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1. Course Correction: Charting a More Effective Approach to U.S.-China Trade

Author:
Clark Packard and Scott Lincicome
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Over the past several years the U.S.-China economic relationship has soured and become subordinated to broader concerns about national security and geopolitics. After a decades‐​long reform agenda in China that lifted hundreds of millions out of grinding poverty, Chinese president Xi Jinping has increasingly turned inward—reembracing Maoist socialism and heavy‐​handed central planning. Washington’s response to these worrisome developments has been reflexively hawkish economically, scattershot, and woefully inadequate for the economic challenge that China presents.
Topic:
National Security, Bilateral Relations, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

2. Formula for a Crisis: Protectionism and Supply Chain Resiliency—the Infant Formula Case Study

Author:
Scott Lincicome, Gabriella Beaumont-Smith, and Alfredo Carrillo Obregon
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
It has become accepted wisdom in Washington that the COVID-19 pandemic revealed how openness to international trade and investment increases U.S. vulnerability to economic shocks and contributes to widespread shortages of food, medicine, and other essential goods. This official narrative, however, ignores ample economic research showing that, while disruptions are inevitable in a modern economy, the alternative to free trade—a protectionism‐​driven onshoring of global supply chains—carries its own risks and can even heighten vulnerability by inhibiting natural market adjustments to economic shocks. The infant formula crisis, which lasted for most of 2022 and was unique to the United States, provided an unfortunate real‐​world lesson in this regard.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Free Trade, Resilience, COVID-19, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

3. The (Updated) Case for Free Trade

Author:
Scott Lincicome and Alfredo Carrillo Obregon
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
The long‐​standing bipartisan consensus in favor of free trade in the United States has unraveled as the nation’s commitment to the multilateral trading system is increasingly subordinated to inward‐​looking ideological priorities. Like all forms of market competition, trade can be disruptive for some companies and workers, and various trade agreements may require updating to address both an increasingly authoritarian China and the 21st‐​century global economy. Nevertheless, both the seen and unseen economic benefits that free trade has delivered to countless individuals, businesses, and communities in America are undeniable and irreplaceable. Furthermore, the lone alternative to free trade, protectionism, has repeatedly proven to impose high costs for minimal benefits. In short, the case for free trade is an economic no‐​brainer.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Economy, Free Trade, and Protectionism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

4. Unfair Trade or Unfair Protection? The Evolution and Abuse of Section 301

Author:
Scott Lincicome, Inu Manak, and Alfredo Carrillo Obregon
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 gives the U.S. trade representative (USTR) broad authority to investigate “unfair” foreign trade policies allegedly harming American companies and to impose tariffs or other trade restrictions to achieve the removal of those policies. The statute was a common tool of U.S. trade policy from the 1980s to the 1990s, authorizing the USTR to conduct almost 100 different investigations during that period. Since the World Trade Organization (WTO) was established in 1995, however, the USTR has used Section 301 infrequently and almost exclusively to initiate or implement WTO dispute settlement actions—actions that, per WTO rules, were supposed to supplant the kinds of unilateral trade actions once applied under the law. The Trump administration departed from this long‐​standing U.S. practice and took advantage of Section 301’s flaws to circumvent the WTO and enact unilateral tariffs against multiple U.S. trading partners, imposing significant economic and geopolitical costs along the way. This paper examines the Trump administration’s actions in historical context, evaluates how the law was stretched beyond its intended purpose in direct contravention of the United States’ WTO obligations, and offers practical reforms to prevent future abuse.
Topic:
Economics, Legislation, Trade, Protectionism, and WTO
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

5. U.S. Trade Policy toward China: Learning the Right Lessons

Author:
Scott Lincicome
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Cato Journal
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Labor market and cultural disruptions in the United States are real and important, as is China’s current and unfortunate turn toward illiberalism and empire. But pretending today that there was a better trade policy choice in 2000—when Congress granted China “permanent normal trade relations” (PNTR) status and paved the way for broader engagement—is misguided. It assumes too much, ignores too much, and demands too much. Worse, it could lead to truly bad governance: increasing U.S. protectionism; forgiving the real and important failures of our policymakers, CEOs, and unions over the last two decades; and preventing a political consensus for real policy solutions. Indeed, that is happening now.
Topic:
International Relations, Economics, Markets, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Protectionism
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

6. Questioning Industrial Policy: Why Government Manufacturing Plans Are Ineffective and Unnecessary

Author:
Scott Lincicome and Huan Zhu
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and rising U.S.-China tensions, American policymakers have again embraced “industrial policy.” Both President Biden and his predecessor, as well as legislators from both parties, have advocated a range of federal support for American manufacturers to fix perceived weaknesses in the U.S. economy and to counter China’s growing economic clout. These and other industrial policy advocates, however, routinely leave unanswered important questions about U.S. industrial policy’s efficacy and necessity: What is “Industrial Policy”? Advocates of “industrial policy” often fail to define the term, thus permitting them to ignore past failures and embrace false successes while preventing a legitimate assessment of industrial policies’ costs and benefits. Yet U.S. industrial policy’s history of debate and implementation establishes several requisite elements – elements that reveal most “industrial policy successes” not to be “industrial policy” at all. What are the common obstacles to effective U.S. industrial policy? Several obstacles have prevented U.S. industrial policies from generating better outcomes than the market. This includes legislators’ and bureaucrats’ inability to “pick winners” and efficiently allocate public resources (Hayek’s “Knowledge Problem”); factors inherent in the U.S. political system (Public Choice Theory); lack of discipline regarding scope, duration, and budgetary costs; interaction with other government policies that distort the market at issue; and substantial unseen costs. What “problem” will industrial policy solve? The most common problems purportedly solved by industrial policy proposals are less serious than advocates claim or unfixable via industrial policy. This includes allegations of widespread U.S. “deindustrialization” and a broader decline in American innovation; the disappearance of “good jobs”; the erosion of middle‐​class living standards; and the destruction of American communities. Do other countries’ industrial policies demand U.S. industrial policy? The experiences of other countries generally cannot justify U.S. industrial policy because countries have different economic and political systems. Regardless, industrial policy successes abroad – for example, in Japan, Korea and Taiwan – are exaggerated. Also, China’s economic growth and industrial policies do not justify similar U.S. policies, considering the market‐​based reasons for China’s rise, the Chinese policies’ immense costs, and the systemic challenges that could derail China’s future growth and geopolitical influence. These answers argue strongly against a new U.S. embrace of industrial policy. The United States undoubtedly faces economic and geopolitical challenges, including ones related to China, but the solution lies not in copying China’s top‐​down economic planning. Reality, in fact, argues much the opposite.
Topic:
Government, Industrial Policy, Manufacturing, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

7. Manufactured Crisis: “Deindustrialization,” Free Markets, and National Security

Author:
Scott Lincicome
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Both the American left and right often use “national security” to justify sweeping proposals for new U.S. protectionism and industrial policy. “Free markets” and a lack of government support for the manufacturing sector are alleged to have crippled the U.S. defense industrial base’s ability to supply “essential” goods during war or other emergencies, thus imperiling national security and demanding a fundamental rethink of U.S. trade and manufacturing policy. The COVID-19 crisis and U.S.-China tensions have amplified these claims. This resurgent “security nationalism,” however, extends far beyond the limited theoretical scenarios in which national security might justify government action, and it suffers from several flaws. First, reports of the demise of the U.S. manufacturing sector are exaggerated. Although U.S. manufacturing sector employment and share of national economic output (gross domestic product) have declined, these data are mostly irrelevant to national security and reflect macroeconomic trends affecting many other countries. By contrast, the most relevant data—on the U.S. manufacturing sector’s output, exports, financial performance, and investment—show that the nation’s total productive capacity and most of the industries typically associated with “national security” are still expanding. Second, “security nationalism” assumes a need for broad and novel U.S. government interventions while ignoring the targeted federal policies intended to support the defense industrial base. In fact, many U.S. laws already authorize the federal government to support or protect discrete U.S. industries on national security grounds. Third, several of these laws and policies provide a cautionary tale regarding the inefficacy of certain core “security nationalist” priorities. Case studies of past government support for steel, shipbuilding, semiconductors, and machine tools show that security‐​related protectionism and industrial policy in the United States often undermines national security. Fourth, although the United States is not nearly as open (and thus allegedly “vulnerable”) to external shocks as claimed, global integration and trade openness often bolster U.S. national security by encouraging peace among trading nations or mitigating the impact of domestic shocks. Together, these points rebut the most common claims in support of “security nationalism” and show why skepticism of such initiatives is necessary when national security is involved. They also reveal market‐​oriented trade, immigration, tax, and regulatory policies that would generally benefit the U.S. economy while also supporting the defense industrial base and national security.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, COVID-19, Free Market, and Deindustrialization
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

8. Protectionism or National Security? The Use and Abuse of Section 232

Author:
Scott Lincicome and Inu Manak
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
With several Section 232 tariffs still in place, and the status of other investigations unclear, the law presents an early test for the Biden administration and a signal about its future trade policy plans. President Biden took office at the height of modern American protectionism. The trade policy legacy he inherited from the Trump administration puts the United States at a crossroads. Will Biden go down the problematic path of executive overreach like his predecessor, or will he forge a new path? We may not need to wait long to find out. In his first trade action, President Biden reinstated tariffs on aluminum from the United Arab Emirates under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which authorizes the president to impose tariffs when a certain product is “being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair national security.” Though infrequently used in the past, Section 232 was a favored trade tool of the Trump administration, which was responsible for nearly a quarter of all Section 232 investigations initiated since 1962. While Congress has constitutional authority over trade policy, Section 232 gives the president broad discretion to enact protectionist measures in the name of national security. Why is this law a problem? First, the statute’s lack of an objective definition of “national security” permits essentially anything to be considered a threat, regardless of the merits. Second, the law’s lack of detailed procedural requirements encouraged the Trump administration to cut corners in applying the law, thus breeding cronyism and confusion. Third, President Trump took advantage of the law’s ambiguity to shield key Section 232 findings from Congress and the public, undermining both transparency and accountability. The Trump administration’s abuse of the rarely used Section 232 has allowed the statute to become an excuse for blatant commercial protectionism, harming American companies and consumers and our security interests. It’s unclear whether the Biden administration will continue this troubling trend or seek reform. The best course of action would be the latter: Biden should avoid using Section 232 and support congressional efforts to rein in presidential power, thus ensuring an end to the calamitous episodes that were common during the Trump era.
Topic:
National Security, Trade Policy, and Protectionism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America