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Begin New Search Political Geography Afghanistan Content Type Commentary and Analysis Publishing Institution Political Violence @ A Glance Publication Year within 10 Years

1. WHY DO MASS EXPULSIONS STILL HAPPEN?

Author:
Meghan Garrity
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
January 30, 2023 marks 100 years since the signing of the Lausanne Convention—a treaty codifying the compulsory “population exchange” between Greece and Turkey. An estimated 1.5 million people were forcibly expelled from their homes: over one million Greek Orthodox Christians from the Ottoman Empire and 500,000 Muslims from Greece. This population exchange was not the first such agreement, but it was the first compulsory exchange. Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion and Muslim Greek nationals did not have the option to remain. Further, Greek and Muslim refugees who had fled the Ottoman Empire and Greece, respectively, were not allowed to return to their homes. Only small populations in Istanbul and Western Thrace were exempted from the treaty.
Topic:
Human Rights, History, Refugees, International Criminal Court (ICC), Rome Statute, Rohingya, Geneva Convention, and Lausanne Convention
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Turkey, Greece, Germany, Nigeria, Myanmar, and Niger

2. FIVE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ASSASSINATION OF AYMAN AL-ZAWAHIRI

Author:
Rebecca Best, Debra Leiter, and Simanti Lahiri
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Last weekend, a US drone dropped two Hellfire missiles, killing Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri on his balcony in the heart of Kabul. It was the first targeted killing of an Al Qaeda leader since the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Here, contributors Rebecca Best, Debra Leiter, and Simanti Lahiri answer questions about what the strike might mean for Al Qaeda, US-Afghanistan relations, and more.
Topic:
Al Qaeda, Drones, Assassination, and Ayman al-Zawahiri
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America

3. WHY STATEBUILDING DIDN’T WORK IN AFGHANISTAN

Author:
David A. Lake
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
The collapse of the Afghan government illustrates the larger dilemma in all statebuilding attempts. The statebuilder wants to build a government strong enough to stand on its own. To do this, the new state must win the support of the people it hopes to rule. This need not be the entire population of a country—no government wins universal praise—but it must be a sufficiently large share of the population that it has room to maneuver, favoring some groups with a policy, and other groups with another policy, but not always sitting on the knife’s edge between repression and rebellion. In short, the statebuilder wants to build a state that is legitimate.
Topic:
War, Military Affairs, Counter-terrorism, Afghanistan, War on Terror, and State Building
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Asia

4. THE END OF THE WAR ON TERROR

Author:
Navin Bapat
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
On August 15, 2021, almost twenty years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Taliban recaptured Afghanistan from the American-supported government led by Ashraf Ghani. Afghans pushed to get on American transport planes to evacuate, conjuring images of the US evacuation of Saigon at the end of the Vietnam War. Others, afraid of Taliban retaliation, turned to social media to plea for help. Meanwhile, in Kabul, militants paraded in front of the evacuated US embassy, signifying the Taliban’s total victory.
Topic:
Taliban, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, 9/11, War on Terror, Vietnam War, COVID-19, Joe Biden, Ashraf Ghani, and Hamid Karzai
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, and United States of America

5. WHY THE “TERRORIST” LABEL HELPS SOME GROUPS AND HURTS OTHERS

Author:
Rebecca Best
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Does adding a terrorist group to the US State Department’s Foreign Terrorist Organization list reduce its violence? Since 1997, the US State Department has maintained a list of designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO), or foreign organizations that use terrorism and threaten US nationals or US national security. The United States has designated a wide array of terrorist organizations and groups—including Hamas, FARC, and ISIL–Khorasan—but has refrained from using the designation for others. For example, the United States never designated the Taliban an FTO. Why not?
Topic:
Terrorism, Taliban, Islamic State, 9/11, Boko Haram, Hamas, Uyghurs, FARC, Haqqani Network, Khorasan Group, Mujahedeen-e-Khalq, and Tamil Tigers
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, Iran, South Asia, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, and United States of America

6. FRAMEWORK DEAL: A LONG-TERM PATH TO PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN

Author:
Matthew Hauenstein and Madhav Joshi
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Two weeks ago, the US envoy to Afghanistan announced that American and Taliban negotiators had drafted a negotiation framework to end the 17-year long war in Afghanistan. Though American troops ousted the Taliban government following September 11th, the Taliban initiated a long-running insurgency against the US-backed Afghan government. After more than a decade of fighting, the Afghan government, the United States, and Taliban insurgents each failed to secure victory and, instead, the conflict has reached an unfavorable equilibrium for each of the parties. The framework deal, therefore, is expected to shift the status quo in Afghanistan’s politics and provide an exit strategy for US troops.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Taliban, Negotiation, and Peace
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

7. HOW US MILITARY AID CAN BACKFIRE

Author:
Daniel Karell and Sebastian Schutte
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Can military forces mitigate insurgent activity—“win hearts and minds”—by implementing small, localized aid projects? Evidence from the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq has provided contradictory answers to the question of aid’s ability to mitigate violence. Some research finds that aid projects increase the legitimacy of the state among civilians and, under specific circumstances, dampen violence. Other studies, however, show that aid projects provoke insurgent activity, even when delivered by non-military organizations. Despite this ambiguous understanding of counterinsurgency (COIN) aid projects, the US military and its allies spent billions of dollars in Afghanistan and Iraq on projects meant to “win hearts and minds’’ among the populace. After all, there are good theoretical reasons for doing so. Aid projects might make the option of taking up arms less attractive by offering employment opportunities and stimulating local economies (i.e., the “opportunity cost” model of participation in rebellion). They might also encourage locals to share vital anti-insurgent intelligence with military forces.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Counterinsurgency, Violence, and Military Aid
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, North America, and United States of America

8. THE LESSON OF THE AFGHANISTAN PAPERS

Author:
Navin Bapat
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
The Washington Post’s publication of the Afghanistan Papers reveals that, although the official line was that the war was turning in favor of the US and its allies in Kabul, policymakers have long been aware that the situation was bleak, deteriorating, and unlikely to produce anything resembling a “victory.” Following 9/11, the US identified failed states as a key national security risk, in that these environments enabled terrorists, rebels, warlords, and other non-state actors to plot and plan operations against the US and the international community. Given that Afghanistan seemed to represent the prototypical weak state, the solution was obvious: Afghanistan needed to be transformed into a strong state that would resist non-state actors—particularly terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. But in trying to achieve this lofty goal, the US has lost thousands of soldiers and contractors and spent several trillion dollars—and the costs will likely continue rising. The Afghans themselves have suffered even more, with over 100,000 deaths since 9/11. Despite all of this loss—and the open acknowledgment that the strategy is failing—there is little appetite among US policymakers for reversing course.
Topic:
War, Military Affairs, Afghanistan, Military Intervention, War on Terror, and Military Contractors
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and United States