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1. A Strategic Challenge: A Peddling Peril Index Analysis of Countries’ Restricted Russia Trade

Author:
David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
National trade control systems and sanctions enforcement across the globe have been particularly challenged by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the unexpected types and number of goods to control, the need for rapid control of those items, and Russia’s determination to thwart others’ trade controls. The Russian situation demonstrates that even countries with strong strategic trade control systems have vulnerabilities. • In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the results of the Peddling Peril Index (PPI) for 2021/2022 provide a method to assess a total of 31 countries identified by their respective roles in the transshipment of restricted goods or the supply of dual-use goods used by the Russian military. • The purpose of this study is to identify patterns in these countries’ scores and lessons in finding ways of thwarting Russia’s success in violating sanctions and export controls.
Topic:
Sanctions, Exports, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

2. Visible Progress at Russia’s Shahed Drone Production Site: Satellite Imagery Update and Call for Action

Author:
David Albright and Sarah Burkhard
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Nearly three months after the Institute and The Washington Post publicly revealed detailed information on the plans of JSC Alabuga1 (“Alabuga”) to produce thousands of deadly Shahed136 kamikaze drones on Russian soil, satellite imagery indicates that plans are progressing at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone. Yet, the company responsible, JSC Alabuga, and related companies are still not found on public U.S. or allied sanctions lists. The information in internal documents, analyzed by Institute staff over hundreds of hours, reveals not only detailed timelines for Alabuga’s production of weaponized drones and the establishment of mass production with Iranian assistance, but also multiple pressure points and vulnerabilities. Now, not later, is the time for the U.S. government to take the lead, work with partner governments and industry, and use leverage against those less inclined to cooperate, to hinder Alabuga from succeeding in providing the Russian military with thousands of Shahed-136 drones. With winter fast approaching, and Alabuga’s Shahed output increasing, Russia can be expected to accelerate its Shahed-136 attacks against Ukraine’s vital energy infrastructure, causing brutal living conditions for the civilian population. A key, overdue first step is for the United States and its allies to sanction JSC Alabuga and its associated companies
Topic:
Weapons, Drones, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

3. Electronics in the Shahed-136 Kamikaze Drone

Author:
David Albright and Sarah Burkhard
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Shahed-136 kamikaze drones, filled with Western electronics, continue to destroy Ukrainian lives and their civilian infrastructure. These drones, also known as Geran 2, are produced and assembled at JSC Alabuga facilities inside the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Russia, with assistance from Iran. Yet, the company responsible, JSC Alabuga,1 and related companies are still not found on public U.S. or allied sanctions lists. Information in internal Alabuga documents, analyzed by Institute staff over hundreds of hours, show a remarkable ability to acquire sophisticated electronic components from the West and build modules aimed at defeating Ukraine’s ability to jam Shahed-136 drones and require Ukraine and its allies to keep deploying additional or more advanced jamming systems. The detailed information on the Shahed-136’s electronic components, with part numbers and manufacturer, provide a valuable opportunity to thwart exports of these specific parts to Russia and its partner Iran, which has to date supplied most of these electronic parts to Alabuga for use in the Shahed-136 drone. Starting next year, however, Alabuga has committed to outfit Shahed136 drones with electronic components it acquires on its own. The danger posed by Alabuga should mobilize governments to apply sanctions and other restrictive measures to Alabuga and the associated companies revealed in the documents. Sanctions on Alabuga would not only be helpful in disrupting Alabuga and associated companies’ procurement efforts, but they would cause stress to a giant drone factory that has to produce thousands of Shahed-136 drones on a tight schedule, with little previous experience with drone production, hundreds of new employees on its payroll, and under financial pressure to prove itself as a capable supplier to the military.
Topic:
Sanctions, Weapons, Drones, and Private Sector
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

4. Satellite Imagery Update on Alabuga Shahed-136 Drone Factory

Author:
David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and Victoria Cheng
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Iranian-designed Shahed-136 kamikaze drones continue to destroy Ukrainian lives and their civilian infrastructure. These drones, also known as Geran-2, are produced and assembled by JSC Alabuga inside the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Russia, with critical assistance from Iran. Recent commercial satellite imagery appears to show that the buildings making the drones continue to operate, and at higher levels than other facilities located at the SEZ. The image, taken on a Wednesday morning in late November, shows a winter scene of the SEZ, with all the visible buildings covered in snow, except the two buildings making the Shahed-136 drone. The heat generated by the Shahed-136 buildings’ interior appears to have melted the snow on their roofs, implying ongoing operation.
Topic:
Security, Weapons, Drones, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

5. Responsible Statecraft Correlates with UN Vote on Russian Invasion of Ukraine: An Application of the 2021 Peddling Peril Index

Author:
David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
On March 2, 2022, the UN General Assembly convened in New York and voted 141 (in favor), 5 (against), and 35 (abstained), on the UNGA Resolution ES-11/1, condemning and demanding an end to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This invasion is a paramount shift in the status quo of peaceful relations on the European continent and will have repercussions throughout the world. The Institute decided to assess the vote in terms related to international norms of responsible strategic trade and associated behavior, using the results and findings in the 2021/2022 Peddling Peril Index (PPI), which ranks national strategic trade control systems. We could have selected other international normative comparisons, but we decided to use the PPI since national strategic trade controls are often correlated with more responsible state actions, and the PPI also measures adherence to a large number of international treaties and conventions. A central finding is that the vote is positively correlated with states' demonstrated commitment and implementation of international arms control, trade control, and financial practices. Countries that voted against the resolution or abstained from voting performed worse, on average, in the Peddling Peril Index.
Topic:
United Nations, Norms, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

6. Procurement Data and Safeguards: Looking Historically and to the Future

Author:
David Albright
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Because nuclear programs depend on procurements, understanding such procurements has become an important aspect of safeguards today. This paper looks back at the development of this approach and draws out lessons for tomorrow. Past cases, recounted using open source data and Institute archives, are drawn from, among others, Iraq Action Team investigations, Iran inspections during 2003-2006, the Khan Network investigations, and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. These cases illustrate important lessons about collecting and including procurement data more explicitly in state declarations and meeting inspection and monitoring goals. The cases also demonstrate the value of procurement data in facilitating the detection of irregularities in a nuclear declaration or verifying the correctness and completeness of a state’s nuclear declaration. These experiences and historical cases yield additional insights and lessons into ways to increase the usefulness of procurement data in future safeguards practices and methodologies.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Data, and Procurement
Political Geography:
Global Focus

7. Sudan/Russian Nuclear Power Cooperation Poses Proliferation Risks

Author:
David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, Allison Lach, Bridget Leahy, and Andrea Stricker
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Reuters reported on March 13, 2018 that Russia has agreed to sign a “roadmap” with Sudan on building nuclear power stations.1 However, Sudan has poor export controls, no adherence to nuclear power safety or nuclear terrorism conventions, and weak safeguards standards. Its neighbors also maintain poor implementation of these preventions against nuclear material and commodity theft or diversion. Russia should not build nuclear reactors in Sudan. Sudan should instead bolster its infrastructure so that it can at some point in the future underpin a well safeguarded nuclear power program backed by robust, internationally-acceptable strategic export controls. After reviewing data from the Institute’s Peddling Peril Index (PPI) for 2017,2 which ranks the efforts of 200 countries, territories, and entities to implement export controls and prevent trafficking in strategic commodities, Sudan and its bordering countries, such as the Central African Republic, Chad, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, and South Sudan, are seen to pose a high proliferation and safety and security risk.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Sudan, and Eurasia

8. Iran Nuclear Deal Procurement Channel Update: Is it being bypassed?

Author:
David Albright and Andrea Stricker
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
The procurement channel set up under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or Iran nuclear deal, appears to be considering fewer proposals than expected and is altogether unused by a traditionally illicit conduit to Iran’s nuclear, missile, and non-nuclear programs, namely China. The procurement channel was designed to regulate Iran’s imports of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use goods for nuclear or non-nuclear use. Given that Iran’s non-nuclear industries have often imported nuclear dual-use goods, this finding raises the question of whether the procurement channel, and its associated Procurement Working Group (PWG), is simply not being used, but illicit, nuclear dual-use supplies are still going to Iran. Although no evidence has emerged of banned sales going from the United States, Europe, or Japan, which have often been targets of Iranian illicit procurement networks, there is concern that banned sales could be going from parts of Asia. In particular, Chinese entities may be continuing to make sales of nuclear dual-use goods to Iran without using the channel. The United States and its allies should augment efforts to detect and intercept the flow of any strategic goods from China to Iran and from other potentially illicit supplier countries to Iran. China needs to reach out to suppliers or distributors of dual-use goods operating on its territory and ensure that they are informed about China’s export control laws and PWG requirements governing the sale of nuclear dual-use goods to Iran’s industries, whether they be nuclear or non-nuclear.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

9. Correlating a Country’s Economic Output with its Level of Export Controls

Author:
David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, Allison Lach, Bridget Leahy, and Andrea Stricker
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
The Peddling Peril Index (PPI) for 2017 is a strategic export control ranking of 200 countries, territories, and entities produced by the Institute.1 It evaluates states as to the effectiveness of their strategic export control systems. In this report, we evaluate the countries ranked in the PPI according to their Volume of Exports and Gross Domestic Product (GDP), both absolute and per capita2. This evaluation uses data on volume of exports and GDP, measured in U.S. dollars, as published by the United Nations and the World Bank. The nature of the exports for each country was not evaluated. The report focuses on the top and bottom 25 percent of countries by export volume (100 countries), GDP (100 countries), and GDP per capita (100 countries). It finds that six countries in particular deserve additional scrutiny due to their weak export controls and high volume of exports. They have very low PPI scores, meaning they do not have adequate export controls in place.3 They are: Indonesia, Nigeria, Kuwait, Viet Nam, Iraq, and Iran (Islamic Rep. of). Two additional countries, Colombia and Egypt, are identified as having relatively high GDP or GDP per capita, but exceptionally low PPI rankings. In general, countries with lower GDP per capita did worse in PPI performance, which highlights the need to tailor export controls in these countries to their resources. Chapter 12 of the PPI report describes several ways in which to do so, ensuring that the countries would have basic but adequate strategic export controls in place.
Topic:
GDP, Economy, Exports, and Illegal Trade
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Indonesia, Colombia, Egypt, and Nigeria

10. What is new in the Iran Nuclear Archive?

Author:
David Albright
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
The Nuclear Archive seized by Israel in Iran contains much new information not previously available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or Western governments about Iran’s past work on nuclear weapons under the so-called AMAD project. I have reviewed much of the information gathered by the IAEA about Iran’s past nuclear weapons programs and it is compelling, but this information has many gaps and is unable to allow for conclusions about the current program and its intentions. The archive fills in many of these holes, and overall, according to the Israelis, it presents a relatively complete and alarming picture of Iran’s nuclear weapons efforts, and in far more detailed than previously available.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

11. Nuclear Infrastructure and Proliferation Risks of the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Egypt

Author:
Sarah Burkhard, Erica Wenig, David Albright, and Andrea Stricker
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Apart from Saudi Arabia, which our Institute views as currently the largest proliferation risk in the Middle East, three key neighbors of Iran also warrant intensive study as to their nuclear capabilities and plans, safeguards and obstacles to proliferation, and future proliferation risks. After Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, and Egypt are seen by the Institute as states in the Middle East most poised to seek advanced nuclear capabilities in response to a resurgent nuclear Iran, or as the limitations under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) conclude or otherwise end. Egypt has the most experience of the three in working with nuclear materials and facilities under efforts dating back decades. Turkey may pose the greatest risk as far as surprise proliferation given the state of political affairs in that country and growing impulse of President Erdogan to consolidate power. The UAE, which was the first Middle Eastern country to adopt a so-called “gold standard” of renouncing enrichment and reprocessing, will be a country to watch for reversing course on its pledge. Each of these countries has varying security concerns with regard to Iran, and each has nuanced domestic goals that could propel proliferation attempts. A common recommendation for all three countries is that the United States and its allies should seek strong defensive relationships with those countries potentially affected by the end of JCPOA limits; others include the United States should work to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities in the region and use national intelligence and diplomatic capabilities to detect and work to reverse proliferation if it emerges. A summary of findings on each country follows, with a technical look at their emerging nuclear capabilities and plans, the security context with regard to Iran, status of their safeguards and obstacles to proliferation, and recommendations for preventing the spread of advanced nuclear capabilities in the region.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Infrastructure, Nuclear Power, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, Egypt, and United Arab Emirates

12. Strengthening the Counter-Illicit Nuclear Trade Regime in the Face of New Threats: A Two-Year Review of Proliferation Threats Associated with the Middle East

Author:
David Albright, Andrea Stricker, Sarah Burkhard, and Erica Wenig
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
The United States’ and associated global export control regime is losing ground due to several global events and trends underway in the United States and the Middle East. The developments at home and abroad are reducing controls and oversight over the flow of commodities vital to the development of nuclear weapons. Unless these trends are reversed, U.S. efforts to stem and stop nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and elsewhere will weaken. Events contributing to this greater proliferation danger include: 1) relaxed U.S. export control regulations and greater emphasis on global trade with streamlined exchange of intellectual property and commodities, including nuclear commodities; 2) on-going questions over the strong regulation of sensitive trade to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs; and 3) the expected actions of additional states to obtain nuclear capabilities to counterbalance Iran. This report provides findings from four studies that were part of a two-year Institute for Science and International Security review which identified threats to the United States’ and interconnected global export control regime and actions to take now to mitigate damages. The review found that U.S. policy goals should include strong efforts to restrict the flow of sensitive technologies to the Middle East where proliferation and security concerns are currently high. This includes examining its own export control reforms and repairing new or ongoing deficiencies that contribute to the spread of sensitive military or other technologies. It should work to negotiate or otherwise impose the extension of limitations on Iran’s nuclear program in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), since the legitimization of Iran’s advanced nuclear program exacerbates proliferation concerns. It should counter illicit nuclear and missile trade in the Middle East and elsewhere, which could support nuclear weapons development. The United States should affirm its strong defensive commitment to allies such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, and Egypt, while working against their development or import of advanced fuel cycle capabilities. The United States should also support the implementation of strong controls and transparency measures in the Middle East to ensure that burgeoning civilian nuclear programs remain peaceful, such as commitments not to enrich or reprocess, implementation of the Additional Protocol, and provision of secure, lifetime fuel supplies for nuclear reactors. It should monitor via national intelligence capabilities any concerning research or imports by Middle East nations that could signify proliferation intentions, and use all available diplomatic or coercive means to prevent additional nuclear proliferation. Finally, the United States and its allies should work to reduce Middle East security tensions and develop threat reduction efforts more broadly.
Topic:
Nuclear Power, Nonproliferation, Trade, and Illegal Trade
Political Geography:
Middle East

13. Transfer of Firearms on U.S. Control Lists Raises Proliferation, Terrorism Concerns

Author:
Andrea Stricker and David Albright
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
On September 19, 2017, Reuters reported that the Trump administration is in the final stages of deciding about the transfer of three categories of items (Categories 1-3) controlled by the United States Munitions List to the Commerce Control List.1 Those categories include firearms, ammunition, and artillery. These items are currently controlled by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, administered by the State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, but would be moved to the Commerce Control List under the Export Administration Regulations, which is administered by the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security.2 The planned transfers would finish a proposed Obama administration reform under the Export Control Reform Initiative that was halted due to opposition from U.S. federal law enforcement agencies.3 The transfers are being hailed as an export promotion program, but the potential risks to U.S. national security are dire. There are a few key problems with the proposed transfers that the administration should be aware of, which could contribute to the proliferation of U.S. firearms worldwide to nefarious countries and to terrorists.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Terrorism, Weapons, and Illegal Trade
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

14. Most Nuclear Ban Treaty Proponents are Lagging in Implementing Sound Export Control Legislation

Author:
David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, Allison Lach, and Andrea Stricker
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Using data compiled from a new index by our Institute, the Peddling Peril Index, which we will soon release, three quarters of the countries that voted in July 2017 in favor of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons lack adequate export control legislation. These countries lack a firm basis to control the export or retransfer of nuclear and nuclear-related commodities that are critical to the production and possession of nuclear weapons. If the UN Ban Treaty proponent countries truly seek a world without nuclear weapons, they should take the lead in ensuring that all countries, including their own, have effective strategic trade control systems able to prevent the spread of dangerous commodities and facilities that are critical to the production, maintenance, and improvement of nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, United Nations, Exports, and Illegal Trade
Political Geography:
Global Focus

15. A Freeze of North Korea’s Nuclear Program: Finding a Definition More Fitting of Today’s Reality

Author:
David Albright
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
The Trump administration has announced that it has created a new North Korea policy that is aimed at exerting maximal pressure on Pyongyang but also achieving negotiations to denuclearize North Korea. However, denuclearization negotiations do not appear imminent. The Trump administration has stated that now is the time for focusing on creating greater pressure on North Korea, and North Korea has signaled little interest in negotiations and much more interest in developing and keeping its nuclear weapons, comprised of both the warheads and missiles. But it is not too early to discuss what negotiations should look like. Many have stated that the denuclearization process should start with the creation of a freeze of North Korea’s nuclear program, as was done in previous North Korean negotiations. A freeze, albeit limited, was also the starting point for the negotiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or Iran nuclear deal. But what should this freeze look like in new North Korean negotiations, given all its nuclear advances in the last several years?
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

16. A Freeze of North Korea’s Nuclear Program: Finding a Definition More Fitting of Today’s Reality

Author:
David Albright
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
The Trump administration has announced that it has created a new North Korea policy that is aimed at exerting maximal pressure on Pyongyang but also achieving negotiations to denuclearize North Korea. However, denuclearization negotiations do not appear imminent. The Trump administration has stated that now is the time for focusing on creating greater pressure on North Korea, and North Korea has signaled little interest in negotiations and much more interest in developing and keeping its nuclear weapons, comprised of both the warheads and missiles. But it is not too early to discuss what negotiations should look like. Many have stated that the denuclearization process should start with the creation of a freeze of North Korea’s nuclear program, as was done in previous North Korean negotiations. A freeze, albeit limited, was also the starting point for the negotiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or Iran nuclear deal. But what should this freeze look like in new North Korean negotiations, given all its nuclear advances in the last several years?
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Negotiation, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

17. Heavy Water Loophole in the Iran Deal

Author:
David Albright and Andrea Stricker
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Although President-elect Donald Trump’s position on the Iran nuclear deal remains unclear, he and his allies in the Congress are expected to at least better enforce and strengthen the Iran deal. They should start by focusing on the deal’s heavy water loophole, whereby Iran can store offshore in Oman heavy water it owns and controls in excess of the nuclear deal’s limits, awaiting its eventual sale. To date, if the stocks in Iran and Oman are counted together (a reasonable view since Iran owns and controls both stocks), Iran has far exceeded the nuclear deal’s stated limit of maintaining a stock of only 130 metric tons of heavy water. Yet, this loophole was sanctioned by the executive body of the Iran deal, the Joint Commission. Despite such generous treatment, Iran has even so twice violated the narrow limit of 130 metric tons of heavy water it can hold inside Iran since the deal started in January 2016. Iran should no longer be facilitated in its overproduction of nuclear-related heavy water. Oman would do the world a favor by halting its willingness to accept Iranian heavy water and send any back to Iran for downblending. The return of the heavy water and its blending down would dramatically signal to Iran that violations of the Iran deal are no longer going to be tolerated, or worse, facilitated. Moreover, any further overproduction should be seen by the United States as a violation of the deal. It should work to end the Oman loophole and mitigate damage caused by a U.S. purchase of Iranian heavy water.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

18. Future Directions in the DPRK’S Nuclear Weapons Program: Three Scenarios for 2020

Author:
David Albright
Publication Date:
02-2015
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Like many secret nuclear weapons programs, the DPRK goes to great lengths to hide its capabilities to produce nuclear explosive materials and nuclear weapons. Despite these actions, a picture can be drawn of North Korea’s current and projected plutonium and weapons-grade uranium (WGU) stocks. Knowing these plutonium and WGU stocks can, in turn, allow an estimate of the DPRK’s current number of nuclear weapons and a range of projections of the number North Korea could build in the next several years. Although great uncertainty surrounds these projections, as well as the quality of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, these projections form a reasonable picture of the DPRK’s possible nuclear weapons futures, absent actions to significantly limit its nuclear programs. After summarizing estimates of stocks of separated plutonium and weapons-grade uranium as of the end of 2014, this report develops three projections of future nuclear arsenals through 2020: low-end, medium, and high-end nuclear futures. In developing these projections, which are intended to bound North Korea’s nuclear futures, a number of constraints are considered, including the number and size of nuclear production facilities, future underground testing, the extent and success of nuclear weaponization efforts, costs, and access to necessary goods and classified and proprietary technologies abroad.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

19. Civil HEU Watch Tracking: Inventories of Civil Highly Enriched Uranium: National and Global Stocks, as of End 2014

Author:
David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini
Publication Date:
10-2015
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Highly enriched uranium (HEU) is a key ingredient in nuclear weapons, making it one of the most dangerous materials in existence. As a result, governments take extraordinary measures to secure HEU against theft or diversion and to reduce the inventories of HEU in the world. To that end, it is important to track how much civil HEU exists and where it is. However, national civil HEU stocks are difficult to estimate, with transparency policies varying by country and few countries providing official declarations of their stocks. As a result, this report contains the few official civil HEU declarations and estimates civil HEU stocks in countries that do not provide public declarations. This study relies on open source information to derive these estimates. It is an update of a report published in 2005.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, and Uranium
Political Geography:
Global Focus

20. Military Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium Stocks in Acknowledged Nuclear Weapon States

Author:
David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), called “fissile materials,” were first produced in large quantities for use in nuclear weapons. Starting in World War II, and for over two decades afterwards, almost all the plutonium and HEU in the world was produced for these immensely destructive weapons. This production was centered almost exclusively in five states: Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States. In the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) these five countries are designated as “nuclearweapon states” because all five had manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon prior to January 1, 1967. To this day, they remain the only acknowledged nuclear weapon states. Although other countries possess nuclear weapons, the acknowledged states have gained a special status in international affairs. As part of that status, however, these five states also committed to work towards nuclear disarmament, in particular steps accompanied by the elimination of their own stocks of fissile material for nuclear weapons. At the end of 2014, these five states had military stocks totaling about 238 tonnes of plutonium and 1,330 tonnes of HEU, mostly weapon-grade uranium (WGU is defined as HEU enriched over 90 percent). Table 1 provides a summary of the results. Tables 2 and 3, located at the end of the report, provide official declarations or detailed estimates of each country’s military plutonium and HEU holdings. These tables provide extensive endnotes describing official declarations, other sources, and the derivation of the various estimates. In addition to aggregate totals, tables 2 and 3 provide partial information about the various types of military stocks held by these five countries, including fissile material dedicated to nuclear weapons activities and naval propulsion programs, and declared excess to defense requirements.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Uranium, and Plutonium
Political Geography:
Britain, Russia, China, France, and United States of America