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Begin New Search Author Ahmed Tahoun Publication Year within 10 Years

1. Country Risk

Author:
Tarek A. Hassan, Jesse Schreger, Markus Schwedeler, and Ahmed Tahoun
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
We construct new measures of country risk and sentiment as perceived by global investors and executives using textual analysis of the quarterly earnings calls of publicly listed firms around the world. Our quarterly measures cover 45 countries from 2002-2020. We use our measures to provide a novel characterization of country risk and to provide a harmonized definition of crises. We demonstrate that elevated perceptions of a country's riskiness are associated with significant falls in local asset prices and capital outflows, even after global financial conditions are controlled for. Increases in country risk are associated with reductions in firm-level investment and employment. We also show direct evidence of a novel type of contagion, where foreign risk is transmitted across borders through firm-level exposures. Exposed firms suffer falling market valuations and significantly retrench their hiring and investment in response to crises abroad. Finally, we provide direct evidence that heterogeneous currency loadings on global risk help explain the cross-country pattern of interest rates and currency risk premia.
Topic:
Economics, Employment, Investment, Risk, and Contagion
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. Firm-Level Exposure to Epidemic Diseases: Covid-19, SARS, and H1N1

Author:
Tarek A. Hassan, Stephan Hollander, Laurence van Lent, and Ahmed Tahoun
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
Using tools described in our earlier work (Hassan et al., 2019, 2020), we develop text- based measures of the costs, benefits, and risks listed firms in the US and over 80 other countries associate with the spread of Covid-19 and other epidemic diseases. We identify which firms expect to gain or lose from an epidemic disease and which are most affected by the associated uncertainty as a disease spreads in a region or around the world. As Covid-19 spreads globally in the first quarter of 2020, we find that firms’ primary concerns relate to the collapse of demand, increased uncertainty, and disruption in supply chains. Other important concerns relate to capacity reductions, closures, and employee welfare. By contrast, financing concerns are mentioned relatively rarely. We also identify some firms that foresee opportunities in new or disrupted markets due to the spread of the disease. Finally, we find some evidence that firms that have experience with SARS or H1N1 have more positive expectations about their ability to deal with the coronavirus outbreak.
Topic:
Economics, Infectious Diseases, Global Markets, Finance, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3. The Global Impact of Brexit Uncertainty

Author:
Tarek A. Hassan, Laurence van Lent, Stephan Hollander, and Ahmed Tahoun
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
Using tools from computational linguistics, we construct new measures of the impact of Brexit on listed firms in the United States and around the world: the share of discussions in quarterly earnings conference calls on costs, benefits, and risks associated with the UK’s intention to leave the EU. Using this approach, we identify which firms expect to gain or lose from Brexit and which are most affected by Brexit uncertainty. We then estimate the effects of these different kinds of Brexit exposure on firm-level outcomes. We find that concerns about Brexit-related uncertainty extend far beyond British or even European firms. US and international firms most exposed to Brexit uncertainty have lost a substantial fraction of their market value and have reduced hiring and investment. In addition to Brexit uncertainty (the second moment), we find that international firms overwhelmingly expect negative direct effects of Brexit (the first moment), should it come to pass. Most prominently, firms expect difficulties resulting from regulatory divergence, reduced labor mobility, trade access, and the costs of adjusting their operations post-Brexit. Consistent with the predictions of canonical theory, this negative sentiment is recognized and priced in stock markets but has not yet had significant effects on firm actions.
Topic:
Economics, Political Economy, Regional Cooperation, Brexit, Global Political Economy, and Economic Policy
Political Geography:
Britain, United States, United Kingdom, Europe, and European Union

4. Corporate Scandals and Regulation

Author:
Luzi Hail, Ahmed Tahoun, and Clare Wang
Publication Date:
12-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
Are regulatory interventions delayed reactions to market failures or can regulators proactively pre-empt corporate misbehavior? From a public interest view, we would expect “effective” regulation to ex ante mitigate agency conflicts between corporate insiders and outsiders, and prevent corporate misbehavior from occurring or quickly rectify transgressions. However, regulators are also self-interested and may be captured, uninformed, or ideological, and become less effective as a result. In this registered report, we develop a historical time series of corporate (accounting) scandals and (accounting) regulations for a panel of 26 countries from 1800 to 2015. An analysis of the lead-lag relations at both the global and individual country level yields the following insights: (i) Corporate scandals are an antecedent to regulation over long stretches of time, suggesting that regulators are typically less flexible and informed than firms. (ii) Regulation is positively related to the incidence of future scandals, suggesting that regulators are not fully effective, that explicit rules are required to identify scandalous corporate actions, or that new regulations have unintended consequences. (iii) There exist systematic differences in these lead-lag relations across countries and over time suggesting that the effectiveness of regulation is shaped by fundamental country characteristics like market development and legal tradition.
Topic:
Economics, Law, Regulation, Finance, Capital, and Fraud
Political Geography:
Global Focus

5. The Personal Wealth Interests of Politicians and the Stabilization of Financial Markets

Author:
Ahmed Tahoun and Laurence van Lent
Publication Date:
10-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
We examine whether personal wealth interests affect politicians’ decisions about stabilizing financial markets. We use the setting of the government’s support of financial institutions under the 2008 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act. We find that the personal wealth interests of politicians are positively associated with voting in favor of the EESA. We implement several analyses to show that personal wealth interests rather than unobservable beliefs in the financial sector explain our result.
Topic:
Financial Markets, Economic Stability, Economic Crisis, and Wealth
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

6. Political Lending

Author:
Ahmed Tahoun and Florin P. Vasvari
Publication Date:
08-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
Using a unique dataset provided by the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), we document a direct channel through which financial institutions contribute to the net worth of members of the U.S. Congress, particularly those sitting on the finance committees in the Senate and the House of Representatives. These individuals report greater levels of leverage and new liabilities as a proportion of their total net worth, relative to when they are not part of the finance committee or relative to other congressional members. Politicians increase new liabilities by over 30% of their net worth in the first year of their finance committee membership. We do not find similar patterns for members of non-finance powerful committees. We find no evidence that finance committee members arrange new personal liabilities ahead of their appointments to the committees. Finance committee members also report liabilities with lower interest rates and longer maturities. Finally, focusing on banks that lend to U.S. Congress members, we find that the weaker performing financial institutions lend to more finance committee members and provide more new debt to these politicians. Our findings suggest that lenders may create political connections with finance committee members in an attempt to obtain regulatory benefits. !
Topic:
Debt, Institutions, Fiscal Policy, Political Class, and Banking
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America