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Begin New Search Topic Economics Political Geography Europe Author Fritz W. Scharpf Publication Year within 25 Years

1. After the Crash: A Perspective on Multilevel European Democracy

Author:
Fritz W. Scharpf
Publication Date:
12-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
At the end of the postwar period, the politically shaped configurations of normatively integrated European political economies differed greatly among “social-market” and “liberal market economies.” Such differences persist even though the characteristic achievements of social market economies have since eroded under the pressures of global capitalism and of European integration. Focusing on European integration from a social-market perspective, there is no question that it has widened the range of individual options. But it has also reduced the capacity of democratic politics to deal with the challenges of global capitalism, and it has contributed to rising social inequality and the erosion of public services and transfers. This paper will first summarize those asymmetries of European integration which have done the most to constrain democratic choices and to shift the balance between capital, labor, and the state by establishing an institutional priority of negative over positive integration and of monetary integration over political and social integration. It will then explain why efforts to democratize European politics will not be able to overcome these institutional asymmetries and why politically feasible reforms will not be able to remove the institutional constraints. The changes that would be required to restore democratic capacities to shape the political economy could only have a chance if present veto positions were to be fundamentally shaken. On the speculative assumption that the aftermath of a deep crisis might indeed create the window of opportunity for a political re-foundation of European integration, the concluding section will outline institutional ground rules that would facilitate democratic political action at both the European and national levels.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, Politics, Labor Issues, Democracy, and Capitalism
Political Geography:
Europe

2. No Exit from the Euro-rescuing Trap?

Author:
Fritz W. Scharpf
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
This paper attempts a normative assessment of the input and output-oriented legitimacy of the present euro-rescuing regime on the basis of policy analyses examining the causes of present crises, the available policy options, and the impact of the policies actually chosen. Concluding that the regime lacks input-oriented legitimacy and that its claim to output-oriented legitimacy is ambivalent at best, the paper explores potential – majoritarian or unilateral – exits from the present institutional constellation that is characterized by the synthesis of a non-democratic expertocracy and an extremely asymmetric intergovernmental bargaining system.
Topic:
Economics, Politics, Financial Crisis, and Democracy
Political Geography:
Europe

3. The Double Asymmetry of European Integration Or: Why the EU Cannot Be a Social Market Economy

Author:
Fritz W. Scharpf
Publication Date:
11-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
Judge-made law has played a crucial role in the process of European integration. In the vertical dimension, it has greatly reduced the range of autonomous policy choices in the member states, and it has helped to expand the reach of European competences. At the same time, however, “Integration through Law” does have a liberalizing and deregulatory impact on the socioeconomic regimes of EU member states. This effect is generally compatible with the status quo in liberal market economies, but it tends to undermine the institutions and policy legacies of Continental and Scandinavian social market economies. Given the high consensus requirements of European legislation, this structural asymmetry cannot be corrected through political action at the European level.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe

4. The Asymmetry of European Integration or why the EU cannot be a "Social Market Economy"

Author:
Fritz W. Scharpf
Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG)
Abstract:
Judge-made law has played a crucial role in the process of European integration. In the vertical dimension, it has greatly reduced the range of autonomous policy choices in the member states, and it has helped to expand the reach of European competences. At the same time, however, “Integration through Law” does have a liberalizing and deregulatory impact on the socio-economic regimes of EU member states. This effect is generally compatible with the status quo in “Liberal Market Economies”, but it tends to undermine the institutions and policy legacies of Continental and Scandinavian “Social Market Economies”. Given the high consensus requirements of European legislation, this structural asymmetry cannot be corrected through political action at the European level.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, and Law
Political Geography:
Europe

5. No Exit from the Joint Decision Trap? Can German Federalism Reform Itself?

Author:
Fritz W. Scharpf
Publication Date:
09-2005
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Research Papers Archive
Abstract:
Germany's unique institutions of a 'unitary federal state', long considered part of the country's post-war success story, are now generally perceived as a 'joint decision trap' impeding effective policy responses to new economic and demographic challenges at both levels of government. Nevertheless, a high powered bi-cameral Commission set up in Autumn 2003 failed to reach agreement on constitutional reforms. The paper analyses the misguided procedural and substantive choices that explain the failure of reform, and it discusses the possibility of asymmetric constitutional solutions that might enhance the capacity for autonomous action at both levels.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Demographics, and Economics
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

6. No Exit from the Joint Decision Trap? Can German Federalism Reform Itself?

Author:
Fritz W. Scharpf
Publication Date:
09-2005
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
The unique institutions that make up Germany's "unitary federal state," long considered part of the country's post-war success story, are now generally perceived as a "joint-decision trap" impeding effective policy responses to new economic and demographic challenges at both levels of government. Nevertheless, a high-powered bicameral Commission set up in the fall of 2003 failed to reach agreement on constitutional reforms. The paper analyzes the misguided procedural and substantive choices that led to this failure, and it discusses the possibility of asymmetric constitutional solutions that might enhance the capacity for autonomous action at both levels.
Topic:
Economics, Government, and Political Economy
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

7. The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity

Author:
Fritz W. Scharpf
Publication Date:
07-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
European integration has created a constitutional asymmetry between policies promoting market efficiencies and policies promoting social protection and equality. National welfare states are legally and economically constrained by European rules of economic integration, liberalization, and competition law, whereas efforts to adopt European social policies are politically impeded by the diversity of national welfare states, differing not only in levels of economic development and hence in their ability to pay for social transfers and services but, even more significantly, in their normative aspirations and institutional structures. In response, the "Open Method of Coordination" is now applied being in the social-policy field. It leaves effective policy choices at the national level, but tries to improve these through promoting common objectives and common indicators and through comparative evaluations of national policy performance. These efforts are useful but cannot overcome the constitutional asymmetry. Hence there is reason to search for solutions which must have the character of European law in order to establish constitutional parity with the rules of European economic integration, but which also must be sufficiently differentiated to accommodate the existing diversity of national welfare regimes. The article discusses two such options, "Closer Cooperation" and a combination of differentiated "framework directives" with the Open Method of Coordination.
Topic:
Civil Society, Economics, and Political Economy
Political Geography:
Europe

8. What Have We Learned?[1] Problem-Solving Capacity of the Multilevel European Polity.

Author:
Fritz W. Scharpf
Publication Date:
07-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
This Working Paper is an attempt, occasioned by the evaluation of the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, to provide a conceptual framework within which institute research on multi-level European problem solving could be discussed in the context of a more comprehensive overview of the literature. The framework combines an institutional dimension (distinguishing between supranational, joint-decision and intergovernmental modes of EU policy making) and a policy dimension (distinguishing between market-creating, market-enabling, market-correcting and redistributive policies). As institutional modes differ in their capacity for conflict resolution, and as policy types differ in the likelihood of severe policy conflict, greater or lesser problem-solving capacity can be explained by the location of a particular policy area on both of these dimensions.
Topic:
Economics, Government, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
Europe