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  • Author: Virginie Coulloudon
  • Publication Date: 08-2003
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
  • Abstract: One of the main difficulties in examining corruption both under the Soviet regime and in post-Soviet Russia lies in its definition. Ever since Yurii Andropov launched systematic anticorruption campaigns in the late 1970s and raised the level of awareness of this social disease, all Soviet and Russian leaders have emphasized the necessity of eradicating corruption without really clarifying what particular phenomenon they had in mind. When analyzing Russian corruption, one is surprised to see how many forms it takes: from rule evasion and bribe taking to rent-seeking, abuses of power, embezzlement, bureaucratic extortion, and insider dealing. Adding to this already complex picture, the causes of such infringements of the law and endemic corruption are perceived differently in different contexts – whether under the Soviet regime or in post-Soviet Russia, or if such actions were motivated by the necessity to survive in an economically and politically hostile environment or merely by a thirst for personal gain.
  • Topic: Government
  • Political Geography: Russia
  • Author: Oleg Bukharin
  • Publication Date: 08-2003
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
  • Abstract: Two factors were of critical significance in shaping the international peace and security agenda after the Cold War: the emergence of nuclear security and proliferation dangers in the wake of the Soviet collapse, and the unprecedented level of cooperation between Russia and other countries to address these problems. As a result of cooperative international and Russia's domestic efforts, important progress has been made in recent years in reducing nuclear arsenals, protecting Russia's nuclear materials, and preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons expertise from Russia. Much work, however, remains to be done.
  • Topic: International Relations, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons
  • Political Geography: Russia
  • Author: Svante Cornell
  • Publication Date: 08-2003
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
  • Abstract: Ethnopolitical conflict has, especially since the early 1990s, been a growing source of concern in the international arena. Having grown since the 1960s, it culminated after the cold war with the eruption of conflict in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Ethnic mobilization among minority populations in multiethnic states has often led to demands for self-rule or to secession. Especially in defined geographical areas where minorities are compactly settled, the creation of a separate state is seen as a feasible goal and control over territory often becomes a chief issue of conflict. Many theorists have found that solutions involving regional autonomy are effective in dealing with ethnic conflict. Ted Gurr, for example, has argued that "negotiated regional autonomy has proved to be an effective antidote for ethnopolitical wars of secession in Western and Third World States." Regional autonomy implies the introduction of ethnoterritoriality - linking territorial control to ethnicity. This is the case either when a region is explicitly created as a homeland for an ethnic group or when a minority group constitutes a large majority of the population of an autonomous state structure and perceives it as its own. Advocates of ethnofederalism argue that autonomy solutions are effective conflict-resolving mechanisms and that further federalization of multiethnic states along ethnic lines will help prevent ethnic conflict. In some of the literature, ethnofederalism has been characterized as what David Meyer terms a "cure-all prescription" for ethnic tensions. There is, however, considerable reason to argue that the institution of territorial autonomy may be conducive not to interethnic peace and cooperation but may in fact foster ethnic mobilization, increased secessionism, and even armed conflict.
  • Topic: Ethnic Conflict, Sovereignty
  • Political Geography: Europe, Caucasus, Soviet Union, Yugoslavia
  • Author: Sonia Ben Ouagrham
  • Publication Date: 08-2003
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
  • Abstract: Since September 11th, the American anthrax-laced letters and the war in Afghanistan have revived the interest of government officials, researchers and the general public to the state and security of former biological weapon (BW) facilities in the Former Soviet Union (FSU). In the popular press, reports of the general economic crisis and the political unrest that characterize FSU countries tend to emphasize the proliferation threat from these countries. Very little is said, however, about the nuances of this threat, its nature and degree of probability. Some reports tend to overestimate the number of employees at former BW facilities, thus inflating the risks of brain drain. While at the same time, other major sources of proliferation, such as the diversion of pathogens or the illicit transfer of specialized equipment are usually ignored. The present paper aims to characterize more precisely the threat stemming from former BW facilities in the FSU by determining what type of resources are available at former BW facilities and to what extent they are accessible to states of concern or terrorist groups. Although the existing open source information enables us to determine more clearly the categories of personnel, the type of equipment and material that pose the greatest proliferation threat, it does not measure properly the extent of the threat, i.e. an inventory of past and present facilities, expertise, equipment and material. Nevertheless, we can conclude that specialized knowledge, equipment and dangerous pathogens are available at former BW facilities in the FSU and can become accessible to state or non-state actors wishing to start or develop covert BW programs. This is particularly true in Central Asia, where economic and security factors, associated with the geographic characteristics of this region all converge to form a chain of proliferation: seekers of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their related technologies, potential suppliers and deliverers.
  • Topic: Sovereignty, Weapons of Mass Destruction
  • Political Geography: Afghanistan, Russia, America, Central Asia
  • Author: Oleksiy Melnyk, Ian Anthony, Alyson J. K. Bailes
  • Publication Date: 11-2003
  • Content Type: Policy Brief
  • Institution: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
  • Abstract: In 1989, the year when the death knell sounded for the Communist bloc in Europe and for the 'cold war' which it had pursued with the West, a total of 6–7.6 million personnel depending on the method of counting (2.5–3.7 million from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, and 3.5–3.9 million from the Warsaw Treaty Organization, WTO) stood in arms within the European theatre. This included some 915 000 forces stationed outside their national borders inter alia from Canada, the Soviet Union and the United States. In the same area there were 80 400 main battle tanks, 76 300 armoured combat vehicles (ACVs), 67 700 heavy artillery pieces, 11 160 combat aircraft and 2615 attack helicopters—as well as many millions of smaller and lighter weapons. Aimed at each other as part of the East–West strategic confrontation, the USA and the USSR in 1990 deployed 10 563 and 10 271 strategic nuclear warheads respectively, while the United Kingdom possessed 300 and France 621. In addition, significant proportions of European territory (especially in the 'front-line' states such as the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, GDR) were taken up by military bases, exercise areas and other facilities such as airfields and pipelines. Large sectors of industry and of scientific, technological, and research and development (R) work were devoted to the needs of military defence. The resources involved were shut out from peaceful, civilian use more emphatically than would normally be the case today, because the bitterness of the strategic confrontation—and the associated risks of espionage and subversion—imposed a degree of secrecy often creating a situation where the citizens of a given state did not know what was happening on their own territory.
  • Topic: NATO, Politics, Sovereignty
  • Political Geography: Russia, Europe, Ukraine
  • Author: Jean Pascal Zanders, John Hart, Frida Kulah, Richard Guthrie
  • Publication Date: 10-2003
  • Content Type: Policy Brief
  • Institution: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
  • Abstract: Since the end of military action in Iraq and the formation of the Coalition Provisional Authority in May 2003, most debate on the future of Iraq has focused on the short-term problems of governance, internal security and economic reconstruction in that country. In addition to the immediate problems, there is also a need to address long-term issues, such as what role Iraq will play in multilateral bodies. Although some issues can only be resolved in the long term, others will require initial decisions to be taken in the near future. In the very long term (measured in terms of decades) there is no option other than for Iraq to be involved in multilateral controls on chemical weapons (CW). However, in the medium term (measured in years) it is unclear what the best method would be to take Iraq from its current situation—as an occupied state with, at the very least, a past CW programme of which knowledge is incomplete—to a new situation where an Iraqi Government commits Iraq to membership of and adherence to multilateral disarmament regimes.
  • Topic: Arms Control and Proliferation, Human Welfare, Weapons of Mass Destruction
  • Political Geography: Iraq, Arab Countries
  • Author: Siemon T. Wezeman
  • Publication Date: 08-2003
  • Content Type: Policy Brief
  • Institution: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
  • Abstract: In December 1991, in Resolution 46/36 L, the United Nations General Assembly established the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA), a 'universal and non-discriminatory Register of Conventional Arms' to which nations were invited to report annually, on a voluntary basis, their imports and exports of certain types of conventional weapons during the previous calendar year. The main purpose of the Register was stated as being 'to prevent excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms'. Resolution 46/36 L also mentioned as goals: (a) implementing new confidence-building measures, (b) the reduction of arms transfers (which by the mid-1980s had reached their highest level since 1950), (c) addressing the problem of the illicit and covert arms trade, including its effects on human rights, (d) reducing the burden placed by arms acquisitions on countries' economies, and (e) the reduction of military expenditures. In practical terms, nations were to start reporting in 1992 on weapons delivered in 1991, and the process was to be reviewed periodically by a group of government experts to consider the need for improvement.
  • Topic: Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Human Welfare, United Nations
  • Author: Zdzislaw Lachowski, Björn Hagelin, Sam Perlo-Freeman, Petter Stålenheim, Dmitri Trofimov, Alyson J. K. Bailes
  • Publication Date: 07-2003
  • Content Type: Policy Brief
  • Institution: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
  • Abstract: The international attention paid to the nations of the South Caucasus region and Central Asia—a group of post-Soviet states beyond Europe's conventional frontiers but included in the Conference on/Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE)—has been fitful at best over the past decade. During the last years of the 20th and at the start of the 21st century, after the conflicts in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh became (at least partly) 'frozen', security concerns about the regions tended to decline and to become overshadowed both by 'oil diplomacy' and by concern about developments within Russia itself, in Chechnya and Dagestan. In 2002–2003 a constellation of changes in the outside world has started to reverse this pattern. Chechnya is no longer a regular topic of high-level political debate between Russia and the West, and President Vladimir Putin has played the anti-terrorist card with some success to secure his freedom to deal with it as an internal security matter. The factors prompting greater international attention to Russia's south-western and southern neighbours, by contrast, have the potential to undermine—perhaps for good—any Russian pretension to decisive influence or an exclusive droit de regard in these regions. At the time of writing, however, this latest shift could again be called in question by a new diversion of focus to the 'greater Middle East' following hostilities in Iraq.
  • Topic: Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation
  • Political Geography: Russia, Iraq, Europe, Central Asia, Caucasus, Middle East, Asia, Soviet Union
  • Author: Ekaterina Stepanova
  • Publication Date: 06-2003
  • Content Type: Policy Brief
  • Institution: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
  • Abstract: Since the tragic events of 11 September 2001, much has been said about potential links between the fight against terrorism and peace-building. In the meantime, the fight against terrorism and peace-building have, by and large, continued to be implemented separately and by different sets of actors. The events of 11 September might have led the world's leading states to reassess terrorism as a security threat, but could hardly fundamentally alter the nature of peace-building operations and tasks, from institution- and democracy-building to post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. It is not surprising that the way the threat of terrorism is addressed by actors involved in peace-building activities is often limited to its possible effect on the security environment for their operations. It is thus seen as a problem to be solved either by the security component of the mission, or by an ad hoc international security force, or by national security structures (if any). A certain reserve towards the fight against terrorism on the part of the peace-building community is not without foundation, and may be seen as a natural reaction to the declaration after 11 September 2001 of a global 'war on terrorism' which goes far beyond traditional anti-terrorist priorities and needs. In fact, many of the adverse effects of this global campaign stem precisely from a lack of clarity about its nature and operational goals.
  • Topic: Security, Peace Studies, Terrorism
  • Author: Dwight Ink
  • Publication Date: 12-2003
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: The National Academy of Public Administration
  • Abstract: My comments on donor policies that increase vulnerability to corruption grow out of experience of directing the Agency for International Development programs in the Western Hemisphere, as well as assessing USAID missions in Africa, the Near East, and Asia. Following this work, I headed a non-profit organization, the Institute of Public Administration, which has been heavily involved in the transition of countries in Europe and Asia from dictatorships to market economies and democratic societies. I should point out, however, that my background is in management, not banking or economics.
  • Topic: Development, Non-Governmental Organization, Poverty, Third World
  • Political Geography: Africa, Europe, Asia