in his diary out of fear of facing severe consequences. The concept of being monitored by a “Big Brother” figure is not a new one, yet in today’s era of the 4IR, this dystopian narrative may resonate with a sense of unease and familiarity. The rapid advancements in technology could pave the way for, or may already be facilitating, a form of surveillance and control reminiscent of totalitarian regimes seeping into the daily lives of certain nations. In nations like China and Russia, we have witnessed widespread implementation of increasingly advanced surveillance systеms in order to maintain control, monitor the activities of citizens, and suppress opposition and threats to their authority. These countries have also established an international model for the utilization of digital technologies for such purposes. This paper will briefly examine how coercion, control, surveillance, and punishment by the North Korean Police State will change in the era of the Fourth Industrial Revolution and the AI revolution. Will new technologies make the Kim regime’s control more effective, or will they enforce reforms and shifts in North Korean society? Will 4IR lead to transformation inside North Korea and create a pathway to reunification?
Topic:: Artificial Intelligence, Police State, and Fourth Industrial Revolution
Political Geography:: Asia and North Korea

9. Knowledge State in the Era of Generative AI and the Future of the Korean Peninsula

Author:: Chaesung Chun
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Korea failed to transform into a fully modern sovereign state when modern international politics was being established. Traditionally, the Korean Peninsula was a single nation and state. However, as the Westphalian modern state systеm, originating in the West, was introduced in the form of imperialism, Korea failed to become a fully sovereign state, ultimately leading to its division. The causes of this division include external factors such as the competition among surrounding empires and Cold War rivalry, as well as internal factors like the fragmentation of state-building capabilities. However, the most significant reason was the civilizational gap, as Korea could not fully absorb and follow the new civilizational standards set by the West after the Industrial Revolution. The current world order is at a turning point following the unipolar era of the United States. While the Western Westphalian domain is maintained, the core element of the liberal international order is being significantly challenged by revisionist states like China and Russia, as well as countries from the Global South. It is uncertain whether global politics will form and maintain a single integrated sphere (권역) or divide into multiple regions experiencing fundamental conflicts. If modern international politics, standardized by Western civilization, were to fragment again, the division of the Korean Peninsula could deepen based on this regional separation. The recent intensification of strategic alliances between North Korea, China, and Russia illustrates this situation. A crucial phenomenon in this process is that the Fourth Industrial Revolution and emerging technologies are redefining the international political order. Unlike previous technological advancements, current technological progress is characterized by enabling technologies or meta-technologies that define the direction of technological development. Generative artificial intelligence, in particular, exemplifies the innovation of these foundational technologies. The role and function of generative artificial intelligence, which significantly impacts military, economic, social, cultural, and governmental governance capabilities, are just beginning. The future development of foundational technologies will have a critical impact on the international political order and the development of various diverging regions. Countries, companies, societies, and international organizations that quickly adapt to these technological changes will advance further, while those that do not will face deepening material and perceptual gaps. Considering the unification of the Korean Peninsula, the current stage of digital technology development in the North and South has maintained ethnic homogeneity and power balance to a level that can aim for unification. However, as new foundational technologies like generative artificial intelligence grow, the development paths, power balance, ethnic homogeneity, and differences in state forms and functions between South and North Korea will likely deepen. If unification is a goal based on a certain degree of homogeneous historical experience and similarity in state systеms and societies, the possibility of such similarity is decreasing. South Korea, as a liberal democratic state with the world's tenth-largest economy, a close alliance with the United States, and an innovative social and corporate atmosphere, has the capacity to rapidly absorb and disseminate artificial intelligence advancements throughout society. In this context, South Korea strives for economic development, international cooperation, and social and cultural innovation. In contrast, North Korea is an exceptionally poor country on a global scale, an unprecedentedly dictatorial state, and maintains its state through strong repression of society. In this context, it is difficult to expect societal innovation, and the acquisition and dissemination of new technologies are solely state-driven, with technological innovation also being state-led. In the increasingly polarized international technology supply chain, North Korea will find it challenging to find alternatives other than relying on China and Russia. North Korea is also striving to develop foundational technologies like artificial intelligence, but its direction will be very different from South Korea's. North Korea utilizes artificial intelligence for strong repression, control, and surveillance of society and aims to use open-source artificial intelligence for political intervention in South Korea and hacking and illegal manipulation in the international community. As the civilizational standards and technological gaps, political systеms, and socio-cultural perceptions between the South and North widen, what will be the future of the power balance and systеmic homogeneity between the two Koreas? Will South Korea's advanced national capabilities increase the possibility of unification with North Korea, or will artificial intelligence act as a larger element of conflict between the two Koreas? It is necessary to recognize and respond to these issues.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Governance, Artificial Intelligence, and Unification
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

10. Tailored Deterrence Strategy on the Korean Peninsula

Author:: Gary Samore
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Over the last decade, the most significant change in the international strategic environment has been the reemergence of a great power rivalry between the U.S. and its European and Asian allies on one hand and Russia and China on the other. This trend began in the second term of President Obama, with the Russian invasion of Crimea in early 2014 and the Chinese construction of a network of military bases in the South China Sea beginning around 2013. Since then, the trend has sharpened. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has locked the U.S. and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies against Russia in a long-term struggle for the survival of Ukraine and future of European security. In Asia, tensions between Beijing and Washington have become worse, as both the Trump and Biden admіnistrations pursued economic measures against China, and as China appears to be building military options to unify Taiwan and the mainland by force. The reemergence of great power rivalry has important nuclear dimensions, increasing concerns about “strategic stability” – the nuclear balance among the great powers – and the risk of nuclear conflict. The Ukraine war has lowered the nuclear threshold. Russia has deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus and threatened to use tactical nuclear weapons to discourage NATO intervention or assistance to Ukraine. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) - the last remaining arms control treaty limiting U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals - expires in February 2026, and Russia has refused U.S. offers to negotiate a new treaty as long as the U.S. is assisting Ukraine. In the meantime, Russia continues to develop an array of exotic nuclear delivery systеms intended to overcome U.S. missile defenses, including hypersonic reentry vehicles, nuclear-armed submarine drones, and nuclear anti-satellite weapons. China is pursuing an unprecedented nuclear build-up, including new strategic bombers, more advanced nuclear-armed submarines, and three new missile bases with more than 300 silos for solid fuel ICBMs with multiple reentry vehicles. According to U.S. Department of Defense estimates, China has more than 500 operational nuclear warheads as of May 2023 and will “probably have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030” (U.S. Department of Defense 2023a). Like Russia, China is also pursuing hypersonic reentry vehicles, anti-satellite weapons, and strategic cyber operations. Some analysts fear that China’s nuclear build-up will make it more confident that it can deter U.S. intervention in the face of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or increase the risk that a U.S.-China confrontation over Taiwan will escalate to nuclear use. To address the reemergence of great power threats, the U.S. has introduced the concepts of “tailored deterrence” and “integrated deterrence” into its nuclear doctrine. According to the Trump admіnistration Nuclear Posture Review, released in February 2018, The United States will apply a tailored and flexible approach to effectively deter across a spectrum of adversaries, threats, and contexts. Tailored deterrence strategies communicate to different potential adversaries that their aggression would carry unacceptable risks and intolerable costs according to their particular calculations of risk and cost (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2018). The tailored deterrence concept was also adopted by the Biden admіnistration in its October 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, saying, Central to U.S. deterrence strategy is the credibility of our nuclear forces to hold at risk what adversary leadership values most. Effectively deterring – and restoring deterrence if necessary – requires tailored strategies for potential adversaries that reflect our best understanding of their decision-making and perceptions (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2022). Building on the concept of tailored deterrence, the Biden admіnistration Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) also introduced the concept of “integrated deterrence,” which is based on the idea that traditional nuclear deterrence can be reinforced by non-nuclear capabilities. According to the NPR, The role of nuclear weapons is well established and embedded in strategic deterrence policy and plans. Non-nuclear capabilities may be able to complement nuclear forces in strategic deterrence plans and operations in ways that are suited to their attributes and consistent with policy on how they are to be employed. A pragmatic approach to integrated deterrence will seek to determine how the Joint Force can combine nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities in complementary ways that leverage the unique attributes of a multi-domain set of forces to enable a range of deterrence options backstopped by a credible nuclear deterrent (Ibid.).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

11. Horizontal Accountability Requires More than Legal Checks and Balances Systеm: Ten Asian Country Cases

Author:: Sook Jong Lee
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Most countries, except closed autocracies, conduct popular elections. However, the quality of global democracy has been deteriorating. One of the most significant illiberal trends is the aggrandizement of executive power led by a popularly elected political leader. Strongmen often bend or simply violate democratic rules by abusing their executive power. The electoral mandate gives them legitimacy, making the efforts to check their executive power difficult. In this context, horizontal accountability based on the checks and balances systеm and oversight institutions is important to prevent the emergence of strongmen. However, horizontal accountability cannot function effectively unless its legal mechanisms are implemented in practice. Ten Asian country cases, presented in previously published ADRN working papers, demonstrated that horizontal accountability perform better when the legislature is not politically captured by the executive power and the judiciary is independent. Oversight institutions also require both political independence and institutional capacity. The electoral accountability of elected elites to voters helps the legislative branch to fulfill its role of constraining the excessive executive power. Independent media and civil society participation always assist both electoral and horizontal accountability.
Topic:: Law, Democracy, Accountability, Civic Engagement, and Political Participation
Political Geography:: Asia

12. Panel Survey on the 22nd Legislative Election

Author:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: The East Asia Institute (EAI) presents key insights from a web-based public opinion survey conducted following the 22nd general election in 2024. The survey aimed to analyze the factors influencing voter behavior and the landscape of political perceptions. The findings indicate that controversies involving the President`s family and close associates, and policy issues?such as rising costs of living and the proposal to increase medical school admission quotas?were pivotal in shaping voter decisions. Furthermore, the survey reveals a prevalent sentiment among voters that Korean society is characterized by inequality and significant intergroup conflicts. A consensus also emerged on the necessity of electoral systеm reforms to mitigate political polarization and more accurately reflect public opinion.
Topic:: Reform, Elections, Conflict, and Survey
Political Geography:: Asia and South Korea

13. Inside the Summit for Democracy: What’s Next?

Author:: Ken Godfrey and Anthony Smith
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: The third iteration of the Summit for Democracy (S4D) in Seoul from March 18 to 20 was an improvement on several elements of previous versions of S4D but still inherited some of the challenges. With this third summit in the rearview mirror, it is a good moment to take stock of the concrete impact of the summit itself and the goals of the S4D process in the future. We argue that the S4D has significant shortcomings but still has added value moving forward if the format can be adjusted in a more pragmatic direction.
Topic:: Civil Society, Democracy, Global South, Cooperation, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Asia

14. The Current Status of Japan’s Countering Digital Influence Operations

Author:: Kazuki Ichida
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Digital influence operations have the capacity to shape and undermine public perceptions and opinions in targeted countries. The United States National Intelligence Council found that China, Russia, and Iran prioritize digital influence operations over cyber attacks, underscoring their perceived efficacy (National Intelligence Council 2023). Digital influence operations are variously referred to as cognitive warfare and information warfare. For the purposes of this briefing, the term “digital influence operations” will be used. This briefing describes the current status of countermeasures employed by major actors in Japan. In Japan, entities such as the Ministry of Defense (MOD), the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the National Police Agency, and the National Center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC), have been developing their budgets and organizations. However, efforts by the private sector, including fact-checking organizations, think tanks, and academics, still face limitations in terms of human resources and scale and are far from sufficient. In recent years, there have been signs of expansion due to increased support from the Japanese government. Three challenges impede Japan’s efforts to counter digital influence operations. First, there is a severe shortage of knowledge and human resources. Second, the measures are primarily focused on countering disinformation, improving literacy, and enhancing strategic communication. Lastly, the attacks leveraging domestic polarization in the target country have not been addressed. This issue is not unique to Japan but also prevalent in Europe and the United States.
Topic:: Public Opinion, Cybersecurity, Disinformation, and Preventive Measures
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

15. China Threats and the Exploitation of China Threats: The 2024 Taiwan General Election

Author:: Chin-en Wu
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: The presidential and legislative elections took place in Taiwan on January 13, 2024. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP or so-called the green camp) selected Vice President Lai Ching-te as their candidate, who also serves as the party chairman. The opposing Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang, KMT or so-called the blue camp) nominated the incumbent mayor of New Taipei, Hou Yu-ih, for the presidential candidacy. The Taiwan People’s Party (TPP or so-called the white camp) chose its leader, former Taipei City mayor Ko Wen-je, as the presidential candidate. Despite initial plans for a joint campaign team between KMT and TPP, a final agreement was not reached. Lai’s victory marked a historic moment, representing the first time since the introduction of direct elections in 1996 that a party has won more than two consecutive presidential terms. Lai secured the presidency with 40% of the votes, followed by Hou with 34%, and Ko with 26%. Lai Ching-te and Hou Yu-yi are political figures within traditional political parties, lacking individual charisma, especially Hou Yu-yi, the former police-in-chief. Ko Wen-je, on the other hand, is a candidate with populist characteristics, appearing as a political outsider at the national level, free from the burden of past ruling records, providing an option beyond the blue-green divide. His interactive style sometimes resembles that of an internet celebrity, using straightforward language to comment on issues or point out social and political problems, in many cases without proposing feasible solutions to these problems. Young people prefer Ko’s relaxed, somewhat sarcastic way of communication. The other part of the general election is the legislative election. DPP gained 51 seats out of 113 seats and lose its majority in the parliament. KMT won 52 seats and become the largest party. TPP gained eight seats. The result makes the new DPP government a minority government.
Topic:: Elections, Domestic Politics, and Cross-Strait Relations
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

16. South Korea’s Official Development Assistance for Democracy Support

Author:: Sook Jong Lee
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: As of 2022, South Korea provides Official Development Assistance (ODA) amounting to 2.79 billion USD, 0.17% of its gross national income, ranking 16th among the donor countries in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which includes 30 countries. Since joining the DAC in 2010, South Korea’s ODA has been steadily increasing. The successful transition from a recipient to a donor country is a significant achievement globally. However, in the context of South Korea’s high status in liberal democracy, its level of support for democratic governance is relatively low. There is no clear definition of ‘democracy aid,’ but it generally refers to aid used to advocate and support democracy. Given that democracy aid could be perceived as interference in the internal affairs of recipient countries, it is not prominently emphasized in development assistance where poverty alleviation and socio-economic development are the primary goals. The DAC aims to promote development cooperation and related policies, targeting Sustainable Development 2030, which includes inclusive and sustainable economic development, progress in national and international equality, poverty eradication, and improving living conditions in developing countries. It establishes a standard of assistance policy in various fields such as development, trade, industry, environment, gender equality, anti-corruption, and strengthening civil society. In essence, the DAC does not explicitly state that spreading democracy is the purpose of ODA (OECD n.d.). South Korea’s Framework Act on International Development Cooperation also stipulates the purpose of itself to “enhance the appropriateness of policies for international development cooperation and the efficiency of the implementation thereof, and effectively achieve the policy objectives of international development cooperation by providing for basic matters concerning international development cooperation, thus contributing to the co-prosperity of humanity and to world peace.” This law outlines the principles of international development cooperation, such as “respect for all the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; support for the self-help efforts and abilities of developing countries; respect for the necessity of development of developing countries; increase in sharing of development experiences; and mutual harmony with the international community and promotion of cooperation therewith,” but there is no mention of linking ODA to democracy (OECD 2005; Korea Legislation Research Institute n.d.).
Topic:: Development, Democracy, Civil Society Organizations, and OECD
Political Geography:: Asia and South Korea

17. The G7’s Geoeconomic Future: Insights from Conflicts with Russia, China, and Iran

Author:: Claudia Schmucker, Stormy-Annika Mildner, and Avi Shapiro
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: In an increasingly conflictual global environment, the G7 has become a more and more important geoeconomic actor. Yet looking at the case studies of Russia, Iran, and China reveals that the geoeconomic role the G7 plays has been mixed. For the G7 countries to improve their geoeconomic impact, they need to align their interests and risk perceptions, as well as improve their ability to propose and enact geoeconomic measures. In addition, the G7 should bolster its partnerships with other democracies and like-minded countries.
Topic:: Partnerships, G7, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

18. The Taiwan election result: A strategic opportunity for a calmer Taiwan Strait

Author:: Mikael Mattlin and Jyrki Kallio
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Taiwan held combined presidential and legislative elections last weekend. The international media generally expected that a win by Lai Ching-te (DPP), who in the past has favoured independence, would lead to tensions and even conflict in the Taiwan Strait. However, there are several reasons why the opposite could be the case.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Elections, and Lai Ching-te
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

19. Challenges to Chinese blue-water operations

Author:: Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: Despite having the world’s largest navy, important questions can be asked about China’s ability to challenge the U.S. Navy on a global scale. A number of factors—geography, logistical infrastructure, force structure, and command culture—all argue that China cannot do so at this time. In particular, China would need to significantly expand the number and caliber of its overseas bases in order to support large-scale, blue-water operations by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). China currently has just two overseas bases—at Djibouti and Cambodia—and both are of limited capacity. Absent such a basing network, the PLAN is reliant on at-sea replenishment, a capability that is inherently vulnerable in wartime. China possesses some quality at-sea replenishment vessels but not nearly in sufficient quantities to support widespread global operations. While Chinese naval aviation has shown important improvements over the last year, the PLAN does not appear to have the logistical capacity to sustain high-tempo carrier operations outside the First Island Chain for an extended period of time. Super-quiet Chinese nuclear submarines would be game-changers in terms of Chinese blue-water operations. But thus far China has not shown mastery of the requisite technologies to build boats with this capability. It would also take China several years to grow a fleet of super-quiet submarines once the necessary technological challenges have been solved. Structural issues with the Chinese economy raise new concerns about Beijing’s ability to fund a blue-water navy over the long term. Such calculations must include the expense of ship construction, but also the massive operations and maintenance budget needed to deploy a potential navy of over 400 ships.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Navy, Economy, and Submarines
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

20. Is the G7 still relevant?

Author:: Raffaele Trombetta
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: In the first of our new Expert Analysis series, former Italian Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Raffaele Trombetta, draws on his career experience to answer the question of whether the G7 is still relevant in today’s international order. Detailing a narrative of the G7’s history, confronting its challenges, and addressing its common criticisms, this paper deals with the alternatives (G20 and BRICS), as well as where the G7’s interests should lie in future relations with China and the African nations.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, G20, G7, BRICS, and International Order
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Europe, and Asia

21. Beijing’s Passive-Aggressive Middle East Policy

Author:: Michael Singh
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: The real threat to U.S. interests in the region isn’t rising Chinese influence, but the erosion of Washington's influence. Will China broker a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? It is a question nobody is asking, because the answer is obvious—not a chance. Yet after Beijing hosted Iran-Saudi talks that led those two rivals to re-establish diplomatic relations in March 2023, some observers wondered if China had supplanted the U.S. as the Middle East’s diplomatic broker. Since Hamas’s Oct. 7 massacre, China has put such illusions to rest: its conduct shows that it is less interested in the success of its own initiatives than in the failure of Washington’s. The real threat to U.S. interests in the Mideast isn’t rising Chinese influence, but the erosion of our own...
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, and Asia

22. China-Taiwan Relations and the EU: How European Soft Power Could Help Reduce Cross-Strait Tensions

Author:: Nicola Casarini
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Russia’s war against Ukraine has brought back to the spotlight the question of China’s (officially the People’s Republic of China, PRC) potential attack on Taiwan (officially the Republic of China, ROC). Beijing claims that the island is one of its provinces, whereas the current Taiwanese government maintains that it is already an independent country. A conflict over Taiwan – or even a Chinese blockade of the island – would have immediate economic and political implications for Europe which will likely impose sanctions on the PRC, the EU’s second-largest trading partner.[1] The EU is not a security actor in East Asia, but has some formidable – and unique – soft power assets that could be leveraged to promote dialogue and understanding between China and Taiwan, with the objective of reducing tensions in the area and maintaining the status quo.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, International Relations, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Taiwan, and Asia

23. Europe’s De-risking from China: Dead on Arrival?

Author:: Nicola Casarini
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: De-risking ties from China has become a buzzword in European policy circles, amid growing tensions between the West and the Asian giant. While US policymakers and experts continue to focus on the need to decouple ties from Beijing, the concept of de-risking has been largely fashioned in Brussels to avoid the decoupling debate and find a common transatlantic ground. While EU member states have reduced critical dependencies on China to varying degrees, their efforts are resisted by some large companies, local authorities and civil society actors eager to boost ties with Beijing. Recently, several EU governments have been promoting industrial cooperation with China, opening doors to Chinese investments in their territories to boost production of electric vehicles and green technologies. While this form of cooperation brings benefits to Europe’s industrial capacity and competitiveness, it however risks increasing the level of dependency on Beijing, undermining the de-risking strategy being put in place by the European Commission, as well as deepening the rift with the US on how to deal with the Asian giant. Going forward, there is a need for a thorough and frank debate about the EU’s de-risking strategy and its future prospect, also considering a possible return of Trump to the White House.
Topic:: Foreign Direct Investment, European Union, Trade, Transatlantic Relations, Industry, and De-Risking
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

24. The Beijing Palestinian Reconciliation Agreement: An Opportunity not to Be Missed

Author:: Menachem Klein
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The Palestinian reconciliation agreement signed in Beijing on 22 July[1] did not attract much attention. It is easy to understand why. Many agreements like it have been signed between Fatah and Hamas since the 1980s and have not been implemented. What is different about this agreement? The difference does not lie in the prospects for reconciliation, which may materialise or ultimately fail like its predecessors, but rather in the contents to which the Hamas movement has agreed. In other words, the novelty is not in the reconciliation but in Hamas’s modified positions.
Topic:: Treaties and Agreements, Hamas, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, Israel, Asia, and Palestine

25. China Will Step Up if the US Falls Behind on Climate Action

Author:: Pey Peili and Danielle Lynn Goh
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: Even under a second Trump administration, climate targets and negotiations will continue, with China stepping up to lead the global energy transition. Southeast Asia must brace itself for protectionist measures from the United States and China, and increased competition between the two in renewable energy.
Topic:: Climate Change, Renewable Energy, Donald Trump, Protectionism, Competition, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:: China and Asia

26. Food Security Beyond Borders: Securing ASEAN’s Food Supply Chains

Author:: Jose M. L. Montesclaros and Paul Teng
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: Regional trade and economic integration will be increasingly important in future ASEAN food security discussions post-2025. A shift is needed going beyond the traditional focus on country-level food security towards a truly integrated regional approach based on interlinked food supply chain security.
Topic:: Food Security, Borders, ASEAN, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: Asia and Southeast Asia

27. Cyberbiosecurity: Adapting to Emerging Threats in the Biosecurity Landscape

Author:: Jeselyn and Julius Caesar Trajano
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: Cyberbiosecurity is a growing area of concern. However, it remains poorly addressed and underappreciated, especially in Southeast Asia. A comprehensive approach incorporating cyber and biosecurity strategies such as raising awareness, capacity-building and engaging the biotechnology sector is needed.
Topic:: Biosecurity, Cybersecurity, Threat Assessment, and Cyberbiosecurity
Political Geography:: Asia and Southeast Asia

28. The Post-2025 ASEAN Agrifood Landscape: What Next?

Author:: Paul Teng
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: The ASEAN agrifood landscape – food produced from agriculture – has changed much since two key guiding documents were conceived – The ASEAN Vision and Strategic Plan of Action for Food, Agriculture and Forestry, 2016-2025, and the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, 2025. New players and new influencing factors are now at the forefront, and more than ever, ASEAN has to balance economic growth-related food security and safeguarding the environment while considering sustainable food systems that provide livelihoods for smallholder farmers and affordable, safe food for consumers.
Topic:: Agriculture, Food, Food Security, Economic Growth, and ASEAN
Political Geography:: Asia

29. ASEAN One Health Efforts: Tackling the Intersections of Climate Change and Health

Author:: Danielle Lynn Goh
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: Climate change and global warming are adversely impacting the environment, and, in turn, human health. Southeast Asia is especially vulnerable. ASEAN policymakers must prioritise regional cooperation to address these challenges. ASEAN’s One Health approach is a good starting point.
Topic:: Climate Change, Health, and ASEAN
Political Geography:: Asia

30. Partnership of convenience: Ream Naval Base and the Cambodia–China convergence

Author:: Rahman Yaacob
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:: It is unlikely that Ream Naval Base in Cambodia will be a Chinese military base or outpost such as the facility in Djibouti fully operated by the People’s Liberation Army. However, China could gain preferential access to the base or use its facilities there to collect intelligence against other states. The Cambodia–China defence convergence is driven by differing motives. Cambodia seeks a partner to modernise its military so it can meet perceived security threats from Thailand and Vietnam, while China wants to expand its political influence and military reach in Southeast Asia. New political and military leadership in Cambodia offers Australia and other like-minded partners an opportunity to deepen defence relations with the kingdom to counter China’s influence.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Navy
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Cambodia

31. China Is Finally Making Progress on the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway

Author:: Niva Yau
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Since the 1990s, China has tried to build the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway. The railway would advance China’s geopolitical and economic interests in Central Asia. Until recently, China has been unable to overcome opposition to the project in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. However, local concerns about the railway may be giving way since Russia’s war in Ukraine has made new trade routes bypassing Russia more profitable, and a new Uzbek government is looking to expand regional and international engagement.
Topic:: Economics, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China, Central Asia, Asia, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan

32. Japan’s New National Security Strategy Is Making Waves

Author:: Ryan Ashley
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Japan’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) contains several groundbreaking commitments, including plans to deploy long-range counterstrike capabilities and to raise defense spending to 2 percent of gross domestic product. A slim-but-significant majority of Japan’s public now seemingly supports efforts to strengthen Japan’s defense capabilities, a political consensus once nearly unthinkable. The United States, India, Taiwan, and others that share Japan’s concern about military aggression from China, North Korea, and Russia have welcomed Japan’s NSS. Some countries in the Indo-Pacific, including South Korea and certain Southeast Asian nations, have expressed mixed reactions to the NSS, as some still harbor distrust toward Japanese military power due to the historical memory of the Second World War. China and North Korea continue to cultivate anti-Japan sentiment within their domestic populations and within other countries in the region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Deterrence, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

33. Stress-Testing Chinese-Russian Relations

Author:: Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: A debate over the nature of the China-Russia relationship has raged for almost two decades. One side believes the two are strategic partners; the other believes their ties are an “axis of convenience” lacking depth. Understanding the true nature of their relationship is of vital importance to U.S. national security. A true strategic partnership represents a grave threat; less robust ties between the two give the U.S. more latitude in dealing with them. We can gain a deeper, more nuanced understanding of China-Russia ties by observing how they interact in regions of the world where they both have important interests at stake. Four regions emerge as key here: Central Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, and East Asia.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

34. Australia and India’s New Military Bases: Responses to China’s Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean

Author:: Felix K. Chang
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Australia and India have built and expanded military bases in and around the Indian Ocean in anticipation of a larger Chinese naval presence in its waters. Most of the construction has focused on creating the capacity to monitor the three main passages into the ocean through the Indonesian archipelago, namely the Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda Straits. India has established two new naval air stations in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and boosted its maritime patrol forces at others nearby. Australia is working to establish a military base in the Cocos (Keeling) Islands and is beefing up its Stirling naval base near Perth to support and sustain nuclear-powered attack submarines.
Topic:: Security, Navy, Military, and Military Bases
Political Geography:: China, India, Asia, Australia, and Indo-Pacific

35. Naval Incident Management in Europe, East Asia and South East Asia

Author:: Ian Anthony, Fei Su, and Lora Saalman
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:: Unprecedented global turbulence in 2022 has demonstrated the need to pay increased attention to naval operations. Enhanced military capability allows naval power projection far beyond home waters. New threats and challenges are emerging from technological advances and new applications, not least the vulnerability of warships and naval facilities to cyber intrusions and cyberattacks. As states implement the programmes they need to protect and promote their interests at sea, there is also likely to be an increase in the number of close tracking incidents. How effective current risk reduction mechanisms will be at dealing with incidents at sea is unclear. This Insights Paper provides a preliminary assessment of the existing mechanisms and suggests areas for further improvement.
Topic:: Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Navy, Crisis Management, and Military
Political Geography:: Europe, East Asia, Asia, and Southeast Asia

36. Cyber Crossover and Its Escalatory Risks for Europe

Author:: Lora Saalman, Fei Su, and Larisa Saveleva Dovgal
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:: The crossover between cybercrime and cyberwarfare has intensified in recent years, particularly against the backdrop of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and mounting tensions between China, Russia and the United States. This paper delves into specific cyber incidents that employ cybercrime tactics with cyberwarfare objectives, allegedly involving Chinese, Russian or US actors. It examines responses within and among the private sector, the public sector and international forums. Although not directly involved in all of the cases, the European Union (EU) was impacted in a variety of ways, including as a result of spillover effects and intentional targeting. Drawing on an examination of cyber incidents, this paper highlights how emerging trends in actors, means and responses present escalatory risks for the EU and emphasizes the pressing need to bolster cybersecurity measures.
Topic:: European Union, Cybersecurity, Conflict, Risk, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

37. Moving to an Offshore Balancing Strategy for East Asia

Author:: Peter Harris
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: Those calling for Washington to expand U.S. military presence in the Western Pacific have misread the regional security environment. The United States can reduce its military footprint in East Asia without jeopardizing its national security or the stability of the region. China is not poised to dominate East Asia or any other part of the Indo-Pacific region. While the distribution of power in East Asia has shifted in favor of Beijing, it does not follow that China constitutes a major threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of all neighboring states. Regional powers can deter China from launching wars of aggression by investing in the right kinds of defensive weaponry to capitalize on geographic advantages. The United States should play the role of an “offshore balancer” by helping China’s neighbors to become more resilient to coercion from Beijing. The leaders of several prominent states in East Asia are anxious to avoid a “cold war” between the United States and China. Washington should heed their calls for restraint. Pushing these governments to choose a side in the U.S.-China rivalry would needlessly antagonize them. The issue of Taiwanese security presents a special challenge for the United States and its allies. Taiwan has the most to lose from China’s rise and perceives U.S. military support as essential to its survival as a de facto independent entity. However, the United States can retrench from East Asia without “abandoning” Taiwan to China. Peace in East Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific does not depend upon the United States enjoying primacy in the region. On the contrary, the pursuit of U.S. military primacy in the Western Pacific will make it more difficult to maintain regional security and promote economic prosperity over the long term.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Deterrence, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: East Asia, Asia, and United States of America

38. Why China Is Taking Sides Against Israel—and Why It Will Likely Backfire

Author:: Michael Singh
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: When news broke of the Hamas attack on Israel last month, the silence from Beijing was conspicuous amid the din of international statements. When the government finally addressed the conflict at a press conference the day after, its words were remarkable for being unremarkable. An unnamed Foreign Ministry spokesperson expressed “deep concern,” called on “relevant parties to remain calm, exercise restraint, and immediately end the hostilities,” and lamented the “protracted standstill of the peace process”—a diplomatic endeavor in which Beijing has never shown more than a passing interest. The wording was nearly identical to China’s reactions during past Gaza conflicts, despite the fact that the circumstances were radically different. Because the brief remarks failed to condemn Hamas or even recognize the scale of the horrors that occurred on October 7, Israeli commentators interpreted them not as neutral, but as hostile. Beijing soon confirmed that interpretation. On October 14, Foreign Minister Wang Yi asserted that Israel’s actions went “beyond the scope of self-defense” and demanded that it stop imposing “group punishment” on Palestinians, while still refusing to condemn Hamas. (For a full listing of Beijing’s official statements on the conflict, see The Washington Institute’s statement tracker.) Chinese media have likewise presented the war as one of Israeli aggression—despite being heavily censored, their early reports were rife with anti-Semitic, anti-Israel commentary claiming that Hamas was defending the two-state solution, even though the group’s past and present actions are patently bent on destroying the Israeli state. Notably, the strident tone in online Chinese commentary moderated in the run-up to President Xi Jinping’s November 15 meeting with President Biden, underscoring the government’s well-established influence over such messaging. This approach is a stark departure from Beijing’s past impassivity toward Middle East conflicts, in which Chinese officials had usually sought to avoid entanglement. Rather, it reflects the government’s new inclination to use far-flung conflicts as opportunities to undermine the United States and score points in the “Global South.” Yet it could also hold longer-term consequences for China, particularly regarding the government’s three-decade effort to improve relations with Israel. In addition, using the current crisis to take potshots at Washington may constrain Beijing’s ability to project impartiality in other regional conflicts.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, Strategic Competition, and Palestinians
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, Israel, Asia, and Gaza

39. Iraqi Officials Eye a Path for Chinese-Iraqi Development

Author:: Baraa Sabri
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Mohammed Shia al-Sudani did not become prime minister in Baghdad as smoothly as desired by the powers close to the “axis of resistance.” Nevertheless, several factors facilitated his rise to power. Domestic concerns, such as Muqtada al-Sadr’s decision to withdraw his bloc from the political process and a push from groups close to Iran to put forward a prime minister with relative acceptance in the regional and international community, played a role. But these considerations compounded with the climate of regional tensions and interests of outside powers—competition between the Gulf and Iran, concerns over the ongoing repercussions of the strained relationship with Washington caused by the Trump administration, and the growing dominance of various armed groups close to Tehran. This precarious reality and confused relationships likewise seem to have driven al-Sudani’s government to attempt to circumvent the traditional binary choice between Washington, the West, and most of the Gulf states on the one hand, and Tehran, Damascus, Lebanon, and their backer Moscow on the other. This new course comes with a distinct and flashy name, the “Development Road” project, and looks to Beijing as a third way forward. Iraq’s political realignment is in large part a response to Iraqis’ shifting views of the United States and the broader geopolitical space: the haphazard American withdrawal from Afghanistan, the political changes in U.S. policy under Biden, the failure to revive the nuclear agreement with Iran, the stagnation in the Syrian issue, Erdogan’s steadfast support of Putin, Russia’s continued attacks on Ukraine, economic movement linked to oil prices, inflation, and financial turmoil in currency rates from Cairo to Tehran, fears of harsh economic sanctions, and, finally and most importantly, the economic rise of China.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Multilateralism, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Iraq, Middle East, and Asia

40. [Global NK Update] July 2023

Author:: Minah Kang
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Key Updates: 1) North Korea’s launch of the ICBM Hwasongpho-18 on July 12th, with an unprecedented 74-minute flight time, drew condemnation from the US, South Korea, and Japan, as discussions were ongoing at a NATO summit. 2) North Korea marked its 70th War Victory Day with a grand ceremony attended by Chinese and Russian officials, including a military parade showcasing their armed forces and strategic weapons, such as the ICBM Hwasongpho-18.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Regional Security, ICBM, and Armistice
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea

41. Strengthening South Korean Value Diplomacy for U.S.-South Korean Normative Alignment

Author:: Sook Jong Lee
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: The foreign policy of any state is formulated by calculating national interest and normative ideals. If national interest is based on tangible economic and security gains, normative ideals are often understood as universal and transformative values. However, this distinction is often blurred in reality, as normative choices are made in the context of long-term national interest. Furthermore, a state’s normative alignment can change due to ideologically different new governments or contentious domestic challenges. The worst-case scenario occurs when a strong state withdraws from leadership of a normative coalition of like-minded states. Like-minded states tend to disperse when they lose their leader; the decline of the Community of Democracies after the United States’s neglect is such a case. States fail to pursue consistent foreign policy because normative politics are in flux domestically and internationally. Despite this complexity, a strong power can exercise normative foreign policy more effectively than a weaker power, as it can employ both hard and soft power. The United States played such an enforcement role during the post–Cold War unipolar world. A newly emerging strong state, such as China, can challenge an existing norm or establish a new norm. What about middle powers? Lacking unilaterally exercisable power, middle powers frequently champion multilateral rules and norms that can protect their interests from great power coercion. Professor Andrew Cooper characterizes a middle power as normatively more virtuous and trustworthy in the global order and describes its preferred diplomacy as pursuing multilateral solutions to international problems, embracing compromise positions in international disputes, and adopting the notions of “good international citizenship” (Cooper et al. 1993, 116). The government of former South Korean President Lee Myung-bak pursued middle powermanship under the Global Korea slogan, emphasized value-based international contributions by expanding foreign aid, and hosted the Group of Twenty (G20) and other global meetings. Now, the Yoon Suk Yeol government has scaled up its middle-power ambitions to those of being a global pivotal state by highlighting South Korea’s international contributions and values-based diplomacy (Yoon 2022a). Like the Lee government, the Yoon government is building its proactive multilateral diplomacy while deepening its long-standing alliance with the United States. But the U.S.-China relationship has changed significantly between the Lee and Yoon governments: geopolitical competition between the United States and China has intensified during the intervening fifteen years, expanding beyond the economic and military spheres to include technology and ideology. Under U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping, an ideological narrative dividing the world between democracies and autocracies has set in. The Russian war in Ukraine has caused Western European countries to merge democratic unity and collective security. In Northeast Asia, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities now threaten not only South Korea but also the faraway United States. Facing all these high-risk challenges, the Yoon government has tightened military and economic ties with the United States. The two countries’ shared democratic values and liberal norms have emerged as a crucial component of deepening bilateral ties. This normative alignment has invited criticism from Beijing, but the Yoon government has so far not rolled back its advocacy for those values—although it has carefully dubbed them as “universal values” rather than liberal or democratic values. The national confidence gained by globally successful popular Korean culture and deteriorating public opinion against China have helped fuel this value assertiveness.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Human Rights, Norms, and Freedom
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

42. Diverging Perspectives on Improving Bilateral Relations: Analysis of the 2023 Korea-Japan Joint Opinion Poll

Author:: Yul Sohn, Yang Gyu Kim, and Hansu Park
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: In 2023, relations between South Korea and Japan began to thaw. Since the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea announced the solution to address disputes regarding forced labor under Japanese colonial rule in March, six bilateral summits were held in the following six months. Intergovernmental exchange has also rapidly increased. With mediation from the United States, South Korea and Japan established consultative groups to address various issues, creating channels of communication between their foreign affairs, defense, industry, finance, and national security offices. People-to-people exchanges, primarily driven by tourism, have also returned to pre-COVID-19 pandemic levels. Since 2012, they have been stuck over the issue of Comfort Women, and after the 2018 Supreme Court ruling, they were in a standoff over the issue of forced labor, a period that can be considered a “crisis of trust” between the two governments. Is 2023 really a year for both countries to put the “lost decade” behind them and usher in a new era? How do the citizens of both countries assess the changes in relations between their two governments? What do they think is the driving force behind the improvement in relations? Has mutual perception improved as relations have improved? Do they perceive that the historical issues, the culprits of the “lost decade,” are being resolved? The results of this year’s survey, marking the 11th year since initiated in 2013, are very interesting and carry significant potential interpretations and policy implications. Firstly, citizens of both countries perceived an improvement in their bilateral relations. Positive evaluations have reached their highest levels, while negative evaluations have hit their lowest points since the survey began. Secondly, there is a noticeable difference in the way citizens of both countries view the progress in bilateral relations. In the case of Japan, favorable opinions have increased with rising favorability toward South Korea, the importance of Korea-Japan relations, support for trilateral security cooperation with the United States and South Korea, and support for a solution to the issue of forced labor. On the other hand, South Korean public opinion has not seen a corresponding increase in positive sentiment regarding these issues, despite increased awareness of an improved relations. Thirdly, these result disparities are reflected in how citizens of both countries assess their governments’ efforts to improve relations. Japanese public opinion supports the efforts of both their own government and the South Korean government to improve relations, while South Korean public opinion has not shown strong support for them. Fourthly, historical issues continue to be a major variable affecting bilateral relations. Citizens of both countries consider historical issues as the primary factor in the development of bilateral relations. South Korea focuses on Japan’s historical perceptions, including issues related to wars, history textbooks, forced labor, and Comfort Women. Japan, on the other hand, is concerned with South Korea’s stance, including anti-Japanese education, statements by South Korean politicians and media about Japan, and excessive anti-Japanese actions by South Koreans. From this survey, it can be interpreted that South Korea believes Japan’s historical perceptions have not changed, while Japan believes that South Korea’s anti-Japanese stance is being corrected. However, the fact remains that there are still significant differences in historical perceptions between the two countries. The implications of the survey results are clear. Both countries need to expand and strengthen functional cooperation in areas such as security and the economy while also making progress towards reconciliation in historical perceptions. Only when these two wheels of functional cooperation and historical reconciliation move together can the South Korea-Japan relationship truly move onto the right track.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, Polls, and Cooperation
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and South Korea

43. 2023 EAI-Genron NPO Korea-Japan Joint Public Opinion Poll: Japan and the ROK-Japan Relations

Author:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: East Asia Institute (EAI) and Genron NPO conducted the 11th Korea-Japan Joint Public Opinion Poll in August and September 2023 to gauge the attitudes of people in both countries regarding their bilateral relations. EAI has presented the survey findings in chart format within the "EAI Public Opinion Briefing." According to the results, citizens of both South Korea and Japan assessed that their bilateral relations have advanced and expressed positive opinions about strengthening cooperation in areas like security and economics, both bilaterally and multilaterally. However, there were contrasting viewpoints between Koreans and Japanese on whether this progress and the importance of bilateral relations have resulted in favorable perceptions of each other`s countries.
Topic:: Security, History, Culture, Public Opinion, Economy, and Perception
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and South Korea

44. 2023 EAI Public Opinion Poll on the International Affairs: ② China and the ROK-China Relations

Author:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Amid the deepening U.S.-China strategic competition, East Asia Institute (EAI) conducted a public opinion poll to discern the Korean people’s perception of China and ROK-China relations. EAI presents the survey results in chart form in the “EAI Public Opinion Briefing.” Despite predominantly negative impressions of China and President Xi Jinping, over 80 percent of respondents believe that Korea-China relations is crucial for Korea. The survey results unveiled public opinion that separately recognizes the favorability and significance of China.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, and Polls
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

45. Young Asians’ Attitude and Behavior Toward Democracy

Author:: Ganbat Damba and Hansu Park
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: As we approach the second quarter of this century, millennials have firmly established themselves as the mainstream of society. The subsequent generation, often referred to as Generation Z, has taken their initial steps into the workforce. This trend is also evident in the political landscape of democratic countries in Asia. As time passes, the proportion of new generations among voters naturally increases, prompting political parties to consider their demands when formulating election strategies and policies. Several Asian countries underwent democratization during the third wave of democracy in the 1980s and 1990s. This wave allowed the new generations in these countries to embrace democracy as an inherent value and norm. As democracy has progressed towards consolidation, it has not only become “the only game in town” but also “the only game in a lifetime” for the new generations. Furthermore, significant advancements in information and communication technologies have opened up new avenues for accessing information and taking into actions for political change. This has led to a widespread belief that younger citizens are generally more pro-democratic compared to their elders. On the flip side, there are concerns that younger generations are relatively less engaged and apathetic towards politics. These concerns often stem from worrisome indicators such as lower voter turnout and occasionally result in a skeptical outlook on the future of democracy. Therefore, it has been increasingly important to delve into the perspectives of the younger generation on democracy, as well as the factors influencing their attitudes toward politics. This brief article reviews previous research conducted through survey analysis and examine youth participation in the Asian region as a case study.
Topic:: Democracy, Youth, Representation, Political Participation, and Attitudes
Political Geography:: Asia

46. [Global NK Update] August 2023

Author:: Minah Kang
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: 1) The recent developments in military cooperation between Russia and North Korea resulted in sanctions on entities that facilitated their arms deals. 2) The South Korea-U.S.-Japan Summit at Camp David laid a strong foundation for continuous and stable trilateral cooperation to address North Korean threats and bolster regional security. 3) North Korea’s second “satellite launch” has raised regional concerns and prompted trilateral action.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Weapons, Cooperation, Military, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Russia, Asia, and North Korea

47. Historical Background and Current State of the Grassroots Democracy: Case Study of Four Asian Regions

Author:: Sri Nuryanti and Hansu Park
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Democracy’s authority and legitimacy relies on people’s participation. In modern democracies, representatives elected by the people are the main actors in political processes, as society has been more complex and policies have become increasingly specialized. Nevertheless, people’s direct participation is an essential part of democratic governance, especially at the local level. This direct democracy includes referendums, recalls, petitions, as well as participatory planning and budgeting. Moreover, active approaches such as mobilizing civil society organizations (CSOs) or protesting can be considered “grassroots democracy.” The word “grassroots” is mostly used as a metaphor for ‘sub-national level’ or ‘marginalized sectors,’ but citizens’ direct and collective actions for bringing about political change and improving democracy are not confined to a certain region or group. Citizens in several Asian countries have struggled to resist against authoritarian regimes and establish democratic constitutions and governments. Movements against dictatorship, military regimes, or the suppression of fundamental rights are still ongoing in some regions. In addition, people under democratic regimes continue spontaneous actions to oversee officials, ensure and solidify civil rights, and push politicians to implement policies and budgets in favor of citizens’ common interests. This article will cover cases from four Asian countries, demonstrating how grassroots democracy efforts have incited more democratic and participatory regimes.
Topic:: Civil Society, Protests, Legitimacy, and Democratic Institutions
Political Geography:: Asia

48. Prospects of and Challenges to Arms Control in South Asia: A Pakistani Perspective

Author:: Sonia Naz
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The arms control stability between Pakistan and India is currently on wobbly grounds due to the increasing development of modern weaponry in South Asia. The already tense situation is intensified by the arms race, as well as by the enforcement of provocative military strategies, actions and speeches.[1] In 2019, an attempted Indian surgical strike on Pakistan after the Pulwama attack[2] and annexation of Indian-occupied Kashmir into the Indian Union by annulling article 370 of the Indian constitution further heightened tensions between the two countries. There is a rising concern that issues such as Kashmir, cross-border terrorism and disputes over shared management of watercourses could escalate into a conventional or even a nuclear war.[3] The modernisation of militaries and expansion of nuclear weapons arsenals seem to be a distinguishing feature of both countries, which is arguably the result of the mutual and wider regional threats that they perceive.[4] The emerging realities of competition between the US and China, and China and India, have made the strategic environment very complex,[5] which has diminished dramatically the prospects of arms control.[6] Indeed, China’s rise fuels Indian insecurity, while, in turn, India’s hegemonic goals and dominance make Pakistan insecure.[7] Amidst these tensions, in 2019, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh clearly stated that Indian No First Use nuclear policy can change into First Use.[8]
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: Pakistan, India, and Asia

49. Timing Is Everything: Italy Withdraws from the Belt and Road Initiative

Author:: Aurelio Insisa
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: After months of rumours and speculations, on 6 December 2023, the Italian newspaper of record, the Corriere della Sera, broke the news that Rome had finally withdrawn from China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), via a note sent to Beijing three days earlier.[1] In the absence of an explicit request to withdraw before the end of December, the memorandum of understanding (MoU) instrumental to Italy’s participation in the BRI would have automatically been renewed for another five years starting from March 2024. Italy’s subdued withdrawal from the BRI marked the epilogue of a long, laborious, yet ultimately successful diplomatic process that reflected a reassessment of its bilateral relations with China. The origins of this reassessment can be traced back to the government led by Mario Draghi between 2021 and 2022. In June 2021, during the first post-pandemic, post-Trump G7 Leaders’ Summit in Carbis Bay, Draghi stated that his government would “examine […] carefully” the MoU.[2] Draghi’s words reflected a deeper awareness of the broader implications of Beijing’s assertiveness in international politics and a close alignment with the Biden administration in Rome. This shift also reflected the absence of tangible economic benefits from BRI membership for Italy, although this was also due to the devastating effect of the Covid-19 pandemic on the designed trajectory of Sino-Italian economic relations.[3] Furthermore, the security-driven decision of the Draghi government to repeatedly exercise its “golden power” to veto Beijing’s investments in Italy’s strategic sectors contributed to shaping the MoU’s outcome.[4] This course correction in Rome’s China policy survived the fall of the Draghi government in July 2022 and the victory of the centre-right coalition led by Giorgia Meloni and her Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy, FdI) party in the legislative elections of September that year. After all, Meloni and her party had consistently opposed the MoU with China from the very beginning, a decision arguably also linked to the perceived need to bolster the party’s credentials as a reliable partner in the eyes of Washington – as in the case of the clear support for Ukraine well before the September electoral victory.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Foreign Direct Investment, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and International Politics
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Italy

50. Italy’s Pivot to the Indo-Pacific – Towards a Value-driven Foreign Policy?

Author:: Nicola Casarini
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Italy is stepping up its involvement in the Indo-Pacific, both in the economic and security realms. The cabinet led by Giorgia Meloni – a centre-right coalition often portrayed by commentators as right-wing and nationalist – is rebalancing Rome’s policy in the Far East by scaling down ties with Beijing and by effectively lending support to the United States and its Asian allies vis-à-vis an increasingly assertive and self-confident China. Moving away from previous centre-left governments that tended to prioritise commercial relations with Beijing, the conservative coalition in power since September 2022 has been fostering defence-related cooperation with Japan and India and chip-related cooperation and investments with Taiwan. Moreover – and remarkably for a country that has long been absent from Asian security – the Italian government has sent a patrol vessel to the South China Sea and plans to forward the country’s flagship aircraft carrier to the area to conduct joint exercises with the navies of Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. The quantity and quality of initiatives being undertaken warrant the label of an Italian ‘pivot’ to the Indo-Pacific. By upgrading its presence in the region, Italy joins the other G7 nations in their efforts to uphold the rules-based order and dissuade Beijing from invading Taiwan. However, to consolidate the western anchorage of this pivot, the Meloni government needs to fully align its policy towards Beijing with that of the Euro-Atlantic allies – which includes deciding whether to continue to lend Italy’s official support to China’s Belt and Road Initiative or not.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Taiwan, Asia, Italy, and Indo-Pacific

51. How Chinese Propaganda Works

Author:: Grigol Julukhidze
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: China is becoming an ever more powerful player in the international political arena. Once a regional power, it now represents the main rival to US global dominance. Over the last few years, Beijing has actively started to apply “propagandistic methods” in order to increase its importance and demonize actual or potential foes. From this point of view, the visibility of the Chinese propaganda model is not as high in Georgia as, for example, the Russian. The main task of the below-presented expert opinion is to illustrate and analyze one of the most powerful machines of disinformation in the world and answer the question, “How does Chinese propaganda work?”
Topic:: Propaganda, Disinformation, and International Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, and Georgia

52. The People-to-People Exchange Between China and Georgia in the Frames of the Belt and Road Initiative

Author:: Jing Shi
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: Since the launch of the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) in September 2013, the interaction between China and the post-Soviet Eurasian countries has become more dynamic than ever before. Considering the individuality among and differences between these countries (Sun, 2023), and the specific forms of cooperation, China has adopted unified but differentiated objectives and plans for collaboration with them. A key feature is that countries participating in the Belt and Road Initiative receive preferential policies and conveniences within the cooperation framework. Meanwhile, bilateral cooperation is also being actively seen. The primary case study chosen to illustrate the progress and current status of people-to-people exchange in this paper is the relationship between China and Georgia. Georgia’s case serves as a representative example when examining cooperation and interaction within the BRI. The exploration of China’s BRI lays the groundwork for understanding the broader context of international collaboration. Within this expansive framework, the specific case study of China-Georgia relations provides a nuanced lens through which to examine the intricacies of people-to-people exchange and cooperation. Evaluating China-Georgia relations through traditional perspectives may risk overlooking the full reality. Firstly, Georgia actively participates in the BRI, demonstrating significant interest in collaboration with China for mutual benefits and profits (Gürcan, 2020). Secondly, due to its geographical distance from China compared to Central Asian states, the forms of interaction and connectivity between Georgia and China require efforts from both sides. This dynamic not only presents specific challenges for various forms of cooperation within the BRI framework, but also underscores the significance and value of this research. Thirdly, analyzing the China-Georgia interaction uniquely from the perspective of the BRI is necessary. When discussing China-Georgia relations, people-to-people exchange and cooperation in science, education, culture, and health represent the realization of mutual interests and understanding between the two countries (Shi, 2018).
Topic:: Development, Education, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: China, Caucasus, Asia, and Georgia

53. The Sources of China’s Innovativeness: Why China’s “Unstoppable” Innovation Powerhouse Might Falter

Author:: Tim Rühlig
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Western governments appear to fear that China is an innovation powerhouse on an almost unstoppable path to dominating future technologies. This is quite a turnaround. Only a few years ago, Western policies were crafted on the assumption that China was a copycat incapable of innovation. A focus on Intellectual Property theft as the Chinese “sin” that drove China’s technological development led many in the West to miss what I have identified as the “Five Virtues” that have made China the innovation powerhouse it is today. China’s future success is not inevitable, however, but dependent on a delicate policy ecosystem.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Innovation, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: China and Asia

54. Between Emotions and Realism: Two Faces of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Balkans

Author:: Srdan Hercigonja and Vuk Vuksanović
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP)
Abstract:: Turkey’s more assertive posture towards the Balkans is neglected compared to the commentariat that deals with Russia and China. To fill this policy gap, the research team of the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) has conducted research based on the analysis of secondary source material and, even more importantly, on fieldwork interviews that involved 16 sources, academics and think tank researchers based in Istanbul and Ankara. Although the consulted sources have different backgrounds and political sympathies, the research established a presence of common themes. Namely, Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans has two aspects. The first is based on emotions. Turkish foreign policy towards the region is framed by Turkey’s special ties with the region based on shared history, social connections, identity factors and the legacy of the Ottoman Empire. The Balkan country most frequently mentioned in the context of special ties with Turkey is Bosnia and Herzegovina, in light of socio-cultural ties and the fact that it is a country in which the Ottoman legacy is felt most strongly. The second approach is rooted in traditional foreign policy realism derived from an objective and calculated assessment of the regional balance of power and one’s own interests. Within this approach, Turkey is trying, for security and strategic reasons, to act pragmatically and be effective in the Balkans without entangling itself in crises that could impede its regional influence. This approach leads Turkey towards engaging Serbia, the region’s strategically consequential country because Ankara is deeply convinced that if it wishes to be effective in the Balkans, it needs to have a partnership with Belgrade. In doing so, it must strike a balance between emotions and realism. It needs to walk the fine line between nurturing ties with communities with cultural and religious ties, like Bosniaks and Albanians, while avoiding alienating countries whose partnership Ankara needs to succeed in the Balkans, such as Serbia.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Emotions, Realism, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Turkey, Asia, and Balkans

55. Climate Security and Role of Women in ASEAN

Author:: Tamara Nair
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: Climate change processes are acknowledged as critical components of regional and international security, and ASEAN should mobilise all segments of its population and existing plans of action to tackle this challenge. The role of women in ASEAN’s peace and security including climate change should be acknowledged and strengthened systematically. The ASEAN Women, Peace and Security Regional Plan of Action offers such an opportunity for increased regional cooperation and resilience.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, International Security, Women, and ASEAN
Political Geography:: Asia and Southeast Asia

56. Climate Change in Japan’s New Defence and Security Strategies

Author:: Alistair D B Cook
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: Japan has taken concrete steps to integrate climate change into its defence and security strategy going forward, and to provide the necessary budget for implementing the relevant measures needed in mitigating the impacts of this threat. This may signal a more prominent leadership role for Japan on climate security in the Indo-Pacific.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Climate Change, and Environment
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

57. Disaster Management in Southeast Asia: 20 Years of Progress and Challenges

Author:: Mely Caballero-Anthony, Alistair D B Cook, and Jonatan Anderias Lassa
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: The management of consequences arising from natural hazards in Southeast Asia has seen laudable advancement in the last 20 years. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has played a positive role in this progress. However, there is emerging disaster policy inertia that reflect local realities at the ASEAN and global levels.
Topic:: Regional Cooperation, Regionalism, and Disaster Management
Political Geography:: Asia and ASEAN

58. China’s “Catchup” on Growing Genetically Modified Crops

Author:: Paul Teng and Genevieve Donnellon-May
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: China, the world’s largest importer of corn and soybean, seems finally to accept the potential of using genetically modified (GM) feed crops. Will this be enough to reduce China’s dependency on such imports and will it meet the demands of other countries that are also experiencing an increase in demand for feed to increase production of animal meat?
Topic:: Agriculture, Science and Technology, Food, and Production
Political Geography:: China and Asia

59. Southeast Asia Aid Map - Key Findings Report

Author:: Alexandre Dayant, Grace Stanhope, and Roland Rajah
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:: Official development finance plays an important role in financing Southeast Asia’s development, equivalent to around 10% of total government development spending in the region. China is Southeast Asia’s single largest development partner and leads infrastructure financing. Yet, implementation problems have seen the scale of China’s financing decline in recent years. Traditional development partners collectively still dominate development financing in Southeast Asia at 80% of the total. The multilateral development banks lead the way, followed by Japan, Europe, and South Korea. The United States and Australia are mid-sized players. India and the Middle East have become notable sources of non-traditional development finance, with the Islamic Development Bank playing an important role. Climate development finance is increasing, but Southeast Asia will need more support if it is to transition towards resilient, low-carbon development. Intraregional development cooperation is growing, but only makes up a small part of development finance in Southeast Asia.
Topic:: Climate Change, Development, Humanitarian Aid, Finance, and Economy
Political Geography:: Asia and Southeast Asia

60. Australia’s Role Supporting Democracies as a Middle Power

Author:: Michael J. Green and Victoria Cooper
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Michael J. Green (Professor and CEO of the United States Study Centre (USSC) in Sydney) and Victoria Cooper (Research Editor at the USSC) analyze Australia’s strengths as a middle power in the face of Beijing’s pressure campaign, and offer areas of regional cooperation that like-minded countries, including Australia, can build upon in order to defend democracy against authoritarian regimes. While acknowledging the limited capacity of Australia to independently counter Beijing’s illiberal behavior, the authors argue that through the expansion of development initiatives, promotion of women’s empowerment, and anti-corruption drives, Canberra can play a key role in leading multilateral efforts to promote democratic resilience in the region.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Statecraft, Middle Power, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Australia

61. Japan’s Gradual Move to Address Technological Challenges to Democracy

Author:: Maiko Ichihara
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Maiko Ichihara, a professor at Hitotsubashi University Graduate School of Law, explores the challenges that technological advancements pose to democracy and analyzes Japan’s recent efforts to regulate disinformation and protect private data. Despite the absence of global regulations on digital technology, Ichihara highlights Japan’s domestic fact-checking efforts as well as its multilateral initiatives with G7 to create action plans promoting international cooperation against disinformation and data privacy abuse. In order to bolster democracy in the digital realm, she advocates for a proactive development of counter-narratives to fake news on social media.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Democracy, Regulation, Privacy, Social Media, G7, Disinformation, Data Collection, and Digital Space
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

62. Restoring Democracy in Myanmar: A Call for Bolstered Anti-Junta Resistance Forces

Author:: Lin Htet Myat
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: February 2023 marks the second anniversary of the military coup in Myanmar that ousted its civilian government and cracked down on democratic protests. Lin Htet Myat, a political analyst from Myanmar, assesses the grim situation in the country and offers new approaches that both the international community and the Burmese anti-junta forces should take to facilitate the restoration of democracy. The author argues that the international community must not engage the junta to seek for a peaceful resolution, and instead strengthen material support and communication with anti-junta forces within Myanmar. Meanwhile, Burmese democratic resistance forces should bolster military cooperation among like-minded groups and build trust in preparation for a federal democratic Myanmar.
Topic:: Democracy, Coup, Humanitarian Crisis, and ASEAN
Political Geography:: Asia and Myanmar

63. Taiwan’s Civic Space Threatened by Chinese Misinformation and the Government’s Worrisome Legislative Responses

Author:: Chin-en Wu
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Civic space in Taiwan is consistently threatened by misinformation campaigns and operations run by external forces, particularly mainland China. Chin-en Wu, an associate research fellow at the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica, assesses that China disseminates fake news to portray positive image of itself while creating internal polarization and competition in Taiwan. The Taiwanese government has attempted to take various measures, such as amending the Social Order Maintenance Act and introducing social media regulation bill, to counter the rampant Chinese misinformation activities. Although Wu acknowledges that the Taiwanese government should collaborate with the civil society to safeguard the island from misinformation, Wu warns that the government must be conscious of the potential damage that the restrictive measures against fake news could inflict on Taiwan’s liberal democracy.
Topic:: Democracy, Social Media, Misinformation, and Civic Engagement
Political Geography:: Taiwan and Asia

64. One Thing It Lacks: South Korea’s North Korea Policy in 2023 National Security Strategy

Author:: Yang Gyu Kim
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Yang Gyu Kim, Principal Researcher at the East Asia Institute, conducts a critical analysis of the new National Security Strategy published on June 7, 2023 and offers policy recommendations for the ROK government’s DPRK policy outlined in the document. While Kim identifies with the National Security Office’s emphasis on strengthening deterrence measures against growing DPRK nuclear and missile threats, he highlights that South Korean countermeasures create a feedback loop that affects North Korea’s threat perception. The author, therefore, points out the limits of the current 3D (Deterrence, Dissuasion, Dialogue) approach and recommends including a “Development” strategy to encourage Pyongyang to envision an alternative future path of prosperity and voluntarily take the denuclearization path.
Topic:: Development, National Security, Deterrence, Dialogue, and Threat Perception
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

65. Tasks for North Korea Policy After the Washington Declaration

Author:: Yu-hwan Koh
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Yu-hwan Koh, the President of the Korea Institute for National Unification, acknowledges the progress made in maintaining the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty regime and bolstering extended deterrence capabilities against North Korean nuclear threats through the Washington Declaration. Nevertheless, he underscores the lack of a fundamental solution to halt further advancements in Pyongyang's nuclear capabilities. Dr. Koh emphasizes the importance of establishing normalized relations between the United States and North Korea, particularly considering that North Korea now possesses nuclear weapons and is unlikely to return to denuclearization talks. In response, he reiterates the significance of the ROK-US alliance in strengthening the Three-Axis system and developing new weapon systems that can effectively counter North Korea's nuclear capabilities.
Topic:: International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:: Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

66. North Korea’s Space Development: The Gap Between Ideal and Reality

Author:: Cheol-wun Jang
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Cheol-wun Jang, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, emphasizes that while North Korea has made significant strides in long-range ballistic missiles, it has not been successful in the area of artificial satellites. Up until now, Pyongyang has had limited engagement in exchanges with major advanced countries involved in space development. Dr. Jang predicts that North Korea is expected to continue its independent pursuit of space development, which will hinder the country’s progress in the satellite sector in the near future.
Topic:: Development, Nuclear Weapons, Space, Kim Jong-un, and Militarization
Political Geography:: Asia and North Korea

67. The South Korea-U.S. Summit and Measures to Enhance Bilateral Cooperation on North Korea

Author:: Jechun Kim
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Jechun Kim, a professor at Sogang University, points out that the Biden administration appears to prioritize competition with China, the Taiwan issue, and the Ukraine War, despite the growing threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities. In response, Kim underlines the importance of issuing a “2023 US-ROK Joint Statement on North Korea” after President Yoon’s visit to the White House. Given the fading interest and support for the reunification of the Korean Peninsula, Professor Kim emphasizes the significance of addressing the rapid advancement in DPRK’s nuclear capabilities. He then suggests that South Korea needs to create a conducive environment for peaceful reunification through strong support from the U.S. for the “Audacious Initiative.”
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

68. Pyongyang in Search of a New Cold War Strategy

Author:: Jihwan Hwang
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Jihwan Hwang, a professor at the University of Seoul, predicts that the strengthening alliance between North Korea, China, and Russia could enable North Korea to overcome its international isolation, weakening the influence of the US-South Korea alliance and increasing China’s leverage over the Korean Peninsula. Dr. Hwang points out that even without the establishment of a new Cold War order, the strengthened cooperation among the authoritarian regimes will pose a significant strategic challenge to South Korea. As Seoul’s approach to Pyongyang has been based on a unipolar system led by Washington, Dr. Hwang highlights the need for South Korea to explore new approaches to address the changing security environment.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Ukraine, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

69. Japan’s Stance on North Korea’s “New Cold War” Narrative: Strengthening Japan’s Defense and Global Normative Power

Author:: Seunghee Oh
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Seunghee Oh, a research professor at Seoul National University Institute of Japanese Studies, suggests that Pyongyang perceives the current global order as a “new Cold War” and views strengthening trilateral cooperation among Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo as hostile to its national interest. In response to North Korea’s moves, Japan prioritizes multilateral initiatives to strengthen its security ties with other partners in the region and the globe. Dr. Oh further claims that as Tokyo assumes the presidency of the G7 Hiroshima Summit this year and has been elected as a non-permanent member of the 2023-24 UN Security Council, Japan is well-positioned to criticize North Korea as an international norm violator and proactively address the North Korean problem and utilize it to enhance its global leadership.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Cold War, International Cooperation, Multilateralism, and Kim Jong-un
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and North Korea

70. U.S. Stance on North Korea’s “New Cold War” Narrative

Author:: Hyun-wook Kim
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Hyun-wook Kim, Professor at Korean National Diplomatic Academy, assesses that North Korea is advocating a new Cold War discourse to strengthen its strategic solidarity with China. However, the intensified Cold War dynamic would lead the United States to prioritize its strategic competition with China, and the Biden administration should turn to a more passive approach toward North Korea. In this context, Dr. Kim anticipates that Washington would not offer incentives to Pyongyang for engaging in dialogue, which would lead Pyongyang to continue its military provocations to influence the direction of Washington’s policy course and gain recognition as a nuclear power. Given the volatility of the situation, Dr. Kim emphasizes the importance of reaffirming the ROK-US military alliance to counter the escalating crisis on the Korean Peninsula.
Topic:: Cold War, International Cooperation, Deterrence, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

71. North Korea’s Outlook on the New Cold War

Author:: Won Gon Park
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Won Gon Park, Chair of the EAI Center for North Korean Studies (Professor at Ewha Womans University), argues that North Korea utilizes its “new Cold War” rhetoric for two objectives: 1) to criticize US military buildup and its DPRK policy, and 2) to enhance the legitimacy of its possession of nuclear weapons by exploiting the geopolitical competition. Further, he claims that North Korea characterizes the Cold War as a clash between liberalism and authoritarianism in an effort to appeal to and garner support from China and Russia. However, Dr. Park assesses that while North Korea, Russia, and China may temporarily cooperate against the US as their common enemy, the nature of their “political marriage of convenience” complicates the likelihood of a sustained alliance. Finally, Dr. Park predicts that the new Cold War system that Pyongyang envisions is unlikely to come to fruition.
Topic:: International Relations, Alliance, Kim Jong-un, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

72. Will Spring Ever Come? Security Landscape of Northeast Asia in 2023

Author:: Kyung-joo Jeon
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Kyung-Joo Jeon, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, predicts that the Korean peninsula might repeat the days of fire and fury in 2017 this year. North Korea will likely turn to its military provocation tactics ahead of the ROK-US Freedom Shield Exercises in mid-March, DPRK’s 70th Anniversary of The Day of Victory in the Great Fatherland Liberation War in July, and another ROK-US joint military drill in August. Dr. Jeon suggests that Seoul should increase its strategic value as an essential global player while Washington seeks a stronger alliance network in the Indo-Pacific region if South Korea wants to live up to its policy goal of the “Global Pivotal State.”
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Asia

73. China’s Stance on North Korea’s “New Cold War” Narrative

Author:: Dong Ryul Lee
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Dong Ryul Lee, Chair of the China Research Center at EAI (Professor at Dongduk Women’s University), highlights that although China and North Korea might seem to have a close relationship, Beijing maintains a reserved stance regarding the North’s perspective on its strategic value amid the US-China competition. Professor Lee explains that Xi Jinping prioritizes political stability by boosting the economy and tries to avoid a full-scale confrontation with the US. Accordingly, China seeks to manage the risk spurred on by Pyongyang’s military provocations, given that they legitimize stronger US-Japan-ROK trilateral security cooperation.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Cold War, Xi Jinping, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

74. Re-Declared “Frontal Breakthrough”: North Korea’s Nuclear First Line in 2023 and Its Limitations

Author:: Walter G. Park
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Won Gon Park, Chair of the EAI Center for North Korean Studies (Professor at Ewha Womans University) stresses that North Korea's persistence to pursue its nuclear-first line will lead Pyongyang to a severe crisis as the line would cripple its economy while boosting the U.S. efforts to establish enhanced alliance security cooperation based on the concept of "integrated deterrence." Dr. Park suggests that the South Korean government establishes measures to assist North Korea's transition to an "economy first" state and to prepare an innovative measure that could guarantee the survival of the regime while not jeopardizing the national security of South Korea.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

75. Filling the Geopolitical Void in Central Asia

Author:: Bruce Pannier
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: A new era in foreign policy is starting for the five Central Asian states—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—in which the role of former colonial master Russia is significantly diminished as Moscow concentrates its attention and resources on the debacle it created when it started a war on Ukraine. China also has considerable influence in Central Asia, but China has not indicated it is willing to fill the vacuums Russia is leaving in Central Asia’s security, finances, or trade. The Central Asian states of necessity are seeking new partners, but it is possible that as the Central Asian states develop new foreign partnerships, they will create new divisions regionally, and the case of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is possibly an example of what is come for Central Asia.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Finance, and Trade
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Central Asia, Eurasia, Kazakhstan, Asia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan

76. Putin Is Doing Xi’s Dirty Work (and the West Is Helping Him)

Author:: William R. Spiegelberger
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Vladimir Putin’s diplomatic turn to China has been a disappointment for good reason: Beijing is more interested in advancing its own anti-Western interests than in helping Moscow. The more fruitful and natural partnership would be between Russia and the West, since both face a common threat from China and the infrastructure for mutual prosperity is already in place. The main impediment to improved Russian-Western relations is the continued rule of Putin, who is increasingly doing China’s bidding at Russia’s expense.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Xi Jinping, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

77. Global Health Security COVID-19 and Its Impacts – Vaccine Resilience: Next Stage in ASEAN’s War?

Author:: Jose M. L. Montesclaros
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: The next stage in ASEAN’s COVID-19 war lies in partnerships to establish local vaccine manufacturing centres within member states, to strengthen the region’s “vaccine resilience”.
Topic:: Public Health, Vaccine, Resilience, COVID-19, and Medicine
Political Geography:: Asia and ASEAN

78. Women in AI: Is There a Singapore Model?

Author:: Tamara Nair
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: The 4ᵗʰ Industrial Revolution introduced Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence (AI) to the forefront and very soon, if not already, AI will be embedded in almost all spheres of our lives. While AI technologies like Alexa and Siri have female names and voices, there are very few women involved in developing AI products and services. Is there a model Singapore can offer?
Topic:: Industrial Policy, Artificial Intelligence, Industrialization, Emerging Technology, and Gender
Political Geography:: Asia and Singapore

79. Reviving Nuclear Power: Is the Philippines Ready?

Author:: Julius Caesar Trajano
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: Philippine President Duterte has signed an executive order to include nuclear power in the country’s energy mix. However, there are critical preparatory issues that need to be resolved to enhance the country’s nuclear energy development.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Science and Technology, Nuclear Power, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:: Asia and Philippines

80. Invasion of Ukraine – Asia’s Food Security in Trouble?

Author:: Paul Teng and Genevieve Donnellon-May
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: The impact of the Ukraine-Russia conflict on food security in many countries demonstrates how inter-linked the global food system has become. Ripple effects from reduced wheat and fertiliser exports are already causing wheat shortages in the Middle East and fertiliser shortages elsewhere. However, the crisis also offers other major agricultural exporting countries opportunities.
Topic:: Security, Agriculture, Food, Food Security, and Malnutrition
Political Geography:: Asia

81. India’s Food Security Resilience: Some Tips for ASEAN?

Author:: Jose M. L. Montesclaros
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: The IMF recently lauded India’s food subsidies in helping minimise COVID-19’s impacts on food and economic insecurity. What are the lessons for ASEAN member states, where extreme poverty increased by 4.7 million amid the pandemic?
Topic:: Regional Cooperation, Food, Food Security, Pandemic, and Resilience
Political Geography:: Asia and ASEAN

82. Ukraine War and Food Security: How Should ASEAN Respond?

Author:: Jose M. L. Montesclaros and Mely Caballero-Anthony
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: ASEAN should come together and assess what regional mechanisms it can leverage in addressing the looming threat of food trade protectionism within the region, amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Topic:: Regional Cooperation, Conflict, Violence, Regionalism, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, and ASEAN

83. Global Food Insecurity – Animal Feed and Meat: Asia’s Looming Food Crisis

Author:: Genevieve Donnellon-May and Paul Teng
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: The impact of the Russia-Ukraine War on the global food situation continues to reverberate around the world, including in Asia. The worst is yet to come as exports of vital livestock feed from Russia and Ukraine are severely affected, causing spikes in retail meat prices, from pork to chicken and fish. Can Asia cope?
Topic:: Food, Food Security, Food Crisis, Food Safety, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Asia

84. Growing Food Insecurity – Asia’s Huge Appetite for Fish: Can It Be Met?

Author:: Paul Teng and Genevieve Donnellon-May
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: The global demand for fish continues to skyrocket, led by Asian consumers, notably in China. There is now a global crisis in fisheries caused by over-fishing and climate change. Aquaculture (fish farming) is expected to plug this gap and is projected to be the primary source by 2030.
Topic:: Food, Food Security, Maritime, Fishing, and Consumerism
Political Geography:: Asia

85. Growing Food Insecurity – Global Water Crisis: Options for Food Security

Author:: Paul Teng and Genevieve Donnellon-May
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: Water is indispensable for agriculture. Farming globally, on which millions depend for livelihood, has become more volatile due to water insecurity. It has worsened due to climate change-induced droughts and floods, which have grown in intensity and frequency worldwide. In Asia, the growing water insecurity has caused unpredictable food production, requiring enormous imports from other regions.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Water, Food, Inequality, and Food Crisis
Political Geography:: Asia

86. Global Food Insecurity – Food Import: Reducing ASEAN’s Dependency

Author:: Paul Teng
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: The current food insecurity caused by the three Cs — COVID-19 pandemic, climate change and conflicts — has highlighted the reliance of many ASEAN states on imported staple food and feed. ASEAN needs to seriously re-examine its priorities to reduce import dependency.
Topic:: Climate Change, Regional Cooperation, Food, Food Security, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Asia and ASEAN

87. Planetary health: An alternative framework for disaster governance in ASEAN?

Author:: S. Nanthini and Lina Gong
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the search for a better way of managing human activities and their environmental impact thereby zeroing in on the specific actions needed to maintain a balance for Planet Earth’s sustainability.
Topic:: Environment, Health, International Cooperation, Governance, Sustainability, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Asia and ASEAN

88. Next Steps for Disaster Resilience in ASEAN

Author:: Alistair D B Cook and Christopher Chen
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: The challenges posed in responding to natural hazards during the global COVID-19 pandemic were felt across Southeast Asia. As travel restrictions and supply chain disruptions ease up, it is time to revaluate disaster management and not simply revert to old ways.
Topic:: Regional Cooperation, Resilience, COVID-19, and Disaster Management
Political Geography:: Asia and ASEAN

89. ndonesia’s 2060 Net-Zero Ambition: The Challenges Ahead

Author:: Margareth Sembiring
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: Recent developments in Indonesia’s sustainability outlook that includes a net-zero goal by 2060 are pointing to stronger commitments to reducing carbon emissions from energy use. At the same time, short- to medium-term realities, and a lack of public trust may derail the long-term sustainability vision.
Topic:: Climate Change, Environment, Sustainability, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:: Indonesia and Asia

90. Global Food Insecurity – The Danger of Misguided Food Production Policies: The Case of Sri Lanka

Author:: Paul Teng and Jose M. L. Montesclaros
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: The Russia-Ukraine conflict has aggravated food insecurity worldwide and encouraged various countries to find new ways to manage this threat, including policies to substitute costly imported agricultural inputs like synthetic fertilizers and pesticides. Sri Lanka’s recent experience shows that drastic policy changes can have disastrous political and societal consequences.
Topic:: Politics, Food, Food Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Asia and Sri Lanka

91. Uncertainty in the Black Sea: Implications for Asia’s Food Security

Author:: Jose M. L. Montesclaros
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: There has been increasing uncertainty, with Russia opting out from the Black Sea Grain Initiative and re-joining five days later. In this brief period, wheat and maize prices jumped for commodity traders. These events portend continuing instability in supply of essential food items amid the Ukraine war and putting Asia’s food security at risk.
Topic:: Security, Food, Food Security, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: Asia

92. The Quad and HADR Operations: Prospects for Cooperation with Southeast Asia

Author:: Christopher Chen
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: Quad leaders met in New York on 23 September 2022 and signed into operation the Guidelines for the ‘Quad Partnership on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) in the Indo-Pacific’. This represents an expansion of the scope of the Quad alliance and opens new prospects for ASEAN and Southeast Asia in this critical area of human security.
Topic:: Security, Humanitarian Aid, International Cooperation, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:: Asia and ASEAN

93. Small Modular Reactors in the Philippines’ Journey Toward Nuclear Energy

Author:: Julius Caesar Trajano
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: The Philippines is seeking nuclear energy partnerships with various countries and allies as it aims to address the twin challenges of achieving energy security and reducing carbon emissions. How can advanced small modular nuclear reactors help the Philippines in its transition to clean energy?
Topic:: Security, Energy Policy, Nuclear Power, Nuclear Energy, and Green Transition
Political Geography:: Asia and Philippines

94. CAN DEBT RELIEF CONSTRAIN REPRESSIVE GOVERNMENTS?

Author:: Brett L. Carter
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: The African continent is confronting the prospect of a new debt crisis. The COVID-19 pandemic wreaked havoc on government finances. The Russian government’s war against Ukraine has increased the cost of food and energy, and compelled investors to sell off government bonds in emerging markets. Rising interest rates in the United States will increase the cost of borrowing. The Chinese economy is struggling under the weight of Xi Jinping’s “Zero COVID” policy and accumulated real estate debt. In 2015, the International Monetary Fund announced that eight countries were in debt distress. By March 2022, 23 were. In June, public debt ratios reached a 20-year high. Africa’s debt-distressed governments “are unlikely to default” in 2022,” The Economist observed, “but face trouble by 2024.” There is some evidence that the debt crisis is especially acute for Africa’s non-democracies. The impending debt crisis coincides with a general sense that Africa is experiencing a democratic recession. Voters are increasingly subject to intimidation and violence. Incumbent presidents are removing term limits. The longstanding norm against military coups is fading.
Topic:: Cold War, Debt, World Bank, GDP, Repression, and IMF
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, China, Ukraine, Asia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and United States of America

95. WILL NANCY PELOSI’S VISIT TO TAIWAN TRIGGER A CRISIS?

Author:: James Lee and Jackie Wong
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: The controversy surrounding Nancy Pelosi’s (D-CA) potential visit to Taiwan centers on what it implies about United States’ relations with Taiwan. When the United States normalized relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1979, it said it would continue relations with Taiwan on an unofficial basis. The Normalization Communique said that “the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.” Beijing has interpreted this statement as a commitment, and it has warned Washington that closer government-to-government interactions with Taipei would violate that commitment and have dire, though unspecified, consequences. But there’s no formula for determining what “unofficial” means. The canonical statements of the United States’ One-China policy—the Shanghai Communiqué, the Normalization Communiqué, the Arms Sales Communiqué, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six Assurances—are written at a high level of abstraction. There is no communiqué in which the United States said that the Speaker of the House would never visit Taiwan; those kinds of details are left to diplomatic protocols (such as the “contact guidelines”) that the United States has defined on its own. It is an act of interpretation—an art rather than a science—and the question now is whether a visit by Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan would be outside the bounds of a reasonable interpretation of “unofficial” relations.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Nancy Pelosi
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

96. MANAGING CONFLICT BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL RIVALS

Author:: Elizabeth Radziszewski and Jeremy Berkowitz
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: Sweden’s and Finland’s recent decisions to join NATO marked a historic moment for the two Nordic states known for their neutrality. The move not only reflects evolving security concerns about Russia’s aggression in Ukraine but marks a shift that is set to end decades of accommodation toward Russia. It also sheds light on a broader question about why some rival countries—or those that have a history of tensions—sustain policies of accommodation over the years, and what pushes them to abandon such policies. Why would Sweden and Finland refrain from alienating Russia for years only to break suddenly with this tradition with their unprecedented decision to apply for NATO membership?
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Military, and Conflict Management
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Finland, Asia, Spain, North Africa, Sweden, Morocco, and United States of America

97. Mixed report card: China’s influence at the United Nations

Author:: Courtney J. Fung and Shing-hon Lam
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:: China is of growing importance to the United Nations. Beijing aims to exert influence at the world body to legitimise and disseminate its foreign policy values and interests. This report contextualises China’s growing presence at the United Nations by examining publicly available data on four metrics that gauge Beijing’s success in steering the global governance agenda. Those metrics are: funding for UN departments, programs, and initiatives; staffing of executive-level personnel positions; voting in the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council; and the use of PRC-specific discourse and language in UN-generated documentation. The United Nations has become progressively more reliant on China’s general contributions, and in turn China has used a combination of levers to elevate its position within the UN system. However, this report finds that China is still selective in its overall approach to UN participation and that efforts by the PRC do not necessarily translate into successful influence at the body. The report makes three recommendations for UN stakeholders. First, a deeper understanding must be gained of what China contributes across different UN agencies and functional areas to establish a more complete picture of its multilateral input. Second, efforts should be made to shape China’s engagement in multilateral issues, in particular those that the PRC is yet to prioritise, such as refugee management. Third, it is vital to articulate an inclusive multilateral vision for a rules-based international order that specifies under which conditions China’s contributions are embraced, rather than framing PRC input solely as a source of concern.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, United Nations, Governance, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:: China and Asia

98. Taiwan’s Local Elections: Defeat of the Ruling DPP Amidst Negative Campaigns

Author:: Kai-Ping Huang
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Taiwan held “nine-in-one” local elections on November 26, 2022, and the ruling Democratic Progressive Party(DPP) lost many seats amidst negative campaigns, while the KMT emerged as the winner of the election. However, Kai-Ping Huang, an Associate Professor of Political Science at National Taiwan University, evaluates the biggest losers are voters who were not offered quality campaigns. Professor Huang defines the campaign’s major issues as Scandals of Plagiarism, Poor Quality of Infrastructure, Discredited Pandemic Control Performance and Economic Difficulties and Anti-China Campaign Backlash. In addition, she states that it is too early to say whether the KMT will have an advantage in the upcoming presidential election. The KMT must clarify its position on national identity. The Taipei voters don`t appreciate what the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) has done to the capital, and most voters do not believe that the TPP is a credible alternative to the two mainstream parties. Therefore, TPP needs to coordinate with the KMT to defeat the ruling DPP can be an option.
Topic:: Education, Elections, Democracy, and Political Parties
Political Geography:: Taiwan and Asia

99. Sustaining Democratic Unity for Ukraine’s Victory and South Korea’s Roles in This

Author:: Yang Gyu Kim
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: The war situation regarding Russia and Ukraine seems to be changing, as Kherson has recently returned to Ukraine. Yang Gyu Kim, a principal researcher at the East Asia Institute, considers the Russia-Ukraine war a “war of value,” and stresses that Ukraine’s victory is highly important, since it involves the restoration of global governance and has strategic implications in various regions around the world. Considering the post-war measures, Kim argues that the most contentious issue to be addressed is the genocide committed by Russian troops toward Ukraine civilians. While various reports confirm the allegations of genocide, he explains establishing its allegations and filing the case to the International Court of Justice remain challenging. Finally, Kim suggests three things that the Korean government can consider to help Ukraine: closely cooperating with the United States and Japan to sanction Russia, providing further humanitarian aid to Kyiv, and supporting Ukraine to win the legal fight in proving the war crimes as genocide.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Genocide, Democracy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Asia, and South Korea

100. Russia’s Partial Mobilization: Issues Pertaining Russian Migrants in Mongolia

Author:: Ariunbayar Bazarvaani
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: The Kremlin recently announced a partial mobilization decree amid the continuing war between Russia and Ukraine. Along with the partial mobilization decree, the Kremlin also amended the Criminal Code that stipulates severe punishment for voluntary surrender and people who deserted from military service. While the Mongolian government holds an abstemious position towards the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Mr. Ariunbayar Bazarvaani, CEO of The Academy of Political Education, states that the non-governmental organizations in Mongolia are keeping an eye on the Russian migrants who had fled from Russia to evade mobilization. He also introduces a survey addressing Russian refugees` challenges and urges the Mongolian government to consider these issues and approach the crisis with an awareness of democracy, human rights, and freedom. Specifically, he argues that the Mongolian government should actively involve Mongolian NGOs to offer a favorable environment, including employment, and thus be recognized as a country that endorses democracy and human rights.
Topic:: Democracy, Migrants, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Mongolia, and Asia

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS