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Begin New Search Content Type Commentary and Analysis Publishing Institution Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Publication Year within 10 Years Publication Year within 5 Years

1. War in Ukraine: One Year On, Nowhere Safe

Author:
Nichita Gurcov
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, ACLED records nearly 40,000 political violence events across the country. Three-quarters of these events are shelling, artillery, and missile strikes mostly affecting the northeastern, eastern, and southern regions of Ukraine. Quantifying the civilian toll of the conflict presents a challenge – especially in areas continuously engulfed by violence, like eastern Ukraine. In areas under Russian occupation, reports of abductions, forced disappearances, torture, and extrajudicial executions have been widespread, though the scale of violence against civilians becomes known only upon the liberation of territories, evidenced in the case of northern Ukraine and especially the Kyiv suburbs. Meanwhile, long-range strikes, including those deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure, pose a permanent threat and continue to induce extreme hardship for communities even farther afield from the frontline.
Topic:
War Crimes, Conflict, Civilians, Russia-Ukraine War, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

2. Political Repression in Cuba Ahead of the 2023 Parliamentary Elections

Author:
Sandra Pellegrini and Ana Marco
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
On 26 March 2023, voters will elect 470 deputies to Cuba’s National Assembly of People’s Power, who, in addition to fulfilling legislative functions during their five-year term, will be nominating Cuba’s next head of state. The government has characterized Cuba’s political system as a grassroots democracy, where candidacies to the parliament largely emerge from municipal authorities and are approved by the National Candidate Commission, a body composed of social organizations, such as labor unions and student associations.1 In practice, however, Cuba’s electoral process has been criticized for blocking the opposition’s access to power. Notably, the Council for Democratic Transition in Cuba, a platform created by opposition members to promote pluralism, freedom, and human rights, has called voters to boycott the upcoming elections after pro-government supporters reportedly prevented several opposition candidates from running in the November 2022 municipal elections.2
Topic:
Elections, Domestic Politics, Repression, and Parliament
Political Geography:
Cuba, Latin America, and Caribbean

3. Actor Profile: The March 23 Movement (M23)

Author:
Ladd Serwat
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
The March 23 Movement (M23) — Mouvement du 23 Mars in French — is an armed group operating in Nord Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), with alleged backing from the Rwandan government. The roots of the M23 go back to the disrupted integration process of Rwandophone militants following the Congo Wars, splitting those willing to return to Rwanda and others desiring to stay in DRC.1 Many fighters remained in Nord Kivu province to form the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) under the leadership of a former Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) militant, Laurent Nkunda. A precursor to the M23, the CNDP claimed to protect Congolese Tutsi and received Rwandan support.2 The M23’s name comes from the failed negotiation process between the CNDP and the Congolese government on 23 March 2009.3
Topic:
Political Violence, Non State Actors, and Armed Forces
Political Geography:
Africa and Democratic Republic of Congo

4. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Sustained Resurgence in Yemen or Signs of Further Decline?

Author:
Emile Roy
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
In the first two months of 2023, suspected United States drone strikes killed two senior leaders of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen’s Marib governorate. One of the group’s top explosives experts, a Yemeni citizen named Husayn Hadbul (also known as Hassan al-Hadrami), was killed on 30 January. The group’s media chief and leader of the group’s Shura Council, Saudi citizen Hamad al-Tamimi (also known as Abu Abd al-Aziz al-Adnani), was killed on 26 February. These strikes on high-profile AQAP leaders took place amid a resurgence of AQAP activity in Yemen, which started during the United Nations-mediated truce between Houthi and anti-Houthi forces that lasted from April to the beginning of October 2022, and that has informally held to this date.1 The lull in fighting between Houthi and anti-Houthi forces induced by the truce allowed for a broader political and military reconfiguration within the anti-Houthi camp. At the political level, former President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi was replaced by an eight-member Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) to enhance coordination among anti-Houthi forces. Armed militias affiliated with the secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) and other United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed forces exploited the new situation to gain control over territory in southern Yemen. As part of this territorial expansion, STC forces spearheaded several offensives against AQAP beginning in August 2022, leading to a sudden rise in AQAP activity in 2022.2 However, the nature of this overall increase is disputed, with some analysts arguing that it is a sign of AQAP’s weakness rather than its strength.3
Topic:
Non State Actors, Armed Forces, Conflict, Houthis, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
Political Geography:
Middle East and Yemen

5. Anti-Government Demonstrations in Iran: A Long-Term Challenge for the Islamic Republic

Author:
Dana Sammy
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
Iran was rocked by mass demonstrations triggered by the September 2022 death of Mahsa Amini — a young Kurdish woman — while in the custody of the Guidance Patrol (also known as the ‘morality police’) for allegedly violating the hijab dress code. Protests over the mandatory hijab rule soon coalesced around a wide range of grievances with the regime, with participants demanding protections for civil, political, and human rights and calling for an end to the Islamic Republic. Although street demonstrations have subsided for the time being, how the protest movement will evolve — and how it will impact the stability of the Islamic Republic — remains an open question. This report explores potential answers to this question by examining notable trends and implications of the wave of demonstrations that unfolded in the country between September and December 2022. It argues that several emerging aspects of the nationwide movement may pose a long-term challenge to the regime. The demonstrations following Amini’s death were not only unique in regard to their geographical spread and longevity, but also in the way they brought together different segments of society with both distinct and overlapping grievances. Moreover, amid a harsh crackdown by Iranian authorities, engagement in violence by demonstrators has trended upward: between mid-September and December 2022, ACLED records the highest number of violent demonstration events for any round of nationwide demonstrations in Iran since the beginning of data collection in 2016. The increased use of Molotov cocktails and the killing of dozens of security personnel are among the most significant trends in demonstration violence observed in the latest round of events. The demonstrations did not reach a critical mass necessary to pose an immediate threat to the survival of the regime. Yet, this latest round in a sequence of increasingly violent demonstrations is indicative of growing resentment in Iranian society against the ruling elites and a willingness to express it forcefully despite severe repression. As the regime refuses to reform, the growing frequency and intensity of demonstrations suggests that the government will find itself in an increasingly unstable domestic position and increasingly isolated in the international arena.
Topic:
Government, Human Rights, Women, State Violence, and Protests
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

6. Actor Profile: The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)

Author:
Sandra Pellegrini and María Fernanda Arocha
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) is a Mexican criminal group that emerged as a splinter group of the Milenio Cartel – one of the Sinaloa Cartel’s allies – after the capture of its leader in 2009 led to internal divisions.1 Initially, the group operated as an armed wing of the Sinaloa Cartel. As part of this alliance, it engaged in a deadly turf war against Los Zetas in Veracruz state, where the group stood out for its use of violence and involvement in numerous massacres.2 Under the leadership of Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, also known as El Mencho, the CJNG grew as an independent organization and one of the most powerful actors in Mexico’s criminal underworld. Rivaling its erstwhile ally, the Sinaloa Cartel, the CJNG turned from an armed wing into a complex drug-producing and trafficking structure, which supplies markets across the globe.3 It has diversified its activities and sources of income, relying on extortion, kidnapping, human trafficking, illegal mining, and oil theft,4 such as the capture of the avocado and oil trade in Michoacán and Guanajuato states.5 To support its growth and international ambitions, the CJNG has expanded its presence to at least 27 of Mexico’s 32 states.6 The presence of the CJNG has often driven increased violence at the local level, notably in areas of territorial dispute with other criminal groups.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Violence, Organized Crime, and Cartels
Political Geography:
Latin America, North America, and Mexico

7. Turkey’s 2023 General Elections and the Kurdish Question

Author:
Ameneh Mehvar and Berk Özlü
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
The most consequential elections in Turkey’s recent history are set to be held on 14 May, when Turkish citizens will elect a new president alongside a new parliament. An ideologically disparate coalition of six opposition parties, ranging from secularists, to Islamic conservatives, and Turkish nationalists, have joined forces under the leadership of Kemal Kilicdaroglu to unseat Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Erdogan has been in power for 20 years, initially as prime minister and then as president since 2014.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Minorities, Elections, and Kurds
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

8. The Normalization of Political Violence and the 2023 Legislative Elections in Greece

Author:
Niki Papadogiannaki and Vicky Yiagopoulou
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
Elections in Greece come less than three months after the deadly head-on train collision at Tempe in the north of the country that killed 57 passengers. The incident on 28 February triggered demonstrations against the government of Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, chastising him for initially blaming the collision on “tragic human error.”1 The unrest that followed caused the government to delay announcing the election date, which had been anticipated in April. Due to a new voting law, the elections will be held under a proportional representation system, wherein the leading party needs to secure at least 46% to have a chance to win absolute majority in parliament. However, this percentage has not been reached in the last three decades,2 making a clear victory on 21 May unlikely.
Topic:
Political Violence, Elections, Domestic Politics, and Protests
Political Geography:
Europe and Greece

9. The Muqawama and Its Enemies: Shifting Patterns in Iran-Backed Shiite Militia Activity in Iraq

Author:
Luca Nevola and Miran Feyli
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
The post-2003 security landscape in Iraq has seen the proliferation of dozens of militias identifying with Shiite Islam. Many of these actors are integrated into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) – a paramilitary group established in 2014 to counter the Islamic State and later incorporated into the Iraqi state forces – and have strong relations with the Iranian regime and its security apparatus.1 These Iran-backed groups include prominent militias such as Kataib Hizbullah (KH), Asaib Ahl al-Haqq (AAH), and Haraka Hizbullah al-Nujaba (HHN), as well as a number of recently formed ‘facade groups’ like Ashab al-Kahf and Qasim al-Jabarin. Such facade groups are generally assumed to operate on behalf of KH, AAH, and HHN (see graph below). These groups are notable for portraying themselves as the Muqawama, or the ‘resistance’ against the United States and other foreign forces.
Topic:
Security, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Militias
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

10. Actor Profile: The Islamic State Sahel Province

Author:
Heni Nsaibia
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
The Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel) is a salafi-jihadist militant group and the Sahelian affiliate of the transnational Islamic State (IS) organization. It is primarily active in the border areas between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger — known as the tri-state border area, or Liptako-Gourma — but it has also engaged in sporadic activity in Algeria, Benin, and Nigeria. The group’s composition reflects the social fabric in the areas where it is active. Its members belong to the Fulani, Arab, Tuareg, Dawsahak, Songhai, and Djerma ethnic groups, although its core leadership was historically composed of Western Saharan militants.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, and Islamic State
Political Geography:
North Africa and Sahel