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1. Mongolia’s Electoral Reform and the State Great Khural (Parliamentary) Elections

Author:
Ganbat Damba and Byambakhand Luguusharav
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Since the transition to a democratic systеm and market economy in the early 1990s, Mongolia has held its 9th parliamentary election. In a historic first, the election held on June 28 was carried out under the new electoral systеm. A total of 78 members of parliament (MPs) were elected from 13 majoritarian districts, with an additional 48 MPs elected through proportional representation in a nationwide constituency (General Election Commission of Mongolia 2024). The new parliament consists of 126 seats, in accordance with the amendments to the Constitution introduced in 2023. The election results demonstrated that the Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) secured 68 seats, followed by the Democratic Party (DP) with 42 seats, the HUN Party with 8 seats, and both the National Alliance and the Civil Will-Green Party with 4 seats each. It is noteworthy that the MPP won 50 constituency seats and 18 from the party list, thereby ensuring a majority presence in parliament alongside three other parties that surpassed the legal threshold for representation (Oyunchimeg 2024). This distribution of seats underscores the diversity of representation in parliament, reflecting the electorate’s support for multiple political entities and ensuring a legislative body that is balanced and representative of the political spectrum. Over the past 34 years, various electoral systеms have been employed, including majoritarian voting systеms with single or multiple mandates and mixed systеms that combine majoritarian and proportional representation voting elements. Each systеm has its strengths and weaknesses. However, the criticism from both the public and political parties of the contemporary electoral systеm has resulted in frequent changes to it. Before the new systеm was introduced, the Mongolian parliament had maintained 76 seats since 1990. The number of seats in the parliament was increased by approximately 40 percent, from 76 to 126. Since 1990, Mongolia’s population has grown from 2.15 million to 3.5 million, an increase of about 40 percent. As a representative institution of the people, there has been significant debate in recent years regarding the potential expansion of the parliamentary seats. The proposed increase in seats has prompted a considerable number of individuals to seek election. In the first democratic election held after new democratic Constitution in 1992, only 293 individuals representing 10 parties and independents ran for the parliament. The 2024 Election saw the largest number of candidates to date, with the highest number of candidacies. A total of 372 individuals from 22 parties and coalitions contested the election through party lists, while 969 candidates ran in constituencies, resulting in a total of 1,341 candidates, marking a record high.
Topic:
Elections, Democracy, Voting, and Parliament
Political Geography:
Mongolia and Asia

2. The 4IR and the Future of the North Korean Police State

Author:
Ken Gause
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The term Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) has gained widespread acceptance as the overarching concept used to describe the impact of new technologies on various aspects of society in the early 21st century. Technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), 5G networks, 3D printing, cloud computing, robotics, drones, VR, AR, IoT, genomics, biometrics, and blockchain are commonly associated with this revolution. The speed, scope, and profound influence of 4IR technological advancements are unprecedented in human history. This revolution is rapidly progressing and transforming nearly every industry globally, as well as all aspects of societal life (Watson 2020). The technologies listed are often considered part of the current wave of emerging technologies that are expected to help human societies tackle global issues such as disease, poverty, and ignorance. Despite its promise, there are also shadowy aspects of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. It is widely acknowledged that technology has the potential to foster human progress and advancement, but it also has the capability to exert control over individuals. In George Orwell’s novel 1984, the character Winston takes precautions to avoid detection by the telescreen in his home while writing in his diary out of fear of facing severe consequences. The concept of being monitored by a “Big Brother” figure is not a new one, yet in today’s era of the 4IR, this dystopian narrative may resonate with a sense of unease and familiarity. The rapid advancements in technology could pave the way for, or may already be facilitating, a form of surveillance and control reminiscent of totalitarian regimes seeping into the daily lives of certain nations. In nations like China and Russia, we have witnessed widespread implementation of increasingly advanced surveillance systеms in order to maintain control, monitor the activities of citizens, and suppress opposition and threats to their authority. These countries have also established an international model for the utilization of digital technologies for such purposes. This paper will briefly examine how coercion, control, surveillance, and punishment by the North Korean Police State will change in the era of the Fourth Industrial Revolution and the AI revolution. Will new technologies make the Kim regime’s control more effective, or will they enforce reforms and shifts in North Korean society? Will 4IR lead to transformation inside North Korea and create a pathway to reunification?
Topic:
Artificial Intelligence, Police State, and Fourth Industrial Revolution
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

3. Knowledge State in the Era of Generative AI and the Future of the Korean Peninsula

Author:
Chaesung Chun
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Korea failed to transform into a fully modern sovereign state when modern international politics was being established. Traditionally, the Korean Peninsula was a single nation and state. However, as the Westphalian modern state systеm, originating in the West, was introduced in the form of imperialism, Korea failed to become a fully sovereign state, ultimately leading to its division. The causes of this division include external factors such as the competition among surrounding empires and Cold War rivalry, as well as internal factors like the fragmentation of state-building capabilities. However, the most significant reason was the civilizational gap, as Korea could not fully absorb and follow the new civilizational standards set by the West after the Industrial Revolution. The current world order is at a turning point following the unipolar era of the United States. While the Western Westphalian domain is maintained, the core element of the liberal international order is being significantly challenged by revisionist states like China and Russia, as well as countries from the Global South. It is uncertain whether global politics will form and maintain a single integrated sphere (권역) or divide into multiple regions experiencing fundamental conflicts. If modern international politics, standardized by Western civilization, were to fragment again, the division of the Korean Peninsula could deepen based on this regional separation. The recent intensification of strategic alliances between North Korea, China, and Russia illustrates this situation. A crucial phenomenon in this process is that the Fourth Industrial Revolution and emerging technologies are redefining the international political order. Unlike previous technological advancements, current technological progress is characterized by enabling technologies or meta-technologies that define the direction of technological development. Generative artificial intelligence, in particular, exemplifies the innovation of these foundational technologies. The role and function of generative artificial intelligence, which significantly impacts military, economic, social, cultural, and governmental governance capabilities, are just beginning. The future development of foundational technologies will have a critical impact on the international political order and the development of various diverging regions. Countries, companies, societies, and international organizations that quickly adapt to these technological changes will advance further, while those that do not will face deepening material and perceptual gaps. Considering the unification of the Korean Peninsula, the current stage of digital technology development in the North and South has maintained ethnic homogeneity and power balance to a level that can aim for unification. However, as new foundational technologies like generative artificial intelligence grow, the development paths, power balance, ethnic homogeneity, and differences in state forms and functions between South and North Korea will likely deepen. If unification is a goal based on a certain degree of homogeneous historical experience and similarity in state systеms and societies, the possibility of such similarity is decreasing. South Korea, as a liberal democratic state with the world's tenth-largest economy, a close alliance with the United States, and an innovative social and corporate atmosphere, has the capacity to rapidly absorb and disseminate artificial intelligence advancements throughout society. In this context, South Korea strives for economic development, international cooperation, and social and cultural innovation. In contrast, North Korea is an exceptionally poor country on a global scale, an unprecedentedly dictatorial state, and maintains its state through strong repression of society. In this context, it is difficult to expect societal innovation, and the acquisition and dissemination of new technologies are solely state-driven, with technological innovation also being state-led. In the increasingly polarized international technology supply chain, North Korea will find it challenging to find alternatives other than relying on China and Russia. North Korea is also striving to develop foundational technologies like artificial intelligence, but its direction will be very different from South Korea's. North Korea utilizes artificial intelligence for strong repression, control, and surveillance of society and aims to use open-source artificial intelligence for political intervention in South Korea and hacking and illegal manipulation in the international community. As the civilizational standards and technological gaps, political systеms, and socio-cultural perceptions between the South and North widen, what will be the future of the power balance and systеmic homogeneity between the two Koreas? Will South Korea's advanced national capabilities increase the possibility of unification with North Korea, or will artificial intelligence act as a larger element of conflict between the two Koreas? It is necessary to recognize and respond to these issues.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, Artificial Intelligence, and Unification
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

4. Tailored Deterrence Strategy on the Korean Peninsula

Author:
Gary Samore
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Over the last decade, the most significant change in the international strategic environment has been the reemergence of a great power rivalry between the U.S. and its European and Asian allies on one hand and Russia and China on the other. This trend began in the second term of President Obama, with the Russian invasion of Crimea in early 2014 and the Chinese construction of a network of military bases in the South China Sea beginning around 2013. Since then, the trend has sharpened. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has locked the U.S. and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies against Russia in a long-term struggle for the survival of Ukraine and future of European security. In Asia, tensions between Beijing and Washington have become worse, as both the Trump and Biden admіnistrations pursued economic measures against China, and as China appears to be building military options to unify Taiwan and the mainland by force. The reemergence of great power rivalry has important nuclear dimensions, increasing concerns about “strategic stability” – the nuclear balance among the great powers – and the risk of nuclear conflict. The Ukraine war has lowered the nuclear threshold. Russia has deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus and threatened to use tactical nuclear weapons to discourage NATO intervention or assistance to Ukraine. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) - the last remaining arms control treaty limiting U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals - expires in February 2026, and Russia has refused U.S. offers to negotiate a new treaty as long as the U.S. is assisting Ukraine. In the meantime, Russia continues to develop an array of exotic nuclear delivery systеms intended to overcome U.S. missile defenses, including hypersonic reentry vehicles, nuclear-armed submarine drones, and nuclear anti-satellite weapons. China is pursuing an unprecedented nuclear build-up, including new strategic bombers, more advanced nuclear-armed submarines, and three new missile bases with more than 300 silos for solid fuel ICBMs with multiple reentry vehicles. According to U.S. Department of Defense estimates, China has more than 500 operational nuclear warheads as of May 2023 and will “probably have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030” (U.S. Department of Defense 2023a). Like Russia, China is also pursuing hypersonic reentry vehicles, anti-satellite weapons, and strategic cyber operations. Some analysts fear that China’s nuclear build-up will make it more confident that it can deter U.S. intervention in the face of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or increase the risk that a U.S.-China confrontation over Taiwan will escalate to nuclear use. To address the reemergence of great power threats, the U.S. has introduced the concepts of “tailored deterrence” and “integrated deterrence” into its nuclear doctrine. According to the Trump admіnistration Nuclear Posture Review, released in February 2018, The United States will apply a tailored and flexible approach to effectively deter across a spectrum of adversaries, threats, and contexts. Tailored deterrence strategies communicate to different potential adversaries that their aggression would carry unacceptable risks and intolerable costs according to their particular calculations of risk and cost (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2018). The tailored deterrence concept was also adopted by the Biden admіnistration in its October 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, saying, Central to U.S. deterrence strategy is the credibility of our nuclear forces to hold at risk what adversary leadership values most. Effectively deterring – and restoring deterrence if necessary – requires tailored strategies for potential adversaries that reflect our best understanding of their decision-making and perceptions (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2022). Building on the concept of tailored deterrence, the Biden admіnistration Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) also introduced the concept of “integrated deterrence,” which is based on the idea that traditional nuclear deterrence can be reinforced by non-nuclear capabilities. According to the NPR, The role of nuclear weapons is well established and embedded in strategic deterrence policy and plans. Non-nuclear capabilities may be able to complement nuclear forces in strategic deterrence plans and operations in ways that are suited to their attributes and consistent with policy on how they are to be employed. A pragmatic approach to integrated deterrence will seek to determine how the Joint Force can combine nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities in complementary ways that leverage the unique attributes of a multi-domain set of forces to enable a range of deterrence options backstopped by a credible nuclear deterrent (Ibid.).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

5. Horizontal Accountability Requires More than Legal Checks and Balances Systеm: Ten Asian Country Cases

Author:
Sook Jong Lee
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Most countries, except closed autocracies, conduct popular elections. However, the quality of global democracy has been deteriorating. One of the most significant illiberal trends is the aggrandizement of executive power led by a popularly elected political leader. Strongmen often bend or simply violate democratic rules by abusing their executive power. The electoral mandate gives them legitimacy, making the efforts to check their executive power difficult. In this context, horizontal accountability based on the checks and balances systеm and oversight institutions is important to prevent the emergence of strongmen. However, horizontal accountability cannot function effectively unless its legal mechanisms are implemented in practice. Ten Asian country cases, presented in previously published ADRN working papers, demonstrated that horizontal accountability perform better when the legislature is not politically captured by the executive power and the judiciary is independent. Oversight institutions also require both political independence and institutional capacity. The electoral accountability of elected elites to voters helps the legislative branch to fulfill its role of constraining the excessive executive power. Independent media and civil society participation always assist both electoral and horizontal accountability.
Topic:
Law, Democracy, Accountability, Civic Engagement, and Political Participation
Political Geography:
Asia

6. Panel Survey on the 22nd Legislative Election

Author:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The East Asia Institute (EAI) presents key insights from a web-based public opinion survey conducted following the 22nd general election in 2024. The survey aimed to analyze the factors influencing voter behavior and the landscape of political perceptions. The findings indicate that controversies involving the President`s family and close associates, and policy issues?such as rising costs of living and the proposal to increase medical school admission quotas?were pivotal in shaping voter decisions. Furthermore, the survey reveals a prevalent sentiment among voters that Korean society is characterized by inequality and significant intergroup conflicts. A consensus also emerged on the necessity of electoral systеm reforms to mitigate political polarization and more accurately reflect public opinion.
Topic:
Reform, Elections, Conflict, and Survey
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

7. Inside the Summit for Democracy: What’s Next?

Author:
Ken Godfrey and Anthony Smith
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The third iteration of the Summit for Democracy (S4D) in Seoul from March 18 to 20 was an improvement on several elements of previous versions of S4D but still inherited some of the challenges. With this third summit in the rearview mirror, it is a good moment to take stock of the concrete impact of the summit itself and the goals of the S4D process in the future. We argue that the S4D has significant shortcomings but still has added value moving forward if the format can be adjusted in a more pragmatic direction.
Topic:
Civil Society, Democracy, Global South, Cooperation, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Asia

8. The Current Status of Japan’s Countering Digital Influence Operations

Author:
Kazuki Ichida
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Digital influence operations have the capacity to shape and undermine public perceptions and opinions in targeted countries. The United States National Intelligence Council found that China, Russia, and Iran prioritize digital influence operations over cyber attacks, underscoring their perceived efficacy (National Intelligence Council 2023). Digital influence operations are variously referred to as cognitive warfare and information warfare. For the purposes of this briefing, the term “digital influence operations” will be used. This briefing describes the current status of countermeasures employed by major actors in Japan. In Japan, entities such as the Ministry of Defense (MOD), the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the National Police Agency, and the National Center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC), have been developing their budgets and organizations. However, efforts by the private sector, including fact-checking organizations, think tanks, and academics, still face limitations in terms of human resources and scale and are far from sufficient. In recent years, there have been signs of expansion due to increased support from the Japanese government. Three challenges impede Japan’s efforts to counter digital influence operations. First, there is a severe shortage of knowledge and human resources. Second, the measures are primarily focused on countering disinformation, improving literacy, and enhancing strategic communication. Lastly, the attacks leveraging domestic polarization in the target country have not been addressed. This issue is not unique to Japan but also prevalent in Europe and the United States.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Cybersecurity, Disinformation, and Preventive Measures
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

9. China Threats and the Exploitation of China Threats: The 2024 Taiwan General Election

Author:
Chin-en Wu
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The presidential and legislative elections took place in Taiwan on January 13, 2024. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP or so-called the green camp) selected Vice President Lai Ching-te as their candidate, who also serves as the party chairman. The opposing Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang, KMT or so-called the blue camp) nominated the incumbent mayor of New Taipei, Hou Yu-ih, for the presidential candidacy. The Taiwan People’s Party (TPP or so-called the white camp) chose its leader, former Taipei City mayor Ko Wen-je, as the presidential candidate. Despite initial plans for a joint campaign team between KMT and TPP, a final agreement was not reached. Lai’s victory marked a historic moment, representing the first time since the introduction of direct elections in 1996 that a party has won more than two consecutive presidential terms. Lai secured the presidency with 40% of the votes, followed by Hou with 34%, and Ko with 26%. Lai Ching-te and Hou Yu-yi are political figures within traditional political parties, lacking individual charisma, especially Hou Yu-yi, the former police-in-chief. Ko Wen-je, on the other hand, is a candidate with populist characteristics, appearing as a political outsider at the national level, free from the burden of past ruling records, providing an option beyond the blue-green divide. His interactive style sometimes resembles that of an internet celebrity, using straightforward language to comment on issues or point out social and political problems, in many cases without proposing feasible solutions to these problems. Young people prefer Ko’s relaxed, somewhat sarcastic way of communication. The other part of the general election is the legislative election. DPP gained 51 seats out of 113 seats and lose its majority in the parliament. KMT won 52 seats and become the largest party. TPP gained eight seats. The result makes the new DPP government a minority government.
Topic:
Elections, Domestic Politics, and Cross-Strait Relations
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

10. South Korea’s Official Development Assistance for Democracy Support

Author:
Sook Jong Lee
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
As of 2022, South Korea provides Official Development Assistance (ODA) amounting to 2.79 billion USD, 0.17% of its gross national income, ranking 16th among the donor countries in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which includes 30 countries. Since joining the DAC in 2010, South Korea’s ODA has been steadily increasing. The successful transition from a recipient to a donor country is a significant achievement globally. However, in the context of South Korea’s high status in liberal democracy, its level of support for democratic governance is relatively low. There is no clear definition of ‘democracy aid,’ but it generally refers to aid used to advocate and support democracy. Given that democracy aid could be perceived as interference in the internal affairs of recipient countries, it is not prominently emphasized in development assistance where poverty alleviation and socio-economic development are the primary goals. The DAC aims to promote development cooperation and related policies, targeting Sustainable Development 2030, which includes inclusive and sustainable economic development, progress in national and international equality, poverty eradication, and improving living conditions in developing countries. It establishes a standard of assistance policy in various fields such as development, trade, industry, environment, gender equality, anti-corruption, and strengthening civil society. In essence, the DAC does not explicitly state that spreading democracy is the purpose of ODA (OECD n.d.). South Korea’s Framework Act on International Development Cooperation also stipulates the purpose of itself to “enhance the appropriateness of policies for international development cooperation and the efficiency of the implementation thereof, and effectively achieve the policy objectives of international development cooperation by providing for basic matters concerning international development cooperation, thus contributing to the co-prosperity of humanity and to world peace.” This law outlines the principles of international development cooperation, such as “respect for all the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; support for the self-help efforts and abilities of developing countries; respect for the necessity of development of developing countries; increase in sharing of development experiences; and mutual harmony with the international community and promotion of cooperation therewith,” but there is no mention of linking ODA to democracy (OECD 2005; Korea Legislation Research Institute n.d.).
Topic:
Development, Democracy, Civil Society Organizations, and OECD
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

11. The G7’s Geoeconomic Future: Insights from Conflicts with Russia, China, and Iran

Author:
Claudia Schmucker, Stormy-Annika Mildner, and Avi Shapiro
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
In an increasingly conflictual global environment, the G7 has become a more and more important geoeconomic actor. Yet looking at the case studies of Russia, Iran, and China reveals that the geoeconomic role the G7 plays has been mixed. For the G7 countries to improve their geoeconomic impact, they need to align their interests and risk perceptions, as well as improve their ability to propose and enact geoeconomic measures. In addition, the G7 should bolster its partnerships with other democracies and like-minded countries.
Topic:
Partnerships, G7, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

12. The Taiwan election result: A strategic opportunity for a calmer Taiwan Strait

Author:
Mikael Mattlin and Jyrki Kallio
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Taiwan held combined presidential and legislative elections last weekend. The international media generally expected that a win by Lai Ching-te (DPP), who in the past has favoured independence, would lead to tensions and even conflict in the Taiwan Strait. However, there are several reasons why the opposite could be the case.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Elections, and Lai Ching-te
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

13. Challenges to Chinese blue-water operations

Author:
Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Despite having the world’s largest navy, important questions can be asked about China’s ability to challenge the U.S. Navy on a global scale. A number of factors—geography, logistical infrastructure, force structure, and command culture—all argue that China cannot do so at this time. In particular, China would need to significantly expand the number and caliber of its overseas bases in order to support large-scale, blue-water operations by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). China currently has just two overseas bases—at Djibouti and Cambodia—and both are of limited capacity. Absent such a basing network, the PLAN is reliant on at-sea replenishment, a capability that is inherently vulnerable in wartime. China possesses some quality at-sea replenishment vessels but not nearly in sufficient quantities to support widespread global operations. While Chinese naval aviation has shown important improvements over the last year, the PLAN does not appear to have the logistical capacity to sustain high-tempo carrier operations outside the First Island Chain for an extended period of time. Super-quiet Chinese nuclear submarines would be game-changers in terms of Chinese blue-water operations. But thus far China has not shown mastery of the requisite technologies to build boats with this capability. It would also take China several years to grow a fleet of super-quiet submarines once the necessary technological challenges have been solved. Structural issues with the Chinese economy raise new concerns about Beijing’s ability to fund a blue-water navy over the long term. Such calculations must include the expense of ship construction, but also the massive operations and maintenance budget needed to deploy a potential navy of over 400 ships.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Navy, Economy, and Submarines
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

14. Is the G7 still relevant?

Author:
Raffaele Trombetta
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
In the first of our new Expert Analysis series, former Italian Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Raffaele Trombetta, draws on his career experience to answer the question of whether the G7 is still relevant in today’s international order. Detailing a narrative of the G7’s history, confronting its challenges, and addressing its common criticisms, this paper deals with the alternatives (G20 and BRICS), as well as where the G7’s interests should lie in future relations with China and the African nations.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, G20, G7, BRICS, and International Order
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Europe, and Asia

15. Beijing’s Passive-Aggressive Middle East Policy

Author:
Michael Singh
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The real threat to U.S. interests in the region isn’t rising Chinese influence, but the erosion of Washington's influence. Will China broker a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? It is a question nobody is asking, because the answer is obvious—not a chance. Yet after Beijing hosted Iran-Saudi talks that led those two rivals to re-establish diplomatic relations in March 2023, some observers wondered if China had supplanted the U.S. as the Middle East’s diplomatic broker. Since Hamas’s Oct. 7 massacre, China has put such illusions to rest: its conduct shows that it is less interested in the success of its own initiatives than in the failure of Washington’s. The real threat to U.S. interests in the Mideast isn’t rising Chinese influence, but the erosion of our own...
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, and Asia

16. China Is Finally Making Progress on the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway

Author:
Niva Yau
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Since the 1990s, China has tried to build the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway. The railway would advance China’s geopolitical and economic interests in Central Asia. Until recently, China has been unable to overcome opposition to the project in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. However, local concerns about the railway may be giving way since Russia’s war in Ukraine has made new trade routes bypassing Russia more profitable, and a new Uzbek government is looking to expand regional and international engagement.
Topic:
Economics, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China, Central Asia, Asia, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan

17. Japan’s New National Security Strategy Is Making Waves

Author:
Ryan Ashley
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Japan’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) contains several groundbreaking commitments, including plans to deploy long-range counterstrike capabilities and to raise defense spending to 2 percent of gross domestic product. A slim-but-significant majority of Japan’s public now seemingly supports efforts to strengthen Japan’s defense capabilities, a political consensus once nearly unthinkable. The United States, India, Taiwan, and others that share Japan’s concern about military aggression from China, North Korea, and Russia have welcomed Japan’s NSS. Some countries in the Indo-Pacific, including South Korea and certain Southeast Asian nations, have expressed mixed reactions to the NSS, as some still harbor distrust toward Japanese military power due to the historical memory of the Second World War. China and North Korea continue to cultivate anti-Japan sentiment within their domestic populations and within other countries in the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Deterrence, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

18. Stress-Testing Chinese-Russian Relations

Author:
Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
A debate over the nature of the China-Russia relationship has raged for almost two decades. One side believes the two are strategic partners; the other believes their ties are an “axis of convenience” lacking depth. Understanding the true nature of their relationship is of vital importance to U.S. national security. A true strategic partnership represents a grave threat; less robust ties between the two give the U.S. more latitude in dealing with them. We can gain a deeper, more nuanced understanding of China-Russia ties by observing how they interact in regions of the world where they both have important interests at stake. Four regions emerge as key here: Central Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, and East Asia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

19. Australia and India’s New Military Bases: Responses to China’s Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean

Author:
Felix K. Chang
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Australia and India have built and expanded military bases in and around the Indian Ocean in anticipation of a larger Chinese naval presence in its waters. Most of the construction has focused on creating the capacity to monitor the three main passages into the ocean through the Indonesian archipelago, namely the Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda Straits. India has established two new naval air stations in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and boosted its maritime patrol forces at others nearby. Australia is working to establish a military base in the Cocos (Keeling) Islands and is beefing up its Stirling naval base near Perth to support and sustain nuclear-powered attack submarines.
Topic:
Security, Navy, Military, and Military Bases
Political Geography:
China, India, Asia, Australia, and Indo-Pacific

20. Naval Incident Management in Europe, East Asia and South East Asia

Author:
Ian Anthony, Fei Su, and Lora Saalman
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
Unprecedented global turbulence in 2022 has demonstrated the need to pay increased attention to naval operations. Enhanced military capability allows naval power projection far beyond home waters. New threats and challenges are emerging from technological advances and new applications, not least the vulnerability of warships and naval facilities to cyber intrusions and cyberattacks. As states implement the programmes they need to protect and promote their interests at sea, there is also likely to be an increase in the number of close tracking incidents. How effective current risk reduction mechanisms will be at dealing with incidents at sea is unclear. This Insights Paper provides a preliminary assessment of the existing mechanisms and suggests areas for further improvement.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Navy, Crisis Management, and Military
Political Geography:
Europe, East Asia, Asia, and Southeast Asia

21. Cyber Crossover and Its Escalatory Risks for Europe

Author:
Lora Saalman, Fei Su, and Larisa Saveleva Dovgal
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
The crossover between cybercrime and cyberwarfare has intensified in recent years, particularly against the backdrop of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and mounting tensions between China, Russia and the United States. This paper delves into specific cyber incidents that employ cybercrime tactics with cyberwarfare objectives, allegedly involving Chinese, Russian or US actors. It examines responses within and among the private sector, the public sector and international forums. Although not directly involved in all of the cases, the European Union (EU) was impacted in a variety of ways, including as a result of spillover effects and intentional targeting. Drawing on an examination of cyber incidents, this paper highlights how emerging trends in actors, means and responses present escalatory risks for the EU and emphasizes the pressing need to bolster cybersecurity measures.
Topic:
European Union, Cybersecurity, Conflict, Risk, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

22. Moving to an Offshore Balancing Strategy for East Asia

Author:
Peter Harris
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Those calling for Washington to expand U.S. military presence in the Western Pacific have misread the regional security environment. The United States can reduce its military footprint in East Asia without jeopardizing its national security or the stability of the region. China is not poised to dominate East Asia or any other part of the Indo-Pacific region. While the distribution of power in East Asia has shifted in favor of Beijing, it does not follow that China constitutes a major threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of all neighboring states. Regional powers can deter China from launching wars of aggression by investing in the right kinds of defensive weaponry to capitalize on geographic advantages. The United States should play the role of an “offshore balancer” by helping China’s neighbors to become more resilient to coercion from Beijing. The leaders of several prominent states in East Asia are anxious to avoid a “cold war” between the United States and China. Washington should heed their calls for restraint. Pushing these governments to choose a side in the U.S.-China rivalry would needlessly antagonize them. The issue of Taiwanese security presents a special challenge for the United States and its allies. Taiwan has the most to lose from China’s rise and perceives U.S. military support as essential to its survival as a de facto independent entity. However, the United States can retrench from East Asia without “abandoning” Taiwan to China. Peace in East Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific does not depend upon the United States enjoying primacy in the region. On the contrary, the pursuit of U.S. military primacy in the Western Pacific will make it more difficult to maintain regional security and promote economic prosperity over the long term.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Deterrence, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
East Asia, Asia, and United States of America

23. Why China Is Taking Sides Against Israel—and Why It Will Likely Backfire

Author:
Michael Singh
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
When news broke of the Hamas attack on Israel last month, the silence from Beijing was conspicuous amid the din of international statements. When the government finally addressed the conflict at a press conference the day after, its words were remarkable for being unremarkable. An unnamed Foreign Ministry spokesperson expressed “deep concern,” called on “relevant parties to remain calm, exercise restraint, and immediately end the hostilities,” and lamented the “protracted standstill of the peace process”—a diplomatic endeavor in which Beijing has never shown more than a passing interest. The wording was nearly identical to China’s reactions during past Gaza conflicts, despite the fact that the circumstances were radically different. Because the brief remarks failed to condemn Hamas or even recognize the scale of the horrors that occurred on October 7, Israeli commentators interpreted them not as neutral, but as hostile. Beijing soon confirmed that interpretation. On October 14, Foreign Minister Wang Yi asserted that Israel’s actions went “beyond the scope of self-defense” and demanded that it stop imposing “group punishment” on Palestinians, while still refusing to condemn Hamas. (For a full listing of Beijing’s official statements on the conflict, see The Washington Institute’s statement tracker.) Chinese media have likewise presented the war as one of Israeli aggression—despite being heavily censored, their early reports were rife with anti-Semitic, anti-Israel commentary claiming that Hamas was defending the two-state solution, even though the group’s past and present actions are patently bent on destroying the Israeli state. Notably, the strident tone in online Chinese commentary moderated in the run-up to President Xi Jinping’s November 15 meeting with President Biden, underscoring the government’s well-established influence over such messaging. This approach is a stark departure from Beijing’s past impassivity toward Middle East conflicts, in which Chinese officials had usually sought to avoid entanglement. Rather, it reflects the government’s new inclination to use far-flung conflicts as opportunities to undermine the United States and score points in the “Global South.” Yet it could also hold longer-term consequences for China, particularly regarding the government’s three-decade effort to improve relations with Israel. In addition, using the current crisis to take potshots at Washington may constrain Beijing’s ability to project impartiality in other regional conflicts.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Strategic Competition, and Palestinians
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Israel, Asia, and Gaza

24. Iraqi Officials Eye a Path for Chinese-Iraqi Development

Author:
Baraa Sabri
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Mohammed Shia al-Sudani did not become prime minister in Baghdad as smoothly as desired by the powers close to the “axis of resistance.” Nevertheless, several factors facilitated his rise to power. Domestic concerns, such as Muqtada al-Sadr’s decision to withdraw his bloc from the political process and a push from groups close to Iran to put forward a prime minister with relative acceptance in the regional and international community, played a role. But these considerations compounded with the climate of regional tensions and interests of outside powers—competition between the Gulf and Iran, concerns over the ongoing repercussions of the strained relationship with Washington caused by the Trump administration, and the growing dominance of various armed groups close to Tehran. This precarious reality and confused relationships likewise seem to have driven al-Sudani’s government to attempt to circumvent the traditional binary choice between Washington, the West, and most of the Gulf states on the one hand, and Tehran, Damascus, Lebanon, and their backer Moscow on the other. This new course comes with a distinct and flashy name, the “Development Road” project, and looks to Beijing as a third way forward. Iraq’s political realignment is in large part a response to Iraqis’ shifting views of the United States and the broader geopolitical space: the haphazard American withdrawal from Afghanistan, the political changes in U.S. policy under Biden, the failure to revive the nuclear agreement with Iran, the stagnation in the Syrian issue, Erdogan’s steadfast support of Putin, Russia’s continued attacks on Ukraine, economic movement linked to oil prices, inflation, and financial turmoil in currency rates from Cairo to Tehran, fears of harsh economic sanctions, and, finally and most importantly, the economic rise of China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Multilateralism, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Iraq, Middle East, and Asia

25. [Global NK Update] July 2023

Author:
Minah Kang
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Key Updates: 1) North Korea’s launch of the ICBM Hwasongpho-18 on July 12th, with an unprecedented 74-minute flight time, drew condemnation from the US, South Korea, and Japan, as discussions were ongoing at a NATO summit. 2) North Korea marked its 70th War Victory Day with a grand ceremony attended by Chinese and Russian officials, including a military parade showcasing their armed forces and strategic weapons, such as the ICBM Hwasongpho-18.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Regional Security, ICBM, and Armistice
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea

26. Strengthening South Korean Value Diplomacy for U.S.-South Korean Normative Alignment

Author:
Sook Jong Lee
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The foreign policy of any state is formulated by calculating national interest and normative ideals. If national interest is based on tangible economic and security gains, normative ideals are often understood as universal and transformative values. However, this distinction is often blurred in reality, as normative choices are made in the context of long-term national interest. Furthermore, a state’s normative alignment can change due to ideologically different new governments or contentious domestic challenges. The worst-case scenario occurs when a strong state withdraws from leadership of a normative coalition of like-minded states. Like-minded states tend to disperse when they lose their leader; the decline of the Community of Democracies after the United States’s neglect is such a case. States fail to pursue consistent foreign policy because normative politics are in flux domestically and internationally. Despite this complexity, a strong power can exercise normative foreign policy more effectively than a weaker power, as it can employ both hard and soft power. The United States played such an enforcement role during the post–Cold War unipolar world. A newly emerging strong state, such as China, can challenge an existing norm or establish a new norm. What about middle powers? Lacking unilaterally exercisable power, middle powers frequently champion multilateral rules and norms that can protect their interests from great power coercion. Professor Andrew Cooper characterizes a middle power as normatively more virtuous and trustworthy in the global order and describes its preferred diplomacy as pursuing multilateral solutions to international problems, embracing compromise positions in international disputes, and adopting the notions of “good international citizenship” (Cooper et al. 1993, 116). The government of former South Korean President Lee Myung-bak pursued middle powermanship under the Global Korea slogan, emphasized value-based international contributions by expanding foreign aid, and hosted the Group of Twenty (G20) and other global meetings. Now, the Yoon Suk Yeol government has scaled up its middle-power ambitions to those of being a global pivotal state by highlighting South Korea’s international contributions and values-based diplomacy (Yoon 2022a). Like the Lee government, the Yoon government is building its proactive multilateral diplomacy while deepening its long-standing alliance with the United States. But the U.S.-China relationship has changed significantly between the Lee and Yoon governments: geopolitical competition between the United States and China has intensified during the intervening fifteen years, expanding beyond the economic and military spheres to include technology and ideology. Under U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping, an ideological narrative dividing the world between democracies and autocracies has set in. The Russian war in Ukraine has caused Western European countries to merge democratic unity and collective security. In Northeast Asia, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities now threaten not only South Korea but also the faraway United States. Facing all these high-risk challenges, the Yoon government has tightened military and economic ties with the United States. The two countries’ shared democratic values and liberal norms have emerged as a crucial component of deepening bilateral ties. This normative alignment has invited criticism from Beijing, but the Yoon government has so far not rolled back its advocacy for those values—although it has carefully dubbed them as “universal values” rather than liberal or democratic values. The national confidence gained by globally successful popular Korean culture and deteriorating public opinion against China have helped fuel this value assertiveness.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Human Rights, Norms, and Freedom
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

27. Diverging Perspectives on Improving Bilateral Relations: Analysis of the 2023 Korea-Japan Joint Opinion Poll

Author:
Yul Sohn, Yang Gyu Kim, and Hansu Park
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
In 2023, relations between South Korea and Japan began to thaw. Since the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea announced the solution to address disputes regarding forced labor under Japanese colonial rule in March, six bilateral summits were held in the following six months. Intergovernmental exchange has also rapidly increased. With mediation from the United States, South Korea and Japan established consultative groups to address various issues, creating channels of communication between their foreign affairs, defense, industry, finance, and national security offices. People-to-people exchanges, primarily driven by tourism, have also returned to pre-COVID-19 pandemic levels. Since 2012, they have been stuck over the issue of Comfort Women, and after the 2018 Supreme Court ruling, they were in a standoff over the issue of forced labor, a period that can be considered a “crisis of trust” between the two governments. Is 2023 really a year for both countries to put the “lost decade” behind them and usher in a new era? How do the citizens of both countries assess the changes in relations between their two governments? What do they think is the driving force behind the improvement in relations? Has mutual perception improved as relations have improved? Do they perceive that the historical issues, the culprits of the “lost decade,” are being resolved? The results of this year’s survey, marking the 11th year since initiated in 2013, are very interesting and carry significant potential interpretations and policy implications. Firstly, citizens of both countries perceived an improvement in their bilateral relations. Positive evaluations have reached their highest levels, while negative evaluations have hit their lowest points since the survey began. Secondly, there is a noticeable difference in the way citizens of both countries view the progress in bilateral relations. In the case of Japan, favorable opinions have increased with rising favorability toward South Korea, the importance of Korea-Japan relations, support for trilateral security cooperation with the United States and South Korea, and support for a solution to the issue of forced labor. On the other hand, South Korean public opinion has not seen a corresponding increase in positive sentiment regarding these issues, despite increased awareness of an improved relations. Thirdly, these result disparities are reflected in how citizens of both countries assess their governments’ efforts to improve relations. Japanese public opinion supports the efforts of both their own government and the South Korean government to improve relations, while South Korean public opinion has not shown strong support for them. Fourthly, historical issues continue to be a major variable affecting bilateral relations. Citizens of both countries consider historical issues as the primary factor in the development of bilateral relations. South Korea focuses on Japan’s historical perceptions, including issues related to wars, history textbooks, forced labor, and Comfort Women. Japan, on the other hand, is concerned with South Korea’s stance, including anti-Japanese education, statements by South Korean politicians and media about Japan, and excessive anti-Japanese actions by South Koreans. From this survey, it can be interpreted that South Korea believes Japan’s historical perceptions have not changed, while Japan believes that South Korea’s anti-Japanese stance is being corrected. However, the fact remains that there are still significant differences in historical perceptions between the two countries. The implications of the survey results are clear. Both countries need to expand and strengthen functional cooperation in areas such as security and the economy while also making progress towards reconciliation in historical perceptions. Only when these two wheels of functional cooperation and historical reconciliation move together can the South Korea-Japan relationship truly move onto the right track.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, Polls, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and South Korea

28. 2023 EAI-Genron NPO Korea-Japan Joint Public Opinion Poll: Japan and the ROK-Japan Relations

Author:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
East Asia Institute (EAI) and Genron NPO conducted the 11th Korea-Japan Joint Public Opinion Poll in August and September 2023 to gauge the attitudes of people in both countries regarding their bilateral relations. EAI has presented the survey findings in chart format within the "EAI Public Opinion Briefing." According to the results, citizens of both South Korea and Japan assessed that their bilateral relations have advanced and expressed positive opinions about strengthening cooperation in areas like security and economics, both bilaterally and multilaterally. However, there were contrasting viewpoints between Koreans and Japanese on whether this progress and the importance of bilateral relations have resulted in favorable perceptions of each other`s countries.
Topic:
Security, History, Culture, Public Opinion, Economy, and Perception
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and South Korea

29. 2023 EAI Public Opinion Poll on the International Affairs: ② China and the ROK-China Relations

Author:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Amid the deepening U.S.-China strategic competition, East Asia Institute (EAI) conducted a public opinion poll to discern the Korean people’s perception of China and ROK-China relations. EAI presents the survey results in chart form in the “EAI Public Opinion Briefing.” Despite predominantly negative impressions of China and President Xi Jinping, over 80 percent of respondents believe that Korea-China relations is crucial for Korea. The survey results unveiled public opinion that separately recognizes the favorability and significance of China.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, and Polls
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Korea

30. Young Asians’ Attitude and Behavior Toward Democracy

Author:
Ganbat Damba and Hansu Park
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
As we approach the second quarter of this century, millennials have firmly established themselves as the mainstream of society. The subsequent generation, often referred to as Generation Z, has taken their initial steps into the workforce. This trend is also evident in the political landscape of democratic countries in Asia. As time passes, the proportion of new generations among voters naturally increases, prompting political parties to consider their demands when formulating election strategies and policies. Several Asian countries underwent democratization during the third wave of democracy in the 1980s and 1990s. This wave allowed the new generations in these countries to embrace democracy as an inherent value and norm. As democracy has progressed towards consolidation, it has not only become “the only game in town” but also “the only game in a lifetime” for the new generations. Furthermore, significant advancements in information and communication technologies have opened up new avenues for accessing information and taking into actions for political change. This has led to a widespread belief that younger citizens are generally more pro-democratic compared to their elders. On the flip side, there are concerns that younger generations are relatively less engaged and apathetic towards politics. These concerns often stem from worrisome indicators such as lower voter turnout and occasionally result in a skeptical outlook on the future of democracy. Therefore, it has been increasingly important to delve into the perspectives of the younger generation on democracy, as well as the factors influencing their attitudes toward politics. This brief article reviews previous research conducted through survey analysis and examine youth participation in the Asian region as a case study.
Topic:
Democracy, Youth, Representation, Political Participation, and Attitudes
Political Geography:
Asia

31. [Global NK Update] August 2023

Author:
Minah Kang
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
1) The recent developments in military cooperation between Russia and North Korea resulted in sanctions on entities that facilitated their arms deals. 2) The South Korea-U.S.-Japan Summit at Camp David laid a strong foundation for continuous and stable trilateral cooperation to address North Korean threats and bolster regional security. 3) North Korea’s second “satellite launch” has raised regional concerns and prompted trilateral action.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Weapons, Cooperation, Military, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Asia, and North Korea

32. Historical Background and Current State of the Grassroots Democracy: Case Study of Four Asian Regions

Author:
Sri Nuryanti and Hansu Park
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Democracy’s authority and legitimacy relies on people’s participation. In modern democracies, representatives elected by the people are the main actors in political processes, as society has been more complex and policies have become increasingly specialized. Nevertheless, people’s direct participation is an essential part of democratic governance, especially at the local level. This direct democracy includes referendums, recalls, petitions, as well as participatory planning and budgeting. Moreover, active approaches such as mobilizing civil society organizations (CSOs) or protesting can be considered “grassroots democracy.” The word “grassroots” is mostly used as a metaphor for ‘sub-national level’ or ‘marginalized sectors,’ but citizens’ direct and collective actions for bringing about political change and improving democracy are not confined to a certain region or group. Citizens in several Asian countries have struggled to resist against authoritarian regimes and establish democratic constitutions and governments. Movements against dictatorship, military regimes, or the suppression of fundamental rights are still ongoing in some regions. In addition, people under democratic regimes continue spontaneous actions to oversee officials, ensure and solidify civil rights, and push politicians to implement policies and budgets in favor of citizens’ common interests. This article will cover cases from four Asian countries, demonstrating how grassroots democracy efforts have incited more democratic and participatory regimes.
Topic:
Civil Society, Protests, Legitimacy, and Democratic Institutions
Political Geography:
Asia

33. Prospects of and Challenges to Arms Control in South Asia: A Pakistani Perspective

Author:
Sonia Naz
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The arms control stability between Pakistan and India is currently on wobbly grounds due to the increasing development of modern weaponry in South Asia. The already tense situation is intensified by the arms race, as well as by the enforcement of provocative military strategies, actions and speeches.[1] In 2019, an attempted Indian surgical strike on Pakistan after the Pulwama attack[2] and annexation of Indian-occupied Kashmir into the Indian Union by annulling article 370 of the Indian constitution further heightened tensions between the two countries. There is a rising concern that issues such as Kashmir, cross-border terrorism and disputes over shared management of watercourses could escalate into a conventional or even a nuclear war.[3] The modernisation of militaries and expansion of nuclear weapons arsenals seem to be a distinguishing feature of both countries, which is arguably the result of the mutual and wider regional threats that they perceive.[4] The emerging realities of competition between the US and China, and China and India, have made the strategic environment very complex,[5] which has diminished dramatically the prospects of arms control.[6] Indeed, China’s rise fuels Indian insecurity, while, in turn, India’s hegemonic goals and dominance make Pakistan insecure.[7] Amidst these tensions, in 2019, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh clearly stated that Indian No First Use nuclear policy can change into First Use.[8]
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Pakistan, India, and Asia

34. Timing Is Everything: Italy Withdraws from the Belt and Road Initiative

Author:
Aurelio Insisa
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
After months of rumours and speculations, on 6 December 2023, the Italian newspaper of record, the Corriere della Sera, broke the news that Rome had finally withdrawn from China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), via a note sent to Beijing three days earlier.[1] In the absence of an explicit request to withdraw before the end of December, the memorandum of understanding (MoU) instrumental to Italy’s participation in the BRI would have automatically been renewed for another five years starting from March 2024. Italy’s subdued withdrawal from the BRI marked the epilogue of a long, laborious, yet ultimately successful diplomatic process that reflected a reassessment of its bilateral relations with China. The origins of this reassessment can be traced back to the government led by Mario Draghi between 2021 and 2022. In June 2021, during the first post-pandemic, post-Trump G7 Leaders’ Summit in Carbis Bay, Draghi stated that his government would “examine […] carefully” the MoU.[2] Draghi’s words reflected a deeper awareness of the broader implications of Beijing’s assertiveness in international politics and a close alignment with the Biden administration in Rome. This shift also reflected the absence of tangible economic benefits from BRI membership for Italy, although this was also due to the devastating effect of the Covid-19 pandemic on the designed trajectory of Sino-Italian economic relations.[3] Furthermore, the security-driven decision of the Draghi government to repeatedly exercise its “golden power” to veto Beijing’s investments in Italy’s strategic sectors contributed to shaping the MoU’s outcome.[4] This course correction in Rome’s China policy survived the fall of the Draghi government in July 2022 and the victory of the centre-right coalition led by Giorgia Meloni and her Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy, FdI) party in the legislative elections of September that year. After all, Meloni and her party had consistently opposed the MoU with China from the very beginning, a decision arguably also linked to the perceived need to bolster the party’s credentials as a reliable partner in the eyes of Washington – as in the case of the clear support for Ukraine well before the September electoral victory.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Foreign Direct Investment, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and International Politics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Italy

35. Italy’s Pivot to the Indo-Pacific – Towards a Value-driven Foreign Policy?

Author:
Nicola Casarini
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Italy is stepping up its involvement in the Indo-Pacific, both in the economic and security realms. The cabinet led by Giorgia Meloni – a centre-right coalition often portrayed by commentators as right-wing and nationalist – is rebalancing Rome’s policy in the Far East by scaling down ties with Beijing and by effectively lending support to the United States and its Asian allies vis-à-vis an increasingly assertive and self-confident China. Moving away from previous centre-left governments that tended to prioritise commercial relations with Beijing, the conservative coalition in power since September 2022 has been fostering defence-related cooperation with Japan and India and chip-related cooperation and investments with Taiwan. Moreover – and remarkably for a country that has long been absent from Asian security – the Italian government has sent a patrol vessel to the South China Sea and plans to forward the country’s flagship aircraft carrier to the area to conduct joint exercises with the navies of Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. The quantity and quality of initiatives being undertaken warrant the label of an Italian ‘pivot’ to the Indo-Pacific. By upgrading its presence in the region, Italy joins the other G7 nations in their efforts to uphold the rules-based order and dissuade Beijing from invading Taiwan. However, to consolidate the western anchorage of this pivot, the Meloni government needs to fully align its policy towards Beijing with that of the Euro-Atlantic allies – which includes deciding whether to continue to lend Italy’s official support to China’s Belt and Road Initiative or not.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Taiwan, Asia, Italy, and Indo-Pacific

36. Southeast Asia Aid Map - Key Findings Report

Author:
Alexandre Dayant, Grace Stanhope, and Roland Rajah
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Official development finance plays an important role in financing Southeast Asia’s development, equivalent to around 10% of total government development spending in the region. China is Southeast Asia’s single largest development partner and leads infrastructure financing. Yet, implementation problems have seen the scale of China’s financing decline in recent years. Traditional development partners collectively still dominate development financing in Southeast Asia at 80% of the total. The multilateral development banks lead the way, followed by Japan, Europe, and South Korea. The United States and Australia are mid-sized players. India and the Middle East have become notable sources of non-traditional development finance, with the Islamic Development Bank playing an important role. Climate development finance is increasing, but Southeast Asia will need more support if it is to transition towards resilient, low-carbon development. Intraregional development cooperation is growing, but only makes up a small part of development finance in Southeast Asia.
Topic:
Climate Change, Development, Humanitarian Aid, Finance, and Economy
Political Geography:
Asia and Southeast Asia

37. Australia’s Role Supporting Democracies as a Middle Power

Author:
Michael J. Green and Victoria Cooper
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Michael J. Green (Professor and CEO of the United States Study Centre (USSC) in Sydney) and Victoria Cooper (Research Editor at the USSC) analyze Australia’s strengths as a middle power in the face of Beijing’s pressure campaign, and offer areas of regional cooperation that like-minded countries, including Australia, can build upon in order to defend democracy against authoritarian regimes. While acknowledging the limited capacity of Australia to independently counter Beijing’s illiberal behavior, the authors argue that through the expansion of development initiatives, promotion of women’s empowerment, and anti-corruption drives, Canberra can play a key role in leading multilateral efforts to promote democratic resilience in the region.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Statecraft, Middle Power, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Australia

38. Japan’s Gradual Move to Address Technological Challenges to Democracy

Author:
Maiko Ichihara
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Maiko Ichihara, a professor at Hitotsubashi University Graduate School of Law, explores the challenges that technological advancements pose to democracy and analyzes Japan’s recent efforts to regulate disinformation and protect private data. Despite the absence of global regulations on digital technology, Ichihara highlights Japan’s domestic fact-checking efforts as well as its multilateral initiatives with G7 to create action plans promoting international cooperation against disinformation and data privacy abuse. In order to bolster democracy in the digital realm, she advocates for a proactive development of counter-narratives to fake news on social media.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Democracy, Regulation, Privacy, Social Media, G7, Disinformation, Data Collection, and Digital Space
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

39. Restoring Democracy in Myanmar: A Call for Bolstered Anti-Junta Resistance Forces

Author:
Lin Htet Myat
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
February 2023 marks the second anniversary of the military coup in Myanmar that ousted its civilian government and cracked down on democratic protests. Lin Htet Myat, a political analyst from Myanmar, assesses the grim situation in the country and offers new approaches that both the international community and the Burmese anti-junta forces should take to facilitate the restoration of democracy. The author argues that the international community must not engage the junta to seek for a peaceful resolution, and instead strengthen material support and communication with anti-junta forces within Myanmar. Meanwhile, Burmese democratic resistance forces should bolster military cooperation among like-minded groups and build trust in preparation for a federal democratic Myanmar.
Topic:
Democracy, Coup, Humanitarian Crisis, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
Asia and Myanmar

40. Taiwan’s Civic Space Threatened by Chinese Misinformation and the Government’s Worrisome Legislative Responses

Author:
Chin-en Wu
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Civic space in Taiwan is consistently threatened by misinformation campaigns and operations run by external forces, particularly mainland China. Chin-en Wu, an associate research fellow at the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica, assesses that China disseminates fake news to portray positive image of itself while creating internal polarization and competition in Taiwan. The Taiwanese government has attempted to take various measures, such as amending the Social Order Maintenance Act and introducing social media regulation bill, to counter the rampant Chinese misinformation activities. Although Wu acknowledges that the Taiwanese government should collaborate with the civil society to safeguard the island from misinformation, Wu warns that the government must be conscious of the potential damage that the restrictive measures against fake news could inflict on Taiwan’s liberal democracy.
Topic:
Democracy, Social Media, Misinformation, and Civic Engagement
Political Geography:
Taiwan and Asia

41. One Thing It Lacks: South Korea’s North Korea Policy in 2023 National Security Strategy

Author:
Yang Gyu Kim
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Yang Gyu Kim, Principal Researcher at the East Asia Institute, conducts a critical analysis of the new National Security Strategy published on June 7, 2023 and offers policy recommendations for the ROK government’s DPRK policy outlined in the document. While Kim identifies with the National Security Office’s emphasis on strengthening deterrence measures against growing DPRK nuclear and missile threats, he highlights that South Korean countermeasures create a feedback loop that affects North Korea’s threat perception. The author, therefore, points out the limits of the current 3D (Deterrence, Dissuasion, Dialogue) approach and recommends including a “Development” strategy to encourage Pyongyang to envision an alternative future path of prosperity and voluntarily take the denuclearization path.
Topic:
Development, National Security, Deterrence, Dialogue, and Threat Perception
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

42. Tasks for North Korea Policy After the Washington Declaration

Author:
Yu-hwan Koh
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Yu-hwan Koh, the President of the Korea Institute for National Unification, acknowledges the progress made in maintaining the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty regime and bolstering extended deterrence capabilities against North Korean nuclear threats through the Washington Declaration. Nevertheless, he underscores the lack of a fundamental solution to halt further advancements in Pyongyang's nuclear capabilities. Dr. Koh emphasizes the importance of establishing normalized relations between the United States and North Korea, particularly considering that North Korea now possesses nuclear weapons and is unlikely to return to denuclearization talks. In response, he reiterates the significance of the ROK-US alliance in strengthening the Three-Axis system and developing new weapon systems that can effectively counter North Korea's nuclear capabilities.
Topic:
International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

43. North Korea’s Space Development: The Gap Between Ideal and Reality

Author:
Cheol-wun Jang
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Cheol-wun Jang, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, emphasizes that while North Korea has made significant strides in long-range ballistic missiles, it has not been successful in the area of artificial satellites. Up until now, Pyongyang has had limited engagement in exchanges with major advanced countries involved in space development. Dr. Jang predicts that North Korea is expected to continue its independent pursuit of space development, which will hinder the country’s progress in the satellite sector in the near future.
Topic:
Development, Nuclear Weapons, Space, Kim Jong-un, and Militarization
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

44. The South Korea-U.S. Summit and Measures to Enhance Bilateral Cooperation on North Korea

Author:
Jechun Kim
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Jechun Kim, a professor at Sogang University, points out that the Biden administration appears to prioritize competition with China, the Taiwan issue, and the Ukraine War, despite the growing threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities. In response, Kim underlines the importance of issuing a “2023 US-ROK Joint Statement on North Korea” after President Yoon’s visit to the White House. Given the fading interest and support for the reunification of the Korean Peninsula, Professor Kim emphasizes the significance of addressing the rapid advancement in DPRK’s nuclear capabilities. He then suggests that South Korea needs to create a conducive environment for peaceful reunification through strong support from the U.S. for the “Audacious Initiative.”
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

45. Pyongyang in Search of a New Cold War Strategy

Author:
Jihwan Hwang
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Jihwan Hwang, a professor at the University of Seoul, predicts that the strengthening alliance between North Korea, China, and Russia could enable North Korea to overcome its international isolation, weakening the influence of the US-South Korea alliance and increasing China’s leverage over the Korean Peninsula. Dr. Hwang points out that even without the establishment of a new Cold War order, the strengthened cooperation among the authoritarian regimes will pose a significant strategic challenge to South Korea. As Seoul’s approach to Pyongyang has been based on a unipolar system led by Washington, Dr. Hwang highlights the need for South Korea to explore new approaches to address the changing security environment.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Ukraine, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

46. Japan’s Stance on North Korea’s “New Cold War” Narrative: Strengthening Japan’s Defense and Global Normative Power

Author:
Seunghee Oh
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Seunghee Oh, a research professor at Seoul National University Institute of Japanese Studies, suggests that Pyongyang perceives the current global order as a “new Cold War” and views strengthening trilateral cooperation among Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo as hostile to its national interest. In response to North Korea’s moves, Japan prioritizes multilateral initiatives to strengthen its security ties with other partners in the region and the globe. Dr. Oh further claims that as Tokyo assumes the presidency of the G7 Hiroshima Summit this year and has been elected as a non-permanent member of the 2023-24 UN Security Council, Japan is well-positioned to criticize North Korea as an international norm violator and proactively address the North Korean problem and utilize it to enhance its global leadership.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Cold War, International Cooperation, Multilateralism, and Kim Jong-un
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and North Korea

47. U.S. Stance on North Korea’s “New Cold War” Narrative

Author:
Hyun-wook Kim
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Hyun-wook Kim, Professor at Korean National Diplomatic Academy, assesses that North Korea is advocating a new Cold War discourse to strengthen its strategic solidarity with China. However, the intensified Cold War dynamic would lead the United States to prioritize its strategic competition with China, and the Biden administration should turn to a more passive approach toward North Korea. In this context, Dr. Kim anticipates that Washington would not offer incentives to Pyongyang for engaging in dialogue, which would lead Pyongyang to continue its military provocations to influence the direction of Washington’s policy course and gain recognition as a nuclear power. Given the volatility of the situation, Dr. Kim emphasizes the importance of reaffirming the ROK-US military alliance to counter the escalating crisis on the Korean Peninsula.
Topic:
Cold War, International Cooperation, Deterrence, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

48. North Korea’s Outlook on the New Cold War

Author:
Won Gon Park
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Won Gon Park, Chair of the EAI Center for North Korean Studies (Professor at Ewha Womans University), argues that North Korea utilizes its “new Cold War” rhetoric for two objectives: 1) to criticize US military buildup and its DPRK policy, and 2) to enhance the legitimacy of its possession of nuclear weapons by exploiting the geopolitical competition. Further, he claims that North Korea characterizes the Cold War as a clash between liberalism and authoritarianism in an effort to appeal to and garner support from China and Russia. However, Dr. Park assesses that while North Korea, Russia, and China may temporarily cooperate against the US as their common enemy, the nature of their “political marriage of convenience” complicates the likelihood of a sustained alliance. Finally, Dr. Park predicts that the new Cold War system that Pyongyang envisions is unlikely to come to fruition.
Topic:
International Relations, Alliance, Kim Jong-un, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

49. Will Spring Ever Come? Security Landscape of Northeast Asia in 2023

Author:
Kyung-joo Jeon
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Kyung-Joo Jeon, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, predicts that the Korean peninsula might repeat the days of fire and fury in 2017 this year. North Korea will likely turn to its military provocation tactics ahead of the ROK-US Freedom Shield Exercises in mid-March, DPRK’s 70th Anniversary of The Day of Victory in the Great Fatherland Liberation War in July, and another ROK-US joint military drill in August. Dr. Jeon suggests that Seoul should increase its strategic value as an essential global player while Washington seeks a stronger alliance network in the Indo-Pacific region if South Korea wants to live up to its policy goal of the “Global Pivotal State.”
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

50. China’s Stance on North Korea’s “New Cold War” Narrative

Author:
Dong Ryul Lee
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Dong Ryul Lee, Chair of the China Research Center at EAI (Professor at Dongduk Women’s University), highlights that although China and North Korea might seem to have a close relationship, Beijing maintains a reserved stance regarding the North’s perspective on its strategic value amid the US-China competition. Professor Lee explains that Xi Jinping prioritizes political stability by boosting the economy and tries to avoid a full-scale confrontation with the US. Accordingly, China seeks to manage the risk spurred on by Pyongyang’s military provocations, given that they legitimize stronger US-Japan-ROK trilateral security cooperation.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Cold War, Xi Jinping, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea