Political leaders could abuse the coronavirus crisis to undermine democracy. Europe’s biggest risk is Hungary. In late March, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán could use his two-thirds majority in parliament to push through a law that would empower him to rule by decrees with no specified time limit. If he succeeds, it will undermine the European Union’s core principles, making the EU even more fragmented and difficult to manage once the pandemic is over.
Topic:
Government, Authoritarianism, European Union, Democracy, Coronavirus, and Pandemic
In Moldova, the weakness of the Eastern Partnership has been over-reliance on incentives, rather than a lack thereof. Veto players who hid their true interests by claiming allegiance to the European cause hijacked the EU’s soft power. The EaP’s shortcoming was lack of means and readiness to make these key opponents of political reforms keep their commitments. Its core challenge is how to overcome the resistance of these veto players who have been obstructing transformational goals.
Topic:
Politics, Reform, European Union, Partnerships, and Oligarchy
Civilian CSDP missions rely on EU member states to staff them with skilled experts via the instrument of secondment. But the rate of seconded personnel in missions has decreased notably over the last ten years. The key to reversing this trend is addressing obstacles at the national level that hinder the recruitment and deployment of civilian experts with specialized profiles. Targeted incentives could help overcome some of these obstacles.
In Moldova, the weakness of the Eastern Partnership has been over-reliance on incentives, rather than a lack thereof. Veto players who hid their true interests by claiming allegiance to the European cause hijacked the EU’s soft power. The EaP’s shortcoming was lack of means and readiness to make these key opponents of political reforms keep their commitments. Its core challenge is how to overcome the resistance of these veto players who have been obstructing transformational goals.
Topic:
Reform, European Union, Partnerships, and Soft Power
Today, trade policy is used more and more often to achieve geopolitical goals. To defend European interests in this new geo-economic environment, the EU must recalibrate its unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral trade toolbox. While the EU needs to counter the increasingly unlevel international playing field, self-sufficiency is not a viable option. The strength of the EU depends on its openness and integration in world markets.
Russia postponed its national vote on constitutional changes to July 1, 2020. Due to restrictions on freedom of movement and assembly from COVID-19, mass protests are unlikely to result. Nevertheless, managing growing social discontent may well be the Kremlin’s next big challenge as it prepares for September’s regional and parliamentary elections. Given its upcoming EU presidency and Council of Europe chairmanship, Germany could make a positive difference in protecting human rights and EU values in Russia.
Topic:
Human Rights, Elections, European Union, and Protests
The impending presidential election in Belarus on August 9, 2020, is highly likely to result in the smooth victory of incumbent Alexandr Lukashenko. Despite this fact, the unprecedented – and still growing – politicization of Belarusian society constitutes a challenge to the regime that will not fade even after a clear-cut election. The resulting tensions will require more diplomatic attention from Germany and the European Union.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Politics, European Union, Society, and Presidential Elections
President Trump wants to withdraw US troops from Germany because it spends too little on defense. US Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, however, is trying to present the decision as the result of a strategic analysis. That seems grotesque. The withdrawal not only weakens NATO, but also the security of Europe and America’s ability to act. The Europeans must finally close their capability gaps, and Germany must make its armed forces fully operational earlier than planned.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America
Zbigniew Rau, who was appointed foreign minister on August 26, will help align the trajectory of Polish diplomacy with the government’s general line. His appointment fits into the logic of a larger government reshuffle, expected this fall, which aims for a greater centralization of power. His higher standing in the governing PiS party may, however, halt the gradual loss of relevance of Poland’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
Brexit talks have entered extra time. If the UK is to leave the EU in an orderly manner, it needs a deal in the next four weeks. The trouble is that, as the prospect of leaving becomes more concrete, the government has finally recognized that it needs to honor the promises it has made to voters. Prime Minister Boris Johnson is struggling to reconcile his vague pledges with real world constraints – both internationally and domestically.
Topic:
Politics, European Union, Brexit, Negotiation, and Boris Johnson
Ursula von der Leyen’s first ‘State of the Union’ speech is an opportunity for her to reassert her political agenda under the conditions of COVID-19 and to set the tone for her four remaining years in office. The summit agreement in July on a recovery strategy was perceived as a leap forward for the EU but fell short of von der Leyen’s ambitions. Fault lines between member states are deepening, and interinstitutional cooperation is on the wane. This is a make-or-break moment for the Commission President.
Part of French President Emmanuel Macron’s European policy is to improve the position of his country in the Eastern European member states of the European Union. Although this is not a change of strategy, but only a new method, it creates favorable conditions for intensified Franco-German dialogue on European strategic issues
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and European Union
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, France, Germany, and Baltic States
Despite welcoming signs from the recent EU-Ukraine Summit, the underlying problems still loom large in this special relationship. The EU is running out of tools to incentivize more difficult reforms, and Ukraine is running out of arguments why it is unable to tackle corruption, oligarchs, and consolidate rule of law. With growing geopolitical turmoil in the region, a further strengthening of this partnership should be a priority. The risk of an increasing anti-Western backlash in Ukraine should not be underestimated.
Topic:
International Relations, Corruption, European Union, and Partnerships
After two weeks of heavy fighting, the new war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh is likely to escalate further. International actors have so far been unable to broker a ceasefire. In this case, the EU, with its limited leverage, can add most value by leading a response to the inevitable humanitarian catastrophe. EU diplomatic efforts should be led by France and Germany, coordinated with other member states, and also with Russia, to the extent necessary.
Topic:
Diplomacy, War, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, France, Germany, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh
British political institutions have shown resilience during the Brexit crisis. London apparently believes it has the scope to put EU talks behind it and recalibrate its position in the world. The British government is carrying out an integrated review of defense, aid, and foreign policy and preparing its presidency of the COP26 climate talks and G7. By contrast, its neighbors are gripped by the notion of Britain’s further constitutional deterioration. Their perceptions could well become self-fulfilling.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Climate Change, Politics, Brexit, and Negotiation
A crisis can bring out the best in Germany’s European policy, resulting in its selfless embrace of deeper integration. But sometimes crises require Germany to lead from the front rather than melt selflessly into the background. On such occasions, Berlin has seemed a little too keen to stress that it is taking action under severe constraints. While Germany’s EU presidency showcased both tendencies, its shift toward crisis-driven realism risks overshadowing its strides for a better Europe.
Topic:
Politics, Domestic Politics, and Crisis Management
More fragmented than ever, Europe is at a crossroads, making the 2019 European Parliament election an immensely political event. Stakes are high for Emmanuel Macron, Matteo Salvini and Viktor Orbán, all of whom could shake up the balance of power in the EP. Macron has lost much of his initial vigor, and the disruptive potential of Salvini and Orbán is significant. If played well, their combined power could send shock waves across all European institutions
For many young people in France, President Macron’s reforms failed to alleviate their social anxieties. Unemployment remains high, employment conditions precarious, and what started as a protest against new fuel taxes quickly spilled over to other reform areas including social policy. Macron will need to gain the youngsters’ trust ahead of the European Parliament election – not least because its outcome will decisively shape his domestic credibility, and consequently, his political fate
Germany considers itself a leading European power that utilizes its influence to promote EU cohesion in the face of Brexit and numerous other crises. However, a different picture emerges in European health policy, an area that is not only being discussed as an essential part of the EU’s social dimension but also in the context of its security and development positioning: Far from shaping the discussion, Germany is at times even perceived as the brakeman to an effective European health policy.
China’s increased engagement in Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe has aroused concerns in Europe that China is pursuing a divisive strategy. Its primary goal, however, is to use the region as a gateway to Western Europe’s markets while including the EU in its own Eurasian integration project; in Beijing’s view, a robust regulatory EU is doubtless preferable to a fragmented Europe. China’s deepening involvement in the region could nevertheless increase economic divisions within the EU as whole. As a trade triangle emerges involving China, Germany, and the Visegrad states, the “German-Central European manufacturing core” potentially stands to gain at the expense of the EU’s Atlantic and southern European member states. Germany must address this risk with a triple strategy that balances national interest, EU cohesion, and engagement with China. This involves, first, working with the Visegrad Four, with other European countries, and with EU institutions to forge a deeper and more effective cooperation with China to enhance transport connectivity and economic modernization, particularly in the Western and Eastern Balkans. Second, Germany should increase pressure on China to open up the Chinese domestic market to ensure mutual access. And third, it should promote forward-looking European industrial policy centered on the digitalization of value and supply chains for Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe. This would allow Germany to prevent intra-European divisions from deepening, while taking advantage of its triangular relations with China and the countries of Central Europe and fostering mutually advantageous integration across Eurasia.