52311. Explaining Political Corruption: An Institutional-Choice Approach
- Author:
- Michael w. Collier
- Publication Date:
- 02-1999
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- International Studies Association
- Abstract:
- This paper presents and institutional-choice model that addresses the problem of political corruption, the abuse of public office for private gain. The institutional-choice model first employs a rational-choice game, and then through a constructivist analyses links the game solutions to a surrounding institutional structure that influences agent decisions. This paper models political corruption as a coordination game among a state's ruling elite and citizen groups—a game with multiple solutions that reveal the range of corruption expected among states. A constructivist theory of rules is then used to build the causal mechanisms explaining the domestic and international causes of political corruption. The paper highlights the need to build self-enforcing mechanisms to police the conduct of public officials.This paper presents and institutional-choice model that addresses the problem of political corruption, the abuse of public office for private gain. The institutional-choice model first employs a rational-choice game, and then through a constructivist analyses links the game solutions to a surrounding institutional structure that influences agent decisions. This paper models political corruption as a coordination game among a state's ruling elite and citizen groups—a game with multiple solutions that reveal the range of corruption expected among states. A constructivist theory of rules is then used to build the causal mechanisms explaining the domestic and international causes of political corruption. The paper highlights the need to build self-enforcing mechanisms to police the conduct of public officials.
- Topic:
- International Relations and Politics